



ICCRTS Panel



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Task Force Fury – 4/82 ABN

Operation Enduring Freedom X


AUG 09 to SEP 10

COL Brian M. Drinkwine

The overall classification of this briefing in UNCLASSIFIED

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TF Fury Mission & C2/Evolutions



C2 (Unity of Vision/Command)

- NATO TACON/US OPCON
- Fury TAC ISO RCW, C2 TF Pro & 3F and synchronize – coordinate (SOF)
- Fury Main at KAF ISO RCS, C2 STB, BSB, 504MP, TF2F, TF1F, PRTs, and SFATs (x 6 O6/O5s)
- ADHOC BDE C2: CTZ Tac II in Zabul: then CTKC in Kandahar, ADTF West in RCW

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ORG for Combat Decisions

- Command & Control (17 sub-CMDs, 5800 people)/Partner w/80,000 Afghans
- Resource TFs, SFATs and COISTs
- 3 x BCT C2 Nodes (temp 4th in Kandahar)
- Heavy LNO Network (Intel/Ops) at every level (NATO units, SOF, KIFC etc)
- Embedding in RC Staffs
- Reachback to the best of our ability
- UAV Plt in West (Center – North)
- MICO ISO of TAC in West
- *Be agile enough to force generate*
- *Who/how to Partner (no set solution because requirements varied)*

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- Missioned to OIF/remissioned to OEF on 3 APR 09 (at MRE)
- Training BDE / CSTC-A (Must be better)
- IJC & NTMA- Standup / Standdown 2BCT Concept
- SFA & COIN w/wo Battlespace
- *Who Do You Work For?*

Fury 6 Commander's Visualization - 4th Qtr


4-82 ABN Mission: Task Force Fury conducts security force assistance with Afghan National Security Forces (ANA, ANP, ABP, ANCOF) in cooperation with coalition partner units and other actors, to build ANSF capacity to defeat insurgents (INS)/criminals (CRIM) in order to protect the Afghan people, provide for a secure environment for sustainable stability, and enhance the development and legitimacy of Government of the Islamic Republic Afghanistan (GIROA).

Purpose: Increase capability, grow capacity, improve competency & credibility, and then sustain the overall effectiveness of ANSF throughout our Operational Environment, in support of the RC-West & RC-South campaign objectives.


Key Tasks (Through – With – By):

- *(with our ANSF) conduct Population Centric COIN (Counterinsurgency)*
- *Separate, disrupt/interdict INS from the Population (physically and psychologically)*
- *Freedom of Movement along main economic corridors*
- *SFA: Build, Equip, and Sustain ANSF units (Capacity Building)*
- *SFA: Advise, Assist, Train and Enable ANSF*
- *Conduct Combined Action with ANSF, improve competency and trust with the people*
- *Transform the environment through Unified Action to enhance GIROA, increase development and reduce abuse of power, corruption and negative influencers*
- *Continue to assess our Operational Environments (OE), Afghan partners and ourselves*
- *Remain an agile, adaptive and learning organization (get better every day)*

4-82 Main Effort ANSF Partnership Model




- Align units with ANA, ANP, ABP organizations
 - Companies and Battalions mentor and C2 subordinate advising elements
 - Mentor/Advising teams require MOS augmentation (Log, Admin, Intel, and Maintenance)
 - LNO required with B-Space owner/partnered forces
- All elements of BCT have advisor/mentor role (BSTB/BSB)



Success is defined by the enduring capability/capacity retained by the ANSF

CTZ Integration Concept



Moving from Embedded Partnership to Integrated Partnership through
Combined Action (Security) and Unified Action (Governance, Development, Sec, Information)


MOBILE DIPLOMACY

Mobile Diplomacy consisted of Leaders throughout 4BCT traveling via aircraft to geographically separated locations to conduct Key Leader Engagements with individuals who previously had been isolated as a result of route and trafficability. These diplomatic engagements were instrumental in establishing the relations necessary to enhance the BDE's Security and COIN Mission.



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Kandahar Dynamics (Peel the Onion Apr 10)




Stakeholders
 CTKC
 KPRT
 ISAF & IJC & RCS
 GIRoA
 DOS/USAID
 ANSF
 TFK (CAN)
 TF Strike (2/101)
 525 BFSB
 2SCR
 SOF & OGA
 NGOs

Ops/Targeting
 (C3)

Collection/CCIR
 (C2)

Desired Outputs
COP "Dashboard"
 CTKC Daily INTSUM
 SIGSUM - HUMSUMs
 HVT/HPTL Weekly
 Effects FRAGO Weekly
 FFIR/CCIR SIGACTs Postings
 CTKC WiseWeb Portal
 Assessment/RODEA

CTKC COIN Information Management (Collect – Fuse – Understand - Decide)




Shareholders
 OCC
 Unit Reports
 Afghan Media
 UNAMA
 KPRT
 CA & PSYOP
 KFC
 KIFC
 SOIC
 CJIATF
 OGA
 ISAF SOF
 CAAT Tm/AWG
 ANSF Dev (OCD)
 NGOs
 Expats/Others

Inputs/Feedback
 OCC
 Units
 Afghan Media
 Intl Media
 KLEs
 Reports
 SBs
 Patrol Debriefs
 Meetings
 Workgroups
 CCIR/Routine reports

Comprehensive understanding for comprehensive operations

Concept of Operations


Combined Team KANDAHAR City (CTKC) as an integrated team in full partnership with ANSF, joint, interagency and multi-national organizations, conducts population centric comprehensive counterinsurgency (COIN) in key terrain to neutralize the insurgency and increase the competency, capacity and credibility of Afghan institutions to achieve stability and security in Kandahar and to connect with the Afghan people.



Challenge 1: Knowledge Fusion

What is the standard and who owns the Network?

- Operational OCC-K and OCC-R, NDS, ANSF and ISAF intelligence representatives meet daily to share intelligence and compile daily intelligence summaries for release to both ISAF and the Government of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA).
- The current RIG and Provincial JICB will be combined to form a weekly coordination meeting held between senior ISAF, NDS and ANSF intelligence representatives at both Provincial and Regional level to coordinate and synchronise Regional and Provincial intelligence collection and analytical efforts in line with operational requirements.
- ANSF and NDS intelligence reports will be fused with ISAF reports with the aim of increasing the quality of combined intelligence products releasable to GIROA and for dissemination to all elements of the Combined Team (CT).
- ISAF partners to ANSF and NDS will seek to ensure that intelligence officers continue to receive appropriate levels of intelligence training.



Challenge 2: Tyranny of C2

How are we leveraging the Leader insights and lessons?


Train for Combat – MCS/CPOF for our Common Operational Picture (COP) and SATCOM for the tactical fight. BCT and Battalion Portals is how we trained and were designed for information management. Quick storyboards to capture the 5W's and rapidly disseminate lessons learned across the formation.

Reality on the Ground – BCT is backboned off of two strategic networks, access to portals below Bns is non-existent. Email becomes the C2 net because it will eventually get through. 7 Days and 700 Emails.

What We Did –

Reconfigure and streamline. Created the Fury ring to link Senior leaders, allow for collaboration of key lessons and dialogue across the formation.

Fury Ring (in stride solution)



COIST/Fusion – Center of Gravity

(Must invest with people, time and resources)



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Challenge 3: Knowledge Fusion Enterprise

What it was – What it could be?

Fury Challenges:

- Most spread-out decentralized BCT – operating in platoons and small SFATs
- Every unit needs access to Data on the move (mounted and dismounted) (data was at fixed sites)
- TiGRNET – CIDNE – CPOF - BIOMETRICS (Did not talk or share information) – bandwidth challenge
- Requirement tripled for Data/SIPR access – equipment available but no extra trained users

Mission Command & Situational Understanding:

- Most ambiguous and complex environment
- Unified Vision and CDR's Intent understood and nested
- Decentralized, empowered, resourced accountable formations (US/Coalition/HN partners)
- Fuse information – top to bottom/time and bandwidth are your friction points
- *But: Who can link all inputs and analyze/fuse and what is real time vs after the fact knowledge*

Can We leverage what is available today in the open market?

Build the Network: Verizon, T-Mobile or ATT/IPHONE.

- Common language and protocols
- Data, Data, Data - - - where is it stored and who knows?

Here come the APPS:

- Prioritize APPs for warfighting functions (Maneuver, Fires...., and all type of key terrain)
- Power of all INTs fused and analyzed in present time (time sensitive – but pull previous information)
- Merging of unclassified to classified – integration of NGO, IGO and Unified Action Partners
- Must be mobile and scalable – and reduced size so the leader on the ground has it in the fight
- Seek user feedback – upgrade over time V1.1, 1.2, 1.3 and so on

Stakeholders vs Shareholders

- Shareholders – part of the enterprise want positive outcomes and measured improvement
- Stakeholders – the people on the ground whose lives depend on the information

Final Thoughts Mission Command

- Build consensus early – founded on trust and the team buying into the enterprise approach – rapidly integrate new teammates
- Subordinate approaches and visualization must be nested
- Don't allow Doctrine to be a crutch – continue to assess/learn
- Art of Mission Command is ahead of the Science
- Cannot command/fight through Email – must strive to have a common “Dashboard” for CDRs – Staffs, Sub-units, others
- Be relevant and agile – build and generate new capabilities and capacity (help your boss/higher HQ solve problems)
- Intel, Info and Operations – can no longer be separate – all interwoven and part of a system of systems
- Knowledge Enterprise – who really owns it?
- Risk Taking – decentralize and empower till it hurts (ex clearing fires)
- Be inclusive and transparent & invest in your liaison network
- Key is to be right more than you are wrong – if you fail, fail quickly and adapt

Questions

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Challenge 4: Human Terrain

Is this the best we can do?

P – Democratically elected officials versus tribal leadership; government reach limited

M – Illegally armed groups versus National Army and Police - diverse security apparatus with limited C2 from national command

E – Narco trafficking versus a developing market economy

S – Diverse demographic; 85% Sunni /15% Shiite; Pashtun Wali stronger than adherence to official laws

I – Limited infrastructure in urban areas versus a predominantly disconnected rural population

I – Information disseminated through sermons and tribal leadership; lack of literate public empowers elite and religious personalities



Tribal Breakdown

41	Pashtun Tribes -	8 major
02	Tajik Tribes -	1 major
11	Hazara Tribes -	5 major

 Ethnic Group

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