



# **NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL**

**MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA**

## **THESIS**

**THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD AND MODERN  
EDUCATION: HOW WILL THE MUSLIM  
BROTHERHOOD ADDRESS EGYPT'S FAILING  
EDUCATION SYSTEM?**

by

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September 2012

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HOW WILL THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD  
ADDRESS EGYPT'S FAILING EDUCATION SYSTEM?**

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requirements for the degree of

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(MIDDLE EAST, ASIA, AND SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA)**

from the

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## **ABSTRACT**

The education system of Egypt has always reflected the type of society and national identity the political leadership wanted to establish. Every time a change in political leadership has occurred, a corresponding shift also occurred in the education policy and its structure. This thesis attempts to determine if another shift in the education system will occur now that the Muslim Brotherhood has gained power in the Egyptian government. This paper establishes many truths about the way the Muslim Brotherhood will proceed now that it has significant control over the Egyptian education system. First, the education system in Egypt is in dire need of reform to increase equality among rich and poor and to improve the overall quality of the system. Second, the Muslim Brotherhood intends to reform the education system primarily to improve the effectiveness of the system and increase access to people of all levels of income. In addition, the Muslim Brotherhood hopes to increase religious instruction, but that is not its primary goal. Third, the Muslim Brotherhood cannot act unilaterally in changing the education system and instead must work with the Egyptian military, other political groups and the United States.

The last important aspect established is that education is not the priority of the new government because other issues, such as security and revitalizing the economy, are considered more important. It is, therefore, most likely that the Muslim Brotherhood will proceed with incremental changes to the education system in the near future. Although education will not be a priority, the Muslim Brotherhood will take small steps to improve the quality of the education system. As in Turkey, once the Muslim Brotherhood has solidified its position in the government, it may proceed to increase Islamic instruction. Even if religious instruction is increased, it will be a moderate version of Islam and not inhibit the teaching of secular subjects.

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## **LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS**

|        |                                                                 |
|--------|-----------------------------------------------------------------|
| AK     | Justice and Development                                         |
| AKP    | Justice and Development Party                                   |
| CCIMD  | Center for Curriculum and Instructional Materials Development   |
| CDC    | Career Development Center                                       |
| FJP    | Freedom and Justice Party                                       |
| GDP    | Gross Domestic Product                                          |
| HEEP   | Higher Education Enhancement Project                            |
| IMF    | International Monetary Fund                                     |
| NGO    | Non-Governmental Organization                                   |
| OECD   | Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development's         |
| QAAP   | Quality Assurance and Accreditation Project                     |
| RCC    | Revolutionary Command Council                                   |
| SCAF   | Supreme Council of the Armed Forces                             |
| TIMSS  | Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study           |
| UNESCO | United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization |
| USAID  | United States Agency for International Development              |

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To my loving wife Lilas, without her support and understanding, this thesis would not have been possible.

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## **I. INTRODUCTION**

### **A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION**

The education system of Egypt has always reflected the type of society and national identity the political leadership wanted to establish. Every time a change in political leadership occurs in Egypt, a corresponding shift in the education policy and its structure has also happened. From Muhammad Ali to Hosni Mubarak, the education system of Egypt has mirrored the direction the government wants the country and society to take. This thesis attempts to determine if another shift in the education system will occur since the Muslim Brotherhood has gained power in the Egyptian government. This potential shift in the Egyptian education system is dependent on three variables. The first variable is the level of importance the Muslim Brotherhood places on education compared to other concerns, such as security and the economy, given that the Egyptian government has limited financial resources. The second variable is the direction the Muslim Brotherhood hopes to take with education, whether it focuses on improving equality and efficiency or emphasizes increasing the amount of religious studies. The third variable is how other forces in the government and society, whether they are secularists, international actors, Salafist or the military, will restrict the ability of the Muslim Brotherhood to implement their educational plans fully. In short, the purpose of this thesis is to consider how the new Egyptian government led by the Muslim Brotherhood may implement its education policy and if it will differ significantly from the status quo.

### **B. IMPORTANCE**

The education system that the Muslim Brotherhood implements in Egypt is important for two reasons. First, the continued improvement of the Egyptian education system is paramount for ensuring development within Egypt. The Egyptian education system became unequal, inefficient and ineffective over the past 40 years and is in

desperate need of increased attention and funding from the Egyptian government.<sup>1</sup> If the Egyptian government does not improve the education system and begin developing the human capital necessary to drive the Egyptian economy, then the lack of economic growth and development will persist. The inability of recent college and high school graduates to acquire employment following education is a cause of instability within Egypt and can be partially solved by developing an education system that provides the necessary skills to its graduates.<sup>2</sup> Better education only fixes the supply problem of the unemployment crisis, at the same time, the government must implement sound economic policy that establishes stability and encourages growth to affect the demand side of the unemployment equation. The economic policy of the Egyptian government is beyond the scope of this research proposal, but an economic policy that complements a shift in education policy is absolutely necessary.

The second reason the Muslim Brotherhood's education policy is important is it may significantly alter the volume and nature of religious instruction that occurs in schools. Religion is currently only a small part of the curriculum that accounts for three hours of the school week on the primary level and two hours of the school week on the preparatory and secondary levels.<sup>3</sup> Based on its historical view of education, it would appear that the Muslim Brotherhood would seek to expand religious education greatly and reduce secular instruction.<sup>4</sup> A radical shift in the amount, and more importantly, the version of Islam taught in the Egyptian schools, could significantly jeopardize the strategic relationship that the United States has with Egypt and disrupt internal stability.

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<sup>1</sup> The World Bank, *Arab Republic of Egypt Improving Quality, Equality, and Efficiency in the Education Sector: Fostering a Competent Generation of Youth*, Human Development Department Middle East and North Africa Region (June 29, 2007): 28.

<sup>2</sup> National Center for Educational Statistics, "Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study 2007," (n.d.), [http://nces.ed.gov/timss/table07\\_3.asp](http://nces.ed.gov/timss/table07_3.asp).

<sup>3</sup> Saeeda Shah, "Educational Leadership: An Islamic Perspective," *British Educational Research Journal* 32, no. 3 (June 2006): 377.

<sup>4</sup> Ehud Rosen, "The Muslim Brotherhood's Concept of Education," in *Current Trends in Islamist Ideology* 7, ed. Hillel Fradkin, Eric Brown, and Hassan Mneimneh (Hudson Institute, 2008): 120.

### C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES

Governments often use the education system to shape the citizens and society that they want to govern; thus, the Muslim Brotherhood would like to introduce an education system that reflects its version of an ideal Egyptian society. To determine the Muslim Brotherhood's views on what constitutes the ideal Egyptian society, and in turn, its ideal education system, a thorough examination of its educational policies is analyzed. No consensus exists in the literature on how the Muslim Brotherhood will treat education in Egypt now that it is in power.<sup>5</sup> It is important to note that while the Muslim Brotherhood controls the presidency and will likely gain a sizable portion of the seats in the People's Assembly (it held 47% (235 of 498) of the seats before it was dissolved), it may have to compromise with other political parties and cannot act unilaterally.

A comparison can be made between the Justice and Development (AK) Party in Turkey and its education policy and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt to generate potential hypotheses. The AK party won an unanticipated landslide victory in 2002, similar to the Muslim Brotherhood's electoral victory in 2011. The AK Party, like the Muslim Brotherhood, is a conservative political party that promotes an increased Islamic identity in a state founded on secularism.<sup>6</sup> The AK Party has been slow to initiate education reform; however, its religious ideology is far less pronounced than that of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt.<sup>7,8</sup>

This thesis explores three potential outcomes of the Muslim Brotherhood's increased role in determining Egypt's education policy. The first potential hypothesis is that the Muslim Brotherhood will not alter the trajectory of the Egyptian education system and will instead focus on other issues or be limited by other parties that have power in the government. This scenario may occur because the Muslim Brotherhood will

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<sup>5</sup> The Freedom and Justice Party, "Election Program the Freedom and Justice Party Egypt Parliamentary Elections 2011," 2011.

<sup>6</sup> BBC News, "Turkey Country Profile," March 22, 2012, [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/country\\_profiles/1022222.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/country_profiles/1022222.stm).

<sup>7</sup> Murat Somer, "Moderate Islam and Secularist Opposition in Turkey: Implications for the World, Muslims and Secular Democracy," *Third World Quarterly* 28, no. 7 (2007): 1277.

<sup>8</sup> Soon-Yong Pak, "Cultural Politics and Vocational Religious Education: The Case of Turkey," *Comparative Education* 40, no. 3 (August 2004): 321.

be cautious and concentrate more on solidifying their political position within Egypt prior to making any significant changes. This scenario could also occur due to budget shortfalls within the government that limit its ability to institute cost prohibitive reforms.<sup>9</sup> The current government is faced with economic and security concerns that may take precedent and inhibit the government from altering the school system. This hypothesis recognizes that the Muslim Brotherhood may want to change the education system to fit its views of an ideal Islamic society better, but does not have the political capital to do so in the near future. The Muslim Brotherhood may also continue to implement the same policies of the previous regime because the current education system reflects its view of society.

The second hypothesis, and the most potentially detrimental to Egyptian stability and U.S.' security concerns, is the Muslim Brotherhood-led government reduces the amount of secular education taught and drastically increases Islamic centered instruction. Religion is currently part of the current Egyptian curriculum, but plays a minor role that accounts for two to three hours of instruction per week depending on grade level.<sup>10</sup> Since its founding, the Muslim Brotherhood has expressed its desire to develop a more Islamic society through education.<sup>11</sup> The Muslim Brotherhood will be under pressure from its grass-root supporters, as well as the ultra-conservative Salafists in the Al-Nour party, to implement increased religious instruction at the expense of secular instruction.

The third hypothesis, and most beneficial to Egypt and the United States, is that the Muslim Brotherhood-led government immediately works to improve the quality of the education system, but does not change religious education. It would create a system that attempts to eliminate the current inefficiencies and inequities by reducing corruption and increasing public funding to reflect the Muslim Brotherhood's social message of reducing poverty and increasing opportunities for all Egyptians. In addition, increased

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<sup>9</sup> Ahmed Namatalla and Alaa Shahine, "Egypt Current Account Deficit Widens as Tourism, FDI Fall," *Bloomberg News*, July 10, 2012, <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-06-10/egypt-current-account-deficit-widens-as-tourism-fdi-fall-1-.html>.

<sup>10</sup> Bradley James Cook, "Egypt's National Education Debate," *Comparative Education* 36, no. 4 (November 2000): 481.

<sup>11</sup> Meir Hatina, "Restoring a Lost Identity: Models of Education in Modern Islamic Thought," *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 33, no. 2 (November 2006): 181.

government expenditures for an improved education system that does not concern curriculum issues are uncontroversial and are an excellent way of improving the popularity of the Muslim Brotherhood within the Egyptian population. This third potential outcome is also in line with the Muslim Brotherhood's historic support for improvements in social welfare to gain popular support.<sup>12</sup>

One of the major problems with this research is that the situation in Egypt remains extremely dynamic, with the political landscape in constant flux. For example, the way the Muslim Brotherhood decides to form a coalition if a new parliament is created and if it continues to maintain the Presidency, will have a significant effect on the education policy implemented. Secondly, the variable of time plays a significant role. The Muslim Brotherhood may not alter the education system initially, but after solidifying its base and addressing more pressing issues, it could choose to do so in the future, as the AK Party has done in Turkey. To mitigate this problem, this paper concentrates on likely outcomes within the next five years, but not in the long term when variables could change too significantly to account for effectively in a reasonable manner.

## **D. LITERATURE REVIEW**

### **1. History of the Egyptian Education System**

One of the fundamental propositions of this thesis is that previous regimes in Egypt have altered the education system to meet their political and societal objectives. This portion of the literature review establishes this proposition by articulating the various ways previous regimes have matched their objectives to the education system they employed. Muhammad Ali's educational reforms in the early 1800s were limited in scope and only truly hoped to provide enough bureaucrats, engineers and doctors to help support his government and military expansion. He actually feared educating the people beyond the basic level and blamed the recent revolutions in Europe on the fact that they had educated middle classes. These revolutions created a divide between elites who learned languages and Western skills and the masses who continued to learn in schools

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<sup>12</sup> Hesham Al-Awadi, *In Pursuit of Legitimacy: The Muslim Brothers and Mubarak, 1982–2000* (London: Tauris Academic Studies, 2004), 18.

that focused on religion. He also initiated a plan to obtain the new “modern” education by sending students on educational missions in Europe, inviting foreign experts to Egypt, and founding new Westernized schools.<sup>13</sup>

In the nineteenth century, the British viewed Egypt as an object and the people within the country as something they needed to control. The British used the Western education system they introduced as a means to train a better workforce and a population they could easily influence.<sup>14</sup> They were not interested in developing an educated middle class, but just enough educated officials to maximize the commercial value of Egypt for the British Empire. The vast majority of the Egyptian population still failed to receive a formal education.

When Gamal Abdel Nasser assumed power in 1952, the education system of Egypt reflected the deep economic and social divisions that existed throughout the country. The children of the elite received an education and the poor did not. Nasser immediately implemented a new education policy that made education universal, free and equal for all citizens of Egypt.<sup>15</sup> Nasser used the education system as a tool to promote his Arab Nationalist vision of Egypt free from international interference. This system was the first education system introduced in Egypt meant to make the country strong from within and increase the capability of all citizens.<sup>16</sup>

The education system changed again under the leadership of Anwar Sadat into its current state. President Sadat’s open door policy (Infitah), following the 1973 war, radically changed the educational system in Egypt and increased the educational divide between the rich and poor. This system allowed for the establishment of private schools

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<sup>13</sup> Linda Herrera, “Education, Islam, and Modernity: Beyond Westernization and Centralization,” *Comparative Education Review* 48, no. 3 (August 2004): 321.

<sup>14</sup> Andrew Shryock, review of *Putting Islam to Work: Education, Politics, and Religious Transformation in Egypt*, by Gregory Starrett, *American Anthropologist* 102, no. 2 (June 2000): 412.

<sup>15</sup> Nadine Mourad Sika, *Educational Reform in Egyptian Primary Schools Since the 1990s: A Study of the Political Values and Behavior of Sixth Grade Students* (New York: The Edwin Mellen Press, 2010), 38.

<sup>16</sup> Judith Cochran, *Educational Roots of Political Crisis in Egypt* (New York: Lexington Books, 2008), 67.

paid for by private and foreign investors.<sup>17</sup> In addition, it internationalized education and made it more secular. A Western model of education was adopted that minimized the importance of Arabic in favor of English and reduced Islamic instruction. Egypt looked to the West to develop its standards and receive assistance. This section has established the fundamental assumption of this thesis that all previous leaders of Egypt have altered the education system to meet their political and societal goals.

## **2. The Current Egyptian Education System**

Another important assumption of this thesis is the overall lack of effectiveness and equality in the current education system. This section and a subsequent chapter shows a consensus in the literature exists concerning the failure of the Egyptian education system. The World Bank in 2007 determined that many factors were inhibiting the Egyptian education system from properly developing human capital. First, the curriculum and testing structure did not provide and assess skills currently needed in the labor market. Second, the two track system, one traditional the other vocational, exacerbates the gap in academic achievement between rich and poor. Third, the current structure incentivizes students and teachers to participate in the illegal tutoring market that further erodes the credibility of the public education system.<sup>18</sup>

In 2003, Egypt participated in the Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS) for the 8th grade, which allows its academic achievement to be compared to other nations' education systems. Egypt scored an average of 406 in math and 421 in science, which placed Egyptian 8th graders far below the international averages of 467 in math and 474 in science, but above the average for the Middle East and North Africa (MENA).<sup>19</sup> Egyptian 8th graders participated again in 2007. The scores

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<sup>17</sup> Sarah Hartman, "At School We Don't Pay Attention Anyway"—The Informal Market of Education in Egypt and Its Implications," *Sociologus* 58, (2008): 31.

<sup>18</sup> The World Bank, *Arab Republic of Egypt Improving Quality, Equality, and Efficiency in the Education Sector: Fostering a Competent Generation of Youth*, Human Development Department Middle East and North Africa Region (June 29, 2007): 2.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, 9.

were lower than in 2003, 391 in math and 408 in science, which placed Egyptian 8th graders once again below the international average, but above the MENA average.<sup>20</sup>

The poor performance of Egyptian students partially results because most Egyptian teachers are underprepared and unqualified. The ineptitude of Egyptian teachers is caused by a myriad of reasons. Compensation for Egyptian teachers is the lowest in the region relative to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita. In addition, the Egyptian school system has one of the highest teaching to non-teaching ratios in the world (1:1.2).<sup>21</sup> One of the reasons for the high proportion of administrative personnel seems to be the limited number of grades in the pay and promotion scale, which restricts promotion possibilities, and encourages senior teachers to take higher paying jobs as administrators. To compound the problem, no legitimate review system exists for teaching performance. Therefore, the teachers have no incentive to perform at a high level.<sup>22</sup>

### **3. Developments in the Turkish Education System**

The development of the Turkish education provides an apt comparison for the development of the Egyptian education system. Examining how the Turkish system developed following the AK party's coming to power provides a reasonable point of comparison on how the Muslim Brotherhood may proceed in Egypt.<sup>23</sup> The last 20 years in Turkey have been characterized by a public debate on the role of religion in the government fuelled by Islamic resurgence in the face of the secular framework upon which the state has been founded.<sup>24</sup> The November 2002 general elections in Turkey were an historic event in Turkish politics. The media has called it a 'silent revolt' by a

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<sup>20</sup> National Center For Educational Statistics, "Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study 2007."

<sup>21</sup> The World Bank, *Arab Republic of Egypt Improving Quality, Equality, and Efficiency in the Education Sector: Fostering a Competent Generation of Youth*, 29.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid., 30.

<sup>23</sup> Bruce H. Rankina and Isik A. Aytac, "Religiosity, the headscarf, and education in Turkey: an analysis of 1988 data and current implications," *British Journal of Sociology of Education* 29, no. 3 (May 2008): 271.

<sup>24</sup> Pak, "Cultural Politics and Vocational Religious Education: The Case of Turkey," 321.

disgruntled electorate that removed the entrenched political establishment and ushered in a new era of majority rule by AK Party, which has unambiguous Islamist roots.<sup>25</sup> Like Turkey, Egypt will be transferring power from a secular ruler in Hosni Mubarak to the Muslim Brotherhood and Islamist party.

The AK party, after 10 years of being in power, plans to substitute the current eight uninterrupted years of primary school education with four years of middle school. The change will allow ten-year-old children to attend specialist religious schools, known as imam-hatip schools.<sup>26</sup> The reforms are the idea of Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Turkey's powerful prime minister. Mr. Erdogan emphasizes the non-democratic origins of the present education system, introduced in 1997, after the military ejected an Islamist-led government and closed the imam-hatip middle schools by decreeing that children should stay at school for eight years.<sup>27</sup> A similar battle between the military and the Muslim Brotherhood over the role of religion in education could also occur in Egypt because like Turkey, the military and the elected Islamist party are the two most powerful political actors.

#### **4. The Development and History of the Muslim Brotherhood**

The development and history of the Muslim Brotherhood gives insight on how the Muslim Brotherhood will proceed now that it has obtained a substantial amount of power in the government. The literature is divided on the political ambitions of the Brotherhood throughout its history; however, the preponderance of evidence clearly indicates it wanted to be involved in politics, but only on a limited basis.<sup>28</sup> In addition, when the Muslim Brotherhood does get involved in a formal political structure, it has shown the willingness to compromise and cooperate with other political parties. The idea that the

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<sup>25</sup> Pak, "Cultural Politics and Vocational Religious Education: The Case of Turkey," 322.

<sup>26</sup> Daniel Dombey, "Education Reforms Divide Turkey," *Financial Times*, March 14, 2012.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid.

<sup>28</sup> Alison Pargeter, *The Muslim Brotherhood: The Burden of Tradition* (London: SAQI Books, 2010), 43.

Muslim Brotherhood has shunned politics since its founding or that it is unwilling to compromise with other points of views is false.<sup>29</sup>

The new guard beginning to dominate the Muslim Brotherhood has very different views than the old guard that has run the Muslim Brotherhood since its founding.<sup>30</sup> The new guard joined the Muslim Brotherhood in the late 1970s and 1980s and did not suffer through the repression Nasser implemented in the 1950s and 1960s. The new guard mostly emerged from universities, where it dominated campus politics and learned to deal with other parties. This experience in campus politics exposed these members of the new guard to daily interactions with students who had different ideologies and forced them to form alliances and work with these groups that had different political views. This experience has conditioned the new guard to be more open to compromise and more in line with secular politics. The new guard assigns greater importance to secular politics and its willingness to compromise can be seen in the elections in 2005 and 2011, in which it formed alliances with parties on both the right and the left.<sup>31</sup>

The Muslim Brotherhood's new guard represents a more open and cordial approach towards politics that is shaping the overall Muslim Brotherhood policy. It wishes to work with other groups and reach a compromise, even if the other group is non-Islamist. Religious ideology is used to drum up support among the grass roots supporters, but plays a much smaller role in the politics of government. Despite the new guard's push for reform, the old guard continues to control most of the mechanisms of power within the Muslim Brotherhood.<sup>32</sup>

A turning point in the Muslim Brotherhood's political views came in 2004 when the General Guide Ma'mun al-Hudaybi passed away. He had been a staunch proponent of an apolitical Muslim Brotherhood and his death, coupled with the release of many younger members imprisoned for political activities in the 1990s, shifted the Muslim

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<sup>29</sup> Mohammed Zahid and Michael Medley, "Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Sudan," *Review of African Political Economy* 33, no. 110 (September 2006): 703.

<sup>30</sup> Bruce K. Rutherford, "What Do Egypt's Islamists Want? Moderate Islam and the Rise of Islamic Constitutionalism," *Middle East Journal* 60, no. 4 (Autumn 2006): 721.

<sup>31</sup> Zahid and Medley, "Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Sudan," 703.

<sup>32</sup> Pak, "Cultural Politics and Vocational Religious Education: The Case of Turkey," 325.

Brotherhood's stance on politics. The younger generation did not fill the vacancy left in the office of General Guide, but did have two of its most prominent members attain the post of Deputy General Guide, Muhammad Habib and Khayrat al-Shatir. Also, the new General Guide Muhammad Akif supported a new political agenda despite being a member of the old guard.<sup>33</sup>

This shift in political thought came right before the parliamentary elections in 2005. Although it could support only independent candidates, it published documents that revealed its political intentions. The Muslim Brotherhood published its "Reform Initiative" in March 2004 and a Campaign platform in October 2005. These documents emphasized the importance of Sharia law and how it must be used to control leaders. The documents also stressed that the leadership works as an agent (*wakil*) for the people and the people have the right to remove a leader they feel does not represent them properly. Furthermore, the Muslim Brotherhood stated it wanted to reduce the power of the executive in general and increase the power of the judiciary. The parliament should also have increased powers relative to the executive according to these documents.<sup>34</sup>

In the 2005 parliamentary elections, the Muslim Brotherhood gained 88 seats running officially as independents. By this time, the Muslim Brotherhood viewed the parliament as a significant tool for inducing political change in Egypt.<sup>35</sup> These elections were important for the Muslim Brotherhood in preparing for its electoral victory in 2011 because they forced it to prepare detailed proposals and increase its knowledge in all areas of governance. Brotherhood representatives serve on a range of committees that cover economic, educational and social issues. The Brotherhood drew its expertise from its own members who consisted of academics and professionals from various fields, including doctors, lawyers, and scientists. The Muslim Brotherhood also developed an

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<sup>33</sup> Rutherford, "What Do Egypt's Islamists Want? Moderate Islam and the Rise of Islamic Constitutionalism," 721.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*, 721–725.

<sup>35</sup> Samer Shehata and Joshua Stacher, "The Brotherhood Goes to Parliament," *Middle East Report*, no. 240 (Fall 2006): 32–36.

excellent record for researching topics extensively and having a much better record of participating in debates than secular parties.<sup>36</sup>

## **5. Muslim Brotherhood's View on Education**

The Muslim Brotherhood has been consistent in its desire to increase the amount of Islamic education in Egypt to improve the values of society. The focus on education has been present since its founding and continues to play an important role to this day; however, an actual educational policy and how it will be implemented has not been expressed.<sup>37,38</sup> The desire to implement a religious education system fully will also be tempered by the current political environment in Egypt. The Muslim Brotherhood was founded by Hassan al-Banna, an Egyptian school teacher, in 1928. In al-Banna's view, the way to transform Egyptian society was through education. In the first Muslim Brotherhood pamphlet published in 1929, "A Memorandum on religious Education," al-Banna outlined his religious education policy. In this pamphlet, he promoted his belief that the purpose of education was not only to impart knowledge to the student, but also to transform the student into a person whose moral compass was guided by the teachings of the Quran and lived his life by these teachings. Al-Banna consistently criticized the school system in Egypt for its weakness in producing graduates with a lack of basic academic skills and no sense of their religious or historical heritage. He wanted to transform the education system into one that produced competent academic graduates guided by a well-developed sense of Islamic law and customs.<sup>39</sup>

In the schools established by the Muslim Brotherhood, students were not taught just to memorize the Quran and the Sunna, but to internalize their principles and be able to apply them to every aspect of his life. Al-Banna was extremely concerned with providing competent teachers and used the most capable members of the Brotherhood as

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<sup>36</sup> Shehata and Stacher, "The Brotherhood Goes to Parliament," 32–36.

<sup>37</sup> Rosen, "The Muslim Brotherhood's Concept of Education," in *Current Trends in Islamist Ideology* 7, 119.

<sup>38</sup> Hatina, "Restoring a Lost Identity: Models of Education in Modern Islamic Thought," 181–183.

<sup>39</sup> Rosen, "The Muslim Brotherhood's Concept of Education," in *Current Trends in Islamist Ideology* 7, 119.

teachers for the next generation. The early schools of the Muslim Brotherhood were informal and some could be even considered basic prayer circles. By 1935, the Brotherhood had 300 of these informal schools operating throughout Egypt.<sup>40</sup> By the 1940s, the Muslim Brotherhood became more standardized and began to implement a curriculum that taught mathematics, reading, writing, rhetoric and other secular subjects along with religious education. Still, the focus was on Islam and producing students who could spread the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood. The proportion of time spent on mathematics and science was relatively small compared to Islam.<sup>41</sup>

The Muslim Brotherhood believes that Islam is not just a religion, but also a way of life that influences all aspects of a believer's life including education. The aim of Islamic education is to develop humans through knowledge to enable them to follow the path of righteousness, and to become useful members of the community.<sup>42</sup> However, this belief has not translated into a coherent strategy or policy for the Muslim Brotherhood.

#### **E. METHODS AND SOURCES**

An in-depth case study of the Egyptian education system is conducted to discover how it evolved into the current system and how it has been adapted to the needs of the government. Empirical data of the Egyptian and Turkish education system available through the Egyptian Ministry of Education and the TIMSS is used to determine the progress and current state of Egyptian education. Additionally, World Bank, USAID and United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) data is used to determine the level of foreign aid. Secondary sources are also used in this case study, and especially, books written on the effectiveness of foreign aid to Egypt and how the education system should be reformed.

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<sup>40</sup> Rosen, "The Muslim Brotherhood's Concept of Education," *Current Trends in Islamist Ideology* 7, 120.

<sup>41</sup> Ibid., 121.

<sup>42</sup> Shah, "Educational Leadership: An Islamic Perspective," 367.

This paper presents an in-depth case study of the Muslim Brotherhood's historical view of education and sharing political power, and concentrates on primary source documents produced by the Muslim Brotherhood, as well as its voting record as members of parliament. Secondary and tertiary sources, such as journal articles, books, and newspaper articles, are also utilized to determine the historical role and importance education has played with the Muslim Brotherhood. The Quran and secondary sources that explore the relationship between Islam and education are also utilized.

## **II. THE HISTORY OF EGYPTIAN EDUCATION**

This chapter focuses on the history of the education system from Muhammad Ali through Hosni Mubarak. The purpose of this chapter is threefold. First, it further establishes the assumption that all previous Egyptian regimes modified the education system in an effort to create a society and political system they wished to govern. Secondly, the history of the Egyptian education system, especially under Sadat and Mubarak, shows how the flaws in the current system developed. Finally, this chapter illustrates that although the education system changed from regime to regime, some aspects have remained consistent, especially over the last 60 years. The idea of free and universal education is now imbedded in the minds of Egyptians and that aspect of the social contract between the government and the people cannot be broken without severe repercussions.

### **A. MUHAMMAD ALI'S EDUCATION SYSTEM**

A consensus in the literature states that in the nineteenth century, due to the growing British, French and Russian imperialism, an urgency arose among the leaders of Egyptian, Ottoman, and Iranian states to adopt new schooling as a means to reform and modernize their militaries, economies, and state bureaucracies.<sup>43</sup> The Muslim empires also believed that schooling would create an indigenous middle class that could compete with foreigners. The economic success of non-Muslims in Egypt and the Ottoman Empire was partially attributed to the educational advantages they had in language and other skills they received in formal education. These empires felt that in order to compete with the Europeans, they would have to introduce Western schools that would produce a skilled middle class that could compete with the Europeans militarily and economically.<sup>44</sup>

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<sup>43</sup> Linda Herrera, "Education, Islam, and Modernity: Beyond Westernization and Centralization," *Comparative Education Review* 48, no. 3 (August 2004): 320.

<sup>44</sup> Ibid.

When Muhammad Ali (1805–49) took control of Egypt, he initiated a plan to obtain the new modern (European) education by sending students on educational missions in Europe, inviting foreign experts to Egypt, and establishing new Westernized schools. These new schools came under attack from religious leaders for being anti-Islamic. The new methods of learning were said to be anti-Islamic since they shunned oral instruction and memorization for textbooks.<sup>45</sup> Muhammad Ali's educational reforms were limited in scope and only truly hoped to provide enough bureaucrats, engineers and doctors to help support his government and military expansion. These reforms created a divide between elites who learned languages and Western skills and the masses who continued to learn in kuttabs that focused on religion.<sup>46</sup>

Muhammad Ali relied on French advisors to modernize and westernize the military education of Egypt. Muhammad Ali's focus was on military strength to ensure his position as leader of Egypt and to expand his power. In 1821, he conscripted Egyptian peasants to fill the ranks of his army, which reached 130,000 soldiers by 1842. To support such a massive army, he needed a large and well-educated support structure to implement such a massive force. Muhammad Ali focused much of his educational budget on developing the administrators, medical staff and accountants that comprised the support structure.<sup>47</sup>

Muhammad Ali soon realized that even with specialized schools designed to train the administrative and medical positions in the military, the education the people received in the Islamic schools was not preparing them to study secular subjects. Muhammad Ali concluded he could not start secular education with young adults, but instead had to start at a much younger age. By starting at a younger age, a pool of talented and secularly educated young adults to pull from would be created to fill the positions in military schools. Muhammad Ali decided to create a completely new education system because he

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<sup>45</sup> Herrera, "Education, Islam, and Modernity: Beyond Westernization and Centralization," 321.

<sup>46</sup> Caroline Finkel, *The History of the Ottoman Empire: Osman's Dream* (New York: Basic Books, 2005), 443.

<sup>47</sup> Cochran, *Educational Roots of Political Crisis in Egypt*, 37.

felt the pre-existing religious education system would be too difficult to reform.<sup>48</sup> All of Muhammad Ali's educational reforms were a direct result of his desire to build a strong military to secure his political position.

## **B. EDUCATION UNDER THE BRITISH**

The British invaded Egypt in 1882 and assumed control over every aspect of the Egyptian government.<sup>49</sup> Lord Cromer was the British controller-general in Egypt and presided over the occupation of Egypt with absolute authority.<sup>50</sup> The British viewed Egypt as an object and the people within the country as something they needed to control. In the 40 years following the British invasion of 1882, the British implemented an educational system in which a select few from the elite were selected to be trained in English and French language schools to staff the growing bureaucracy. They cut the funding for education to the middle class and the poor.<sup>51</sup> The British at the same time changed the nature of the already established kuttabs, so that those schools would provide education for the masses. The kuttabs were forced to expand their curricula to include subjects other than religion and submit to inspections to receive aid from the British controlled government.<sup>52</sup>

Cromer's priorities in Egypt were to restore its credit and to maintain domestic peace. Cromer did not want the industrial base of Egypt to expand because it may grow to compete with the British. He instead invested heavily in agriculture development, especially cotton.<sup>53</sup> Cromer's focus on agricultural progress led him to reduce the budget for education, which caused the closure of many of the specialized postsecondary

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<sup>48</sup> Cochran, *Educational Roots of Political Crisis in Egypt*, 38.

<sup>49</sup> William L. Cleveland and Martin Bunton, *A History of the Modern Middle East*, 4th ed. (Boulder: Westview Press, 2009), 104.

<sup>50</sup> Ibid.

<sup>51</sup> Hoda A. Yousef, "Reassessing Egypt's Dual System of Education Under Ismail: Growing 'Ilm and Shifting Ground in Egypt's First Educational Journal, Rawdat Al-Madaris," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 40 (2008): 124.

<sup>52</sup> Vickie Langohr, "Colonial Education Systems and the Spread of Local Religious Movements: The Cases of British Egypt and Punjab," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 47, no. 1 (January 2005): 166.

<sup>53</sup> Cleveland and Bunton, *A History of the Modern Middle East*, 104.

schools. Enrollments at the primary and secondary levels also declined.<sup>54</sup> Since Cromer appropriated such a small portion of the budget to the Department of Public Instruction, tuition fees were introduced at all levels of education that severely reduced the number of students who could afford to enroll in school.<sup>55</sup>

Cromer not only restricted access to education for economic reasons, but political factors as well. From his experience in India, he thought if Egyptians were exposed to Western education, especially at the university level, it would create a group of Egyptian intellectuals with a nationalistic spirit and a sense of anger at their inferior status in their own country. Thus, Cromer attempted to confine the Westernized schools to the training of future civil servants and have the majority of primary school graduates go onto vocational training.<sup>56</sup>

The British controlled government showed no desire to establish an expanded public education system due to budgetary issues. By 1907, all education provided by the government required the payment of tuition. Even the elementary schools that were meant to educate all Egyptians could only be attended by the middle class because the poor could not afford them. As the education provided by the government began to shrink, the amount of schools provided by private funds, especially by religious groups, continued to increase, which illustrated demand for education by the Egyptian people; however, the government was not meeting this demand.<sup>57</sup>

### **C. EGYPTIAN EDUCATION BETWEEN 1922 AND 1952**

The British unilaterally declared Egypt's independence in 1922 and gave control of the Egyptian education system back to the Egyptians despite many Brits remaining part of the education structure.<sup>58</sup> Under the British, the goal of the education system was to produce enough government officials to run the country and a docile native population.

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<sup>54</sup> Cleveland and Bunton, *A History of the Modern Middle East*, 106.

<sup>55</sup> Ibid.

<sup>56</sup> Ibid.

<sup>57</sup> Cochran, *Educational Roots of Political Crisis in Egypt*, 42.

<sup>58</sup> Ibid., 51.

After the British gave control of the education system back to Egyptians, the goal was now to educate the entire population; therefore, the education system began to expand and become more standardized.<sup>59</sup> The increase in public schools was made possible by the increase in government spending in education. The number of public schools quadrupled because the government increased the budget for education from 5% in 1923 to 11% in 1953.<sup>60</sup> More students began attending primary school because the government removed fees in 1943 and offered private primary schools subsidies if they would eliminate fees as well. With these increasing regulations, the private schools in Egypt increasingly fell under the control of the government.<sup>61</sup>

The primary task was obtaining a higher literacy rate for a largely illiterate population and providing basic math skills. However, this program was difficult to implement in a largely agrarian society in which families counted on their children to be productive workers. If their children went to school, their families would forfeit not only their labor, but would also have to pay for books and transportation to school. In addition, much of the population viewed elementary education as providing no value added because most men worked in the fields while women worked in the home. The 1923 Egyptian Constitution tackled this problem by making school compulsory and free for all children ages 6 to 12. However, the Egyptian Government lacked the facilities, qualified teachers and materials necessary to provide education for all Egyptian students ages 6 to 12.<sup>62</sup>

The government tried to expand practical schools meant to provide a basic education for students who would become farmers, laborers, and housewives. These schools were six years long with the first four years covering reading, writing, arithmetic and religion. The last two years covered practical skills in farming or a trade. These schools met for half a day and only received two Egyptian Pounds per student, which

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<sup>59</sup> Langohr, "Colonial Education Systems and the Spread of Local Religious Movements: The Cases of British Egypt and Punjab," 166.

<sup>60</sup> Ibid., 167.

<sup>61</sup> Ibid.

<sup>62</sup> Cochran, *Educational Roots of Political Crisis in Egypt*, 53.

meant the facilities and teaching quality was lacking. The expansion of these schools was also limited by a lack of available funding. The Ministry of Education could not expand the number of schools and increase access without severely reducing quality.<sup>63</sup>

Another concern of the Ministry of Education was to produce graduates who could provide leadership and expertise on complex governmental issues. The Ministry of Education used the secondary schools to hone these future leaders. The students who attended these schools were from the elite strata of society even after the fees were eliminated in 1943.<sup>64</sup> Admittance and graduation from a secondary school was of great importance because it was the road to university and then on to a prestigious government position. These schools taught classes in mathematics, biology, history, geography, English, French, and civics. The duration and amount of graduates varied throughout the time period depending on governmental needs. The duration fluctuated from three to five years, with corresponding curriculum changes to meet governmental needs.<sup>65</sup>

#### **D. THE EGYPTIAN EDUCATION SYSTEM UNDER NASSER**

In July 1952, a secret society of officers led by Gamal Abdel Nasser took over the Egyptian government.<sup>66</sup> The Nasser regime represented the shift to the nationalization of the socio-economic system. The Free Officers established a populist-socialist system that nationalized major industries and services and introduced agrarian reform measures to reduce the political power of large land owners.<sup>67</sup> Socialism became the main philosophy within in the education system and permeated the curriculum at all levels. Nasser nationalized private foreign schools, centralized administration in the Ministry of Education, standardized curricula, increased enrollment and promoted technical education.<sup>68</sup> Primary education was now compulsory and free. Law 210/1953 stated all

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<sup>63</sup> Cochran, *Educational Roots of Political Crisis in Egypt*, 53.

<sup>64</sup> Ibid., 54.

<sup>65</sup> Ibid., 55.

<sup>66</sup> Albert Hourani, *A History of the Arab Peoples* (New York: Grand Central Publishing, 1991), 362.

<sup>67</sup> Nadine Mourad Sika, *Educational Reform in Egyptian Primary Schools Since the 1990s: A Study of the Political Values and Behavior of Sixth Grade Students* (New York: The Edwin Mellen Press, 2010), 37.

<sup>68</sup> Sika, *Educational Reform in Egyptian Primary Schools Since the 1990s: A Study of the Political Values and Behavior of Sixth Grade Students*, 38.

school age children had the right to education and that the Ministry of Education would administer all schools.<sup>69</sup>

Before the 1952 revolution, many problems facing the Egyptian education system were a result of its lack of structure and uniformity. Following the revolution, socialism became the framework for all government operations, which was reflected in the education system. The administration was centralized and the curriculum was standardized. At the same time, enrollments increased at all levels, and technical education became more prominent in an effort to promote the development of Egyptian patriotism through education of the masses. To support the emphasis of patriotism through education, the Ministry of Education focused on Arabic language instruction and science also became a national priority.<sup>70</sup> Similar to the elementary school legislated in 1922, the purpose of the new primary education was to eliminate illiteracy. The enrollment in primary school expanded rapidly. In 1952, 1 million students attended primary education, and by 1960, the number had tripled to 3 million.<sup>71</sup>

During the 1960s, Egyptians took over the foreign owned private schools that were then run as regular private schools that fell under the control of the Ministry of Education. The desire of Nasser to unite the education system came from a larger goal to unite Egyptian society as a whole. He believed that the rift in society between those who went to foreign schools, religious schools, private schools, and government schools needed to end to unite the Egyptian people. One of the tools Nasser used to unite the people was the Arabic language. Arabic became the most important subject in school; for students to advance to the next grade, they had to pass the Arabic exam without exception.<sup>72</sup>

To encourage students to go on to university, tuition was abolished and more universities were opened in the provincial capitals. The Nasser government did this

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<sup>69</sup> Sika, *Educational Reform in Egyptian Primary Schools Since the 1990s: A Study of the Political Values and Behavior of Sixth Grade Students*, 38.

<sup>70</sup> Cochran, *Educational Roots of Political Crisis in Egypt*, 67.

<sup>71</sup> Ibid., 68.

<sup>72</sup> Sika, *Educational Reform in Egyptian Primary Schools Since the 1990s: A Study of the Political Values and Behavior of Sixth Grade Students*, 39.

because it needed the people with the necessary skills to run a nationalized economy without the need for support from other countries or outside institutions. To further encourage students to attend university in 1962, Nasser announced that every student who graduated from university could gain employment from the government. The number of students at university doubled during this time period in the 1960s, but like the primary and secondary schools, the universities were ill-equipped to deal with the influx of students.<sup>73</sup>

Nasser understood the appeal of religious institutions and tried to bring them under the control of the state and use them to further the revolution.<sup>74</sup> This tact was particularly true in Nasser's policy towards al-Azhar University, which was and continues to be, the epicenter for Islamic learning in Egypt. Governments prior to Nasser had avoided interfering with al-Azhar or had been unsuccessful in confronting the powerful ulama. In 1961, Nasser broke from previous regimes' approaches and forced Al-Azhar to accept four new faculties: medicine, engineering, agriculture, and an Islamic woman's faculty. This interference reduced the authority of the ulama at the university, and the government control over the curriculum, teachers and administrators.<sup>75</sup>

In Egypt, by 1960, 65% of children age six to ten were attending primary school.<sup>76</sup> Egypt's significant investment in education caused a significant decrease in the illiteracy rate, which dropped from 76% of men in 1937 to 56% by 1960.<sup>77</sup> The illiteracy rate amongst women also dropped during this time period from 94% in 1937 to 83% in 1960.<sup>78</sup> In addition, 50% of school age girls were in school, which was much higher than the average in the rest of the Arab world. Tunisia, for example, only had a 30% enrollment rate for school-aged girls.<sup>79</sup>

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<sup>73</sup> Cleveland and Bunton, *A History of the Modern Middle East*, 320.

<sup>74</sup> Ibid., 321.

<sup>75</sup> Ibid.

<sup>76</sup> Hourani, *A History of the Arab Peoples*, 390.

<sup>77</sup> Ibid.

<sup>78</sup> Ibid.

<sup>79</sup> Ibid.

The number of students receiving a technical education increased under Nasser as well. From 1956 to 1960, the number of students receiving a technical education at the preparatory level increased from 8,000 to 42,000. During the same time period, the number increased from 22,000 to 75,000 at the secondary level, and 1,400 to 15,000 at the post-secondary level.<sup>80</sup> These graduates filled the gap left behind by the outflow of foreign workers and formed a new technocratic civilian element that allowed Nasser to pursue his nationalist socialist agenda. Science was emphasized heavily to ensure students graduating from Egyptian schools could fill the technical positions. The push to incorporate science more heavily in the education system was formalized in the Egyptian National Charter of 1962 when Nasser described science as the weapon with which the revolution could be secured.<sup>81</sup> In general, Nasser saw his expansion of the education as a weapon to secure the revolution by producing a population that could resist foreign influence.

#### **E. SADAT'S EDUCATION SYSTEM**

Anwar Sadat came to power in October 1970 and pursued a course for Egypt that deviated significantly from the one pursued by Nasser. Sadat pushed Egypt towards privatization and a market economy, and away from the welfare state that Nasser had developed. Sadat inherited a country from Nasser that was in economic and diplomatic disarray following the defeat in the 1967 war with Israel. Sadat saw the United States as the only way to improve Egypt's current economic and diplomatic situation.<sup>82</sup> Sadat further changed the direction of the country when he agreed to a peace treaty with Israel in 1979, which isolated Egypt from the rest of the Arab world that was angered by Egypt's willingness to sign a peace treaty with Israel.<sup>83</sup> In education, Sadat promoted an increase in private education, but all education was still controlled by the Ministry of Education. Sadat's Open Door (infitah) policy allowed foreign money to re-enter the

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<sup>80</sup> Cochran, *Educational Roots of Political Crisis in Egypt*, 71.

<sup>81</sup> Ibid.

<sup>82</sup> Cleveland and Bunton, *A History of the Modern Middle East*, 374.

<sup>83</sup> Sika, *Educational Reform in Egyptian Primary Schools Since the 1990s: A Study of the Political Values and Behavior of Sixth Grade Students*, 39.

country, which vastly increased the number of private schools available.<sup>84</sup> The education system reflected the political system and society in general; the wealthy flourished in foreign and private schools, while the masses received a low quality of education in the public schools.

In the 1970s, the Egyptian education system was confronted with a rapidly expanding population along with the mandate of universal education. The 1966 census showed an annual growth rate of 2.54% that was one of the highest in the world.<sup>85</sup> Despite the growing population, the education system was still able to increase enrollment rates. In 1959, only 46% of six year olds attended primary education, but by 1979, 75% were enrolled in school.<sup>86</sup> In addition to increasing the initial access to education, the greater achievement was made in the increased ability of students to matriculate through the system. In 1963, only 20% of students who completed primary education went on to preparatory education. By 1979, 50% of students who completed primary education went on to attend preparatory education.<sup>87</sup> From the 1970s forward, the Egyptian Ministry of Education was in a constant battle to provide education to a rapidly growing population.

With Sadat's open door policy, foreign investors flooded back into Egypt in the 1970s and early 1980s. The wealthy Egyptians attended the newly established foreign supported schools while the poor attended government or religious fundamental schools. As happened before the Nasser takeover, the religious and cultural heritage of common people of Egypt clashed with the wealthy Egyptians who took advantage of the investments by wealthy Americans, Germans, French, and Japanese.<sup>88</sup> The education system reflected the divided culture in Egyptian society as a whole. Graduates of the inadequate government schools were guaranteed low paying jobs with the government even if their services were not needed. Graduates of foreign language schools able to

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<sup>84</sup> Sika, *Educational Reform in Egyptian Primary Schools Since the 1990s: A Study of the Political Values and Behavior of Sixth Grade Students*, 40.

<sup>85</sup> Cochran, *Educational Roots of Political Crisis in Egypt*, 76.

<sup>86</sup> Ibid.

<sup>87</sup> Ibid., 77.

<sup>88</sup> Cochran, *Educational Roots of Political Crisis in Egypt*, 78.

speak French, German, and English were able to obtain high paying jobs in the private sector. The government paid 70 Egyptian Pounds a month for an entry level-paying job as a secretary, while a secretary who could speak English would make five times as much working at a private firm.<sup>89</sup> Once again, to move up the social and economic ladder, it was imperative to attend a foreign language school and not the government-run schools.

By 1980, the government schools faced many deficiencies as outlined by the National Council that advised President Sadat. Among their findings was that over half the teachers in the public education system were not certified and that 56% of 8,000 primary school building were not suitable for educational purposes.<sup>90</sup> The National Council also concluded that the quality of instructors and facilities was also inadequate at the preparatory level of education as well, which was mostly due to the rapidly increasing population of school age children.<sup>91</sup>

Education in Egypt in the 1970s exacerbated the divide between rich and poor due to the influx of foreign money into the education system. Like society in general, the education system represented a distorted market that benefited the rich, but failed the middle class and poor. In addition, the problems faced by Sadat were made more acute because of a rapidly growing population and lack of funds due to years of participating in wars and providing subsidies.<sup>92</sup>

## **F. MUBARAK'S EDUCATION SYSTEM**

On October 6, 1981, Hosni Mubarak succeeded Sadat as President of Egypt. Mubarak did not have the *political* and social ambitions to transform Egypt; his primary concern was remaining in power. Mubarak's reluctance to support significant reforms and his inability to form a vision of the country's future contributed stagnation in all aspects of Egyptian society.<sup>93</sup> By the 1990s, liberalization in Egypt completely stalled

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<sup>89</sup> Cochran, *Educational Roots of Political Crisis in Egypt*, 78.

<sup>90</sup> Ibid., 79.

<sup>91</sup> Ibid., 81.

<sup>92</sup> Ibid., 91.

<sup>93</sup> Cleveland and Bunton, *A History of the Modern Middle East*, 392.

and the economy began to deteriorate. The economic crisis faced by Egypt forced it to seek help from the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) that helped reform its fiscal and monetary policies. The World Bank and IMF help came under the condition that Egypt further liberalized its economy and political system.<sup>94</sup>

Mubarak realized Egypt was facing an education crisis in the early 1990s. In 1991, Mubarak stated that education was an important cornerstone of national security and that the 1990s would be a decade of educational reform with a focus on eliminating illiteracy. “Education is the major pillar for our national security on a broad scale and comprehensive view and also our economy ... it is our way to world competition in interior and exterior markets.”<sup>95</sup> Under Mubarak, education was now associated with national security strategy and economic development.

In 1991, Mubarak declared the need for complete structural reform of the Egyptian education system. Mubarak stated, “We have to be honest with ourselves that the crisis in our educational system is reflected on the school, the teacher, the student and the curriculum. Even though it is burdening our country...but the output at the end is very weak.”<sup>96</sup> A national conference on the reform for primary education was held in 1993 with the prime goal of developing a curriculum that would improve the overall quality of education. The next year, a similar conference was held concerning preparatory education. The focus of this conference was developing a citizenry who could compete in a modern economy by having the necessary math, science and language skills. The conference also recognized that most Egyptian students lacked critical thinking and problem solving skills fundamental to functioning in a modern economy.<sup>97</sup>

Late in 1993, Egypt began organizing national educational seminars with a goal of improving curricula and teaching methods. These conferences, along with the creation of the Center for Curriculum and Instructional Materials Development (CCIMD) the

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<sup>94</sup> Sika, *Educational Reform in Egyptian Primary Schools Since the 1990s: A Study of the Political Values and Behavior of Sixth Grade Students*, 41.

<sup>95</sup> Ibid.

<sup>96</sup> Ibid., 45.

<sup>97</sup> Ibid., 46.

same year, reflected the fact that the Ministry of Education recognized the weaknesses in the education system and was working to fix them.<sup>98</sup> CCIMD's goal was to link education to the actual social and economic needs of Egyptians in a modernizing economy and society. More focus was given to the subjects of mathematics, languages and religion. In addition, world studies were added to the curriculum to give students a better understanding of the rest of the world, an important step given globalization.<sup>99</sup>

The Minister of Education, Yousry al-Gamal, undertook new reform strategies in 2007. In an effort to improve the quality of the education system, he proposed the development of technical education and vocational training centers, promotion of public-private partnership, and involvement of civil society in the education system. Yousry al-Gamal also want to enlarge the scope of the decentralizing process started early in the decade.<sup>100</sup> In 2006, al-Gamal stated there were three major goals for Egyptian education. The first was to increase overall quality by applying the principles of the newly founded National Authority of Educational Quality Assurance and Accreditation. The second is to increase community participation in the school system and decentralize authority to the local level. The third is to ensure access to quality education for all Egyptians regardless of economic circumstance.<sup>101</sup>

Egypt openly acknowledged its need for outside help for its education system when it issued Ministerial Decree Number 30/2002, which gave non-governmental organizations (NGOs) the right to create one classroom and small schools.<sup>102</sup> The Egyptian government also allowed UNESCO to come to Egypt and evaluate its progress. In 2002, UNESCO concluded that much had been done to reform the Egyptian education system, but an urgent need for more reforms still remained. Specifically, it indicated that Egypt needed to improve quality and efficiency in the system, as well as the quality of

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<sup>98</sup> Sika, *Educational Reform in Egyptian Primary Schools Since the 1990s: A Study of the Political Values and Behavior of Sixth Grade Students*, 47.

<sup>99</sup> Ibid., 48.

<sup>100</sup> Ibid., 51.

<sup>101</sup> Ibid., 52.

<sup>102</sup> Ibid., 55.

teachers through proper training.<sup>103</sup> Mubarak saw the educational system as a tool for development and recognized the need of formal outside support to drive improvements. Unlike Sadat, he relied on NGOs instead of private investments.

This chapter established that the Egyptian education system changed as new political leadership came to power. Leaders introduced education systems that reflected and reinforced the political and societal goals they pursued. Muhammad Ali introduced an education system that produced graduates who supported a massive military machine that protected his position as leader of Egypt. The British introduced an education system that staffed its bureaucracy, but limited education so a significant educated population would not develop. Nasser came to power with the desire to develop a self-sufficient country independent of foreign assistance and interference. Nasser's education system reflected this desire by expanding rapidly to produce enough graduates to fill the void left by the outflow of foreign expertise. Sadat's education system reflected his push towards a market economy and the encouragement of foreign investment. Finally, Mubarak was focused on development through international aid and expertise, which resulted in an education system heavily influenced by international NGOs and funded significantly by external sources. In all instances, as new regimes came to power, the education system changed significantly, and in a way that supported the regime's interests.

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<sup>103</sup> Sika, *Educational Reform in Egyptian Primary Schools Since the 1990s: A Study of the Political Values and Behavior of Sixth Grade Students*, 55.

### III. THE CURRENT EGYPTIAN EDUCATION SYSTEM

This chapter addresses the other underlining assumption of the thesis that the education system lacks quality, efficiency and equality. In particular, highlighted include the inequality between rich in poor in terms of access to higher education, the pervasiveness of private tutoring at all levels of the system, and the lack of quality materials and teachers in the government schools. The poor state of the current education system is a vital concern of the new Egyptian government because models of economic development stress the importance of quality education. Economists have long argued that the implementation of a quality education system should form a principal component in any development strategy.<sup>104</sup>

#### A. BASIC EDUCATION

Egypt's education system is the largest in the MENA region, with over 16 million students and 1.2 million teachers and administrators.<sup>105</sup> The Egyptian education system is comprised of four levels of instruction: primary, preparatory, secondary, and tertiary. The compulsory education is the six years of primary education and the three years of preparatory education. At this point, students can take one of two paths. Students who have high-test scores are sent to general secondary school, which lasts three years and prepares them for a university level education. Those students who have lower test scores go to vocational secondary programs that specialize in commerce, industry or agriculture.<sup>106</sup>

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<sup>104</sup> Abdeljalil Akkari, "Education in the Middle East and North Africa: The Current Situation and Future Challenges," *International Education Journal* 5, no. 2 (2004): 144.

<sup>105</sup> The World Bank, *Arab Republic of Egypt Improving Quality, Equality, and Efficiency in the Education Sector: Fostering a Competent Generation of Youth*, 52.

<sup>106</sup> Hartman, "'At School We Don't Pay Attention Anyway'—The Informal Market of Education in Egypt and Its Implications," 31.

## **B. LACK OF QUALITY AND EQUALITY COMPARED TO INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS**

In 2003, Egypt participated in TIMSS for 8th grade, which allows its academic achievement to be compared to other nations' education systems. Egypt scored an average of 406 in math and 421 in science, which placed Egyptian 8th graders far below the international averages of 467 in math and 474 in science, but above the average for MENA.<sup>107</sup> Egyptian 8th graders participated again in 2007. Their scores were lower than in 2003, 391 in math and 408 in science, which placed Egyptian 8th graders once again below the international average, but above the MENA average.<sup>108</sup> The fact that Egypt is participating in international testing regimes is an improvement within itself and highlights the willingness of the Egyptian education system to do a legitimate assessment of the effectiveness of its education system. Although Egypt is below the international average, the country is performing relatively well if the differences in GDP per capita are considered between the participating countries. When compared to the lower middle income countries, Egypt scores lower than Jordan and Lebanon, but higher than Chile and the Philippines.<sup>109</sup>

When the data for the Egyptian TIMSS scores are broken down to see individual achievement, it indicates very few high achievers. TIMSS considers scores between 525 and 600 advanced, 475 to 525 high, 400 to 475 intermediate and below 400 low. In Egypt, only 6% of students were high performers or above in math and only 10% were high performers or above in science. At the same time, 40% of students failed to even achieve the low benchmark of 400 in either math or science. By comparison, only 23% of Iranian students and 32% of Lebanese students failed to reach the 400 mark. This large group of under achievers is high compared to both the international and MENA averages

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<sup>107</sup> The World Bank, *Arab Republic of Egypt Improving Quality, Equality, and Efficiency in the Education Sector: Fostering a Competent Generation of Youth*, 9.

<sup>108</sup> National Center for Educational Statistics, "Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study 2007."

<sup>109</sup> The World Bank, *Arab Republic of Egypt Improving Quality, Equality, and Efficiency in the Education Sector: Fostering a Competent Generation of Youth*, 10.

and presents Egypt with sizable population that likely lacks any of the skills necessary in an advanced economy.<sup>110</sup>

Inequality exists throughout the entire Egyptian education system. The two lowest income quintiles perform much more poorly than their more well off counterparts. The disparity between rich and poor students is more profound in Egypt than any other country in the MENA.<sup>111</sup> This data indicates that a substantial difference exists in the quality of schools in Egypt likely due to income because most wealthy students attend higher quality private schools and can afford private tutors.<sup>112</sup>

In Egypt, family income affects enrollment in schools significantly. The number of working children between 6–14 years of age is estimated to be 1.5 million children, which represents 12.5% of the population in question. These children are normally from poor families that need the extra income to survive. Net enrolment rates for children in the top quintile of household wealth are 81% until they reach 15 years of age. Enrolments of children in the poorest one fifth of the households are below 50% at 15 years of age.<sup>113</sup> These percentages indicate that student income levels significantly affect the education system even at the primary level. The Muslim Brotherhood will likely address these disparities in education equality because a solution to this problem is desired by a significant amount of the population. Improving the quality of education is more politically viable than overt actions to increase religious education.

### **C. TEACHING AND STAFFING ISSUES**

The lack of quality teachers severely hampers the effectiveness of Egyptian schools in imparting valuable skills to students. Personnel costs are within the international norm, at approximately 85% of public recurrent expenditures. However, the compensation for Egyptian teachers is the lowest in the region relative to GDP per capita.

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<sup>110</sup> The World Bank, *Arab Republic of Egypt Improving Quality, Equality, and Efficiency in the Education Sector: Fostering a Competent Generation of Youth*, 11.

<sup>111</sup> *Ibid.*, 1.

<sup>112</sup> *Ibid.*, 14.

<sup>113</sup> Akkari, “Education in the Middle East and North Africa: The Current Situation and Future Challenges,” 149.

In addition, the Egyptian school system has one of the highest teaching to non-teaching ratios in the world (1:1.2). The worst ratio occurs at the preparatory level in which only 51% of those employed are actually teachers. In general, the education corps is ineffectively deployed, with over representation in administrative and non-teaching roles, and those who do teach, are under paid.<sup>114</sup>

Also a problem are Senior and Supervisor Senior Teachers, who are counted as teachers, but only teach half as much as regular teachers. One of the reasons for the high proportion of administrative personnel seems to be the limited number of grades in pay, and a promotion scale that restricts promotion possibilities, which in turn, encourages senior teachers to take higher paying jobs as administrators. In addition, no legitimate review system exists for teaching performance; therefore, incentive to perform at a high level is nonexistent. As mentioned previously, teaching pay is low, or only one and a half times per capita GDP. The salary of teachers in developing countries should be approximately three to three and half times per capita GDP.<sup>115</sup> The high proportion of non-teachers in the education system indicates that the Egyptian education system may have an adequate numbers of teaching assets, but they are not employed effectively.

#### **D. LOW ECONOMIC RETURNS TO EDUCATION**

Despite a significant investment in the education services in Egypt over the last 30 years, the connection between educational achievement and better employment opportunities is still lacking. In Egypt, the rewards of academic achievement in terms of access to better paying employment are becoming increasingly precarious. The unemployment rate among those ages 15 to 24 is 18%, which accounts for 70% of total unemployment. Forty percent of students who graduate from vocational high schools are still unemployed three years after graduation.<sup>116</sup> Males in Egypt who complete secondary school but do not attend university only earn 6% more over their lifetimes than males who did not even attend any level of schooling. The returns to education are lower than

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<sup>114</sup> The World Bank, *Arab Republic of Egypt Improving Quality, Equality, and Efficiency in the Education Sector: Fostering a Competent Generation of Youth*, 29.

<sup>115</sup> *Ibid.*, 31–32.

<sup>116</sup> *Ibid.*, 24.

similar countries in the region, such as Morocco and Tunisia.<sup>117</sup> Schools, specifically primary and preparatory levels, do not produce marketable skills; hence, the high rate of unemployment among this category. Investing in education must be accompanied by massive investment in economic sectors in which the skills mastered can be used to provoke more economic growth.<sup>118</sup>

Egypt must ensure that the money invested in education should actually result in the development of human capital, so that Egypt can compete in the global economy. Human capital is the broad range of knowledge, skills, and capabilities needed for life and work, which is gained through quality education. Inadequate human capital constrains productivity and growth and severely weakens the strength of the economy. Egypt can invest heavily in physical capital, but without the development of sufficient human capital to implement it properly, the economy of Egypt will continue to flounder.<sup>119</sup>

The World Bank in 2007 determined many factors were inhibiting the Egyptian education system from properly developing human capital. First, the curriculum and testing structure did not provide and assess skills currently needed in the labor market. Second, the two track system, one traditional the other vocational, exacerbates academic achievement between rich and poor. Third, the current structure incentivizes students and teachers to participate in the illegal tutoring market that further erodes the credibility of the public education system.<sup>120</sup>

## **E. HIGHER EDUCATION**

In 1952, Egypt still had a very limited higher education system. Only 50,000 students attended Egypt's three universities. Many of these students were the children of

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<sup>117</sup> The World Bank, *Arab Republic of Egypt Improving Quality, Equality, and Efficiency in the Education Sector: Fostering a Competent Generation of Youth*, 26.

<sup>118</sup> Akkari, "Education in the Middle East and North Africa: The Current Situation and Future Challenges," 149.

<sup>119</sup> The World Bank, *Arab Republic of Egypt Improving Quality, Equality, and Efficiency in the Education Sector: Fostering a Competent Generation of Youth*, 1.

<sup>120</sup> *Ibid.*, 2.

the rich Egyptian elite.<sup>121</sup> The revolution in 1952 brought about the idea of having higher education more available to all segments of society. Following the revolution, Egypt eliminated tuition, established a universal admission examination, and expanded enrollment in the interest of social justice and an effort to improve economic development.<sup>122</sup> With the increased access granted to the Egyptian population, an immediate need existed to increase the supply of higher education. To meet this increase demand, Assiut University was opened in 1957, and an additional seven more universities were opened in the mid-1970s. In addition to building universities, Egypt constructed technical training institutes to meet the increase demand. Currently, 47 two-year and four 5-year technical training institutes operate in Egypt.<sup>123</sup>

With the guarantee of free higher education, enrollments expanded rapidly following 1952. By 1969, 140,000 students were enrolled, which tripled enrollment in less than 20 years. The growth rate was even faster in the 1970s and early 1980s, and by 1982, over half a million Egyptians were enrolled in the higher education system.<sup>124</sup> The growth rate slowed in the 1980s, but was still significant, and by 2008, 1.4 million students in were enrolled in the higher education system.<sup>125</sup> This rapid increase in enrollments placed a significant strain on all higher education institutions. By 2008, 30% of the Egyptian population ages 18 to 23 were enrolled in some form of post-secondary education and the number is expected to reach 40% by 2022.<sup>126</sup>

Egypt, accordingly, spends a significant amount of its budget funding higher education. Egypt compares favorably to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development's (OECD) average of five percent of GDP and is above the 4% average of MENA countries. This significant level of investment in higher education is above any

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<sup>121</sup> Emily Cupito and Ray Langsten, "Inclusiveness in Higher Education in Egypt," *Higher Education* 62, no. 2 (2011): 184.

<sup>122</sup> *Ibid.*, 183.

<sup>123</sup> *Ibid.*, 184.

<sup>124</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>125</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>126</sup> *Ibid.*, 185.

country in the region, but is still not enough to ensure the quality of education.<sup>127</sup> The higher education system in Egypt is strictly controlled by the state. The Supreme Council of Universities determines the number of students in each institution, while the Ministry of Higher Education determines the overall admissions rates for the system and specific fields of study.<sup>128</sup>

## **F. INEQUALITY IN HIGHER EDUCATION**

The inequality that exists at the lower levels of education also permeates higher education. With the rapid expansion in enrollment rates, lack of tuition, and universal examinations, it was thought that the education system would transform from a luxury of the elite to an experience that could benefit all segments of Egyptian society. It appears that despite all the reforms, a disproportionate amount of wealthy Egyptians still attend post-secondary schooling compared to their less well-off counterparts.<sup>129</sup> Until the well-to-do-families saturate their demand for higher education, the inequality will persist and less well-to-do young adults will not attend post-secondary education at a satisfactory rate. Looking at enrolment rates by income level, it is clear the poor have less access to higher education than the non-poor do, which occurs because wealthier families are able to afford better quality secondary education, as well as private tutoring.

Despite the virtual non-existent gender gap in education levels achieved by 2005, the gap in higher education due to wealth indifferences was still prevalent. In 1988, 22.9% of males and 15.7% of females ages 19 to 22 enrolled in higher education, a significant difference between males and females. By 2005, the numbers changed significantly to 32.8% of males, 30.3% of females, which means the gender gap that existed in 1988 was virtually non-existent by 2005. In 1988 29.4% of males and 20.8% of females from the poorest quintile of society attended higher education following secondary school completion, compared to 69.7% of the males and 66.7% of the females

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<sup>127</sup> Abir El Kadi and Kimiz Dalkir, "What Challenges Confront Quality Assurance and Accreditation Initiatives in Egypt? An Empirical Case Study on the Higher Education Enhancement Project HEEP," The International Conference on Information Management and Evaluation: University of Cape Town, South Africa March 26, 2010, 6.

<sup>128</sup> Cupito and Langsten, "Inclusiveness in Higher Education in Egypt," 184.

<sup>129</sup> *Ibid.*, 185.

in the wealthiest quintile.<sup>130</sup> The discrepancy between rich and poor remained in 2005 with 26.2% of males and 23.2% of females in the poorest quintile went on to higher education while their counterparts in the richest quintile had an 80.5% enrollment rate for males and a 77.2% enrollment rate for females.<sup>131</sup> The data clearly indicates that young adults from the wealthiest quintile maintain a distinct advantage in attending higher education. Between 1988 and 2005, Egypt made very limited progress in opening higher education to the entirety of society, especially those from the financial disadvantaged segments of society. In 2005, the richest fifth of society still occupied 40% of the students in higher education.<sup>132</sup>

To open up the universities to the smartest children rather than the richest, the Egyptian government started a nationwide examination system in 1954. Those students who score the best on the examination choose their field of study and the school they will be attending.<sup>133</sup> This data shows that a national exam is insufficient to close the gap between rich and poor in providing equal access to higher education, if the quality of education in the primary and secondary level is not equal. Reform at the primary, intermediate and secondary levels must occur to ensure equal access to higher education. The national examination does not level the playing field if the rich students have access to higher quality education prior to taking the examination.

## **G. DECLINE IN QUALITY OF HIGHER EDUCATION**

Many educators in Egypt believe the decline in the quality of Egyptian education occurred because rapid expansion did not allow for the proper development of competent instructors and a comprehensive curriculum. Egyptian institutes now enroll five times as many students as they were originally designed to accommodate.<sup>134</sup> The severe overcrowding has forced an emphasis on rote learning and passing examinations at the expense of original thought and analysis. Egyptian university classrooms are so

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<sup>130</sup> Cupito and Langsten, "Inclusiveness in Higher Education in Egypt," 188.

<sup>131</sup> Ibid., 190.

<sup>132</sup> Ibid., 194.

<sup>133</sup> Mary H. Shann, "The Reform of Higher Education in Egypt," *Higher Education* 24, (1992): 229.

<sup>134</sup> Ibid., 228.

overcrowded that some lectures halls with the capacity to seat 500 are forced to accommodate 1,500 students, with many students forced to sit on the floor or stand.<sup>135</sup>

Egyptian higher education also suffers from relatively high student to teacher ratio that does not provide students with a good learning environment. In 2005, Egypt had a student to teacher ratio of 32:1, which is much higher than the averages for MENA (23:1), or OECD countries (14:1), or the world (16:1).<sup>136</sup> The data also indicates that the return to higher education in Egypt is relatively low. Egypt's 8% rate of return to higher education in 2000 was slightly below the 9% of both Morocco in 1999 and Jordan in 2004. However, it is much lower than that in the more open and reformed economies of South America. The rate was 16% in Argentina, 20% in Chile, and 12% in Uruguay as of 1997.<sup>137</sup>

The decline in the quality of Egyptian higher education cannot be blamed solely on overcrowding, but on the poor material condition of teaching facilities as well. Most of the libraries in the provincial universities lack even basic reading materials in their libraries, and those few that do have a substantial collection, often have periodicals that have not been updated in over 20 years. This situation becomes an issue when texts are recommended to students, but cannot be found at the library or online due to the lack of computer facilities. Instead of reading published works in preparation for exams, students are often forced to rely solely on their lecture notes.<sup>138</sup>

The desire to reform higher education in Egypt was initiated at the National Conference for Higher Education Enhancement, held in Egypt in 2000. From this conference, the Higher Education Enhancement Project (HEEP) was the primary program developed to enhance and ensure quality. The project was started in 2002 with a loan

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<sup>135</sup> Mary Tyler E. Holmes, "Higher Education Reform in Egypt: Preparing Graduates for Egypt's Changing Political Economy," *Education, Business and Society: Contemporary Middle Eastern Issues* 1, no. 3 (2008): 180.

<sup>136</sup> Yasmine Fahim and Noha Sami, "Adequacy, Efficiency and Equity of Higher Education Financing: The Case of Egypt," *Prospects* 41 (2011): 51.

<sup>137</sup> *Ibid.*, 52.

<sup>138</sup> Shann, "The Reform of Higher Education in Egypt," 229.

from the World Bank of 13 million dollars.<sup>139</sup> The HEEP program quickly discovered that the lectures at the universities were overcrowded and the professors lacked proper media equipment to enhance their presentations. The program also discovered a severe shortage of access to computer labs and that the library collections were limited in quantity and severely outdated.<sup>140</sup> More importantly, the project determined that the quality of university education in Egypt was so poor that it would not allow Egypt to have the necessary human capital to advance its economy and compete in the globalized economy.

The Quality Assurance and Accreditation Project (QAAP) was initiated in 2001 and was deemed satisfactory in its performance by the World Bank, and accomplished many milestones in ensuring quality in Egyptian higher education. In addition to establishing a nationwide assurance and accreditation mechanism, the program created 17 quality assurance centers in public universities. Most importantly, QAAP established national academic reference standards for 10 sectors of learning to ensure basic proficiency across places of learning. The 10 fields covered by the new national standards were nursing, agriculture, engineering, veterinary medicine, pharmacy, medicine, core sciences, home economics, arts, and physical education.<sup>141</sup>

HEEP and QAAP determined the problems with higher education and created quality standards, but did not address the fundamental structural problems with Egyptian higher education. These issues can only be addressed by either rapidly expanding the infrastructure of the existing university system or by limiting admissions to the most qualified students. New quality standards cannot be maintained if the student-to-teacher ratios are not significantly reduced, and the quality of student is not properly assessed prior to admittance as well.

A consensus exists in Egypt for the need to upgrade educational quality significantly in Egyptian universities. This lack of quality higher education is a drag on

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<sup>139</sup> El Kadi and Dalkir, "What Challenges Confront Quality Assurance and Accreditation Initiatives in Egypt? An Empirical Case Study on the Higher Education Enhancement Project HEEP," 6.

<sup>140</sup> Ibid.

<sup>141</sup> Ibid., 7.

Egypt's economic competitiveness, especially in an ever-increasing globalized economy. In addition, employers prefer foreign skilled and semi-skilled graduates to Egyptian workers. To improve its higher education system, Egypt must reduce enrollment to improve student to teacher ratios, improve professor compensation to allow full time dedication to education, and improve the quality of the facilities.<sup>142</sup>

Upgrading the quality of higher education in Egypt will be extremely expensive. The World Competitiveness Report for 2008–2009 by the World Economic Forum, which ranks the quality of public higher education institutes in different countries, ranked Egypt 126 out of 134 countries.<sup>143</sup> The report also ranked Egypt 128 out of 134 countries in the category of the degree to which the higher educational system satisfies the needs of a competitive labor market. According to the report, graduates are unable to cope with the rapidly changing needs of the technology age, and cannot respond adequately to labor market demands. Recent studies also show that a mismatch between the skills demanded by businesses and those available in the work force, which leads graduates to an extended and difficult transition period as they try to find work.<sup>144</sup> The supply of available jobs is far smaller than the demand for employment by Egyptian university graduates with 40% of job seekers unable to find positions. Approximately 30% of graduates will not find positions within a year or more of graduation.<sup>145</sup>

## **H. TUTORING RAMPANT ACROSS ALL LEVELS OF EDUCATION**

The tutoring system is a symptom of the disease of high stake tests that require rote memorization and low teacher pay. Most countries have mechanisms that sort students based on ability and then filter them towards different forms of educational institutions. In Egypt, these mechanisms are stronger than in most countries. The primary

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<sup>142</sup> The World Bank, *Project Appraisal Document on a Proposed Loan In the Amount of \$50 Million to the Arab Republic of Egypt for a Higher Education Enhancement Project*, Prepared by Mae Chu Chang, Report No. 23332-EGT (March 7, 2002): 5.

<sup>143</sup> Fahim and Sami, "Adequacy, Efficiency and Equity of Higher Education Financing: The Case of Egypt," 58.

<sup>144</sup> Ibid.

<sup>145</sup> Holmes "Higher Education Reform in Egypt: Preparing Graduates for Egypt's Changing Political economy," 181.

mechanism to filter students in Egypt is the Thanawiya Amma, the test following secondary school that determines which university a student will attend and what will be studied.<sup>146</sup> All students take exactly the same exam and no other mechanisms exist for universities to use to select students. In addition, students must take the exam immediately following their graduation and cannot wait and take it a future time. These characteristics of the Thanawiya Amma cause fierce competition because if a student scores poorly, almost no chance exists of attending a respectable university and studying a useful curriculum. These circumstances cause tutoring to become more important. Teachers also have a disincentive to reform the system because they supplement their income so heavily from private tutoring.<sup>147</sup> It also appears these tutoring sessions are used exclusively to prepare students for the Thanawiya Amma because students who participate heavily in tutoring do not score better on the TIMSS. This situation also illustrates that the Thanawiya Amma does not do a good job of assessing achievement if very little correlation occurs between performance between the Thanawiya Amma and the TIMSS exams.<sup>148</sup> Until the Thanawiya Amma is reformed, the rest of the system will never be fixed because the incentives to change the system do not exist.

Due to the poor quality of the in class experience, and the fierce competition for graduate degrees, the market for tutors has expanded significantly, which has also negatively impacted Egyptian higher education. It has now become common practice for university professors in Egypt to gain extra income by tutoring students in private, which has led many professors to devote time to private tutoring instead of their primary role as instructor.<sup>149</sup> Due to their low salaries, it is almost impossible for Egyptian teachers to survive on their legitimate income alone. Most are forced to resort to private tutoring that consumes a significant amount of their time and their students' time as well. Egyptian

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<sup>146</sup> The World Bank, *Arab Republic of Egypt Improving Quality, Equality, and Efficiency in the Education Sector: Fostering a Competent Generation of Youth*, 43.

<sup>147</sup> *Ibid.*, 45.

<sup>148</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>149</sup> Shann, "The Reform of Higher Education in Egypt," 230.

families are now spending a significant amount of their income on these private tutoring lessons.<sup>150</sup>

The World Bank conducted a study regarding the amount of money Egyptian families spend on education. It discovered that by far the largest household education expense was private tutoring sessions. The average family spent more on tutoring than books, private schools and supplies.<sup>151</sup> According to the Egypt Human Development Report conducted in 2005, 31% of the families polled said the biggest problem with the Egyptian education system was the prevalence of private tutoring. Families also insinuated that teachers purposefully do not cover the entire syllabus at school so students must hire them as tutors.<sup>152</sup> The tutoring phenomenon further explains the gap beyond the rich and poor who attend places of higher education. Not only do rich students attend private schools with better teachers and learning materials, they also can afford better tutors. The tutoring practice is not a new phenomenon in Egypt. In 1983, Mustafa Kamal Helmi, the Egyptian Minister of Education, recognized that private lessons were undermining the foundation of the Egyptian free and public educational system.<sup>153</sup> However, the importance and effect of tutoring has increased immensely and needs to be addressed by the incoming government led by the Muslim Brotherhood.

The current shortcomings in the Egyptian education system are profound and permeate all levels of instruction. An overwhelming lack of equal opportunity in access to quality education exists due to income level and social standing. A lack of quality instruction also occurs due to poor the material condition of facilities and insufficient compensation for teachers. To ensure the continued development of Egypt, it is imperative the Muslim Brotherhood eliminate the inequality and inefficiencies in the current education system.

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<sup>150</sup> Hartman, ““At School We Don’t Pay Attention Anyway”—The Informal Market of Education in Egypt and Its Implications,” 27.

<sup>151</sup> Ibid., 34.

<sup>152</sup> Ibid., 35.

<sup>153</sup> Ibid., 28.

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## IV. THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD AND EDUCATION

The previous two chapters on the history and current inadequacies in the Egyptian education confirmed the two major assumptions of this thesis. First, that as new governments come to power, they alter the education system, often times dramatically, to suit their needs. Second, the current education system is inadequate in terms of equality, efficiency and quality. This chapter focuses specifically on the Muslim Brotherhood's views on education. The first part of the chapter explores an assumption not of this thesis, but an assumption many make about the compatibility of Islam and modern education. Many assume that the Muslim Brotherhood will implement an education system that focuses more heavily on Islamic principles; this assumption is normally accompanied by the idea that an increase presence of Islam is inherently detrimental to the education system. It is, therefore, important to understand how Islam treats education and how Islam has historically interacted with modern education. It is also essential to determine if Islam as interpreted by the Muslim Brotherhood is compatible with modern education and if an increase in Islamic teaching is innately harmful to a modern education system. This chapter also addresses the current feelings of Egyptians have towards Islam, and specifically, its role in the education system.

The second portion of the chapter examines the Muslim Brotherhood's historical views on education and the programs they previously supported. The chapter then concludes with the Muslim Brotherhood's current views on education based on formal policy statements and recent actions. It will become apparent that currently no official stance on education exists by the Muslim Brotherhood with specific principles or goals. Instead, the Muslim Brotherhood has only made general statements that focus on non-contentious improvements.<sup>154</sup>

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<sup>154</sup> The Freedom and Justice Party, "Election Program the Freedom and Justice Party Egypt Parliamentary Elections 2011," 2011, 23.

## A. ISLAM AND EGYPTIAN EDUCATION

Since the mid-nineteenth century, Egypt has had to struggle to determine the role of Islam in its education system. The role of Islam in education is not a new predicament that the Muslim Brotherhood must deal with, but is an issue all previous political groups have faced in Egypt. In 1922, the Egyptian government decided to maintain the secular approach to education introduced by the British. This decision minimized the amount of time devoted to religious studies.<sup>155</sup> In the Egyptian education system, religion is taught in the primary, preparatory and secondary levels and is strictly controlled by the government. Religion is only a small part of the curriculum, which accounts for three hours of the school week on the primary level and two hours of the school week on the preparatory and secondary levels. Islam is not included on the national exam that determines admittance to universities after the secondary level of education. Thus, students will spend a greater amount of time studying for subjects that determine their ability to attend university, dictating the rest of their lives, instead of religion.<sup>156</sup> The current system teaches a moderate interpretation of Islam that promotes religious toleration towards Christians and Jews.<sup>157</sup>

Since the 1970s, the proliferation of religious materials and television programs has become much more prevalent in Egypt. The wearing of hijab and niqab by woman and beards on men has become much more prevalent in Egyptian society. Also, the amount of students belonging to Islamic student groups has increased and obvious increase also exists in adherence to religious observance throughout society.<sup>158</sup> The majority of students think that the Egyptian education system has become too Westernized and that religion should be more prominent in secondary education. In

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<sup>155</sup> Langohr, "Colonial Education Systems and the Spread of Local Religious Movements: The Cases of British Egypt and Punjab," 162.

<sup>156</sup> Cook, "Egypt's National Education Debate," 481.

<sup>157</sup> Fatma H. Sayed, *Transforming Education in Egypt: Western Influence and Domestic Policy Reform* (Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press, 2006), 35.

<sup>158</sup> Cook, "Egypt's National Education Debate," 477.

addition, the majority of students think a more Islamic orientation to Egyptian universities would provide a better education.<sup>159</sup>

In 1993, the education minister, Husayn Kamal Baha' al-Din, tried to combat the spread of Islamism by implementing many new policies regarding education. He reduced religion in the curriculum, demoted teachers with Islamic leanings, and placed limitations on wearing the veil. Specifically, Islam was taught in a way that emphasized the commonalities with other monotheistic religions and minimized portions of the Quran that could be considered offensive to Jews and Christians. Husayn Kamal Baha' al-Din was heavily criticized for the changes and religious groups accused him of giving into American pressure to alter the curriculum. He countered those charges by stating that the United States only provided technical assistance and was not involved in developing the religious curriculum. He also justified the new religious education program by saying that al-Azhar had a hand in drafting the new curriculum.<sup>160</sup> The use of al-Azhar by the President and his cabinet to endorse their religious policies was done often by Mubarak and previous regimes. This practice started in 1961 when al-Azhar came under the control of the government in an effort to boost the religious legitimacy of President Nasser.<sup>161</sup>

## **B. THE AL-AZHAR SCHOOL SYSTEM**

The Al-Azhar system runs in parallel with the public educational system, but focuses more on religious instruction. Unlike the public school system, boys and girls are separated into different educational facilities at the preparatory and secondary levels. In addition, the Ministry of Education does not directly supervise the schools. Instead primary supervision is provided by the Supreme Council of the Al-Azhar Institution. Al-Azhar schools are divided into three levels: primary, preparatory, and secondary just like the government schools. Unlike the pervasive public perception, secular subjects are taught, but more focus is given to Islam than in the government schools. Al-Azhar

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<sup>159</sup> Cook, "Egypt's National Education Debate," 481.

<sup>160</sup> Steven Barraclough, "Between the Government and Islamists," *Middle East Journal* 52, no. 2 (Spring 1998): 246.

<sup>161</sup> Cleveland and Bunton, *A History of the Modern Middle East*, 321.

schools can be found all over Egypt, but are especially popular in rural areas in which government schools tend to be overcrowded and underfunded.<sup>162</sup> As of 2008, approximately 8,000 Al-Azhar schools exist in Egypt that account for 5% of school age children.<sup>163</sup> The graduates of this system are then automatically accepted into Al-Azhar University, the oldest and most respected Sunni Islamic university in the world.

In 1962, the Al-Azhar system was forced to include subjects in the curriculum other than those pertaining to Islam. This change not only affected the Al-Azhar University, but also the Al-Azhar primary and secondary schools.<sup>164</sup> New subjects added at the pre-university level were natural sciences, mathematics, and geography. At Al-Azhar University, courses of study were added, such as medicine and engineering. In addition to adding secular learning to their academic institutions, new regulations placed the administration of the entire Al-Azhar system under the control of the Egyptian head of state. President Nasser used al-Azhar for religious legitimacy to counter the growing power of the Muslim Brotherhood.<sup>165</sup>

During the 1960s, the number of students attending Al-Azhar primary and secondary schools was relatively low. Shaykh Abd al-Halim Mahmud took control of the Al-Azhar system in 1973 and remained in power until his death in 1978. He was known for his modernizing approach to teaching at Al-Azhar, preaching moderation, and embracing modern science as a religious duty.<sup>166</sup> Due to this shift in approach to education, the number of students attending the al-Azhar primary and secondary schools increased considerably in the 1970s and beyond. In 1963, only 212 pre-university Al-Azhar institutes with 64, 000 students existed. By 1983, approximately 1,300 institutes

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<sup>162</sup> The World Bank, *Arab Republic of Egypt Improving Quality, Equality, and Efficiency in the Education Sector: Fostering a Competent Generation of Youth*, 9.

<sup>163</sup> UNESCO Institute for Statistics, UIS Statistics In Brief, "Education (All Levels) Profile—Egypt, (n.d.), [http://stats.uis.unesco.org/unesco/TableViewer/document.aspx?ReportId=121&IF\\_Language=en&BR\\_Country=2200](http://stats.uis.unesco.org/unesco/TableViewer/document.aspx?ReportId=121&IF_Language=en&BR_Country=2200).

<sup>164</sup> Malika Zeghal, "Religion and Politics in Egypt: The Ulema of al-Azhar, Radical Islam, and the State (1952–94)," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 31, no. 3 (August 1999): 372.

<sup>165</sup> *Ibid.*, 374.

<sup>166</sup> *Ibid.*, 378.

with over 300, 000 students were in existence. The system continued to expand in the 1980s and reached 3,161 institutes by 1993 with 966,000 students.<sup>167</sup>

When Hosni Mubarak became the president in 1981, he assumed even more control over the Al-Azhar system to demonstrate his Islamic credentials. Mubarak's government needed Al-Azhar to generate Islamic legitimacy, especially with the growing popularity of the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist groups. Mubarak repeatedly called upon Al-Azhar to issue statements that justified his campaigns against the Muslim Brotherhood. The Mubarak regime saw Al-Azhar's main function as a religious authority that could be used to sanction the government's policies and denounce its opposition.<sup>168</sup> Al-Azhar's contrary position towards the Muslim Brotherhood is not a recent phenomenon. Al-Azhar has been used for the past 60 years to combat the growing power of the Muslim Brotherhood. In the struggle between Nasser and the Muslim Brotherhood in 1953 and 1954, Al-Azhar firmly backed the government against the Muslim Brotherhood. Al-Azhar again supported the government in the 1960s as it battled against the Muslim Brotherhood.<sup>169</sup>

Before the revolution, the Muslim Brotherhood had long argued that Al-Azhar lost its religious legitimacy and acted as a political puppet for the regime. Following the death of Sheikh Mohammed Sayed Tantawi in March 2010, this Muslim Brotherhood demanded that a body of scholars elect the head of Al-Azhar and not be appointed by the state.<sup>170</sup> Hamdi Hassan, spokesman of the Muslim Brotherhood, stated "We demand that the sheikh of Al-Azhar be elected by Azhar scholars and not appointed by the president. The status of Al Azhar has deteriorated, and it is no longer playing its role for Muslims."

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<sup>167</sup> Zeghal, "Religion and Politics in Egypt: The Ulema of al-Azhar, Radical Islam, and the State (1952-94)," 379.

<sup>168</sup> Baraclough, "Between the Government and Islamists," 236.

<sup>169</sup> Ibid., 238.

<sup>170</sup> Nadia Abou al Magd, "Muslim Brotherhood Seeks New Way to Pick Al Azhar Head," *The National*, March 12, 2010, <http://www.thenational.ae/news/world/middle-east/muslim-brotherhood-seeks-new-way-to-pick-al-azhar-head>.

He went on to say, “It’s very essential that Al Azhar regain its role, and this won’t happen while a government employee is at its head.”<sup>171</sup>

Tension between the two organizations continued following the revolution as well. Widespread local media coverage of the Muslim Brotherhood stated that Ahmed al-Tayeb, grand imam of al-Azhar, was not given a seat on the stage for President Morsi’s first address to Egypt. The religious leader was so upset he left the venue before the new president started to speak. To avoid an open conflict, Morsi apologized to al-Tayeb, claiming that the seating fiasco was due to poor organization.<sup>172</sup> This incident is one example of the petty animosity that the leadership of both organizations have for each other.

The leadership of both organizations may resent each other but recently, the Muslim Brotherhood and Al-Azhar are growing closer together ideologically and in terms of personnel. Muslim Brothers are among the thousands of students and educators in the Al-Azhar system.<sup>173</sup> Despite the history of hostility between the Muslim Brotherhood and Al-Azhar, the Muslim Brotherhood may look to the Al-Azhar education system as a model for its education system. The Muslim Brotherhood would have to implement the Al-Azhar techniques in existing government schools. Expanding the Al-Azhar system is not a feasible option because the system is far too small to meet Egypt’s educational needs.

### **C. ISLAM AND MODERN EDUCATION**

Growing concern in the West has occurred about the allegedly radicalizing influence of Islamic schools since the attacks on September 11, 2001, especially in countries, such as Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. In both countries, an implicit assumption by Western critics exists that the major cause of Islamic radicalism is the focus on religion in these schools. These critics see secularization of these schools as the only

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<sup>171</sup> al Magd, “Muslim Brotherhood Seeks New Way to Pick Al Azhar Head.”

<sup>172</sup> Jonathan Spyer, “The House the Muslim Brothers Built,” *Jerusalem Post*, August 24, 2012, 14.

<sup>173</sup> Baraclough, “Between the Government and Islamists,” 249.

answer to creating non-radical youth.<sup>174</sup> However, a completely secular school system runs counter to the belief that Islam is a complete way of life that does not recognize the division between religion and education that is accepted and expected in Western democracies. These different approaches to education present a challenge for educators in the Muslim world who seek reforms that will honor the place of Islam while delivering an education that will produce non-radicalized students.<sup>175</sup>

No inherent conflict between science and Islam occurs, and in actuality, at the core of Islam, is a thirst for knowledge and learning, in which the Quran promotes the obtaining of knowledge through many of its suras. Islam is not just a religion, but also a way of life that influences all aspects of a believer's life, including education. The aim of Islamic education is to develop humans through knowledge to enable them to follow the path of righteousness, and to become useful members of the community.<sup>176</sup> In Islam, learning becomes a religious obligation, compulsory on every Muslim throughout the entire life. The role of Islamic education is perceived as giving meaning to life, instilling the necessary discipline, preserving values, and creating a just society.<sup>177</sup>

#### **D. EARLY HISTORY OF ISLAMIC EDUCATION AND ISLAMIC GOLDEN AGE**

The Islamic Golden Age illustrates that Islam and science can coexist and that leaders do not have to choose one or the other when implementing an education system. The Golden Age of Islam began in the Abbasid rule, which lasted from 750 AD to 1258 AD. This period saw an explosion of intellectual activity in science, technology, literature, and history in the Muslim world. This period most clearly illustrates that Islam is completely compatible with science, medicine, mathematics, and other modern intellectual pursuits. Scholars made vast advances in science. Islamic intellectuals

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<sup>174</sup> Jeffrey Ayala Milligan, "Islamization or Secularization? Educational Reform and the Search for Peace in the Southern Philippines," *Current Issues in Comparative Education* 7 (December 2004): 30.

<sup>175</sup> Ibid.

<sup>176</sup> Shah, "Educational Leadership: An Islamic Perspective," 367.

<sup>177</sup> Ibid., 369.

collected new astronomical data, built the world's first observatory, and developed the first astrolabe.<sup>178</sup> Significant advances also occurred in medicine, agriculture, and diet.<sup>179</sup>

Muslims were taught from the beginning the importance of knowledge, and under that mandate, they began to collect classical works from the libraries in Constantinople, Baghdad, and Alexandria to expand their knowledge. Interest in the classics reached its highest point under the Caliph al-Mamun. He instructed his scholars to find as many classical manuscripts as possible and to translate them into Arabic in the Bayt al-Hikmah (House of Wisdom). The Bayt al-Hikmah was the most important place for translating classical writings into Arabic and played a significant role in expanding the intellectual base of Muslim society. Some of the most important work done at the Bayt al-Hikmah was in mathematics. In addition to translating famous works by Euclid and Archimedes, original work was conducted as well. Muhammad ibn Musa al-Khwarizmi wrote *Kitab al Jabr wa-I-Muqabalah* the first book on algebra that included two solutions for quadratic equations.<sup>180</sup>

Much of the early work at Bayt al-Hikmah concentrated on mathematics, but other fields, such as medicine, were also studied. The most important medical scholar at Bayt al-Hikmah was Hunayn ibn Ishaq, a Christian. These medical scholars were able to translate almost all the Greek medical works into Arabic, and like their counterparts in mathematics, expanded on the Greek translations. One example is Hunayn wrote 29 original works on ophthalmology that included the anatomy and physiology of the eye, as well as treatments for distorted vision. Bayt al-Hikmah showed that Muslims not only had a thirst for knowledge, but also were willing to learn from other cultures and religions to obtain it.<sup>181</sup>

This section on the Islamic Golden Age illustrates that historical Islam has been a force for advances in science and mathematics and that Islam and science can coexist. A

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<sup>178</sup> Judith Cochran, *Democracy in The Middle East: The Impact of Religion and Education* (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2011): 34.

<sup>179</sup> Ibid., 35.

<sup>180</sup> Ibid., 36.

<sup>181</sup> Ibid., 37.

large caveat to this example is being applied today. The Golden Age was driven by a few select scholars and did encompass a large portion of the population. Introducing a broad education program for the masses is significantly different from encouraging innovation from a select few. However, one can conclude that secular learning can coexist effectively with Islam.

#### **E. RESPONSE TO COLONIAL EDUCATION BY ISLAMIC MODERNISM**

Many Muslim scholars rejected colonialism, but at the same time, embraced the idea of modern education and science. They believed that the education systems could be advanced without compromising the Islamic foundations of the Muslim nations. An important figure in the reform movement of the nineteenth century was Jamal al-Din Afghani (1838–97). Jamal al-Din Afghani traveled throughout the Muslim world in an effort to strengthen the Muslim countries and drive out the colonialist powers. In addition to driving the European powers out of Muslim lands, Afghani's main goal was to synthesize the ideas of secular modernists and religious traditionalists. Afghani did not think rejecting Western occupation and influence meant rejecting reason and science. He thought that reason and science were actually an integral part of the religion and should be embraced not because they were Western ideas, but because they would improve Islamic society. He believed Muslims could become great powers through science and did not have to become more like the West to do it.<sup>182</sup>

Afghani wrote: "All wealth and riches are the result of science...At first the Muslim had no science, but, thanks to the Islamic religion, a philosophic arose among them...This is why for a short time they acquired all the sciences...those who forbid science and knowledge in the belief that they are safeguarding the Islamic religion are really the enemies of that religion. The Islamic religion is the closest of religions to science and knowledge, and there is no incompatibility between science and knowledge, and there is no incompatibility between science and knowledge and the foundation of the

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<sup>182</sup> John L. Esposito, *Islam: The Straight Path*, 4th ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 155.

Islamic faith.”<sup>183</sup> In other words, science and technology was not a Western concept that threatened Islam, but a universal truth that should be embraced by Muslims as it had been before when the Muslim world dominated the scientific world.<sup>184</sup>

One of Afghani’s most important disciples was Muhammad Abduh who went on to many accomplishments including becoming leading ulama in Egypt, reformer, and teacher at al-Azhar University, Mufti of Egypt, and most importantly, the founder of Islamic Modernism. In the late nineteenth century, he collaborated with Afghani to write many reformist articles and then was exiled from Egypt for participating in the Urabi revolt. After living in Paris, he returned to Egypt and started to focus attention again on reforming Egyptian society. Abduh believed that science and religion were not at odds but were in fact complimentary and were the twin sources of Islam. He also believed that religious scholars were failing their followers by not having the needed fresh interpretations of Islam necessary in a modern society.<sup>185</sup>

This section of the chapter illustrates that Islam and modern education are compatible. Even if the Muslim Brotherhood increases the presence of Islam in the curriculum, the effectiveness of the system will not be inherently undermined or the importance of secular subjects eroded, such as math and science. Islamic education consists of many versions, and not all are like the backwards versions practiced in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas in Pakistan. The West accepts the effects other religious traditions (e.g., Jesuits) have on education, and has seen that religion has often improved education and enhanced student performance. In sum, Islam is not inherently opposed to modern education, and if the Muslim Brotherhood increases the level of Islam in the curriculum, the quality of the education system will not be inherently undermined. The next few sections of this chapter explore the Muslim Brotherhood’s specific views on education.

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<sup>183</sup> Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, “An Islamic Response to Imperialism,” in *Islam in Transition*, 17–19.

<sup>184</sup> Esposito, *Islam: The Straight Path*, 156.

<sup>185</sup> *Ibid.*, 157.

## **F. MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD'S HISTORICAL VIEWS ON EDUCATION**

The Muslim Brotherhood was founded by Hassan al-Banna, an Egyptian schoolteacher, in 1928. In al-Banna's view, the way to transform Egyptian society was through education. In the first Muslim Brotherhood pamphlet published in 1929, "A Memorandum on Religious Education," al-Banna outlined his religious education policy. In this pamphlet, he promoted his belief that the purpose of education was not only to impart knowledge to the student, but also to transform the student into a person whose moral compass was guided by the teachings of the Quran and lived life by these teachings. Al-Banna consistently criticized the school system in Egypt for its weakness in producing graduates with a lack of basic academic skills and no sense of their religious or historical heritage. He wanted to transform the education system into one that produced competent academic graduates that were guided by a well-developed sense of Islamic law and customs.<sup>186</sup>

Al-Banna was not alone in promoting the importance of education in the development of the Muslim Brotherhood and a better Egypt. Mahmud Abd al-Halim, one of the founders of the Muslim Brotherhood, stated that the basis for the Muslim Brotherhood's ability to spread and prosper is through education.<sup>187</sup> Al-Banna was influenced by Jamal al-Din Afghani and Rashid Rida and other Islamic scholars' views on educational, but was also influenced by Western methods. Al-Banna was a graduate of the Dar al-Ulum school for teachers in Cairo. The curriculum of Dar al-Ulum was aimed at providing students with both a secular and religious education using Western pedagogical methods. His education caused al-Banna to implement theories of European holistic education, with the aim of producing well-rounded, but truly Islamic graduates. Al-Banna established the first Muslim Brotherhood School in 1931 in the town of Isma'iliyya above its first mosque. Al-Banna even went as far as to say that he could

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<sup>186</sup> Rosen, "The Muslim Brotherhood's Concept of Education," *Current Trends in Islamist Ideology* 7, 119.

<sup>187</sup> Ibid.

picture the likes of famous German educator Friedrich Froebel teaching at his new school.<sup>188</sup>

In the schools established by the Muslim Brotherhood, students were not taught just to memorize the Quran and the Sunna, but to internalize their principles and be able to apply them to every aspect of life. Al-Banna also expressed the need to teach students a love for one's homeland and the Islamic world as a whole. In addition, Al-Banna emphasized the need to teach students that they were part of a larger community in which the individual should work to improve the community as a whole. Al-Banna was extremely concerned with providing competent teachers and used the most capable members of the Brotherhood as teachers for the next generation. By 1935, the Brotherhood had 300 of these informal schools operating throughout Egypt.<sup>189</sup> By the 1940s, the Muslim Brotherhood became more standardized, and began to implement a curriculum that taught mathematics, reading, writing, rhetoric, and other secular subjects along with religious education. Still, the focus was on Islam and producing students who could spread the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood.<sup>190</sup>

Al-Banna wanted to reform society from the ground up, starting with the individual, then the family, government, and finally, the whole nation. The concept of education supported by the Muslim Brotherhood was more than transmitting knowledge to the student. The Muslim Brotherhood believed that education should aim at transforming the individual into a person guided by Islamic teachings in every aspect of life. As a political organization, the Muslim Brotherhood viewed its education effort as a way to gain a political position in the public sphere. The Muslim Brotherhood concentrated its efforts on the urban youth because it thought the urban youth would be the most likely to initiate change in the future. In addition, the Muslim Brotherhood saw the urban youth as the most likely segment of society that could be corrupted by secular influences of the West. The Muslim Brotherhood disliked the modern secular schools

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<sup>188</sup> Rosen, "The Muslim Brotherhood's Concept of Education," *Current Trends in Islamist Ideology* 7, 119.

<sup>189</sup> Ibid., 120.

<sup>190</sup> Ibid., 121.

because of the mingling of the sexes, the lack of religious teachings, and the reduction of Arabic teachings.<sup>191</sup>

After Nasser came to power, the role of the Muslim Brotherhood in education was significantly reduced for two reasons. First, the education system was rapidly expanded, which left little room for alternative schools run by the Muslim Brotherhood. Second, the government heavily targeted the Muslim Brotherhood, which limited its ability to provide educational services,<sup>192</sup> as well as reduced its role in education from an active provider to ancillary support and services, and a commentator on the government's policies.

In 1986, the Brothers became very involved in the teachers' faculty clubs and secured control of the clubs in Cairo, Alexandria, and Asyut. It gained the support and eventual control by promising to increase salaries and the availability of affordable housing, and improve health care services. It did not focus on politics and religion, but only goods and services. The Muslim Brotherhood was able to raise the salary of teachers threefold from 1986 to 1992.<sup>193</sup> In one instance, the Brothers met with the Education Minister Fathi Mohammad to demand affordable housing for young teachers. The Minister was shocked that the Muslim Brotherhood was asking for cheap housing because he thought it only cared about religion. The Brothers responded by saying that the Muslim Brotherhood cared deeply about education, not just religion, and would do what they could to improve the lives of teachers. They were successful in their efforts and gaining over 200 flats from the Ministry of Housing. The Muslim Brotherhood was also very effective at gaining healthcare for educators.<sup>194</sup>

In the early 1980s, the Muslim Brotherhood began heavily to recruit students in the universities to join the Muslim Brotherhood. These students were not attracted solely to the religious rhetoric of the Muslim Brotherhood, but the supply of goods and services no longer being provided by the state. They provided university students with cheap books, financial aid, and even discounted living spaces. The services provided to students

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<sup>191</sup> Hatina, "Restoring a Lost Identity: Models of Education in Modern Islamic Thought," 181–183.

<sup>192</sup> Cleveland and Bunton, *A History of the Modern Middle East*, 306.

<sup>193</sup> Al-Awadi, *In Pursuit of Legitimacy: The Muslim Brothers and Mubarak, 1982–2000*, 124.

<sup>194</sup> *Ibid.*, 125.

by the Muslim Brotherhood were superior to both the government and the leftists. Many students joined the Brotherhood and accepted its services not because of the Islamist principles, but because of the goods and services it provided.<sup>195</sup>

Islamist parties are able to recruit frustrated young people successfully whose needs are not being met by the university. The Muslim Brotherhood provided students with academic class notes, free tutoring services needed to pass examinations, and separate transportation for veiled women. Graduates of university education often turned to Islamists to find jobs, borrow funds from their local Mosque's banking system, and receive subsidized healthcare.<sup>196</sup> The Muslim Brotherhood supported improvements in the education system consistently over the past 30 years and made no demands to increase religious education.

#### **G. THE FREEDOM AND JUSTICE PARTY'S STANCE ON IMPROVING THE QUALITY OF EDUCATION**

The Muslim Brotherhood recognizes the desperate need to reform education, which is indicated by its review of the current conditions of the education system stated in its official party platform for the 2011 parliamentary elections. Its platform states, "None of the Egyptian universities came anywhere amongst the top 500 universities in the world. Moreover, Egypt ranked number 129 out of 134 countries in the quality of pre-university education."<sup>197</sup> This statement indicates it will address quality deficiencies in the education system. President Morsi has stressed the importance of higher education and scientific research, claiming it is the locomotive of development. He also stated he would meet with the Ministry of Finance to discuss raising the salaries for university professors to ensure they are compensated properly.<sup>198</sup>

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<sup>195</sup> Al-Awadi, *In Pursuit of Legitimacy: The Muslim Brothers and Mubarak, 1982–2000*, 37.

<sup>196</sup> Holmes "Higher Education Reform in Egypt: Preparing Graduates for Egypt's Changing Political Economy," 181.

<sup>197</sup> The Freedom and Justice Party, "Election Program the Freedom and Justice Party Egypt Parliamentary Elections 2011," 3.

<sup>198</sup> Egypt State Information Service, "Morsi-Education, Scientific Research Wings of Soft Power in Egypt," July 8, 2012.

The Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) promises to provide an accessible education system, effective and appropriate for all strata of society, and to protect the right to education.<sup>199</sup> As far as elementary and secondary education, the FJP stated in their official platform specific areas they would improve and focus on to include: doubling the education budget gradually, so as to match international rates, increasing the percentage of kindergarten capacity to 50%, increasing the number of classrooms by building 40,000 new classrooms, as a first stage, within five years, restoring trust in educational institutions to reduce the magnitude of the private lessons problem, solving the problem of illiteracy by providing human and material resources, and cooperating with colleges of education and civil society organizations who volunteer help and assistance in this regard.<sup>200</sup> These goals, however, are not accompanied by a concrete plan or method to ensure they are reached.<sup>201</sup>

The FJP also addresses higher education in its 2011 election platform. Its specific goals are implementing procedures for real and effective independence of Egyptian universities, encouraging horizontal expansion in public universities and community colleges to achieve a percentage of one university per two million people, linking the number of universities and students and their curricula to the needs of the labor market, and improve infrastructure of scientific laboratories, libraries and student activities.<sup>202</sup> The official program also addresses restoring the balance between education outputs and labor market requirements. The FJP specifically stated the desire to expand vocational, industrial, and technical schools to achieve excellent levels of education covering all the requirements of the labor market.<sup>203</sup>

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<sup>199</sup> The Freedom and Justice Party, "Election Program the Freedom and Justice Party Egypt Parliamentary Elections 2011," 23.

<sup>200</sup> Ibid., 26.

<sup>201</sup> The Freedom and Justice Party, "2011 Program on Human Development," December 4, 2011, <http://www.fjponline.com/article.php?id=195>.

<sup>202</sup> The Freedom and Justice Party, "Election Program The Freedom and Justice Party Egypt Parliamentary Elections 2011," 26.

<sup>203</sup> Ibid., 19.

The FJP also recognizes the need for improvements in technology. It states it will provide all faculties, colleges, institutes and educational establishments, of all stages of education, as well as public libraries, with high quality and high-speed internet services. In addition, the FJP platform states, “Develop educational institutions in the intermediate, university and postgraduate/higher studies stages, in the field of Computer Science and Information Technology, in order to move the country from the stage of learning information and technology to the stage of creating information and technology.”<sup>204</sup>

The Muslim Brotherhood needs to address the current deficiencies in the Egyptian education system. The need for general reform to improve the quality and effectiveness of the system will likely take precedent over any desire to increase religious instruction. In Egypt, the level of expenditure as a percentage of GDP is large compared to the international average, but due to inefficiencies in the education system, a corresponding high level of achievement does not exist.<sup>205</sup> Since the problem of universal education has been solved, the focus now needs to shift on quality and equality. The major areas the Muslim Brotherhood should focus on are improvements in teaching quality, reduction in private tutoring, and improving the quality of struggling schools. The Muslim Brotherhood has realized this, but does not have specific policies on how to implement changes or how to sequence improvements.

## **H. THE FREEDOM AND JUSTICE PARTY’S STANCE ON RELIGION IN EDUCATION**

The FJP’s 93-page long party program sheds significant light on the Brotherhood’s plans for Egypt. There is no aspect of human life that the program does not aim to discuss and to put under state regulation. On domestic issues, the FJP’s program calls for many of the Islamist policies historically associated with the Brotherhood. The Brotherhood’s historical obsession with the dangers posed to Egypt by foreign education is highlighted, and the program calls for Arabizing the teaching in

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<sup>204</sup> The Freedom and Justice Party, “Election Program the Freedom and Justice Party Egypt Parliamentary Elections 2011,” 40.

<sup>205</sup> The World Bank, *Arab Republic of Egypt Improving Quality, Equality, and Efficiency in the Education Sector: Fostering a Competent Generation of Youth*, 28.

universities, and asserts that the goal of education is to “strengthen Arab and Islamic identity.” The role of houses of worship should be expanded to include a department combating illiteracy, committees for solving disputes, a department for educational services, and others.<sup>206</sup> The FJP specifically states that it will promote religious freedom in the education system and include an emphasis on religious freedom in the curriculum.<sup>207</sup> However, some aspects of the FJP program on education are ambiguous on the role of religion, such as “integration of traditional family values and the values of chastity and modesty in education curricula.”<sup>208</sup>

The FJP’s official platform for the parliamentary elections is also highly focused on religion. It states:

Therefore, our program relies on religious institutions and expects them to play a prominent role in promoting the various cultural, political, social and other aspects of Egyptian life. Indeed, these institutions played an essential role in establishing Egypt’s leading position in education as well as religious and spiritual guidance. In this context, reform and development of the religious affairs sector, as well as the advancement of Al-Azhar are necessary for the revitalization and rejuvenation of Egyptian society, to restore to it the status it deserves with its glorious history and its prominent place in religious heritage.<sup>209</sup>

The FJP wants to reform Al-Azhar University completely, and has stated many reform policies to complete this goal. These proposed reforms include choosing the Grand Imam, Sheikh of Al-Azhar mosque also by election, from among members of the Islamic Research Academy; and granting for the Al-Azhar mosque and university financial and administrative independence.<sup>210</sup> Barry Rubin argues that the Muslim Brotherhood will take over the Al-Azhar system, and appoint a Brother as the chief qadi. Rubin continues to state it will penetrate all levels of the organization, which will

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<sup>206</sup> Samuel Tadros, “Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood After the Revolution,” *Current Trends in Islamist Ideology* 12 (Washington, DC: Hudson Institute, 2011): 17.

<sup>207</sup> The Freedom and Justice Party, “Election Program the Freedom and Justice Party Egypt Parliamentary Elections 2011,” 12.

<sup>208</sup> Ibid., 25.

<sup>209</sup> Ibid., 41.

<sup>210</sup> Ibid.

completely transform the al-Azhar system by making it more radical.<sup>211</sup> The Brotherhood has made no formal attempts at this time to dismantle the existing Al-Azhar structure.

The FJP does emphasize the importance of religion in all aspects of life. It states, “The Egyptian people are amongst the oldest and most devoted to their religion. They also have the most respect for the religious morals and values.”<sup>212</sup> The FJP goes on to state in its official platform, “the religion of Islam the supreme authority and fundamental framework for them in all fields. Therefore religious institutions should play a prominent role in promoting the various cultural, political, social and other aspects of Egyptian life.”<sup>213</sup> In reference to education the FJP’s platform, it later states that religious institutions played an essential role in establishing Egypt’s leading position in education.<sup>214</sup>

This chapter shows through the official statements and actions that the Muslim Brotherhood does plan to address the educational system of Egypt. It plans on making changes in two areas. First, it plans to improve the overall quality of both general and higher education. Second, the Muslim Brotherhood plans to increase the role of Islam in education. Even if the Muslim Brotherhood increases the presence of Islam in curriculum, the effectiveness of the system will not be inherently undermined or the importance of secular subjects eroded, such as math and science. More importantly, although the Muslim Brotherhood has expressed the desire to change the current education system, it has not developed concrete policies to implement change. In addition, it has not stated which changes take precedent over others.

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<sup>211</sup> Barry Rubin, “What Happened in Egypt,” *Jerusalem Post*, August 22, 2012.

<sup>212</sup> Freedom and Justice Party, “Election Program Parliamentary Elections 2011,” 36, (n.d.), <http://www.scribd.com/doc/73955131/FJP-Program-En> Page.

<sup>213</sup> Ibid.

<sup>214</sup> Ibid.

## **V. THE POLITICS OF THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD AND THEIR CURRENT POLITICAL SITUATION**

The previous chapter established how the Muslim Brotherhood historically viewed education in Egypt and its views on the current system. This chapter explores how the political landscape in Egypt and competing interests of other political entities will affect the education policy actually implemented by the Muslim Brotherhood-led government. The initial section of this chapter explores the political history of the Muslim Brotherhood to understand how it has evolved over the years and how it typically interacts with other political entities. The general history of the group is covered to provide context, but the focus of this chapter is on its historical willingness to compromise politically with other organizations. Its ability and willingness to compromise is an important aspect of its leadership, as it becomes the most powerful political entity in Egypt. The second section of this chapter covers how the importance of religion has ebbed and flowed in the Muslim Brotherhood since its founding. The third section of this chapter addresses the Muslim Brotherhood's current political environment. This section navigates through the other power brokers in Egypt by depicting their relative strength and their objectives compared to those of the Muslim Brotherhood.

The final portion of this chapter addresses the fact that the debate on Islam in school is not unique to Egypt, and that Islam in national education poses significant challenges for all contemporary Muslim-majority nations. Many Muslim nations share common problems of integrating the secular and religious curricula, and the politicization of religious schooling.<sup>215</sup> This section offers a comparison to Turkey, another country led by a moderate Islamist party. While the situation in the Turkish education system is not exactly the same as the one in Egypt, enough similarities exist to help support the development of general conclusions for the way ahead in Egypt. Both countries have moderate Islamist governments that face internal opposition from a strong military and have to contend with education systems that fail to provide the necessary skills to their graduates. In addition, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt is keenly aware of the how the

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<sup>215</sup> Pak, "Cultural Politics and Vocational Religious Education: The Case of Turkey," 335.

AK party is proceeding with its educational policy in Turkey and is learning from AK party's experiences, which allows it to make more prudent decisions as it advances its education policies.

#### **A. MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD GENERAL HISTORY**

The Muslim Brotherhood was founded by Hassan al-Banna, a layman educated at the Teachers' Training College. The Brotherhood grew dramatically during the 1930s with 500 branches throughout Egypt and a membership of over 20,000. The Muslim Brotherhood was both innovative and traditional in its approach. It was traditional because al-Banna thought the resurgence of Islam was necessary to restore Egyptian greatness. However, al-Banna did not just want to implement shariah and have the people of Egypt revert to how they lived in the past. The progressive message of the Muslim Brotherhood wanted Egyptians to take advantage of the new technology introduced by the British, and modernize and incorporate it into traditional Islamic values.<sup>216</sup>

The appeal of the Muslim Brotherhood was not limited to the underprivileged. Its message was embraced by people from all classes who felt marginalized by the current political situation. The urban poor were attracted to the group because of its social welfare programs and because the Brotherhood provided a place for religious community. University students were attracted to the Muslim Brotherhood's desire to reform the government because they were faced with a dismal economy and only the hope of a low paying government position despite their academic achievements. Youth in general supported the Brotherhood because of its complete defiance with regard to British occupation and the Treaty of 1936. This wide appeal to many segments of society allowed the Muslim Brotherhood to emerge from World War II as a significant force in Egyptian politics.<sup>217</sup>

The Muslim Brotherhood was by far the most popular political group in Egypt following the 1952 revolution. Many of the Free Officers actually had ties to the Muslim Brotherhood and cooperation initially occurred between the two organizations as each

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<sup>216</sup> Cleveland and Bunton, *A History of the Modern Middle East*, 199.

<sup>217</sup> Ibid., 200.

tried to control the other. The initial cooperation did not last long, and in 1954, the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) went on the offensive against the Muslim Brotherhood after the latter attempted to assassinate Nasser.<sup>218</sup> The RCC retaliated by outlawing the Muslim Brotherhood, and killed six of its leaders and imprisoned thousands more. The Muslim Brotherhood was forced to operate underground, but was far from eliminated, and remained a powerful force.<sup>219</sup>

During the 1980s, the Muslim Brotherhood became the representative of the moderate centrist political movement by shunning violence. The Muslim Brotherhood expanded its influence on university campuses and gained control of the boards of many of the professional organizations. In addition, the Muslim Brotherhood remained active in providing social services to the public when the government failed to do so. The Muslim Brotherhood provided medical, educational, and social welfare services.<sup>220</sup>

The Muslim Brotherhood during the 1980s was still prohibited from being members of the parliament, but many ran as independents and received seats in parliament. Under Egyptian law, religious parties were not allowed to run for public office.<sup>221</sup> The lack of highly contentious ideas in the Muslim Brotherhood's ideology on religion made it more appealing than the extremist views expressed by other religious groups, which made it more acceptable to larger portions of the population compared to the militant Islamic groups. In general, the organization's religious message conformed to the popular understanding of Islam and the prescriptions of religious scholars who worked under the authority of the state. Its Islamic message is also universally understood by the population when compared to liberal democracy or communism, which are foreign in nature.<sup>222</sup>

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<sup>218</sup> Cleveland and Bunton, *A History of the Modern Middle East*, 306.

<sup>219</sup> Ibid.

<sup>220</sup> Ibid., 448.

<sup>221</sup> Ibid.

<sup>222</sup> Ziad Munson, "Islamic Mobilization: Social Movement Theory and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood," *The Sociological Quarterly* 42, no. 4 (Autumn 2001): 504.

## **B. THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD'S WILLINGNESS TO COMPROMISE AND FOCUS ON SOCIAL WELFARE**

When Mubarak came to power in 1981, he was much more tolerant of the Muslim Brotherhood, which the latter took advantage of immediately. During the 1980s, the Muslim Brotherhood rapidly expanded its social network in an effort to gain political recognition.<sup>223</sup> During the 1980s, the Brotherhood decided to work within the existing political system and take a strong stance against violence as a means to initiate change. The decision to abandon any form of radicalism was influenced heavily by the influx of younger members who had not suffered through the brutal repression enforced by Nasser's regime.<sup>224</sup> Also during this time period, , the Muslim Brotherhood decided to expand its organization (tanzim). In addition to a general expansion, the Brotherhood developed specialized departments to focus on specific issues. Eleven departments included both departments on education and teachers.<sup>225</sup> The decision to enter formal politics was hotly debated not only between the old and young, but also in the Guidance Council itself. Umar al-Tilmesani, then the head of the Guidance Council, argued that the Muslim Brotherhood could both expand its social programs and participate in formal politics.<sup>226</sup>

In the early 1980s, the Muslim Brotherhood began to recruit students in the universities heavily to join the Muslim Brotherhood. These students were not attracted solely to the religious rhetoric of the Muslim Brotherhood, but the supply of goods and services no longer being provided by the state. It provided university students with cheap books, financial aid, and even discounted living spaces. The services provided to students by the Muslim Brotherhood were superior to both the government and the leftists. Many students joined the Brotherhood and accepted its services not because of the Islamist principles, but because of the goods and services it provided.<sup>227</sup>

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<sup>223</sup> Al-Awadi, *In Pursuit of Legitimacy: The Muslim Brothers and Mubarak, 1982–2000*, 37.

<sup>224</sup> *Ibid.*, 61.

<sup>225</sup> *Ibid.*, 63.

<sup>226</sup> *Ibid.*, 57.

<sup>227</sup> *Ibid.*, 37.

In 1984, the Muslim Brotherhood joined an alliance with the New Wafd party and was the only alliance to win enough seats to enter parliament other than the National Democratic Party. The Muslim Brotherhood's goals in parliament were to initiate reform within the system and to show the public that it had truly adopted a non-violent approach to change.<sup>228</sup>

Abdul Mun'em Abu Al-Futuh stated:

We were not much concerned with how large our number was in parliament in 1984. This was our first experience and we just wanted to make our presence felt. We wanted to prove our presence those who despised us; we wanted to have a presence in the society and to function through legal and open channels. Otherwise we would not have engaged in the political process in the first place.

Tilmesani's decision to align with the secular New Wafd Party in 1984 showed the Muslim Brotherhood was truly willing to compromise with groups that did not completely align with them politically. Tilmesani practiced a very flexible strategy and aimed to forge relations with his political and ideological opponents. Nothing exemplified this attitude more than the alliance with the Wafd Party, which had always been secular and nationalist.<sup>229</sup> During their time in parliament from 1984 to 1987, the Muslim Brotherhood acted in a very professional manner. It did not engage in religious rhetoric, but instead focused on addressing the socio-economic concerns of its constituencies.<sup>230</sup>

In the 1980s, the younger brothers in the universities were not overtly religious. Unlike the Brothers of the 1970s, they wore western clothes and not the julbab, and did not have long beards. Instead of focusing primarily on religion, they focused more on freedom and democracy and serving the educational needs of the students. This emphasis was unlike the 1970s when the Brotherhood in universities focused almost completely on religious revival. This focus on freedom and democracy has continued to this day.<sup>231</sup>

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<sup>228</sup> Al-Awadi, *In Pursuit of Legitimacy: The Muslim Brothers and Mubarak, 1982–2000*, 80.

<sup>229</sup> Ibid.

<sup>230</sup> Ibid., 82.

<sup>231</sup> Ibid., 91.

Ahmad Al-Nahas was very active for the Muslim Brotherhood in promoting social welfare, especially at Alexandria University and various syndicates. He stated that the Brotherhood focused solely on providing services in syndicates rather than spreading their religious message during the early 1980s. He went on to say that the best way to gain support was to provide services not through religious indoctrination. It took a very a-political approach to providing services.<sup>232</sup> The Muslim Brotherhood learned that providing goods and services was more effective in establishing support than the use of religious rhetoric.

The Muslim Brotherhood participated in the 1987 parliamentary elections as it had in 1984. It formed the Islamic Alliance with 'Amal' and the Ahrar parties and won 36 seats compared to only eight in 1984. As in 1984, the Muslim Brotherhood concentrated on issues other than religion. It was heavily critical of the regime's handling of education and pushed Mubarak to improve the infrastructure and facilities of the schools. It also supported efforts to improve Egypt's literacy rate.<sup>233</sup>

The new guard beginning to dominate the Muslim Brotherhood has very different views than the old guard that has run it since its founding. The new guard mostly emerged from universities, where it dominated campus politics and learned to deal with other parties. This experience in campus politics exposed these members of the new guard to daily interactions with students who had different ideologies and forced them to form alliances and work with these groups that had different political views. This familiarity has conditioned the new guard to be more open to compromise and more in line with secular politics. The new guard assigns greater importance to secular politics and its willingness to compromise can be seen in the elections in 2005 and 2011 in which it formed alliances with parties on both the right and the left.<sup>234</sup> The average young Muslim Brother has changed, is now much more open to coordination with other groups, and is referred to as the new breed of Islamist who reads blogs and watches *al-Jazeera*. In

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<sup>232</sup> Al-Awadi, *In Pursuit of Legitimacy: The Muslim Brothers and Mubarak, 1982–2000*, 97.

<sup>233</sup> *Ibid.*, 114.

<sup>234</sup> Mohammed Zahid and Michael Medley, "Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Sudan," *Review of African Political Economy* 33, no. 110 (September 2006): 703.

addition, these new Brothers have not experienced the political oppression the older Brothers have experienced.<sup>235</sup>

A turning point in the Muslim Brotherhood's political views came in 2004 when the General Guide Ma'mun al-Hudaybi passed away. He had been a staunch proponent of an apolitical Muslim Brotherhood and his death, coupled with the release of many younger members imprisoned for political activities in the 1990s, shifted the Muslim Brotherhood's stance on politics. The younger generation did not fill the vacancy left in the office of General Guide, but did have two of its most prominent members attain the post of deputy General Guide, Muhammad Habib and Khayrat al-Shatir. In addition, the new General Guide Muhammad Akif supported a new political agenda despite being a member of the old guard.<sup>236</sup>

In the 2005 parliamentary elections, the Muslim Brotherhood gained 88 seats running officially as independents. By this time, the Muslim Brotherhood viewed the parliament as the primary means for political change in Egypt.<sup>237</sup> These elections were important for the Muslim Brotherhood in preparing for its electoral victory in 2011 because it forced it to prepare detailed proposals and increase its knowledge in all areas of governance. Brotherhood representatives serve on a range of committees that cover economic, educational and social issues. The Brotherhood drew its expertise from its own members who consisted of academics and professionals from various fields, including doctors, lawyers and scientists. The Muslim Brotherhood also developed an excellent record for researching topics extensively and having a much better record of participating in debates than secular parties.<sup>238</sup>

Observers argued that the Muslim Brotherhood used its representatives as puppets and would be in lock step with the Muslim Brotherhood headquarters in Cairo. The voting record shows that the Muslim Brotherhood does not vote as a monolithic bloc. An

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<sup>235</sup> Hossam El-Hamalawy. "Comrades and Brothers," *Middle East Report*, no. 242 (Spring 2007), 43.

<sup>236</sup> Rutherford, "What Do Egypt's Islamists Want? Moderate Islam and the Rise of Islamic Constitutionalism," 721.

<sup>237</sup> Shehata and Stacher, "The Brotherhood Goes to Parliament," 32–36.

<sup>238</sup> Ibid.

example occurred in May 2005 when members voted differently on a consumer protection law. In general, however, the Brotherhood voted as a block on major issues, such as the extension of emergency law, judicial authority, and press legislation.<sup>239</sup> Despite openly stating that one of its primary goals is an Islamic state, the Brotherhood has shown it is perfectly comfortable working through democratic elections. More importantly, the Muslim Brotherhood has proven it is willing to work with other political parties, including secular ones.<sup>240</sup>

### C. MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD FOLLOWING THE REVOLUTION

After the fall of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in February 2011, many thought that the revolution led by young liberals would run the country. However, despite young liberals leading the revolution, the Muslim Brotherhood has filled the void left by the old regime and remains at the forefront of Egyptian politics.<sup>241</sup> When word of the demonstrations against the government was becoming more organized and more pronounced, the Muslim Brotherhood initially did not want to get involved. It thought the protests would eventually fail, and that as Islamists, it would feel the brunt of the punishment. However, by January 23, 2011, the Brotherhood announced it would participate in the demonstrations as it saw it had the potential to change the political landscape. The leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood sought to portray the Brotherhood as part of the rest of the Egyptian opposition struggling to meet the demands of the average Egyptian, who was being ignored by the government. The Muslim Brotherhood did not mobilize and go in full force to Tahrir Square in the first few days, but did allow its younger members to participate.<sup>242</sup>

After seeing the size and staying power of the initial demonstrations and the inability of the government to react to them, the Muslim Brotherhood realized a potential existed for change. The next demonstration was scheduled for Friday, January 28, 2011,

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<sup>239</sup> Shehata and Stacher, "The Brotherhood Goes to Parliament," 36.

<sup>240</sup> Pargeter, *The Muslim Brotherhood: The Burden of Tradition*, 216.

<sup>241</sup> Tadros, "Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood After the Revolution," 5.

<sup>242</sup> *Ibid.*, 7.

and was a perfect setting for the Brotherhood to join the protests in full force. After Friday prayers, the movement began mobilizing its members, and by using each mosque as a launching site for a demonstration, the Brotherhood was able to bring thousands of its members to the streets. These protesters quickly overwhelmed the local police forces and caused the government to call in the military.<sup>243</sup>

The initial goals of the Muslim Brotherhood before it became clear that the regime would fall were limited. The first goal was recognition for the Muslim Brotherhood as an organization that could operate and negotiate with the government. The second goal was to allow the Muslim Brotherhood the ability to participate openly in the political process by forming a political party. The final goal was to ensure its role in the political process in the future by not allowing bans on its participation.<sup>244</sup>

Many analysts initially believed that the Arab Spring would exacerbate splits inside the Muslim Brotherhood, and especially between moderates and traditionalist. These analysts have exaggerated the extent of the differences inside the Brotherhood, and, more importantly, the ability of any potential breakaway group to pose a threat to the mother organization. The ties that exist between Brotherhood members are simply too hard to break because they extend beyond ideology, as well as also often involving financial, social and familial connections. Leaving the movement on bad terms often means losing financially and being shunned by family and friends.<sup>245</sup> The interaction between the Muslim Brotherhood and its newly created political party, the FJP, remains unclear, especially if non-Brothers can join the FJP and take on positions of leadership.<sup>246</sup>

If the Muslim Brotherhood had gained a stake in the Egyptian government in the past, it would have had a lot of rhetoric, but very few concrete policies and little technical expertise. Over the past five years, the Brotherhood has worked hard to develop intricate policy proposals in a plethora of fields. The Brotherhood is able to use the members who

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<sup>243</sup> Tadros, "Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood After the Revolution," 8.

<sup>244</sup> Ibid., 9.

<sup>245</sup> Ibid., 15.

<sup>246</sup> Ibid.

work in the universities, private business and state institutions to gain the knowledge to build it various policies.<sup>247</sup> The Brotherhood is trusted by the population not to take advantage of its government position for personnel gain despite possibly not agreeing with its politics.<sup>248</sup> In the cultural arena, the Muslim Brotherhood will be slow to implement its view of a good Islamic society. Despite wanting to satisfy its political base, the Muslim Brotherhood will likely be slow in implementing any radical policy changes.

#### **D. MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD'S RECENT ELECTORAL SUCCESSES**

Mohamed Morsi is the leader of the Muslim Brotherhood's FJP. He was the party's second choice to run for the presidency, until the original contender Khairat al-Shater, lost his appeal against disqualification.<sup>249</sup> Mohamed Morsi won the election and became the President of Egypt in June 2012. He is currently in a political battle with the military leadership in Cairo.<sup>250</sup> In the presidential election, Morsi barely beat Ahmed Shafik, the last prime minister to serve under former President Hosni Mubarak, and captured 52% of the votes. Following his victory in the presidential elections, Morsi resigned from the Muslim Brotherhood and its FJP in an effort to send a message that he will represent all Egyptians.<sup>251</sup>

International observers deemed the election of the People's Assembly to be a successful, although some irregularities rose. Islamists controlled 70% of the 498 seats with the Muslim Brotherhood's FJP-led Democratic Alliance controlling the most at 47% (235 total).<sup>252</sup> The Islamist Alliance-list headed by the Salafist Nour Party came in second with 25% (125 seats), followed by the Wafd at 8%, and the liberal Egyptian bloc

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<sup>247</sup> Nathan J. Brown, "When Victory Becomes an Option: Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood Confronts," *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace* (January 2012): 12.

<sup>248</sup> *Ibid.*, 15.

<sup>249</sup> BBC News Middle East, "Egyptian Presidential Elections: The Candidates," May 23, 2012, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-17859639>.

<sup>250</sup> Elise Labott, "Clinton Meets with Egypt's New President," *CNN*, July 14, 2012, [http://www.cnn.com/2012/07/14/world/africa/egypt-clinton/index.html?hpt=wo\\_c1](http://www.cnn.com/2012/07/14/world/africa/egypt-clinton/index.html?hpt=wo_c1)

<sup>251</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>252</sup> U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, *Egypt in Transition*, by Jeremy M. Sharp, CRS Report RL33003 (Washington, DC: Office of Congressional Information and Publishing, 2012), 3.

party list at 6.8%.<sup>253</sup> The results of the parliamentary elections indicate the strength and appeal of the Muslim Brotherhood. The Egyptian Supreme Court nullified the results of these parliamentary elections as unconstitutional, and as of August 2012, no elected parliament exists.

#### **E. THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD'S INTERACTIONS WITH OTHER POLITICAL ENTITIES**

The previous section addressed how the Muslim Brotherhood achieved its position in the newly formed government of Egypt and how it currently views education. This section addresses the fact that although the Muslim Brotherhood has gained significant power in the new government, it must negotiate with and placate other political actors. The Muslim Brotherhood will not be able to act unilateral to implement policies it wishes to pursue. This chapter covers the other significant political forces in Egypt, and details its relative strength, and how its objectives compare to those of the Muslim Brotherhood.

##### **1. Supreme Council of the Armed Forces**

In February 2011, President Hosni Mubarak resigned as President of Egypt and the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) assumed executive authority of Egypt.<sup>254</sup> Since then, a high level of unrest in Egypt has occurred as different factions in Egyptian society try to have their interests represented in the government that replaces Mubarak. These different groups have resorted to popular protests, political campaigns, and other measures to gain influence. Within the various groups fighting for power, the Muslim Brotherhood and the SCAF have emerged as the two most powerful forces in Egyptian politics.<sup>255</sup> The manner in which the SCAF interacts with the newly elected officials who are predominately members of the Muslim Brotherhood will significantly impact the policy decisions regarding the Egyptian education system.<sup>256</sup>

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<sup>253</sup> U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, *Egypt in Transition*, 3.

<sup>254</sup> *Ibid.*, 1.

<sup>255</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>256</sup> *Ibid.*

Field Marshal Mohamed Hussein Tantawi, a 76-year-old career infantry officer, who fought in Egypt's wars with Israel in 1967 and 1973, headed the SCAF, which has been extremely active in establishing their authority. They have regulated the process that approved amendments to Egypt's constitution, issued a constitutional declaration, forced the removal of the parliament, and issued new statutes on the way parties could behave during parliamentary elections. According to Gallup polls, however, 63% of Egyptians believe it would be bad for the military to remain involved in politics after the presidential elections.<sup>257</sup> Despite the people's apparent dislike for the military, it will remain one of the strongest forces in the government that forms in the coming years. The Muslim Brotherhood and the ruling SCAF are negotiating behind the scenes for a transition of power acceptable to both sides and the Egyptian people.

An example of the limit of SCAF power occurred in November 2011. The SCAF attempted to interfere with the appointment of members to the constitutional assembly, which is the right of parliament according to the March 2011 constitutional referendum. The Muslim Brotherhood, which had correctly anticipated a victory in the parliamentary elections and perceived the SCAF's interference as a threat to its own power, responded by organizing a massive protest in Cairo on November 18. The protests resulted in condemnation of the SCAF and a subsequent concession by the military to accelerate the timetable for transition to civilian rule from 2013 to the summer of 2012.<sup>258</sup> This concession by the SCAF demonstrated how they miscalculated the degree of opposition to changes to the transition plan, and indicates the SCAF is limited in their ability to shape the new government.

President Mohamed Morsi forced the retirement of the defense minister and the army chief of staff in an effort to reclaim a measure of political power. Mr. Morsi also nullified the military constitutional declaration issued before he took office. He replaced the previous declaration that had restricted the president's powers with a new declaration that greatly expanded presidential powers. In addition, the new declaration gives him significant influence in the formation of the body that will draft the new Egyptian

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<sup>257</sup> U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, *Egypt in Transition*, 1.

<sup>258</sup> Ibid.

constitution. Field Marshal Tantawi had served as the defense minister for more than 20 years. His removal was a major step in solidifying Morsi's legitimacy. In addition to removing Tantawi, President Morsi removed Sami Hafez Anan, the Army Chief of Staff, as well as the heads of the Navy and Air Force.<sup>259</sup>

The powers assumed by President Morsi following his new declaration allow him to select a new panel to write the Egyptian constitution. He has also more powers to pass legislation; however, he promises to give this power back to the parliament once a new parliament is formed.<sup>260</sup> Steven A. Cook argues that Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi's decision to change the military leadership and cancel the military's June 17 constitutional decree was the result of a simple consolidation of power. He does not believe the move should shock people because any good national leader consolidates his power once he takes office.<sup>261</sup>

Cook believes that Morsi's shake-up at the Egyptian Ministry of Defense will be followed by a strategic realignment between Cairo and Washington, but that it is hard to draw any conclusion just yet about Egypt's future political structure and orientation. Many have assumed that Morsi's removal of Egypt's top national security and defense officials might signal a shift in Egyptian foreign policy away from the United States. However, no countries can fill the void of the United States as Egypt's patron. Egypt may not want a patron at this point, but with all of its internal instability, may need one to ensure the economy and security situation improve to acceptable levels.<sup>262</sup>

How the SCAF-Brotherhood agreement over the powers of the military once civilian rule is established will be critical to stabilizing Egypt's domestic politics, especially education. Former President Jimmy Carter stated, "I don't think the SCAF is

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<sup>259</sup> Kareem Fahim, "In Upheaval for Egypt, Morsi Forces Out Military Chiefs," *The New York Times*, August 12, 2012, <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/13/world/middleeast/egyptian-leader-ousts-military-chiefs>.

<sup>260</sup> Ibid.

<sup>261</sup> Steven A. Cook, "Morsi Makes His Move: What the Power Grab Means for Cairo and Washington," *Foreign Affairs*, August 13, 2012, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137823/steven-a-cook/morsi-makes-his-move?page=show>.

<sup>262</sup> Ibid.

going to turn over full responsibility to the civilian government. There are going to be some privileges of the military that would probably be protected” following a meeting with Field Marshal Hussein Tantawi.<sup>263</sup> The exact details of the separation of powers between elected officials and the military in Egypt’s emerging political system are unclear. The military will likely retain certain powers after the transition, especially in the areas of national security and foreign affairs. The military leaders will be less concerned with domestic issues, such as education,<sup>264</sup> which may allow the Muslim Brotherhood to have a degree of flexibility when dealing with the role of Islam in education.

## **2. Salafists**

Islamists controlled 70% of the 498 seats in the People’s Assembly before it was dissolved, with the Muslim Brotherhood’s FJP-led Democratic Alliance controlling the most at 47% (235 total).<sup>265</sup> The Islamist Alliance-list headed by the Salafist Nour Party came in second with 25% (125 seats), followed by the Wafd at 8%, and the liberal Egyptian bloc party list at 6.8%.<sup>266</sup> With an overwhelming majority of seats, most experts anticipated that domestic legislative issues, such as education, would be subject primarily to competition between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafists.

The Muslim Brotherhood is extremely resistant to claims that it will create a so-called natural alliance with the Salafist movements that also did well in the elections. The Brotherhood is likely telling the truth in this instance because it views the Salafist parties more as natural competitors than natural partners. Furthermore, by including moderates and social liberals in its coalition, the Muslim Brotherhood quells fears by the public that the liberals will be marginalized in the new government. In this setting, the Muslim Brotherhood will be able to pursue a few selected policies, but not take stances that leave it vulnerable to criticism and attacks from the left.<sup>267</sup>

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<sup>263</sup> U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, *Egypt in Transition*, 2.

<sup>264</sup> *Ibid.*, 3.

<sup>265</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>266</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>267</sup> Brown, “When Victory Becomes an Option: Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood Confronts Success,” 9.

The Muslim Brotherhood clearly supports Islamist principles, but its beliefs differ sharply from Salafists. Salafists take a conservative, literalist approach to interpreting the Koran, and are expected to focus on infusing Islam into domestic policies in a much more rigid manner. Egypt's Salafist movement wants to transform Egypt into an Islamic state by making Shari'ah law the main source of legislation in the country. The Salafists have built broad-based grassroots networks throughout the country and managed to unite quickly after the revolution. However, they lack a good understanding of how Egyptian politics work and will not be able to match the Muslim Brotherhood in support and power in the near future.<sup>268</sup> Also prior to the revolution, the Salafists avoided politics and instead focused on running social programs and promoting their strict interpretation of Islam through their network of mosques. Salafists have moved ferociously into the political arena because they see it as an excellent tool to spread Islamist ideology.<sup>269</sup>

The electoral success of the Salafist groups shows they have a base of supporters and are competing directly with the Muslim Brotherhood for recruits and supporters. The Muslim Brotherhood does not want to alienate its base and forfeit those supporters to the Salafists by appearing too tentative in promoting an Islamic society that is the base of the Brotherhood's doctrine. Salafists have been integrated into parliaments before, in particular the Kuwaiti Parliament, and acted in a reasonable manner by being cordial to all members, including women and liberals.<sup>270</sup> Despite the competition with the Salafists, the Muslim Brotherhood will be slow to institute massive reform and will view the political mechanism as a tool to minimize corruption and focus on its social agenda through its private organization.

Most experts assume the FJP to differentiate itself from the Salafist opposition by being more pragmatic, especially in how the economy is run and organized. Egypt's economy has declined significantly since the revolution with GDP growth in 2011 of only 1.8%.<sup>271</sup> In addition, foreign exchange reserves have been dropping rapidly, from a

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<sup>268</sup> Tadros, "Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood After the Revolution," 11.

<sup>269</sup> U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, *Egypt in Transition*.

<sup>270</sup> Brown, "When Victory Becomes an Option: Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood Confronts," 17.

<sup>271</sup> U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, *Egypt in Transition*, 4.

pre-revolution level of \$36 billion to perhaps as little as \$10 billion by February 2012.<sup>272</sup> The Muslim Brotherhood will be very practical in dealing with economic issues and buying some freedom to adjust the education system to incorporate more religious instruction.

### **3. United States**

The United States has a long-standing military relationship with Egypt, and has a profound interest in maintaining the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty. In addition, over the past 40 years, Egypt has been an Arab ally, which the United States needs for stability and to ensure its ability to influence the region.<sup>273</sup> Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has stated, “that the United States would work to support the military’s return to a purely national security role...and the United States supports the full transition to civilian rule, with all that it entails.”<sup>274</sup> The United States’ main ability to shape Egypt’s education policy is through the aid given to Egypt. The Egyptian government is in dire need of economic relief and must not irritate the United States too much or it risk losing the aid it so desperately need to form new institutions and stabilize the country.

#### ***a. United States Aid to Egypt History and Reasons***

Since 1975, Egypt has received significant amounts of educational aid and support from the United States. Improving the quality of education in Egypt has been a focus of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) because of the fundamental link quality education plays in Egypt’s national development.<sup>275</sup> An improved Egyptian education system increases productivity and improves the overall economy by decreasing the likelihood of internal instability.<sup>276</sup> By increasing internal stability within Egypt, the United States improves stability in the entire region, especially

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<sup>272</sup> U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, *Egypt in Transition*, 4.

<sup>273</sup> *Ibid.*, 1.

<sup>274</sup> Labott, “Clinton Meets with Egypt’s New President.”

<sup>275</sup> El Kadi and Dalkir, “What Challenges Confront Quality Assurance and Accreditation Initiatives in Egypt? An Empirical Case Study on the Higher Education Enhancement Project HEEP.”

<sup>276</sup> Sayed, *Transforming Education in Egypt: Western Influence and Domestic Policy*, 46.

with Israel, a major focus of U.S. foreign policy. In addition to securing regional stability with Israel, U.S. foreign aid to Egypt has always played the national security function of reducing Islamic fundamentalism, as well as ensuring various other American interests.

Egyptians have often criticized USAID educational aid for being anti-Islamic and only serving the needs of the United States and its client state Israel. Egyptians perceptions of U.S. involvement in the education system is affected by hundreds of years of outside interference from the Ottomans, to Muhammad Ali, to the British. The Egyptian people still view foreign interference in education as a way to mold their people to make them more accepting to foreign rule and influence.<sup>277</sup>

Despite the difficulties, significant evidence exists that education not only improves the overall economy, but also has positive effects on income distribution. Additionally, evidence states that as primary school and secondary school enrollments increase, the income gaps between the poorest and middle class in society tend to decrease, which occurs because over half of the inequality in earnings can be explained by the inequality in education of workers.<sup>278</sup> The World Bank has determined that returns to investments by international agencies in education are higher than or at least as high as returns to other types of investment. In a study that incorporated 61 developing countries, it was found that returns to education were higher than returns to physical capital. It was also determined that returns for primary education was the highest, that returns for secondary education was next, and returns for higher education produced the lowest level of returns.<sup>279</sup>

#### ***b. Initial Support to Egyptian Education***

Foreign assistance from the USAID has resulted in the allocation of millions of dollars to the Egyptian education system. USAID supported 16 projects to support the Egyptian education system from 1975 to 1980. These programs were

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<sup>277</sup> Jandhyala B. G. Tilak, "Foreign Aid for Education," *International Review for Education* 34, no. 3 (1988): 315.

<sup>278</sup> *Ibid.*, 317.

<sup>279</sup> *Ibid.*, 316.

extremely diverse in their support and included training school bus mechanics, textbook development, improving primary and secondary educational curriculum, and starting schools that operate all year. Despite the extensive goals of these programs, very little was accomplished during this time period. The biggest problem was very little integration of the goals of the Egyptian Ministry of Education and USAID.<sup>280</sup>

In 1980, USAID launched several five-year plans that would cost a total of \$250 million dollars.<sup>281</sup> From 1980 to 1990, Egypt relied heavily on the United States to expand its primary education. USAID allocated \$39 million to build new schools and facilities in five separate governorates deemed to be the most in need. The program resulted in 6,595 new classrooms, 1,000 schools, and 140 person-months of technical assistance and other activities.<sup>282</sup> The most recent programs from 2004 to 2007 have produced significant results. Over 31,000 girls were educated in newly constructed schools and 6,535 students received primary education in rural areas previously not covered by primary schools. In addition, 5,815 girls received scholarships to attend school. Under the National Book Program, USAID provided 15,496 schools with books averaging 525 books per school.<sup>283</sup> Since USAID began giving aid to Egypt, in 1975, literacy rates increased from 32% to 72% in 2008. In addition, net-enrollment in primary school increased from 70% to 96%, and the number of primary schools more than doubled over the same time period.<sup>284</sup>

### ***c. USAID Support for 2012***

USAID has specifically requested \$91 million dollars for fiscal year 2012 for aid to Egyptian education, an increase from the \$60.9 million given in fiscal year 2010.<sup>285</sup> USAID's education strategy for 2012 and beyond in Egypt addresses learning

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<sup>280</sup> Cochran, *Educational Roots of Political Crisis in Egypt*, 121.

<sup>281</sup> *Ibid.*, 122.

<sup>282</sup> *Ibid.*, 129.

<sup>283</sup> *Ibid.*, 132.

<sup>284</sup> United States Agency for International Development, "Egypt, Then and Now," (n.d.), [http://www.usaid.gov/locations/middle\\_east/documents/egypt/impact.pdf](http://www.usaid.gov/locations/middle_east/documents/egypt/impact.pdf).

<sup>285</sup> U.S. Department of State, *Congressional Budget Justification Foreign Operations Annex: Regional Perspectives Fiscal Year 2012*, 514.

across the education spectrum, which includes basic education, higher education, and workforce development. The United States will donate \$48 million dollars to the Egyptian higher education system in 2012.<sup>286</sup> USAID will also continue to promote cooperation between U.S. and Egyptian science and research communities.<sup>287</sup> USAID will also partner with the Ministry of Higher Education to open career development centers at all public universities in Egypt to help prepare Egyptian graduates for both the local and global labor markets. The United States will donate \$43 million dollars for basic education to Egypt.<sup>288</sup>

#### **F. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS WITH TURKISH EDUCATION**

The previous sections detailed the Muslim Brotherhood's current views on education and their current political environment. It established that the Muslim Brotherhood has historically shown a willingness to compromise with other political entities and must do so in the current environment. This section addresses the fact that the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt is not proceeding with its education policy in a vacuum and that its experience in Egypt can be compared to Islamist parties' experiences in other countries. Turkey offers the best comparison because the AK party's situation is similar to that of the Muslim Brotherhood's in Egypt. In addition, the AK party assumed power in 2001, which provides over 10 years-worth of data to study and analyze.

Since the founding of the Turkish Republic in 1923, the Turkish state has played a significant role in the rapid expansion of education in Turkey. Turkey became the first secular Muslim country and began implementing a series of reforms to modernize the country based on a Western model. Educational reform played a significant role in transforming Turkey into a modern and secular nation-state.<sup>289</sup> While secularization has

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<sup>286</sup> U.S. Department of State, *Congressional Budget Justification Volume 2 Foreign Operations Fiscal Year 2012*, 295.

<sup>287</sup> U.S. Department of State, *Congressional Budget Justification Foreign Operations 2010*, May 22, 2009, 417.

<sup>288</sup> U.S. Department of State, *Congressional Budget Justification Volume 2 Foreign Operations Fiscal Year 2012*, 292.

<sup>289</sup> Bruce H. Rankin and Isik A. Aytac, "Religiosity, the headscarf, and education in Turkey: an analysis of 1988 data and current implications," *British Journal of Sociology of Education* 29, no. 3 (May 2008): 274.

transformed every aspect of Turkish society since the end of the Ottoman Empire, Islam has remained an important aspect of society.<sup>290</sup> The secular identity of Turkey has been challenged over the past 30 years because of the ongoing politicization of religiosity caused by a cultural Islamic resurgence. Islam has reasserted itself as a real political force in contemporary Turkish politics, which could have a significant impact on the secular nature of the Turkish state. The Imam-Hatip (Prayer-Schools) schools are one of many political issues that divide secularists and Islamists.<sup>291</sup> The growth in religiosity in Turkey over the last 30 years is similar to the growth of religiosity in Egypt during the same time period.

The November 2002 general elections in Turkey were a historic shift in the government of Turkey and its course as a secular nation. The election ushered in a new era in Turkey, led by the Justice and Development Party (AKP), a center-right conservative political party, which maintains clear Islamist principles. Founded in 2001 by members of a number of existing parties, it is the largest in Turkey and its leader, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, is Prime Minister.<sup>292</sup> With the AK Party's rise to power, it was inevitable that the role of religion in education would come under review by the government.<sup>293</sup> The ascendancy of the AK party is the best comparison to the success of the FJP in Egypt.

The AKP had another overwhelming electoral victory in July 2007, which gave it the profound ability to reshape Turkey's social and political structure to make Islam an integral part of society.<sup>294</sup> In Turkey, 800 civil servants were transferred from the Directorate of Religious Affairs to the Ministry of Education under AKP direction. Complaints regarding primary and secondary schools include the gradual Islamization of textbooks, for example, by gradually replacing the theory of evolution with versions of creationism. Critics also charge that tacit encouragement of Islamic conservatism is

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<sup>290</sup> Pak, "Cultural Politics and Vocational Religious Education: The Case of Turkey," 321.

<sup>291</sup> Ibid.

<sup>292</sup> BBC News, "Turkey Country Profile."

<sup>293</sup> Pak, "Cultural Politics and Vocational Religious Education: The Case of Turkey," 322.

<sup>294</sup> Somer, "Moderate Islam and Secularist Opposition in Turkey: Implications for the World, Muslims and Secular Democracy," 1272.

occurring, for example, by endorsing or encouraging the practice of namaz (Muslim praying), the distribution of religious reading material in school grounds, or teachers arguing that dating is sinful.<sup>295</sup> In the general elections in June 2011, the AKP further increased its share of the popular vote to 49.8% and secured 327 parliamentary seats to form a third-consecutive majority government.<sup>296</sup>

With its most recent victory, the AKP plans to substitute the current eight uninterrupted years of primary school education with four years to allow children aged 10–14 to attend specialist religious schools, known as Imam-Hatip schools. The proposed education reform exposes the fault line in Turkish society between religious conservatives and secularists. Supporters say the reforms will make education more attractive to religious families.<sup>297</sup> Opponents claim reintroducing Imam-Hatip middle schools undermines the secular foundations of the Turkish Republic. It is important to note that the AKP waited nine years and victory in three consecutive elections before formally trying to change the Turkish education system.

These reforms are championed by Mr. Erdogan who claims the current system is a result of non-democratic actions by the military in 1997 that resulted in the closure of the Imam-Hatip middle schools by decreeing that children should in public schools for eight years.<sup>298</sup> The Imam-Hatip schools, which are vocational secondary schools for producing religious functionaries, are one of the most debated aspects of Turkish education. The Imam-Hatip schools were at the height of their popularity in 1997, when the eight-year compulsory education reform bill was passed in the parliament, which closed the middle school section of the religious vocational schools.<sup>299</sup>

Prior to the 1997 Education Reform Bill, the growth of Imam-Hatip schools was rapid in the 1980s and 1990s. Imam-Hatip schools in the 1980s became a legitimate

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<sup>295</sup> Somer, “Moderate Islam and Secularist Opposition in Turkey: Implications for the World, Muslims and Secular Democracy,” 1279.

<sup>296</sup> BBC News, “Turkey Country Profile.”

<sup>297</sup> Dombey, “Education Reforms Divide Turkey.”

<sup>298</sup> Ibid.

<sup>299</sup> Pak, “Cultural Politics and Vocational Religious Education: The Case of Turkey,” 322.

alternative to mainstream schools, especially among religiously conservative families.<sup>300</sup> In 1951, the state established Imam-Hatip schools in seven cities. In 1958, the number of Imam-Hatip schools totaled 26, but by 1971, the number had grown to 71, and by 1994, the number increased to 398 schools with a student enrolment of 162,828.<sup>301</sup> By 1997, the number of Imam-Hatip schools across the nation reached 600 with a tenth of the student population within Turkey, just before the education reform bill forced the closing of the middle school section of the Imam-Hatip schools.<sup>302</sup>

This new trend was unacceptable for secularists as they claimed that these schools had deviated from their original mission of producing religious officials to producing a new generation of Islamists who entered every sector of the society, and thereby, undermining its secular nature.<sup>303</sup> Secularists argued that the explosive growth of Imam-Hatip schools resulted in religious schools bypassing the Law of Unification of Instruction and a return to a dual track education system of the Ottoman times with education divided into religious and secular schools.<sup>304</sup> The huge increases in the enrollment rates at Imam-Hatip schools were permitted initially by a series of secularist regimes for many reasons. The most obvious reason was the notion that Islam should be studied within boundaries set by the state in an effort to stop radicalization. Another reason was to ensure that the number of state-certified religious officials fully met the needs to staff the mosques around the country and oversee religious services.<sup>305</sup> The Islamists, on the other hand, insist that the secularists have a wrong impression about Islamic education, who regard it as incompatible with the dictate of the modern age.<sup>306</sup>

Imam-Hatip schools are not the only religious battleground in Turkish education between secularists and Islamists. In 2012, the Turkish Ministry of Education introduced

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<sup>300</sup> Pak, "Cultural Politics and Vocational Religious Education: The Case of Turkey," 332.

<sup>301</sup> Ibid., 334.

<sup>302</sup> Ibid.

<sup>303</sup> Ibid.

<sup>304</sup> Ibid., 335.

<sup>305</sup> Ibid.

<sup>306</sup> Ibid., 336.

Quran lessons in state-run schools. In addition, the AK party has also begun to appointment overtly pious rectors to various state universities.<sup>307</sup> The AK party has also adjusted the budget so that the Directorate for Religious Affairs received twice the budget allocated for the country's top science agency TUBITAK.<sup>308</sup> These other tactics utilized by the AK party can be used as a menu of choices for the Muslim Brotherhood to select from to increase the pervasiveness of Islam in the education system. The Muslim Brotherhood will not use the Turkish model as a definitive blueprint, but as an example to learn from and borrow successful strategies and tactics. Once again, it is important to remember that the AK Party waited nine years before attempting to make significant changes to education and even then moved cautiously.

Education plays a major part in determining the outcome of the ongoing Islamic culture war in Turkey. The battle between the AK Party and the military in Turkey over the Imam-Hatip schools and other areas of increased religious education may act as a preview of the future battles between the Muslim Brotherhood and the military in Egypt over the role of Islam in education. The AKP did not directly challenge the role of Islam in education until it had secured three overwhelming victories in consecutive elections. It moved cautiously before trying to change the education system because of the strength of the military, and as a result, the Muslim Brotherhood will likely proceed in a similar fashion.

The purpose of this chapter was to show that the Muslim Brotherhood has evolved significantly over the past 90 years. The most important change is the Muslim Brotherhood's willingness to compromise with other organizations and political points of view. It is willing to form political alliances even if that means sacrificing its religious agenda. This willingness to compromise will be of great importance when it implements policy in the new Egyptian government. It is also clear that the Muslim Brotherhood is now more concerned with providing quality services to the Egyptian people, rather than establishing an Islamic state. The Muslim Brotherhood's focus on providing quality

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<sup>307</sup> *The Economist*, "Peddling Religion: Why Secular Academics Fret About an Islamic Bicycle," September 15, 2012, <http://www.economist.com/node/21562945>.

<sup>308</sup> Ibid.

services over religion will go a long way in shaping the education policies it chooses to employ. It appears that the importance of religion has been relatively reduced compared to the importance of providing social welfare. The Muslim Brotherhood relies more heavily on providing social services to gain support than religious rhetoric.

This chapter also illustrated that the Muslim Brotherhood cannot act unilaterally in reforming the Egyptian education system. Domestically, it must contend with the Egyptian military, which despite recent setbacks, retains significant amounts of power. It must also combat the Salafists, who are rapidly growing in power as indicated by finishing second in the 2011 parliamentary elections, and who are actively poaching the more devote members of the Brotherhood. The United States will also have a significant impact on the educational policies Egypt implements because of the massive amount of aid it receives from the United States. The Muslim Brotherhood cannot risk losing American aid in its current economic state. These other political entities will inhibit the Muslim Brotherhood from making any drastic changes to the current education system.

## **VI. THE FUTURE OF EGYPTIAN EDUCATION UNDER MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD LEADERSHIP**

The Muslim Brotherhood is at an unprecedented point in its history now that it occupies a significant role in the Egyptian government. Having spent most of its history working to survive government repression and promoting a way of life diametrically opposed to the one supported by the Egyptian government, disagreement is evolving on how the Muslim Brotherhood will react once it has power in the government. Despite the lack of consensus, the preponderance of the evidence suggests the Muslim Brotherhood will likely proceed cautiously, solidify its base and ensure a comfort level before pursuing a controversial education policy.<sup>309</sup> A popular Muslim Brotherhood motto is *kull khatwa madrusa* (every step is deliberate), which suggests it will be cautious and take a long-term view on politics. The group's methodical base building causes it to be pragmatic in its decision making, and not radical.<sup>310</sup> In addition, education appears not to be a priority for the new government as its focus has been squarely on the economy and security.<sup>311</sup>

### **A. PRESIDENT MORSI STRIVES TO FORM AN INCLUSIVE GOVERNMENT**

In his *Foreign Affairs* article "The Arab Spring at One: A Year of Living Dangerously," Fouad Ajami claimed it would be a disaster if a religious republic gained power in Egypt. According to Ajami, Egypt lacks the economic resources necessary to become a religious republic. He emphasizes that the Egyptian economy is dependent on tourism, the Suez Canal, foreign aid, and remittances from abroad to drive its economy. Without a solid internal form of revenue, such as oil in Iran, the establishment of an

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<sup>309</sup> Brown, "When Victory Becomes an Option: Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood Confronts," 9.

<sup>310</sup> Stephen Glain, "Can Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood Deliver Islam and Capitalism?" *Institutional Investor (America's Edition)*, April 2012.

<sup>311</sup> Muhammad Shukri, "The Challenges Facing Egypt's New President," *BBC News*, June 25, 2012, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-18582746>.

Islamic republic that shuns the outside world is economically unfeasible.<sup>312</sup> Ajami is correct that a religious republic would be disastrous, but he underestimated the amount of power the Muslim Brotherhood, especially President Morsi, would amass in the new government. President Morsi has effectively marginalized the military leadership, and appears to have control over all levers of power in the government. President Morsi will still be careful to not overreach and alienate the military and secularists because it would further erode stability in an already relatively volatile situation. In addition, Egypt is too dependent on foreign aid support from the United States, which it would sacrifice if it became a religious republic.<sup>313</sup>

Mohammed Morsi faces significant challenges as the new President of Egypt. These issues include a divided public, a legacy of corruption, poverty, a failing education system, and a high unemployment rate. In addition to these issues during the run-off election, over 12 million people voted for Ahmed Shafik, which indicates Morsi must work hard to unite a country clearly divided about who should lead the new government. Morsi appears intent on uniting the forces that stood against him during the election, especially liberals and Copts. Morsi's immediate resignation from the Muslim Brotherhood and the FJP were just the first steps in this process.<sup>314</sup>

Mr. Morsi has worked tirelessly to portray himself as a unifier and a President for all Egyptians. For the last 80 years, many in Egypt feared that if Islamists came to power, sweeping changes to the country would occur. People thought veils would become mandatory, banks would be closed, and schools would turn into Koran memorization schools. It is now clear that an immediate change will not occur and that Mr. Morsi is more concerned with uniting the country than introducing legislation that will cause further divisions.<sup>315</sup> Rod Nordland argues that the Muslim Brotherhood has always taken

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<sup>312</sup> Fouad Ajami, "The Arab Spring at One: A Year of Living Dangerously," *Foreign Affairs* 91, no. 2 (March/April 2012): 63.

<sup>313</sup> Brown, "When Victory Becomes an Option: Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood Confronts," 9.

<sup>314</sup> Shukri, "The Challenges Facing Egypt's New President."

<sup>315</sup> Rod Nordland, "Egypt's Islamists Tread Lightly, but Skeptics Squirm," *The New York Times*, July 28, 2012, <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/29/world/middleeast/egypts-islamists-tread-lightly-but-skeptics-squirm>.

the long view, preferring incremental to sweeping changes. Mr. Morsi has been active in courting other groups; for example, shortly after his electoral victory, he met with the Coptic Pope Anba Bakhomious in an effort to assuage the fears of the Coptic minority. More importantly, Mr. Morsi has shown no indication he is going to make sweeping social changes.<sup>316</sup>

On August 13, 2012, Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi reclaimed many Presidential powers restricted by the SCAF, and forced the retirement of the SCAF's leader Field Marshal Hussein Tantawi. Many believe President Morsi's consolidation of power can be interpreted in two ways, either the continuation of a Muslim Brotherhood and military pact, or the victory of the Muslim Brotherhood over the military in an attempt to control Egypt.<sup>317</sup> In reality, President Morsi's decision to change the military leadership and cancel the military's June 17 constitutional decree was the result of a simple consolidation of power. Morsi did what any good national leader does when winning, consolidating power upon taking office.<sup>318</sup> Many have assumed that Morsi's removal of Egypt's top national security and defense officials might signal a shift in Egyptian foreign policy away from the United States. However, no countries can fill the void of the United States as Egypt's patron. Egypt may not want a patron at this point, but with all of its internal instability, it may need one to ensure the economy and security situation improve to acceptable levels.<sup>319</sup>

Hind M. Ahmed Zaki claims that after Morsi's August 13 decision to remove Field Marshal Tantawi, it is clear the generals in the military are now subordinate to the President. The fact that the Muslim Brotherhood does not have a visible political rival does not mean it will have *cart blanche* to implement the education system it wants. The bureaucracy that implements the education policy remains a bastion of the old regime and the Muslim Brotherhood has found it difficult to control the thousands of public servants

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<sup>316</sup> Nordland, "Egypt's Islamists Tread Lightly, but Skeptics Squirm."

<sup>317</sup> Hind M. Ahmed Zaki, "The Shape of Egypt's Second Republic," *Al-Masry Al-Youm*, August 21, 2012, <http://www.egyptindependent.com>.

<sup>318</sup> Cook, "Morsi Makes His Move: What the Power Grab Means for Cairo and Washington."

<sup>319</sup> *Ibid.*

to occupy its ranks. In addition, the revolutionary action that brought down the last regime continues in the forms of strikes demanding social services and improvements. The Muslim Brotherhood must respond to these needs because the use of force as utilized by the previous regimes is no longer a viable option.<sup>320</sup>

Oxford professor Tariq Ramadan, the grandson of Muslim Brotherhood founder Hassan El-Banna, has expressed doubt in the ability of President Morsi to lead Egypt successfully. He has listed many factors that will inhibit President Morsi's ability to implement effective change in education. Mr. Ramadan included the strength of the military, the polarization of Egyptian society, and the power of Salafist parties.<sup>321</sup> Tarek Osman believes the Muslim Brotherhood is not as cohesive as it once was due to struggles over power. He continues to question whether President Morsi is responding to demands from the base of his party in implementing an education system that reflects its desires. Mr. Osman also believes that the FJP lacks the experience to run a country as complicated as Egypt.<sup>322</sup>

Maha Azzam, an associate fellow at Chatham House, believes that Morsi maintains popular support that will allow him to make progress in addressing many of Egypt's socio-economic problems, including education. She thinks the majority of people want him to succeed and that those working against him are only the liberals and secularists. Although Azzam admits that the socio-economic challenges confronting Morsi and the FJP are enormous, she nevertheless remains confident that their grassroots experience will enable them to tackle such problems head-on, with the support of society. She believes the FJP and Morsi have tended to move away from ideological statements, and focus on critical issues, more so than their secular opponents.<sup>323</sup> Omar Ashour, director of the Middle East Institute at the University of Exeter, also maintains an optimistic view on Morsi's ability, as long as he maintains a coalition encompassing

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<sup>320</sup> Zaki, "The Shape of Egypt's Second Republic."

<sup>321</sup> Sarah El-Rashidi, "Challenges Facing Egypt's First Democratically Elected President," *Ahram Online*, August 12, 2012, <http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/49936/Egypt/Politics-/Challenges-facing-Egypt's-first-democratically-elec.aspx>.

<sup>322</sup> Ibid.

<sup>323</sup> Ibid.

liberals, the military, and Salafists. Ashour thinks Morsi was smart by appointing only a small number of Muslim Brothers to cabinet positions, with many positions going to old regime figures and technocrats.<sup>324</sup>

## **B. THE ECONOMY AND SECURITY TAKE PRECEDENCE IN THE NEW GOVERNMENT**

The two issues that will draw Morsi's immediate attention are the failing economy and the lack of internal security. The economy has declined significantly since the revolution with 40% of the population living below the poverty line. In addition, Egypt's foreign reserves have dwindled, and many investors have withdrawn their funds.<sup>325</sup> Egypt's New Prime Minister Hesham Qandil has openly stated the government's focus is on economic growth and controlling the deficit.<sup>326</sup> His economic reform plan aims to reduce consumer subsidies and hopes to achieve a growth rate of 3% to 4%.<sup>327</sup> The Prime Minister also stated that the government aims to cut the budget deficit, which is now running at about 8% of gross domestic product, by one percentage point in two years. The focus on cutting the budget and improving the economy would indicate an increase in the education budget is extremely unlikely in the short term.<sup>328</sup>

On the security front, the murder rate, kidnappings, and car theft have risen since the revolution.<sup>329</sup> Prime Minister Qandil has asked the Minister of Interior to order security directors to intensify their presence on the streets to combat the increase in violence and crime.<sup>330</sup> In addition to crime, the threat of militants has also taken an important place in the government's priority list. Egypt and Israel are coordinating on Cairo's biggest security sweep in decades against militants in the Sinai, in which 32

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<sup>324</sup> Sarah El-Rashidi, "Challenges Facing Egypt's First Democratically Elected President."

<sup>325</sup> Shukri, "The Challenges Facing Egypt's New President."

<sup>326</sup> Edmund Blair and Patrick Werr, "Exclusive: Egypt's PM to Put Economic Focus on Growth, Deficit Cut," *Reuters*, September 9, 2012, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/09/us-egypt-economy-idUSBRE88804V20120909?feedType=RSS&feedName=topNews>.

<sup>327</sup> Ibid.

<sup>328</sup> Ibid.

<sup>329</sup> Shukri, "The Challenges Facing Egypt's New President."

<sup>330</sup> Egypt State Information Service, "Egypt: Qandil Asks Interior Minister to Order Security Directors to Intensify Existence," September 9, 2012, <http://allafrica.com/stories/201209090283.html>

people have been killed. The Egyptian government fears Islamist militants, possibly linked to al Qaeda, have gained a foothold in the Sinai border area since the overthrow of Hosni Mubarak.<sup>331</sup> These economic and security issues are clearly more important to President Morsi and restrict the level of effort he will give to reforming education.

### C. EDUCATION POLICY OF THE NEW GOVERNMENT

The composition of the new cabinet will also have a significant impact on the education system implemented by the new government. The new Prime Minister Hesham Qandil is a life-long technocrat, and more importantly, not a member of the Muslim Brotherhood, to answer fears that President Morsi would stack his cabinet with members of the Muslim Brotherhood. After Mr. Qandil was announced as the new Prime Minister, he emphasized the need for a political diverse cabinet that represented the interests of all Egyptians.<sup>332</sup> The new Prime Minister chose 35 ministers, seven of whom were ministers in the previous SCAF-appointed government. Five ministries, including higher education, were given to the Muslim Brotherhood's FJP. The new Minister of Education is Ibrahim Ahmed Ghoneim Deif and the new minister of Higher Education is Mostafa Mossad.<sup>333</sup> Both are moderates who will seek to improve the quality of education without implementing drastic changes. The Minister of Higher Education, Mostafa Mossad, was in charge of the education portfolio during Morsi's campaign, and has indicated he does not want significant changes in the near future. Mostafa Mossad was also a Cairo University engineering professor that gives him insight into higher education from the ground level.<sup>334</sup> The Education Minister, Ibrahim Ahmed Ghoneim Deif, is not a member

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<sup>331</sup> Marwa Awad, "Egypt, Israel Coordinating on Sinai Security Sweep: Army," *Reuters*, September 8, 2012, [http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-09-08/news/sns-rt-us-egypt-sinai-militantsbre88707z-20120908\\_1\\_sinai-peace-treaty-egyptian-security-forces](http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-09-08/news/sns-rt-us-egypt-sinai-militantsbre88707z-20120908_1_sinai-peace-treaty-egyptian-security-forces)

<sup>332</sup> Rod Nordland and Mayy El Sheikh, "Egyptian President Names Minister in Interim Cabinet as Premier," *The New York Times*, July 24, 2012, <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/25/world/middleeast/egyptian-president-names-prime-minister>.

<sup>333</sup> Kareem Fahim and Mayy El Sheikh, "New Egyptian Cabinet Includes Many Holdovers," *The New York Times*, August 2, 2012, <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/03/world/middleeast/mew-egyptian-cabinet>.

<sup>334</sup> Ursula Lindsey, "Freedom and Reform at Egypt's Universities," *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, 14, September 2012, <http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/09/04/freedom-and-reform-at-egypt-s-universities/drak>.

of the Muslim Brotherhood and served as a technocrat in the interim government.<sup>335</sup> President Morsi was able to prevent a member of the Al Nour (Salafist) party from becoming the Minister of Education in the new cabinet, which was a position it coveted. The diverse cabinet is another example of how the Muslim Brotherhood will proceed with caution moving forward.

Despite having to deal with more pressing issues, such as the economy and security concerns, the new government has made token efforts to improve the education system. These efforts work to improve the system, but are not part of a comprehensive plan to remake the education system. One example is that the Egyptian Cabinet and the World Bank officially agreed on a \$200 million project with a significant portion of the money going to the Ministry of Education. Egypt and the World Bank agreed on the loan in late June 2012 and signed the agreement on August 14, 2012.<sup>336</sup> Another example of small improvements is the announcement by the Egyptian Minister of Higher Education, Mr. Mostafa Mossad and USAID Assistant Administrator Mara Rudman, concerning the establishment of Career Development Centers (CDCs) at 14 Egyptian university campuses. The U.S. Government through the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) will fund the CDCs.<sup>337</sup> These examples show that the new government does desire to improve education, but is highly dependent also on international sources of funding. In addition, the loan from the World Bank and the collaboration with USAID is a continuation of long standing relationships and does not take the Egyptian education system in a new direction.

An example of incremental change to the Egyptian education system is the new policy on history books. History textbooks in Egypt had been used to increase the historical significance and amplify the accomplishments of Egyptian rulers. This tactic had been used since the Army toppled the monarchy in Egypt in 1952; however, the new

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<sup>335</sup> Omar Ashour, "Egypt's Government, a Bit of the New and a lot of the Old," *The Daily Star*, August 10, 2012, <http://www.dailystar.com.lb/Opinion/Commentary/2012/Aug-10/184077-egypts-government-a-bit-of-the-new-and-a-lot-of-the-old.ashx#axzz25uKEb0j1>.

<sup>336</sup> Associated Press, "Egypt, World Bank Sign \$200 Million Loan Project," August 14, 2012, <http://www.businessweek.com/ap/2012-08-14/egypt-world-bank-sign-200-million-loan-project>.

<sup>337</sup> Targeted News Service, "Ministry of Higher Education and U.S. Government Announce Establishment of Career Development Centers in Egyptian Public Universities," August 30, 2012.

regime intends to change this practice. Education officials have said that history textbooks will no longer be manipulated to glorify the country's rulers.<sup>338</sup> This change to the education is significant, but does not comprise a well-developed policy aimed at significant reform.

An example of how the Muslim Brotherhood wants to improve education, but is stymied by the current political situation, occurred in the early spring of 2012. At that time, parliament agreed to pass six amendments to the existing law, which formalized the procedures for the election of deans and presidents, and stipulated increases in the salaries of all professors between EGP1000 and EGP3500. However, after Egypt's High Constitutional Court dissolved parliament on June 14, 2012, the new legislation became void. This legislation showed that the parliament led by the Muslim Brotherhood wanted to have free and fair elections in universities and wanted to increase the salary of university professors, but was unable to accomplish its goal due to the struggle for political power with the military.<sup>339</sup>

Ursula Lindsey, the Middle East correspondent for the Chronicle of Higher Education, claims higher education reform has not been a priority in the new Egyptian government. A few improvements have occurred, such as free elections for student unions, and the reduction of repressive tactics by police and intelligence services on campuses, but for the most part, significant changes are lacking.<sup>340</sup> Lindsey argues that the quality of higher education will not improve until the political will exists to create a more transparent and equitable system. She believes that universities need to be given oversight and control over their budgets, and must also overhaul the way national universities hire faculty and admit students. She continues to argue that the universities need to develop new programs that provide students with useful degrees in today's job market. She also challenges the social and economic benefit to free university education for all citizens. In short, she argues Egypt must undertake a number of fundamental and

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<sup>338</sup> Ramadan A. Kader, "Changing for the Better," *The Egyptian Gazette*, July 17, 2012.

<sup>339</sup> Ursula Lindsey, "Freedom and Reform at Egypt's Universities," *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, 13, September 2012 <http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/09/04/freedom-and-reform-at-egypt-s-universities/drak>.

<sup>340</sup> Lindsey, "Freedom and Reform at Egypt's Universities," 1.

difficult reforms to improve its overburdened, underperforming public university system.<sup>341</sup> Her arguments are sound, but do not reflect the current political environment in Egypt in which compromise is essential to a harmonious transition.

Almost all members of Egyptian academia want new reforms that protect academic freedom and freedom of expression on campus. However, no reforms have been introduced in the year and a half since Mubarak's ouster.<sup>342</sup> One factor slowing the process of change is the polarization of groups on campus, with Islamist forces on one side and secular forces on the other. Despite working together following the months after the revolution by focusing on the similar goals of ending corruption and conducting reforms, when it came time to compete for positions on campus and to formulate policy, the united front ended.<sup>343</sup>

Once higher education policy takes a prominent place on the political agenda, it is likely that the Muslim Brotherhood will play a prominent role in formulating it. Many of its cadre have benefited from the upward mobility promised by a university education.<sup>344</sup> The Brotherhood's FJP's program calls for increasing faculty salaries, improving infrastructure, and gradually raising research and development spending to 2.5% of GDP.<sup>345</sup> Despite its interest in controlling the higher education portfolio, the Muslim Brotherhood has offered few specific policy proposals. The assumption has largely been that once universities are free of corrupt administrators and the government allots them the increased funding needed, the situation will improve dramatically. The difficult discussion of how to finance universities more efficiently, equitably, and sustainably, is unlikely to occur anytime soon.<sup>346</sup> Education reform is waiting on ongoing political

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<sup>341</sup> Lindsey, "Freedom and Reform at Egypt's Universities," 1.

<sup>342</sup> *Ibid.*, 11.

<sup>343</sup> *Ibid.*, 12.

<sup>344</sup> *Ibid.*, 14.

<sup>345</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>346</sup> *Ibid.*, 15.

transitions and is further complicated by underfunded and overcrowded school systems.<sup>347</sup>

By exploring the history and current state of both Egyptian education and the Muslim Brotherhood, this paper has gleaned general conclusions that help to forecast the way the Muslim Brotherhood will precede now that it has significant control over the Egyptian education system. First, historically new regimes in Egypt typically change the education system to meet their political and societal goals. Second, the education system in Egypt is in dire need of reform to increase equality among rich and poor, and to improve the overall quality of the system. Third, Islam and modern education can coexist, so even if the Muslim Brotherhood increases the amount of religious instruction in the curriculum, science and math will still be taught. Fourth, the Muslim Brotherhood intends to reform the education system primarily to improve the effectiveness of the system and increase access to people of all levels of income. In addition, the Muslim Brotherhood hopes to increase religious instruction, but that is not its primary goal. Fifth, the Muslim Brotherhood cannot act unilaterally in changing the education system and instead must work with the Egyptian military, other political groups, and the United States. The last important aspect established is that education is not the priority of the new government because other issues, such as security and revitalizing the economy, are considered more important.

Education reform has not been a priority during the transition period. The military leadership and the Muslim Brotherhood have focused all their energies on consolidating power and gaining leverage in the newly formed government.<sup>348</sup> It is, therefore, most likely that the Muslim Brotherhood will proceed with incremental changes to the education system in the near future and implement elements of both hypothesis one and three of this thesis.

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<sup>347</sup> Ursula Lindsey, "Back to School Egyptian and Tunisian Classrooms Learn to Learn in a Post-Dictator Era," *Foreign Policy*, April 23, 2012, [http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/04/23/back\\_to\\_school?page=full](http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/04/23/back_to_school?page=full).

<sup>348</sup> Lindsey, "Freedom and Reform at Egypt's Universities," 14.

Hypothesis one anticipated change would not occur in the education system because the current political environment is not conducive to a complete restructuring of the education system, which has proven to be the reality in Egypt. Therefore, the Muslim Brotherhood will be cautious and concentrate more on solidifying its political position within Egypt prior to making any significant changes, which will also occur due to budget shortfalls within the government, as well as the current economic and security concerns that take precedent over education. Although education will not be a priority, the Muslim Brotherhood will take small steps to improve the quality of the education system as anticipated in hypothesis three.<sup>349</sup> These changes will focus on improvements in the system that increase the effectiveness of the system, but do not change the level of religious instruction. As in Turkey, once the Muslim Brotherhood has solidified its position in the government, and has become less dependent on American aid, it may proceed to increase Islamic instruction. Even if religious instruction is increased, it will be a moderate version of Islam and not inhibit the teaching of technical subjects.

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<sup>349</sup> Al-Awadi, *In Pursuit of Legitimacy: The Muslim Brothers and Mubarak, 1982–2000*, 18.

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