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**MILITANCY IN PAKISTAN:
A SCHIZOPHRENIC PROBLEM**

by

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September 2012

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MILITANCY IN PAKISTAN: A SCHIZOPHRENIC PROBLEM

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ABSTRACT

Since 2001, the West has focused on the insurgency along the Afghan-Pakistani border. The minimal achievements of Pakistan's counterinsurgency operations drew U.S. scrutiny. Skeptics accused Pakistan of not being serious about eliminating Islamic militants. Pakistan has opposed, supported, or ignored Islamic militant groups. Both domestic and transnational issues complicate Islamabad's decision-making ability. This thesis evaluates to what extent India, Islamic affinity, and Pashtun nationalism shaped Pakistan's counterinsurgency strategy. The perceived existential Indian threat creates a security dilemma for the Pakistani military. Pakistan lacks the capacity to fight a two-front war without international assistance. Islamabad's instrumental use of Islamic groups to achieve political and strategic objectives allows Islamist to become intertwined with the state. Strategic successes of the military-militant nexus created deep-rooted sympathies toward Islamic militants that make implementing counterinsurgency policies problematic. Fearing Pashtun nationalism, the Pakistan army's deployment in the region was minimal, and instead, Pashtun tribal leaders were unprotected against radical elements. The Mullahs' growing strength upset the balance of authority within the tribal governance system. The spread of radical fundamentalism outside the FATA region forced Islamabad to react.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

CAR	Central Asian Republics
CFL	Cease Fire Line
CI	Counterinsurgency
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CSF	Coalition Support Funds
FATA	Federally Administered Tribal Areas
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FCR	Frontier Crime Regulations
GDP	Gross National Product
IJI	Islami Jamhoori Itihad
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
ISI	Inter-Service Intelligence
JAHA	Jamiat Ahl-e-Hadith
JI	Jamiat e-Islami
JKLF	Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front
JUI	Jamiat Ulema e-Islam
JUP	Jamiat Ulema-I-Pakistan
KKM	Khudia Khidmatgar Movement
LOC	Line of Control
LEJ	Lashkar-e-Jhangvi
LET	Lashkar-e-Taiba
MMA	Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NPT	Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
PATA	Provincially Administered Tribal Areas
PML	Pakistani Muslim League
OIF	Operation Iraqi Freedom
SIPRI	Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
TTP	Tehrik-I-Taliban Pakistan

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION

Pakistan has been using Islamic militant groups as a foreign policy tool against Afghanistan and India over the past sixty years; however, the events of 9/11 created a paradigm shift on the way Pakistan dealt with such groups. The context in which militant groups operating within Pakistan has been affected by Islamabad's enhanced friendship with Washington. With over 24 different domestic and transnational militant groups identified within Pakistan, the Pakistani government has supported, ignored, or opposed militant groups. With multiple militant groups with varying objectives operating within Pakistan, it would take considerable research to answer that problem in its entirety. Isolating the problem to a particular region narrows the focus of the overall problem. The research is concentrated on the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, which harbors the greatest population of Islamic militant groups oriented toward Afghanistan and Pakistan. Although President Musharraf quickly joined the United States' "War on Terror," Pakistan has been reluctant to conduct counterinsurgency operations to stymie cross-border militant activity along the Afghan-Pakistani border, which has increased U.S. skepticism toward Pakistan. Pakistan has been placed in a precarious position by garnering substantial aid from the United States in exchange for assistance in building Afghan security. Thus, Islamabad must appease Washington, but at the same time maintain domestic order and ensure state security. Pakistan has the seventh largest military in the world, but Pakistan has not eliminated militant groups. Instead, they have conducted minimal military operations from 2001–2008 against militants groups. In this thesis, I intended to demonstrate to what extent the state's Islamic ideological affinities, India, and Pashtun nationalism have shaped Pakistan's counterinsurgency strategy in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province from 2001–2008.

B. IMPORTANCE

Washington's policies regarding the "War on Terror" have direct consequences to Pakistan. The U.S. invasion of Afghanistan has exacerbated tensions along the Af-Pak

border particularly in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) region. An antiquated governance system left in place from the British rule has permitted the territory to be a safe haven for Islamic militant groups that are interfering with U.S. state-building operations in Afghanistan and challenging the writ of the Pakistani government. Washington's increasing pressure on Islamabad to act against cross border attacks has had varying success; therefore, a greater understanding of the security calculations that Pakistan is facing will assist U.S. policy makers to understand Islamabad's capacity and aspirations in regards to militant groups.

C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES

As India plays a dominating role in Pakistan's strategic calculation, to what extent has Islamabad's counterinsurgency strategy in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa been affected? The existential threat of India toward Pakistan is a deep-rooted fear inscribed from partition. Both South Asian countries have troops deployed in close proximity to their shared borders, and although President Musharraf has sought to normalize relations with New Delhi, the closeness and cold start strategy ensures India remains a constant in Pakistan's security calculation. New Delhi's collaboration with Kabul has heightened Pakistani concerns. Although Pakistan would prosper from Afghan domestic stability, the threat of a pro-Indian regime in Kabul is troublesome as it could threaten Pakistan's existence with a two-front dilemma. While Pakistan has always relied on the United States to intervene on Indo-Pakistan hostilities, the Bush administration's pro-Indian foreign policy has alarmed Islamabad. Without minimizing India's threatening stature either through normalization or assurance from the United States, Pakistan will continue to do the minimum toward counterinsurgency in along its western border.

To what extent have Islamic ideological affinities shaped counterinsurgency strategy in the western regions? Pakistani military has used *jihad* rhetoric to mobilize 'freedom fighters' in Afghanistan and India as a proxy force to assist in achieving strategic victories by maintaining minimal state association. The Islamic nature of the state creates natural assumptions that the state supports Islamic militant groups operating within the state. The Military and ISI's ties with militant groups and the period of

Islamization by General Zia al-Huq contribute to this assumption. Although the Pakistani military is predominately Muslim, similar to the United States being primarily Christian, military leaders maintain secular views by weeding out leaders with radical affinities. President Musharraf's proscribing of militant groups and assassination attempts against him positively argues that Islamic militant groups have become unpopularity within the military and state. Although the state and military has been linked to Islamic militant groups in the past, the state and military have made considerable efforts to disassociate themselves from sectarian ideologies, but maintain links as a security calculation against India.

To what extent has Pashtun nationalism shaped counterinsurgency strategy in the in the western regions? Throughout Pakistan's past, Islamabad has been challenged with separatist movements and continues to endure an unresolved situation next door in Baluchistan. The FATA region is inhabited by the largest tribal society in the world. The Pashtun tribes straddle both sides of the Durand line that is governed by the Frontier Crime regulations (FCR)—an outdated governing system left over from the British in 1901—that allows for tribes to maintain a semi-autonomous relationship with the Pakistani central government. Since partition, a separate Pashtun state has been solicited by Afghanistan to rejoin the Afghan and Pakistani tribes together. Afghan regimes have further agitated the situation by advocating for a rejoining of tribal territories at the expense of Pakistan. Islamabad has become obsessively concerned with its territory after the secession of East Pakistan. The Pashtun tribal society has a strong cohesive ability. Pakistan military has intervened in the tribal areas with regular forces and the frontier corps with limited success. The frontier corps comprised of tribal Pashtuns disintegrated in military operations while regular forces faced substantial tribal lashkars. The Pakistani military must be sensitive to a population centric strategy that identifies them as an occupier, which could aggravate a dormant separatist movement or face a united tribal society.

D. LITERATURE REVIEW

The U.S. invasion into Pakistan in October of 2001, and subsequent occupation drove a majority of the insurgents across the border into Pakistan. The ungoverned territories of the FATA region provided sanctuary for insurgents to reorganize and launch offensive operations into Afghanistan against the International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF). Pakistan's participation in the "war on terror" was an absolute requirement to avoid the wrath of the United States after 9/11. Although the alliance with the United States to weed out Al Qaeda members has been successful, Pakistan has been unsuccessful to inhibit the Afghan Taliban and affiliated groups from conducting cross-border attacks. Why has Pakistan the seventh largest army in the world been unable adequate stymie insurgent operations? To answer that question the purpose of this research is to understand what has shaped Pakistan's counterinsurgency strategy in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa from 2001–2008.

With India aiding state building in Afghanistan, the existential Indian threat to Pakistan now exists on two fronts. As Feroz Khan explains, Pakistan fears a "strategic envelopment" by India, in which would cause political and security problems for Pakistan.¹ Christine Fair points out; Pakistan has been supporting Afghan Taliban, Haqqani network, and even groups such as LeT to undermine India's position in Afghanistan.² Islamabad sees the Delhi-Kabul relationship as a zero-sum game with Islamabad that may have dire consequences for Pakistan. Two main issues are centered on the Durand Line that Kabul does not accept internationally and a reawakening of the Pashtunistan secessionist movement. Pakistan is concerned that India may be the catalyst that reignites these past grievances, which would undermine Pakistan's domestic and international status. As New Delhi and Islamabad attempt to normalize relations, Pakistani leaders face the difficulty of reigning in militants. Militants of the Jihadi

¹ Feroz Hassan Khan, "Rough Neighbors: Afghanistan and Pakistan," *Strategic Insight* 2, January 2003.

² C. Christine Fair, "Under the Shrinking U.S. Security Umbrella: India's End Game in Afghanistan," *The Washington Quarterly* 34 (2011), 181.

organizations are highly motivated, which makes it difficult to change their mindset since many know no other vocation besides ‘the jihad.’³

Washington’s policies and attention toward Afghanistan and Pakistan over the past years has drawn scrutiny. Rashid discusses how the lack of U.S. military presence in Afghanistan and failure to acknowledge Musharraf’s double game fostered a benevolent attitude toward thwarting militant activity.⁴ Additionally, the Bush administration did not question Musharraf about FATA’s status as long as the Pakistan army and ISI cooperated with the principal U.S. aims of capturing Al-Qaeda leaders.⁵ The effects of possible U.S. abandonment are central to the arguments for Pakistan supporting militant groups. As Zahid Hussain states, the Pakistani military believes a renewed Afghan civil war will break out when U.S. troops leave.⁶ Mohan Malik argues that the Pakistani Military is apprehensive to dismantle the Al Qaeda terrorist infrastructure for fear that Pakistan’s importance would be devalued within U.S. security strategy.⁷ Additionally, the reliance of U.S. financial and military aid has forced Islamabad into a dilemma that by following U.S. dictation and engaging militant groups could create a Pakistani civil war. Pamela Constable describes U.S.-Pakistan relationship as a love-hate relationship since many Pakistani’s view the United States as manipulative superpower that has supported repressive rulers and has a hatred of Muslims.⁸

Military campaigns in FATA have been documented to provide a relatively complete sequence of events that give insight to failures and successes of the Pakistani army. The lack of a comprehensive and integrated counter-terrorism strategy has become

3 Riaz Mohammad Khan, *Afghanistan and Pakistan: Conflict, Extremism, and Resistance to Modernity* (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 2011), 257.

4 Ahmed Rashid, *Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil, and Fundamentalism in Central Asia* (New York: Penguin Group, 2009), 228.

5 Ibid., 237.

6 Zahid Hussain, “Battling Militancy,” in *Pakistan beyond the ‘Crisis State,’* ed. Maleeha Lodhi (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), 202.

7 Mohan Malik, “The Stability of Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia: The Clash between State and Antistate Actors,” *Asian Affairs: An American Review* 30 (2003): 189.

8 Pamela Constable, *Playing with Fire: Pakistan at War with Itself* (New York: Random House, 2011), 238

a major problem dealing with rising militancy.⁹ In evaluating Pakistan's offensives in Swat and FATA, Daud Khattak summarized that an ineffective counterinsurgency strategy has allowed for militant groups to regain influence, and that civilians have been alienated due to inadequate rebuilding phases.¹⁰ To mitigate militant violence throughout Pakistan and against Pakistani military, peace deals were brokered. Zahid Hussain argues that policies of appeasement over the past decade have allowed the militant groups to gain control of FATA and surrounding areas.¹¹ Riaz Mohammad Khan agrees that peace deals have emboldened militants and undermine the government's authority.¹² Although the appeasement had short-term conflict resolution, why did the Pakistani military offer peace deals when in the longer term the peace deals undermined the central governments regional power?

Selective action by the Pakistani state and army has been taken against particular groups of Islamist terrorists, particularly those who have turned against the state.¹³ What Mohan Malik calls anti-state actors? Musharraf's post 9/11 proscribing of militant groups and the Red Mosque are the main watershed events that have turned groups against the state. Militant groups began to challenge the government and the sociopolitical system creating conditions for a possible civil war.¹⁴ The consequences of mishandling the Red Mosque siege swayed the TTP and Al Qaeda to declare war against the Pakistan.¹⁵ Lieven agrees that the military's attitude toward militant groups changed once specific groups became direct threats to Pakistan.¹⁶

9 Hussain, "Battling Militancy," 147.

10 Daud Khattak, "Evaluating Pakistan's Offensives in Swat and FATA," *CTC Sentinel* 4 (2011): 11.

11 Hussain, "Battling Militancy," 146.

12 Khan, "Rough Neighbors," 228.

13 Ajai Sahni, "The War on Terror: Assessing U.S. Policy Alternatives on Pakistan," *Faultlines* 18, 2007. <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/publication/faultlines/volume18/article1.htm>

14 Khan, 257.

15 Ziad Haider, "Ideologically Adrift," in *Pakistan beyond the 'Crisis State'*, ed. Maleeha Lodhi (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), 138.

16 Anatol Lieven, *Pakistan: A Hard Country*, *Pakistan: A Hard Country* (New York: Public Affairs, 2011): 175.

Husain Haqqani states that the radical and violent manifestations of Islamist ideology can be interpreted as a state project gone awry.¹⁷ The linkage of Islam and Pakistan is explicitly tied to the state. Haqqani continues to elaborate that Islamic ideology is closely linked to Pakistan's military and the Worldview of Political elites.¹⁸ Imtiaz Gul agrees that Islamic ideology is used to promote of political agendas¹⁹ while Daniel Markey believes that Pakistan security services maintain connections with Islamic militants less out of ideological sympathy and more out of strategic calculation to hedge against abandonment by the United States.²⁰ Islamic militants directly tie Islamic ideology to their agenda. Additionally, evidence suggests that collusion between the Pakistani military, Musharraf, and Islamist politicians bolster political power by alienating secular parties. Although Islamic militant groups, Al Qaeda, and the state share Islamic beliefs, does that affinity create sympathy toward certain groups from the Pakistani military and Political elites?

The Pashtun tribes have been an autonomous tribal society since the seventeenth century. Under the British, the Durand line was formed to create a buffer state between British India and Russia, and divided the Pashtun tribal areas. The tribes never paid attention to this imaginary line and crossed back and forth freely without fear of retribution. The partition of India and Pakistan allowed for the bid of an independent state called Pashtunistan to reunite the tribal areas. There is a prevalent amount of literature that describes the events that carved out the unsuccessful bid for an independent state by Ghaffar Khan. With a majority of the Afghan population Pashtun, subsequent Afghan regimes have attempted to incorporate the Pashtun tribal areas form Pakistan. Pakistan initially supported the Taliban to establish an Islamabad friendly regime in Kabul and put an end to Pashtunistan. There is minimal literature on the Pashtun separatist movement in Pakistan in context to the Pakistani government counterinsurgency operations. Adeel Khan contends that Pashtun nationalist have little sympathy for the Taliban since Pashtun

¹⁷ Husain Haqqani, *Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military* (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005), 317.

¹⁸ Ibid., 312

¹⁹ Imtiaz Gul, *The Most Dangerous Place* (New York: Penguin Group, 2010), 35.

²⁰ Markey, 7.

nationalists have become integrated into the Pakistani state and their main concern is based on power instead of ethnicity.²¹ Nasreen Ghufuran argues that the Taliban insurgency is not based on Pashtun nationalism, but on Islamic interpretations with Pashtun's being mobilized by their Islamic religious identity.²² Conrad Schetter evaluates the movement as a conflict between the Pakistani state and tribe based on ethno-nationalistic ideas while Robert Kaplan argues that the Taliban constitutes the latest manifestation of Pashtun nationalism.²³

E. METHODS AND SOURCES

A Qualitative study using secondary resources will be used to demonstrate what shaped Pakistan's counterinsurgency (CI) strategy in the NWFP between 2001 and 2008. Specifically, I will look at how Islamic ideological affinities, India as a security threat, and Pashtun Nationalism has shaped their strategy. The intention of this thesis is to determine to what extent these factors have shaped CI, and does not imply other casual factors do not exist. The timeframe has been chosen to isolate events after 9/11 when the context of international community changed with regards to transnational terrorism, and maintains a constant regime in both Pakistan and the United States; therefore minimizing the effects of policy changes in subsequent administrations. Although confined to an eight-year window, historical research will be conducted to demonstrate how past policies have shaped contemporary attitudes.

The Indo-Pakistani security competition is an enduring calculus shaped by the development and structure of state system within the subcontinent. A review of Pakistani concerns regarding its counterinsurgency strategy will begin by comparing each army's organization structure and static base locations to demonstrate the geostrategic issues. Second, a discussion on how Pakistani tactics are fixed by conventional warfare directed toward India. Third, a review of Pakistani troop movements in relation to Indian army

²¹ Adeel Khan, "Pashtun Ethnic Nationalism: From Separation to Integration," *Asian Ethnicity* 4 (2003): 17.

²² See Nasreen Ghufuran, "Pushtun Ethnonationalism and the Taliban Insurgency in the NorthWest Frontier Province of Pakistan," *Asian Survey* 49 (2009): 1092–1114.

²³ Robert Kaplan, "The Revenge of Geography," *Foreign Policy* 172 (2009): 96.

mobilization to demonstrate the reactionary nature of the Pakistani army towards Indian aggression. Third, Pakistan fears U.S. abandonment of Afghanistan, and foresees a similar situation as in 1989; therefore, a discussion on how Washington's resolve on Afghanistan have altered Pakistan's position. Lastly, a review of Pakistan's military expenditure to determine if the state's financial capacity is able to support security operations on two fronts.

The effects Pashtun nationalism on Islamabad's decision making process will begin with describing Pashtun tribal society and center-state relations between Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Islamabad. Next, past Pashtun separatist movements will be addressed to establish the rationality for Pakistan's concerns. A comparison to the Siege of Malakand in 1897 will be used to illustrate the Mullahs mobilizing abilities. A review of the Maliki system and how the growing power of mullahs has intertwined and radicalized the Islamic Pashtun identity to establish concerns on military intervention. Lastly, this thesis will illustrate the deterioration of tribal governance and the spread of Talibanization.

The State's and military Islamic ideology affinity became radicalized under General Zia ul-Haq's regime; therefore, his regime will be used to establish the underlying basis for the affinity, and how the military used jihad rhetoric to mobilize militant groups to act as proxies against the Soviets in the 1980s. Addressing specific events such as Red Mosque incident, military's removal of Islamic fanatics within the higher echelons, Madrassa reform, President Musharraf's anti-militant policies will be used to demonstrate how the Mullah-Military nexus has been de-hyphenated. President Musharraf's collusion with the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA), and how he used Islamic political parties to bolster his political agenda will be used to demonstrate how power politics and political manipulation have shaped CI strategies. Lastly, a review of peace deals between the state and Islamic militant groups to demonstrate that other factors besides Islamic affinities created a need to sue for peace instead continuing military attacks.

F. THESIS OVERVIEW

Organization of the thesis will be broken down into five sections. The first chapter will be the introduction that describes the major research question, importance, problems, and hypothesis. The second chapter will compare Pakistan's security capacity to India's capacity. The third chapter will review the Pashtun nationalism problem and how Islamabad's relationship with the Pashtun tribal society has shaped the Pakistani's counterinsurgency strategy. The fourth chapter will analyze the Mullah-Military nexus to illustrate the pragmatic issues that this relationship has on counterinsurgency operations. Lastly, the fifth chapter will be the conclusion.

II. IS INDIA A CREDIBLE THREAT?

A. INTRODUCTION.

In this chapter, I show to what extent the Indian military along the Pakistani eastern border has affected Pakistan's troop employment and weapons procurement vis-à-vis counterinsurgency. The existential threat of India has primacy in Pakistani security calculations, and planners emphasize protection against any potential Indian aggression. Although Pakistan recognizes the insurgent threat along its western borders, security managers balance force and resource allocations to ensure security is not jeopardized on either front. At the same time, Pakistan must be confident that the United States' resolve in the region will be steadfast in order to minimize fears of possible U.S. abandonment, which would leave Pakistan vulnerable to an Indian regional hegemony.

B. OPPOSING ARMIES

1. Conventional Forces in Comparison

The Pakistan military is the strongest institution of the state and the primacy of the Indian threat dominates Pakistan's focus. At times, the Pakistani political leadership calls upon the military to stifle domestic conflict, but typically the military focuses on the eastern and western borders with the greater emphasis to the former. The communal violence of partition, India's early assertions of abrogating partition, and the unfinished business of Kashmir shaped this geographic predisposition. The conventional force strength of Pakistan is numerically disadvantaged relative to India. This disadvantage hampers Pakistani military planners from using regular forces in western Pakistan.

Pakistan's 'all volunteer' force is comprised of 550,000 regular service members with an additional half million reserve that are principally posted at strategic bases mirroring Indian garrisons along the Indo-Pakistani border. The traditional force structure is influenced by Western, Soviet, and Chinese military weapon systems and doctrines that are oriented toward conventional war. It has nine corps composed of armor, mechanized infantry, and independent infantry along with supporting arms units. The preponderance of these units are strategically positioned to serve as holding and strike

elements for a possible Indian offensive into the Punjab plain (see Figure 1). Two corps serve as tactical reserves in the event of an Indo-Pakistan conflict, but chiefly serve as the primary security forces for Baluchistan and Kyhber Pakhtunkhwa provinces (see Figure 1).

On the opposite side of the border, Pakistan faces the third largest standing army in the world with 1.3 million regular service members and one million reserve personnel, which is only exceeded by the United States and China. Additionally, India's paramilitary component is similar in size to the regular army, thereby, creating a potential adversarial army of over 3.5 million combatants. Born from the same colonial military establishment, India's force structure compares similarly to the Pakistani armed forces, although numerically advantaged. External and internal military industrial complexes supply the Indian Army to maintain a modern and technologically competitive mechanized force.²⁴ The organizational structure of the Indian Army has six field commands comprised of 13 infantry corps with 10 corps oriented toward Pakistan (see Figure 2). More importantly, India has an estimated 300,000 to 500,000 Indian troops actively deployed in the disputed state of Jammu and Kashmir. Even with nuclear deterrence, the numerically advantaged conventional force in close proximity to the Indo-Pakistan border renders a substantial looming threat that Pakistani security planners must take into account.

²⁴ Radhakrishna Rao, "Need for an Indian Military Industrial Complex," *Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies*, 26 April, 2010.




Figure 1. Pakistan Army's Corps Peacetime Positions.²⁵



Figure 2. Indian Army's Corps Peacetime Positions.²⁶

25 See <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/pakistan/army-orbat-corps-aor.htm>.

26 See <http://brfrahulm.blogspot.com/2011/05/indian-army-corps-geographical-commands.html>.

2. Marginalized Paramilitary Force

The use of marginalized paramilitary force is problematic in curtailing the domestic insurgency threat. Pakistan relies on the Frontier Corps to maintain security within its western territories. Both Baluchistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa have separate provincial Frontier Corps, and are the primary force used against militants within Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).²⁷ The Frontier Corps is marginalized by regular forces in training, equipment, and leadership, which has greatly affected their effectiveness in counterinsurgency operations. Senior command positions are reserved for regular army officers. The low prestige of these positions makes these billets undesirable for career-minded officers, thereby, limiting high quality leadership.²⁸ Local Pashtun recruits fill a majority of the lower ranks. Their local knowledge of the natural and human terrain, language, and kinship gives the military a resource to counter the insurgent's popular advantage, but tribal loyalties and kinship make soldiers susceptible to insurgent coercion against families.

3. Pakistani Armies Conventional Training

The training of Pakistan's army is shaped by the Indian threat. The perceived existential threat of India toward Pakistan has dominated Rawalpindi's security calculation over the past six decades. The majority of the Pakistani army remains trained and outfitted to engage a conventional war against India. Pakistan uses conventional tactics against the insurgents. This approach strained the indigenous population by displacing nearly two million people attempting to escape the violence. The use of conventional tactics against Islamic militant groups exacerbates the insurgency problem along the western border of Pakistan. These strains benefit the insurgents as the people lose confidence in their government. Insurgents goad the military into tactics that are self-

27 Hassan Abbas, "Transforming Pakistan's Frontier Corps," *Terrorism Monitor* 5, March 30, 2007.

28 Joshua T. White, "Applying Counterinsurgency Principles in Pakistan's Frontier," *The Brookings Institution, Counterinsurgency and Pakistan Paper Series*, No. 2, June 25, 2009.

defeating. The enemy provokes the military into an overreacting behavior with scant discrimination, which contributes to reducing the legitimacy of central authority.²⁹

The use of a direct military approach in counterinsurgency operations represents the leadership's parochial mindset towards conventional warfare. U.S. Joint Chief of Staff, Admiral Michael Mullin, offered to provide U.S. military training to Pakistan's regular military forces, but the offer was not accepted by Pakistan's army chief.³⁰ General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani ascertained that the army's principal mission is to remain deployed along the eastern border to counter possible conflicts with their traditional enemy of India.³¹ Instead, the army relied on the tribal militias and the Frontier Corps to conduct counterinsurgency operations. This reliance became problematic as the Frontier Corps lack of effectiveness quickly gave the insurgents a strategic advantage. However, by 2003, the Pakistani military was convinced that Al Qaeda and foreign fighters were a threat to internal security, and collaborated with U.S. agencies to eliminate the foreign threats; however, Islamabad failed to recognize that the insurgent groups such as the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Haqqani, and Afghan Taliban were a growing threat.³² The government's failure to recognize the impending threat of an insurgency is a common oversight as early insurgent acts lack sufficient strength to challenge the government;³³ therefore, the military's primary orientation remains toward India.

²⁹Colin S. Gray, *War, Peace and International Relations: An Introduction to Strategic History* (New York: Routledge, 2007), 255.

³⁰ Ahmed Rashid, "Pakistan's Continued Failure to Adopt a Counterinsurgency Strategy," *CTC Sentinel* 2 (2009): 8.

³¹ Ahmed Rashid, "Pakistan's Worrisome Pullback," *Washington Post*, June 6, 2008.

³² Rashid, *Taliban*, 225.

³³ David Galula, *Counter-Insurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964), 9.

C. MILITARY EXPENDITURES.

Pakistan cannot afford to fight a two front war. Pakistan uses its national budget for defense spending in an attempt to reach parity with India.³⁴ Geographic proximity, the military's size, and past conflicts create a natural fear of a conventional strike, although somewhat reduced with nuclear weapons, but remains a concern as India's military modernizes its conventional capability.³⁵ To date, the Kashmir dispute remains unsettled, and continues to be a source of controversy as the Line of Control (LOC) remains a de facto state border. Although India has minimally challenged the status quo since the original Cease Fire Line (CFL) was established in 1948, Pakistan has overtly demonstrated its resolve to annex Kashmir from India as late as 1999 during the Kargil War. The Indian political and military leadership's ability and willingness to act within the margins of the nuclear escalation ladder sustains the fear of Indian military aggression against Pakistan.

Pakistan cannot match India's economic growth and increased military spending. India's aspiration to emerge as a great power creates an asymmetric arms race. Identified almost 30 years ago, India's military expenditure behavior has become independent of Pakistan's military expenditure.³⁶ India's increase in military expenditure has paralleled its economic growth. By 2000, increases in Indian GDP and an average 3% military expenditure has allowed defense spending to increase four times greater than Pakistan's expenditure (see Tables 1 and 2). According to the 2008 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) yearbook, India accounted for 80% of South Asia's military expenditure, thereby becoming the largest arms importer in the developing world.³⁷

34 Ayesha Jalal, *The State of Martial Rule: The Origins of Pakistan's Political Economy of Defence* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 42; Reviewing Pakistan's military expenditure as a percentage of GDP since partition, an increase occurred during the 1965 and 1971 Indo-Pakistani wars, and remained above 5 percent until the 1998 nuclearization period in which expenditures began to contract to 2.8% by 2008.

35 Ibid.

36 Majeksi, S. and D. Jones, "Arms Race Modeling: Causality Analysis and Model Specification," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 25 (1981): 259–288.

37 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, *Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Yearbook 2008: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security* (Oxford: University Press, 2008), 194; Siddharth Srivastava, "Indian Arms spree on the Fast Track," *Asia Times*, June 4, 2009.

During the same period, the Pakistani military budget has contracted, and with approximately 75% of peacetime military budgets accounting for salaries, training, maintenance, procurement, and operational costs, Pakistan cannot afford to match India's military buildup without severely affecting domestic developmental and welfare programs.³⁸ The adoption of a defensive and asymmetric posture has assisted in correcting the financial imbalance;³⁹ nevertheless, Pakistan lacks the resources to conduct large scale counterinsurgency operations without jeopardizing military readiness along the eastern border.




Table 1. Indian and Pakistan Military Expenditure⁴⁰

³⁸ Andrew Davies, "Asian Military trends and their implications for Australia," *ASPI Strategic Insights*, July 2008.

³⁹ Munir Akram, "Reversing Strategic 'Shrinkage'," in *Pakistan: Beyond the 'Crisis State,'* ed. Maleeha Lodhi (New York, Columbia University Press, 2011), 297.

⁴⁰ Data obtained from World Bank, World Development Indicators.




Table 2. Indian and Pakistan Gross Domestic Product (GDP)⁴¹

Without jeopardizing its security, the perception of India as the greater threat inhibits Pakistan from directing monetary funds toward fighting a counterinsurgency. The exogenous shock of the 1990 U.S. sanctions under the Foreign Assistance Act severely impeded Pakistan's military capability to modernize. The Bush Administration mended the U.S.-Pakistani relationship by reversing previous sanctions and re-engaging Pakistan in defense cooperation.⁴² U.S. Arms Sales and Coalition Support Funds provide the monies to conduct counterinsurgency operations. Since 2001, the United States has provided approximately U.S.\$14 billion through the American security assistance program to Pakistan to facilitate troop deployments along the Afghan border, military training assistance, and military equipment procurement.⁴³ The establishment of the

⁴¹ Data obtained from World Bank, World Development Indicators.

⁴² Richard F. Grimmett, "U.S. Arms Sales to Pakistan," *Congressional Research Service Report for Congress* (CRS Order Code RS22757), 2008, 2.

⁴³ Eric Schmitt and Jane Perlez, "U.S. Is Deferring Millions in Pakistani Military Aid," *New York Times*, July 9, 2011.

Coalition Support Funds (CSF) reimburses Pakistan's logistical and operational efforts in support of U.S. operations in Afghanistan.

Increased U.S. funding has allowed Pakistan to modernize its military. The sale of certain military equipment, such as the F-16 Block 52, is criticized as unnecessary for counterinsurgency operations,⁴⁴ and Pakistan is essentially spending funds on weapon systems aimed at combating India.⁴⁵ Defense planners have the inherent responsibility to ensure that their country is protected on all fronts. The purchase of sophisticated weapon systems is indicative of a renewed weapons procurement program designed to compete against adversarial modern militaries. Although Pakistan has purchased less expensive aircraft such as attack helicopters and unmanned aerial vehicles more suitable for counterinsurgency operations, it has come at the behest of the United States. Furthermore, Pakistan's advancement in naval capability and nuclear delivery platforms exhibits a continuing tilt toward an Indian threat.

D. HONORING THE CONVENTIONAL THREAT

Indo-Pakistan security competition is a structural problem as state proximity to one another is a key variable in interstate conflict.⁴⁶ Pakistan maintains a preponderance of its conventional forces along the eastern border. Both countries demonstrate their willingness to enter into conventional conflict under the 'nuclear umbrella.' This contentious relationship was exacerbated by four large-scale wars and the continued territorial dispute over the state of Jammu and Kashmir.⁴⁷ Even during the moratorium on large-scale military conflict that existed from 1971 thru 1999, limited engagements and India's military posture sustained tensions between the two dyads, and, in fact, it has reinforced the Pakistani belief that India is a constant threat to the state.⁴⁸ Such primacy

⁴⁴ Gurmeet Kanwal, "U.S. Arms Sales are Propping up Pakistan as a Regional Challenger," *Institute for Defense Studies and Analysis*, February 11, 2010.

⁴⁵ Frederic Grare, *Rethinking Western Strategies Toward Pakistan: An Action Agenda for the United States and Europe* (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2007), 34.

⁴⁶ Stephen A. Kocs, "Territorial Disputes and Interstate War, 1945–1987," *The Journal of Politics* 57 (1995): 172.

⁴⁷ "The Stability of Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia," 187.

⁴⁸ Haqqani, *Pakistan*, 14.

places a lopsided military focus with Pakistan's conventional force poised to defend its eastern border against a potential attack from an Indian Army that greatly outnumbers and out spends Pakistan.⁴⁹

Nuclear weapons have deterred neither Pakistan nor India from conducting low-intensity conflict. During the 1999 Kargil War, India reduced Pakistan's nuclear deterrence capability by consciously avoiding a full-scale war that would trigger a possible nuclear retaliation. With discriminate low-intensity military operations, the Indian military was able to roll back the Pakistani army from the Indian-administered areas of Kashmir.⁵⁰ India further demonstrates its willingness to escalate conflicts with Pakistan during the Twin Peaks crisis. The crisis was instigated by attacks on the Indian parliament buildings in December 2001, and again in May 2002, by alleged Pakistani sponsored militants. In response to the attacks the Indian army mobilized its military to its western border.⁵¹ Although the conflict was deescalated by political means, Pakistan recognized that the nuclear umbrella did not provide protection against India's military capacity.

Indian security managers recognize impediments to their conventional strategy. The civil-military relationship and military mobilization plan was revamped by establishing forward staging positions along the Indo-Pakistan border, where armor corps could strike with limited warning into Pakistan.⁵² Indian military leaders determined that the three weeks required to coordinate an offensive campaign against Pakistan allowed the international community to intervene. Thus, India's political leaders were pressured

49 Shuja Nawaz, "Pakistan's Security and the Civil-Military Nexus," in *The Afghanistan-Pakistan Theater: Militant Islam, Security, and Stability*, ed. Daveed Gartenstein-Ross et al. (Washington, DC: FDD Press, 2010), 20.

50 Jasjit Singh, "The Fourth War," in *Kargil 1999: Pakistan's Fourth war for Kashmir*, ed. Jasjit Singh (New Delhi: Knowledge World, 1999), 128.

51 Polly Nayak and Michael Krepon, *U.S. Crisis Management in South Asia's Twin Peaks Crisis* (Washington, DC: Henry L. Stimson Center, 2006), 12.

52 Gurmeet Kanwal, "Lost opportunities in Operation Parakram," *Indian Defense Review*, December 13, 2011.

not to carry out retaliatory attacks on Pakistan.⁵³ In fact, Pakistan has consistently relied on outside intervention for protection, which is perpetuated by international fear of nuclear escalation. The elapsed time also gave the Pakistani army time to redeploy troops from the FATA region to the eastern front.⁵⁴ India realizes the limitations of its current military doctrine to rapidly deploy a strike force against Pakistan. Planning began to develop an offensive doctrine specifically to act against Pakistan that reduces the Pakistani temporal advantage.

India's new doctrine, called 'Cold Start,' is designed as a high intensity short duration armored strike to seize limited swaths of terrain that could be used in post conflict negotiations.⁵⁵ Pakistan can no longer rely on India's traditional deterrence posture and must protect the vulnerable Punjabi plain. Pakistan's major population centers and much of its infrastructure are situated near the Indian frontier, and security problems are compounded by a lack of strategic depth. An obstructed Indian Armor advance into Pakistan would more than likely require Pakistan to give substantial ground before forces could be redeployed to counterattack. With its limited depth, giving up ground could be costly; therefore, a similar type catalyst such as the Twin Peaks terrorist attacks could incite an Indo-Pakistan war with little warning. A more efficient Indian mobilization and limited objective strike plan obligates the Pakistani military to maintain a majority of its forces along its eastern border to counter an Indian threat. Pakistani regular forces cannot afford to become mired in counterinsurgency operations on the opposite side of the country.

Indian restraint to the 2006 and 2008 Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) attacks was a significant confidence building step between India and Pakistan. India did not mobilize forces against Pakistan; instead, the following illustrates India's temperament change.

53 Neil Joeck, "The Indo-Pakistani Nuclear Confrontation: Lessons from the Past, Contingencies for the Future," in *Pakistan's Nuclear Future: Reigning in the Risk*, ed. Henry Sokolski (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 2009), 29–30.

54 Syed Rifaat Hussain, "Battling Militancy," "The Indian Factor," in *Pakistan: Beyond the 'Crisis State'*, ed. Maleeha Lodhi (New York, Columbia University Press, 2011), 329.

55 Walter C. Ladwig, "A Cold Start for Hot Wars? The Indian Army's New Limited War Doctrine," *International Security* 32 (2008): 165.

One, Indian political leaders looked inward at their internal security failures.⁵⁶ Two, India sought United Nations recourse to pressure Pakistan to enhance anti-terrorist policies.⁵⁷ Three, U.S.-Indian rapprochement slashed barriers to Indian political leaders for a quick U.S. diplomatic response,⁵⁸ and finally, India recognized that Islamabad was actively opposing insurgents through counterinsurgency operations. The change in posture infused confidence in Rawalpindi decision-makers that their eastern flank can be exposed without India retribution. This transition is demonstrated by a 2010 Indian Military Intelligence assessment that reported 35% of Pakistani army's troop strength was actively deployed in FATA.⁵⁹

E. WILL WASHINGTON ABANDON PAKISTAN?

Pakistan hesitated to redeploy forces to the Af-Pak border due to uncertainty of Washington's resolve in the region. Pakistan dreaded the possibility of being entrenched in a counterinsurgency operation if the United States abandoned the region. Without Washington balancing India's regional hegemony, Islamabad could not afford to leave its Eastern border relatively unsecure. Additionally, Pakistani leaders believed that insurgency was a result of U.S. intervention in Afghanistan, and once the United States left, the insurgency problem would be resolved; therefore, decision makers were not willing to exhaust resources.

The U.S.-Pakistan relationship deteriorated prior to 9/11. Material handicaps generated by partition impelled Pakistan to enter into a strategic partnership with the United States to reduce insecurities toward India while at the same time, Washington benefited by anchoring its western flank of Kennan's containment strategy against the Soviet Union.⁶⁰ Over the years, due to relationship strains and changes in the

⁵⁶ Angel Rabasa et al., *The Lessons of Mumbai*, (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2009), 15.

⁵⁷ Ibid., 19.

⁵⁸ Stephen Tanner, *Afghanistan: A Military History from Alexander the Great to the War Against the Taliban* (New York: Da Capo Press, 2009), 337.

⁵⁹ Suman Sharma, "Pakistan Removes Third of Army's Border Deployment," *Daily News and Analysis*, June 2, 2010.

⁶⁰ Robert J. McMahon, *Cold War on the Periphery: The United States, India and Pakistan* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 191.

international environment, this opportunistic relationship has fractured.⁶¹ United States indifference to the 1965 and 1971 Indo-Pakistani wars and U.S. administrations alienation of the subcontinent in favor of pursuing nonproliferation policies caused Pakistan to lose confidence.⁶² Distanced from Pakistan throughout the 1970s, the United States and Pakistan rejoined to fight communist adventurism in Afghanistan as the United States financed Pakistan to funnel equipment and train forces to counter the Soviet army. But as quickly as the U.S. entered the area, they left, leaving Pakistan with a renewed civil war next door in Afghanistan. The civil war transformed into an Indian-Pakistan proxy war with Pakistan supporting the Taliban and the Northern Alliance receiving aid from India.⁶³ Moreover, heavy sanctions were placed on Pakistan due to Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) violations, which hollowed U.S.-Pakistan relations and gave a sense of U.S. abandonment to the Pakistani leadership.

The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, catapulted Pakistan back onto the frontlines of the U.S. war against the Taliban in Afghanistan. Pakistan's alignment with the United States was for strategic reasons. President Musharraf feared Pakistan being labeled a 'terrorist' state, and subsequently an enemy of the United States. However, The United States minimal military footprint in Afghanistan signaled to Pakistani leaders that Washington was not committed to the region. In 2002, U.S. troop strength in Afghanistan reached a maximum of 10,500 and only increased to an average 21,000 military personnel prior to 2008. Pakistan took a minimalist approach in supporting U.S. action in order to preserve security along its eastern border. The early days of U.S. military operations in Afghanistan concentrated on counterterrorism instead of counterinsurgency,⁶⁴ and Washington applied minimal pressure on Pakistan to act against the Taliban.⁶⁵ Washington and Pakistan's shared objective of capturing or killing

61 Jeffrey Goldberg, "The Ally from Hell," *The Atlantic Monthly* 308 (2011): 56.

62 Deepa Ollapally and Raja Ramanna, "U.S.-India Tensions: Misperceptions on Nuclear Proliferation," *Foreign Affairs* 74 (1995): 16.

63 Hussain, "Battling Militancy," "Battling Militancy," 202.

64 Greg Mills and David Richards, "The Bonds That Tie Us: Overcoming the Obstacles to Peace in Afghanistan," *Council on Foreign Relations*, November 24, 2010.

65 Rabasa et al., *The Lessons of Mumbai*, 18.

of Al Qaeda and foreign fighters allowed for a simple partnership.⁶⁶ The Pakistani government entered into ‘peace deals’ with Islamic insurgent groups and only deployed regional forces to counter the Islamic militant groups. The limited objectives created perceptions that United States had limited intentions and quickly leave once those objectives were accomplished. Furthermore, as the U.S. military diverted resources and attention to Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) this perception was reinforced.⁶⁷

The United States’ change in its Afghan policy signaled to Pakistan a strengthened U.S. commitment to the region. From 2002 to 2006, Pakistan did conduct counterinsurgency operations in its western territories,⁶⁸ but a majority of the security forces were members of the Frontier Corps and the only regular forces employed were from the XI Corps headquartered in Peshawar. In 2008, President Obama reoriented the military operations back to Afghanistan by increasing troop strengths to 98,000 by 2010.⁶⁹ At the same time, Pakistan deployed forces away from the Indian border to participate in the Swat Valley Campaigns without fear of retribution from India as U.S.-Indian rapprochement facilitated a limited Indo-Pakistan détente.⁷⁰ Pakistani military forces deployed the equivalent of six infantry divisions, which comprised its strike force into India, away from the Indian border to counter insurgent threats.⁷¹

F. CONCLUSION

Although a majority of literature focuses on Pakistan’s “unwillingness” to conduct counterinsurgency operations in the Af-Pak border regions, this chapter shows a limited capacity for Pakistan to conduct a two front military operation. India is a perceived existential threat to Pakistan. Pakistan’s military faces a considerable

66 Ashley J. Tellis, *Pakistan and the War on Terror: Conflicted Goals, Compromised Performance* (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2008), 7.

67 From 2003–2008, U.S. presence in Iraq averaged 147,000 troops. See Amy Belasco, “The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11,” *Congressional Research Service Report for Congress* (CRS Order Code RL33110), 2011.

68 C. Christine Fair and Seth G. Jones, “Pakistan’s War Within,” *Survival* 51 (2010): 167.

69 Belasco, “The Cost,” 44.

70 Hussain, “Battling Militancy,” “Battling Militancy,” 157.

71 Shuja Nawaz, *Crossed Swords: Pakistan, Its Army, and the Wars Within* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 21.

numerical and material disadvantaged compared to India. The uncertainty of Indian intentions created by the 'Cold Start' doctrine, increased military expenditure, and the proximity of India's military mass transfixes Pakistani security managers on the Indo-Pakistan Border. Its conventional forces are trained to fight an Indian threat which has weakened its counterinsurgency operations. Thus, Pakistan cannot afford to fight a two front war without foreign assistance.

With the absence of conflict resolution and continuing spread of violent actors, the prospects of crises remain volatile. Terrorist attacks by non-state actors in 2001 and 2008 against India illustrate the volatility of Indo-Pakistan relations. With U.S.-Indian rapprochement, India is persuaded to reduce its military posture toward Pakistan, which allows Islamabad to expose its eastern borders so military forces can participate in counterinsurgency operations. The United States' reassertion into the region signals to Pakistani leaders that they will not be abandoned. With the Indian threat minimized on Pakistan's eastern border and U.S. aid providing physical capital to sustain military operations, Islamabad has renewed military offensive action along the Af-Pak border after almost eight years of ambivalence toward insurgent groups.

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III. A SELECTIVE ISLAMIC AFFINITY

A. INTRODUCTION

In this chapter, I intend to show that Pakistan has not been serious about containing Islamic fundamentalists until Islamic militant groups threatened the state. Pakistan promoted Islamic fundamentalism to achieve political and geostrategic objectives. Washington's stance on terrorism altered the way Pakistan dealt with Islamic groups. Attempts were made by Pakistan to curtail some Islamic groups; however, Pakistani leaders accepted groups that continued to align themselves with Islamabad's objectives. President Musharraf used Islamists to consolidate his political power, but at the same time worked to appease Washington, which caused resentment within the public, military, and government. Musharraf attempted to balance his domestic agenda by appeasing both the United States and religious militant groups. However, Pakistan's tilt toward the United States, enraged religious militant groups to oppose national forces acting in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).⁷² Domestic affairs made circumstances difficult for Islamabad to divorce itself from its former strategy; however, the spread of radical fundamental violence changed the government's orientation toward militant groups as the militants began directly challenging the state's authority.

B. JIHADI RHETORIC

Islamic militants are used instrumentally to further Pakistan's national interests specifically in Afghanistan and Kashmir.⁷³ *Jihadi* rhetoric is a tool used by religious extremists to project their version of Islam onto the world hoping to create a pan-Islamic *Ummah*.⁷⁴ Although Pakistani leaders do not necessarily share pan-Islamic aspirations, they identified the manipulative power of *jihad* to organize groups as a foreign policy instrument to achieve strategic objectives. Early examples are indicated during the

⁷² Nasreen Akhtar, "Polarized Politics: The Challenge of Democracy in Pakistan," *International Journal on World Peace* 26 (2009): 41.

⁷³ Lieven, *Pakistan: A Hard Country*, 185.

⁷⁴ Hassan Abbas, *Pakistan's Drift into Extremism: Allah, the Army, and America's War on Terror* (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2005), 201.

Kashmiri dispute at partition and 1971 Bangladesh Crisis. At partition, fearing the territorial loss of the state of Jammu and Kashmir, tribesmen from the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa were recruited under the rubric of *jihad*. These tribal raiders became a proxy force to violently coerce the Maharaja Hari Singh to cede the princely state to Pakistan. During the 1971 Bangladesh crisis, the Pakistani military used Islamic rhetoric and solicited the help of Islamic groups to intimidate East Pakistani secular leaders against challenging the West Pakistani political regime.⁷⁵

The use of Islamic militant groups expanded during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. The Soviet invasion intensified fears of communist expansion. General Zia-ul-Haq in collaboration with Washington and Riyadh sponsored militant groups to combat Soviet forces.⁷⁶ The Inter-Service Intelligence's (ISI) fondness for Islamic fundamentalists emerged due to perceptions that they were fearless fighters and malleable to Pakistani desires,⁷⁷ which encouraged the CIA-ISI nexus to funnel military aid to radical Islamic parties.⁷⁸ During this time, the ISI staff expanded from 2,000 to 40,000 employees and to a billion dollar budget.⁷⁹ Young Pakistanis and Afghan refugees were militarized and indoctrinated into a jihadist culture through a flourishing Madrasa network.⁸⁰ With the withdrawal of the Soviet Union in 1989 and success of the United States' strategic mission, a U.S. exit left Pakistan with a large population of unemployed 'freedom fighters.'⁸¹

Recognizing the success of militants against a global hegemon, Islamabad pursued a similar asymmetric design against India. Pakistan disputes the accession of

⁷⁵ Haqqani, *Pakistan*, 89.

⁷⁶ Mussarat Jabeen et al., "U.S. Afghan Relations: A Historical Perspective of Events of 9/11," *South Asian Studies* 25 (2010): 158.

⁷⁷ Gartenstein-Ross, 33.

⁷⁸ Rashid, *Taliban*, 85.

⁷⁹ Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, "Religious Militancy in Pakistan's Military and Inter-Service Intelligence Agency," in *The Afghanistan-Pakistan Theater: Militant, Security, and Stability*, ed. Daveed Gartenstein-Ross et al. (Washington, DC: FDD Press, 2010), 32.

⁸⁰ S.V.R. Nasr, "Rise of Sunni Militancy in Pakistan: The Changing Role of Islamism and the Ulama in Society and Politics," *Modern Asian Studies* 34 (2000): 142.

⁸¹ Gartenstein-Ross, 35.

Kashmir to India as illegitimate, and it fails to acquire the territory through conventional military means. ISI managed extremist groups in the low-intensity conflict against India.⁸² The surplus of ‘freedom fighters’ were funneled into Kashmir to supplement indigenous Kashmiri separatist groups compelled to settle the Kashmir dispute in favor of Pakistan. Not all separatist groups exhibited an Islamic ideology. Instead initial patronage was provided to the secular separatist group Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) whose radical factions were more determined to act against India. As the aspirations of particular separatist groups lost momentum, the ISI would redirect support to groups whom were more invigorated to join Kashmir to Pakistan.⁸³ Although many of the groups followed an Islamic ideology, Islamabad demonstrated through support of multiple militant groups that Islamic ideology was not a requirement, but only an instrument to mobilize militant action.

Pakistan’s continued perseverance in supporting religious militants to advance strategic ends was further demonstrated through its patronage toward the Taliban during the Afghan civil war. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the changing geopolitical situation provided Benazir Bhutto’s government a chance to establish a pro-Islamabad Kabul regime that could stabilize the Afghan government, and open up a direct trade route with Central Asian Republics (CAR).⁸⁴ In looking for the best faction to support these objectives, regional expert Frederic Grare summarizes that “In [Pakistan’s] bid to control Afghanistan, the army supported in succession two ideologically different organizations, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Hezb-i-Islami and the Taliban whose only similarity was their Pashtun character.”⁸⁵ The Taliban is a movement to cleanse society and establish a theocratic state and an ulema controlled government that was distinct from Hekmatyar’s secular desire for political power.⁸⁶ Hekmatyar’s inability to

82 Hussain, “Battling Militancy,” *Frontline Pakistan*, 13; Sumit Ganguly and S. Paul Kapur, “The Sorcerer’s Apprentice: Islamist Militancy in South Asia,” *The Washington Quarterly* 33 (2010): 52.

83 Ganguly, 50, 51.

84 Rashid, 26; Gilles Dorronsoro, “Pakistan and the Taliban: State Policy, Religious Networks and Political Connections,” in *Pakistan: Nationalism Without a Nation?* ed. Christopher Jaffrelot (New York: Zed Books, 2004), 170.

85 Frédéric Grare, “Pakistan: The Myth of an Islamic Pearl,” *Carneige Policy Brief* 45 (2006): 5.

86 Rashid, 23; Dorronsoro, 164.

consolidate power encouraged the ISI to invest in Mullah Omar's Taliban.⁸⁷ Furthermore, the ISI and the Pakistanis wanted to emphasize the Islamist Afghan side over the nationalist Afghan side. Pakistan hoped that a transnational Islamic identity would diminish secular Afghan leader's platform to recapture lost Afghan territory from Pakistan.⁸⁸ For over twenty years, Pakistan used Islamic militant groups as coercive tools to promote its foreign policy.

C. PROSCRIBING MILITANT GROUPS

Under President Musharraf, Islamic militant groups were proscribed by the government; however, the state continued a benevolent attitude. Minimalist policies were constructed. State leadership targeted domestic sectarian groups to curb Sunni-Shia domestic violence.⁸⁹ The spread of fundamentalist ideology by Islamic militant groups had damaging effects on Pakistani civil society. On August 14, 2001, President Musharraf publicly took a stance by proscribing the pro-Sunni Karachi based group, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), as a first step to restore domestic stability. The degrading effects of Pakistan's association with the Taliban impelled Musharraf to ban two political Islamic groups (Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammad) along with additional sectarian groups.⁹⁰ Lenient policies were established based on the presumption that by limiting free rein of militant groups, they would eventually wean themselves from *jihadi* practices.⁹¹ Eventually, some groups did disperse; however, others either found refuge in FATA, or joined forces with Al Qaeda and the Taliban.⁹²

Although Musharraf's landmark attempt to curtail Islamic militancy within Pakistan established a new found precedence against militancy that no prior government

⁸⁷ David B. Edwards, *Before Taliban: Genealogies of the Afghan Jihad* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), 291.

⁸⁸ Mark Smith, "The Taliban-Pakistan Alliance," *Frontline*, October 3, 2006.

⁸⁹ Ibid., 23.

⁹⁰ Grare, "Pakistan," 4.

⁹¹ Riaz Mohammad Khan, *Afghanistan and Pakistan: Conflict, Extremism, and Resistance to Modernity* (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Press, 2011), 234.

⁹² Imtiaz Gul, *The Most Dangerous Place: Pakistan's Lawless Frontier* (New York: Penguin Group, 2010), 17.

had sought to achieve⁹³ skeptics accuse the Pakistani army and ISI of not being serious about eliminating Islamic militant groups.⁹⁴ Islamabad took no action against transnational groups until pressured by the United States. Even then, in November 2003, Musharraf banned fifteen violent sectarian organizations while other similar organizations that are useful in Afghanistan and Kashmir were placed on a watch list. Additionally, Pakistan's past use of Islamic militant groups against the existential threat of India and the strategic interest of Afghanistan created deep rooted sympathies and loyalties that caused the slow implementation of policies. Musharraf's government made a distinction between al Qaeda, foreign fighters, and 'freedom fighters.' Although the targeting of the two former groups preserved western goodwill, the 'freedom fighters' are considered Pakistani citizens and useful in both Afghanistan and Kashmir; thus, Islamabad is hesitant to act against them.⁹⁵

Islamic militant groups began turning against the government as the minimalist polices allowed militant groups to continue operating unobstructed. Islamic militant group's regional power and strength increased in the absence of central authority.⁹⁶ As groups became more emboldened, they began challenging Islamabad. Retribution was sought as their increased strength resulted in assassination attempts against political leaders. Musharraf faced two unsuccessful assassination plots that materialized from Waziristan and included low-level assistance from within the armed forces.⁹⁷ Fearing a Musharraf-Bhutto coalition government set against Islamic fundamentalists, Islamic militants assassinated former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto during a political rally

93 Feroz Khan, "Pakistan's Challenges and the Need for a Balanced Solution," *Strategic Insight* 1, 2002.

94 Daniel Markey, "A False Choice in Pakistan," *Foreign Affairs* 86 (2007): 86.

95 Grare, "Pakistan," 5.

96 Ibid., 1.

97 Lieven, *Pakistan: A Hard Country*, 192, 423.

marking her return to Pakistan.⁹⁸ The attacks illustrate the violent opposition to proscribing policies, but, more importantly, it exhibits the government's failure to stem Islamic militancy.

D. POLITICAL COLLUSION

Both military and civilian regimes use Islamic parties to strengthen their political base. With Islamic parties carrying extensive clout among the population, political leaders learned to bolster their position by gaining Islamic party support. The early use of Islamists allowed them to become intertwined within Pakistani political institutions. The Islamists mobilizing strength was identified during the Ayub Khan era. Ayub Khan's elitist economic policies and inequitable distribution instigated right-wing mobilization to pressure Ayub Khan's ouster.⁹⁹ Learning from Ayub Khan's mistakes, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto gave Islamist political concessions and promoted a state Islamic ideology. Bhutto sought economic equality under the guise of Islamic socialism in an attempt to appease Islamic parties. He used the state's Islamic identity to develop foreign policies with other Islamic states. However, Bhutto's overreliance on a weak Islamic bond could not overcome an overwhelming Military-Islamist nexus headed by General Zia al-Huq.¹⁰⁰

Islamists became entrenched under General Zia. Zia's pious religiosity eased the cultivation of Islamist sentiment toward his military regime.¹⁰¹ Collaboration with religious groups aided Zia in gaining political legitimacy and allowed Jamat'at-e-Islami (JI) to infiltrate into governmental institutions.¹⁰² This practice continued with Nawaz Sharif, who had explicit ties to JI as head of the Islami Jamhoori Itihad (IJI). Benazir Bhutto, former prime minister of the Shia PPP party, even supported the Sunni oriented Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan (Pakistan Army of the Prophet's Companions), to bolster her

⁹⁸ The postmortem investigation discovered evidence that linked Beitullah Mehsud's Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) to the assassination.

⁹⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁰ Lawrence Ziring, *Pakistan: At the Crosscurrent of History* (Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2003) 153, 154.

¹⁰¹ Iqtidar, 87, 88.

¹⁰² Ibid., 57

position against the opposition party, Pakistan Muslim League (PML), in the mid-1990s. The trend of political leaders using Islamist parties to maneuver against their political opposition continues as General Musharraf aligns his King's party with Mutahidda Majles-e-Amal (MMA).¹⁰³

President Musharraf's used the MMA to neutralize its political opposition. "State necessity" impelled Chief Justice Irshad Hasan Khan to justify General Musharraf's 1999 coup d'état and gave Musharraf three years to hold democratic elections.¹⁰⁴ Musharraf saw secular politicians as his primary rival for political power; therefore, he used a common political tactic by bolstering his political power through Islamist parties to marginalize secular parties.¹⁰⁵ The MMA made electoral gains through the redistricting, exile of secular political leaders, and electoral concessions.¹⁰⁶ Their electoral support from Pashtun sympathizers boosted the MMA into power giving them a large minority within the national assembly.¹⁰⁷ No Islamist political party possessed the organizational capacity or popular support necessary to seize power in Islamabad until the 2002 elections.¹⁰⁸

The MMA's association with Islamic militant groups and increased power allowed the MMA to politically oppose counterinsurgency operations. The MMA evolved from the Pak-Afghan Defense council—a conglomeration of religious parties opposed to U.S. intervention in Afghanistan and Islamabad's participation in the "War on Terror"—in 2002 to contest the general elections on a common agenda.¹⁰⁹ The six constituents of the MMA—the J.I., the JUP, the JUI (of Maulana Samiul Haq), the JUI (of Fazlur Rahman), the Islami Tehreek Pakistan and the Jamiat Ahl-e-Hadith (JAH) —

¹⁰³ Husain Haqqani, "The Role of Islam in Pakistan's Future," *The Washington Quarterly* 28 (2004): 90,91.

¹⁰⁴ "Pakistan Court Limits Army Rule," http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/746262.stm

¹⁰⁵ Haqqani, "The Role of Islam in Pakistan's Future," 91.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., 91.

¹⁰⁷ Hussain, "Battling Militancy," *The Scorpion's Tail* (New York: Free Press, 2010), 29.

¹⁰⁸ Markey, "A False Choice in Pakistan," 95.

¹⁰⁹ International Crisis Group, "Pakistan: The Mullahs and the Military," *Asia Report* No. 49, March 20, 2003, 5.

have differing ideologies particular toward the Taliban. For example the JI emphasized state and legal reform along Islamic lines and supports the Taliban while JUI attempts to portray itself as a strictly political movements with little interest in replicating social or political aspects of Mullah Omar's purist Islamist vision.¹¹⁰ Many of the party candidates who were elected to the national and state assemblies were former militant commanders who fought in Afghanistan and Kashmir.¹¹¹ The MMA was now in a greater position to influence the assembly and block legislature soliciting adverse action against the Islamic militant groups.

E. THE MILITARY IS NOT MONOLITHIC

Pakistan inherited a professional and disciplined army trained by the British that continues to be a bulwark for national security. Every officer and soldier carries a strong sense of commitment and unity to the army,¹¹² which is reinforced by the economic and social advantages provided under their loyal service.¹¹³ Pakistani army officers do not want to see the army turned into a 'vehicle for religious propagation.'¹¹⁴ The officer corps police themselves by purging religious ideologically motivated officers that was exemplified by the army chief General Asif Nawaz Janjua's removal of the 'bearded' generals.¹¹⁵ General Zia's attempt to institutionalize the military was met half heartily as many followed the rhetoric more to mollify their superior.¹¹⁶

President Musharraf's support of Washington's 'War on Terror' was a drastic reversal on policy toward militant groups. Many senior generals in the Pakistan army understood the reasoning and consequences of joining the United States. Past support of

110 Joshua T. White, "Pakistan's Islamist Frontier: Islamic Politics and U.S. Policy in Pakistan's North-West Frontier," in *The Afghanistan-Pakistan Theater: Militant, Security, and Stability*, ed. Daveed Gartenstein-Ross et al. (Washington, DC: FDD Press, 2010), 52, 54.

111 Hussain, "Battling Militancy," *The Scorpion's Tail*, 29,30.

112 Lieven, *Pakistan: A Hard Country*, 162.

113 Nawaz, 385.

114 Stephen Philip Cohen, "The Jihadist Threat to Pakistan," *The Washington Quarterly* 26 (2003): 16.

115 Ibid.

116 Nawaz, 385.

Islamic groups build ties between the military and Islamic groups. Musharraf had to deal with the ISI who had closely dealt with the Taliban over the past ten years, and began to sympathize with Islamic groups. Musharraf ordered the dismantlement of the Afghan cell, and replaced it with a new Counter Terrorism Cell (CTC) that propagated ISI, FBI and CIA collaboration to hunt down al Qaeda fugitives. In targeting foreign fighters, ISI assisted the CIA in operations to remove external actors supporting the insurgency. Furthermore, the ISI was purged of officers with extremist sympathies, which was demonstrated by the forced resignation of ISI Chief Lieutenant General Mahmud Ahmed and a number of other military commanders regarded as pro-Taliban or Islamist. However, the dominance of the ISI prevents a total purge, which allows continued support.

The military was apprehensive of conducting offensive operations against Pakistani citizens. Internal state strife pitting citizen against citizen placed Pakistani soldiers' in a moral predicament, as they were forced to choose between family fidelity and military service. Personal choice was further complicated when public opinion denounced the U.S. led coalition in Afghanistan, identified Musharraf as a U.S. stooge, and perceived military combat operations in Pakistan as an 'American war.'¹¹⁷ As religious extremists became more emboldened, they challenged the writ of government, forcing the military to act.¹¹⁸ Increased Islamic militant attacks against central authority and high casualty rates created animosity between military and extremists.¹¹⁹ With the increased violence against the military counterinsurgency operations began to expand. As Ahmed Rashid reports, "The Pakistani army has no love for Islamic extremists now, but it differentiates between Afghan Taliban, which it sees as a potential ally in a pro-Pakistan Afghanistan if U.S. efforts there fail, and the Pakistani Taliban, which is viewed as a threat to the state to be eliminated."¹²⁰

117 C. Christine Fair, "Why the Pakistan Army is Here to Stay: Prospects for Civilian Governance?" *International Affairs* 87 (2011): 578.

118 Nasreen Akhtar, "Polarized Politics: The Challenge of Democracy in Pakistan," *International Journal on World Peace* 26 (2009), 52.

119 Markey, 93.

120 Ahmed Rashid, "On a Credible U.S. Strategy in Afghanistan," *The Washington Post*, September 23, 2009.

F. ISLAMIC GROUPS CHALLENGE THE STATE

As Islamic militants continued to challenge the central government, their deviant behavior brought Islamabad past the breaking point. The red mosque siege exemplifies Islamabad's resolve against Islamic militants who challenge the state. The mosque once received considerable state patronage during the Zia regime. As the state was supporting the *jihadi* movements, the mosque militarized and provided mujahedin recruits to fight in the Afghan *jihad* and later the Kashmiri *jihad*.¹²¹ The mosque's reputation for radicalism attracted hardliners from the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.¹²² Anti-American sentiment fueled the mosque's influence. Islamabad's ambivalence toward the Red Mosque's leadership emboldened radical behavior and promoted *sharia* law. The Mosque's leadership enforced Islamic standards through violence as they targeted women who chose not to wear veils and stores selling music CDs and movie DVDs. Fatwas were issued that labeled Pakistani soldiers killed in the FATA region as U.S. pawns and not worthy of an Islamic burial. They kidnapping police officers and held hostage Chinese women assumed to be prostitutes serving Pakistani elites. The radical behavior encroached onto the government's rule.

Musharraf's regime faced a volatile situation in dealing with the Red Mosque dissidents when the *fatwas* began overstepping onto the central government's authority.¹²³ "Security forces attempted to peacefully stop the vigilant behavior; however, the mosque occupants were uncooperative and barricaded themselves within the mosque confines. The standoff between security forces and armed extremists dragged on for four months as negotiation attempts were unsuccessful. JI and JUI-F Islamic parties differed on their stances. JUI-F acted as a go-between with the central government and mosque clerics,¹²⁴ while JI directly supported mosque leadership and opposed the central

121 Khan, "Afghanistan and Pakistan," 253.

122 Syed Shoaib Hasan, "Profile: Islamabad's Red Mosque," *BBC News*, July 27, 2007.

123 Joshua T. White, "Vigilante Islamism in Pakistan: Religious Party Responses to the Lal Masjid Crisis," in *Current Trends in Islamist Ideology*, ed. by Hillel Fradkin et al. (Washington D.C.: Hudson Institute, 2008), 55.

124 Ibid., 58.

government's position.¹²⁵ The Musharraf regime was publicly criticized for the inability or unwillingness to take effective action, and eventually the situation came to a head. After weeks of failed negotiations, "Operation Silence" was launched resulting in the death of approximately 100 militants including Pakistani cleric Abdul Rashid Ghazi. The event demonstrated the government's resolve against Islamic militants who challenge the state.

The government's efforts to stop radical behavior cascaded into bloodshed, which redirected militancy against the state. Government agencies were targeted as militants began focusing their violent methods against the government, military, and ISI. Many Islamic leaders perceived the military action as a compliment to the West's desire to crush Islam. In the fall of 2007, Mehsud announced the formation of the Tehreek-e-Talibane-Pakistan (TTP, Pakistani Taliban), which is a confederation of several militant commanders, and began expanding their operations outside the tribal areas with a severe rise in violence in Punjab.¹²⁶ There was an increase in suicide bombings and ambushes.¹²⁷ Even the military's headquarters in Rawalpindi was raided and besieged. The Red Mosque was a national and international awakening to the promotion of "Talibanization."¹²⁸ Until the TTP became a direct threat to the state much of the military saw campaigns against Pakistani militants as U.S. bidding against Pakistani Muslims.¹²⁹

G. CONCLUSION

History demonstrates Pakistan's reliance on Islamic militant groups to achieve its strategic objectives. The militant's success prompts Islamabad to maintain an ambivalent attitude toward the groups. Although Musharraf attempted to curtail domestic sectarian violence, the minimalist approach of proscribing militant groups allowed groups to operate unrestrained. Furthermore, Islamic militant groups became entrenched within the

¹²⁵ Ibid., 57.

¹²⁶ Khan, "Afghanistan and Pakistan: Conflict, Extremism, and Resistance to Modernity," 233.

¹²⁷ Ibid., 68.

¹²⁸ Johnson, 57.

¹²⁹ Lieven, *Pakistan: A Hard Country*, 175

Pakistani security and political structures. The use of jihad to mobilize fighters to achieve state objectives roots Islamic ideology within Pakistani institutions. Increased political recognition embedded Islamists into political institutions, which became pronounced during General Zia's regime. However, President Musharraf further advanced the Islamist's position to stem secular opposition groups. The 2002 elections gave the MMA a large minority and a greater ability to affect legislation. The MMA's connection to Islamic militant influenced their opposition to counterinsurgency operations.

The Pakistan Army is a secular organization, but it is not a monolithic institution. A majority of the officer and soldiers carry a strong sense of commitment and unity to the army;¹³⁰ however, there are pockets of Islamic sympathizers that undermine counterinsurgency operations. Pakistani army officers do not want to see the army turned into a "vehicle for religious propagation."¹³¹ The officer corps polices themselves by purging religious ideologically motivated officers as exemplified by the Army Chief's, Asif Nawaz Janjua, removal of the bearded Generals.¹³² Initially, apprehension against extremist did occur, as soldiers did not want to fight Pakistani citizens; however, as casualty rates increased, that apprehension turned to animosity. By 2008, the military has increased its counterinsurgency operations along the Af-Pak border. The Red Mosque siege illustrates Islamabad's reaction against Islamic militants who challenge the state. However, unless Pakistani leaders refrain from promoting Islamic ideology to achieve political and strategic objectives, radical fundamentalism has the potential to continue growing.

¹³⁰ Lieven, Pakistan: A Hard Country, 162.

¹³¹ Ibid., 163.

¹³² Stephen Philip Cohen, "The Jihadist Threat to Pakistan," *The Washington Quarterly* 26 (2003): 16. Additionally, the 1995 Pakistani coup d'état led by Major General Zaheer ul Islam Abbasi was an attempt to remove Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto and install an Islamic Regime; however, the military's strict vertical discipline disallowed the coups success and ultimately the junior general officers responsible for organizing the coup were court martialed.

IV. PASHTUN NATIONALISM POST-9/11

A. INTRODUCTION

In this chapter, I intend to demonstrate how Islamabad's dread of past irredentist movements along ethno-linguistic lines of the Pashtun tribes minimized counterinsurgency operations and provided political space for insurgents to challenge Islamabad's authority.¹³³ The cohesiveness of Pashtun tribes and the past Pashtun nationalistic aspirations has caused Islamabad to proceed cautiously against the Taliban. The existing tribal governing system within FATA benefited the insurgents as it allowed the charismatic religious leaders to gain legitimacy over the central government agents by restoring law and order in the region. Although public opinion initially favored the insurgents which repressed military leaders from intervening, the fallout from the Taliban's strict adherence to their religious code and repressive practices changed public opinion against the Taliban, which shaped an opening for military intervention.

B. WHO ARE THE PASHTUNS?

Estimates suggest that the Pashtuns began inhabiting the Af-Pak border region in the 4th century BC with tribal enclaves stretching from the Iranian plateau to the Gangetic plains of India.¹³⁴ In 1747, under Ahmad Shah Durrani, the Pashtun tribal factions were consolidated into the present day territories of southern Afghanistan and Western Pakistan.¹³⁵ These tribal enclaves along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region are considered the largest segmentary lineage system in the world¹³⁶ with an estimated 12.5 million in Afghanistan, approximately 30 million in Pakistan whom are concentrated

133 From Alexander the Great to the British Raj, history has demonstrated that Pashtun tribes have had a strong aversion to invading armies. With 75% of military personnel from the Punjabi region, the ethnic disparity within the army could portray the Pakistani forces as an occupying army. This is also tied to Pashtuns strong sense of governmental autonomy within the FATA region.

134 Leon B. Poullada, "Pashtunistan: Afghan Domestic Politics and Relations with Pakistan," in *Afghanistan in the 1970s*, ed. Louis Dupree et al. (New York: Praeger, 1975), 129.

135 John C. Griffiths, *Afghanistan: Key to a Continent* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1981), 26.

136 David Kilcullen, *The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 74.

in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and an additional 3.18 million living in FATA.¹³⁷ Originally their homeland was first identified as “Pakhtunkhwa,” or the Pashtun quarter.¹³⁸ Although the Pashtuns only constitute approximately 16% of the total population of Pakistan, they are a majority within the northwestern territories of Pakistan. Seven tribal areas and six frontier regions divide the 10,507 square miles of the Pakistani state that equates to comparing an area equivalent to the size of Vermont.¹³⁹ The rugged terrain of the FATA region is an extension of the Hindu Kush mountain range, and shares a 1240 kilometer border with Afghanistan.

Pashtun tribal organization is a segmented lineage system based on egalitarian clans, patrilineal genealogies, and agnatic kinship. Furthermore, the ethno-linguistic Pashtun identity is based on a common descent, the Pashto language, and following the moral and social code of Pashtunwali.¹⁴⁰ Although created from a rural heritage, the development of the modern nation-state created a dichotomy in the social construct of the Pashtuns; and therefore, Pashtuns are categorized by their affiliation with the state into two categories-rural and urban Pashtuns.¹⁴¹ The harsh arid landscape predisposes the rural Pashtuns into subsistent agricultural and pastoral living that intensifies socioeconomic problems within the tribes. Their basic traditional lifestyle in the mountainous regions of FATA and minimal state interaction has left much of the inhabitants disenfranchised from the central government. In contrast, urban centers such as Peshawar and intrastate migration has integrated Pashtuns into the Punjabi dominated social strata. Initial Pashtun incorporation into the state’s jurisdiction began when the British Raj formally recognized the two zones and divided the Northwest Territory into

137 Amin Saikal, “Afghanistan and Pakistan: The Question of Pashtun Nationalism,” *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs* 30 (2010): 6; The population of FATA came from the 1998 census, available at <http://www.fata.gov.pk/>

138 Ibid.

139 Juan Cole, “Pakistan and Afghanistan: Beyond the Taliban,” *Political Science Quarterly* 124 (2009): 222.

140 Thomas J. Barfield, “Weapons of the Not So Weak in Afghanistan: Pashtun Agrarian Structure and Tribal Organization for Times of War and Peace” (paper presented to the Agrarian Studies Colloquium Series, Yale University, February 23, 2007).

141 Kilcullen, 75.

two distinct administrated areas – the FATA and PATA.¹⁴² Under the British colonial frontier crimes regulations (FCR) of 1872, the FATA was managed under a specific set of laws that were based on the tribal customs and traditions as the British depended on the traditional tribal governance to maintain order and discipline within the region in conjunction with brutal retribution from the British military. This autonomous system remains today within the FATA region, and preserves the independent ideology of the tribal Pashtuns. On the other hand, the urbanization of the region and increased central authority has inclined landed elite and entrepreneur to favor modern state politics by participating in government institutions and industrialized sectors.¹⁴³

History has strengthened the resistive nature and the martial character of rural Pashtuns. The passage of invading armies through Hindu Kush region onward to the Indian subcontinent endured great losses at the hands of Pashtun warriors. The unrelenting warrior culture combined with the tribal segmented organization facilitates the cohesive ability of the tribes to unite under a common banner to mobilize against outside conquest.¹⁴⁴ Their strong group solidarity is rooted in Pashtunwali, which emboldens fighters to die rather than shame themselves by retreating.¹⁴⁵ As late as the nineteenth century, the British fought two unsuccessful wars and bared considerable losses to the ferocity of Pashtun warriors. The cohesive ability and visceral response of the Pashtuns tribes to British troop invading the tribal spaces was encountered during the frontier disturbances of 1897 when 80,000 tribal Pashtuns went against the garrisons at Malakand.¹⁴⁶ These attitudes carry forward today as the Pashtuns fierce attachment for

142 Barfield, “Weapons of the Not so Weak in Afghanistan”

143 Assad Muir, “Why Peace Deals in FATA will not Work,” *Tribune*, October 6, 2011.

144 Stephen Tanner, *Afghanistan: A Military History from Alexander the Great to the War Against the Taliban* (New York: Da Capo Press, 2009), 323.

145 Thomas J. Barfield, *Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), 59.

146 David B. Edwards, *Heroes of the Age: Moral Fault Lines on the Afghan Frontier* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), 172–219.

their traditions causes deep antipathy for any central control. Today, the Taliban represents those past jihadi groups and charismatic leaders that fought the British at the turn of the century.¹⁴⁷

C. WHAT IT IS PASHTUN NATIONALISM?

1. Durand Line

The lack of unity within Afghanistan permitted the British to expand North through India and into present day Pakistan. Fearing Tsarist Empire expansion that could bring crisis to the British India economically and strategically, the British unsuccessfully attempted twice to expand their control past the Khyber Pass to occupy and subdue the region before the signing the Durand Line agreement. The agreement was signed in 1893 by Amir Abdu Rahman Khan, the monarch of Afghanistan, and Sir Henry Mortimer Durand, the Foreign Secretary of British India. With the line stretching from the Wakhan corridor to the Persian border (see Figure 1), it has formed the eastern and southern borders of modern day Afghanistan, and served British imperialism in two ways. First, the British found it more conceivable to alienate the region by conceding control and confining Pashtun hostilities within the borders of Afghanistan in lieu of allowing tribal factions to interfere with the commerce of British India. Second, the intention of the British Empire was to form a buffer state between the British India and the Soviet Union.

¹⁴⁷ Ayesha Jalal, *The Sole Spokesmen: Jinnah, the Muslim League and the demand for Pakistan* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 3; Thomas H. Johnson and M. Chris Mason, "No Sign Until the Burst of Fire: Understanding the Pakistan-Afghanistan Frontier," *International Security* 32 (2008): 53.



Figure 3. Afghanistan-Pakistan Border Regions

A common occurrence during colonialism was border delineation based on geostrategic requirements and less on the social construct of the regions. The demarcation of borders along geographic lines ignored the ethnology of the region; therefore becoming a major contributor to the tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan in addition to Kabul questioning the legitimacy of the Durand line. The Durand line split the Pashtun tribes whom have strong transnational cultural, economic, and political affinities overlap into both countries,¹⁴⁸ and ignored by borderland Pashtun tribes who view the line as illogical from a perspective of regional economics, ethnography, or basic

¹⁴⁸ H. Sidky, "War, changing Patterns of Warfare, State Collapse, and Transnational Violence in Afghanistan: 1978–2001," *Modern Asian Studies* 41 (2007): 870.

geography.¹⁴⁹ Since the inception of the Durand line, controversy over its legality, its fragmenting affect, and porous nature has been as political tool for social movements, which disrupts Afghan-Pakistan relations.¹⁵⁰ Kabul challenges the legitimacy of the Durand line and considers it only a de facto border, while Pakistan considers in de jure, and thus is concerned with a challenge to the state boundary either organized from a grass roots or irredentist standpoint.

2. Pashtunistan

The failures of the first and second Anglo-Afghan wars, the strategic nature of the Durand line, and tribal resistance to colonial rule prompted the British to institute indirect rule to govern the Pashtuns in Northwestern frontier of British India.¹⁵¹ The British's indirect rule took advantage of the already established tribal Maliki System that relied on subsidies, or bribes, to facilitate safe passage through the region and to deter general malfeasance against the British. However, the subsidies and British regulations began to stratify the Pashtun society as large landed elite began to prosper from a land revenue system,¹⁵² and economically threaten the smaller land owners as they were unable to pay taxes.¹⁵³ In response, Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan's promoted the non-violent Khudia Khidmatgar movement (KKM)¹⁵⁴ that materialized in the shadows of India's anti-colonial movement in the 1930s. Unfortunately for Khan, he lacked the political

149 Jeffery Roberts, *The Origin of Conflict in Afghanistan* (Westport: Praeger Publisher, 2003), 29.

150 Rubin, 64.

151 Adeel Khan, "Pukhtun Ethnic Nationalism: From Separatism to Integrationism," *Asian Ethnicity* 4 (2003): 69.

152 In 1901, the British established the NWFP. During this time they incorporated Pashtuns into the British system through various institutions and implemented a land revenue system. The land revenue system created permanent landownership for those Pashtuns whom could afford high tax rates.

153 Ibid., 78.

154 A social movement that sought to reunite the Pashtun tribes of British India and Afghanistan in an independent state called "Pashtunistan."

charisma to efficaciously orchestrate a grassroots movement while British policies weaken the KKM top-down through patronizing the elites with land grants and subsidies.¹⁵⁵

Fearing Punjabi domination, KKM remerged once again during partition.¹⁵⁶ Pashtun elites isolated from central British India were initially not alarmed by Hindu-Muslim communal hatreds until riots ensued shifting elites to the Muslim league.¹⁵⁷ The KKM promoted a plebiscite that included independence and accession to Afghanistan in addition the India and Pakistan choices. But, additional choices were considered untenable by the British, and once the referendum was final, the KKM acknowledged being part of the Pakistan with a redefined agenda seeking provincial autonomy.¹⁵⁸

3. Afghan Factor

In the past, Afghanistan has supported Pashtunistan ambitions, and Islamabad fears that an anti-Islamabad Kabul may incite an irredentist movement. For Afghan rulers, even after the establishment of the Durand line, eastern Pashtuns were still claimed to essentially belong to Afghanistan,¹⁵⁹ but typically, Kabul's "Pashtunistan policy" were more opportunistic and reactive to political events in Pakistan.¹⁶⁰ In 1963, Daoud attempted to use the Pashtun repugnance of the "One Unit" plan to re-aggravate "Pashtunistan" fears, which resulted in Pakistan closing of the Torkham border and transit trade, which inflicted serious economic damage on Afghanistan.¹⁶¹ More important, though was the Pashtun tribal responses. Pakistan Pashtun tribes resisted direct Pakistani military support, and instead Pakistani tribes relied on local militias to

155 Nasreen Ghufuran, "Pushtun Ethnonationalism and the Taliban Insurgency in the North West Frontier Province of Pakistan," *Asian Survey* 49 (2009): 1097.

156 Julian Schofield, "Diversionary wars: Pashtun unrest and the sources of the Pakistan-Afghan Confrontation," *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal* 17 (2011): 40.

157 Ghufuran, 1097.

158 Ibid.

159 Anthony Hyman, "Nationalism in Afghanistan," *International Journal of the Middle East Studies* 34 (2002): 307.

160 Ibid., 308.

161 Ibid.

resist Afghan Pashtuns.¹⁶² The resistance demonstrated that if Pashtun tribes were well funded and provided autonomy they were not susceptible to separatism and would fight against co-ethnic groups, and it displayed their virulent hostiles and cohesiveness to oppose outsiders. In both cases, the Pashtuns showed their tacit support of belonging to Pakistan.

In the wake of 9/11 and the emplacement of the Karzai regime, Karzai's attitude on "Pashtunistan" made Islamabad apprehensive about the possibilities of secessionist movement. Characteristically, weak leaders seek a solid popular power base among divided constituents, by creating a unifying issue in which a consensus can be built.¹⁶³ With a Pashtun and non-Pashtun ethnic divide occurring in Afghanistan, Karzai has raised the issue on reuniting Pashtuns.¹⁶⁴ Conversely, President Musharraf countered by pressuring Karzai and Washington to include more Pashtuns into central government for fear of a dominating Northern Alliance representation that had substantial ties to India, and to minimize "Pashtunistan" aspirations. Although Pashtuns are too fragmented to form a common political front for "Pashtunistan," the questionable policies of Kabul on the "Pashtunistan" issue are a sensitive matter for Islamabad, and Pakistan may continue to curtail any military activity that may provoke Pashtun unrest and give a Kabul an advantage.¹⁶⁵

D. FAILED GOVERNANCE

KP and FATA are governed by two distinct systems. FATA maintains semblance of the British FCR as Pakistan's central government was too poor and preoccupied with India during the early years of partition and adopted a less intrusive policy by granting more local autonomy.¹⁶⁶ In KP, the elites were persuaded by political modernity to enter

¹⁶² Schofield, 42,43.

¹⁶³ Poullada, 147.

¹⁶⁴ Selig S. Harrison, "The Fault Line Between Pashtuns and Punjabis in Pakistan," *The Washington Post*, May 11, 2009.

¹⁶⁵ Hyman, 39.

¹⁶⁶ Schofield, 41.

conventional democratic politics.¹⁶⁷ Although both areas are predominately Pashtun, they have either integrated or isolated themselves from the central government, and in the case of FATA, it has been problematic for Islamabad.

Like the British, Islamabad utilized the same local hierarchy to administer control over the tribal region. By doing so, it allowed a loose political system of tribal autonomy in which Islamabad could still maintain minimal legal jurisdiction.¹⁶⁸ The organizational and power sharing structure is triangular relationship between the tribal leadership, religious establishment, and government representative with the two former guided by Pashtunwali and the government official taking orders from Islamabad via the provincial governor. Typically, government representatives would establish policies within the tribal areas by distributing subsidies, or bribes, which in turn would bring compliance. Traditionally, the mullah had minimal authority except for dispute resolution and religion.¹⁶⁹ The system worked for many decades because of the financial incentives distributed by the state through the Maliks. However, local hierarchies of rural and tribal society began to erode during the Afghan Civil war as radical clergy were enlisted to lead the state sponsor of jihad, which elevated the mullah's position.¹⁷⁰ The military often chose mullahs over traditional leaders whom had a tendency to be more inclined to enlist in Pashtun nationalist causes to mobilize fighters against the Soviet army.¹⁷¹ Additionally, the infusion of Saudi money, and the flourishing madrassa system further advanced the religious leaders position and challenged the Malik financial clout.¹⁷²

Not until the enemy-centric approach of the military against the Taliban in 2002 did the Tribal governance triad fail. Although hesitant to take military action within its

167 Sana Haroon, *Frontier of Faith: Islam in the Indo-Afghan Borderland* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 194.

168 Johnson, 53.

169 David Kullcullen. *The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 80.

170 Farzana Shaikh, "From Islamisation to Shariatisation: Cultural transnationalism in Pakistan," *Third World Quarterly* 29 (2008): 601.

171 Marvin Weinbaum, "Hard Choice in Countering Insurgency and Terrorism Along Pakistan's North-West Frontier," *Journal of International Affairs* 63 (2009), 75.

172 "Confronting the Pakistan Problem," <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/taliban/pakistan/fair.html> (interview with C. Christine Fair)

own borders, Islamabad became immersed in an unavoidable situation as the changing international context against terrorism and Washington's insistence constrained Islamabad into taking a military action. Unfortunately, the military incursion undermined the influence of the political agents, and created political space for a growing youth opposition to tribal governance system whom perceived the old system as a restraint to entrepreneur aspirations.¹⁷³ Two key factors created the political space for pro-Taliban militants in the guise of religious leaders to enter.¹⁷⁴ First, isolation and disregard by Islamabad led to a decaying socioeconomic infrastructure and second, the absence of an influential tribal governance system, which led to anarchical situation within the tribal regions. As the local Taliban asserted their authority, curtailed violence, and brought law and order to the tribes, positive popular opinion toward the Taliban precluded continuing military action for fear of sparking tribal revolt.¹⁷⁵

E. CONTAINING THE THREAT

Following the U.S. invasion in October 2001, thousands of Taliban fighters including Pashtun and foreign fighters have found sanctuary in FATA and in some parts of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The porous nature of the Durand line continues to concede western Pakistan as an extension of Afghan territory that permits the Taliban sanctuary within Pashtun dominated area.¹⁷⁶ Beginning in 2002, at behest of Washington, military campaigns into the FATA have met fierce resistance and demonstrated the Pashtun resolve to counter military incursions into the tribal areas reinforcing segmented politics of uniting against common outside force.¹⁷⁷ Pakistani authorities worried that further incursion into FATA may transform the Taliban movements into a Pashtun nationalist movement.¹⁷⁸ Public support was also in favor of the Taliban as the United States drone

173 Antonio Giustozz, *Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop: The Neo-Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), 39

174 Ibid.

175 Saikal, 5.

176 O'Loughlin, 441.

177 Cole, 222.

178 Giustozzi, 27; Saikal, 5.

attacks and killing of fellow Pashtuns fueled anti-American sentiment.¹⁷⁹ Additionally, the military already faced an internal insurgency in the adjacent province of Baluchistan, and did not want to instigate further hostilities in the country. Faced with a potential cascading internal security dilemma over past irredentist movements along ethno-linguistic lines of the Pashtun tribes, Islamabad minimized offense operations, and instead attempted to contain Pashtun sympathies toward the Taliban with appeasement.

F. TALIBANIZATION

David Galula, an expert in counterinsurgency, found that counterinsurgent himself tends to inadvertently protect insurgent by failing to properly assess the potential threat and therefore ignoring or misjudging the problem.¹⁸⁰ As Joshua White explains, the Pakistani government has been susceptible to same situation along the eastern border as they watched insurgents take root in small regions, and they have done very little in terms of forceful resistance until the problem became dire.¹⁸¹ Typically, the military has come down heavy handed with an enemy-centric approach with their search-and-destroy missions and air strikes, which often kill innocent villagers, which strengthened the anti-government movements.¹⁸²

The Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal's (MMA) willingness to politically block counterinsurgency campaigns provided the Taliban the free space to establish networks, and allow spread of the Talibanization.¹⁸³ Talibanization is defined as a social phenomenon that uses Islamist doctrines, ideologies, and values to achieve desired goals.¹⁸⁴ Pakistan Taliban sought to impose Sharia law throughout the FATA region. The appeasement policies and public support for the Taliban contributed to the spread, as

¹⁷⁹ Hussain, "Battling Militancy," *The Scorpion's Tail*, 30,31.

¹⁸⁰ Galula, 17.

¹⁸¹ Joshua T. White, "Applying Counterinsurgency Principles in Pakistan's Frontier," *Counterinsurgency and Pakistan Paper Series*, No. 2, The Brookings Institution, 25 June 2009.

¹⁸² Cole, 241; David Kilcullen has characterized this phenomena as the accidental guerilla syndrome in which the local population reacts negatively, and rejecting outside intervention and allying with the insurgent.

¹⁸³ Hasan Askari Rizvi, "View: Counter-Terrorism: The Missing Links," *Daily Times*, March 4, 2007.

¹⁸⁴ Bilveer Singh, *The Talibanization of Southeast Asia: Losing the War on Terror to Islamist Extremists* (Westport: Praeger Security International, 2007), ix.

militant groups became more embolden by a weak central government who seemed more than willing to concede as long as activities remained confined within FATA. The predatory tactics of the Taliban alienated the inhabitants of the tribal areas. Positive public opinion has shifted away from militants as their violent tendencies and criminal activity has changed their image from “provider of justice” to “thug.”¹⁸⁵ The militants within FATA and neighboring areas of KP have mirrored organized crime syndicates in both organizational structure and behavior.¹⁸⁶ No longer constrained by negative public opinion, Islamabad became more at ease to confront the Pashtun militants. The Pakistani government acknowledged the growing threat of Talibanization toward the state,¹⁸⁷ and launched repeated attacks into the tribal areas where state authority was overtly challenged.¹⁸⁸ Unfortunately, Islamabad’s delay and heavy handed tactics resulted in two million internally displaced people (IPD). The government was not prepared for the refuge problem, which once again allowed space for militant groups to act. The local Taliban began building charity camps showing that the militants were in a better position to take care of the population than the government.

G. CONCLUSION

The British’s limited exercise of bureaucratic control endorsed tribal autonomy, which continued after partition with Islamabad’s neglect of the frontier regions due to the weak nature of the central government.¹⁸⁹ Along the Western Border, aspirations of the Khudia Khidmatgar movement calling for the separate state of “Pashtunistan” continue to exist, and are further agitated by the Kabul regimes as a political tactic to garner Pashtun support. With the majority of the Pashtuns integrated into the modern society, it’s the 3 million rural Pashtuns of the FATA region that Islamabad dreads. Prior to the 9/11, the

¹⁸⁵ Gretchen Peters, *Crime and Insurgency in the Tribal Areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan* (West Point: Combating Terrorism Center, 2010), 51.

¹⁸⁶ Ibid., 58.

¹⁸⁷ Michael Abramowitz and Karen DeYoung, “Bush Seeks Increased Pakistani Cooperation; Musharraf Vows Fight Against ‘Talibanization,’” *Washington Post*, September 23, 2006.

¹⁸⁸ Tanner, 346.

¹⁸⁹ Francine R. Frankel, and M.S.A. Rao, *Dominance and State Power in Modern India* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1987), 1.

inhabitants of the FATA region existed undisturbed from the reach of Islamabad, and relished in their autonomy. Nevertheless, the context of center-state relations dramatically changed as the United States focused on the Taliban-Al Qaeda nexus.

As the Afghanistan war extended into the tribal regions of Western Pakistan, Washington has pressured Islamabad to act against insurgents to deny access to the unmonitored terrain. Pakistani political and military leader were apprehensive to conduct attacks against fellow Pakistani, but the cohesive and visceral character of the Pashtuns served as a deterrent against military actions. For the first time in 2002, military forces enter the FATA region to deny insurgents a sanctuary from U.S. forces, and met substantial resistance that predicated signing peace deals to prevent further military casualties. With the Taliban operating without restraint, they were able to fill the political vacuum and bring a sense of stability to the region. Embolden by their triumphs, they embellished their control and turned positive popular support into negative. With new popular inspiration for military intervention to remove the Taliban, Pakistani leader's anxieties of separatist movement sparked by a Punjabi dominant army have been reduced. Unfortunately, the heavy handed tactics of the Pakistani Army have contributed to two million IDPs in which the insurgents are poised to recapture their support.

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V. CONCLUSION

A. AN INDIAN NEIGHBOR

Pakistan faces a growing insurgency problem. Events inside Afghanistan pushed insurgents into the ungoverned areas of western Pakistan. Washington alleges that Pakistan is supporting insurgents by preserving safe havens for organizing and launching attacks against coalition forces in Afghanistan to destabilize a pro-Indian Kabul regime. Critics are quick to surmise that Pakistan is acting in a dubious manner against U.S. intentions in Afghanistan, and Islamabad has done little to thwart insurgency within its borders. However, critics fail to realize the complexity of Pakistan's security environment and disregard the traditional Indo-Pakistan conventional rivalry.

Animosity between India and Pakistan was shaped by the events of partition. Four conventional wars precipitated in their relative short history. India's intervention into Pakistan's 1971 civil war, which resulted in the secession of East Pakistan, entrenched the perceived Indian threat. Cold war politics further polarized their relationship as each country aligned with opposite global hegemonic states. The 1998 nuclearization of India, which Pakistan followed two weeks later, reflects the security concerns that Pakistan draws from India's military posture. Moreover, the sharing of an 1800 mile border that remains partially contested forms a structural problem for both states to endure.

The Indian military along the Pakistani eastern border has affected Islamabad's commitment to counterinsurgency operations along the Af-Pak border. The existential threat of India has primacy in Pakistani security calculations, and planners must ensure protection against any potential Indian aggression. However, India's military restraint after the 2008 Mumbai attacks placed confidence into Pakistan's policy makers that eastern border protection could be relaxed without jeopardizing security. Although Pakistan did recognize the insurgent threat along its western borders, security managers must not only balance force deployments, but resource allocations, as well, to ensure security is not jeopardized on either front. At the same time, Pakistan must be confident that the United States' resolve in the region will be steadfast in order to minimize fears of

possible U.S. abandonment, which would leave Pakistan vulnerable to Indian regional hegemony. Without Indo-Pakistan rapprochement or a change in threat prioritization, Pakistani military training, expenditure, and deployments will be made in regards to India.

B. ISLAMIC AFFINITY

The political and military links to Islamist extremism were formed through instrumental means to achieve political and geostrategic objectives and not a state fundamentalist ideology. Islamic militants were used as tools to shape foreign policy to further Pakistan's national interests specifically in Afghanistan and Kashmir.¹⁹⁰ President Musharraf's used Islamist parties to consolidate political power, while at the same time distancing himself from his military base. Additionally, he tried to balance his domestic agenda with the right wing, while at the same time working to appease Washington, which caused resentment within the public, military, and government. Furthermore, the U.S.-Pakistani union, invigorated religious groups to oppose to national forces acting in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).¹⁹¹ Domestic affairs made circumstances difficult for Islamabad to divorce itself from its former strategy; however, the spread of radical fundamental violence changed the government's orientation toward militant groups as the militants began directly challenging the state's authority.

Pakistan's geostrategic position in relation to Afghanistan made it a 'frontline' state in the United States "War on Terror" ¹⁹² while Al Qaeda's pan-Islamic ideology, fundamentalist nature and connection to the Taliban brought a religious element to the conflict. With Pakistan sharing an Islamic identity with the militant groups operating in the northwestern territories and the state's ineffectiveness to curtail their violent actions, doubts were cast on Islamabad's fidelity to Washington. Historical examples demonstrate the capability of Pakistani secular elites to manipulate Islamic ideology to

¹⁹⁰ Lieven, *Pakistan: A Hard Country*, 185.

¹⁹¹ Akhtar, 41.

¹⁹² *Ibid.* 59.

aid in achieving national interests.¹⁹³ The Pakistani military's promotion of *jihad* has shown to be a viable tactic. However, the events of 9/11 changed the way the world viewed terrorists and the states that harbor them. Islamabad's patronage toward militant groups was quickly severed, but sympathies within the ranks made it hard to make a clean break from Islamic militant groups.

Historically, political elites used Islamists to bolster their political position against the opposition, and Musharraf was no different. The MMA's electoral gains were an unprecedented political outcome that gave Islamists an influential path into Islamabad's decision-making process against the insurgency. But, as Islamic zealots began threatening the state's central authority, the Pakistani Military renewed its efforts to curtail Islamic fundamentalist activity. At the policy level the military and the secular political elite are operating against the religious groups in Pakistan; however, support is still provided due to deep-rooted sympathies, anti-American sentiment, and regional affinities rather than religious affinities.¹⁹⁴

C. PASHTUN NATIONALISM

Pashtun nationalism emerged in the 1930s as part of the anti-colonial movement in British India. Landed elites faced off against landless laborers, who were led by Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan. The Khan's Khudia Khidmatgar movement (KKM) promoted the reunion of the Pashtun tribes of British India and Afghanistan first in 1930 in opposition to the British rule and once again during partition,¹⁹⁵ as an independent nation called "Pashtunistan." In addition, Kabul exacerbated Pakistani fears by challenging the legitimacy of the Durand line and the denial to recognize Pakistan within the United Nations in 1947.¹⁹⁶ Throughout the twentieth century, Kabul's non-consistent policies toward the Pashtun ethnic groups inhabiting the Afghanistan-Pakistani border region

¹⁹³ Haqqani, "The Role of Islam in Pakistan's Future," 89.

¹⁹⁴ Iqtidar, 164.

¹⁹⁵ Saikal, 8.

¹⁹⁶ The Durand line established the border between British India and Afghanistan under the Treaty of Rawalpindi in 1893. Since 1947, Afghanistan has challenged the legitimacy of the Durand line, and adheres to a policy that the treaty was signed under duress. Pakistan and the majority of the International community consider the border *de jure*.

concerned Islamabad;¹⁹⁷ therefore, after the withdrawal of the Soviet Union, Islamabad chose to align itself with the Taliban during the Afghan civil war. Pakistan sought an Islamabad friendly Kabul regime that would meet Pakistan's strategic requirements and oppose Pashtun nationalist goals.¹⁹⁸ Unfortunately for Islamabad, that alliance was short lived as the context of the international environment changed, and the Taliban-Al Qaeda nexus was the focal point of the United States' "War on Terror." President Musharraf's reversal on terrorist policies had potential implications to reenergizing ethnic Pashtun tensions as the Taliban are considered one the same with Pashtun ethnicity.¹⁹⁹

Shared ethnic and tribal ties and little disregard for the Af-Pak border allowed for Taliban to use the FATA territory as a safe haven and launching point against ISAF's military campaign within Afghanistan making the Pashtun-dominated areas of western Pakistan an extension of Afghan territory.²⁰⁰ Washington failed to understand the ethnic context of the Af-Pak region, and it continued to increase pressure on Islamabad to prevent the Taliban's regional occupation. The Pakistani government was sensitive to a possible Pashtun self-determination movement possibly sparked by an invading Punjabi dominated army.²⁰¹ From Alexander the Great to the British Raj, history has demonstrated that Pashtun tribes have had a strong aversion to invading armies. With 75% of military personnel from the Punjabi region, the ethnic disparity within the army could portray the Pakistani forces as an occupying army. This is also tied to Pashtuns strong sense of governmental autonomy within the FATA region. As well, anti-American sentiment was rabid throughout the region because of U.S. and NATO operations against Pashtuns in Afghanistan resulting in Islamabad losing a significant

¹⁹⁷ Schofield, 40.

¹⁹⁸ Vikram Jagadish, "Reconsidering American strategy in South Asia: destroying terrorist Sanctuaries in Pakistan's Tribal Areas," *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 20 (2009): 37.

¹⁹⁹ Although not every Pashtun is consider Taliban, the Taliban movement emerged from the Pashtun tribes of Pakistan, and a preponderance of Taliban recruits are members of the Pashtun tribes that inhabit the hill country along the Af-Pak border.

²⁰⁰ John O'Loughlin, et al. "The Afghanistan-Pakistan Wars, 2008–2009: Micro-geographies, Conflict Diffusion, and Clusters of Violence," *Eurasian Geography and Economics* 51 (2010): 441.

²⁰¹ Saikal, 5.

amount of influence in the tribal regions,²⁰² and local Taliban groups became more poised to challenge Islamabad.

The cohesiveness of Pashtun tribes and the past Pashtun nationalistic aspirations has caused Islamabad to proceed cautiously against the Taliban. Islamabad feared past irredentist movements along ethno-linguistic lines of the Pashtun tribes; therefore, the military conducted limited counterinsurgency operations. With minimal central government opposition, insurgents had the freedom to build their popular support base. The charismatic religious leaders tilted the existing tribal governing system within FATA in their favor by restoring law and order in the region. Locals favored the renewed regional stability. But, eventually the fallout from the Taliban's strict adherence to their religious code and repressive practices changed public opinion against the Taliban, which created an opening for military intervention.

²⁰² C. Christine Fair, "The Militant Challenge in Pakistan," *Asia Policy* 11 (2011): 128.

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