Organizational Learning and the Marine Corps: The Counterinsurgency Campaign in Iraq (CIWAG Case Study on Irregular Warfare and Armed Groups)
Abstract
What the Marine Corps achieved in Anbar constituted a major turning point in the Iraq War. Many had declared the fight there lost at the very time I MEF was launching a three-dimensional strategy in 2006 that culminated in 2007 with a strategic defeat for AQI and those insurgents aligned with it. The fight for Anbar Province demonstrated the Marine Corps s capacity to learn and change in order to address complicated and very violent challenges. The four-year fight in the Sunni heartland is an important illustration of that Marine capacity to improvise and adapt, which is infused into the Corps training routines and warrior ethos. This study details how I MEF designed and implemented a counterinsurgency approach that was contextualized for Anbar, consisting of (1) the COIN phases of clear, hold, build ; (2) tribal engagement to expand the operating force available to maintain local security; and (3) targeted counterterrorism aimed at degrading al Qaeda s clandestine apparatus.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jan 01, 2012
- Accession Number
- ADA571004
Entities
People
- Richard H. Shultz Jr.
Organizations
- Naval War College