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MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

**CONVENTIONAL AND SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES
INTEGRATION AT THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL**

by

Joel P. Ellison and Daniel G. Hodermarsky

December 2012

Thesis Advisor:
Second Reader:

Nancy Roberts
Erik Jansen

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**CONVENTIONAL AND SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES INTEGRATION AT
THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL**

Joel P. Ellison
Major, United States Army
B.A., Benedictine University, 1999

Daniel G. Hodermarsky
Captain, United States Army
B.S., James Madison University, 2003

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

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**NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
December 2012**

Authors: Joel P. Ellison
Daniel G. Hodermarsky

Approved by: Dr. Nancy Roberts
Thesis Advisor

Dr. Erik Jansen
Second Reader

Dr. John Arquilla
Chair, Department of Defense Analysis

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ABSTRACT

Combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq demonstrated that different types of military forces must be integrated to effectively counter evolving threats. Senior Army leaders have identified the need to retain the ability to effectively integrate conventional and special operations forces. Integration should not aim to combine forces to the point they are indistinguishable, but should maximize the effects of each force's unique capabilities. This thesis concludes that in the future, conventional and special operations forces integration should be addressed with the following tenets:

- integration should be determined by the task, not the unit
- integrated operations require a dedicated staff at the joint task force level
- the supported/supporting command relationship is most appropriate and should be determined by task

It also proposes a methodology that enables the identification of task interdependencies between conventional forces (CF) and special operations forces (SOF). Identifying these interdependencies informs staffs and commanders where integrated operations are best conducted. The design structure matrix, an approach used in the business and systems engineering sectors, provides a basis for the methodology. The goal of this campaign planning tool is cross-force synergy emerging from utilization of the unique capabilities of CF and SOF for maximum gains.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

BCT	Brigade Combat Team
CA	Civil Affairs
CE	Caucasus Emirate
CF	Conventional Forces
ChRI	Chechen Republic of Ichkeria
COIN	Counterinsurgency Operations
C2	Command and Control
DA	Department of the Army
DOD	Department of Defense
DSM	Design Structure Matrix
FATA	Federally Administered Tribal Areas
FM	Field Manual
GWOT	Global War on Terrorism
HIC	High Intensity Conflict
HNSF	Host Nation Security Forces
HNSOF	Host Nation Special Operations Forces
IDF	Israeli Defense Forces
ISI	Inter-Services Intelligence Agency
JeM	Jaish-e-Mohammad
JKLF	Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front
JP	Joint Publication

JSOTF	Joint Special Operations Task Force
JTF	Joint Task Force
LeT	Lashkar-e-Toiba
LIC	Low Intensity Conflict
LNO	Liaison Officer
MISO	Military Information Support Operations
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NWFP	North West Frontier Province
OPCON	Operational Control
PSYOP	Psychological Operations
SOCCE	Special Operations Command and Control Element
SOF	Special Operations Forces
SFA	Security Force Assistance
TC	Training Circular
TSOC	Theater Special Operations Command
UAS	Unmanned Aerial System
US GAO	United States Government Accountability Office
USSOCOM	United States Special Operations Command
WMD	Weapon/s of Mass Destruction

I. INTRODUCTION

The last decade of combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq demonstrated that different types of military forces must be able to work together in order to effectively counter modern threats. One of the most significant shifts occurred in the United States Army, where conventional forces (CF) and special operations forces (SOF), traditionally separated in both training and combat, have worked closely together. Senior Army leaders identified the need to continue to effectively integrate conventional and special operations forces in the future. This thesis proposes a methodology that enables identification of high level task interdependencies between conventional forces (CF) and special operations forces (SOF). Identifying these interdependencies informs staffs and commanders where integrated operations are best conducted. The design structure matrix, an approach used in the business and commercial sectors provides the basis for the methodology. The goal of this campaign planning tool is cross-force synergy emerging from utilization of the unique capabilities of CF and SOF for maximum gains. This task first requires a review of the existing literature relevant to the topic as a conceptual foundation for further examination.

A. THREAT ENVIRONMENT AND HYBRID WARFARE

One of the most challenging tasks that senior military leaders face is accurately predicting the nature of future conflicts and preparing the United States military appropriately. Prior to the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), the United States Army focused the majority of its training efforts on conducting combat operations in high intensity conflict (HIC). After the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, the United States Army adjusted its training strategy to meet the challenges of these new operating environments. The Army was able to adapt its tactics to better conduct counterinsurgency and stability operations.

As operations in Afghanistan draw down, senior military leaders must determine the path that the United States Army should take in preparing for future conflicts. Some advocates believe that the United States Army should return its focus to high intensity

conflicts. Others argue that the United States Army should maintain its focus on counterinsurgency and stability operations, also known as low intensity conflict (LIC). Recently, military theorists have developed a third scenario, hybrid warfare, that combines elements of both high and low intensity conflicts. This section presents several definitions and characteristics of hybrid warfare, and proposes a common definition used in this thesis.

In 2005, Frank G. Hoffman was one of the first defense analysts to utilize the term “hybrid warfare.” In *Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars*, he argues that future operational environments will consist of a combination of regular and irregular tactics specifically designed to target U.S. vulnerabilities.¹ Hoffman states: “Hybrid Wars can be waged by states or political groups, and incorporate a range of different modes of warfare including conventional capabilities, irregular tactics and formations, terrorist acts including indiscriminate violence and coercion, and criminal disorder.”² The term *hybrid* not only describes the tactics but also describes these new adversaries’ organizations. Hybrid threat groups may have a hierarchical command structure that oversees many decentralized or networked tactical units.³ Hoffman acknowledges that at the strategic level several forms of warfare can exist simultaneously. In hybrid warfare, “these forces become blurred into the same force in the same battlespace...”⁴ In *Joint Forces Quarterly*, Hoffman later describes the evolution of warfare as a *convergence* of methods of warfare. “The evolving character of conflict that we currently face is best characterized by convergence. This includes the convergence of the physical and psychological, the kinetic and non-kinetic, and combatants and noncombatants.”⁵ Hybrid threat organizations will often operate in restrictive terrain, or as Hoffman calls them, contested zones, such as dense urban jungles

¹ Frank G. Hoffman, *Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars*, Arlington: Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, 2007, 8.

² Hoffman, *Conflict in the 21st Century*, 58.

³ Ibid, 28.

⁴ Ibid, 8.

⁵ Frank G. Hoffman, “Hybrid Warfare and Challenges,” *Joint Forces Quarterly*, 2009, 34.

and congested littoral areas.⁶ Hoffman warns against the bifurcation of the U.S. military into specialized forces. He states that hybrid warfare requires a force possessing robust and integrated combined arms capabilities. “This will require military forces that are not merely ‘general purpose’ but professional *multi-purpose* units with flexibility and credible combat power.”⁷

The 2006 Israeli-Hezbollah War provides an example of a non-state actor, Hezbollah, employing hybrid tactics to pose significant operational challenges to a conventional military force, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF). In *Military Capabilities for Hybrid War: Insights from the Israel Defense Forces in Lebanon and Gaza*, David Johnson highlights the challenges that the IDF faced as they encountered an adversary operating in the middle range of military operations.⁸ Prior to the 2006 conflict, the IDF focused almost entirely on counterinsurgency and stability operations, leaving them incapable of combined arms maneuver.⁹ Hezbollah in Lebanon were not a purely irregular opponent or a conventional state actor-like force. They operated in the middle ground with the ability to easily transition from irregular to conventional tactics.¹⁰ Hezbollah was well trained, and organized into small units armed with a wide array of modern weaponry.¹¹ Johnson offers lessons learned from Israel and recommendations for the U.S. Army in preparing for future hybrid threats. First, the U.S. Army’s almost exclusive focus on preparing for counterinsurgency (COIN) operations in Afghanistan and Iraq will hinder its ability to defeat a hybrid opponent. Johnson argues that hybrid opponents present a challenge that demands combined arms fire and maneuver, despite the relatively small size of their fighting units.¹² The effective integration of air, artillery, and unmanned aerial system (UAS) assets are vitally important to fighting a hybrid

⁶ Hoffman, *Conflict in the 21st Century*, 15.

⁷ Ibid, 47.

⁸ David E. Johnson, *Military Capabilities for Hybrid Warfare: Insights from the Israeli Defense Forces in Lebanon and Gaza*, Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 2010, 2.

⁹ Johnson, *Military Capabilities for Hybrid Warfare*, 3.

¹⁰ Ibid, 5.

¹¹ Ibid, 3.

¹² Ibid, 7.

adversary. Finally, Johnson highlights the importance of utilizing armor and infantry fighting vehicles, supported by medium or light forces, for their survivability, lethality, and mobility.¹³

Although the Department of Defense (DOD) does not recognize hybrid warfare as a new form of conflict, and has not created an operating definition, Joint Publication (JP) 3-0 has identified the need for the armed forces to maintain the ability to transition from one form of warfare to another. The “Range of Military Operations” model identifies three main categories of military operations that vary from military engagements and security cooperation, to limited contingency operations and major combat operations. While JP 3-0 does not specifically address a hybrid threat scenario, it does state that the “...nature of strategic security environment may require U.S. forces to engage in several types of joint operations simultaneously across the range of military operations.”¹⁴ This model makes several fundamental assumptions about the nature of future operating environments. First, it states that there is the potential to conduct several different types of military operations in the same theater of operations. However, U.S. military forces will be required conduct simultaneous operations along the spectrum of conflict in a hybrid warfare environment. It then assumes that there will be a distinct linear or sequential transition between different phases of combat operations. As described earlier, a variety of military operations will be required simultaneously in a theater of operations, and will occur in geographically separated areas. Finally, the JP 3-0 model assumes that one force structure is appropriate for all elements within the range of military operations. In Operation Iraqi Freedom, a force structure designed for high intensity conflict was not inherently well-suited or appropriate for counterinsurgency or stability operations.

In November 2010, the Department of the Army (DA) published *Training Circular (TC) 7-100 Hybrid Threat* to define and describe how an opponent might organize to fight using a hybrid strategy. It states:

Hybrid threats are innovative, adaptive, globally connected, networked, and embedded in the clutter of local populations. They can possess a wide

¹³ Ibid, 8.

¹⁴ Department of Defense, *Joint Publication 3-0: Joint Operations*, Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 2011, V-2.

range of old, adapted and advanced technologies—including the possibility of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). They can operate conventionally and unconventionally, employing adaptive and asymmetric combinations of traditional, irregular, and criminal tactics and using traditional military capabilities in old and new ways.¹⁵

The circular contends that those using a hybrid strategy will continually adjust their organizational structure, tactics, and equipment to create dilemmas for U.S. forces. Adversaries will focus their disruptive efforts in every potential sphere of an operating environment to include: information, social, political, infrastructure, economic, and military domains. Hybrid warfare actors will attempt to utilize criminals and criminal organizations to finance and facilitate operations in this environment.¹⁶ *Training Circular 7-100* identifies two key strategies of a hybrid warfare threat: adaptation and transition. *Natural adaptation* is the process by which the actor pursuing hybrid warfare refines his ability to apply political, economic, military, or informational power. *Directed adaptation* is the application of lessons learned to disrupt U.S. forces in an operating environment.¹⁷ Transitions refer to the shift in the adversary's organizational and design structure to maximize its ability to blend in with the local population creating a new and distinct advantage. The circular concludes that the traditional concepts of conventional vs. unconventional and regular vs. irregular war are of no use in applying to adversaries in hybrid warfare, but instead allow them to exploit these principles against their potential opponents.¹⁸

A 2010, United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) study for Congress examined how the DOD defines and uses hybrid warfare in strategic planning and if hybrid warfare represents a new form of conflict. According to the GAO, the DOD does not have an official definition for hybrid warfare because it does not consider it a new form of warfare.¹⁹ Many DOD officials assert that hybrid warfare incorporates all

¹⁵ Department of the Army, *Training Circular 7-100 Hybrid Threat*, Fort Leavenworth: Headquarters, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 2010, 1-1.

¹⁶ Department of the Army, *TC 7-100 Hybrid Threat*, 1-2.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Ibid, 1-3.

¹⁹ United States Government Accountability Office, *Hybrid Warfare*, Washington, D.C.: United States Government Accountability Office, 2010, 2.

elements of warfare along the spectrum of conflict. The term “hybrid” is used to describe the increasingly complex operating environments that will require the U.S. military to maintain a full-spectrum force.²⁰ In this report, the GAO provides the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) definition of hybrid warfare: “A hybrid threat is one posed by any current or potential adversary, including state, non-state and terrorists, with the ability, whether demonstrated or likely, to simultaneously employ conventional and non-conventional means adaptively, in pursuit of their objectives.”²¹

As we have shown, there is still debate concerning whether hybrid warfare constitutes a new and emerging threat to the U.S. military. The DOD maintains that the existing Range of Military Operations model sufficiently captures future threat scenarios. An Army view is hybrid threats are not a new phenomenon but that future adversaries are likely to employ hybrid tactics to exploit U.S. vulnerabilities. Hoffman warns that future conflicts will likely involve adversaries who will employ a convergence of conventional and unconventional tactics and organizations. In Figure 1, Hoffman illustrates that the U.S. military should prepare for mid-intensity conflict, or hybrid warfare, because it poses the most operational risk due to its frequency of occurrence and intensity.²²

²⁰ U.S. GAO, *Hybrid Warfare*, 11.

²¹ *Ibid*, 15.

²² Frank G. Hoffman, “Hybrid Threats: Reconceptualizing the Evolving Character of Modern Conflict,” *Strategic Forum*, No. 240, April 2009, 6.




Figure 1. Hoffman's Implied Change in Spectrum of Conflict (Hoffman, 2007)

We assume that the likely operational tasks for this mid-intensity conflict will include: direct action, counterinsurgency, training and advisory, and anti-terrorism operations. This operating environment will require a force structure that places more emphasis on unconventional tasks while maintaining the ability to conduct high-intensity operations. We contend that the U.S. military cannot afford to classify our military forces in conventional or unconventional terms; hybrid warfare will require a combined arms or multi-modal force that is capable of operating across the spectrum of military operations.

B. THESIS STRUCTURE

The second chapter reviews literature available on the topic of integration of conventional and special operations forces. Organizational theory lends insights from the business and systems engineering perspectives. It introduces the design structure matrix as a tool for determining where task interdependencies exist, and where integration is beneficial. The chapter examines current Joint and Army doctrine to identify their main concepts for dealing with CF-SOF integration.

The third chapter describes the use of the design structure matrix as a tool for determining where interdependencies exist and where integration could be beneficial. A value system for the design structure matrix identifies each instance of CF-SOF task

interdependency and determines where integration of units would be beneficial, harmful, or makes no difference. An example demonstrates how a design structure matrix would be built, populated, and analyzed. It concludes with identification of the limitations of the tool.

The fourth and fifth chapters provide two hypothetical case studies in areas of the world that could present hybrid warfare environments. They examine Chechnya and Pakistan in terms of historical background, their current situations, and how those situations may worsen and present a hybrid warfare situation. These case studies provide context for use of the design structure matrix by presenting notional scenarios where a senior commander could examine how integration of his conventional and special operations forces could help achieve U.S. objectives.

The sixth chapter analyzes design structure matrices developed for the illustrative notional Chechen and Pakistani scenarios. The matrices, once completed, offer insight into where conventional and special operations forces can achieve better results by conducting integrated operations for certain tasks. The matrices also reflect where it would be better to keep the different units separated. This analysis demonstrates how commanders and planners can identify where and when to integrate conventional and special operations forces by using the design structure matrix. The final chapter offers conclusions and recommendations for using the design structure matrix as a planning tool to examine the possibilities for CF-SOF integrated operations.

II. LITERATURE REVIEW

A. INTRODUCTION

This chapter reviews literature addressing three topics: hybrid warfare, Joint and Army Doctrine regarding the integration of conventional forces (CF) and special operations forces (SOF), and works addressing conventional force-special operations force (CF-SOF) integration. This review examines possible answers to the primary questions that already exist. Those questions are: Is the integration of conventional and special operations forces beneficial in a hybrid warfare scenario? And if so, when and how? The following sections examine where current doctrine fails to adequately address CF-SOF integration against such threats. Previous works addressing how to better integrate CF-SOF suggest where the Army can begin reorganizing and reeducating leaders for better integration in more complex operational environments.

B. ORGANIZATIONAL THEORY

In terms of organizational design, the U.S. Army is an excellent example of hierarchy and bureaucracy. These models apply historically, and continue to be a good fit for military organizations. The current global environment however, may require changes to the Army's organizational structures. The fields of organizational theory and organizational design may offer new ways of analyzing the Army's organizational model to address CF-SOF integration. Work done to study integration in the corporate world provides a new lens to examine the integration of CF and SOF units.

Henri Barki and Alain Pinsonneault note that while some may perceive homogenizing departments to a degree where there are no longer apparent differences as the apex of integration, this is not always optimal. They contend that extreme integration can negate the different and complementary skills and expertise that come with specialization.²³ This is a key consideration when examining CF-SOF integration. CF

²³ Henri Barki & Alain Pinsonneault, "A Model of Organizational Integration, Implementation Effort and Performance," *Organization Science*, Vol. 16, No. 2, 166.

and SOF will each try to maximize the contributions unique to their particular skills.²⁴ The goal should not be to form a CF-SOF hybrid where there is no difference between the forces, but rather to utilize the unique capabilities of each individual force for maximum gain.

Another aspect of CF-SOF integration is the concept of interdependence. In 1967, Thompson identified that the most effective structure is one that groups interdependent roles and processes together. This suggests that once tasks requiring SOF-CF integration are identified, interdependent staff roles and processes should be put together. The trick about interdependencies is that they are easily misidentified, with the primary tendency being to ignore them.²⁵ Headquarters integration of CF and SOF requires grouping of the staffs according to interdependencies. For the sake of time and resources however, if the situation does not call for CF-SOF to integrate fully throughout the campaign, a systematic approach must be adopted to determine where interdependencies exist. The most effective approach will be one that allows for integration of CF-SOF where high levels of interdependency exist, and separation where they do not.²⁶

The design structure matrix (DSM) is an effective tool for identifying where interdependencies exist. This tool allows for better visualization of where parts of a system exhibit interdependence, and where they are autonomous. By mapping the departments of an organization, or the tasks performed by organizations working together, the DSM can illuminate where integration is beneficial. The methods chapter addresses the DSM and its applicability to CF-SOF integration in more depth.

C. INTEGRATING BY THE BOOK

Examining current Joint and Army doctrine shows how the military, as an institution, believes that integration should be approached. Current Army and Joint doctrine focuses on units working together in traditional, high-intensity combat situations, not adequately addressing how to integrate CF and SOF at the operational

²⁴ Barki & Pisonneault, "A Model of Organizational Integration," 170.

²⁵ Nicolay Worren. "Hitting the Sweet Spot Between Separation and Integration in Organization Design." *People and Strategy*. Vol. 34 Issue 4, 25.

²⁶ Worren, "Hitting the Sweet Spot Between Separation and Integration," 26.

level in complex environments. This chapter structures the review of doctrine by focusing on the integration concepts found in *Joint Publication 3-05 Special Operations*; these are operations, command relationships, and liaisons.²⁷

1. Operations

JP 3-05 recommends that CF-SOF begin planning integrated operations “...at the first efforts at mission development and concluding with the achievement of the desired end state.”²⁸ This indicates that for an operation to be truly integrated, it must be planned as such from the initial development of the operational concept, through conflict termination. Focusing on CF-SOF integration receives no other specific attention in the current literature.

2. Command Relationships

Command relationships can sometimes be a very contentious issue for military leaders. JP 3-05 provides that leaders conducting integrated operations will need to shift from a vertical focus, receiving orders from a higher headquarters, to a horizontal focus of working closely with partners.²⁹ This mental shift can prove critical. If the focus remains on who works for whom, then this aspect will remain a barrier to integration.

Joint Publication 3-33, *Joint Task Force Headquarters*, provides joint forces with guidance for achieving an integrated command structure, but not in the sense CF-SOF integration. JP 3-33 offers a NATO headquarters as an example, providing these main factors for an integrated command:

- a designated single commander
- a staff composed of members from all partner nations
- subordinate commands and staff integrated into the lowest echelon necessary to accomplish the mission.³⁰

²⁷ Department of Defense, *Joint Publication 3-05: Special Operations*. Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, III-11.

²⁸ Department of Defense, *JP 3-05: Special Operations*, III-11.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Department of Defense, *Joint Publication 3-33: Joint Task Force Headquarters*, Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, IV-19.

JP 3-33's guidance does not rely on the use of liaisons to achieve an integrated command structure, but rather on creating a staff that is representative of the types of units involved in the operation (partner nations). It is possible to look at CF-SOF units as "partner nations" for integrated operations and to form one staff responsible to an overall command authority, either conventional or SOF, for planning and executing operations.

3. Liaison Elements

Liaison elements receive the most attention when dealing with CF-SOF integration. Doctrinally, the primary vehicle is the Special Operations Command and Control Element (SOCCE). This team is described in Joint Publication 3-05, *Special Operations*, as the "focal point for the synchronization of activities with conventional force operations." Normally utilized when SOF is acting in support of CF, the SOCCE performs command and control, as well as liaison functions as directed by the local SOF commander. It is important to note that SOCCE remains under the operational control (OPCON) of its SOF commander, while working and living with the supported CF headquarters. The SOCCE performs the following functions:

- as directed, executes C2 of SOF elements attached or in direct support of the supported CF commander
- advises CF commander on SOF capabilities and limitations
- advises the SOF commander on the supported CF's status, intentions, and requirements
- provides required secure communications links
- coordinates and de-conflicts SO activities with CF operations
- assists supported commander with CF-SOF staff link-up³¹

The SOCCE is an attractive option because it can serve both as a liaison element and function as a command element for SOF working in support of the CF commander. The SOCCE, however will not truly function as an integrated element of the headquarters, and remains a very robust liaison cell, as long as it is OPCON to a separate SOF commander.

³¹ Department of Defense, *JP 3-05: Special Operations*, II-12.

According to JP 3-05, another method for CF-SOF integration is the exchange of SOF liaison officers (LNOs). LNOs report directly to the SOF commander, but are positioned within the supported CF components to ensure the timely exchange of information to aid mission execution and to prevent fratricide, duplication of effort, disruption of operations or the loss of intelligence sources.³² This is a well-known, and often utilized method of keeping units working under the same command, or in the same areas, apprised of each other's actions. Most headquarters will have LNOs from each of their subordinate units, as well as any units operating inside or around their operational area. Their continued use suggests that both CF and SOF leaders feel comfortable with LNOs during training and operations.

Making the LNO the centerpiece of integration leaves much to be desired in achieving integration. The roles and responsibilities of LNOs, as outlined in doctrine, allow for SOF and CF to *coexist* in the same operational environment and avoid fratricide, but do not allow for them to become truly *integrated*. In Army doctrine, specifically the Corps Operations manual, liaisons serve four functions: to monitor, coordinate, advise, and assist.³³ Joint Doctrine, as outlined in JP 3-33 *Joint Task Force Headquarters*, provides guidelines for LNOs:

- LNOs are not full-time planners
- LNOs are not replacements for proper staff-to-staff coordination
- LNOs do not have the authority to make decisions for their commander without coordination and approval³⁴

This demonstrates that liaisons are not meant to achieve integration. While LNOs are vital to achieving coordination, they do not have the presence, role, or authorities required to achieve integration of units during planning or execution.

A 2010 RAND study explores liaisons being used in CF-SOF coordination, and recommends changes for future improvement. This study cites the heavy requirements often placed on SOF commands to provide LNO's to supported CF headquarters. RAND

³² Ibid, II-13.

³³ Department of the Army, *Field Manual 3-92: Corps Operations*, Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 5-12.

³⁴ Department of Defense, *JP 3-33: Joint Task Force Headquarters*, II-19.

cites a 2005 Center for Army Lessons Learned publication showing that during the early phases of Operation Iraqi Freedom entire Special Forces A-Teams were dismantled in order to provide members of the required liaison teams.³⁵ While this was probably viewed as a necessary evil, and expected to be a short-term commitment, having to break up operational units in order to fill LNO billets demonstrates a critical lack of capability. The same RAND study recommends that the burden should be shared both ways. A specialized SOF liaison element could be established that would be attached to the Joint Task Force (JTF) headquarters. Another, conventional force “Coordination Detachment” could be formed to augment a theater special operations command (TSOC) or Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) headquarters to aid in mission planning.³⁶ Doctrine has yet to explore the option of creating these elements as organic staff components of each headquarters, or at minimum as designated, habitual exchanges between operational CF and SOF headquarters personnel.

The issue of CF-SOF integration has been addressed primarily in the context of major combat operations. CF-SOF integration has not adequately been applied to the context of more ambiguous, hybrid threat scenarios. The issue is primarily addressed to achieve, at minimum coexistence, and at best synchronization of actions in the same operational environment. There remains a break between what is considered “special operations” and “everything else.” This divergence could prove detrimental to the U.S. military’s ability to cope with future threats that do not present problems easily solved by A or B-type choices. Keeping the current focus creates the perception that integration is a problem to be dealt with, as opposed a way to exploit the greater opportunities presented by truly integrated operations.

D. CONVENTIONAL FORCES – SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES INTEGRATION

Significant literature exists outside of official doctrine contributing to CF-SOF integration. Multiple issues relevant to CF-SOF integration emerge from these sources

³⁵ Timothy M. Bonds, Et Al., *Enhancing Army Joint Force Headquarters Capabilities*, Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 88.

³⁶ Bonds, Et Al., *Enhancing Army Joint Force Headquarters Capabilities*, 90-91.

and are examined in this chapter. These trends from the literature are: integrated operations are determined by task, not by unit; integrated operations require unity of command; integration requires dedicated, possibly organic SOF staff support at the JTF level (this implies the creation of permanent CF-SOF exchange elements); and, a supported/supporting command-support relationship is the most effective.

In 1994, Michael Kershaw argued that integrated operations require more than mere cooperation, and that they are determined by task, not by unit.³⁷ This perspective demonstrates that when determining what aspects of an operational plan require CF-SOF integration the analysis should focus on what tasks can be better accomplished by integrating forces, not by focusing on how many units have mutual CF-SOF representation.³⁸

Harry S. Brown, in 1996, approached CF-SOF integration by focusing the issue of unity of command. Brown describes unity of command by stating that it encompasses two concepts: the idea of the commander who is not biased, and the development of a unified team.³⁹ Brown offers the lack of integration during the invasion of Grenada, Operation Urgent Fury, as a case study in how parochialism and lack of impartiality negatively affected operations.⁴⁰ Brown's observation supports the idea that for operations to be truly integrated, they must be conducted under a single commander.

It is generally accepted that the last decade of conflict in Afghanistan and Iraq has resulted in perhaps the best working relationships between CF and SOF in recent history. This has occurred out of necessity as CF and SOF units have had to find ways to work together and counter multiple types of threats. In 2012, Generals Sacolick and Grigsby argue that this level of integration, based mainly on personal relationships and experiences over the last ten years will not last, and cannot prove of future use to the Army unless knowledge is institutionalized. They stress that these lessons must be

³⁷ Michael M. Kershaw. *The Integration of Special Operations and Conventional Forces*. Naval Postgraduate School Thesis. December 1994. 6-7.

³⁸ Kershaw, *The Integration of Special Operations and Conventional Forces*, 131.

³⁹ Harry S. Brown. *The Command and Control of Special Operations Forces*. NPS Thesis. December 1996. 1-2.

⁴⁰ Brown, *The Command and Control of Special Operations Forces*, 98.

institutionalized, beginning in the generating force, the Army's schools and Centers of Excellence. Once integration becomes part of the Army's approach to education, it will spread to operational units in the field.⁴¹ Sacolick and Grigsby recommend adding new functional cells to the Army's staff structure. These cells would govern the synchronization of CF and SOF operations, drawing both frameworks closer and integrating their capabilities for the joint force commander.⁴² While intended to be part of a new "Special Operations Warfighting Function," this recommendation is one of the first to propose creating an organic integration mechanism inside operational staffs.

In 2008, retired General Gary Luck and Colonel Mike Findlay approached the integration of CF-SOF for Joint Forces Command. Luck and Findlay found a recurring need for the incorporation of SOF expertise and perspectives into strategic planning and for more clearly defined the relationships between Theater Special Operations Commands and established Joint Task Force headquarters. They argue that this requires dedicated, and possibly organic, SOF staff support at the JTF level.⁴³

An information paper published following the Army's Unified Quest 2012 exercise addresses the need to better integrate CF-SOF in future conflicts. The paper argues that in future conflict the required force will not be either CF or SOF, but a mix of the two. Unified Quest demonstrated that attention should be given to the possibility of forming temporary or permanent CF planning and coordination elements assigned to SOF commands, as well as SOF planning and coordination elements assigned to CF commands.⁴⁴

Luck and Findlay contend that the joint doctrinal concept of supporting/supported command relationships is best for achieving CF-SOF integrated operations. This relationship requires the supporting commander to aid or assist the supported commander. The supporting commander then, in essence, is responsible for the success

⁴¹ Bennet S. Sacolick & Wayne W. Grigsby, "Special Operations/Conventional Forces Interdependence: A Critical Role in 'Prevent, Shape, Win,'" *Army Magazine*, June 2012 Vol.62 No.6, 40.

⁴² Sacolick & Grigsby, "Special Operations/Conventional Forces Interdependence," 42.

⁴³ Mike Findlay & Gary Luck, *Special Operations and Conventional Force Integration*. Suffolk: Joint Warfighting Center, USJFCOM, 2008, 1-2.

⁴⁴ Department of the Army, "Increasing Special Operations Forces (SOF)/Conventional Forces (CF) Integration, Interoperability, and Interdependence," *Unified Quest 2012 Issue Paper*, May 2012, 7-9.

of the supported commander.⁴⁵ This was institutionalized in doctrine by United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) Publication 3-33. This product states that the supported/supporting relationship allows SOF the greatest freedom to shape the operational environment without being restrained by geographic boundaries.⁴⁶ It also allows the supported commander to set requirements and priority of support, while allowing the supporting commander to determine methods and tactics.⁴⁷

Jeffrey Ortoli, a Special Forces officer, points out that the supported/supporting command relationship is intentionally vague, that it remains focused on access to capabilities, not the ownership of forces.⁴⁸ This challenges traditional military culture, where commanders are trained to gain ownership of the forces in their respective areas, since they are responsible for what happens there. A cultural shift will be required for the Army to adopt the joint concept of supported/supporting command relationships.

E. SUMMARY

The future adversaries of the U.S. Army will likely adopt hybrid warfare strategies. This will require the U.S. Army to find better ways to integrate CF and SOF units in order to better counter these types of threats. The doctrinal approach of focusing integration efforts on operations, command relationships, and liaison elements does not adequately address how to integrate outside of high-intensity conflict scenarios. Operations, or tasks, have been given the least attention in favor of focusing on liaisons. This thesis utilizes tasks to explore ways to identify how to integrate CF-SOF in a hybrid warfare scenario. We utilize existing concepts carrying the study of CF-SOF integration forward. Those concepts are: 1) integrated operations are determined by task, not by unit; 2) integrated operations require unity of command; 3) integration requires dedicated, possibly organic SOF staff support at the JTF level, implying the creation of permanent

⁴⁵ Findlay & Luck, *Special Operations and Conventional Force Integration*, 7.

⁴⁶ Department of Defense, *US SOCOM Publication 3-33.3, CF/SOF: Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Conventional Forces and Special Operations Forces Integration and Interoperability*, Fort Leavenworth: HQ, Combined Arms Center, 2.

⁴⁷ Department of Defense, *USSOCOM Pub 3-33.3*, 12.

⁴⁸ Jeffrey Ortoli, *Integration and Interoperability of Special Operations Forces and Conventional Forces in Irregular Warfare*, Fort Leavenworth: USACGSC Thesis, 2009, 77.

CF-SOF exchange elements; and 4) that supported/supporting command-support relationship is the most effective.

To examine how to better integrate CF-SOF in hybrid warfare, we use the design structure matrix to identify where interdependencies would exist between CF and SOF operations in the same theater. By focusing on what types of operations are interdependent, we can determine where CF-SOF integration is most beneficial. This is developed further in the next chapter.

III. METHODOLOGY

The current body of literature dedicated to CF-SOF integration focuses mainly on the use of liaison elements. This can accomplish coordination, but is not sufficient to achieve effective integration. The Army must identify where CF-SOF operations are interdependent, and then plan for these operations to be CF-SOF integrated. A systematic way to identify where interdependencies exist is the design structure matrix, or DSM. The DSM provides a method for the mapping of interdependencies between tasks, process steps, or members of the organization. It can reflect three different types of relationships between tasks, which will correspond to the level of interdependency between units or departments:

- Independent – this means that separate units do not require interaction with each other to accomplish tasks. They can remain separate and operate in parallel
- Sequential – this exists when one unit requires information or resources from another to complete its own tasks
- Reciprocal – the strongest type of interdependence and is characterized by a feedback loop. This exists when extensive information exchange is required and is best served by placing units inside the same organizational boundary⁴⁹

The DSM is meant to create a visualization of the organizational structure, and aid in design changes if necessary.⁵⁰ Utilizing the DSM to examine CF-SOF interdependency may provide a more precise method of determining where integration is required in a campaign plan.

There are multiple types of DSM's. In relation to time, they can be static or time-based. A static DSM represents elements of a system that exist simultaneously, for instance groups inside an organization. In time-based DSM's, the ordering of rows and columns indicates the flow of tasks or processes through time. A team-based, or organizational, DSM can be utilized for modeling organizational structures, based on

⁴⁹ Warren, "Hitting the Sweet Spot Between Separation and Integration," 27-28.

⁵⁰ Tyson R. Browning, "Applying the Design Structure Matrix to System Decomposition and Integration Problems: A Review and New Directions," *IEEE Transactions and Engineering Management* Vol. 48, No. 3, August 2001, 293.

individuals or groups and their interaction. This type of DSM is static. Activity-based DSM's are used for examining processes and the related flow of information, and are time-based.⁵¹ This thesis utilizes a static, team-based DSM to identify where interdependencies exist between CF and SOF across a campaign. The DSM functions as an aid in deciding where and how to integrate CF-SOF for success. The analysis identifies the tasks that require combining CF and SOF for integrated operations during a campaign, and what tasks are better suited for keeping CF and SOF elements separate.

As a campaign plan develops, the tasks for both the Joint Task Force (Conventional Forces) and Joint Special Operations Task Force (Special Operations Forces) are arrayed on the two axis of the DSM. Planners analyze the intersection of each task to determine if interdependency exists, and assign a corresponding value. These values are somewhat arbitrary and indicate if creating an integrated headquarters for the task would be beneficial, detrimental, or if integrating CF-SOF has no effect. This thesis utilizes the following values throughout:

- 1 – Integration of CF-SOF headquarters will benefit the operation (combining forces is more optimal)
- 0 – Integration of CF-SOF headquarters will neither benefit/harm the operation (no difference)
- -1 – Integration of CF-SOF headquarters will harm the operation (keeping forces separate is more optimal)

Once these values are assigned to each task intersection, planners are able determine the set(s) of tasks in a campaign plan that will be optimized by combining CF and SOF elements to complete these tasks as integrated operations.

Table 1 is an example, with CF tasks (A-D across the top of the matrix), and SOF tasks (E-H down the left side of the matrix). Inserted values are for illustration.

⁵¹ Browning, "Applying the Design Structure Matrix," 292-293.

	A	B	C	D
E	0	1	-1	0
F	0	-1	0	0
G	1	0	1	0
H	-1	-1	1	0

Table 1. Example Design Structure Matrix

With these values reflected above, planners can make the following planning assumptions:

- That there is *no effect* on operations by integrating CF-SOF for tasks at intersections: A-E, A-F, B-G, C-F, or any intersection under task D. This implies that there is no requirement to combine CF-SOF for integrated operations here.
- That there is a *positive effect* on operations by integrating CF-SOF for tasks at intersections: A-G, B-E, C-G, and C-H. This implies that the campaign plan is better served by planning for integrated operations to accomplish these tasks.
- That there is a *negative effect* on operations by integrating CF-SOF for tasks at intersections: A-H, B-F, B-H, and C-E. This implies that operations will be hindered by integrated operations.

The matrix allows for visualization of where integration will have an effect, and the nature of that effect. The DSM can help make the decision where to conduct CF-SOF integration across a campaign.

This thesis does not examine integration as it applies across the spectrum of conflict. Using Worren's chart for the relationship between formal structure and the level of work process interdependencies, we examine where effective integration of CF-SOF exists in a hybrid warfare scenario. This allows the focus on a situation where there is an

integrated formal structure, and a high level of interdependence. Figures 2 and 3 illustrate the application of Worren’s integration approach to the topic of hybrid warfare.




Figure 2. Formal Structure and Work Process Interdependencies (From Worren, 2012).




Figure 3. Formal Structure and Level of Interdependence in Hybrid Warfare (Adapted from Worren, 2012).

We provide two theoretical situations that call for both CF and SOF to operate in support of U.S. objectives. These scenarios are purely notional and are only meant to provide context for use of the DSM. These situations arise from areas where there are currently internal security issues, namely Chechnya and Northwestern Pakistan. These areas offer cases of state powers currently struggling to maintain control and defeat local militant groups. It is not unreasonable to assume that, in the next five to ten years, one of these situations could escalate to the point where the existing government could require some level of foreign assistance or intervention. The fact that each of these areas is located inside the borders of a nuclear state adds complexity to each situation.

We develop the Chechen and Pakistani scenarios by using the operational design framework. Historical context provides the environmental frame; current threat trends and events provide the problem frame. We develop likely U.S. campaign objectives to arrive at the solution frame. Once the solution frame is determined, campaign tasks are assigned to a notional JTF and JSOTF. These tasks will then populate the design structure matrix for each scenario. Upon creation of the DSM and establishment of the task interdependencies, we determine the integration mechanisms that could provide the best fit.

A. LIMITATIONS

The major limitation of using a static DSM is that it only provides a snapshot of the expected tasks that will be completed in the course of operations. The DSM no longer applies once operations begin and the situation changes. Once new set of tasks is identified, the DSM must be rebuilt and analyzed. This should not detract from the value of the DSM to planners, as it still provides a method to analyze where CF-SOF interdependencies exist, and where there is value in conducting integrated operations across a campaign.

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IV. CHECHNYA CASE STUDY

A. INTRODUCTION

In this chapter, we examine historical and current conditions that make Chechnya an excellent example of a hybrid warfare scenario. The first section consists of a brief historical context of Chechnya with a more in-depth look at the First and Second Chechen Wars. In the next section, we describe the current conditions, to include the current state of the insurgency, in the Republic of Chechnya. Finally, we examine lessons learned and utilize these to develop tasks for the notional JTF and JSOTF that would be required to develop an operational campaign plan for a Chechnya-like scenario and be required to determine where and how to conduct CF-SOF integrated operations inside that campaign. The DSM analysis in Chapter Six will be used to evaluate CF and SOF tasks in order to identify where task interdependencies exist, and where the commander can best combine CF-SOF for integrated operations and best accomplish those tasks.

B. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

For over two centuries, local inhabitants and the Russian government have been in competition for control of the North Caucasus region that includes Chechnya. More recently, in 1934, the Russian government merged Chechnya and its neighboring province of Ingush to form an autonomous republic under Russian control. This republic was then abolished in 1944 because the Russian government alleged that Chechen and Ingush citizens were assisting the German military. Russia deported hundreds of thousands of Chechens and Ingush to Central Asia and Siberia due to these allegations. It is estimated that there were over 200,000 Chechen deaths that resulted from the deportation and exile under these harsh conditions.⁵² In 1957, Nikita Khrushchev, the First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, allowed the Chechen and Ingush people to return to their homelands. The deportation and exile of the Chechen people, for almost 13 years, is one of the most influential events to define their cultural

⁵² Tim Youngs, *The Conflict in Chechnya*, Research Paper, London: House of Commons Library, 2000, 8.

narrative. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Dzhokhar Dudayev, a former Soviet military officer, declared Chechen independence from Russia.

In 1994, the Russian government sent approximately 35,000 soldiers to regain control of the Chechen Republic. This event began the First Chechen War. After an unsuccessful military campaign, the Russian government signed a peace agreement with the Chechen rebels in 1996. This accord granted Chechnya substantially more autonomy but not independence.⁵³ As a result of terrorist attacks in Dagestan and Russia in 1999, the Russian government sent the military back to Chechnya to subdue the rebel factions. The Russian military proved to be significantly more effective during the Second Chechen War, lasting from August 1999 to May 2000. Since that time, Russia has maintained a military presence in the region to support the Pro-Russian Chechen government and conduct counterinsurgency operations against the Chechen rebels. Chechen insurgent groups still conduct regular attacks on Russian and Chechen government forces. The most recent incident reported was a simultaneous three-person suicide bomb attack that killed six people in Grozny in August 2011.⁵⁴ The following section contains a more detailed look at the First and Second Chechen Wars.

C. THE FIRST CHECHEN WAR

The First Chechen War is an excellent example of a Chechen force, in both its organization and hybrid tactics, confronting a larger conventional military element. In December 1994, after three years of independence, Russian forces entered Chechnya to regain control of its lost republic.⁵⁵ Although Russia was still adjusting to a post-Soviet era, their government and military leaders were confident that they could quickly defeat the Chechen rebels. It soon became apparent that the Russian military, comprised of 35,000 soldiers—the majority conscripts—and trained on Cold War doctrine was not prepared for a hybrid threat actor and environment. On New Year's Eve 1994, Russian forces attempted to seize Grozny by conducting an unsupported armored column advance

⁵³ British Broadcasting Company News, *Regions and territories: Chechnya*, London: BBC News at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/country_profiles/2565049.stm (accessed on September 15, 2012).

⁵⁴ BBC News, *Regions and territories: Chechnya*.

⁵⁵ Youngs, *The Conflict in Chechnya*, 10.

on the city. The Chechen rebels, consisting of small, decentralized elements of fifteen to twenty personnel and working in three- or four-person teams, conducted a series of anti-armor ambushes against the Russians.⁵⁶ The Russian forces took devastating casualties in this first major battle of the war. The 131st “Maikop” armored brigade suffered heavily. They reportedly lost 20 of 26 tanks and 102 of 120 armored personnel carriers. It is believed that approximately 2,000 Russian soldiers were killed during this first engagement.⁵⁷ According to Arquilla and Karasik, the Chechen rebels were so successful against the Russian military largely on account of their decentralized nature. “Instead of a centralized command and control, the Chechens gave great latitude for action to their dispersed but highly interconnected bands, which fought in a nonlinear fashion, enabling them, repeatedly, to ‘swarm’ advancing Russian columns from all directions.”⁵⁸ The Chechen ability to swarm highlights their ability to converge on Russian forces, conduct an attack, and then return to their smaller groups. In addition to their organizational structure, Chechen forces were highly effective against the Russian military because of their access to modern weaponry and their ability to move freely about the battlefield.

After the New Year’s Eve battle, the Russian forces attempted to surround Grozny and systematically clear the city of the Chechen rebels. This strategy involved aerial and artillery barrages inside the city prior to Russian infantry and Special Forces attempts to secure the area using standard, conventional practices.⁵⁹ Simultaneously, the Chechen rebel groups infiltrated the city by blending in with the population and exploiting gaps in the Russian perimeter. The regular rotation of Chechen soldiers in and out of Grozny allowed their forces to refit and share information that they learned while

⁵⁶ John Arquilla & Theodore Karasik, “Chechnya: A Glimpse of Future Conflict?” *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 1999, 210.

⁵⁷ Youngs, *The Conflict in Chechnya*, 10.

⁵⁸ Arquilla & Karasik, “Chechnya: A Glimpse of Future Conflict?” 208.

⁵⁹ Youngs, *The Conflict in Chechnya*, 10.

fighting inside the city.⁶⁰ This campaign also highlighted several shortfalls for the Russian military's force structure that hindered their tactical capabilities. First, they did not have a unified command structure to synchronize the actions of units from three governmental departments: the Defense Ministry, the Interior Ministry, and the Security Ministry. Additionally, the Russian force consisted primarily of conscript soldiers, which impacted combat readiness levels and soldier discipline. Finally, poor communication systems limited the tactical units' ability to coordinate with each other. Poor communications, coupled with poor unit discipline, resulted in numerous fratricide incidents. With mounting casualty numbers, popular support for the war in Chechnya rapidly decreased.⁶¹ In April 1996, the Chechen President, Dzhokhar Dudayev, was killed by a Russian air strike, opening the door for negotiations. In June 1996, President Yeltsin and Zelimkhan Yandarbiev, Dudayev's successor, signed a peace accord to officially end the war after almost 18 months of fighting.

D. THE SECOND CHECHEN WAR

In the years between the two Chechen wars, the Russian military spent a significant amount of time analyzing the lessons learned from the first conflict. As a result, they made several significant improvements for combating unconventional threats, such as training for mountain warfare and improving unit coordination measures. However, one area that the Russian military did not address was urban warfare. Due to the significant number of casualties in the first war, Russian military planners were convinced that it was best to avoid urban warfare altogether.⁶² In the meantime, Chechen rebels also focused on training for an eventual second war with Russia. They established several training centers for tactics and marksmanship; heavy weapons; diversionary and

⁶⁰ "Arquilla and Karasik state: 'Chechen small-unit cohesion during the war benefited greatly from the fact that fighters were almost always serving in combat with their kinsmen. A particular taip, for example, might have a supply of 600 fighters. These would be broken down into units of 150 (further subdivided into squads of about 20) that would work one-week shifts, one after the other.'" Arquilla and Karasik, "Chechnya: A Glimpse of Future Combat?" 210.

⁶¹ Youngs, *The Conflict in Chechnya*, 11.

⁶² Olga Oliker, *Russia's Chechen Wars 1994 – 2000: Lessons Learned from Urban Combat*, Santa Monica: RAND, 2001, 36-38.

terrorist tactics; and psychological and ideological warfare.⁶³ In addition to their training efforts, the Chechens prepared defensive positions, excavating underground passages between buildings in Grozny. Like the First Chechen War, these defensive positions allowed the Chechen rebels to move freely through Grozny and ambush Russian armored columns.

During the second war, the Russian military employed several new strategies that significantly increased effectiveness. First, Russia deployed approximately 95,000 soldiers under one unified commander. Second, the Russian's adopted a new strategy in an effort to avoid significant casualties in urban areas. Russian "Storm" detachments, consisting of three to five personnel with specialized training and equipment, would conduct reconnaissance forward of the main body to identify Chechen positions, constituting the formation and tailoring of special operations forces used in direct support of conventional forces. After the enemy positions were identified, artillery and aviation attacks were focused on those areas before "clearing forces" moved into the area.⁶⁴ Marginally effective, these tactics caused a significant number of civilian casualties and damage to the local infrastructure. Their final, and perhaps most important new strategy involved their information management programs. During the Second Chechen War, the Russian government severely restricted the media's access to the battlefield. This allowed the Russian military to use extremely harsh tactics with minimal objections from the international community. Russian popular support of the Second Chechen War remained relatively high.

Despite shifting their strategy, the Russian military made several significant mistakes. First, the Russian military's plan for seizing Grozny involved developing a "spider web" of the city so that they could clear each section sequentially. However, the Russians did not realize that the Chechen rebels were fighting a different kind of war.⁶⁵

⁶³ Olikier, *Russia's Chechen Wars*, 39-40.

⁶⁴ Ibid, 45-46.

⁶⁵ "According to Olikier: 'Whatever spiderweb had been planned, actual fighting was positional and costly: house-to-house and block-by-block. Territory captured one day was lost the next. Furthermore, it soon became apparent that the Russians were not, as they had hoped, shrinking the Chechen area of control as they advanced. Instead the rebels refused to be trapped and repeatedly recaptured areas, often behind Russian lines.'" Olikier, *Russia's Chechen Wars*, 48.

The Russians remained focused on a conventional, territory-based form of warfare. The Chechen rebels, on the other hand, were content to give ground to the Russians while inflicting as much damage on their military forces as possible. An important factor in Russia's inability to decisively defeat the Chechen rebels again was their refusal to prepare for urban combat. The Russian focus on mountain warfare prior to the Second Chechen War ensured that the military had to re-learn the lessons of urban warfare during combat.

E. CURRENT CONDITIONS IN CHECHNYA

This section, describes the current political, social and military conditions in the Republic of Chechnya. In March 2007, President Vladimir Putin nominated Ramzan Kadyrov to serve as the President of Chechnya. Ramzan Kadyrov's father, Akhmad Kadyrov, was a former Chechen President killed in a bombing in Grozny in 2004.⁶⁶ Since his appointment, Ramzan Kadyrov has consolidated much of the power in the executive branch of the government, regulated media outlets, and engaged in an aggressive, lethal campaign to target the insurgents.⁶⁷ Under his tenure, Chechnya has received a significant amount of aid from the Russian government for reconstruction efforts. In addition, Kadyrov has made a deliberate effort to resurrect Chechen cultural traditions, such as the Chechen language, which had been lost during the Soviet rule.⁶⁸ However, rampant corruption at the national and local levels has damaged Kadyrov's and the government's legitimacy. Local government officials are reported to regularly extort the local population for kickbacks, typically 50 percent, on government reconstruction efforts.⁶⁹ Despite the corruption, there has been a significant amount of reconstruction since the last Chechen war. Kadyrov has attempted to sell the message that: "Kadyrov

⁶⁶ BBC News, *Regions and territories: Chechnya*.

⁶⁷ Robert W. Schaefer, *The Insurgency in Chechnya and the North Caucasus: From Gazavat to Jihad*, Santa Barbara: Praeger Security International, 2011, 253.

⁶⁸ Schaefer, *The Insurgency in Chechnya*, 259.

⁶⁹ Ibid, 256.

saves Chechen culture. Chechnya under Kadyrov, has actually achieved independence.”⁷⁰

The Russian military has maintained a regular presence in Chechnya since the end of the Second Chechen War, conducting counterinsurgency operations. In 2012, Shaefer stated that the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division, with 15,000 personnel, possessed the primary responsibility for operations in the Caucasus region. In addition, two separate mountain brigades, with specialized anti-terrorism training, with approximately 4,500 soldiers remain in the region.⁷¹ The Russian government also deploys police officers on six-month rotations to the North Caucasus region. However, the exact numbers and locations are unknown.⁷² Russian forces do not regularly conduct combined operations with local Chechen security forces. The Russians claim that many of the local police members either actively or passively support the Chechen insurgents.

Chechnya was historically a significant exporter of oil and natural gas to Russia and the North Caucasus region. In addition, the oil pipeline from Azerbaijan passes through Grozny on its way to the Black Sea.⁷³ The oil infrastructure in Chechnya was almost completely wiped out during the First Chechen War and still has yet to fully recover. Chechnya does not have a significant agricultural market, and most livestock has either died or been killed by Russian troops.⁷⁴ Since the end of the Second Chechen War, the Russian government has provided a great deal of financial support to the Chechen government to support reconstruction efforts. The unemployment rate is approximately 50 percent, despite the influx of jobs from reconstruction efforts. In 2010, Russian subsidies accounted for almost 90 percent of Chechnya’s annual budget.⁷⁵ Shaefer states: “Once Kadyrov is no longer able to artificially keep the economy afloat

⁷⁰ Ibid, 259.

⁷¹ Ibid, 269.

⁷² Ibid, 268.

⁷³ Svante E. Cornell, “The War Against Terrorism and the Conflict in Chechnya: A Case for Distinction,” *The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs*, 2003: 170.

⁷⁴ Cornell, “The War Against Terrorism and the Conflict in Chechnya,” 181.

⁷⁵ Shaefer, *The Insurgency in Chechnya*, 255.

and pay salaries, the situation will deteriorate and even more men will join the insurgency—because the emirate will always be able to pay them.”⁷⁶

The two most important factors that affect Chechen social interactions are kin (family) relationships and religion. According to Arquilla and Karasik: “An important building-block of Chechen success was the structure of Chechen society, which consists of tribal/clan formations divided between lowland inhabitants and the mountaineers—who frequently feud.”⁷⁷ Chechen society is divided into village, tribal, and clan relationships. At the lowest level, *ne’ke* or *gar* divide individuals into sub-clan groups in villages. A *taip* group consists of several villages, with approximately 400 to 600 people. A council of elders governs each *taip*, regulating economic interests and establishing rules for the collective villages. A *tukhum*, or tribe, consists of several *taip*’s and is usually separated between the mountain and lowland inhabitants.⁷⁸ Religion has become the second most influential factor in Chechen society. Islam has historically been the most prevalent religion in the area, and has seen resurgence after the fall of the Soviet Union. Most Chechens are Sunni Muslim and practice either Shafi’I or Sufi Islam, both of which are moderate forms of the religion that emphasize tolerance, spirituality, and education.⁷⁹

Much of the basic infrastructure in Chechnya was destroyed during the First and Second Chechen Wars. The Chechen oil reserves and the oil pipelines are arguably one of the reasons Russia has fought so hard to retain Chechnya as a federal republic. The Chechen oil industry produces about two million barrels of oil annually, with those revenues going directly to the Russian federal offices.⁸⁰ Kodyrov, with the aid of Russian funding, has made a substantial effort to rebuild much of the country’s infrastructure in recent years. These efforts have included: government buildings,

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ Arquilla & Karasik, “Chechnya: A Glimpse of Future Conflict?” 209.

⁷⁸ Ibid, 210.

⁷⁹ Mark E. Johnson, *The Chechen Conflict: A Case for U.S. Intervention*, Fort Leavenworth: School of Advanced Military Studies: United States Army Command and General Staff College, 2006, 48-49.

⁸⁰ Schaefer, *The Insurgency in Chechnya*, 255.

apartments, schools, hospitals, parks, industrial buildings, and cultural centers.⁸¹ Although government corruption and poor quality construction have diminished some of Kadyrov's efforts, conditions have generally improved in the last several years.

Information management has played a key role in both Russia's and Kadyrov's pro-Russian government to combat the Chechen insurgency. Prior to the 2nd Chechen War, Vladimir Putin depicted the Chechen insurgency as an Islamic terrorist movement, drawing parallels to the United States' Global War on Terror. Throughout the war, Russia maintained tight control over the media's access to the conflict. As a result, Russian public support remained high throughout the second campaign.⁸² Today, Kadyrov's government maintains strict control of media outlets in Chechnya. There are currently two government-run television and radio stations and three newspapers, two of which are run by the government. Reporters Without Borders named President Kadyrov one of the "Predators of Press Freedom."⁸³ According to Schaefer, Kadyrov uses his control of media outlets to promote his information campaign to counter the insurgency. Kadyrov states: "Chechnya has now been rebuilt, and it is better than ever. The separatists and the Islamists wanted Chechen independence, but they had no idea what to do with it when they had it and instead of a successful modern state, they created a mafia racket."⁸⁴

F. CHECHEN INSURGENCY

In late 2007, Dokka Umarov, the president of the unofficial secessionist government of Chechnya, proclaimed the end of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria (ChRI) and established the Caucasus Emirate (CE). Following this event, the Chechen insurgency abandoned its organizational identity of a secular democratic movement and adopted a more ideological one: reactionary traditionalism in the form of conservative Islam.⁸⁵ The insurgency now incorporates the religious structure of an emirate into the

⁸¹ Ibid, 253.

⁸² Cornell, "The War Against Terrorism and the Conflict in Chechnya," 174.

⁸³ BBC News, *Regions and territories: Chechnya*.

⁸⁴ Schaefer, *The Insurgency in Chechnya*, 261.

⁸⁵ Ibid, 239.

already existing clan structures.⁸⁶ The CE's strategic goal is to expel Russian forces from the North Caucasus region and establish a *shari'a*-based government. Although there are some ideological differences within the CE, they maintain their alliances by focusing on their common enemies. The CE's near-term goals are to garner popular support by highlighting the current Chechen government's illegitimacy, corruption, and its inability to provide essential services to Chechen citizens.⁸⁷ At the tactical level, the insurgency has focused its attacks on Russian and Chechen security forces. A focus on rural-based operations represents one significant change in the insurgent's tactics.⁸⁸ The rural guerrilla force appears to be disciplined, with well-trained platoon-sized elements and access to sophisticated weapons technology. In addition to the guerilla force, they maintain a sizeable auxiliary that is estimated at approximately 15,000 individuals.⁸⁹ It appears that the CE is attempting to maintain their relevancy by conducting small-scale attacks on government forces, while they recruit, train, and grow their guerrilla force.

In the region's mountainous rural areas, Chechen tactical formations closely resemble infantry platoon formations, with standardized uniforms and weapon systems. Simultaneously, they maintain the ability to de-aggregate into smaller groups to achieve a tactical advantage over their Russian counterparts in an urban environment. The Chechen anti-armor and sniper teams that operated in Grozny during both wars are excellent examples of the rebels' ability to conduct decentralized operations. Despite their independent nature, with the use of communications systems these small teams were able to converge and conduct decisive attacks on enemy forces. An additional challenge that the hybrid Chechen rebels pose is their ability to blend in with the local populace. As we have seen in the Russo-Chechen wars, the Chechen ability to transition from non-combatant to insurgent presented significant challenges to the Russian military forces.

⁸⁶ Ibid, 241.

⁸⁷ Ibid, 247.

⁸⁸ "Robert Schaefer states: 'I estimate the guerrilla force to be about 500 full-time rural-based fighters and another 600-800 urban-based, part-time insurgents that rally to conduct operations as need in either urban or rural environments. Platoon-sized elements of up to 30 men operate in the mountains and forests, while smaller cells of five to eight routinely attack targets in the cities and population centers.'" Ibid, 243.

⁸⁹ Ibid, 244.

Purely to illustrate the methodology, we make the assumption that the Russian and Chechen governments are unable to deal with the growing insurgency in the Republic of Chechnya. This leads to a notional crisis that requires their governments to request U.S. military assistance. We utilize the design structure matrix (DSM) in Chapter Six to examine CF- SOF integration against such threats for this scenario. This is accomplished by developing the tasks required of both the JTF and JSOTF to counter emerging hybrid warfare threats in Chechnya. Additionally, the DSM can show where integration of the different forces would be beneficial, and where it would be detrimental. This serves as a demonstration of how campaign planners and senior commanders can identify during planning what operations should be conducted as CF-SOF integrated operations.

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V. PAKISTAN CASE STUDY

A. INTRODUCTION

This chapter examines current trends in Pakistan that demonstrate a hybrid warfare environment. Understanding what dynamics in Pakistan constitute a new kind of threat demonstrates the necessity to look at CF-SOF integration from a fresh perspective. This chapter examines the historical background behind the violent conflict in Kashmir between Pakistan and India; explaining what factors lead Pakistan to assume a proxy strategy there against India, and how that proxy strategy has caused great risk to the internal stability of Pakistan itself. Again, purely for illustration of the methodology, we create a situation that leads to the commitment of U.S. forces to assist Pakistan in its counterinsurgency efforts.

B. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Pakistan currently faces serious threats to internal security from Islamic militant groups. The irony is that these groups have enjoyed both overt and covert Pakistani support for almost thirty years. Pakistan initially formed and supported these groups to fight a proxy war against India in Jammu and Kashmir, and now is losing control of these proxies and is now conducting a prolonged counterinsurgency fight inside its own borders.

Examining the history of violence in Jammu and Kashmir demonstrates why Pakistan chose to adopt a proxy strategy against its traditionally stronger enemy in India. The contested territory of Jammu and Kashmir, along the India-Pakistan border, has seen many decades of conflict. Pakistan has argued that this region should be part of its nation due to the large Muslim population, and it has waged various wars since 1947 to try and acquire the province. The first Muslim separatist groups in Jammu and Kashmir were organized in the 1920s, while the area was still part of British India. Violent conflict with these groups began in the late 1980's with an attack by the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) on the Kashmiri State Legislative Assembly in Srinagar. The

violence can be attributed to two factors, India's poor management of policy in Kashmir, and Pakistan's start of a proxy campaign.

Basing their strategy on the successful use of irregular Muslim fighters in Afghanistan against the Soviet Union, Pakistan decided to support existing Kashmiri militant organizations and form many more. This was intended to keep a stream of irregular fighters, based in Pakistan, operating against India inside Kashmir. This strategy hoped to keep bleeding Indian manpower and resources while preventing the outbreak of a large-scale war between the two nuclear powers. Examining the history of violence in Jammu and Kashmir suggests that Pakistan's strategy will not result in Jammu and Kashmir becoming part of Pakistan, but will only continue to force India to commit resources to the region.

So far unsuccessful in gaining control of Jammu and Kashmir, Pakistan now faces a serious threat from the militant organizations that it created and sponsored to act as insurgents against India. These militant groups gained global attention when they began carrying out attacks outside Kashmir, and were labeled international terrorist organizations by the United States in the early phases of the Global War on Terror. This caused Pakistan to adopt two simultaneous approaches to its proxies. The Pakistani government has publically banned many militant organizations with violent groups like Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) at the top of the list, while the Inter-Services Intelligence agency (ISI) secretly lends support.⁹⁰ The Pakistani government's public support of American policies, however, has resulted in Pakistan now being targeted as well. The evolution of these Pakistani-based groups suggests that they have begun to assert more control over the rural, loosely governed regions of Pakistan where they have historically been based. Traditionally managed by Pakistan's Intra-Services Intelligence (ISI), many of the violent groups are now asserting their independence and finding alternate sources of support. The groups are now controlling their local areas, while resisting Pakistan's attempts to establish Islamabad's authority.

⁹⁰ The South Asia Terrorism Portal identifies twelve "domestic" organizations inside Pakistan as well as thirty-two "transnational" groups. This chapter will refer to all of these as "militant organizations/groups." Full list is available at http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/terroristoutfits/group_list.htm.

This burgeoning insurgency poses a serious danger to the nuclear state of Pakistan. If the ISI has lost control of the militant groups that it helped create, Pakistan may suffer a crisis that will have repercussions across central Asia.

C. THE KASHMIR PROBLEM

Contention over Kashmir began with the separation of India and Pakistan from the former British Empire following World War II. Kashmir acceded into the Indian Union in 1947. The accession was not accepted by Pakistan, who felt that the large number of Muslims inside the state warranted Kashmir becoming part of Pakistan.⁹¹ Both India and Pakistan had interests in Kashmir, which was the largest princely state under the British system prior to 1947. Kashmir was considered strategically important because of its location along the borders of the USSR, China, and Afghanistan. Both India and Pakistan saw possession of Kashmir as essential for establishing defensible borders.⁹²

Kashmiris occupy a place between cultures, and have always felt a gap between themselves and their rulers. The Hindu group known as the Dogras took control of Kashmir under the Treaty of Amritsar in 1846. Kashmir became a state with a Muslim majority population, ruled by a Hindu minority. The Dogras' rule of Kashmir was characterized by discrimination against Kashmiris in general, especially Muslims. Kashmiris were not given the right to keep weapons, while Muslims were heavily taxed, denied access to education, and excluded from state services. Muslims quickly developed a distrust of their Hindu Dogra rulers.⁹³

Kashmir saw the rise of Muslim separatist groups in the 1940s. In 1945, the group Azad Kashmir (Free Kashmir) published a manifesto that committed Kashmiri Muslims to the struggle for a separate homeland and the formation of Pakistan.⁹⁴ Despite the efforts of Kashmiri Muslims and Pakistan, Kashmir still chose to join the Indian Union in

⁹¹ Santhanam K. Sreedhar & Sudhir Saxena Manish, *Jihadis in Jammu and Kashmir: A Portrait Gallery*, London: SAGE Publications, 2003, 20-21.

⁹² Navnita Chadha Behera, *Demystifying Kashmir*, Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institute Press, 2006, 21.

⁹³ Behera, *Demystifying Kashmir*, 14-15.

⁹⁴ *Ibid*, 20.

1947, keeping conditions for the average Kashmiri largely unchanged after India's independence.

Tension remained in Kashmir, with Pakistan and India fighting conventional battles over the territory, but the local independence movement was largely non-violent until the late 1980s. Allegations of fraudulent State Legislative Assembly elections in 1987 helped fuel resentment among many young Kashmiri Muslims, and would eventually begin the era of terrorism in Kashmir. In February 1988, militants founded the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF). On July 31, 1988 militants bombed the Central Telegraph Office and Srinagar Club in the city of Srinagar, marking the beginning of the Muslim terror campaign in Kashmir.⁹⁵

D. PAKISTAN ADOPTS A PROXY

Pakistan saw the opportunity to adopt a new strategy designed to gain control of Kashmir. The new approach would allow Pakistan to inflict pain on India, without risking defeat at the hands of their conventionally superior neighbor. Using the defeat of the USSR in Afghanistan by jihadi militants as a model for Kashmir, Pakistan decided to adopt a proxy war strategy against India. Pakistan, through its intelligence service, the Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), started to assist existing Muslim militant groups, or *tanzeems*, as well as form new ones. Pakistan believed that more groups would aid with operational security and encouraged the split of existing groups. India believes the ISI may have created and sponsored as many as 150 organizations from 1980-1999.⁹⁶ Internally, the ISI saw sponsoring militant groups as a way to temper Pakistan's pro-Iranian Shia populace.⁹⁷

Many Pakistani militant organizations adhere to the Deobandi belief system of Islam, one of the most stringent of the many variations of Islamic belief systems. This system is very close the better-known Wahabism of Saudi Arabia, that Al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations follow. This Islamic belief system dates back to India in

⁹⁵ Sreedhar & Manish, *Jihadis in Jammu and Kashmir*, 23.

⁹⁶ Ibid, 23-25.

⁹⁷ Olivera Roy, *Islamic Radicalism in Afghanistan and Pakistan*, UNHCR WRITENET Paper No 06/2001.

1867. Deobandis initially founded their own madrassas to counter European influence in education and still believe in a strict adherence to Islamic Law. Deobandis are considered the most conservative and anti-western Sunni sect in Pakistan.⁹⁸ Many Deobandi groups believe that Kashmir is less a territorial dispute between India and Pakistan, and more a war between the ideologies of Islam and that of all non-believers.⁹⁹ This ideological shift, however, brought groups farther away from the native Kashmiris for whom they claimed to be fighting. This changed the problem from Indian occupation of Kashmir to the broader issue of non-Muslims occupying Islamic lands. It expanded the enemy from India to all non-believers. The context shifted as well, from the Kashmiri independence movement, to that of Pakistan's larger proxy war aimed at hurting India slowly, now mixed with Al Qaeda's larger war against the West.¹⁰⁰

E. THE CONFLICT EXPANDS OUTSIDE KASHMIR

Groups closely linked to the ISI, like Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT) and Jaish e Muhammad (JeM), initially were primarily involved with Pakistan's proxy war against India inside Kashmir. These groups entered the global arena at the end of 2001 when they participated in the attack on the Indian Parliament buildings in New Delhi. Five terrorists attacked the Parliament buildings with firearms and explosives, killing nine security guards and one civilian.¹⁰¹ This attack brought India and Pakistan to the brink of war in Kashmir, with one million troops being deployed to the border between India and Pakistan for six months. The attack on the Indian Parliament changed international perceptions about the conflict in Kashmir from a fight for popular self-determination to an issue of international terrorism.¹⁰² The attack resulted in U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell adding LeT and JeM to the list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations, bringing them onto radars in America and worldwide. Pakistani President Musharraf outlawed the

⁹⁸ Daniel Billquist & Jason Colbert, *Madrassas and Militancy*, NPS Thesis, December 2006, 20.

⁹⁹ Behera, *Demystifying Kashmir*, 156-157.

¹⁰⁰ Professor Michael Freeman, "Five Things That Ideologies Do," Class Lecture Notes taken at Naval Postgraduate School, 7 NOV 11.

¹⁰¹ Congressional Research Service Report RL32223, "Foreign Terrorist Organizations," Washington, D.C.: The Library of Congress, 40-41.

¹⁰² Behera, *Demystifying Kashmir*, 88, 258.

groups formally in January 2002 and placed the JeM leader Masood Azhar under house arrest for twelve months.¹⁰³ The detention of Azhar by Pakistan had less to do with JeM's involvement in the New Delhi attacks, and more to do with Azhar's direct involvement in the January 2002 murder of the Wall Street Journal correspondent Daniel Pearl in Pakistan.¹⁰⁴ Following the brutal murder of a U.S. citizen, Pakistan could not afford to not take this demonstrative action.

Since most militant groups claiming to fight for Kashmiri independence operate out of Pakistan, and are significantly controlled by the ISI, they are affected more by what happens in Pakistan than in Kashmir. Sponsorship by Pakistan, and the fact that most recruits come from outside Kashmir, has caused many groups to lose their indigenous character and has alienated many Kashmiris. The Kashmiris are generally more tied to the Sufi traditions of Islam than the fundamentalist Deobandi belief system. This has caused many native Kashmiris to reject the puritanical religious philosophy of many militant groups. Kashmiris have also withdrawn their support for jihadi groups due to their brutality, like the beheading of enemies and the mutilating of their bodies.¹⁰⁵

As a result of this loss of support, Pakistani and other non-Kashmiri mercenaries now make up most of the militant groups fighting in Kashmir.¹⁰⁶ For example, a Pakistani named Faizal Shahzad, who attempted to carry out a car-bomb attack in New York's Times Square in 2010, testified that he learned bomb making techniques in Pakistan where he developed ties to JeM and LeT.¹⁰⁷ Also, two of the suicide bombers involved in the July 2005 attacks on London, Shezad Tanweer and Siddique Khan, had active ties to groups in Pakistan. The reach of their recruiting efforts is well demonstrated by the recent arrest of five young Americans who were captured in the Sargodha district of Punjab who stated they were trying to join either JeM or LeT.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰³ CRS Report, "Foreign Terrorist Organizations," 40.

¹⁰⁴ Sreedhar & Manish, *Jihadis in Jammu and Kashmir*, 31.

¹⁰⁵ Behera, *Demystifying Kashmir*, 245-246.

¹⁰⁶ Sreedhar & Manish, *Jihadis in Jammu and Kashmir*, 25.

¹⁰⁷ Stewart Bell, "Linked Group Declared War on US; Pakistani Militants, Alleged to be connected with Faisal Shahzad," *National Post* (Canada), May 2010, pA17.

¹⁰⁸ Animesh Roul, "Jaish-e-Mohammad's Charity Wing Revitalized Banned Group in Pakistan," *Terrorism Monitor* Vol. IX Issue 41, November 2011, 5.

This demonstrates that while groups similar to LeT and JeM are losing popular support inside Kashmir, they are still actively sending Pakistani men to conduct terrorist attacks outside the Subcontinent.

The support base for militant groups comes mainly from the fundamentalist Muslim community in Pakistan. Organizations conduct regular fundraisers by visiting mosques and Islamic schools. At these fundraisers groups will sell the hides of sacrificed animals. Two financial organizations that are known to fund terrorist operations are the Al Rashid Trust and Al Akhtar Trust.¹⁰⁹ Both of these funds were frozen by the United States government in October 2001 for their shared ties to Al Qaeda.

A large amount of funding for groups like LeT and JeM comes from the Pakistani ISI. It is believed that the ISI sends up to Rs 200 crore or \$45 million USD annually into Kashmir in support of jihadi groups. For example, JeM receives approximately 25% directly from the ISI and the other 40% is filtered from the ISI through various Islamic groups.¹¹⁰

After the banning of certain groups by Pakistan and the freezing of their funds by the United States in 2002, militant leaders quickly adapted and continued to acquire resources. The Al Rahmat Trust, founded in 2001, is officially listed as an educational and religious charity. The Al Rahmat Trust claims to fund approximately 850 homes of jihadi martyrs and families of jihadis currently imprisoned in India and other countries. The Trust carries out open fund raising through legitimate channels and seeks donations for the building of mosques in Pakistan. The Trust's online magazine *Al Qalam* claims that it has built thirteen mosques and has another twenty-four under construction. The Al Rahmat Trust solicits donations to support the households of martyrs and mujahedeen fighters. The U.S. Treasury Department denounced the Trust in November 2010 for being a suspected terrorist front organization. However, during an interview with the Karachi-based *Express Tribune* in the summer of 2011, a militant group leader named

¹⁰⁹ Behera, *Demystifying Kashmir*, 160.

¹¹⁰ Sreedhar and Manish, *Jihadis in Jammu and Kashmir*, 36.

Maulana Asfaq Ahmed stated that the Al Rahmat Trust was actively fundraising in the Punjab and Khyber-Paktunkhwa provinces of Pakistan.¹¹¹

The funding from the Al Rahmat Trust has allowed groups to expand their strategy to providing social services for the local population, and filling a crisis relief role that the local government often cannot fill itself. The large earthquake in 2005 in Azad Kashmir (Pakistani-controlled Kashmir) killed more than 55,000 and created a homeless population of over two million. Initially, the Pakistani Army was concerned that Indian forces would use the earthquake as an opportunity to cross the Line of Control to gain territory, and deployed the majority of Pakistan's forces to strategic positions along the Line of Control's heights. JeM, for example, used its post-Pakistan ban alias Khuddum-al-Islam, under the sponsorship of the Al Rahmat Trust, and deployed thousands of volunteers to aid in recovery efforts, even supplying locals with medical care. Providing this care caused many locals to see the militants as their saviors after the earthquake crisis.¹¹² This action shows an evolution inside militant organizations like JeM, and could point towards a shift in their strategy toward the local population. Continuing to provide essential services could win more sustained support from the Kashmiri populace. This increased support will hamper Pakistan's ability to regain control of areas where militants have asserted themselves.

F. PAKISTAN'S PROXY STRATEGY

It is clear that Pakistan has been deeply involved with militant organizations as part of its proxy war against India in Kashmir. Using jihadi groups, it has developed the organizations into operational arms of its ISI. The groups have always positioned their headquarters inside Pakistan's borders.¹¹³ Pakistan has waged the low-intensity campaign in Kashmir under its nuclear umbrella, and has utilized the militant groups it sponsors very effectively. During the Kashmir confrontation in 2002 for example, Pakistan directed militant groups to dominate the strategic areas along the southern border belts of

¹¹¹ Roul, "Jaish-e-Mohammad's Charity Wing Revitalized Banned Group in Pakistan," 5.

¹¹² Behera, *Demystifying Kashmir*, 188.

¹¹³ Sreedhar & Manish, *Jihdadis in Jammu and Kashmir*, 200.

Kashmir. Pakistan supplied these groups with night vision devices, sniper rifles, mortars, grenade launchers, and sophisticated communications gear. They instructed the irregular fighters to target Indian lines of communications and the Indian Army's rear areas.¹¹⁴ Being able to leverage this kind of control over the irregular fighters provides Pakistan with another operational asset when facing the numerically superior forces of India. This gives Pakistan a good reason to maintain relations with the militant groups inside its borders. The other side of this practice, however is that the ISI has increased the capabilities of the militant groups, making it easier for them to adopt a hybrid warfare model of operations.

The beginning of the Global War on Terror in 2001 caused Pakistan to adopt a dual approach in its support to the jihadi groups in Kashmir. The Pakistani government moved to publically separate itself from many groups like LeT and JeM, adding them to its list of banned organizations. After the 9/11 attacks in America, and following the attack on the Indian Parliament, the ISI was forced to focus on protecting its jihadi groups. The ISI developed a code of conduct for the groups receiving sponsorship, directing them to avoid contact with the media, and to stop making inflammatory statements against the West, especially the United States. The ISI also directed groups to take down their signs on offices in Islamabad and to stop holding rallies in Pakistan. The ISI also attempted to have groups change their organizational names to less military-sounding ones to make it easier for ISI to claim it was supporting political organizations.¹¹⁵ This demonstrates the ISI feels that it is necessary to keep their proxies protected for future utilization. This may not match the Pakistani government's long-term goals for its place in the region and may already be causing serious internal problems.

A few violent groups have tried to make Pakistan's support for American efforts to fight terrorism more costly. President Musharraf gave his reasons for assisting the American efforts in Afghanistan against the Taliban by saying that it would secure Pakistan's strategic assets, safeguard the cause in Kashmir, prevent Pakistan from being

¹¹⁴ Behera, *Demystifying Kashmir*, 91.

¹¹⁵ Arif Jamal, *Shadow War: The Untold Story of Jihad in Kashmir*, New York: Melville House, 231.

declared a terrorist state, and prevent an anti-Pakistani government from coming to power in Kabul.¹¹⁶ This has caused militant groups to actively resist U.S. interests in Pakistan, and to target high-level government members who are viewed as pro-American.¹¹⁷ One group, Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) has even gone so far as to target President Musharraf himself. In December 2003, JeM tried to assassinate Musharraf near Rawalpindi, using information taken from a JeM sympathizer inside the local police force. JeM again attempted to assassinate Musharraf in January 2004. Even after these attempted attacks, JeM and its support group the Al Rahmat Trust are able to publish inside Pakistan with Audit Bureau of Circulation certifications from the Pakistani Ministry of Information and Broadcasting.¹¹⁸ This willingness to attack high-level officials demonstrates future problems for Pakistan posed by the militant groups that it helped create.

G. TROUBLE INSIDE PAKISTAN

Supporting militant jihadi groups in Pakistan to fight India in Kashmir has proven effective only to the extent that India has tied up large amounts of people and resources inside Kashmir. Pakistan's efforts to take Kashmir under Pakistani control however have not been successful. Now Pakistan faces danger from the groups it has formed and supported in its fight against India. While still fighting India in Kashmir, these groups are now also pursuing the goal of turning Pakistan into a more fundamentalist Islamic state. This new objective poses a serious threat to Pakistan itself, as the jihadi groups now resemble a beast that Pakistan can no longer control.¹¹⁹

These militant groups are no longer merely an operational arm of Pakistani policy, they have become more independent and are able to pursue their own goals, despite any objections from the ISI or Pakistani government. These actions have included attacks on Pakistani forces and government officials, as well as attacks in India that threaten the unstable peace between the two nuclear powers. This loss of control of

¹¹⁶ Behera, *Demystifying Kashmir*, 228.

¹¹⁷ Ibid, 92.

¹¹⁸ Roul, "Jaish-e-Mohammad's Charity Wing Revitalized Banned Group in Pakistan," 5.

¹¹⁹ Jessica Stern, "Pakistan's Jihad Culture," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 79 No. 6 (Nov-Dec 2000), 118.

the many militant groups that Pakistan has sponsored poses critical threats to both internal and external security interests.¹²⁰

Internally, groups like the Tehrik-e-Taliban (aka Pakistani Taliban), which the government of Pakistan (the ISI) once supported in Afghanistan against the Soviet Union, now assert control over large tracts of Pakistani territory. Once in control of an area, the groups resist the central government, enforce strict Islamic law, and abet militants fighting against NATO inside Afghanistan.¹²¹ This harms Pakistan internationally, as they are unable to control militants working against NATO interests in Afghanistan. Internally, it demonstrates an irony that groups supported by the ISI to wage an insurgency against the USSR in Afghanistan are now beginning to wage another one against Pakistan itself.

The militant organizations supported by Pakistan now have a history dating back to the 1980s. There are men that have no experience outside of fighting their *jihad*. Even if Kashmir's conflict is resolved, this population of fighters has no aspirations beyond holy war. Since Pakistan is home to many of these groups, it became their new battlefield. The militant's long-standing relationship with the criminal elements of Pakistan increases the threat they currently pose. The jihadis have long utilized criminals to help smuggle supplies and serve as part-time mercenary fighters. Many groups are now deeply intermingled with criminal organizations inside Pakistan. This creates problems for Pakistan and the ISI since they will be able to exert less control over fighters simply looking for profit as opposed to those who may be more sympathetic to ideological or state goals.¹²² This new support system will also allow militant groups to rely less on the ISI, creating less leverage that Pakistan may have in controlling these groups' actions.

More troubling is the fact that Pakistan, so far, has been unable to regain control of the areas that militants have claimed for themselves. These areas are confined to the parts of Pakistan known as the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). As their names suggest, central government control

¹²⁰ Sumit Ganguly & S. Paul Kapur, "The Sorcerer's Apprentice: Islamist Militancy in South Asia," *The Washington Quarterly* (January 2010), 48-49.

¹²¹ Ganguly & Kapur, "The Sorcerer's Apprentice," 53.

¹²² Stern, "Pakistan's Jihad Culture," 121-123.

and an actual administrative or institutional presence by Pakistan has historically been lacking in these areas. Groups naturally took up residence in these rural areas to set up training camps, and support networks. The militant groups found areas in the FATA and NWFP where they could more easily compete with the Pakistani government for control over the population. While the Pakistani government has been relatively successful in using the ISI to support insurgencies since the 1980s, it has proven unsuccessful in combating the insurgencies beginning to develop inside its own borders. Pakistan has lost up 1,500 of the 100,000 soldiers that it has deployed to the FATA and NWFP. While facing constant attack by militant groups in these areas, they are also seeing soldiers become less than willing to fight their fellow tribesmen.¹²³

Unable to stabilize the NWFP and FATA with large conventional formations, the Pakistani government brokered a peace deal with the tribal groups in September 2006. This deal included the stipulations that the Pakistani government would stop conducting attacks against the militants. The militants agreed to stop crossing the Afghani border, and have non-Pakistani fighters leave the country. The Pakistani army vacated its checkpoints and security bases. The tribal leaders agreed to not to form any shadow governments while the Pakistani government promised to honor local traditions and customs when dealing with local issues. As well the Pakistani government agreed to pay condolences for property damage and civilian deaths. These peace accords did not last long in Pakistan, and the army is still struggling to implement a solid counterinsurgency strategy inside the FATA and NWFP.¹²⁴ If unable to establish control, and provide stability inside these regions, the Pakistani government will face a situation where the parallel states run by the militant groups may become too strong to dislodge without foreign assistance. The historic independence of the tribal population, combined with the insurgent know-how of the militant groups that Pakistan helped create and support, has the potential to create a situation that the Pakistani government is not capable of solving. Given Pakistan's proximity to troubled regions in India and China, as well as central

¹²³ Brig Kurmeet Kanwal (retd), "Losing Ground: Pak Army Strategy in FATA and NWFP," *Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies Issue Brief* (New Delhi), No 84 (October 2008), 1.

¹²⁴ Kanwal, "Losing Ground: Pak Army Strategy," 2-5.

Asian states like Afghanistan, any serious threat to the internal security of nuclear-armed Pakistan could quickly cause a catastrophic international crisis.

Pakistan's proxy strategy against India in Kashmir has been ultimately unsuccessful. India has not ceded any territory in Jammu and Kashmir to anything but the conventional military clashes that have determined the current Line of Control between the two countries. India learned over time how to implement better counterinsurgency strategies inside Kashmir. This combined with the fundamentalist beliefs of the militant groups has turned most of the Kashmiri people against the militant groups and lessened their willingness to support them either actively or inactively. While the ISI has added the tactic of using the drug trade against India in Kashmir, which demonstrates a creative approach to unconventional warfare, it is most likely a last-ditch effort. Pakistan and the ISI will most likely continue their efforts at sustaining the insurgency in Jammu in Kashmir, this will allow them to continue forcing India to commit resources to the problem as Pakistan continues to try and level the playing field with their conventionally superior neighbor.

The very groups formed and supported by Pakistan now pose one of the most dangerous threats to its security. The ISI is beginning to lose control of these irregular militants. By supporting American efforts against militants in Afghanistan, the Pakistani government is now viewed as an enemy by many jihadi groups taking sanctuary inside Pakistan. These groups are now more independent, and able to operate with the support of criminal networks. This alternate support base requires less from the ISI, and allows the militant organizations to ignore any guidance from their former masters. Unless Pakistan is able to more effectively conduct counterinsurgency operations against these groups in the FATA and NWFP, Pakistan may face crisis at the hands of a beast they created.

We make the assumption that Pakistan is somehow unable to deal with the insurgency in the FATA and NWFP. This leads to a notional crisis that requires Pakistan to request U.S. military assistance. This notional scenario guides the use of a design structure matrix (DSM) in Chapter Six to focus on CF-SOF integration against such threats. By developing what tasks are required of both the JTF and JSOTF to counter

emerging hybrid warfare threats in Pakistan; the DSM demonstrates where integration of the different forces would be beneficial, and where it would be detrimental. This functions as a way to demonstrate how planners and senior commanders can identify during campaign planning what operations should be conducted as CF-SOF integrated operations.

VI. ANALYSIS

The previous chapters demonstrate that Chechnya and Pakistan are good representations of possible hybrid warfare scenarios. This chapter utilizes the design structure matrix (DSM) to examine where interdependencies exist between the notional U.S. forces that would be called upon to respond to conflict in these areas. We assume that the force would consist of both a JTF constituting the conventional forces in theater and a JSTOF constituting the special operations force. The overall force would be controlled by a single commander, who along with the JTF and JSTOF commanders, would be required to determine what operations should be conducted with the JTF and JSOTF acting independently of each other, and what operations would require the JTF and JSTOF to combine for integrated operations. The DSM provides this analysis by showing where the tasks of each force will intersect, and demonstrating if there is any benefit to combining CF-SOF efforts to complete specific tasks. While the values assigned in the DSM are subjective in the end, planners should rely on objective assessments of whether integration will yield benefits, make no difference, or cause harm to operations.

A. CHECHNYA

This section focuses on analysis of CF-SOF integration in respect to the notional hybrid warfare scenario that may develop in Chechnya. The notional U.S. commander of the forces sent into a Chechnya intervention will be required to develop a campaign plan. For the purposes of this thesis, we assume that one commander has been appointed to control a JTF, the conventional forces element, and a JSOTF, the special operations forces element. The JTF is assumed to be an Army Corps Headquarters that will control conventional Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) as its operational units. The JSOTF is assumed to be a Special Forces Group Headquarters that will control its organic Special Forces teams as well as Civil Affairs and Military Information Support Operations elements. JTF and JSOTF elements will be required to operate simultaneously in the same environment to establish a security environment free of active violence conducted

by insurgent forces, with U.S. forces successfully withdrawn from the region and host nation security forces able to maintain security independent of U.S. assistance.

The JTF and JSOTF are each assigned an initial list of tasks to accomplish, to be developed into their respective operations plans. The challenge this section examines, is that in a campaign against the hybrid threat seen in Chechnya, where does the commander find benefit in combining his JTF and JSOTF for integrated operations?

The likely tasks assigned to the JTF, drawing on *FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency*, would be as follows:

- Secure the populace
- Isolate the insurgency
- Identify and neutralize political and support infrastructure
- Security Force Assistance (SFA) to Host Nation Security Forces (HNSF)
- Transition control to HNSF
- Employ HNSF with counterinsurgency (COIN) advisors
- Establish local, regional, and national agencies and departments
- Reestablish the justice system
- Support and secure elections
- Assist local government in providing essential services

The likely tasks assigned to the Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) would be as follows:

- Counter Terrorism
- Security Force Assistance to Host Nation Special Operations Forces
- Military Information Support Operations (MISO, formerly PSYOP)
- Civil Affairs
- Intelligence, Special Reconnaissance
- Direct Action
- Counter-Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)

Identifying task intersections (where interdependency) exist and assigning the corresponding values (as outlined in the methods chapter) produces a completed DSM.

For example, looking at the JTF task *Isolate the Insurgency*, we contend that this task is better performed when integrated with the JSOTF tasks of *Counter Terrorism*. Both tasks support separating the insurgent from the population, and alienating those members of the insurgency that utilize terrorist strategies. Therefore, the value of integration at the task intersection is one (1), indicating that integrating CF-SOF for operations would be beneficial. Likewise, looking at the task intersections for the JTF task *Reestablish the Justice System* and the JSOTF task *Counter Terrorism*, conducting integrated operations aligned would not yield greater benefits. Therefore the task intersection here is zero (0), reflecting that integrating CF-SOF operations at this point makes no difference. Examining the remaining JTF and JSOTF tasks in this manner populates the DSM and creates the finished product seen in Figure 4.

Design Structure Matrix (CF-SOF Integration) -Chechnya										
Special Operations Force HQ (_SFG(A))	Conventional Force HQ (_ Corps)									
	Secure the Population	Isolate the Insurgency	ID and Neutralize Political and Support Infrastructure	SFA to HN6 F	Transition control to HN6 F	Employ HN6 F with COIN Advisors	Est. local regional agencies and departments	Reestablish Justice System	Support and Secure elections	Essential Services
	Counter-Terrorism	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
	SFA to HN6 F	0	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0
	MISO	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
	CA	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	1
	Intel (Special Recon)	0	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	0
	Direct Action	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Counter-Proliferation (WMD)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Figure 4. Design Structure Matrix for Chechnya Case Study

B. SUMMARY

The DSM applied to the Chechen scenario demonstrates several conclusions concerning the interrelated nature of the task list for both the JTF and JSOTF. First, the DSM allows planners to identify which organization should assume primary responsibility for planning specific campaign tasks. Second, planners can determine the manner, and the amount of integration required for each task. In this scenario, there are several conventional force tasks that require supporting efforts from the special operations forces. Alternatively, there are several conventional force tasks that play a supporting role to a primary Special Operations task. These relationships are highlighted in the DSM by the vertical or horizontal alignment of the clusters. A horizontal cluster suggests that the special operations task would be supported by the conventional forces tasks that lie along the vertical axis. In the Chechnya DSM, task intersections where interdependency exists, and integration is beneficial were identified:

- Integration is beneficial for the JTF tasks of *Isolate the Insurgency* and *Identify and Neutralize Political and Support Infrastructure*, with the JSOTF's *Counter Terrorism*, *SFA to HN SOF*, *MISO*, *CA*, *Special Reconnaissance*, and *Direct Action efforts*. As the JTF works to isolate the insurgency from the population and dismantle its support networks, coordinating efforts for the identified JTF and JSOTF tasks can prove critical. The vertical alignment of these clusters suggests that the JSOTF's efforts will be supporting the JTF's in these specific cases.
- Integrated operations are beneficial for the JSOTF task of *Security Force Assistance to HN SOF* and the JTF tasks of *Isolate the Insurgency*, *Identify and Neutralize Political and Support Infrastructure*, *Security Force Assistance to HN Security Forces (HNSF)*, *Transition Control to HNSF*, and *Employ HNSF with COIN Advisors*. As the JSOTF works to conduct SFA focused on Chechen SOF elements, the JTF's efforts focused on SFA to other Chechen security forces must be integrated to support the JSOTF's advisory effort.
- Integration is beneficial for the JSOTF's *Civil Affairs* efforts and the JTF's tasks of *Isolate the Insurgency*, *Identify and Neutralize Political and Support Infrastructure*, *Establish Local, Regional Agencies and Departments*, *Reestablish the Justice System*, *Support Secure Elections*, and *Assist the Local Government in Providing Essential Services*. Integration of these tasks will ensure that all tasks aimed at creating a sustainable Chechen government, supported by its people, are conducted with unity of effort. The horizontal alignment of this cluster suggests that

the JSOTF would be the supported unit, with these specific JTF tasks supporting its efforts.

C. PAKISTAN

In the theoretical, illustrative case of Pakistan asking for U.S. military assistance for its counterinsurgency efforts in the North West Frontier Province and Federally Administered Tribal Areas, there would be a requirement for the JTF and JSOTF to develop campaign plans and decide where forces can conduct integrated operations for optimal effect. The notional U.S. commander of the forces sent into a Pakistani intervention will be required to develop a campaign plan. Assumptions about the composition of the JTF and JSOTF have not changed from those for the Chechen scenario. JTF and JSOTF elements will be required to operate simultaneously in the same environment to accomplish U.S. objectives in the region. U.S. objectives in this case will be the establishment of security in the NWFP and FATA under the control of the Pakistani government, free of active violence conducted by insurgent forces, with U.S. forces successfully withdrawn from the region and Pakistani security forces able to maintain security independent of U.S. assistance. The assistance to Pakistan would most likely focus on counterterror efforts and security force assistance to local forces conducting counterinsurgency operations.

The JTF and JSOTF will each be assigned an initial list of tasks to accomplish, which would later be developed into their respective operations plans. The challenge this section examines, is that in a campaign against an opponent that employs hybrid warfare in Pakistan, where does the commander find benefit in combining his JTF and JSOTF for integrated operations?

The likely tasks assigned to the Joint Task Force (JTF), drawing on *FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency*, would be as follows:

- Secure the populace
- Isolate the insurgency
- Identify and neutralize political and support infrastructure
- Security Force Assistance to Host Nation Security Forces (HNSF)
- Employ HNSF with counterinsurgency (COIN) advisors

- Establish local, regional, and national agencies and departments
- Assist local government in providing essential services.

The likely tasks assigned to the Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) would be as follows:

- Counter Terrorism
- Security Force Assistance to Host Nation Special Operations Forces
- Military Information Support Operations (MISO, formerly PSYOP)
- Civil Affairs
- Intelligence, Special Reconnaissance
- Direct Action
- Counter-Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)

Identifying task intersections (where interdependency) exists and assigning the corresponding values (as outlined in the methods chapter) produces a completed DSM. For example, looking at the JTF task *Isolate the Insurgency*, we contend that this task is better performed when integrated with the JSOTF tasks of *Military Information Support Operations*, *Civil Affairs*, and *Direct Action*. All of these tasks support separating the insurgent from the population. Therefore, the value of integration at these task intersections is one (1), indicating that integrating CF-SOF for operations would be beneficial. Looking at the other task intersections for the JTF task *Isolate the Insurgency*, conducting integrated operations aligned with the remaining JSOTF tasks would not yield greater benefits. Therefore the rest of the task intersections in this column are zeros (0), indicating that integrating CF-SOF operations at these points makes no difference. This is not to say the remaining JSOTF tasks will not in some way support efforts at isolating the insurgency, only that CF-SOF integrated operations would not yield better results. Examining the remaining JTF and JSOTF tasks in this manner populates the DSM and creates the finished product seen in Figure 5.

Design Structure Matrix (CF-SOF Integration) -Pakistan							
Special Operations Force HQ (_SFG(A))	Conventional Force HQ (_ Corps)						
	Secure the Populace	Isolate the Insurgency	ID and Neutralize Political and Support Infrastructure	SFA to HNSF	Employ HNSF with COIN Advisors	Est. local, regional agencies and departments	Essential Services
	Counter-Terrorism	0	0	1	0	0	0
	SFA to HN SOF	0	0	0	1	1	0
	MISO	0	1	1	0	0	1
	CA	0	1	1	0	0	1
	Intel (Special Recon)	0	0	1	0	0	0
	Direct Action	0	1	1	1	1	0
	Counter-Proliferation (WMD)	0	0	1	0	1	0

Figure 5. Design Structure Matrix for Pakistan Case Study

From this completed DSM, we make the following conclusions regarding CF-SOF integration in the notional Pakistan campaign:

- Integration is most beneficial with the JTF task of *Identify and neutralize political and support infrastructure* being supported by the JSOTF efforts of *MISO*, *CA*, *Special Reconnaissance*, *Direct Action*, and *Counter-proliferation*. The vertical alignment of this cluster suggests that the JTF would be the supported unit for this task while the JSTOF's specified efforts function in a supporting role.
- Integrated operations are beneficial with when conducted for the JSTOF task of *Security Force Assistance to host nation SOF* and the JTF tasks of *Security Force Assistance to HNSF* and *Employ HNSF with counterinsurgency advisors*. The horizontal alignment of this cluster suggests the JSTOF would be lead for Security Force Assistance efforts as the supported unit, with the JTF's efforts acting in a supporting role.
- Integrated efforts are beneficial when the JSOTF task of *Direct Action* is supported by the JTF tasks of *Isolate the insurgency*, *identify and*

neutralize political and support infrastructure, Security Force Assistance to HNSF, and Employ HNSF with counterinsurgency advisors.

- The JTF task of *Employ HNSF with COIN advisors* benefits when integrated with the JSOTF's *SFA to host nation SOF, Direct Action, and Counter-proliferation* operations.
- The JTF task of *Establish local, regional, and national agencies and departments* should be integrated with the JSOTF *Civil Affairs* and *MISO* operations
- The JSOTF *Civil Affairs* efforts are benefitted by integrating with the JTF tasks of *Establish local, regional, and national agencies and departments*, and *Assist local government in providing essential services*.

D. SUMMARY

The analysis utilizing the DSM allows the senior commander, with authority over both the JTF and JSOTF, to identify where integrated operations are best conducted. It also allows the commander to visualize where keeping his forces independent is more effective. The commander must designate which element is the *supported* and which is the *supporting* unit for each integrated effort. Identifying what operations will be integrated early allows respective planners from the JTF and JSOTF to focus their efforts, as opposed to developing separate campaign plans, and tasking tactical units to integrate when a need is identified. Staffs can then develop plans for completing specific tasks as integrated efforts with the JTF and JSOTF combined very early in the process. This early combination of staffs allows more time for planning both those tasks that require integration, and those that each force can accomplish independently.

One mechanism for accomplishing this integration during planning would be to form a temporary "integrated operations group" inside each element's functional planning cell. These JTF-JSOTF integration cells would form to accomplish planning for tasks identified as requiring integration, complete operations planning for these tasks, and then re-form once operations begin and plans must be updated.

The design structure matrix is a useful planning tool for determining when circumstances require integrated efforts between conventional and special operations forces. Also importantly, it identifies areas where integration is not necessary, or when it will hinder operational efforts. Its ease of use allows planners to quickly isolate those

areas where conventional and special operations forces in the notional situations for Chechnya and Pakistan benefit from clear lines of responsibility—and models future solutions for hybrid warfare.

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VII. CONCLUSION

As the international security environment evolves, the distinction between traditional forms of warfare will continue to converge as the number of weak, failing, or corrupt states increase. In such cases, future adversaries will begin to develop a hybrid approach to warfare. Additionally, non-state actors will gain greater access to technologically advanced weapons and equipment in weak or failing states. For these reasons, we believe the U.S. military will face increasingly complex challenges in future operating environments. In hybrid warfare, adversaries will attempt to blend conventional and unconventional capabilities to exploit the U.S. military's vulnerabilities. This will challenge the U.S. Army to develop an integrated, multi-purpose force capable of conducting operating across the spectrum of operations. To accomplish this, the Army must develop better ways to integrate and synchronize conventional and special operations forces on the battlefield.

Current doctrine focuses on three approaches to integrating conventional and special operations forces: operations, command relationships, and liaison elements. JP 3-05 highlights the importance of a combined effort between conventional and special operations forces during the planning and execution of operations. Similarly, current doctrine emphasizes the importance of designating a single commander and staff that is representative of each unit within the task force. Liaison elements are the most common approach to integration. However, these elements are not full-time planners and do not remove the need to conduct staff to staff coordination. More importantly, liaisons do not have the authority to make decisions without approval from their command element. We suggest that in the future, conventional and special operations forces integration should be addressed with the following tenets in mind:

- integration should be determined by the task, not the unit
- integrated operations require a dedicated staff at the JTF level
- the supported/supporting command relationship is most appropriate and should be determined by task

The design structure matrix (DSM) is a tool that the commander and his staff can use to ensure the efforts of conventional and special operations forces are effectively integrated. The DSM can be first used to identify where interdependency would be beneficial. It also highlights tasks in which integration is not required or can be detrimental to mission accomplishment. Second, the DSM can determine areas in which an integrating cell is required. These cells may range from weekly working groups, liaison elements, and semi-permanent “integration” cells. Finally, the JTF commander can use the DSM to determine the supported and supporting relationships between tasks by each unit. This allows the JTF commander to assign primary responsibility for a line of effort to a specific element.

Prior to the Global War on Terror, the primary responsibility for operational tasks was clearly delineated between conventional and special operations forces. However, conditions forced the Army to implement a more adaptive approach to traditional combat roles and organizational structures due to the complexity of the operating environments in Afghanistan and Iraq. As the international security environment continues to become increasingly complex, it remains a necessity that the U.S. Army be able to effectively integrate conventional and special operations forces in the future. It should be remembered that the goal is not to form indistinguishable organizations, but to maximize the synergy that can be achieved by leveraging the unique capabilities of each type of force. A useful tool for success is the DSM, which allows a commander to integrate his forces where high levels of interdependency exist, and to separate forces where they do not.

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