Modeling Conflict between China and the United States
Abstract
As the United States exits Iraq and Afghanistan, it must begin the long process of preparing for future challenges. There is considerable pressure on policy makers within the Congress and the Department of Defense (DoD) to make strategy and force structure decisions with costs in mind. A key question is what will future conflict look like and how many resources should be committed to large conventional forces. To effectively analyze the desired size and characteristics of tomorrow's military, we must take a hard look at feasible, real-world contingencies, one of which could be conflict with China. This thesis examines the strengths and weaknesses of the United States' and China's military forces, and uses Game Theory to model conflict between the two countries using the Correlates of War data to measure national power. The central question that drives this study is as follows: Can the United States "win" a conventional war against China, and, if not, are there offensive irregular warfare (IW) activities that can deter China while being advantageous to the United States? Modeling can provide input to policy makers by providing insight into three questions: (1) How would the United States fare in a conventional war with China?; (2) Would the United States fare better using IW against China?; and (3) Is there a combination of conventional force, IW, and diplomacy that can achieve U.S. strategic objectives? The models in this study are meant to provide mathematical "insights" into whether IW is an essential element of U.S. national strategy.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Dec 01, 2012
- Accession Number
- ADA574562
Entities
People
- Phil W. Reynolds
Organizations
- Naval Postgraduate School