Who Takes the Blame? The Strategic Effects of Collateral Damage

Abstract

Can civilians caught in civil wars reward and punish armed actors for their behavior? If so, do armed actors reap strategic benefits from treating civilians well and pay for treating them poorly? Using precise geo-coded data on violence in Iraq from 2004 through the beginning of 2009, we show that both sides are punished for the collateral damage they inflict. Coalition killings of civilians predict higher subsequent levels of insurgent attacks directed against Coalition forces while insurgent killings of civilians predict fewer such attacks in subsequent periods. The effect is short term, lasting less than four weeks, and is strongest in mixed districts and highly urban districts. Our findings have strong policy implications, provide support for the argument that information civilians share with government forces and their allies is a key constraint on insurgent violence, and suggest that theories of intrastate violence must account for civilian agency.

Open PDF

Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
Nov 03, 2010
Accession Number
ADA576241

Entities

People

  • Jacob N. Shapiro
  • Luke N. Condra

Organizations

  • Princeton University

Tags

Communities of Interest

  • Energy and Power Technologies
  • Human Systems
  • Weapons Technologies

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Civil War
  • Collateral Damage
  • Descriptive Analytics
  • Ethnic Groups
  • Governments
  • Indirect Fire
  • Information Science
  • International Organizations
  • Law
  • Political Science
  • Sectarian Violence
  • Terrorism
  • Terrorists
  • Urban Areas
  • Violence
  • Warfare
  • Weapons Effects

Fields of Study

  • History

Readers

  • Political Violence and Terrorism Studies.
  • Systems Analysis and Design