

**Democratic Values and Support for Militant Politics:
Evidence from a National Survey of Pakistan***

C. Christine Fair, Georgetown University
Neil Malhotra, Stanford University
Jacob N. Shapiro, Princeton University

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Abstract

A longstanding research tradition on political culture argues that greater support for core liberal values leads to a rejection of destructive political activities and reduced support for violent politics. In this vein, many contemporary analysts of security policy contend that a lack of democratic values in the Middle East promotes the development of violent political organizations. Unfortunately, there have been few direct tests of the hypothesis that an individual's rejection of democratic values correlates with support for militant groups. We conduct such a test in Pakistan using an original 6,000-person provincially-representative survey. We find that strong supporters of democratic values are actually *more* supportive of militant groups and that this relationship is strongest among those who believe that Muslim rights and sovereignty are being violated in Kashmir. This is consistent with the context of Pakistani politics, where many militant groups use the principle of *aẓādi* (i.e. freedom and self-determination) to justify their actions. These results challenge the conventional wisdom about the roots of militancy and underscore the importance of understanding how local context mediates the influence of civic culture on political stability and violence.

A longstanding research tradition on political culture suggests that greater mass support for core liberal democratic values leads to a rejection of destructive political activities (Kirwin and Cho 2009) and produces a wide range of benefits including resistance to autocracy (Gibson 1997), durability of democratic institutions (Dalton 1994; Persson and Tabbellini 2009), better governance (Almond and Verba 1963), and economic growth (Huntington 1984). Drawing on this tradition, a major tenet of U.S. foreign policy under the Bush administration—one which still influences Obama administration policy—is that “exporting democracy” to regions of the world where it is deficient will reduce support for violent political activity such as terrorism (see e.g. National Security Council 2006; Hamid and Brooke 2010). Part of the logic underlying this proposition is the implicit assumption that support for militant associations is linked to non-democratic attitudes, an especially relevant association in the Islamist context where groups often espouse anti-democratic ideologies. What has been missing from this discussion is individual-level data empirically assessing whether support for democratic values is actually correlated with the rejection of violent political organizations.

A thoughtful reflection on the claims made by many militant groups over the last fifty years, and on the nature of competition between governments and militant groups in some regions, suggests that theories about the palliative role of democratic values need to take political context into careful consideration. Beginning at least with the American Revolution, there has been no shortage of political movements that have rallied their followers to kill, and to risk death, in the name of freedom, democratic representation, and other liberal democratic values. In present day South Asia and the Middle East, many militant groups claim to be defending freedom, fighting for self-representation, and mobilizing against what they perceive to be corrupt governments. Moreover, the populations from which these varied militant groups draw support appear to believe these claims. Thus, support for liberal democratic values may actually be *positively* correlated with support

for militancy, particularly among individuals who believe key factual claims these groups make about the political environment.

We collect and analyze survey data from Pakistan to test the hypothesis that support for core democratic values is associated with a rejection of violent political organizations.¹ We focus on one type of violent organization, Islamist militant groups, because in Pakistan many of these groups justify their actions with appeals to narratives of freedom and self-determination. Studying support for such groups is therefore particularly useful for testing whether the correlation between democratic values and support depends on beliefs about what groups are trying to achieve.² Our original 6,000-person survey is representative of adults in each of Pakistan’s four main provinces: Punjab, Sindh, Khyber-Pakhtunkwa (KPK), and Balochistan. It is the first to: (1) measure affect towards a range of specific militant organizations within one country; (2) measure beliefs about the importance of core democratic values; and (3) be representative of both rural and urban regions of each of the four normally-administered provinces of Pakistan (Punjab, Sindh, Balochistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa).³

To measure support for militant groups we employ an “endorsement experiment,” which has several advantages in this unique survey environment. First and foremost, this technique minimizes risk to both enumerators and respondents alike. This concern is paramount. Important as it is to understand the empirical underpinnings of popular support for militancy, researchers have a duty under human subjects protocols to minimize risk to all research participants. Employing survey techniques that are empirically robust while minimizing risk will become even more important for

¹ In this paper, we focus on the relationship between democratic values and support for militant groups, not support for the act of committing violence. This is the more politically-relevant dependent variable, since each of the groups relies on mass-level support to function.

² While Pakistan hosts ethno-nationalist insurgencies (e.g. the Baloch, Sindhi, and Mohajir mobilizations), we limit our interest to those groups that are explicitly Islamist in their objectives. Equally important, while there are many political Islamist parties in Pakistan, we restrict our focus to those Islamist groups that perpetrate violence and operate outside the formal political system.

³ We did not field the survey in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), Azad Kashmir, or Gilgit-Baltistan, all of which are administered under a different legal structure than the rest of the country.

future research in Pakistan, as the country's insecurity is unlikely to abate any time soon. Our measurement technique may therefore be of interest to other scholars seeking to conduct sensitive research in dangerous areas.

Second, this approach also mitigates item non-response and social desirability bias, which plague surveys on sensitive topics.⁴ While our endorsement experiment overcomes these safety and empirical issues, it does so at the cost of precision about the variable being measured.⁵ Given the prevailing conditions in Pakistan, we believe this is a tradeoff that must be made in order to study specific militant organizations, particularly in rural and economically underdeveloped areas.

As described below, we measure differences in support for policies unrelated to Islamist militancy between two randomly assigned groups. One group was told only about the policy; the other was told that a militant organization supports the policy. This technique reveals how attitudes towards policies change as a consequence of their association with an Islamist militant group, and is thus an indirect measure of support for the group. In contrast to a direct measure, the endorsement experiment mitigates non-response and social desirability concerns since respondents are reacting to the policy and not to the group itself. By asking respondents about multiple policy issues and randomizing the pairing of issue with militant groups, we can identify both average attitudes towards Islamist militancy and support for specific organizations in ways that are unlikely to be biased by the details of any specific policy.

Using this approach, we find that support for a set of liberal democratic values—property rights, free speech, independent courts, the ability of citizens to elect representatives, a separation of civilian and military power, and freedom of assembly—is positively related to support for militancy,

⁴ Work that suffers from these issues includes Shapiro and Fair (2010); Fair et al. (2008); WorldPublicOpinion.org (2009a, b); and the Pew Global Attitudes Project (Pew Research Center 2002, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, and 2008). For a full discussion of the various challenges with surveys in Pakistan, see Fair et al. (2010).

⁵ This, however, is an inescapable trade-off when studying sensitive political attitudes in large-scale surveys. Other solutions to the problem include list experiments (see e.g. Glynn 2009) and randomized response methods (see e.g. Gingerich 2010), both of which have their own inferential limitations.

as measured through the endorsement effect. This result at first seems unexpected, but makes sense once one takes the political context into account. One of the most powerful tropes employed by militant groups in Pakistan is the notion of *azadi*, which has a rich and important history in South Asia. The word, found in Urdu and several other South Asian languages, came to prominence during the anti-Colonial movement against the British Raj and is variously translated as “freedom,” “independence,” or “self-determination.” Azadi also implies decolonization and freedom from tyranny and occupation. Militant Kashmiri groups argue that India oppresses Kashmiris. Similarly, the Taliban contends that the foreign occupiers and their collaborators persecute the Afghans. These groups also stress the Kashmiris’ and Afghans’ lack of access to democratic institutions for redress of grievances and use of extra-judicial violence by the occupiers. Thus while azadi is not isomorphic with democracy, it taps a set of values that are closely linked to liberal democratic concepts. This rhetoric of azadi likely explains why support for such values is associated with a 4-5 percentage point increase in the endorsement effect, nearly as large as the effect on support for social policies of moving from the bottom to the top income group.

Two patterns in the data confirm this interpretation. First, the militant groups which appeal most strongly to those who support core liberal democratic values are those most associated with the azadi narrative (the Afghan Taliban and Kashmiri groups). The correlation between democratic values and the endorsement effect is approximately 60% larger for these two groups than for other organizations, though the difference is not statistically significant at conventional levels. More strikingly, the relationship between the endorsement effect and democratic values is more than three times as large (12 percentage points) among respondents who believe that Muslim rights and sovereignty are being violated in Kashmir, a statistically significant and substantively large difference. Among respondents who do not share these beliefs about the nature of the conflict in these regions, there is a statistically insignificant relationship between support for democratic principles and

support for militant organizations. Supporters of democratic values, in other words, are more likely to favor militant groups if they believe that those militants are fighting against foreign forces denying Muslims their right to azadi.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The first section provides a brief background on militant groups in Pakistan, with a focus on the political claims they make. Next, we provide a theoretical basis for our hypotheses, centered around the concept of azadi. We then describe our survey in detail, including how we measure the core dependent and independent variables. Subsequently, we present our methods of analysis. We conclude by discussing the results, the challenges of survey research on this issue, and implications for the study of political violence as well as for foreign policy.

Islamist Militancy in Pakistan

The contemporary landscape of Islamist militancy in Pakistan is populated by an array of Islamist militant groups, sometimes called *tanzeems*. (This paper does not deal with groups that principally mobilize violence around ethno-nationalist concerns.) The members of one cluster of militant groups, the “sectarian tanzeems” such as Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) and Sipah-e-Sahaba-e-Pakistan (SSP), have long-targeted Shia and Ahmediyas, and, in recent years, members of Pakistan’s varied Sufi sects (often referred to as *Barelhis*). A second cluster of groups are those that call themselves “Kashmiri tanzeems” because they claim to operate on behalf of Kashmiris and other Muslims living on Indian territory. These groups aim to “liberate” India’s Muslims from the supposed oppression of the Hindu-dominated Indian state.

The Afghan Taliban are based in Pakistan and claim to be resisting Western occupation of their country in an effort to restore their own government, which was toppled in December 2001. Pakistan has also played host to several al-Qa’ida activists, including Osama Bin Laden, who was

killed there in May 2011 (Fair 2011a; Hussain 2011; Khan 2011; Haqqani 2005). Finally, after the commencement of Pakistan's selective participation in the U.S. war on terror in 2001, some of Pakistan's erstwhile Islamist militant proxies reorganized and began to attack the state (Fair 2011a). By late 2007, several of these groups had coalesced under the banner of the Tehreek-e-Taliban-e-Pakistan (TTP), or Pakistani Taliban.

Among the five clusters of Islamist militant groups described above (sectarian tanzeems, Kashmiri tanzeems, the Afghan Taliban, al-Qa'ida, and the Pakistani Taliban), narratives of azadi are most prominent among the Kashmiri tanzeems and the Afghan Taliban.⁶ The Pakistani state has long promoted the goals of both of these groups in its educational institutions, military indoctrination and training procedures, and print and electronic media (Fair 2011a). Pakistani civilian and military leadership alike refer to "Kashmir Tanzeems" as "freedom fighters," who are struggling to liberate India's Muslim population, both in Kashmir and beyond (Fair 2011a; Jalal 2008; Haqqani 2005; Hussain 2005). These groups have appealed to azadi since their inception in the late 1980s.

Lashkar-e-Taiba (also known as Jamaat-ud-Dawa) is one of the most prominent Kashmiri tanzeems, with deep ties to the Pakistani state. In the group's manifesto, *Hum Kyon Jihad Kar Rahe Hain* (Why Are We Waging Jihad), the anonymous author mobilizes activists to undertake jihad by asking:

Is there any place in this world today where Muslims are not suffering? Are there not cries for help from the downtrodden Muslim men, women and children in Indian Kashmir, the Philippines, Chechnya, China, Russia, Bosnia among other places, all pleading to be saved from their torments? (Jamaat-ud-Dawa 2004, 13. Authors' translation).

Elsewhere in the treatise the author justifies jihad in India by recounting the various abuses perpetrated by the Indian government in Kashmir and the general abuse of Muslims throughout India.

⁶ Ironically, these groups oppose indigenous organizations in Indian-administered Kashmir which seek resolution through politics and frame their opposition without any reference to Islam (e.g. the Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front).

The Afghan Taliban focuses on liberating Afghanistan from Western occupation and from the current Afghan leadership, which enables this occupation. The Taliban's central message is that the coalition aims "to occupy Afghanistan and destroy Islam." The message of liberating Afghans from occupation is plausible because many Afghans have never heard of the September 11, 2001 attacks that precipitated the war and simply do not understand why Americans and others are trying to run their country (Lujan 2012). In 2009, the Taliban issued a statement on the eighth anniversary of the government's fall in which they depicted themselves as "nationalist actors upholding the undeniable Islamic right to self-defense....their objectives [were] defined as 'independence, Islamic social justice, human dignity and national identity'" (cited in Brahimi 2010, 5).

Equally important, pro-Afghan Taliban commentators in Pakistan legitimize the efforts of the Afghan Taliban in terms of *azadi* for Afghans. Such commentators argue that the "Afghan Taliban have grassroots support in the south and southeast, and the movement is a reaction to the lack of Pashtun representation...The Afghan Taliban are a genuine resistance force fighting an ideological war against foreign invasion" (Daiyar 2012). While Pakistani commentators have asserted the legitimacy of the Taliban government since the mid-1990s, the Afghan Taliban's claims to be liberating Afghanistan from occupation originated with the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001 but obviously intensified after 2005, when they launched a full-fledged insurgency to oust the United States and NATO forces from Afghanistan.

This overview is necessarily simplistic, as these groups differ in their sectarian commitments, relationship with Pakistan's military and intelligence agencies, operational modes, and depth of ties to Pakistan's various religious and mainstream parties (*inter alia* Fair 2011a; Haqqani 2005; Hussain 2005). For a more detailed discussion, see Online Appendix A.

Theoretical Overview: The Concept of *Azadi*

Understanding the concept of azadi, for which many Islamist militant groups claim to be fighting, is required to make sense of the politics of militancy in Pakistan. Azadi literally means freedom in Urdu (as well as in Hindi, Dari, Persian, Pashto, and other related languages), with explicit reference to the political self-determination of a specific group of people. However, it also refers to the combination of freedom and self-determination at the level of a polity (e.g., and especially, Afghans or Kashmiris). As noted earlier, this concept is redolent of, but not isomorphic with, what we might term “democracy.” Azadi fundamentally conveys a sense that politics should be organized by and answerable to the groups seeking freedom rather than the government or military forces (foreign or domestic) which govern these populations against their will.

During the period of British colonization, azadi referred to freedom from the oppressive and exploitative British occupation and an assertion of Indian self-rule (where “Indian” refers to the indigenous population within the territorial dominion of the British Raj). Since partition of the sub-continent in 1947, the concept of azadi has been used by a variety of separatist groups to assert sub-national autonomy and/or freedom in both post-partition India and Pakistan, and thus azadi may also be used to legitimize secession (as was the case in East Pakistan prior to the 1971 civil war which resulted in the emergence of an independent Bangladesh).

The Pakistani state has long used Islamist militants as proxies to advance Pakistan’s interests by conducting attacks in Indian Kashmir, India at large, and Afghanistan (Fair 2011a). The Kashmiri organizations and the Afghan Taliban employ the concept of azadi to mobilize support for their actions, in part by assembling long lists of oppressive activities by the Indian or Afghan states in an effort to undermine any claims that these governments are legitimate. Legitimate governments, after all, do not deny citizens access to rule of law and basic civil liberties. They then demand that the target regimes (India or NATO-occupied Afghanistan) “de-colonize” and grant their subjects the right of self-determination.

With respect to Kashmir, the narrative of attaining *azadi* or freedom for Muslim Kashmiris living under Indian (e.g. “Hindu”) oppression is crucially important in Pakistani domestic politics and society.⁷ Pakistan-administered Kashmir is called “Azad Kashmir”⁸ (Free Kashmir) while that under India’s administration is called “Maqbuza Kashmir” (Occupied Kashmir) and reports of the Indian state’s abuses and other missteps in Kashmir appear daily in the Pakistani media. Pakistan’s leaders, civilian and military alike, refer to the militant groups which claim to fight on behalf of Kashmir’s freedom as “freedom fighters” rather than terrorists. Each year on February 5, Pakistan celebrates Kashmir Day with demonstrations in Azad Kashmir and elsewhere to show solidarity with Kashmiris living under Indian “occupation.” Pakistanis driving to Azad Kashmir do so on the “Srinagar Highway,” named for the capital of Maqbuza Kashmir. Pakistan’s cities are strewn with public commemorations and memorials of Kashmir, and much of Pakistan’s leadership (e.g. the Sharifs of the Pakistan Muslim League) are Kashmiri. Many products, such as cooking oil, are sold and marketed under the brand name “Kashmir.”

The notion of *azadi* also applies to Afghanistan in Pakistani discourse, albeit much less intensely. In the 1980s, the mujahideen were mobilized to free the Afghans from the secular Soviet occupation. Throughout the 1990s, Pakistan continued to justify its involvement and that of its so-called “mujahideen proxies” in Afghanistan by arguing that it was “liberating” Afghanistan from vicious warlords enjoying the support of India, Russia, and Iran, among others (Rashid 2000). After the U.S. invasion in 2001, Pakistanis again view Afghanistan as occupied and the Afghan Taliban as

⁷ This is of course an oversimplification. Residents of the disputed area of Jammu and Kashmir under Indian control include Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs, and Buddhists, among others. Since violence erupted there in the late 1980s, there has been considerable ethnic cleansing, with Hindus and Sikhs moving out of the valley of Kashmir to Jammu. Buddhists historically lived in the Leh-Ladakh area and remain there. Currently, the most intense dispute is over the valley of Kashmir, which is dominated by Muslims. The Pakistani claim that India is a “Hindu” state is also deeply problematic, because India is technically a democratic state that, while not secular in the American sense, adheres to a notion of religious equality. Nonetheless, due to the preponderance of Hindus in the security forces, this facile and polemic characterization of “Hindu” oppression is sustainable for many Pakistanis.

⁸ *Azad* is the adjective corresponding to the noun *azadi*.

a legitimate group fighting jihad for the azadi of Afghans. This is not just a Pakistani view. The Afghan Taliban evoke the concept of azadi when they claim that they are fighting not *against* the West, but rather *for* the independence of Afghanistan.⁹ In turn, the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) seeks to undermine the Taliban's use of liberation as a mobilizing ideology; the Dari title of one of its flagship information operations products is: *Sada-e-Azadi* (*D'azadi-e-Ghag* in Pashto, *Voice of Freedom* in English) (ISAF, n.d.). This political context means that concepts of democracy, self-determination, and violent uprising are intertwined in Pakistani culture.

In summary, the term azadi combines both behavioral conceptions of democracy (i.e., freedom from repression) but also institutional characteristics (i.e., procedures for collective choice, self-rule, and justice), suggesting three testable hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1 (H1): *Pakistanis who are more supportive of liberal democratic principles consistent with azadi should be more supportive of militant groups operating from Pakistan.*

Hypothesis 2 (H2): *The relationship posited by H1 should be stronger for groups that employ and are identified with azadi narratives.*

Hypothesis 3 (H3): *The relationship posited by H1 should be strongest among Pakistanis whose beliefs about what the groups are doing maps well onto the azadi narrative.*

Testing these posited relationships is particularly important in this context because Pakistanis remain committed to democratic principles despite their general skepticism about the quality of their democratically-elected leaders. As the contributors to Norris (1999) pointed out, "critical citizens" of many countries are skeptical about the core institutions of representative democracy in their country yet still aspire to achieve democratic ideals. Indeed, Clearly and Stokes (2006) contend that a skeptical polity which does not necessarily trust government may be more participatory and

⁹ Semple (2011), in his description of Taliban popular cultural products (poems, ballads, pamphlets) argues that "If one were to sum up the poets' narrative of the struggle, it is to achieve an Afghanistan free of foreigners because it is self-evident that a country free of foreigners and inhabited by the honourable and god-fearing Afghans will be a better place" (28).

committed to political liberalism. Therefore, democratically-minded Pakistanis unsatisfied with the performance of government may be particularly attracted to extra-state solutions.

The Survey

None of the extant datasets measuring Pakistani public opinion on militancy (including surveys conducted by Gallup, Zogby, The Pew Foundation, World Public Opinion.org (WPO), the International Republican Institute (IRI), and Terror Free Tomorrow) were suitable for analyzing the relationship between democratic values and support for militancy. Most of these surveys assess support for terrorist tactics generally, which makes it hard to tie them directly to support for specific organizations. Surveys that did ask respondents directly about their support for these groups had high don't know/no opinion response rates in the range of 40% (Terror Free Tomorrow 2008; Pew 2009) or higher.¹⁰ The surveys which indirectly measured attitudes by asking whether groups “operating in Pakistan are a problem” (IRI 2009) or pose “a threat to the vital interests of Pakistan” (WPO 2009a) are hard to interpret and still suffer high item non-response rates. Finally, the samples used in prior surveys are concentrated in urban areas. These sampling patterns are problematic as public opinion about militancy as well as the prevalence of some militant groups varies across urban and rural regions (Fair 2009).

We therefore designed and fielded a 6,000-person, national survey with four goals. First, we wanted to survey a representative sample of the Pakistani population, including rural and urban

¹⁰ Surveys which indirectly measure affect by asking whether groups “operating in Pakistan are a problem” (IRI 2009) or pose “a threat to the vital interests of Pakistan” (WPO 2009) still obtain item non-response rates as high as 31%. The PIPA 2007 survey of urban Pakistanis, for example, had a don't know/no response (DK/NR) rate of around 20% on most of the questions, but for questions about the activities of Pakistan-based militant groups, the DK/NR rate was sometimes in excess of 50%. The Pew Global Attitudes Survey encountered similar problems when asking (predominantly urban) Pakistanis whether they have “a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable, or very unfavorable opinion” of al Qa’ida. In 2008 and 2009, the DK/NR rates were 41% and 30%, respectively. When the same question was posed about the Taliban in 2008 and 2009, the DK/NR rates were 40% and 20%, respectively (Pew Research Center 2009).

areas, in each of Pakistan's four main provinces. Second, we sought to measure attitudes towards specific militant organizations in a way that minimized the item non-response to sensitive questions which plagued previous surveys in Pakistan. Third, we aimed to mitigate social desirability bias. As is well known, respondents in many survey settings answer to please the enumerator or in order to appear to be high-status (Krosnick 1999; Marlowe and Crowne 1964, 109). These tendencies may be exacerbated when questions touch on sensitive issues, and fear and the desire to avoid embarrassment come into play. In Pakistan, respondents can often determine significant information about the class, ethnicity, and sectarian orientation of an enumerator based on his or her name and accent. This makes social desirability concerns even greater for surveys studying the politics of militancy in Pakistan, as respondents may be wary of signaling pro-militant views to high-status enumerators. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, we sought to achieve all of these analytical goals while mitigating risk to all persons involved in the survey. Enumerators are at particular risk of being threatened by militants, security officials, and even respondents when asking about support for specific organizations. These safety concerns are particularly acute in rural areas.

Working with our Pakistani partners, Socio-Economic Development Consultants (SEDCO), and using the Pakistan Federal Bureau of Statistics sample frame, we drew a stratified random sample of 6,000 adult Pakistani men and women from the four "normal" provinces of the country (those governed by Pakistan's 1973 constitution): Punjab, Sindh, KPK, and Balochistan. The respondents were randomly selected within 500 primary sampling units (PSUs), 332 in rural areas and 168 in urban ones (following the rural/urban breakdown in the Pakistan census). We oversampled in the less-populous provinces (Balochistan and KPK). We calculated post-stratification survey weights based on population figures from the most recent available census (performed in 1998). Following procedures outlined by Lee and Forthofer (2006), all analyses reported below were weighted and clustered to account for survey design effects.

The face-to-face questionnaire was fielded by six mixed-gender teams between April 21, 2009 and May 25, 2009. This was a period of some tension in Pakistan, as the Pakistani military began a major operation against militants in Swat and Malakand districts on April 26. Despite those tensions, the AAPOR RR1 response rate was 71.8 percent, which rivals the high response rates achieved by major academic surveys such as the American National Election Studies. Full question wordings for all variables used in the analysis are provided in Online Appendix C. Online Appendix D reports the sample demographics and balance checks for the full sample and by province. All variables described below were coded to lie between 0 and 1, so that we can easily interpret a regression coefficient as representing a 100β percentage point change in the dependent variable associated with moving from the lowest possible value to the highest possible value of the independent variable.

Measuring Support for Militant Organizations and Democratic Values

We measured support for four groups – the Kashmiri tanzems, the Afghan Taliban, al-Qa’ida, and the sectarian tanzems – using an endorsement experiment, in indirect method of eliciting views on sensitive political organizations.¹¹ In an endorsement experiment respondents are asked how much they support policies, measured on a five-point scale, which are relatively well known but about which they do not have strong feelings (as we learned during pretesting). Half the respondents are randomly assigned to a treatment condition in which they are told that one of four groups mentioned in the first section supports the policy in question, with the pairing of group to policy randomized within respondent. The difference in means between treatment and control groups then provides a measure of affect towards the groups, since the only difference between the treatment

¹¹ Full details on this endorsement experiment are in Appendix B. See also Fair, Malhotra and Shapiro (2012) for more details on this survey and Bullock, Imai, and Shapiro (2011) for a full discussion of the measurement properties of this particular endorsement experiment.

and control conditions is the group endorsement.¹²

To construct our dependent variable we average support within respondent across the four policies and leverage random assignment into treatment (endorsement) and control to measure differential support for militancy. The main dependent variable therefore is a twenty-point scale; each respondent was asked about four policies measured on a five-point scale ($4 \times 5 = 20$). As with all other variables, we recoded the policy support scale to lie between 0 (no support for all four policies) to 1 (a great deal of support for all four policies). The policy scale had a mean value of .79 (s.d. = .15) in the control group. The distributions for each of the four policies in by province are presented in Figure 1. The distributions of the twenty-point scale by province are presented in Figure 2. As described below, we also examined support for each of the groups individually.

We measure support for democratic values by assessing support for six core institutional features of liberal democratic societies using questions which draw on the widely-used Freedom in the World (FIW) survey (Freedom House 2011). We focus on the specific institutional characteristics of democracy (i.e. independent courts) that are most prominent in Pakistani discourse, as opposed to asking about views on behavioral outcomes (i.e. perceptions about the legitimate actions of the state), to minimize any between-subject variation due to respondent-specific beliefs about the political situation.¹³ Of course, as Munck and Verkuilen's (2002) analysis of the challenges to measuring democracy at the country level demonstrates, there is no broadly agreed upon way to measure "democratic values" or "freedom." Indeed, Collier and Levitsky (1997) famously report finding 500 examples of "democracy with adjectives." Our measurement approach

¹² Appendix figure B1 illustrates the procedure.

¹³ Robbins and Tessler (2012), for example, use World Values Survey questions to study the impact of elections on whether people will demonstrate on behalf of democracy, which they measure by combining a question on whether democracy is the best form of government with one on whether it would be good for governing Algeria. Their approach conflates views on democracy with beliefs about what is best given the current political situation, but may the more relevant measurement strategy for studying their dependent variable of interest. Given the political situation in Pakistan, and the arguably poor historical performance of democratic governments, we felt that constructing an index from support for institutional features was the better approach for this analysis.

brackets these complexities by focusing on institutional features that are, for the most part, uncontested parts of the institutional package of democracy as formulated by organizations such as Freedom House. Nonetheless, a limitation of our measurement approach is that we do not conceptualize democracy in explicitly behavioral terms. *Free Speech*. “How important is it that individuals be able to express their political views, even though other people may not agree with them?” (Freedom of Expression and Beliefs module)

Independent Courts. “How important is it for you to live in a country where the decisions of the courts are independent from influence by political and military authorities?” (Rule of Law module)

Freedom of Assembly. “How important is it that individuals be able to meet with others to work on political issues?” (Associational and Organizational Rights module)

Being Governed by Elected Representatives. “How important is it for you to live in a country that is governed by representatives elected by the people?” (Functioning of Government module)

Property Rights. “How important is it that individual property rights be secure? This means the state cannot take away property without proper court proceedings.” (Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights module)

Having Civilian Control over the Military. “The 1973 Constitution of Pakistan says civilians should control the military. This means the military cannot take action without orders from civilian leaders. In your opinion, how much control should civilians have over the military?” (Functioning of Government module)

The first five items were measured on a five-point scale (“extremely important,” “very important,” “moderately important,” “slightly important,” “not important at all”). The civilian control item was measured on a different five-point scale (“complete control,” “a lot of control,” “a moderate amount of control,” “a little control,” “no control at all”).

As shown in Table 1, about half of respondents selected the most-democratic response

(“extremely important” or “complete control”) and few selected the very bottom categories. Accordingly, we divide respondents into two groups—those selecting the highest response category and all others. We also estimated specifications in which responses were treated as continuous measures and obtained similar results. We constructed a scale in which we average the six items together to reduce measurement error. Cronbach’s alpha for the six items was .75, suggesting a high level of scale reliability. The democratic support index had a mean of .48 (s.d. = .33).

Our survey measures obviously do not capture the nuances of democratic values as discussed by democratic theorists. Indeed, it is unlikely that survey respondents in a developing nation would conceptualize democratic values in such a manner. Nonetheless, the questions ask about institutional features common to liberal democracies as discussed in scholarship on the topic. For instance, our measures do not capture Dahl’s (1989, 2006) conception of citizen involvement and enlightened understand, but come closer to what he terms “polyarchy.” Similarly, our questions do not deal with hierarchical structures discussed in Held’s (1995) theory of cosmopolitan democracy, but do closely tap his criteria for traditional liberal democracy (Held 2006). Finally, we do not explicitly measure Shapiro’s (1999) concept of democracy as a conditioning good, a bottom-up theory of a polity collectively democratizing over shared pursuits and values.

To test Hypothesis 3, we measure respondents’ beliefs about the status of Muslims living in Kashmir. We constructed a three-point scale measuring perceptions that Muslims are being oppressed in Kashmir based on two binary indicators.¹⁴ The first question asked respondents “How well does India protect the rights of its Muslim citizens in Kashmir?” (response options: “extremely well,” “somewhat well,” “neither well nor poorly,” “somewhat poorly,” “extremely poorly”).¹⁵

¹⁴ We also examined the conditional effects of these two variables in isolation and obtained similar results as the averaged measure.

¹⁵ Prior to asking this question, we randomly presented some respondents with information about the relative strength of the Indian and Pakistani militaries. This manipulation had no significant or substantive effect on responses to this question.

Respondents answering “extremely well” and “somewhat well” were coded as 0 and all others were coded as 1. The second question asked respondents “Thinking about the political preferences of Muslims in occupied Kashmir, please tell us which statement you agree with the most” (response options: “In occupied Kashmir, the majority of Muslims want to be part of India,” “In occupied Kashmir, the majority of Muslims want an independent state,” “In occupied Kashmir, the majority of Muslims want to be part of Pakistan”). Respondents answering that Muslims want to be part of India were coded as 0 and all others were coded as 1.

Control Variables

We also measured several control variables, which we include in our models both additively and multiplicatively: gender; marital status; age; access to the Internet; possession of a cellular phone; ability to read, write, and do math; education level; income; and sectarian affiliation (Sunni/Shia). These variables have all been cited as potential correlates of support for violent politics.¹⁶ We also controlled for various attitudinal measures, including views on the U.S. government’s influence on the world, views on the U.S. government’s influence on Pakistan, and belief that Shari’a law is about physical punishment (which should proxy for agreement with the theological elements of militant organizations’ ideologies). We hypothesize that negative views of the U.S. and belief in the corporal punishment aspects of Shari’a should be positively related to support for militant organizations. Moreover, we control for religiosity using two dummy variables indicating those who attend Quran study sessions (*dars e Quran*) daily and those who attend occasionally with non-attenders as the omitted category. Question wordings for all control variables are provided in Online Appendix B. Finally, in the regression models, we also include province fixed effects to account for regional

¹⁶ For a discussion of the effects of these demographic covariates, see: age (Russell and Millter 1977); marital status (Berrebi 2007); media access (Bell 1978; Dowling 2006); education (Becker 1968); income (Muller 1985); and religion (Juergensmeyer 2003).

differences in support for militant groups.

Methods of Analysis

To test Hypothesis 1, we estimate the following OLS regression model:

$$P_i = \beta_1 T_i + \beta_2 D_i + \beta_3 (T_i \times D_i) + \alpha_j + \varepsilon_i \quad (1)$$

where P_i is a continuous variable representing average support for the four target policies, T_i is a dummy variable representing assignment to the treatment condition, D_i is a continuous variable ranging from support for zero democratic values (0) to support for all six values (1), α_j are province fixed effects, and ε_i is a normally-distributed error term. β_1 represents our measure of support for militant groups—the change in support for the policy due to the group endorsement—among respondents who score lowest on the democracy index. β_2 represents the effect of democratic values on support for policies among respondents in the control group. $\beta_1 + \beta_3$ represents support for militancy among respondents who are the strongest supporters of democracy. Hence, the key parameter of interest is β_3 , from which we can derive the marginal effect of support for democracy on support for militancy (following Brambor et al. 2006 and Kam and Franzese 2007).

Note that the difference in variance across policies suggests that some may exhibit greater treatment effects than others because prior attitudes are less well-formed. We therefore use the variance of the responses in the control group to proxy looseness of pre-treatment attitudes and account for its influence by weighting each policy response by this variance. Further, because the policies may have different valence in each province, we calculate weights based on the within-province variance. Hence, we place greater weight on policies where the survey responses lead us to expect a greater likelihood that attitudes will be shifted in response to the endorsements.¹⁷

¹⁷ The results are substantively similar without this weighting or with weights based on national-level variances (see Online Appendices E and F, respectively). We report province-weighted results throughout

To test the robustness of our results, we also estimate a series of more-saturated models, the most complex of which is represented by equation (2):

$$P_i = \beta_1 T_i + \beta_2 D_i + \beta_3 (T_i \times D_i) + \alpha_j + \boldsymbol{\eta} \mathbf{x}_i + \boldsymbol{\lambda} \mathbf{z}_i + \boldsymbol{\xi} T_i \mathbf{x}_i + \boldsymbol{\psi} T_i \mathbf{z}_i + \varepsilon_i \quad (2)$$

where $\mathbf{x}_i$ represents a vector of demographic control variables and $\mathbf{z}_i$ represents a vector of attitudinal and religiosity control variables.¹⁸ Note that equation (2) includes interaction terms between the controls and the treatment dummy. To test Hypothesis 2 we estimate models (1) and (2) by group and for combinations of groups that vary in their association with azadi narratives.

To test Hypothesis 3, we estimate an analogous set of models:

$$P_i = \beta_1 T_i + \beta_2 D_i + \beta_3 K_i + \beta_4 (T_i \times D_i) + \beta_5 (T_i \times K_i) + \beta_6 (D_i \times K_i) + \beta_7 (T_i \times D_i \times K_i) + \boldsymbol{\gamma}_i + \varepsilon_i \quad (3)$$

$$P_i = \alpha + \beta_1 T_i + \beta_2 D_i + \beta_3 K_i + \beta_4 (T_i \times D_i) + \beta_5 (T_i \times K_i) + \beta_6 (D_i \times K_i) + \beta_7 (T_i \times D_i \times K_i) + \alpha_j + \boldsymbol{\eta} \mathbf{x}_i + \boldsymbol{\lambda} \mathbf{z}_i + \boldsymbol{\xi} T_i \mathbf{x}_i + \boldsymbol{\psi} T_i \mathbf{z}_i + \varepsilon_i \quad (4)$$

where K_i represents respondents' beliefs about the state of Muslims in Kashmir. As mentioned in the section entitled "Measuring Support for Democratic Values," these beliefs are measured using an index based on three questions about each groups' goals. Interpreting these models is complex; we follow procedures laid out by Brambor et al. (2006). The main parameter of interest is represented by β_7 , which allows us to test whether the democracy-militancy relationship implied by H1 is stronger amongst respondents high on the "Kashmir beliefs" index than those lower on the index.

Obviously, we cannot randomly assign democratic values to respondents. Accordingly, what we report below are associations between support for democratic values and support for militant politics. Nonetheless, one of the main null hypotheses that we are testing—one that is often posited

as we believe they more accurately capture the impact of cues on attitudes. The post-stratification weight was multiplied by the vector of policy weights to produce the overall sampling weight.

¹⁸ There may be concerns with including both education and income in the model due to multicollinearity. Although these two variables are not extremely highly correlated in the data ($r=.36$), we also present our main results dropping income and education individually (see Online Appendix G). Further, to mitigate concerns of non-random item non-response, we present all results only with the complete estimation sample.

in the policy community—is that those who do not support democracy are more prone to militancy. If we find no association between these variables in this posited negative direction, it is unlikely that there is a causal relationship in that direction.

Results

Consistent with Hypothesis 1, we find that support for democratic values is *positively associated* with support for militant groups. In the first column of Table 1, we present the estimates from the simple model described in equation (1). Controlling for provincial differences in support, we find that among those scoring zero on the democracy scale, the group endorsement actually decreases support for the policies by about 2.6 percentage points ($\beta_1 = -.026, p < .01$, two-tailed). However, among the strongest supporters of democracy, we estimate the treatment effect of the endorsements to be positive 1.5 percentage points ($\beta_1 + \beta_3 = .015, p = .06$). Therefore, the overall effect of democracy on support for militant groups is 4.2 percentage points ($\beta_3 = .042, p < .01$). In Figure 3, we plot the marginal effect of support for democracy along with the associated 95% confidence interval. Among weak supporters of democracy the treatment effect of the endorsement cues is negative. Strong supports of democracy, however, are more supportive of the policies as a result of the endorsements.

How big is this effect in substantive terms? In the control group, support for the government policies is 12.1 percentage points higher among respondents who support democratic values, as indicated by the parameter estimate of β_2 . Hence, our difference-in-difference estimate represents about 35% of this baseline level of support and is therefore substantively meaningful. Another way to assess the effect size is to compare it to the effect of income—an expectedly strong predictor—on support for the policies. Unsurprisingly, going from the bottom income group to the top income group is associated with a 6.1 percentage point decrease in support for the policies, three

of which involve social services. The difference-in-difference estimate (β_3) represents almost 70% of the income effect.

This finding is highly robust. In column two of Table 1, we present estimates from a regression specification including demographic controls along with a dummy variable for respondents who did not answer the income question.¹⁹ In column three, we listwise delete cases for which we do not have a valid income response. In column four, we include attitudinal controls in the model. Finally, in column five, we estimate the model represented by equation (2), which includes all the main and interactive effects. Our estimate of β_3 is highly stable across all specifications, representing between 3.6-4.2 percent of the range of the dependent variable.

Consistent with Hypothesis 2, we find that the positive relationship between democratic values and the endorsement effect is strongest for groups that are associated with an azadi narrative. As shown in Table 2, the difference-in-difference estimate of β_3 from equation (1) is positive and significant for all four groups. However, it is over 60% larger for the Kashmir tanzeem and Afghan Taliban—groups associated with an azadi narrative—than for al-Qa’ida and the sectarian tanzeems. The pooled estimate of β_3 for the azadi groups is .040 ($p < .01$), higher than the pooled estimate for the non-azadi groups (.025, $p = .03$). Although the difference between these two coefficient estimates is not statistically significant, it is substantively large and in the direction we expect.

Consistent with Hypothesis 3, we find that the positive democracy-militancy relationship shown in Figure 3 is driven by those who feel that the groups are fighting for democratic values. We present estimates from equation (3) in the first column of Table 3. The parameter estimate of β_7 is positive and statistically significant ($\beta_7 = .127$, $p = .08$), indicating that the difference-in-difference estimate increases by 12.7 percentage points as we move from belief that Muslims are not being

¹⁹ Due to space limitations, we do not report every single estimate in the text. Complete regression results are presented in Online Appendix I.

mistreated in Kashmir and that they want to live under Indian control ($K_i = 0$) to belief that Muslims are disenfranchised ($K_i = 1$). Figure 4 illustrates these results. Note that the slope of the relationship between support for democratic values and the endorsement effect is essentially flat among those low on the Kashmir index ($K_i < 1$), and becomes positive and steep when the value of the index is 1. Columns (2)-(5) of Table 3 show this result is robust to specification choice and the addition of control variables. Online Appendix Table H shows the estimate of β_j is correctly signed for all six components of the democracy index, with the strongest relationship being for four particular indicators—property rights, independent courts, elected representatives, and freedom of assembly.

Discussion

To better understand the politics of militancy in Pakistan and to shed light on larger theories about the relationship between democratic values and support for violent political organizations, we designed and conducted a 6,000-person provincially representative survey of Pakistani adults, measuring affect towards four specific militant organizations. We applied a novel measurement strategy to mitigate social desirability bias and item non-response given the sensitive nature of militancy in the region. Our endorsement experiment overcomes several issues that have plagued past efforts to use surveys to study the politics of militancy.

Using this innovative approach we find that support for a set of core liberal democratic values is correlated with *higher* support for militant groups. This finding contradicts the conventional wisdom which underlies recent U.S. policy approaches to Pakistan and the Muslim world. We measure support for democratic values using an index that aggregates support for six key values: property rights, free speech, independent courts, rule by elected representatives, civilian control of the military, and freedom of assembly. Moving from the lowest value on this index to the highest value is associated with a 4-5 percentage point increase in support for militant groups.

This result may seem puzzling but it makes sense in the particular context of Pakistan where militant groups (and their advocates in government) have long justified their actions as defending azadi, a concept that loosely translates as freedom and self-determination. Our results are consistent with this history in two respects. First, the relationship between democracy and support is strongest for groups whose concerns are more closely associated with azadi narratives. Second, the relationship is strongest for respondents whose beliefs about Kashmir are consistent with the azadi narrative and who consequently may plausibly believe that the groups are fighting for justice, democracy, and to protect Muslim sovereignty.

Moving beyond Pakistan, one larger theoretical contribution of this research is to reaffirm that individuals' attitudes towards violent political organizations depend heavily on their beliefs about the political context. This has long been recognized in other settings (see e.g. Prothro and Grigg 1960) but is underappreciated in current debates about Islamist militancy. Simply put, there is no clean mapping between personal adherence to values that seem normatively attractive (such as a belief in individual liberty) and rejection of normatively unappealing methods of political contestation. In Pakistan, for example, some militant groups' rhetoric justifying the fight for azadi has been so widely accepted that it is exactly those who believe most deeply in democratic values that are most supportive of violent groups.

The policy implications of this research are stark. Whether democratic values are a force for peace or for conflict depends on how people understand the political context. Those seeking to promote pacific dispute resolution and orderly politics in Pakistan and elsewhere need to move beyond efforts to delegitimize violence in a normative sense towards attempts to convince potential supporters of violent methods that such tactics are counterproductive. It may be easier to convince people that the facts of the situation call for different political behavior than it is to change their underlying attitudes. In Pakistan, such an approach might entail mechanisms to convey unbiased

information on how Muslims are treated in India. Our results also suggest that versions of Radio Free Europe in the Middle East (e.g. Radio Sawa) may not be efficacious.

Nonetheless, there are problems with interpreting findings from surveys in the context of studying ongoing, politically high-risk activity. Even if one could change the views of the population towards militant groups, it is unclear what impact such changes would have on militant activity. Mass beliefs and elite actions are distinct concepts. On the one hand, increased public support for militant groups in a region could make it easier for such groups to operate in secrecy and enlarge their recruitment pool. On the other hand, it could bring greater attention to that area from state security services, which might outweigh these advantages. Further, analyzing a cross-sectional survey is inherently static and not ideally suited to studying high-risk political situations characterized by uncertainty and constantly changing political dynamics. Unfortunately, there is as yet no systematic research that can help disentangle these effects. Such work would require panel data on both violence and on public opinion and a source of variation in public opinion that was independent of factors driving violence. While such data exist for both Afghanistan and Iraq, and to a lesser extent for Palestine, it is unclear whether there are viable strategies for identifying plausibly exogenous variation in public opinion (though see Iyengar and Montan (2008) for an approach using variation in media coverage).

Finally, this paper suggests some new lines of inquiry for students of both violent politics and political behavior. For those studying violent politics, the paper highlights the potential importance of learning about how beliefs about the strategic environment interact with deeply-seated attitudes to generate support for specific militant organizations. Future studies can potentially manipulate beliefs about the strategic impact of the groups' actions and measure resulting changes in support for militant groups. What we show here is that measuring highly sensitive political attitudes

is feasible even in highly contested places.²⁰ For those studying political behavior, the paper provides further evidence that beliefs about the political environment interact with long-standing values to generate attitudes towards specific actors. This means one cannot look solely at what is going on inside peoples' heads, but also how those attitudes interact with political structures, organizations, and institutions.

²⁰ See also recent work in Afghanistan (Lyall, Imai, and Blair 2011), Colombia (Garcia and Matanock 2011), and Mexico (Diaz-Cayeros et. al. 2011).

Table 1: Support for Democratic Values Predicts Support for Militant Groups

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
β_1 : Group Cue	-0.026*** (0.007)	-0.025*** (0.006)	-0.026*** (0.006)	-0.025*** (0.006)	-0.045* (0.026)
β_2 : Support for Democratic Values	0.121*** (0.016)	0.094*** (0.014)	0.094*** (0.015)	0.091*** (0.014)	0.089*** (0.014)
β_3 : Group Cue x Support for Democratic Values	0.042*** (0.012)	0.038*** (0.011)	0.040*** (0.011)	0.036*** (0.011)	0.039*** (0.013)
Constant	0.748*** (0.011)	0.845*** (0.022)	0.845*** (0.022)	0.805*** (0.029)	0.814*** (0.031)
R ²	0.142	0.244	0.241	0.254	0.260
N	5243	5243	5092	5243	5243
Region Fixed Effects	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Demographic Controls	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
Income Listwise Deleted	—	N	Y	N	N
Attitudinal Controls	N	N	N	Y	Y
Group Cue-Demographics Interactions	N	N	N	N	Y
Group Cue-Attitudinal Interaction	N	N	N	N	Y

*** $p < .01$; ** $p < .05$; * $p < .10$ (two-tailed)

Note: OLS regressions predicting support for policies. Data weighted and adjusted for sampling design. Demographic controls include: gender, marital status, age, access to Internet, possession of cellular phone, ability to read, ability to write, ability to perform arithmetic, formal education level, income, and religion sect. Attitudinal controls include two measures of attitudes toward United States, views of Shari'a law, and religiosity.

Table 2: Support for Democratic Values is More Strongly Correlated with Support for Azadi Groups

	<u>Azadi Groups</u>			<u>Non-Azadi Groups</u>		
	<u>Kashmir</u> <u>Tanzeem</u>	<u>Afghan</u> <u>Taliban</u>	<u>Pooled</u> <u>Azadi</u>	<u>al-Qa'ida</u>	<u>Sectarian</u> <u>Tanzeem</u>	<u>Pooled</u> <u>Non-Azadi</u>
β_1 : Group Cue	-0.042*** (0.010)	-0.045*** (0.010)	-0.031*** (0.008)	-0.036*** (0.009)	-0.027*** (0.010)	-0.020*** (0.007)
β_2 : Support for Democratic Values	0.080*** (0.015)	0.084*** (0.016)	0.091*** (0.014)	0.082*** (0.015)	0.082*** (0.015)	0.091*** (0.014)
β_3 : Group Cue x Support for Democratic Values	0.047*** (0.016)	0.043** (0.017)	0.040*** (0.014)	0.031* (0.016)	0.023 (0.017)	0.025** (0.012)
Constant	0.826*** (0.033)	0.805*** (0.035)	0.803*** (0.032)	0.807*** (0.034)	0.843*** (0.035)	0.813*** (0.032)
R ²	0.154	0.142	0.189	0.149	0.154	0.194
N	5243	5243	5243	5243	5243	5243

*** $p < .01$; ** $p < .05$; * $p < .10$ (two-tailed)

Note: OLS regressions predicting support for policies. Data weighted and adjusted for sampling design. All regressions include region fixed effects, demographic controls, and attitudinal controls. Demographic controls include: gender, marital status, age, access to Internet, possession of cellular phone, ability to read, ability to write, ability to perform arithmetic, formal education level, income, and religion sect. Attitudinal controls include two measures of attitudes toward United States, views of Shari'a law, and religiosity.


Table 3: Perception of Muslims in Kashmir Moderates the Democracy-Militancy Relationship

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
β_1 : Group Cue	0.010 (0.030)	0.015 (0.029)	0.024 (0.029)	0.019 (0.029)	-0.004 (0.037)
β_2 : Support for Democratic Values	0.175*** (0.050)	0.159*** (0.044)	0.159*** (0.047)	0.163*** (0.042)	0.165*** (0.042)
β_3 : Perception of Muslims in Kashmir	0.082*** (0.023)	0.065*** (0.022)	0.074** (0.023)	0.063*** (0.022)	0.061*** (0.023)
β_4 : Group Cue x Support for Democratic Values	-0.082 (0.070)	-0.098 (0.064)	-0.090 (0.068)	-0.102 (0.065)	-0.101 (0.065)
β_5 : Group Cue x Perception of Muslims in Kashmir	-0.037 (0.033)	-0.040 (0.031)	-0.052 (0.031)	-0.043 (0.032)	-0.038 (0.033)
β_6 : Support for Democratic Values x Perception of Muslims in Kashmir	-0.058 (0.052)	-0.069 (0.045)	-0.070 (0.048)	-0.075* (0.044)	-0.078* (0.044)
β_7 : Group Cue x Support for Democratic Values x Perception of Muslims in Kashmir	0.121* (0.073)	0.135** (0.067)	0.129* (0.071)	0.137** (0.067)	0.138** (0.068)
Constant	0.675*** (0.024)	0.789*** (0.032)	0.781*** (0.032)	0.760*** (0.036)	0.770*** (0.037)
R ²	0.156	0.255	0.253	0.263	0.268
N	5002	5002	4864	5002	5002
Region Fixed Effects	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Demographic Controls	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
Income Listwise Deleted	—	N	Y	N	N
Attitudinal Controls	N	N	N	Y	Y
Group Cue-Demographics Interactions	N	N	N	N	Y
Group Cue-Attitudinal Interaction	N	N	N	N	Y

*** $p < .01$; ** $p < .05$; * $p < .10$ (two-tailed)


Note: OLS regressions predicting support for policies. Data weighted and adjusted for sampling design. Demographic controls include: marital status, age, access to Internet, possession of cellular phone, ability to read, ability to write, ability to perform arithmetic, formal education level, income, and religion sect. Attitudinal controls include two measures of attitudes toward United States, views of Shari'a law, and religiosity.

Figure 1: Distribution of Support for Policies




Note: Support for policies measured on 5-pt scale from not support at all (1) to support a great deal (5).

Figure 2: Distribution of Policy Scale




Note: Support for policies measured on 20-pt scale from averaged responses across four policies on 5-pt scale.

Figure 3: Support for Militancy by Support for Democratic Values



Note: Marginal effect of endorsement effect (and 95% confidence interval) plotted against values of democratic values index (property rights, free speech, independent courts, government by elected representatives, civilian control of the military, freedom of assembly)

Figure 4: Moderating Effect of Views of Muslims in Kashmir on Democracy-Militancy Relationship



Note: Marginal effect of endorsement effect (and 95% confidence interval) plotted against values of democratic values index (property rights, free speech, independent courts, government by elected representatives, civilian control of the military, freedom of assembly) for two subsets of respondents: (a) those with values of less than 1 on the Kashmir Index; and (b) those with values of 1 on the Kashmir index

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**Democratic Values and Support for Militant Politics:
Evidence from a National Survey of Pakistan**

[ONLINE APPENDIX]

C. Christine Fair, Georgetown University
Neil Malhotra, Stanford University
Jacob N. Shapiro, Princeton University

This version November 27, 2012

Online Appendix A: Democracy and Militancy in Pakistan

Pakistan's relationship with democracy has been uneven. The military has governed the country directly for more than half of its history, and—by exerting influence on political parties, the judiciary, and the bureaucracy—has governed indirectly for the remainder. While constitutional democracy has never been fully consolidated, however, authoritarianism has never enjoyed widespread and enduring legitimacy. In 2008, the country emerged from its most recent bout of authoritarianism when president and army Chief Pervez Musharraf stepped down—first as army chief and then as president—to pave the way for elections. Those elections ushered in a new era of democratic governance under the auspices of Pakistan's People Party. Despite Pakistanis' dissatisfaction with the perceived ineptitude and corruption of mainstream politicians, they still overwhelmingly prefer democracy to other modes of governance (Gallup Pakistan 2011; Fair 2011b; Shah 2011; Shah 2003).

Pakistan's history of instrumentalizing Islamist militancy, however, has been consistent. The government has utilized jihadist elements in Kashmir and elsewhere in India since the early years of independence in 1947 (Swami 2007), and has been inserting Islamist political proxies into Afghanistan since the 1960s (Rubin 2002; Haqqani 2005; Hussain 2005). In the mid-1970s, Afghan Islamists fleeing persecution by Mohammed Daoud Khan's government began to arrive in Pakistan. Prime Minister Z.A. Bhutto armed and organized them to fight the anti-Pakistan, Communist regime in Afghanistan.¹ By the time the Russians crossed the Amu Darya in 1979, all of the major *mujahideen* forces were already assembled (Hussain 2005; Haqqani 2005). Throughout the 1980s, Pakistan, led by the military regime of Zia ul Haq and supplied with resources by its allies, raised

¹ Z.A. Bhutto enlisted the assistance of a recently retired 2-star general in the Pakistan Army, Major General Naseerullah Babar (a Pashtun) to fund and train the Afghan mujahideen to counter Daoud's regime. Babar later became the special advisor on internal affairs to Benazir Bhutto (Z.A. Bhutto's daughter) during her first government (1988-1990) and Minister of Interior during her second (1993-1996). It was under Babar's guidance that Ms. Bhutto's government began supporting the Afghan Taliban.

tens of thousands of mujahideen to oust the Soviet forces. Pakistan's utilization of Islamist militants in the region intensified following the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989 and increased in step with its developing nuclear capability (Fair 2011a; Swami 2007; Jamal 2009).²

Not surprisingly given this history, militant violence has been a fact of life in Pakistan for decades. Since its earliest years, the state has been plagued by ethno-nationalist insurgencies in Balochistan, Sindh, and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK, formerly known as the Northwest Frontier Province or NWFP), some of which continue, at lower levels, to this day.³ Sectarian *tanzeems* (e.g. Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) and Sipah-e-Sahabah-e-Pakistan (SSP)), which were involved in the anti-Soviet Jihad and which are now assisting the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban, have been conducting attacks since 1979 in key districts and cities in Southern Punjab as well as in the major provincial capitals (e.g. Quetta, Lahore, Peshawar, and Karachi). In the last five years, these groups and some of the so-called Kashmiri tanzeems (i.e. Jaish-e-Mohammad) have been targeting Pakistani security forces, civilian government figures, and civilian targets in FATA and adjacent territories under the umbrella of the Pakistan Taliban.⁴ They have conducted attacks throughout KPK (especially Peshawar and its environs), and hit Islamabad, Lahore, and Karachi (Gul 2009; Jones and Fair 2010). In the year before our survey was fielded, 11,429 people were killed or injured in terrorist attacks in KPK, 3,788 in Balochistan, 4,424 in Punjab, and 1,791 in Sindh.⁵

As noted above, this paper focuses on Islamist rather than other forms of political violence in Pakistan. It is widely believed that Islamist militancy in Pakistan is a phenomenon that is rooted in

² It is widely believed that Islamic militancy in Pakistan is rooted in the rule of General Zia ul Haq, who ousted Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Butto in 1977. Although they are sometimes conflated, the mujahideen formed by Zia in the 1970s and 1980s is distinct from the non-state Islamic militant organizations seen in Pakistan today. Although we do not have space to discuss this history in the text, a more detailed accounting of militancy in Pakistan is provided in Online Appendix A.

³ A successful ethno-nationalist insurgency in Bengali-dominated East Pakistan led to the creation of Bangladesh after the 1971 Indo-Pakistan war.

⁴ The term "Kashmiri tanzeem" is a misnomer. With the exception of Hizbul Mujahideen, these groups tend to be comprised of operatives and leaders who are not ethnically Kashmiri, their theatres of operation stretch beyond Kashmir, and their goals are typically more expansive than "liberating Kashmir."

⁵ Author calculations based on data from the National Counter Terrorism Center's Worldwide Incident Tracking System.

the rule of General Zia ul Haq, who ousted Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in 1977. General Zia (as he is known) was Pakistan's fourth Chief Martial Law Administrator and sixth president from July 1977 until his death in August 1988. Zia is notorious both for his efforts to turn Pakistan into a Sunni Islamist state and for his success in winning U.S. and Saudi support for his strategy of using armed Islamic militants to wage jihad against the Soviets in Afghanistan. Supporting these groups was preferable to assisting an Afghan nationalist insurgency because Zia feared that such an approach might inspire restless ethnic groups (especially the Pashtuns) on Pakistan's border with Afghanistan to rebel against the state. With ample support from the United States and Saudi Arabia, Zia helped to orient Pakistan's domestic religious institutions towards the production of *mujahideen* for the fight against the Soviets (Haqqani 2005). The conventional wisdom holds that when the Soviets were ousted these mujahideen were redeployed to India.

This narrative is misleading for several reasons. First, Pakistan's utilization of jihadist elements in Kashmir and elsewhere in India began in the early years of independence (Swami 2007). Second, Pakistan began inserting Islamist proxies into Afghanistan in an effort to shape events there as early as the 1960s. By the mid-1970s, Afghan Islamists were fleeing persecution by Mohammed Daoud Khan's regime. They arrived in Pakistan, where Prime Minister Z.A. Bhutto, enlisting the assistance of a recently retired 2-star general in the Pakistan Army, Major General Naseerullah Babar (a Pashtun), began arming and organizing them to resist the anti-Pakistan, Communist government in Afghanistan.⁶ By the time the Russians crossed the Amu Darya on Christmas day 1979, all of the major mujahideen forces were already assembled (Hussain 2005; Haqqani 2005).

It is certainly the case that Pakistan intensified its use of Islamist militants after the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan in 1988/1989; this shift was enabled by Pakistan's growing nuclear

⁶ Babar later became the special advisor on internal affairs to Benazir Bhutto (Z.A. Bhutto's daughter) during her first government (1988-1990) and Minister of Interior during her second (1993-1996). It was with Babar's guidance that Ms. Bhutto's government began supporting the Afghan Taliban.

deterrent. Indeed, the United States sanctioned Pakistan for crossing nuclear red lines as early as 1979 (Fair 2011a). Thus a more accurate reading of the historical record suggests that Pakistan has employed Islamist militancy in India and Afghanistan as tools of foreign policy since 1947 (the year Pakistan became independent) and that this continues today (Swami 2007; Hussain 2005; Jamal 2009); but also that Pakistan intensified reliance upon “jihad under the nuclear umbrella” as its nuclear capabilities developed.

There is also considerable confusion about the nature of Sunni sects that have been mobilized for these jihadi efforts. The Pakistan state has relied upon organizations tied to Jamaat-e-Islami (a Leninist Islamist religious party in Pakistan that espouses a supra-sectarian ideology) to produce militant groups such as Al Badr and Hizbul Mujahideen (Nasr 1994, Jamal 2009). The state has also relied upon institutions tied to the Deobandi interpretative tradition of Sunni Islam. A Deobandi Islamist political party with various factions (Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam, or JUI) maintains tight relations with the Deobandi mosques and madrassahs associated with numerous Islamist militant groups, such as the Afghan Taliban, the Pakistani Taliban, various groups operating in India such as Jaish-e-Mohammad, and anti-Shia groups such as Lashkar-e-Jhangvi. The state has also provided unstinting support to Lashkar-e-Taiba and its various operational guises (such as Jamaat ud Dawa), which draw on the Ahl-e-Hadeeth Sunni interpretative tradition (Fair 2011a; Haqqani 2005).

In recent years there has been renewed interest in Pakistani adherents of the Barelvi tradition (also referred to as “Sufis”), in part because there is a casual assumption that Pakistan’s “Sufis” are not inclined towards violence (Hussain 2011). This is a regrettable simplification. It is true that some militant groups in Pakistan target these Sufis because they engage in practices that seem antithetical to orthodox Islam (e.g. veneration of saint’s tombs, requesting spiritual leaders to intervene on behalf of supplicants, seeking talismans to overcome illness or infertility, etc.). However, this does not mean that members of these traditions are less inclined to support violence

than other Pakistanis. In fact, the literature on Pakistan's militant groups and their recruitment consistently shows that organizations actually recruit Barelvis, out of a desire to "convert" them and also because of the unsubstantiated belief that Sufis comprise the majority of the population (Rana 2004). Those who believe that Barelvis are more inclined towards pacifism were startled when Barelvi religious leadership strongly supported the killing of a controversial Punjab Governor (Salman Taseer) who opposed Pakistan's blasphemy law. Taseer was in fact killed by a Barelvi adherent (Khan 2011).

Since the commencement of Pakistan's selective participation in the U.S. war on terror, many of Pakistan's erstwhile proxies began to redirect their focus to attacking the state itself (Fair 2011a). The groups that were most inclined to frame the state as their enemy were generally those associated with the Deobandi interpretative tradition. In 2005, these Pakistani militants began attacking state actors (e.g. military, police, intelligence agencies, and political figures) as well as ordinary civilians whom they oppose on political or religious grounds. By late 2007, several of these groups coalesced under the banner of the Tehreek-e-Taliban-e-Pakistan (TTP) or Pakistan Taliban.

Thus when we fielded our survey in April in 2009, the militant landscape in Pakistan was (as it remains) populated by groups that vary in their sectarian commitments, targeting choices, theater of operations, members' ethnicity, and political objectives. To understand how views on democracy might relate to popular support for these groups, a nuanced picture of the Pakistani militant organizations that were active during our survey is in order. (With a few modifications, this description remains relevant for the contemporary landscape (Fair 2011a)). This Appendix outlines the major groups included in our survey.

Militants Fighting in Kashmir

There are several organizations which Pakistanis group under the name "Kashmiri tanzeems" (Kashmiri groups). All of them profess to act on behalf of Kashmiri independence (azadi

in Urdu).⁷ One cluster belongs to the Deobandi interpretative tradition of Sunni Islam (e.g. Jaish-e-Mohammad (JM), Harkat-ul-Ansar/Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HUA/HUM) and their splinter groups). While they recruit within Pakistan proper and often train in or fight in Afghanistan as well, their recruitment materials suggest a Kashmir-oriented mission. In recent years JM has become intimately involved with the Pakistan Taliban and has provided suicide attackers for assaults on Pakistani targets and international targets within Pakistan. A separate set of groups operating under the influence of Jamaat-e-Islami in Kashmir includes Hizbul Mujahideen, al Badr, and related factions. These groups primarily recruit Kashmiris and generally have remained focused on securing autonomy or independence for Kashmir. They have not been involved with the Pakistan Taliban, and have not targeted the Pakistani state or international targets within Pakistan.

The most prominent of the Kashmiri tanzeems is Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), which operated in Indian-administered Kashmir for much of the 1990s (Abou Zahab 2007). LeT conducted its first attack outside of Kashmir in 2000 and in recent years has attacked international targets in India—the November 2008 Mumbai hotel attacks are the most prominent example—as well as U.S. and allied forces fighting in Afghanistan (Fair 2011a). LeT has not targeted the Pakistani state nor has it pursued western targets within Pakistan.

Afghan Taliban

As is well known, the Taliban government (with Pakistani assistance) achieved dominance over most of Afghanistan in 1996 (Rubin 2002). The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks made it impossible for Islamabad to continue supporting the Taliban (Musharraf 2006) and when the United States-led coalition routed the Taliban in late-2001 many fled to Pakistan's tribal areas to regroup. In 2005, the Afghan Taliban launched a renewed insurgent campaign run by leadership *shuras* in Quetta,

⁷ Ironically, these groups oppose indigenous organizations in Indian-administered Kashmir which seek a resolution of the conflict through political means and frame their opposition without any reference to Islam (e.g. the Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front).

Peshawar, and Karachi (Levin 2009).

The Afghan Taliban, despite considerable organizational changes since 2001, remain focused on ousting foreign forces, aid workers, and other foreign civilians from Afghanistan, overthrowing the Karzai regime, and restoring their role in governing Afghanistan (Giustozzi 2009). Unlike al-Qa'ida, the Taliban's focus is on liberating Afghanistan from Western occupation and from the current Afghan leadership, which enables this occupation. The Taliban's central message is that the coalition aims "to occupy Afghanistan and destroy Islam." The message of independence from occupation is important because many Afghans have never heard of the September 11, 2001 attacks that precipitated the war and simply do not understand why Americans and others are trying to run their country (Lujan 2012).

Pakistani Taliban

Since 2004 a cluster of militant groups whose members self-identify as "Pakistani Taliban" has developed in Pakistan.⁸ We were unable to measure support for these groups due to the extreme sensitivity of the subject at the time of our survey.⁹ But understanding the differences between them and the Afghan Taliban is important for interpreting our results (Fair 2011a).

⁸ The Pakistan Taliban rose to prominence in early 2004, as local militias established micro-emirates in large swathes of Pakistan's Pashtun areas. Popular characterization of all Pakistan Taliban as being part of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) is incorrect; the term most accurately refers to a loose group of local militias espousing a particular view of shari'a law. The so-called Talibanization of the tribal areas began in North and South Waziristan, but quickly spread to parts of the other tribal agencies. Beginning in 2007 local Taliban also emerged in parts of KPK (previously known as Northwest Frontier Province or NWFP). The Pakistan army has engaged in various operations to disrupt these militant groups (Jones and Fair 2010).

⁹ We did not include questions about the Pakistan Taliban in this survey for a number of reasons. First, at the time we were planning the survey many Pakistanis were still skeptical that the Pakistan Taliban (Tehreek-e-Taliban) was a genuine organization. They believed that the numerous attacks within Pakistan were the work of "external agents," typically a reference to India, Israel, or even the United States. While such a belief may seem (to American or other western readers) to be untethered from rational discourse, this view has considerable staying power in Pakistan. By April 2009, when we had cleared human subjects review and were ready to enter the field, the Pakistan Taliban had indeed become a household name. When we began fielding our survey, Pakistan Taliban groups were launching ferocious attacks across Pakistan. In May of 2009, the Pakistan army launched a sustained offensive against a Pakistan Taliban faction in Swat that would continue for about a year (Jones and Fair 2010). Thus, even if we were in a position to ask about the Pakistan Taliban, it would have been imprudent to do so given the intensity of the ongoing militant and military operations.

The militants grouped by Pakistanis under the name “Pakistani Taliban” have the goal of undermining the Pakistani state in select areas and establishing their own parallel governance structures, organized around commanders’ particular understanding of Shari’a. At the time our survey was in the field these groups had conducted few operations apart from attacking police forces in the FATA and parts of KPK. Unfortunately, within months of the survey period TTP-affiliated militants, in response to government offensives against them, conducted attacks across Pakistan, killing thousands. Like the Afghan Taliban, many of the TTP cadres are ethnic Pashtuns, and many of their command centers are located in Pashtun areas. That said, the TTP also recruits heavily from Punjab-based groups such as JM and the anti-Shia sectarian groups noted below. The TTP is an explicitly Islamist enterprise, with its various sub-commanders seeking to establish micro-emirates under Shari’a in their areas of operation (Fair 2011a). Unlike the Kashmiri groups or even the Afghan Taliban, the message of the TTP is not one of liberation (*azad*) but rather of overthrowing the current democratic (albeit problematic) constitutional order in Pakistan.

Al Qa’ida

For Western policy makers and politicians, the most important militant group operating in Pakistan is al-Qa’ida, the group responsible for the September 11, 2001 attacks. Former British Prime Minister Gordon Brown summed up these concerns when he reported that “three quarters of the most serious plots investigated by the British authorities have links to al Qa’ida in Pakistan” (Coates and Page 2008). Important al Qa’ida leaders remain in the FATA, and many al Qa’ida operatives—Abu Zubaidah, Khalid Sheikh Mohammad, and others—have been arrested in Pakistani cities. Al-Qa’ida operatives in Pakistan have targeted the Pakistani state and executed terrorist plots targeting the West and its allies. The July 7, 2005, bombings in London have been linked to al-Qa’ida

in Pakistan, for example, as have at least five foiled plots since 2004 (Jones and Fair 2010).¹⁰

Sectarian Tanzeems

Pakistan has long been also home to a number of militant groups seeking to advance a sectarian agenda. These *firqavarana tanzeems* include the anti-Shia Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) and Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP).¹¹ The Sunni sectarian groups grew to prominence in the 1980s and are now a well-established part of Pakistan's political landscape (Nasr 2000a). In the past, Shia sectarian groups targeted Sunni Muslims, although these groups have largely disappeared.

The anti-Shia groups all claim to be fighting for a Sunni Deobandi Pakistan by purging the country of Shias, whom they view as apostates.¹² Their actions typically take the form of attacks on Shi'ite mosques and community gatherings, and they have periodically attacked Christian and Ahmediya targets as well. In reality, a great deal of the anti-Shia violence is motivated by class issues and urbanization. The large land-holding families in Pakistan have historically been Shia and have not treated their tenant farmers well. Thus an agenda of class conflict has been executed through a narrative of apostasy (Nasr 2000b; Zaman 1998).

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¹⁰ Many Pakistanis are skeptical about the existence of al-Qa'ida *per se*. All focus group participants in our pre-testing, however, understood what we were referring to when we explained that al-Qa'ida was "Osama bin Laden's militia."

¹¹ Many of these groups have been proscribed numerous times only to re-emerge under new names. We use the names which are likely to be most familiar to readers.

¹² While an exact accounting of Shia in Pakistan is impossible because the Pakistani census is not fielded in areas where Shia are populous (e.g. the Northern Areas), they are believed to comprise 20 percent of the population (CIA 2009).

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Online Appendix B: Measuring Support for Islamist Militant Organizations,

The Endorsement Experiment

The endorsement experiment involves assessing support for policies which are relatively well known but about which Pakistanis do not have strong feelings (as we learned during pretesting). It works as follows:

- Respondents are randomly assigned to treatment or control groups (one half of the sample is assigned to each group).
- Respondents in the control group are asked their level of support for four policies, measured on a five-point scale (recoded to lie between 0 and 1 for the analysis).
- Respondents in the treatment group are asked identical questions but then are told that one of four groups mentioned in the first section supports the policy in question. Which group is associated with each of the four policies is randomized within the treatment group.
- The difference in means between treatment and control groups provides a measure of affect towards the groups, since the only difference between the treatment and control conditions is the group endorsement.

Figure B1 provides a sample question, showing the treatment and control questions, and illustrates the randomization procedure in visual form.¹³ The questions measuring policy support are presented in the appendix.

¹³ Since our enumerators were not able to bring computers into the field—doing so was culturally inappropriate, physically risky, and complicated by severe and sustained power outages—we developed a procedure that allowed our field team to conduct the randomization with printed survey forms. There were 25 experimental conditions: 1 control questionnaire form, and 4! (= 24) possible treatment forms. We assigned the control form number 1 and the remaining forms numbers 2 to 25. Using a random number generator we randomized the order of these forms, repeating the control form 24 times. SEDCO's team then laid out the 48 boxes with these forms in randomized order and proceeded to staple them one-at-a-time onto the serialized base forms. This procedure effectively randomized across treatment and control as well as within treatment. We then randomly ordered the 500 PSUs and assigned the serialized forms to PSU in order, so form 1 went to PSU 1, form 2 went to PSU 2, etc. This added another layer of randomization. We audited every survey form in 10% of PSUs before they went into the field and found that SEDCO carried out the randomization perfectly as the balance tests in Table 1 and Online Appendix C attest.

The advantage of this approach is that the militant organization is not the primary object of evaluation; the policy is. We expected respondents to be more willing to share their opinions on uncontroversial policies rather than controversial groups. However, by embedding endorsements within the questions, we are able to indirectly ascertain support for militant organizations. Because we randomize both assignment to the group endorsement and the pairing of issues with groups, any difference in policy support can be attributed solely to the impact of the group endorsement.¹⁴

We used this method to measure support for four groups: the Kashmiri tanzeems, the Afghan Taliban, al-Qa'ida, and the sectarian tanzeems.¹⁵ This required that we ask about four policy issues: polio vaccinations, reforming the Frontier Crimes Regulations (the legal code governing the FATA), redefining the Durand line (the border separating Pakistan from Afghanistan), and requiring madrassahs to teach math and science. By randomizing which group is associated with which policy among the treatment group, we control for order effects and randomize the pairing of issue with group. This allows us to identify effects for multiple groups that are unlikely to be biased by the details of any specific policy or the information a group's endorsement carries about that policy.

For an endorsement experiment of this type to work the policies need to have two characteristics (see Bullock, Imai, and Shapiro 2011). First, they need to be ones about which respondents do not have overly strong prior opinions so that a group's endorsement can still affect their evaluation of the policy. This procedure would not work, for example, if one asked American respondents about banning abortion, on which prior attitudes are strong. Second, the policies have to be at least somewhat familiar to respondents since the group endorsement has to be meaningful and salient. For example, a similar survey in the U.S. could not ask about an obscure mining

¹⁴ See Bullock, Imai, and Shapiro (2011) for a full discussion of the measurement properties of this endorsement experiment.

¹⁵ Our budget for the survey only allowed us to interview 6,000 respondents (still twice as large as any previous survey of Pakistani public opinion). This meant that we could only study four groups (i.e., divide the sample into four cells) while maintaining a sample large enough for significance. Given this constraint, we omitted an endorsement experiment on the Pakistan Taliban, which was not then as prominent as it has since become.

regulation since respondents may not provide meaningful responses and endorsements may have limited impacts. While the policies we studied may seem high valence to professional students of politics, they do not appear to be so for most Pakistanis. During pre-testing, we found that most respondents knew about all four issues but did not have strong opinions on them. Our enumerators, professionals averaging 4.6 years of experience, likewise felt these issues would be ones respondents would be familiar with but on which they would not have extremely rigid positions.


This approach unambiguously drove down item non-response. Our survey posed a number of direct questions (i.e., without an endorsement experiment) such as “What is the effect of group X’s actions on their cause?” Non-response on these items ranged from 22% for al-Qa’ida to 6% for the Kashmiri tanzeem. Item non-response on the endorsement experiment questions, by contrast, ranged from a high of 7.6% for al-Qa’ida endorsing Frontier Crimes Regulation reform to 0.6% for the sectarian tanzeems endorsing polio vaccinations. Additionally, there were no large differences in non-response rates to the policy questions between treatment and control groups.¹⁶

The low item non-response rate in our survey provides *prima facie* evidence that this technique reduced respondents’ concerns about reporting sensitive information. The fact that the endorsement experiment drives down item non-response, and that there is almost no consistent difference in non-response between treatment and control groups, is not necessarily evidence that our approach also ameliorates social desirability bias. Nonetheless, one would need to construct a fairly contorted story to explain why a technique that drives down item non-response so dramatically would fail to address social desirability biases that stem from respondents’ concerns about how enumerators will react to their answers.¹⁷

¹⁶ 14 of 16 endorsements were insignificantly related to response. The probability of rejecting the null in 1 or 2 of 16 draws at the 95% level if there is in fact no impact of the endorsements on response is roughly 96%.

¹⁷ We considered other methods of addressing the complexities inherent in asking directly about militancy in insecure locations. Like the endorsement experiment, the list experiment produces an indirect, aggregate-level measurement of support. Unlike the endorsement experiment, however, the list experiment

Figure B1: Illustration of The Endorsement Experiment



still entails asking respondents how they feel about sensitive groups, and therefore does less to minimize safety concerns. Additionally, recent studies have pointed to several complications of using list experiments, including design effects (i.e., the inclusion of a treatment item in the list changes the meaning of the control items) and floor/ceiling effects (i.e., respondents may still not reveal their true intentions if they approach the floor or ceiling of selecting the number of items on the list). See Glynn (2009) and Blair and Imai (2012) for more details.

Online Appendix C: Question Wordings

Policies for Endorsement Experiment

The World Health Organizations recently announced a plan to introduced universal Polio vaccination across Pakistan. How much do you support such a plan?

- A great deal
- A lot
- A moderate amount
- A little
- Not at all

The newly-elected national government has proposed reforming the Frontier Crimes Regulation and making tribal areas equal to other provinces of the country. How much do you support such a plan?

- A great deal
- A lot
- A moderate amount
- A little
- Not at all

Governments of Pakistan and Afghanistan have explored using peace jirgas to resolve their disputes for example the location of the boundary [Durand line/Sarhad]. How much do you support such a plan?

- A great deal
- A lot
- A moderate amount
- A little
- Not at all

In recent years the government of Pakistan has proposed curriculum reform for madaris to minimize sectarian discord. How much do you support such a plan?

- A great deal
- A lot
- A moderate amount
- A little
- Not at all

Components of Kashmir Index

How well does India protect the rights of its Muslim citizens?

- Extremely well
- Somewhat well
- Neither well nor poorly
- Somewhat poorly
- Extremely poorly

Thinking about the political preferences of Muslims in occupied Kashmir, please tell us which statement you agree with the most:

- In occupied Kashmir the majority of Muslims want to be part of India.
- In occupied Kashmir the majority of Muslims want an independent state.
- In occupied Kashmir the majority of Muslims want to be part of Pakistan.

Democratic Values

How important is it for you to live in a country that is governed by representatives elected by the people?

- Extremely important*
- Very important*
- Moderately important*
- Slightly important*
- Not important at all*

How important is it for you to live in a country where the decisions of the courts are independent from influence by political and military authorities?

- Extremely important*
- Very important*
- Moderately important*
- Slightly important*
- Not important at all*

How important is it that individuals be able to express their political views, even though other people may not agree with them?

- Extremely important*
- Very important*
- Moderately important*
- Slightly important*
- Not important at all*

How important is it that individuals be able to meet with others to work on political issues?

- Extremely important*
- Very important*
- Moderately important*
- Slightly important*
- Not important at all*

How important is it that individual property rights be secure? This means the state cannot take away their things without proper court proceedings?

- Extremely important*
- Very important*
- Moderately important*
- Slightly important*
- Not important at all*

The 1973 Constitution of Pakistan says civilians should control the military. This means the military cannot take action without orders from civilian leaders. In your opinion, how much control should civilians have over the military?

- Complete control*
- A lot of control*
- A moderate amount of control*
- A little control*
- No control at all*

Attitudinal Controls

Tell us if you agree with this opinion: a Shari'a government means a government that uses physical punishments (stoning, cutting off hands, whipping) to make sure people obey the law.

- Agree
- Disagree

Please tell us about the U.S. government's influence on the world, if it is: extremely positive, somewhat positive, neither positive nor negative, somewhat negative, or extremely negative?

- Extremely positive
- Somewhat positive
- Neither positive nor negative
- Somewhat negative
- Extremely negative

Please tell us about the U.S. government's influence on Pakistan's politics, if it is: extremely positive, somewhat positive, neither positive nor negative, somewhat negative, or extremely negative?

- Extremely positive
- Somewhat positive
- Neither positive nor negative
- Somewhat negative
- Extremely negative

Do you attend dars e Quran?

- Yes
- No

How many times do you go to dars e Quran per week on average? (Open-ended, post-code as daily or otherwise).

Demographics

Are you married?

- Yes
- No

Are you Sunni or Shi'ite?

- Sunni
- Shi'ite
- Non-Muslim [WRITTEN IN BY INTERVIEWER IF NON-MUSLIM]

What is your age in years?

What was the highest class you completed?

- Primary
- Middle
- Matriculant
- Intermediate (F.A/F.Sc)
- Graduate (B.A/B.Sc.)
- Professionals (M.S.C., M.A., Ph.D. or other professional degree)
- Illiterate

What is the approximate monthly income in your household?

-Less than 3000 rupees

-3000 to 10,000 rupees

-10,001 to 15,000 rupees

-15,001 to 25,000 rupees

-More than 25,000 rupees

Do you ever go online to access the Internet, do web site browsing, or to send and receive email?

-Yes

-No

Do you have a personal cell phone?

-Yes

-No

Read in any language with understanding?

-Yes

-No

-If yes, what language?

Can you write in any language, more than signing your name?

-Yes

-No

-If yes, what language?

Can you solve simple math (addition, subtraction) problems? Like 10 plus 7, or 30 divided by 5?

-Yes

-No

-Not sure

Sex:

-Male

-Female

Online Appendix D: Descriptive Statistics and Randomization Checks

Table D1: Descriptive Statistics and Randomization Checks

Demographic and Attitudinal Controls				Democratic Values							
	Total	Control	Treatment		Total	Control	Treatment		Total	Control	Treatment
<u>Gender (F: .81 p=.37)</u>				<u>U.S. Influence on World (F: .57 p=.68)</u>				<u>Democratic Values Index (F: 1.6 p=.16)</u>			
Male	54.6%	54.1%	55.2%					1	14.6%	14.5%	14.7%
Female	45.4	46.0	44.8	Extremely Negative	62.4%	62.6%	62.3%	.83	16.8	18.2	15.3
				Somewhat Negative	21.3	20.7	21.9	.67	12.4	11.7	13.1
				Neutral	8.9	9.3	8.4	.5	14.7	14.1	15.4
<u>Urban/Rural (F: .42 p=.52)</u>				Somewhat Positive	6.1	6.1	6.1	.33	15.1	15.0	15.3
Urban	31.5%	31.9%	31.0%	Extremely Positive	1.3	1.3	1.3	.17	15.0	14.9	15.0
Rural	68.5	68.1	69.0					0	11.5	11.6	11.3
				<u>U.S. Influence on Pakistan (F: 1.5 p=.20)</u>				<u>Elected Representatives (F: 2.0 p=.10)</u>			
<u>Province (F: .23 p=.86)</u>				Extremely Negative	63.4%	64.2%	62.5%	Extremely Important	49.4%	49.4%	43.3%
Punjab	55.2%	55.7%	54.7%	Somewhat Negative	18.8	17.8	19.9	Very Important	30.4	30.6	30.1
Sindh	25.0	24.8	25.2	Neutral	10.2	10.2	10.2	Moderately Important	14.1	14.2	14.0
NWFP	13.7	13.5	13.8	Somewhat Positive	6.3	6.2	6.4	Slightly Important	3.9	3.2	4.6
Balochistan	6.2	6.1	6.2	Extremely Positive	1.4	1.7	1.2	Not Important at All	2.3	2.5	2.0
				<u>Sharia Requires Physical Punishment (F: 2.7 p=.10)</u>				<u>Independent Courts (F: .71 p=.58)</u>			
<u>Religious Sect (F: .57 p=.45)</u>				1	57.2%	56.2%	58.4%	Extremely Important	54.7%	55.0%	54.3%
Sunni	96.0%	96.1%	95.8%	0	42.8	43.9	41.6	Very Important	26.0	26.1	25.8
Shi'ite	4.0	3.9	4.2					Moderately Important	14.8	14.6	15.0
				<u>Dars e Quran Attend Daily (F: 1.1 p=.29)</u>				Slightly Important	3.3	2.9	3.7
<u>Age (F: .57 p=.72)</u>				Yes	20.2%	20.8%	19.6%	Not Important at All	1.4	1.4	1.3
18-24	23.0%	23.0%	23.2%	No	79.8	79.3	80.4	<u>Free Speech (F: .88 p=.48)</u>			
25-29	18.7	19.0	18.3					Extremely Important	48.1%	48.9%	47.3%
30-39	28.8	28.3	29.2					Very Important	33.3	33.4	33.2
40-49	17.7	17.9	17.5	<u>Dars e Quran Attend Some (F: .2 p=.89)</u>				Moderately Important	13.7	13.1	14.3
50-59	7.6	7.9	7.3	Yes	39.1%	39.0%	39.2%	Slightly Important	4.1	3.8	4.5
60+	4.2	3.8	4.5	No	60.9	61.0	60.8	Not Important at All	0.1	0.1	0.1
								<u>Freedom of Assembly (F: .86 p=.49)</u>			
<u>Internet Use (F: .86 p=.77)</u>				<u>Education (F: 1.3 p=.26)</u>				Extremely Important	53.5%	54.1%	52.8%
Yes	7.3%	7.4%	7.2%	Illiterate	32.0%	32.3%	31.6%	Very Important	29.8	29.4	30.2
No	92.7	92.6	92.8	Primary	13	13.8	12.1	Moderately Important	12.7	12.4	13.1
<u>Cellphone (F: .41 p=.84)</u>				Middle	14.8	13.9	15.7	Slightly Important	3.5	3.5	3.6
Yes	48.8%	48.9%	48.6%	Matriculant	19.4	19.5	19.4	Not Important at All	0.0	0.1	0.0
No	51.2	51.1	51.3	Intermediate	12.6	12.8	12.4				
				Graduate	6.3	5.9	6.8	<u>Property Rights (F: .94 p=.44)</u>			
<u>Read (F: .04 p=.85)</u>				Professional	1.9	1.8	2.1	Extremely Important	66.9%	67.0%	66.8%
Yes	71.1%	71.0%	71.2%					Very Important	18.5	18.3	18.7
No	28.9	29	28.8	<u>Monthly Income (F: .72 p=.57)</u>				Moderately Important	9.5	10.0	9.0
				Less than 3000 PKR	12.1%	12.0%	12.1%	Slightly Important	3.9	3.6	4.2
<u>Numerate (F: .00 p=.97)</u>				3,000-10,000 PKR	54.7	55.2	54.1	Not Important at All	1.2	1.1	1.3
Yes	76.4%	76.4%	76.4%	10,001-15,000 PKR	22.8	22.9	22.6				
No	23.6	23.6	23.6	15,001-25,000 PKR	8.6	8.1	9.1	<u>Civilian Control of Military (F: .56 p=.69)</u>			
				More than 25,000 PKR	1.9	1.7	2.1	Complete control	40.7%	40.2%	41.3%
<u>Marital Status (F: .02 p=.89)</u>								A lot of control	17.8	17.5	18.0
Married	77.6%	77.7%	77.6%	<u>Write (F: .00 p=.96)</u>				A moderate amount of control	24.6	25.5	23.6
Single	22.4	22.3	22.4	Yes	70.0%	70.0%	70.0%	A little control	10.6	10.6	10.7
				No	30.0	30.0	30.0	No control at all	6.4	6.2	6.5

Note: Demographics and randomization checks for estimation sample of N=5,243 respondents who provided data on all policy questions and all control variables except for income. 151 of those respondents did not provide data on household income.

Table D2: Descriptive Statistics and Randomization Checks (Punjab)

	Demographic and Attitudinal Controls							Democratic Values		
	Total	Control	Treatment		Total	Control	Treatment	Total	Control	Treatment
<u>Gender (F: .26 p=.61)</u>				<u>U.S. Influence on World (F: .61 p=.64)</u>				<u>Democratic Values Index (F: 1.5 p=.18)</u>		
Male	57.0%	56.6%	57.6%	Extremely Negative	1.1%	1.1%	1.0%	0	5.3%	4.7%
Female	43.0	43.5	42.4	Somewhat Negative	2.8	2.6	3.1	.17	10.7	11.0
				Neutral	3.6	4.1	3.2	.33	13.2	12.8
				Somewhat Positive	14.0	13.3	14.7	.5	15.5	14.5
				Extremely Positive	78.5	78.9	78.1	.67	11.9	11.5
								.83	23.3	25.6
								1	2.0	19.8
										20.4
<u>Urban/Rural (F: .91 p=.34)</u>				<u>U.S. Influence on Pakistan (F: 2.6 p=.04)</u>				<u>Elected Representatives (F: 2.9 p=.02)</u>		
Urban	28.8%	29.7%	27.9%	Extremely Negative	1.1%	1.5%	0.6%	Extremely Important	63.1%	63.8%
Rural	71.2	70.3	72.1	Somewhat Negative	3.8	3.4	4.3	Very Important	26.0	26.3
				Neutral	4.3	3.6	5.1	Moderately Important	5.9	5.7
				Somewhat Positive	12.6	11.9	13.4	Slightly Important	2.4	1.5
				Extremely Positive	78.2	79.6	76.7	Not Important at All	2.6	2.8
										2.5
<u>Religious Sect (F: .00 p=.98)</u>				<u>Sharia Requires Physical Punishment (F: 5.3 p=.02)</u>				<u>Independent Courts (F: 3.0 p=.02)</u>		
Sunni	97.1%	97.1%	97.1%	Yes	58.7%	56.5%	61.2%	Extremely Important	67.2%	67.9%
Shi'ite	2.9	2.9	2.9	No	41.3	43.5	38.8	Very Important	21.7	22.6
								Moderately Important	7.7	7.0
								Slightly Important	2.2	1.5
								Not Important at All	1.2	0.1
										1.5
<u>Age (F: .62 p=.68)</u>				<u>Dars e Quran Attend Daily (F: .16 p=.69)</u>				<u>Free Speech (F: 1.8 p=.14)</u>		
18-24	23.7%	23.3%	24.1%	Yes	18.5%	18.8%	18.1%	Extremely Important	55.7%	57.1%
25-29	18.5	19.0	18.0	No	81.5	81.2	81.8	Very Important	32.9	32.8
30-39	26.3	26.2	26.5					Moderately Important	8.7	7.9
40-49	17.6	18.3	16.9					Slightly Important	2.4	2.0
50-59	8.2	8.3	8.0					Not Important at All	0.4	0.2
60+	5.7	5.1	6.5							0.7
								<u>Freedom of Assembly (F: 1.2 p=.33)</u>		
<u>Internet Use (F: .02 p=.90)</u>				<u>Dars e Quran Attend Some (F: .40 p=.53)</u>				Extremely Important	61.1%	62.2%
Yes	5.1%	5.0%	5.1%	Yes	42.8%	42.2%	43.5%	Very Important	28.4	27.9
No	95.0	95.0	94.9	No	57.2	57.8	56.5	Moderately Important	8.3	7.6
								Slightly Important	2.0	1.8
								Not Important at All	0.1	0.5
<u>Cellphone (F: .03 p=.86)</u>				<u>Education (F: 2.2 p=.05)</u>						0.0
Yes	46.9%	46.7%	47.1%	Illiterate	29.3%	30.7%	27.9%	Extremely Important		59.8%
No	53.1	53.3	52.9	Primary	14.9	13.8	13.6	Very Important		28.9
				Middle	17.3	15.9	18.9	Moderately Important		9.1
				Matriculant	20.7	20.5	21.0	Slightly Important		2.1
				Intermediate	10.8	11.1	10.3	Not Important at All		0.0
<u>Read (F: .56 p=.45)</u>				Graduate	5.4	4.2	6.6			
Yes	74.1%	73.4%	74.8%	Professional	1.6	1.6	1.7			
No	25.9	26.6	25.2					<u>Property Rights (F: 3.4 p=.01)</u>		
								Extremely Important	80.7%	81.9%
<u>Numerate (F: .98 p=.32)</u>								Very Important	12.9	12.0
Yes	78.4%	77.6%	79.3%					Moderately Important	5.2	5.6
No	21.6	22.5	20.7					Slightly Important	1.0	4.3
								Not Important at All	0.2	0.1
<u>Marital Status (F: .53 p=.83)</u>				<u>Monthly Income (F: .82 p=.51)</u>						0.4
Yes	77.6%	77.5%	77.8%	Less than 3000 PKR	6.2%	5.5%	6.9%			
No	22.4	22.5	22.3	3,000-10,000 PKR	54.4	55.4	53.2			
				10,001-15,000 PKR	26.7	27.0	26.5	<u>Civilian Control of Military (F: 62 p=.64)</u>		
<u>Write (F: .53 p=.47)</u>				15,001-25,000 PKR	10.9	10.4	11.6	Complete control	42.9%	42.5%
Yes	73.6%	72.9%	73.6%	More than 25,000 PKR	1.8	1.7	1.9	A lot of control	16.5	16.2
No	26.4	27.1	26.4					A moderate amount of control	26.1	27.4
								A little control	8.8	8.4
								No control at all	5.7	5.5
										6.0

Note: Demographics and randomization checks for estimation sample of respondents who provided data on all policy questions and all control variables except for income.

	<u>Demographic and Attitudinal Controls</u>						<u>Democratic Values</u>					
	Total	Control	Treatment		Total	Control	Treatment		Total	Control	Treatment	
<u>Gender ($F^2_{\text{2},6} \ p=.11$)</u>				<u>U.S. Influence on World</u>				<u>Democratic Values Index ($F^2_{\text{2},64} \ p=.69$)</u>				
Male	48.8%	46.8%	50.9%	($F^2_{\text{2},27} \ p=.89$)				0	16.9%	17.8%	15.9%	
Female	51.2	53.2	49.1	Extremely Negative	1.4%	1.5%	1.3%	.17	18.8	17.9	19.7	
				Somewhat Negative	7.5	8.0	7.0	.33	15.5	16.2	14.8	
				Neutral	15.3	15.8	14.7	.5	14.9	15.1	14.8	
<u>Urban/Rural ($F^2_{\text{2},00} \ p=.98$)</u>				Somewhat Positive	34.3	34.1	34.6	.67	15.8	14.5	17.2	
Urban	47.4%	47.5%	47.4%	Extremely Positive	41.5	40.1	42.4	.83	9.2	9.6	8.7	
Rural	52.6	52.5	52.6					1	8.9	8.9	8.9	
				<u>U.S. Influence on Pakistan</u>				<u>Elected Representatives ($F^2_{\text{2},41} \ p=.79$)</u>				
				($F^2_{\text{2},81} \ p=.50$)				Extremely Important	39.6%	38.8%	40.5%	
<u>Religious Sect ($F^2_{\text{2},12} \ p=.27$)</u>				Extremely Negative	1.0%	1.1%	1.0%	Very Important	34.6	35.7	33.3	
Sunni	90.8%	91.6%	90.0%	Somewhat Negative	7.2	7.1	7.3	Moderately Important	19.8	19.8	19.8	
Shi'ite	9.2	8.4	10.0	Neutral	15.8	17.2	14.3	Slightly Important	4.2	3.8	4.7	
				Somewhat Positive	30.1	28.6	31.7	Not Important at All	1.8	1.9	1.7	
				Extremely Positive	45.9	45.9	45.9					
<u>Age ($F^2_{\text{2},38} \ p=.85$)</u>				<u>Sharia Requires Physical Punishment ($F^2_{\text{2},02} \ p=.90$)</u>				<u>Independent Courts ($F^2_{\text{2},69} \ p=.60$)</u>				
18-24	19.2%	19.6%	18.8%	Yes	46.0%	45.8%	46.1%	Extremely Important	41.0%	40.8%	41.1%	
25-29	19.5	19.8	19.2	No	54.0	54.2	53.9	Very Important	30.8	29.3	32.3	
30-39	34.5	33.4	35.6					Moderately Important	23.9	24.9	22.9	
40-49	19.3	19.2	19.4					Slightly Important	3.2	3.5	2.9	
50-59	5.8	5.9	5.7	<u>Dars e Quran Attend Daily</u>				Not Important at All	1.2	1.4	0.9	
60+	1.7	2.1	1.4	($F^2_{\text{2},06} \ p=.81$)								
				Yes	26.0%	25.8%	26.3%	<u>Free Speech ($F^2_{\text{2},27} \ p=.88$)</u>				
<u>Internet Use ($F^2_{\text{2},10} \ p=.75$)</u>				No	74.0	74.2	73.7	Extremely Important	46.3%	45.5%	47.1%	
Yes	12.8%	13.1%	12.5%					Very Important	36.3	36.6	36.0	
No	87.2	87.0	87.5	<u>Dars e Quran Attend Some</u>				Moderately Important	13.3	13.3	13.3	
				($F^2_{\text{2},11} \ p=.29$)				Slightly Important	3.2	3.5	2.9	
<u>Cellphone ($F^2_{\text{2},33} \ p=.07$)</u>				Yes	33.6%	34.9%	32.3%	Not Important at All	0.9	1.1	0.8	
Yes	56.2%	54.0 %	58.6%	No	66.4	65.1	67.7					
No	43.8	46.0	41.4					<u>Freedom of Assembly ($F^2_{\text{2},20} \ p=.93$)</u>				
				<u>Education ($F^2_{\text{2},87} \ p=.51$)</u>				Extremely Important	50.2%	50.6%	49.9%	
<u>Read ($F^2_{\text{2},01} \ p=.93$)</u>				Illiterate	35.1%	34.8%	35.5%	Very Important	32.2	31.7	32.7	
Yes	66.4%	66.3%	66.5%	Primary	10.5	10.7	10.2	Moderately Important	14.8	14.7	14.9	
No	33.6	33.7	33.5	Middle	8.6	9.1	8.1	Slightly Important	2.3	2.5	2.2	
				Matriculant	15.8	15.7	15.8	Not Important at All	0.4	0.6	0.3	
<u>Numerate ($F^2_{\text{2},04} \ p=.84$)</u>				Intermediate	17.8	17.3	18.3					
Yes	68.3%	68.5%	68.1%	Graduate	9.9	10.8	9.0	<u>Property Rights ($F^2_{\text{2},21} \ p=.92$)</u>				
No	31.7	31.5	31.9	Professional	2.3	1.7	3.1	Extremely Important	50.0%	49.5%	5	

Table D4: Descriptive Statistics and Randomization Checks (KPK)

	Demographic and Attitudinal Controls						Democratic Values		
	Total	Control	Treatment	Total	Control	Treatment	Total	Control	Treatment
<u>Gender (F: .40 p=.53)</u>				<u>U.S. Influence on World (F: .49 p=.74)</u>			<u>Democratic Values Index (F: .35 p=.90)</u>		
Male	54.1%	55.0%	53.1%	Extremely Negative	2.3%	1.8%	0	18.1%	19.3%
Female	45.9	45.0	46.9	Somewhat Negative	9.3	10.7	.17	22.8	22.7
				Neutral	13.1	14.5	.33	22.8	23.2
<u>Urban/Rural (F: .23 p=.63)</u>				Somewhat Positive	24.2	22.5	.5	14.9	14.2
Urban	17.3%	16.8%	17.8%	Extremely Positive	51.1	50.5	.67	9.3	9.1
Rural	82.7	83.2	82.2				.83	6.7	7.4
							1	5.5	5.5
<u>Religious Sect (F: .72 p=.40)</u>				<u>U.S. Influence on Pakistan (F: .69 p=.59)</u>			<u>Elected Representatives (F: .92 p=.45)</u>		
Sunni	99.6%	99.5%	99.8%	Extremely Negative	3.1%	2.6%	Extremely Important	21.8%	20.9%
Shi'ite	0.4	0.5	0.2	Somewhat Negative	10.6	11.7	Very Important	40.3	40.0
				Neutral	20.1	20.9	Moderately Important	28.4	29.7
				Somewhat Positive	18.9	18.1	Slightly Important	8.6	8.3
				Extremely Positive	47.3	46.8	Not Important at All	0.9	1.4
<u>Age (F: 1.4 p=.24)</u>				<u>Sharia Requires Physical Punishment (F: .06 p=.80)</u>			<u>Independent Courts (F: .30 p=.86)</u>		
18-24	29.7%	32.0%	27.3%	Yes	71.3%	71.9%	Extremely Important	39.6%	39.7%
25-29	17.6	18.1	17.2	No	28.7	29.1	Very Important	33.7	33.7
30-39	24.2	21.9	2.7				Moderately Important	19.1	19.4
40-49	15.0	13.9	16.2				Slightly Important	6.3	5.7
50-59	9.8	10.8	8.8	<u>Dars e Quran Attend Daily (F: 4.1 p=.05)</u>			Not Important at All	1.3	1.6
60+	3.6	3.3	4.0	Yes	19.3%	21.7%			
<u>Internet Use (F: 1.2 p=.27)</u>				No	80.7	78.3	<u>Free Speech (F: .27 p=.89)</u>		
Yes	7.2%	8.0%	6.2%				Extremely Important	26.4%	26.3%
No	92.9	92.0	93.8	<u>Dars e Quran Attend Some (F: 1.2 p=.26)</u>			Very Important	33.5	34.4
<u>Cellphone (F: 9.0 p=.00)</u>				Yes	69.0%	70.8%	Moderately Important	26.8	26.1
Yes	59.8%	55.6%	64.1%	No	31.0	29.3	Slightly Important	11.2	10.8
No	40.3	44.4	35.9				Not Important at All	2.2	2.5
<u>Read (F: .04 p=.85)</u>				<u>Education (F: 1.2 p=.31)</u>			<u>Freedom of Assembly (F: .33 p=.85)</u>		
Yes	64.5%	65.7%	63.3%	Illiterate	36.0%	35.2%	Extremely Important	37.4%	38.3%
No	35.5	34.3	36.7	Primary	7.8	7.8	Very Important	33.2	33.6
				Middle	15.2	13.1	Moderately Important	20.1	19.1
<u>Numerate (F: 3.6 p=.06)</u>				Matriculant	22.1	22.8	Slightly Important	8.2	7.8
Yes	82.4%	85.9%	84.2%	Intermediate	11.9	12.9	Not Important at All	1.1	1.2
No	17.6	14.1	15.8	Graduate	5.2	5.8			
<u>Write (F: .52 p=.47)</u>				Professional	1.9	2.5	<u>Property Rights (F: 2.1 p=.09)</u>		
Yes	64.3%	65.2%	63.4%	<u>Monthly Income (F: 1.2 p=.30)</u>			Extremely Important	53.2%	49.3%
No	35.7	34.8	36.7	Less than 3000 PKR	8.3%	10.9%	Very Important	19.0	20.9
				3,000-10,000 PKR	63.3	58.3	Moderately Important	21.8	23.5
<u>Marital Status (F: 4.48 p=.04)</u>				10,001-15,000 PKR	20.4	21.7	Slightly Important	5.5	5.5
Married	69.4%	66.3%	72.7%	15,001-25,000 PKR	6.5	7.9	Not Important at All	0.5	0.8
Single	30.6	33.7	27.3	More than 25,000 PKR	1.6	1.3			
							<u>Civilian Control of Military (F: 2.15 p=.08)</u>		
							Complete control	44.1%	42.7%
							A lot of control	25.6	24.3
							A moderate amount of control	23.7	25.8
							A little control	5.8	6.9
							No control at all	0.8	0.4

Note: Demographics and randomization checks for estimation sample of respondents who provided data on all policy questions and all control variables except for income.

Demographic and Attitudinal Controls							Democratic Values					
	Total	Control	Treatment		Total	Control	Treatment		Total	Control	Treatment	
<u>Gender (F: .51 p=.48)</u>				<u>U.S. Influence on World</u>	<u>Democratic Values Index (F: .82 p=.55)</u>							
Male	51.5%	50.4%	52.7%	<u>(F: .64 p=.63)</u>				0	32.5%	33.1%	31.8%	
Female	48.5	49.6	47.3	Extremely Negative	1.7%	1.5%	1.8%	.17	20.5	18.4	22.8	
				Somewhat Negative	20.7	19.2	22.2	.33	14.0	15.4	12.6	
				Neutral	19.3	20.6	17.9	.5	7.9	7.6	8.2	
				Somewhat Positive	30.6	31.7	29.4	.67	8.5	7.9	9.2	
<u>Urban/Rural (F: .55 p=.46)</u>				Extremely Positive	27.9	27.0	28.8	.83	11.8	13.0	10.4	
Urban	21.7%	22.6%	21.8%						4.8	4.7	5.0	
Rural	78.3	77.4	79.3									
				<u>U.S. Influence on Pakistan</u>	<u>Elected Representatives (F: .46 p=.73)</u>							
				<u>(F: .63 p=.63)</u>								
<u>Religious Sect (F: .91 p=.34)</u>				Extremely Negative	2.4%	2.7%	2.2%	Extremely Important	28.1%	28.1%	28.0%	
				Somewhat Negative	14.6	15.4	13.7	Very Important	27.9	27.0	28.8	
Sunni	99.4%	99.7%	99.2%	Neutral	18.7	19.3	18.0	Moderately Important	33.5	33.8	33.2	
Shi'ite	0.6	0.3	0.8	Somewhat Positive	28.2	25.8	30.6	Slightly Important	6.5	6.2	6.9	
				Extremely Positive	36.2	36.8	35.5	Not Important at All	4.0	4.8	3.2	
<u>Age (F: 2.0 p=.08)</u>				<u>Sharia Requires Physical</u>	<u>Independent Courts (F: .77 p=.54)</u>							
				<u>Punishment (F: 2.8 p=.10)</u>								
18-24	19.4%	16.8%	22.2%	Yes	55.1%	57.4%	52.7%	Extremely Important	29.4%	30.4%	28.5%	
25-29	20.1	19.0	21.2	No	44.9	42.7	47.3	Very Important	29.0	29.1	28.8	
30-39	37.6	39.7	35.5					Moderately Important	29.8	2.8	32.1	
40-49	17.0	18.2	15.7	<u>Dars e Quran Attend Daily</u>				Slightly Important	6.9	6.9	6.9	
50-59	4.4	5.3	3.4	<u>(F: .95 p=.33)</u>				Not Important at All	4.9	6.0	3.8	
60+	1.5	1.0	2.0	Yes	13.6%	14.6%	12.6%					
				No	86.4	85.4	87.4	<u>Free Speech (F: 1.6 p=.18)</u>				
<u>Internet Use (F: .01 p=.94)</u>								Extremely Important	30.6%	33.2%	27.9%	
Yes	5.1%	5.1%	5.2%	<u>Dars e Quran Attend Some</u>				Very Important	25.5	25.7	25.3	
No	94.9	94.9	94.8	<u>(F: 3.1 p=.08)</u>				Moderately Important	32.6	31.7	33.5	
				Yes	40.4%	43.2%	37.4%	Slightly Important	8.9	6.8	11.0	
<u>Cellphone (F: .24 p=.62)</u>				No	59.6	56.9	62.6	Not Important at All	2.5	2.6	2.3	
Yes	49.7%	48.9%	49.5%					<u>Freedom of Assembly (F: .48 p=.74)</u>				
No	50.3	51.1	50.5	<u>Education (F: .73 p=.61)</u>				Extremely Important	32.8%	31.7%	34.0%	
				Illiterate	35.2%	32.7%	37.9%	Very Important	23.9	23.2	24.5	
<u>Read (F: .65 p=.46)</u>				Primary	17.4	18.4	16.4	Moderately Important	28.4	30.4	26.2	
Yes	75.9%	77.1%	74.6%	Middle	15.9	17.2	14.5	Slightly Important	13.2	12.6	13.7	
No	24.1	22.9	25.4	Matriculant	15.6	15.8	15.4	Not Important at All	1.8	2.1	1.6	
				Intermediate	9.5	9.6	9.4					
<u>Numerate (F: .26 p=.61)</u>				Graduate	4.1	4.3	3.8	<u>Property Rights (F: .81 p=.51)</u>				
Yes	71.8%	72.5%	71.0%	Professional	2.3	1.9	2.7	Extremely Important	39.8%	39.6%	39.9%	
No	28.2	27.5	29.0					Very Important	19.4	17.7	21.3	
				<u>Monthly Income</u>				Moderately Important	20.2	21.8	18.5	
<u>Write (F: 1.40 p=.24)</u>				<u>(F: 2.3 p=.07)</u>				Slightly Important	15.8	16.7	14.8	
Yes	75.3%	77.0%	73.5%	Less than 3000 PKR	40.7%	41.6%	39.7%	Not Important at All	4.9	4.3	5.5	
No	24.7	23.0	26.5	3,000-10,000 PKR	37.1	37.4</						

Online Appendix E: Tables 1-4 with No Policy Weights

Table 1E: Support for Democratic Values Predicts Support for Militant Groups (Unweighted)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
β_1 : Group Cue	-0.026*** (0.006)	-0.025*** (0.006)	-0.025*** (0.006)	-0.024*** (0.006)	-0.051* (0.024)
β_2 : Support for Democratic Values	0.139*** (0.014)	0.116*** (0.013)	0.116*** (0.013)	0.108*** (0.013)	0.104*** (0.013)
β_3 : Group Cue x Support for Democratic Values	0.033** (0.011)	0.031** (0.011)	0.032** (0.011)	0.029** (0.011)	0.037** (0.012)
Constant	0.738*** (0.011)	0.835*** (0.022)	0.835*** (0.022)	0.785*** (0.030)	0.798*** (0.030)
R ²	0.166	0.246	0.244	0.256	0.261
N	5243	5243	5092	5243	5243
Region Fixed Effects	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Demographic Controls	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
Income Listwise Deleted	—	N	Y	N	N
Attitudinal Controls	N	N	N	Y	Y
Group Cue-Demographics Interactions	N	N	N	N	Y
Group Cue-Attitudinal Interaction	N	N	N	N	Y

*** $p < .001$; ** $p < .01$; * $p < .05$; + $p < .10$ (two-tailed)

Note: OLS regressions predicting support for policies. Demographic controls include: gender, marital status, age, access to Internet, possession of cellular phone, ability to read, ability to write, ability to perform arithmetic, formal education level, income, and religion sect. Attitudinal controls include two measures of attitudes toward United States, views of Shari'a law, and religiosity.

Table 2E: Support for Democratic Values is More Strongly Correlated with Support for Azadi Groups (Unweighted)

	<i>Azadi Groups</i>			<i>Non-Azadi Groups</i>		
	<u>Kashmir</u> <u>Tanzeem</u>	<u>Afghan</u> <u>Taliban</u>	<u>Pooled</u> <u>Azadi</u>	<u>al-Qa'ida</u>	<u>Sectarian</u> <u>Tanzeem</u>	<u>Pooled</u> <u>Non-Azadi</u>
β_1 : Group Cue	-0.028*** (0.008)	-0.032*** (0.009)	-0.030*** (0.007)	-0.019* (0.008)	-0.019* (0.008)	-0.019** (0.006)
β_2 : Support for Democratic Values	0.106*** (0.013)	0.111*** (0.013)	0.108*** (0.013)	0.108*** (0.013)	0.108*** (0.013)	0.108*** (0.013)
β_3 : Group Cue x Support for Democratic Values	0.037* (0.014)	0.034* (0.016)	0.035** (0.013)	0.023+ (0.013)	0.020 (0.014)	0.022+ (0.011)
Constant	0.788*** (0.030)	0.771*** (0.033)	0.780*** (0.030)	0.788*** (0.032)	0.793*** (0.033)	0.791*** (0.031)
R ²	0.161	0.149	0.207	0.155	0.159	0.214
N	5243	5243	5243	5243	5243	5243

*** $p < .001$; ** $p < .01$; * $p < .05$; + $p < .10$ (two-tailed)

Note: OLS regressions predicting support for policies. Regression models include region fixed effects, demographic controls, and attitudinal controls. Demographic controls include: gender, marital status, age, access to Internet, possession of cellular phone, ability to read, ability to write, ability to perform arithmetic, formal education level, income, and religion sect. Attitudinal controls include two measures of attitudes toward United States, views of Shari'a law, and religiosity.

Table 3E: Perception of Muslims in Kashmir Moderates the Democracy-Militancy Relationship (Unweighted)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
β_1 : Group Cue	0.001 (0.028)	0.006 (0.027)	0.014 (0.027)	0.009 (0.028)	-0.022 (0.035)
β_2 : Support for Democratic Values	0.167*** (0.046)	0.147*** (0.042)	0.145** (0.047)	0.144*** (0.041)	0.138*** (0.041)
β_3 : Perception of Muslims in Kashmir	0.064** (0.022)	0.042* (0.022)	0.052* (0.022)	0.035 (0.021)	0.028 (0.022)
β_4 : Group Cue x Support for Democratic Values	-0.067 (0.064)	-0.087 (0.061)	-0.078 (0.065)	-0.091 (0.061)	-0.073 (0.062)
β_5 : Group Cue x Perception of Muslims in Kashmir	-0.028 (0.030)	-0.031 (0.029)	-0.041 (0.029)	-0.034 (0.030)	-0.020 (0.031)
β_6 : Support for Democratic Values x Perception of Muslims in Kashmir	-0.035 (0.048)	-0.035 (0.043)	-0.035 (0.048)	-0.038 (0.043)	-0.036 (0.043)
β_7 : Group Cue x Support for Democratic Values x Perception of Muslims in Kashmir	0.100 (0.067)	0.117+ (0.064)	0.110 (0.068)	0.120+ (0.064)	0.110+ (0.064)
Constant	0.684*** (0.023)	0.801*** (0.031)	0.791*** (0.031)	0.767*** (0.035)	0.782*** (0.036)
R ²	0.178	0.255	0.253	0.262	0.266
N	5002	5002	4864	5002	5002
Region Fixed Effects	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Demographic Controls	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
Income Listwise Deleted	—	N	Y	N	N
Attitudinal Controls	N	N	N	Y	Y
Group Cue-Demographics Interactions	N	N	N	N	Y
Group Cue-Attitudinal Interaction	N	N	N	N	Y

*** $p < .001$; ** $p < .01$; * $p < .05$; + $p < .10$ (two-tailed)

Note: OLS regressions predicting support for policies. Data weighted and adjusted for sampling design. Demographic controls include: marital status, age, access to Internet, possession of cellular phone, ability to read, ability to write, ability to perform arithmetic, formal education level, income, and religion sect. Attitudinal controls include two measures of attitudes toward United States, views of Shari'a law, and religiosity.

Table 4E: Results by Components of Democratic Values Index (Unweighted)

	<u>Property Rights</u>	<u>Free Speech</u>	<u>Indep. Courts</u>	<u>Elected Reps.</u>	<u>Civil/Mil. Separation</u>	<u>Freedom Assembly</u>
β_1 : Group Cue	-0.018** (0.006)	-0.011* (0.005)	-0.022*** (0.005)	-0.017*** (0.005)	-0.015*** (0.004)	-0.018*** (0.005)
β_2 : Support for Democratic Values	0.045*** (0.007)	0.039*** (0.008)	0.032*** (0.008)	0.049*** (0.008)	0.055*** (0.008)	0.030*** (0.008)
β_3 : Group Cue x Support for Democratic Values	0.009 (0.008)	0.000 (0.008)	0.023** (0.008)	0.012 (0.008)	0.008 (0.007)	0.014+ (0.007)
Constant	0.797*** (0.029)	0.810*** (0.029)	0.808*** (0.029)	0.810*** (0.029)	0.797*** (0.029)	0.812*** (0.030)
R ²	0.224	0.217	0.221	0.229	0.237	0.216
N	5243	5243	5243	5243	5243	5243

*** $p < .001$; ** $p < .01$; * $p < .05$; + $p < .10$ (two-tailed)

Note: OLS regressions predicting support for policies. Data weighted and adjusted for sampling design. Regression models include region fixed effects, demographic controls, and attitudinal controls. Demographic controls include: gender, marital status, age, access to Internet, possession of cellular phone, ability to read, ability to write, ability to perform arithmetic, formal education level, income, and religion sect. Attitudinal controls include two measures of attitudes toward United States, views of Shari'a law, and religiosity.

Online Appendix F: Tables 1-4 Applying National-Level Policy Weights

Table 1F: Support for Democratic Values Predicts Support for Militant Groups (National Weights)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
β_1 : Group Cue	-0.027*** (0.007)	-0.026*** (0.006)	-0.026*** (0.006)	-0.025*** (0.006)	-0.045+ (0.026)
β_2 : Support for Democratic Values	0.122*** (0.016)	0.096*** (0.014)	0.095*** (0.015)	0.092*** (0.014)	0.090*** (0.014)
β_3 : Group Cue x Support for Democratic Values	0.042*** (0.012)	0.038*** (0.011)	0.040*** (0.011)	0.036** (0.011)	0.040** (0.013)
Constant	0.748*** (0.011)	0.845*** (0.022)	0.844*** (0.022)	0.803*** (0.030)	0.813*** (0.031)
R ²	0.143	0.240	0.237	0.249	0.255
N	5243	5243	5092	5243	5243
Region Fixed Effects	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Demographic Controls	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
Income Listwise Deleted	—	N	Y	N	N
Attitudinal Controls	N	N	N	Y	Y
Group Cue-Demographics Interactions	N	N	N	N	Y
Group Cue-Attitudinal Interaction	N	N	N	N	Y

*** $p < .001$; ** $p < .01$; * $p < .05$; + $p < .10$ (two-tailed)

Note: OLS regressions predicting support for policies. Data weighted and adjusted for sampling design. Demographic controls include: gender, marital status, age, access to Internet, possession of cellular phone, ability to read, ability to write, ability to perform arithmetic, formal education level, income, and religion sect. Attitudinal controls include two measures of attitudes toward United States, views of Shari'a law, and religiosity.

Table 2F: Support for Democratic Values is More Strongly Correlated with Support for Azadi Groups (National Weights)

	<i>Azadi Groups</i>			<i>Non-Azadi Groups</i>		
	<u>Kashmir</u> <u>Tanzeem</u>	<u>Afghan</u> <u>Taliban</u>	<u>Pooled</u> <u>Azadi</u>	<u>al-Qa'ida</u>	<u>Sectarian</u> <u>Tanzeem</u>	<u>Pooled</u> <u>Non-Azadi</u>
β_1 : Group Cue	-0.033*** (0.009)	-0.036*** (0.009)	-0.033*** (0.008)	-0.024** (0.008)	-0.021* (0.009)	-0.020** (0.007)
β_2 : Support for Democratic Values	0.090*** (0.014)	0.094*** (0.014)	0.091*** (0.014)	0.092*** (0.014)	0.093*** (0.014)	0.092*** (0.014)
β_3 : Group Cue x Support for Democratic Values	0.044** (0.015)	0.041** (0.016)	0.043** (0.014)	0.028* (0.014)	0.024 (0.015)	0.026* (0.012)
Constant	0.807*** (0.032)	0.792*** (0.034)	0.801*** (0.034)	0.797*** (0.033)	0.818*** (0.033)	0.810*** (0.034)
R ²	0.157	0.145	0.182	0.151	0.155	0.185
N	5243	5243	5243	5243	5243	5243

*** $p < .001$; ** $p < .01$; * $p < .05$; + $p < .10$ (two-tailed)

Note: OLS regressions predicting support for policies. Data weighted and adjusted for sampling design. Regression models include region fixed effects, demographic controls, and attitudinal controls. Demographic controls include: gender, marital status, age, access to Internet, possession of cellular phone, ability to read, ability to write, ability to perform arithmetic, formal education level, income, and religion sect. Attitudinal controls include two measures of attitudes toward United States, views of Shari'a law, and religiosity.

Table 3F: Perception of Muslims in Kashmir Moderates the Democracy-Militancy Relationship (National Weights)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
β_1 : Group Cue	0.010 (0.030)	0.016 (0.029)	0.026 (0.029)	0.019 (0.030)	-0.003 (0.037)
β_2 : Support for Democratic Values	0.179*** (0.049)	0.162*** (0.043)	0.162*** (0.046)	0.163*** (0.042)	0.164*** (0.042)
β_3 : Perception of Muslims in Kashmir	0.080*** (0.023)	0.064** (0.022)	0.073** (0.023)	0.060** (0.022)	0.058* (0.023)
β_4 : Group Cue x Support for Democratic Values	-0.081 (0.069)	-0.098 (0.064)	-0.093 (0.069)	-0.102 (0.065)	-0.100 (0.065)
β_5 : Group Cue x Perception of Muslims in Kashmir	-0.038 (0.033)	-0.042 (0.032)	-0.054+ (0.031)	-0.045 (0.032)	-0.039 (0.033)
β_6 : Support for Democratic Values x Perception of Muslims in Kashmir	-0.061 (0.051)	-0.070 (0.044)	-0.071 (0.047)	-0.074+ (0.043)	-0.077+ (0.043)
β_7 : Group Cue x Support for Democratic Values x Perception of Muslims in Kashmir	0.122+ (0.072)	0.136* (0.067)	0.133+ (0.071)	0.138* (0.067)	0.138* (0.068)
Constant	0.676*** (0.024)	0.791*** (0.032)	0.781*** (0.032)	0.761*** (0.036)	0.771*** (0.037)
R ²	0.156	0.250	0.248	0.257	0.262
N	5002	5002	4864	5002	5002
Region Fixed Effects	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Demographic Controls	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
Income Listwise Deleted	—	N	Y	N	N
Attitudinal Controls	N	N	N	Y	Y
Group Cue-Demographics Interactions	N	N	N	N	Y
Group Cue-Attitudinal Interaction	N	N	N	N	Y

*** $p < .001$; ** $p < .01$; * $p < .05$; + $p < .10$ (two-tailed)

Note: OLS regressions predicting support for policies. Data weighted and adjusted for sampling design. Demographic controls include: marital status, age, access to Internet, possession of cellular phone, ability to read, ability to write, ability to perform arithmetic, formal education level, income, and religion sect. Attitudinal controls include two measures of attitudes toward United States, views of Shari'a law, and religiosity.

Table 4F: Results by Components of Democratic Values Index (National Weights)

	<u>Property Rights</u>	<u>Free Speech</u>	<u>Indep. Courts</u>	<u>Elected Reps.</u>	<u>Civil/Mil. Separation</u>	<u>Freedom Assembly</u>
β_1 : Group Cue	-0.016** (0.006)	-0.008 (0.005)	-0.022*** (0.005)	-0.015** (0.005)	-0.011* (0.005)	-0.017*** (0.005)
β_2 : Support for Democratic Values	0.042*** (0.008)	0.027*** (0.008)	0.023** (0.008)	0.041*** (0.009)	0.060*** (0.008)	0.018* (0.009)
β_3 : Group Cue x Support for Democratic Values	0.013+ (0.008)	0.003 (0.008)	0.028*** (0.008)	0.017* (0.008)	0.008 (0.007)	0.019* (0.008)
Constant	0.811*** (0.029)	0.825*** (0.029)	0.823*** (0.030)	0.827*** (0.029)	0.807*** (0.030)	0.829*** (0.030)
R ²	0.225	0.213	0.220	0.228	0.244	0.213
N	5243	5243	5243	5243	5243	5243

*** $p < .001$; ** $p < .01$; * $p < .05$; + $p < .10$ (two-tailed)

Note: OLS regressions predicting support for policies. Data weighted and adjusted for sampling design. Regression models include region fixed effects, demographic controls, and attitudinal controls. Demographic controls include: gender, marital status, age, access to Internet, possession of cellular phone, ability to read, ability to write, ability to perform arithmetic, formal education level, income, and religion sect. Attitudinal controls include two measures of attitudes toward United States, views of Shari'a law, and religiosity.

Online Appendix G: Robustness to Dropping Education and Income Controls

	<u>Dropping Income</u>	<u>Dropping Education</u>
β_1 : Group Cue	-0.024*** (0.006)	-0.025*** (0.006)
β_2 : Support for Democratic Values	0.088*** (0.014)	0.091*** (0.014)
β_3 : Group Cue x Support for Democratic Values	0.035** (0.011)	0.036** (0.011)
Constant	0.797*** (0.029)	0.806*** (0.029)
R ²	0.246	0.254
N	5243	5243
Region Fixed Effects	Y	Y
Demographic Controls	Y	Y
Income Listwise Deleted	N	N
Attitudinal Controls	Y	Y
Group Cue-Demographics Interactions	N	N
Group Cue-Attitudinal Interaction	N	N

*** $p < .001$; ** $p < .01$; * $p < .05$; + $p < .10$ (two-tailed)

Note: OLS regressions predicting support for policies. Data weighted and adjusted for sampling design. Demographic controls include: gender, marital status, age, access to Internet, possession of cellular phone, ability to read, ability to write, ability to perform arithmetic, formal education level, income, and religion sect. Attitudinal controls include two measures of attitudes toward United States, views of Shari'a law, and religiosity.

Online Appendix H: Results by Components of Democratic Values Index

	<u>Property Rights</u>	<u>Free Speech</u>	<u>Indep. Courts</u>	<u>Elected Reps.</u>	<u>Civil/Mil. Separation</u>	<u>Freedom Assembly</u>
β_1 : Group Cue	-0.015** (0.006)	-0.007 (0.005)	-0.022*** (0.005)	-0.015** (0.005)	-0.010** (0.005)	-0.017*** (0.005)
β_2 : Support for Democratic Values	0.043*** (0.008)	0.027*** (0.008)	0.022* (0.009)	0.039*** (0.009)	0.061*** (0.008)	0.019** (0.009)
β_3 : Group Cue x Support for Democratic Values	0.013* (0.008)	0.002 (0.008)	0.029*** (0.008)	0.018** (0.008)	0.007 (0.007)	0.019** (0.008)
Constant	0.811*** (0.029)	0.825*** (0.028)	0.824*** (0.029)	0.828*** (0.028)	0.807*** (0.029)	0.829*** (0.029)
R ²	0.231	0.219	0.225	0.233	0.25	0.219
N	5243	5243	5243	5243	5243	5243

*** $p < .01$; ** $p < .05$; * $p < .10$ (two-tailed)

Note: OLS regressions predicting support for policies. Data weighted and adjusted for sampling design. Regression models include region fixed effects, demographic controls, and attitudinal controls. Demographic controls include: gender, marital status, age, access to Internet, possession of cellular phone, ability to read, ability to write, ability to perform arithmetic, formal education level, income, and religion sect. Attitudinal controls include two measures of attitudes toward United States, views of Shari'a law, and religiosity.

Online Appendix I: Complete Model Results for Tables 1-3 and H

Table 1I: Support for Democratic Values Predicts Support for Militant Groups

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
β_1 : Group Cue	-0.026*** (0.007)	-0.025*** (0.006)	-0.026*** (0.006)	-0.025*** (0.006)	-0.045+ (0.026)
β_2 : Support for Democratic Values	0.121*** (0.016)	0.094*** (0.014)	0.094*** (0.015)	0.091*** (0.014)	0.089*** (0.014)
β_3 : Group Cue x Support for Democratic Values	0.042*** (0.012)	0.038*** (0.011)	0.040*** (0.011)	0.036** (0.011)	0.039** (0.013)
Female	- -	-0.080*** (0.011)	-0.080*** (0.011)	-0.078*** (0.010)	-0.090*** (0.011)
Age	- -	-0.002 (0.016)	-0.002 (0.016)	-0.006 (0.016)	-0.050* (0.021)
Married	- -	0.007 (0.006)	0.007 (0.006)	0.007 (0.006)	0.009 (0.007)
Online	- -	0.003 (0.009)	0.004 (0.010)	0.001 (0.009)	0.001 (0.012)
Cell Phone	- -	0.037*** (0.007)	0.038*** (0.007)	0.032*** (0.007)	0.041*** (0.008)
Read	- -	-0.016 (0.016)	-0.016 (0.017)	-0.016 (0.016)	-0.001 (0.023)
Write	- -	0.018 (0.018)	0.019 (0.018)	0.022 (0.018)	0.004 (0.024)
Math	- -	-0.006 (0.010)	-0.007 (0.010)	-0.008 (0.010)	-0.006 (0.011)
Education	- -	-0.016 (0.014)	-0.015 (0.014)	-0.019 (0.013)	-0.028+ (0.016)
Income	- -	-0.061*** (0.016)	-0.061*** (0.016)	-0.056*** (0.015)	-0.064*** (0.019)
Missing Income	- -	0.035* (0.016)	- -	0.037* (0.016)	0.041* (0.017)
Sunni	- -	-0.039* (0.017)	-0.040* (0.017)	-0.042* (0.017)	-0.042* (0.019)
U.S. Impact on Pakistan	- -	- -	- -	0.049** (0.016)	0.042* (0.018)
U.S. Impact on World	- -	- -	- -	-0.018 (0.015)	-0.006 (0.017)
Sharia Implies Physical Punishment	- -	- -	- -	0.020** (0.008)	0.024** (0.008)
Attends Dars e Quran Daily	- -	-0.016 (0.014)	-0.015 (0.014)	-0.019 (0.013)	-0.028+ (0.016)

Attends Dars e Quran Sometimes	-	-0.061***	-	-0.056***	-0.064***
	-	(0.016)	-	(0.015)	(0.019)
Sindh	-0.050***	-0.061***	-0.060***	-0.053***	-0.052***
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)
KPK	0.009	0.005	0.002	0.007	0.006
	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Balochistan	-0.049**	-0.063***	-0.061***	-0.054***	-0.054***
	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)
Group Cue x Female	-	-	-	-	0.024**
	-	-	-	-	(0.009)
Group Cue x Married	-	-	-	-	-0.005
	-	-	-	-	(0.010)
Group Cue x Age	-	-	-	-	0.094***
	-	-	-	-	(0.027)
Group Cue x Online	-	-	-	-	0.001
	-	-	-	-	(0.016)
Group Cue x Cell Phone	-	-	-	-	-0.019*
	-	-	-	-	(0.008)
Group Cue x Read	-	-	-	-	-0.029
	-	-	-	-	(0.032)
Group Cue x Write	-	-	-	-	0.036
	-	-	-	-	(0.033)
Group Cue x Math	-	-	-	-	-0.003
	-	-	-	-	(0.011)
Group Cue x Education	-	-	-	-	0.017
	-	-	-	-	(0.023)
Group Cue x Income	-	-	-	-	0.016
	-	-	-	-	(0.020)
Group Cue x Income_miss	-	-	-	-	-0.008
	-	-	-	-	(0.023)
Group Cue x Sunni	-	-	-	-	0.002
	-	-	-	-	(0.016)
Group Cue x U.S. Impact on Pakistan	-	-	-	-	-0.028
	-	-	-	-	(0.019)
Group Cue x U.S. Impact on World	-	-	-	-	0.016
	-	-	-	-	(0.020)
Group Cue x Sharia Implies Physical Punishment	-	-	-	-	-0.009
	-	-	-	-	(0.008)
Group Cue x Attends Dars e Quran Daily	-	-	-	-	-0.004
	-	-	-	-	(0.011)

Group Cue x Attends Dars e Quran	-	-	-	-	-0.000
Sometimes	-	-	-	-	(0.009)
Constant	0.748*** (0.011)	0.845*** (0.022)	0.845*** (0.022)	0.805*** (0.029)	0.814*** (0.031)
R ²	0.142	0.244	0.241	0.254	0.260
N	5243	5243	5092	5243	5243
Region Fixed Effects	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Demographic Controls	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
Income Listwise Deleted	—	N	Y	N	N
Attitudinal Controls	N	N	N	Y	Y
Group Cue-Demographics Interactions	N	N	N	N	Y
Group Cue-Attitudinal Interaction	N	N	N	N	Y

*** $p < .001$; ** $p < .01$; * $p < .05$; + $p < .10$ (two-tailed)

Note: OLS regressions predicting support for policies. Data weighted and adjusted for sampling design. Demographic controls include: gender, marital status, age, access to Internet, possession of cellular phone, ability to read, ability to write, ability to perform arithmetic, formal education level, income, and religion sect. Attitudinal controls include two measures of attitudes toward United States, views of Shari'a law, and religiosity.

Table 2I: Support for Democratic Values is More Strongly Correlated with Support for Azadi Groups

	<i>Azadi Groups</i>			<i>Non-Azadi Groups</i>		
	<u>Kashmir</u> <u>Tanzeem</u>	<u>Afghan</u> <u>Taliban</u>	<u>Pooled</u> <u>Azadi</u>	<u>al-Qa'ida</u>	<u>Sectarian</u> <u>Tanzeem</u>	<u>Pooled</u> <u>Non-Azadi</u>
β_1 : Group Cue	-0.042*** (0.010)	-0.045*** (0.010)	-0.031*** (0.008)	-0.036*** (0.009)	-0.027** (0.010)	-0.020** (0.007)
β_2 : Support for Democratic Values	0.080*** (0.015)	0.084*** (0.016)	0.091*** (0.014)	0.082*** (0.015)	0.082*** (0.015)	0.091*** (0.014)
β_3 : Group Cue x Support for Democratic Values	0.047** (0.016)	0.043* (0.017)	0.040** (0.014)	0.031+ (0.016)	0.023 (0.017)	0.025* (0.012)
Female	-0.084*** (0.013)	-0.075*** (0.013)	-0.069*** (0.011)	0.089*** (0.012)	-0.101*** (0.014)	-0.085*** (0.012)
Age	0.004 (0.021)	0.021 (0.023)	0.019 (0.019)	-0.005 (0.024)	0.014 (0.023)	0.006 (0.020)
Married	0.006 (0.009)	0.003 (0.010)	0.002 (0.008)	0.014 (0.010)	0.006 (0.010)	0.010 (0.008)
Online	-0.000 (0.013)	0.006 (0.013)	0.002 (0.011)	-0.004 (0.014)	0.008 (0.013)	0.000 (0.012)
Cell Phone	0.043*** (0.009)	0.036*** (0.009)	0.030*** (0.008)	0.044*** (0.009)	0.035*** (0.009)	0.032*** (0.008)
Read	-0.028 (0.027)	-0.014 (0.024)	-0.029 (0.024)	0.001 (0.025)	-0.012 (0.025)	-0.007 (0.021)
Write	0.035 (0.029)	0.031 (0.026)	0.040 (0.025)	-0.001 (0.026)	0.018 (0.026)	0.007 (0.022)
Math	-0.008 (0.013)	-0.009 (0.013)	-0.009 (0.011)	-0.010 (0.014)	-0.005 (0.013)	-0.009 (0.011)
Education	-0.014 (0.022)	-0.038+ (0.021)	-0.019 (0.018)	-0.007 (0.020)	-0.037+ (0.020)	-0.014 (0.016)
Income	-0.059** (0.021)	-0.071** (0.022)	-0.053** (0.018)	0.069*** (0.020)	-0.078*** (0.020)	-0.062*** (0.017)
Missing Income	0.036 (0.023)	0.029 (0.020)	0.030 (0.020)	0.053** (0.019)	0.025 (0.020)	0.042* (0.017)
Sunni	-0.054** (0.017)	-0.037+ (0.020)	-0.042* (0.018)	-0.052** (0.020)	-0.042* (0.020)	-0.044* (0.019)
U.S. Impact on World	0.045* (0.021)	0.071*** (0.020)	0.059*** (0.017)	0.042+ (0.023)	0.036+ (0.020)	0.042* (0.019)
U.S. Impact on Pakistan	-0.025 (0.020)	-0.050** (0.019)	-0.033+ (0.018)	-0.009 (0.022)	-0.028 (0.019)	-0.016 (0.018)
Sharia Implied Physical Punishment	0.016+ (0.010)	0.024* (0.010)	0.015+ (0.009)	0.028** (0.010)	0.028** (0.010)	0.023** (0.009)
Attends Dars e Quran Daily	-0.000	-0.001	0.002	-0.001	-0.011	-0.003

	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.010)
Attends Dars e Quran	0.017+	0.017+	0.017*	0.017+	0.008	0.012
Sometimes	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.008)
Sindh	-0.051***	-0.050***	-0.056***	-0.042**	-0.048***	-0.050***
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.013)
KPK	0.010	0.007	-0.000	0.021	0.010	0.008
	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.012)
Balochistan	-0.038*	-0.048*	-0.051**	-0.045**	-0.067***	-0.061***
	(0.016)	(0.019)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.015)
Constant	0.826***	0.805***	0.803***	0.807***	0.843***	0.813***
	(0.033)	(0.035)	(0.032)	(0.034)	(0.035)	(0.032)
R ²	0.154	0.142	0.189	0.149	0.154	0.194
N	5243	5243	5243	5243	5243	5243

*** $p < .001$; ** $p < .01$; * $p < .05$; + $p < .10$ (two-tailed)

Note: OLS regressions predicting support for policies. Data weighted and adjusted for sampling design. Regression models include region fixed effects, demographic controls, and attitudinal controls. Demographic controls include: gender, marital status, age, access to Internet, possession of cellular phone, ability to read, ability to write, ability to perform arithmetic, formal education level, income, and religion sect. Attitudinal controls include two measures of attitudes toward United States, views of Shari'a law, and religiosity.

Table 3I: Perception of Muslims in Kashmir Moderates the Democracy-Militancy Relationship

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
β_1 : Group Cue	0.010 (0.030)	0.015 (0.029)	0.024 (0.029)	0.019 (0.029)	-0.004 (0.037)
β_2 : Support for Democratic Values	0.175*** (0.050)	0.159*** (0.044)	0.159*** (0.047)	0.163*** (0.042)	0.165*** (0.042)
β_3 : Perception of Muslims in Kashmir	0.082*** (0.023)	0.065** (0.022)	0.074** (0.023)	0.063** (0.022)	0.061** (0.023)
β_4 : Group Cue x Support for Democratic Values	-0.082 (0.070)	-0.098 (0.064)	-0.090 (0.068)	-0.102 (0.065)	-0.101 (0.065)
β_5 : Group Cue x Perception of Muslims in Kashmir	-0.037 (0.033)	-0.040 (0.031)	-0.052 (0.031)	-0.043 (0.032)	-0.038 (0.033)
β_6 : Support for Democratic Values x Perception of Muslims in Kashmir	-0.058 (0.052)	-0.069 (0.045)	-0.070 (0.048)	-0.075+ (0.044)	-0.078+ (0.044)
β_7 : Group Cue x Support for Democratic Values x Perception of Muslims in Kashmir	0.121+ (0.073)	0.135* (0.067)	0.129+ (0.071)	0.137* (0.067)	0.138* (0.068)
Female	- -	-0.078*** (0.010)	-0.078*** (0.011)	-0.078*** (0.010)	-0.087*** (0.011)
Age	- -	0.004 (0.016)	0.004 (0.016)	-0.000 (0.016)	-0.042* (0.021)
Married	- -	0.005 (0.006)	0.005 (0.006)	0.005 (0.006)	0.006 (0.007)
Online	- -	0.006 (0.010)	0.006 (0.010)	0.004 (0.010)	0.006 (0.013)
Cell Phone	- -	0.036*** (0.007)	0.037*** (0.007)	0.033*** (0.007)	0.043*** (0.008)
Read	- -	-0.019 (0.016)	-0.020 (0.017)	-0.021 (0.017)	-0.005 (0.024)
Write	- -	0.015 (0.018)	0.017 (0.019)	0.022 (0.018)	0.004 (0.025)
Math	- -	-0.007 (0.010)	-0.007 (0.010)	-0.009 (0.010)	-0.008 (0.011)
Education	- -	-0.014 (0.014)	-0.013 (0.014)	-0.018 (0.013)	-0.029+ (0.017)
Income	- -	-0.061*** (0.016)	-0.062*** (0.016)	-0.056*** (0.015)	-0.063*** (0.019)
Missing Income	- -	0.037* (0.017)	- -	0.043** (0.016)	0.042* (0.019)
Sunni	-	-0.039*	-0.040*	-0.043*	-0.044*

	-	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.019)
U.S. Impact on Pakistan	-	-	-	0.048**	0.042*
	-	-	-	(0.015)	(0.018)
U.S. Impact on World	-	-	-	-0.023	-0.012
	-	-	-	(0.015)	(0.017)
Sharia Implied Physical Punishment	-	-	-	0.017*	0.021*
	-	-	-	(0.008)	(0.008)
Attends Dars e Quran Daily	-	-	-	-0.002	-0.002
	-	-	-	(0.008)	(0.009)
Attends Dars e Quran Sometimes	-	-	-	0.011	0.009
	-	-	-	(0.007)	(0.008)
Sindh	-0.047***	-0.059***	-0.058***	-0.051***	-0.051***
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)
KPK	0.011	0.004	0.001	0.006	0.005
	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Balochistan	-0.056***	-0.070***	-0.069***	-0.061***	-0.060***
	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.014)
Group Cue x Female	-	-	-	-	0.018*
	-	-	-	-	(0.009)
Group Cue x Married	-	-	-	-	-0.001
	-	-	-	-	(0.010)
Group Cue x Age	-	-	-	-	0.089**
	-	-	-	-	(0.028)
Group Cue x Online	-	-	-	-	-0.002
	-	-	-	-	(0.017)
Group Cue x Cell Phone	-	-	-	-	-0.021*
	-	-	-	-	(0.008)
Group Cue x Read	-	-	-	-	-0.030
	-	-	-	-	(0.033)
Group Cue x Write	-	-	-	-	0.034
	-	-	-	-	(0.034)
Group Cue x Math	-	-	-	-	-0.001
	-	-	-	-	(0.011)
Group Cue x Education	-	-	-	-	0.022
	-	-	-	-	(0.023)
Group Cue x Income	-	-	-	-	0.014
	-	-	-	-	(0.021)
Group Cue x Missing Income	-	-	-	-	0.004

	-	-	-	-	(0.024)
Group Cue x Sunni	-	-	-	-	0.002
	-	-	-	-	(0.016)
Group Cue x U.S. Impact on Pakistan	-	-	-	-	-0.028
	-	-	-	-	(0.020)
Group Cue x U.S. Impact on World	-	-	-	-	0.015
	-	-	-	-	(0.021)
Group Cue x Sharia Implies Physical Punishment	-	-	-	-	-0.011
	-	-	-	-	(0.008)
Group Cue x Attends Dars e Quran Daily	-	-	-	-	-0.002
	-	-	-	-	(0.011)
Group Cue x Attends Dars e Quran Sometimes	-	-	-	-	0.003
	-	-	-	-	(0.009)
Constant	0.675***	0.789***	0.781***	0.760***	0.770***
	(0.024)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.036)	(0.037)
R ²	0.156	0.255	0.253	0.263	0.268
N	5002	5002	4864	5002	5002
Region Fixed Effects	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Demographic Controls	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
Income Listwise Deleted	—	N	Y	N	N
Attitudinal Controls	N	N	N	Y	Y
Group Cue-Demographics Interactions	N	N	N	N	Y
Group Cue-Attitudinal Interaction	N	N	N	N	Y

*** $p < .001$; ** $p < .01$; * $p < .05$; + $p < .10$ (two-tailed)

Note: OLS regressions predicting support for policies. Data weighted and adjusted for sampling design. Demographic controls include: marital status, age, access to Internet, possession of cellular phone, ability to read, ability to write, ability to perform arithmetic, formal education level, income, and religion sect. Attitudinal controls include two measures of attitudes toward United States, views of Shari'a law, and religiosity.

Table HI: Results by Components of Democratic Values Index

	<u>Property Rights</u>	<u>Free Speech</u>	<u>Indep. Courts</u>	<u>Elected Reps.</u>	<u>Civil/Mil. Separation</u>	<u>Freedom Assembly</u>
β_7 : Group Cue	-0.015** (0.006)	-0.007 (0.005)	-0.022*** (0.005)	-0.015** (0.005)	-0.010* (0.005)	-0.017** (0.005)
β_2 : Support for Democratic Values	0.043*** (0.008)	0.027** (0.008)	0.022* (0.009)	0.039*** (0.009)	0.061*** (0.008)	0.019* (0.009)
β_3 : Group Cue x Support for Democratic Values	0.013+ (0.008)	0.002 (0.008)	0.029*** (0.008)	0.018* (0.008)	0.007 (0.007)	0.019* (0.008)
Female	-0.087*** (0.010)	-0.085*** (0.011)	-0.084*** (0.010)	-0.086*** (0.010)	-0.078*** (0.010)	-0.085*** (0.011)
Age	0.003 (0.016)	0.004 (0.016)	0.006 (0.016)	0.002 (0.016)	-0.001 (0.016)	0.003 (0.016)
Married	0.008 (0.006)	0.008 (0.006)	0.007 (0.006)	0.008 (0.006)	0.008 (0.006)	0.009 (0.006)
Online	-0.004 (0.011)	-0.002 (0.011)	-0.001 (0.010)	0.001 (0.010)	-0.002 (0.010)	-0.002 (0.011)
Cell Phone	0.032*** (0.007)	0.034*** (0.007)	0.037*** (0.007)	0.034*** (0.007)	0.030*** (0.007)	0.034*** (0.007)
Read	-0.012 (0.016)	-0.010 (0.017)	-0.015 (0.016)	-0.011 (0.016)	-0.009 (0.017)	-0.012 (0.017)
Write	0.020 (0.018)	0.023 (0.018)	0.026 (0.018)	0.020 (0.018)	0.013 (0.018)	0.025 (0.019)
Math	-0.016+ (0.010)	-0.017+ (0.010)	-0.016 (0.010)	-0.013 (0.010)	-0.010 (0.010)	-0.017+ (0.010)
Education	-0.015 (0.013)	-0.018 (0.014)	-0.018 (0.014)	-0.019 (0.014)	-0.015 (0.013)	-0.017 (0.014)
Income	-0.044** (0.015)	-0.043** (0.016)	-0.049** (0.016)	-0.043** (0.016)	-0.037* (0.015)	-0.043** (0.016)
Missing Income	0.043* (0.017)	0.047** (0.017)	0.044** (0.017)	0.046** (0.016)	0.035* (0.016)	0.042* (0.017)
Sunni	-0.049** (0.017)	-0.051** (0.017)	-0.049** (0.017)	-0.049** (0.017)	-0.043* (0.017)	-0.049** (0.017)
U.S. Impact on World	0.057*** (0.016)	0.063*** (0.016)	0.062*** (0.016)	0.055*** (0.016)	0.061*** (0.016)	0.062*** (0.016)
U.S. Impact on Pakistan	-0.002 (0.015)	-0.005 (0.015)	-0.006 (0.015)	-0.010 (0.016)	-0.006 (0.014)	-0.008 (0.015)
Sharia Implied Physical Punishment	0.017* (0.008)	0.018* (0.008)	0.018* (0.008)	0.018* (0.008)	0.023** (0.008)	0.017* (0.008)
Attends Dars e Quran Daily	0.001 (0.008)	0.003 (0.008)	0.004 (0.008)	0.001 (0.008)	0.002 (0.008)	0.005 (0.008)
Attends Dars e Quran Sometimes	0.017* (0.008)	0.020** (0.008)	0.020** (0.008)	0.018* (0.008)	0.015* (0.008)	0.020** (0.008)

	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Sindh	-0.053*** (0.012)	-0.066*** (0.012)	-0.059*** (0.012)	-0.059*** (0.012)	-0.061*** (0.012)	-0.066*** (0.012)
KPK	-0.000 (0.011)	-0.005 (0.011)	-0.004 (0.011)	0.003 (0.011)	-0.017 (0.011)	-0.007 (0.011)
Balochistan	-0.057*** (0.014)	-0.070*** (0.015)	-0.065*** (0.015)	-0.064*** (0.015)	-0.073*** (0.015)	-0.070*** (0.015)
Constant	0.811*** (0.029)	0.825*** (0.028)	0.824*** (0.029)	0.828*** (0.028)	0.807*** (0.029)	0.829*** (0.029)
R ²	0.231	0.219	0.225	0.233	0.25	0.219
N	5243	5243	5243	5243	5243	5243

*** $p < .001$; ** $p < .01$; * $p < .05$; + $p < .10$ (two-tailed)

Note: OLS regressions predicting support for policies. Data weighted and adjusted for sampling design. Regression models include region fixed effects, demographic controls, and attitudinal controls. Demographic controls include: gender, marital status, age, access to Internet, possession of cellular phone, ability to read, ability to write, ability to perform arithmetic, formal education level, income, and religion sect. Attitudinal controls include two measures of attitudes toward United States, views of Shari'a law, and religiosity.