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THESIS

**GETTING UGLY: EXPLORING NETWORK
DEVELOPMENT IN “THE UGLY AMERICAN”**

by

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**GETTING UGLY: EXPLORING NETWORK DEVELOPMENT
IN “THE UGLY AMERICAN”**

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ABSTRACT

While social network analysis (SNA) has been utilized for a wide variety of purposes across various academic, business, and consulting fields, military applications of this emerging field have tended to focus on the “mapping” of dark networks. By borrowing from the considerable accumulation of SNA software and network theory, this work reveals how techniques designed for network analysis and dark network interdiction can also help reveal distinct characteristics of successful approaches to host nation interaction and indigenous network development.

The network models examined in this thesis are drawn from William J. Lederer and Eugene Burdick’s book, *The Ugly American*. This text, widely viewed as an indictment of the application of U.S. foreign policy in Asia throughout the mid–20th century, serves as a foundation for the examination of indigenous network development at both the operational and tactical levels. The goal of this thesis is to illuminate and elucidate the unique characteristics of four network design approaches that appear in the book. This study also seeks to re-emphasize the important and often overlooked principles of effective host nation interaction presented in *The Ugly American* that have been recognized and discussed by generations of Foreign Service officers, military advisors, and civilian volunteers.

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I. INTRODUCTION

During these past years in Asia, the patterns of behavior I had observed in U.S. officials were about as broad as all humanity. There were some officials who affected a studied aloofness, saying that Americans couldn't represent the United States properly if they became too involved with local people. There were others who strove for comradeship with the Asians around them: some who went too far by going native and some who struck a good balance by remaining themselves while making friends. There were Americans of the "take charge" type, bossing everyone within site, often in order to get some worthwhile job done but stifling the initiative and stomping on the dignity of the very Asians they were trying to help. There were technicians blind to everything outside their immediate programs, at times gullibly and unwittingly aiding Asian political sharpies and money grubbers eager for the 'pork barrel' opportunities in some U.S. program. There were Americans who behaved nobly and those who behaved atrociously. There were bored Americans putting in career time and Americans who made every moment count.¹

Over a decade before retired Major General Edward Lansdale summarized the wide variation among the Americans he encountered while working overseas, William J. Lederer and Eugene Burdick published a best-selling work of historical fiction that presented an equally diverse assortment of characters embroiled in a struggle to stem Communist expansion into the fictional Southeast Asian nation of Sarkhan. Their book, *The Ugly American*, first appeared in 1958 and has since influenced generations of Americans who have devoted themselves to working with foreign populations.

Host nation dignitaries and indigenous peoples throughout the world continue to encounter a mixture of American personalities as varied as those described by Lansdale and featured throughout *The Ugly American*. Each American serving abroad today has a conscious choice to make before they ever leave the United States: they must choose what *kind* of American they will be when they set foot on foreign soil.

What most Americans think of today when they hear the term "ugly American" is not Homer Atkins—the Ugly American presented in the book—or his successful

¹ Edward G. Lansdale, *In the Midst of Wars: An American's Mission to Southeast Asia* (New York: Fordham University Press, 1991), 366.

endeavor to improve the lives of farmers in Sarkhan. In actuality, the kind of person who most people throughout the world think of when they hear the phrase “ugly American” is the antithesis of Homer Atkins. The expression has come to be associated with people who end up insulting the inhabitants of the distant lands they visit because they resist non-“American” ways of doing things and refuse to adapt to other countries’ social norms. These Americans contribute to a general sense prevalent in many regions of the world that Americans are an arrogant and xenophobic people who do not truly wish to help make the world a better place. Who would ever want to aspire to such an ideal?

This work explores the choices made by several fictional characters in *The Ugly American*—all of which are based on real people and real events. It seeks to illustrate how their behavior impacted indigenous populations and supported or undermined the execution of U.S. foreign policy. The overall intent is to present options for those Americans who will travel abroad in the future and to challenge them with the most implausible goal: *be* an “ugly” American.

Two additional objectives of this thesis are 1) to illustrate the utility of social network analysis techniques for the exploration of the entire spectrum of host nation networks and 2) to examine various approaches to indigenous network development presented in *The Ugly American*. A final closely related theme involves attempting to rectify the decades-old misappropriation of the title of “ugly American.” Many Americans have either forgotten or have never even been exposed to the myriad of lessons presented in the book (including the story of the Ugly American himself) that demonstrate how to respectfully and effectively interact with indigenous peoples. This thesis revisits what being “ugly” really means and in so doing reveals how the Ugly American and three other key characters in the book design successful host nation networks.

A. BACKGROUND

The tools of social network analysis (SNA) provide an insightful and potentially powerful framework for those interested in understanding how the increasingly complex networks of the 21st century operate. Professionals from various academic, business, and

consulting fields currently utilize SNA for a wide variety of purposes. However, military applications of this emerging field of study focus primarily on the “mapping” of *dark networks*—covert enemy or criminal organizations that the military is attempting to disrupt, defeat, or destroy.² Recently, the military has widened its use of SNA to include the mapping of friendly or *light networks* as part of a concerted effort to maximize the effectiveness of both indirect and direct approaches to interdicting threat networks worldwide.³ By borrowing from the considerable accumulation of SNA software, theory, and practices developed for network analysis and dark network interdiction, this work concentrates on the mapping of *grey networks*—those networks that are neither overtly tied to friendly light networks of the U.S. government or its foreign allies nor clearly under the control of adversarial dark networks.

The Ugly American recounts a wide variety of attempts by Americans to understand and influence various non-aligned, threatened, or disadvantaged communities throughout Southeast Asia. Importantly, these communities do not necessarily support their host nation governments nor have they fallen completely under the sway of the Communist agents attempting to convert them to their cause. As evidenced by recent counterinsurgency initiatives in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as observations from other regions of the world, non-aligned or “neutral” populations actually have a tendency to

² For further detail concerning dark networks, see Jörg Raab and H. Brinton Milward, “Dark Networks as Problems,” *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory: J-PART* 13, no. 4 (Oct. 2003): 413–439.

³ The U.S. military currently uses the terms *direct* and *indirect* to differentiate between the two key operational approaches to adversarial interdiction; see Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), *Counterterrorism. Joint Publication (JP) 3–26* (November 2009), III-4 to III-7. For a discussion of similar concepts as they apply to SNA under the kinetic (direct) and non-kinetic (indirect) labels, see Nancy Roberts and Sean F. Everton, “Strategies for Combating Dark Networks,” *Journal of Social Structure* 12, no. 2 (2011): 1–32, [http://www.cmu.edu/joss/content/articles/volume12/Roberts Everton.pdf](http://www.cmu.edu/joss/content/articles/volume12/Roberts%20Everton.pdf).

move frequently from one side to another in the midst of an ongoing internal conflict.⁴ One Marine officer with counterinsurgency experience in Iraq asserts that current U.S. doctrine “fails to account for the fluid nature of a population where individuals may move back and forth [between sides] on a daily basis.”⁵ By addressing various approaches to interacting with indigenous populations in general, this study adds to the growing understanding of how best to influence various host nation networks—those that are adversarial (dark or red networks), those that are outwardly friendly to the U.S. (light or green networks), and those that are inclined to support both sides, be neutral, or switch their allegiances often (grey or white networks).⁶

B. PURPOSE AND SCOPE

The purpose of this thesis is to utilize contemporary network theory and SNA techniques to examine “models” for indigenous network development extracted from *The Ugly American*. This study will use network concepts, graphs, and sociograms (i.e., visualizations) to illustrate the successful approaches to host nation network development presented in *The Ugly American* over 50 years ago. By using modern SNA techniques, it

⁴ The Sons of Iraq (SoI) initiative in Iraq and Village Stability Operations/Afghan Local Police (VSO/ALP) initiative in Afghanistan are two recent examples of U.S. efforts to work with indigenous populations whose loyalty to adversarial groups and to their host nation governments could be assessed as prone to vacillation based on the fluid conditions of each insurgency. Sparrow notes that dark (i.e., criminal) networks are dynamic and possess “fuzzy boundaries” resulting in it being difficult to pinpoint exactly who is a part of a particular dark network or for an analysis to remain accurate over time. These qualities are equally prevalent in destabilized communities where populations may often choose to passively or actively support an adversarial network based on simple cost-benefit analyses, changing perceptions of legitimacy, or as a result of violent coercion. Malcolm Sparrow, “Network Vulnerabilities and Strategic Law Enforcement,” *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence* 5, no. 3 (1991): 267–269.

⁵ Lane V. Packwood. “Popular Support as the Objective in Counterinsurgency: What Are We Really After?” *Military Review* 89, no. 3 (2009): 69. Current U.S. military counterinsurgency doctrine is detailed in: U.S. Department of the Army (DA) and U.S. Marine Corps (USMC), *Counterinsurgency. Field Manual 3–24/Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3–33.5* (December 2006).

⁶ In addition to the network categorization used widely throughout the academic community (i.e., dark networks and light or bright networks), the U.S. military’s *Attack the Network* manual proposes the following network classifications: **red networks** are “formal and/or informal grouping[s] of adversarial actors that are in opposition to the friendly networks;” neutral or **white networks** are “not hostile to, or in any way supportive of any one of the forces in a hostile environment;” **blue networks** consist of “military and government civilian U.S., allied and coalition forces;” **green networks** are “military and government civilian host-nation forces;” and **black networks** are “formal and/or informal grouping[s] of criminals that are not necessarily adversarial to the friendly networks, but thwart attempts to create stability so that they can further the aims of their criminal enterprises.” U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM), *Commander’s Handbook for Attack the Network* (May 2011), Glossary.

is possible to re-emphasize the important and still routinely overlooked principles of effective host nation interaction that have been recognized and discussed by generations of Foreign Service officers, military advisors, and civilian volunteers. When combined with proactive light network assistance and dark network interdiction, these approaches reflect a third aspect of comprehensive counterinsurgency strategy—grey network development.

Published in 1958, *The Ugly American* is a roman à clef consisting of a collection of factually-based vignettes describing U.S. efforts to combat the spread of Communism in the fictional Southeast Asian country of Sarkhan. This text, widely viewed as an indictment of the misguided application of U.S. foreign policy in Asia throughout the mid-20th century, serves as a useful foundation for the examination of host nation network development at both the operational and tactical levels. It is not the intent of this study to imply that today's scenarios are as cut-and-dry as those presented in the book or that any one of the four network models presented should be mirrored in its entirety. There are, however, a wide range of principles, ideas, and lessons that can be extracted from *The Ugly American* and incorporated into the working knowledge of any American interacting with indigenous populations. The goal of this study is to illuminate and elucidate distinct models of network design that can serve as either a starting point or as an additional resource for any individual or organization intent on understanding, modifying, or initiating indigenous network development.

This introductory chapter provides the background and genesis of the research and its goals. Chapter II reviews the literature that informs the research with special attention to key concepts drawn from theories of social networks and network design. Chapter III describes social network analysis methodology and tools used to generate the network models mapped from *The Ugly American*. Chapter IV provides an overview of the “big picture” (i.e., macro-level) network extracted from the book. Ambassador Sears, the first American ambassador introduced in the book provides an example of what not to do and his replacement, Ambassador MacWhite, serves as his counter example when he engineers a successful counter-Communist campaign by enlisting the aid of Father Finian, Homer Atkins, and Colonel Hillandale. Chapter IV also briefly introduces three

additional characters who have a positive influence on U.S. efforts in Sarkhan but whose networks are not sufficiently described in the text to enable their mapping.

Chapters V, VI, VII, and VIII take a deeper dive into the four subnetworks that are extracted from the aggregated network. Each chapter's title refers to the principle characteristic each network designer exemplifies. Ambassador MacWhite *orchestrates* a network of networks. Homer Atkins is a *confederate* who works side-by-side with the Sarkhanese people.⁷ Father Finian *facilitates* his network's emergence and works by, with, and through a local proxy. And Colonel Hillandale uses *persuasion* to personally influence the members of his network.

Each of these four network models presents a distinct approach to interacting with indigenous populations and developing host nation networks. The primary differences among the techniques revolve around the level to which each network designer interacts with the indigenous population and the level to which he is personally involved in directing his network's activities. Colonel Hillandale does his work himself. Homer Atkins has a local proxy but chooses to work alongside him as a co-equal among the local population. Father Finian prefers to concentrate his efforts on finding and vetting a suitable local proxy who he then empowers to build a network and direct it along the general lines that Finian prefers. Ambassador MacWhite stays well away from directly interacting with the general population and instead makes contact with several American proxies who he then allows to develop their own approaches to supporting the Sarkhanese people.

Chapter IX describes the macro-level implications of the thesis: How can SNA be utilized to explore and influence grey or neutral host nation network development to

⁷ The title of confederate is utilized (instead of collaborator) to avoid the implication that he might be associated with adversarial entities.

assist dark network interdiction in irregular warfare (IW) environments?⁸ Devoting an appropriate amount of effort and resources towards building networks similar to those derived from *The Ugly American* provides additional effects for commanders and policy makers attempting to stabilize host nation governments and indigenous populations under pressure from adversaries. These effects include: 1) “shrinking the white space” (i.e., denying needed resources and freedom of maneuver to adversarial groups); 2) helping to identify and counter adversarial entrepreneurial efforts to influence the population, exacerbate tensions, or exploit local grievances; and 3) serving as a conduit for a number of collateral activities that may indirectly or directly support a wide array of kinetic and non-kinetic IW operations and initiatives.

⁸ Irregular warfare is defined by current U.S. joint doctrine as “a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s). Irregular warfare favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capacities, in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will.” See Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, Joint Publication (JP) 1-02 (March 2012), 170. The five principal activities of IW are: counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, foreign internal defense, unconventional warfare, and stability operations; see U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), *Irregular Warfare: Countering Irregular Threats, Joint Operating Concept Version 2.0* (May 2010), 17.

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II. LITERATURE REVIEW

Networks have recently risen to a prominent place in our view of human existence, in part due to the highly interconnected world made possible through social media. Professionals and academics from the fields of medicine, business, technology, and the social sciences have largely embraced the seemingly ubiquitous notion that networks can be used to explain a wide array of observations and to justify numerous theories and recommendations. Far from being confined to the academic circles from which it emerged, network theory is now prevalent in popular books, professional seminars, online interactions, and even viral phenomenon such as the “Six Degrees of Kevin Bacon”—an illustration of the “small-world” concept popularized by social psychologist Stanley Milgram’s research in the 1960s.

The business world realized early on that the emerging field of network theory possessed profound implications pertaining to how companies might better organize to maintain relevance and a competitive advantage in the fast-paced, technology driven world that emerged in the latter part of the 20th century. Over the past decade, networks have become even more central as the proliferation of cell phones and increased access to the Internet have facilitated the formation of online social networks that have impacted everything from revolutionary causes and disaster relief efforts to how we decide what to buy or where to eat. Enduring insurgencies and global terrorist organizations have also led military and government agencies to embrace the study of networks in an effort to better understand and be able to defeat asymmetric adversarial organizations whose decentralized structure challenges traditional methods of interdiction.

What is a *network*? Simply put, a network consists of a set of two or more “nodes” or “actors” that are in some way connected to one another. As one noted network scholar observes, “networks are present everywhere”—from the interactions among individual cells in our bodies and neurons in our brains to the myriad of electronic signals that bind the Internet together and the connections that we establish and utilize in our

social circles.⁹ Today, the term “network” has developed several connotations and its meaning can have considerable differences among researchers from various academic disciplines. One of the many distinct divergences in how networks are defined and how network concepts are used is discussed below. For the theoretical framework of this work, the idea that network forms are ubiquitous and that they are present in the innumerable connections that surround us in our everyday lives, best describes its usage.

Barabási traces the advent of modern network theory back to the origins of graph theory in the early 18th century.¹⁰ In 1736, a young Leonhard Euler, who would later become one of the most prolific and influential mathematicians in history, focused his genius on tackling an age-old conundrum that had amused the residents of a small village near his home in St. Petersburg. The question that he confronted was whether or not someone could walk across the seven bridges that spanned the town’s two rivers and connected its four separated land masses without ever crossing the same bridge twice (see Figure 1). The revolutionary method that Euler applied in his proof that no such route existed involved representing each of the four separate areas as a circle, or node, and each bridge as a line, or link. Together, these nodes and links created a *graph* or “a set of vertices and a set of lines between pairs of vertices.”¹¹ And thus was born the now common practice of drawing lines between graphic representations of any number of people, places, or things that are somehow connected to one another.

⁹ Albert-László Barabási, *Linked: How Everything Is Connected to Everything Else and What It Means for Business, Science, and Everyday Life* (New York: Plume, 2009), 7.

¹⁰ Ibid., 9–13.

¹¹ Wouter de Nooy, Andrej Mrvar, and Vladimir Batagelj, *Exploratory Social Network Analysis with Pajek* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 7.




Figure 1. Visualization of Euler’s Königsberg Bridge Proof¹²

Social networks are groups of nodes (e.g., people) whose connections allow *something* to be shared among the members of that particular network.¹³ Sharing a link with a long-dead ancestor, for instance, may include that relative in your extended family network but that person could not be considered part of your *active* social network. Christakis and Fowler further elaborate by labeling this necessary transmission across social network ties as “contagion.” They submit that the transfer of everything from “germs, money, violence, kidneys, happiness, or obesity” can illustrate the existence of a social network.

Social network analysis (SNA) consists of “a collection of theories and methods that assumes that the behavior of actors (whether individuals, groups or organizations) is profoundly affected by their ties to others and the networks in which they are embedded.”¹⁴ SNA seeks to capture and scrutinize the social ties among people, organizations, or nations that are involved in social relations.¹⁵ For this work, SNA’s detection and visualization process—with its roots dating back to Euler’s bridge

¹² From Barabási, *Linked*, 11.

¹³ Nicholas Christakis and James H. Fowler, *Connected: How Your Friends’ Friends’ Friends Affect Everything You Feel, Think, and Do* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2009), 16.

¹⁴ Sean F. Everton, *Disrupting Dark Networks* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 2.

¹⁵ de Nooy, Mrvar, and Batagelj, *Exploratory Network Analysis*, 5.

problem—is sufficient to form the basis for the network models proposed in the ensuing chapters. An interpretation of the technical metrics that are at the core of SNA’s relevance and utility (e.g., network topography, centrality measures, or subgroup cohesion) may indeed provide additional insight into the network development detailed in *The Ugly American*, but such an undertaking is beyond the scope of this particular study.

A. THE EVOLUTION OF MODERN NETWORK THINKING (ABRIDGED)

In a pivotal article written in 1990, organizational sociologist Walter Powell confronted the contemporary notions of organizational structure after observing that “firms appear to be changing in significant ways and forms of relational contracting appear to have assumed much greater importance.”¹⁶ His examination of the importance of relationships and how they affect lines of communication, horizontal as opposed to vertical integration, and the flow of resources revealed the need to address the network organizational structure as an entity unto itself. Powell argued that networked organizations displayed distinct qualities that could not be adequately captured by attempting to categorize this emerging form of systemic governance along the traditional market-hierarchy continuum. In his effort to define networks “as a distinctive form of coordinating economic activity,”¹⁷ Powell expanded upon the then-current economic theory that viewed markets as “spontaneous coordination mechanisms” occupying the decentralized extreme of economic organization and hierarchies as rigid administrative entities that marked the other end of the spectrum.

Throughout the evolution of network study, two general approaches to defining networks have emerged. The first views networks primarily as one type of organizational form while the second sees characteristic components of networks existing everywhere—both in the natural world and in nearly every realm of human existence. The prevailing sentiment that came to dominate economic and business theory, as well as the field of international relations, followed Powell’s line of thought contending that networks are a

¹⁶ Walter Powell, “Neither Market Nor Hierarchy: Network Forms of Organization,” *Research in Organizational Behavior* 12 (1990): 297.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 301.

discrete form of organization, one of several options possessing unique characteristics.¹⁸ Hierarchical organizational structures, for example, are typically focused on the production of specific goods or services and tend to be more formalized and rigid. In contrast, network organizations are generally more decentralized and open to new ideas and innovative processes. Organizational management theorists began identifying the characteristics of the networked organization several decades ago,¹⁹ eventually describing the configuration as an “adhocracy” and giving this unique organizational form its rightful place alongside more recognizable and formalized forms of bureaucracies and traditional hierarchical structures.²⁰ Since then, numerous scholars have devoted considerable effort towards further revealing the distinct qualities, strengths, and weaknesses of adhocracies and networked organizations as they exist in the modern world.

A second school of thought embraced by many in the social network analysis field is that all interactions between two or more entities, no matter how broadly or how narrowly defined, constitute a network. Therefore, even a rigid, traditional hierarchical structure that lacks the characteristics of a “network organization” is considered a network. In a sense, everything is a network and the examination of ties and relationships between the nodes in a particular network can provide a tremendous amount of insight into how well or how poorly each particular system is functioning (regardless of its intended purpose). Krackhardt and Hanson differentiate between the formal relationships inherent in an organization’s hierarchical structure and the informal networks (i.e., trust,

¹⁸ Mette Eilstrup-Sangiovanni and Calvert Jones, “Assessing the Dangers of Illicit Networks: Why Al-Qaida may be Less Dangerous than Many Think,” *International Security* 33, no. 2 (Oct. 2008): 11.

¹⁹ For an early description of emerging organizational leadership and structure characterized as both “temporary” and “adaptive,” see Warren G. Bennis and Philip Elliot Slater, *The Temporary Society* (New York: Harper & Row, 1968). While the authors do not apply the designation “adhocracy,” they describe the future of organizational leadership as necessitating “an active method for producing conditions where people and ideas and resources can be cultivated to optimum effectiveness and growth.” For insight into the early popularization of the term “adhocracy,” see Alvin Toffler, *Future Shock* (New York: Random House, 1970).

²⁰ Henry Mintzberg describes the following six major organizational configurations: Machine Bureaucracy, Professional Bureaucracy, Simple Structure, Divisionalized Form, Adhocracy, and Missionary Configuration in Henry Mintzberg, *Structure in Fives: Designing Effective Organizations* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1993).

advice, communication) that exist behind the scenes. They demonstrate that informal ties have a substantial impact on what actually transpires in an organization's day-to-day operations.²¹

The second approach to networks has revealed significant implications that cross over all of the organizational configurations described above and into nearly every aspect of human existence. From the subtle yet profound ways that “weak ties” in our social circles impact our lives to how intangible “social” capital affects job performance and organizational effectiveness, the expanding insight into the unique characteristics of network relationships continues to offer new ways to examine the world around us. It also is helping to improve the way we design and contribute to our own personal and professional networks—even those we encounter while working in foreign countries.²²

B. NETWORK THEORY AND RELATED CONCEPTS

Gaining an appreciation of the current state of network theory is an important step for those interested in pursuing network design or incorporating network principles into their skill-sets. In addition to including his discoveries concerning network scale and other characteristics of complex networks, Barabási provides a comprehensive and accessible overview of contemporary network thinking in *Linked: How Everything Is Connected to Everything Else and What It Means for Business, Science, and Everyday Life*. The text includes a history of the evolution of network theory over the past two centuries and addresses a wide range of subjects from modern implications concerning the vulnerability of Internet hubs to basic network principles such as the “small worlds” and “six degrees of separation” concepts. Barabási successfully demonstrates that

²¹ David Krackhardt and Jeffrey R. Hanson, “Informal Networks: The Company Behind the Chart,” *Harvard Business Review* 74, no. 4 (July 1993): 104–111.

²² For Granovetter's original study concerning “weak ties,” see Mark Granovetter, “The Strength of Weak Ties,” *American Journal of Sociology* 73, no. 6 (1973): 1360–1380. For additional detail concerning “social capital” and how it relates to more traditional forms of financial and intellectual capital, see Patricia Anklam, *Net Work: A Practical Guide to Creating and Sustaining Networks at Work and in the World* (Boston: Elsevier/Butterworth-Heinemann, 2007), 13–16, 151–152, 229–230.

networks and network-based phenomenon exist all around us and are extremely important to nearly all aspects of human existence.²³

In *Connected*, Christakis and Fowler also provide a compelling argument that networks deserve considerable attention and are impacting the modern world in astoundingly frequent and interesting ways.²⁴ Their work focuses on the interdependent relationship between individuals and the groups that form around them (i.e., the networks that we help shape and that simultaneously shape who we are). Their corollary to the “six degrees of separation” rule, what they call the “three degrees of influence rule,” holds that our own actions will tend to affect friends and colleagues in our social network out to three degrees (friends of our friends’ friends). While much of Christakis and Fowler’s research centers on modern technology and the abundant network phenomenon present in today’s “hyperconnected” world, their insights into the spread of influence describe an important discovery concerning network behavior and provide a useful addendum to more traditional approaches that can be applied to the examination of network leadership.

Each of the network models presented in this study contains a central figure that is responsible for initiating their network’s emergence or evolving it to meet their desired purpose. The role of these actors and the influence they exert over their networks are central to the study’s analysis. Whether viewed as “catalysts,” “translational leaders,” “choreographers,” or “influentials,” numerous authors have observed that individual leaders play critical roles in how networks establish themselves and progress over time. Some networks simply need a charismatic person to coalesce around while others might flourish (or just barely manage to survive) because they learn to successfully collaborate or establish open dialogue.²⁵

²³ Barabási, *Linked*.

²⁴ Christakis and Fowler, *Connected*.

²⁵ This study relies heavily on the principles of collaboration detailed in: David Straus, *How to Make Collaboration Work: Powerful Ways to Build Consensus, Solve Problems, and Make Decisions* (San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler, 2002). For a process oriented guide to improving organizational and interpersonal communication, see Deborah L. Flick, *From Debate to Dialogue: Using the Understanding Process to Transform our Conversations* (Boulder, CO: Orchid Publications, 1998).

Several scholars contend that certain people are simply born to play critical roles in influencing the lives of those around them. Gladwell's "law of the few" suggests that some of these special people possess specific traits that allow them to easily connect with other people; that some are charismatic and persuasive "salesmen;" and that some possess the capacity to gather and retain a tremendous amount of detailed information that allows them to be frequently called on to offer expert advice.²⁶

During their research on systemic resilience, Zolli and Healy found that leaders who were able to successfully guide their constituents through periods of evolution or dramatic disruptions did not possess any common physical attributes and were not simply able to connect with a large number of diverse people.²⁷ These "translational" leaders were skilled at making connections between seemingly disparate groups; they were able to "translate" across various levels both within and outside of their organizations and lead from the "middle-out." What other characteristics might impact a person's ability to lead other people, particularly when that person is interacting with people from a different culture?

The extensive canon of literature from the fields of individual and organizational behavior and social psychology contains innumerable hypotheses that seek to explain how leaders actually go about the process of leading. There are undoubtedly a multitude of authors whose ruminations on leadership could serve to inform the examination of network leadership presented in this study. To further narrow the scope of the research for this project, critical facets of interpersonal influence, trust establishment, and group collaboration were isolated from several fields of study and utilized to inform the various in-depth analyses of the network designers presented in subsequent chapters.

First published in 1984, Cialdini's highly regarded book, *Influence: The Psychology of Persuasion*, details six of the most common and effective approaches used

²⁶ Malcolm Gladwell, *The Tipping Point: How Little Things can make a Big Difference* (Boston: Back Bay Books, 2002), 30–88.

²⁷ Andrew Zolli and Ann Marie Healy, *Resilience: Why Things Bounce Back* (New York: Free Press, 2012), 239–258.

to elicit compliance.²⁸ Cialdini's work addresses basic but pivotal concepts of measuring a persuader's *likeability* or a target audience's predisposition towards *obedience* and includes more complicated scenarios such as increasing the perceived *scarcity* of a good or service to make someone want it more. The text provides guidelines for individuals and organizations (including those operating among foreign populations) that are either attempting to influence others or are interested in being able to recognize external attempts at manipulation.

Social psychologists John French and Bertram Raven provide a useful paradigm for examining interactions with indigenous networks. In a study first published in 1959, they describe the various factors that impact how individuals respond to external attempts to induce change. By advancing the understanding of the fundamental forces that underlie how well or how poorly external influence is received (what French and Raven refer to as the "bases of social power"), influence operations and host nation network development may be more effectively and efficiently planned and executed.²⁹

The social power that external actors may wield over indigenous populations is significantly tied to perceptions of trust. Like the role of influence, understanding the role of trust in network development is critical for network developers who plan on establishing tight-knit or long-lasting relationships with their network members. An understanding of the nature of trust as described in trust literature can assist network designers in differentiating between the basic factors that influence *category-based trust* (e.g., perceptions of role responsibilities and expectations, being able to identify with someone based on shared group membership) and those that affect *person-based trust* (e.g., perceived levels of benevolence, integrity, and competence).³⁰ For most network designers, a basic appreciation for how individual (i.e., person-based) and collective (i.e., category-based) actions effect the transference of trust is sufficient to enable them to

²⁸ Robert B. Cialdini, *Influence: The Psychology of Persuasion* (New York: Quill, 1993).

²⁹ French and Raven's five bases of social power consist of: reward power, coercive power, referent power, legitimate power, and expert power. John French and Bertram Raven, "The Bases of Social Power," in *Studies in Social Power*, ed. John French et al. (Oxford: University of Michigan Press, 1959), 150–167.

³⁰ Barbara D. Adams and Robert D.G. Webb, "Trust in Small Military Teams," accessed October 3, 2012, http://www.dodccrp.org/events/7th_ICCRTS/Tracks/pdf/006.PDF.

more effectively approach a specific task or a particular person. Network designers working with foreign populations may benefit further from Sztompka's more detailed examinations of the "deployment" of trust and his differentiation between primary trust (i.e., trust based on reputation, performance, and appearance) and secondary trust (i.e., trust calculations tied to accountability, pre-commitment, trust-inducing situations).³¹

C. NETWORK EXAMINATION

This study relies on Dr. Nancy Roberts' Continuum of Network Designs (see Figure 2) as a primary tool for network examination.³² This graphic representation of a network at a specific time offers a discrete, comprehensive snapshot of where that network fits on the broad continuum between anarchical disunion and rigid organization. This approach evaluates networks according to three separate criteria: 1) level of openness (open to closed); 2) level of formality (informal to formal); and 3) level of planning (self-organizing/emergent to planned). Traditional organizational structures (often referred to as hierarchies) occupy the far right extreme of the continuum and tend to be highly formalized, largely inflexible, and founded on strict authoritarian relationships focused on producing tangible results. In contrast, "ad hoc" networks are typically more informal in nature, retain a high degree of flexibility, and produce significant intangible value through mutual trust and accountability, shared interests, and common purpose.³³ Networks that are completely open, informal, and solely self-organizing—those that would occupy the far left of the continuum—risk falling into an anarchical state and finding it exceedingly difficult to maintain solvency or consistency of purpose.

³¹ Piotr Sztompka, *Trust: A Sociological Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 69–97.

³² Nancy Roberts, "Notes on Networks" (lecture, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 9 April 2012).

³³ Anklam, *Net Work*, 22–25.




Figure 2. Dr. Nancy Roberts' Continuum of Network Designs

In addition to the continuum and individual network visualizations, the analysis of each of the four networks drawn from *The Ugly American* also includes a description of the network's background and each network's purpose, structure, style, and value. These four principal components of networks are drawn from Patti Anklam's book, *Net Work*, and provide essential insight into the unique design processes inherent in each of the models presented. A network's *purpose* is what brings the network to life and what makes its members "care" about it in the first place. Anklam's first principle of networks posits that all networks can be drawn and that the resulting *structure* reflects how various responsibilities, roles, and social bonds are arranged within a particular network. The four basic network structures that appear in this study are shown in Figure 3. *Style* refers to a network's "social climate," how its members interact with one another, whether it is meant to produce specific results or is oriented on discovery, and how the network's leaders approach their responsibilities. Finally, a network's *value* indicates whether what the network produces is tangible or intangible and whether or not its value is what was initially sought after by the network or something different that has emerged throughout the network's evolution.³⁴

³⁴ Ibid., 30.




Figure 3. Network Structures: Hub-and-Spoke, Mesh, Federated, Core/Periphery³⁵

D. THE U.S. MILITARY AND NETWORK THEORY³⁶

The *Commander's Handbook for Attack the Network* published in May 2011 serves as one illustration of where the American military currently stands on incorporating network principles into “population-centric” irregular warfare operations. Although the Attack the Network (AtN) handbook is not approved joint doctrine, the document and its Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) authors are at the leading edge of efforts to “further develop the application of AtN techniques to the conduct of military operations and mature AtN concepts for possible transition into joint doctrine.”³⁷ The title of the publication is somewhat misleading as the document is a comprehensive study that presents a wide variety of pertinent network concepts and attempts to address the entire spectrum of threat, friendly, and neutral networks. As the handbook puts forth in its initial chapter:

AtN involves more than the focused use of ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] assets, analytical methodologies, and dynamic or deliberate targeting means. If AtN is to make a contribution to the success of the overall joint operation/campaign, it must be a part of a broader, command wide effort to: 1) Build a better friendly network, 2) Empower information exchange, 3) Employ all enablers, and 4) Exploit all opportunities with IO [information operations]. These fundamental actions leverage the lethal and nonlethal capabilities of the military force and

³⁵ These network illustrations appear separately in Anklam's *Net Work*. From Ibid., 58, 67, 75.

³⁶ The U.S. military's *Commander's Handbook for Attack the Network* currently defines a network as: “that group of elements forming a unified whole, also known as a system;” it further states that “networks are comprised of people, processes, places, and material—components that are identifiable, targetable, and exploitable.” USJFCOM, *Attack the Network*, GL-23, III-1.

³⁷ Ibid., iii.

participating United States Government (USG), multinational, and HN [host nation] partners.³⁸

The AtN handbook, like the military’s current counterinsurgency manual, does address critical concepts pertaining to networks and the use of SNA in irregular warfare environments. What appears to be beyond the scope of both manuals and where this study seeks to provide additional insight is in describing how military and interagency personnel might best go about the task of actually initiating or influencing “white” networks (i.e., the general population). To illustrate this point, the AtN handbook goes so far as to suggest that “enabling friendly networks” should be the “decisive effort” within the proposed AtN methodology (see Figure 4) yet almost the entire chapter on “engaging the network” is devoted to directly interdicting *threat* networks.




Figure 4. Example Attack the Network Lines of Effort³⁹

³⁸ Ibid., I-3.

³⁹ From Ibid., IV-4.

Additionally, the inclusion of only one Civil Affairs (CA) staff member on the proposed AtN Working Group (see Figure 5) suggests a potential oversight when attempting to recommend a functioning staff whose capacity to devise acceptable courses of action is proportionally aligned with the suggested “decisive effort.” To further clarify, the proposed Working Group contains 34 members—only two of these positions (the CA/MISO seat and the Information Operations seat) are filled by specialists whose primary purpose is to impact popular support and influence indigenous communities. Civil Affairs personnel might be the most qualified members of the proposed staff who could ostensibly plan, monitor, or orchestrate a wide range of indigenous network development initiatives similar to those examined in this study.

Figure 5. Attack the Network Working Group⁴⁰

⁴⁰ Ibid., V-6.

counterinsurgency manual does address SNA. Several manuals do, however, allude to the importance of popular support and unequivocally present the role of the population as being critical to success in irregular warfare environments. Yet the majority of the applicable doctrine provides little descriptive content, assessment techniques, or operational suggestions concerning how to affect arguably the most critical task necessary for conflict resolution—influencing the majority of the population to reject the counter-state movement. While it is beyond the scope of this study to provide specific recommendations for future joint or service doctrine, by addressing where the military’s grasp of network theory is at the present time, this work does seek to add to the discussion concerning how best to move forward.

This study is ultimately about the choices that Americans make while serving overseas and about learning from the fictional and real-life lessons of recent and not-so-recent history. It seeks to pull from a variety of sources in an effort to provide effective, feasible options for those Americans who will interact with indigenous populations in the future. As the former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Michael G. Mullen, recently observed:

To put it simply, we need to worry a lot less about *how* to communicate our actions and much more about *what* our actions communicate. I also hope we learn to be more humble, to listen more. Because what we are after in the end—or should be after—are actions that speak for themselves, that speak for us. What we need more than anything is credibility.⁴¹

⁴¹ Michael G. Mullen, “Strategic Communication: Getting Back to Basics,” *Joint Forces Quarterly* 55 (2009): 4.

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III. METHODOLOGY

This study first began with the realization that *The Ugly American* described a multitude of interesting social interactions that had the capacity to be analyzed using SNA software. The majority of the book's 23 chapters are self-contained accounts typically centered on a particular character's successful or ill-fated attempts to influence various indigenous populations throughout Southeast Asia. This format allowed the individual networks that developed around each character to be isolated and separately analyzed.

Several of these individual network developers were indirectly connected to one another through the work of Ambassador Gilbert MacWhite (discussed in detail in Chapters IV and V). MacWhite's role is central both to this analysis and to the story presented in *The Ugly American*. His actions serve to unite the three other main characters in this study to the larger network that he forms as part of a comprehensive effort to stop Communist expansion into the fictional nation of Sarkhan.

Only a small portion of the characters presented in *The Ugly American* actually became part of this analysis. Of the 300 Americans that he served with in Sarkhan, Ambassador MacWhite asserts that, "only five of them were at all valuable in our struggle against Communism."⁴² As a result of this pivotal statement, the focus of this study was narrowed to the relationships developed by MacWhite and these five individuals. The activity of two of these *change agents*, John Colvin and Major Wolchek, is not described in sufficient detail in the text to warrant their inclusion as separate network developers (although each character is addressed in Chapter IV).⁴³ There is, however, enough information in the text for the actions of MacWhite and the other three change agents (Homer Atkins, Father Finian, and Colonel Hillandale) to be coded into

⁴² William J. Lederer and Eugene Burdick, *The Ugly American* (New York: Norton, 1999), 267.

⁴³ For the purposes of this work, a *change agent* is defined as an individual actor who, in an official or unofficial capacity, seeks to modify, coerce, manipulate, or otherwise influence the belief system, way of life or livelihood, or personal preferences of another actor or group of actors. For clarification, Anklam defines a "change agent" as an individual who purposefully bridges boundaries between different groups and organizations to bring specific actors or functions into their network. Anklam, *Net Work*, 210–211.

SNA-software and analyzed based on established network techniques and principles of interpersonal interaction and group collaboration.

To produce the network sociograms that are the essential SNA-based contribution to this study, the text was first carefully examined to identify and define the types of ties that best described the majority of the connections made between the four change agents and the other characters that they encountered in *The Ugly American*. The ties that were identified consist of informal connections based on trust, advice, or friendship and formal ties based on participation or membership in the same organization, operation, or business (each relationship is defined in detail below).⁴⁴

1. Trust Ties. Trust relations are defined by the willingness of an actor (i.e., character) to stake personal reputation, capital, life, or livelihood on another actor's ability to do what they say they can or will do. When not directly and explicitly addressed in the text (e.g., "This man can be trusted."), trust is inferred through an actor's deliberate and voluntary choice to establish a relationship with another actor that relies on the implicit expectation that the other actor will do what he or she says that they will do.

2. Advice Ties. Advisory relations consist of one actor's reliance on another actor's technical, tactical, personal, or professional input to inform or otherwise impact one's decision calculus. In Sarkhan, as in many Asian countries, this may include advice generated through the practice of astrology, palm-reading, and similar "occult" sciences.

3. Friendship Ties. Friendship relations are defined as attachments to another actor based on affection or esteem.

4. Organizational Ties. Organizational relations are defined as two actors sharing simultaneous membership in a formal organization. Coded organizations include political parties, governmental institutions, and resistance movements.

5. Operational Ties. Operational relationships consist of shared participation in the execution of a discrete act. Operations may be hastily or deliberately planned and can

⁴⁴ For further detail concerning informal networks, see Krackhardt and Hanson, "Informal Networks," 104–111.

include distinct events in the execution of one's official responsibilities (e.g., non-routine or event driven diplomatic negotiations).

6. Business Ties. Business relationships are defined as participation as an owner, employee, or customer of a for-profit organization.

Following the identification of these six ties, the relationships of 95 characters connected to the four change agents were encoded into the SNA software platform, UCINET. To provide additional fidelity, each character's nationality and general role were also identified and added in UCINET (see Table 2 for additional detail on these attributes). Six of the 95 characters serve only to illustrate the original U.S. Embassy network that was established by MacWhite's predecessor, Ambassador Sears (see Chapter IV). With the exception of Ambassador MacWhite's extended network, the author attempted to include all of the relevant characters that were a part of or directly connected to each of the three other networks (i.e., Finian's, Atkins', and Hillandale's). MacWhite encountered several additional characters throughout the book whose inclusion would only further illustrate the federated nature of his network and his propensity to develop numerous "weak" ties and accept input from a variety of external sources (see Chapter V).

All six relational ties were coded to produce Ambassador MacWhite's 89-member extended network as it appears in the study. This network was extracted from chapters 1–5, 10, 15, 17, 18, and 21 in *The Ugly American*. Homer Atkins' network consists of 42 members that were involved in the formation of the Jeepo-Atkins Company (see Chapter VI). This network was derived principally from chapters 17, 18, and 21 in *The Ugly American* and includes relationships based on business connections, advice, and trust. Father Finian's "Nine Friends" network consists of 14 characters whose organizational and trust ties are revealed in chapters 3, 4, and 21 of *The Ugly American* (see Chapter VII). Colonel Hillandale's 13-member "Cuenco 10" network emerges in chapters 9, 10, 15, and 21 of *The Ugly American* (see Chapter VIII). It includes the friendship, advice, and organizational ties that emerge between Colonel Hillandale and the ten Filipinos that he influences and between Colonel Hillandale, Ambassador MacWhite, and Magsaysay.

Table 1 provides an example of the UCINET dataset (with all ties joined and aggregated) that was produced by coding relationships from chapters 3, 4, and 21 of *The Ugly American*. Father Finian's "facilitator" network consists of informal trust ties and formal organizational ties. Coded ties represent the presence of either a positive or negative connection based on each relationship and are non-valued (i.e., -1, 0, or 1).

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15
	Fa	Ar	U	U	To	"F	"F	"F	"F	"F	V	AM	Ru	AM	AM
	th	ch	Ti	Pi	ki	ri	ri	ri	ri	ri	ni	B	th	B	B
	er	bi	en	u	(	en	en	en	en	en	ch	Kr	J	Se	Ma
	F	sh	(	"	"F	d"	d"	d"	d"	d"		up	yo	ar	cw
	in	op	Fr	Fr	ri	4	5	6	7	8		it	ti	s	hi
	ia	o	ie	ie	en							zy	n		te
	n	f	nd	nd	d"										
	Mo	"	"	"	3										
	kt	1)	2)	)											
	hu														
1	Father Finian	0	1	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
2	Archbishop of Mokthu	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
3	U Tien ("Friend" 1)	2	1	0	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	0	0	0	0
4	U Piu ("Friend" 2)	0	0	2	0	2	2	2	2	2	2	0	0	0	0
5	Toki ("Friend" 3)	0	0	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	0	0
6	"Friend" 4	0	0	2	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	0	0	0	0
7	"Friend" 5	0	0	2	2	2	2	0	2	2	2	0	0	0	0
8	"Friend" 6	0	0	2	2	2	2	2	0	2	2	0	0	0	0
9	"Friend" 7	0	0	2	2	2	2	2	0	2	2	0	0	0	0
10	"Friend" 8	0	0	2	2	2	2	2	2	0	2	0	0	0	0
11	Vinich	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
12	AMB Krupitzyn	-1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
13	Ruth Jyoti	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
14	AMB Sears	-1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
15	AMB Macwhite	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0

Table 1. UCINET Dataset Display of Father Finian's Network

Each network was then processed through UCINET's network visualization tool, NetDraw, to produce the sociograms used throughout this study (see Figure 6). Network visualizations that benefitted from illustrating negative ties (i.e., Ambassador Sear's network shown in Figure 8) were produced by exporting the UCINET dataset into the Pajek SNA software platform.




Figure 6. Example NetDraw Visualization (Father Finian)

While not all of the networks coded and presented in this study existed simultaneously, each represents a network that the respective change agent personally established and could potentially reengage. Additionally, for the purposes of this work the network visualizations serve to illustrate the types of network development that Ambassador MacWhite (and the book's authors) considered effective and how each change agent's distinctive approach manifested in a unique network design methodology. Although other relationships might presumably have existed between the fictional characters in *The Ugly American*, this study has attempted to avoid any undue extrapolation of probable relationships and instead focuses on connections that should be readily apparent when filtered through the previously defined ties. It is likely, for instance, that certain members of the Cuenco 10 or Jeepo-Atkins network considered each other friends; however, the coding of potential relationships is not within the purview of this study and would likely only obscure the basic yet distinctive lessons that Lederer and Burdick presented in their novel.

Relationships that would only have produced redundant ties between nodes were also purposefully not coded. For example, there is evidence that operational and advice ties existed between the Burmese members of Father Finian's core network, yet coding

these additional ties would only have reinforced the organizational ties already identified. Since a simple visualization of the relationships established between the actors in each network was sufficient for this study, the critical ties that bound together the network's members are noted to further augment the understanding of each network's genesis.

As addressed previously, the four change agents that became the focus of this study were singled out for two reasons: 1) they were principal characters who the authors of *The Ugly American* used to illustrate what they believed to be effective methods of host nation interaction, and 2) there existed sufficient (albeit incomplete) information in the text to serve as a basis for the mapping of their respective networks.

Incompleteness is a challenge faced often by network researchers. In addition to his observations concerning “fuzzy boundaries” and the dynamic nature of dark networks, Sparrow comments on the inevitable incompleteness of network data where “some existent links will be unobserved or unrecorded.”⁴⁵ Although Sparrow's work focused on dark networks, this phenomenon is prevalent throughout network analysis where network “mapping” relies on getting enough (hopefully accurate) information for the process to be undertaken in the first place. In his critique of the “influentials hypothesis,” Duncan Watts recounts several shortcomings related to the procurement of anecdotal evidence—the kind of evidence needed to inform social network analysis (e.g., through interviews, questionnaires, or even interrogations). Watts cites several memory biases (e.g., recency and hindsight bias) and the “filling in” of unremembered details as key contributors to what one study revealed as a 50 percent inaccuracy rate among respondent-driven data. In an observation particularly relevant to SNA, Watts suggests that “when asked to whom they go for advice, respondents may simply name individuals whose roles position them as advice-givers . . . rather than first recollecting the last time they actually sought advice.”⁴⁶

In this regard, the data collected from *The Ugly American* (and other fictional accounts, for that matter) might be considered even more “accurate” than traditional data

⁴⁵ Sparrow, “Network Vulnerabilities,” 268.

⁴⁶ Duncan Watts, “Challenging the Influentials Hypothesis,” *Measuring Word of Mouth* 3 (2007): 203–204.

pulled from real-world sources. While the narrative provided in the novel remains incomplete and the authors unfortunately are no longer available to confirm or deny the assertions made in this study, fictional accounts like *The Ugly American* have the capacity to reveal what a character *actually* believes and feels rather than simply providing an account of an individual's actions or a person's fallible recollections. This does not mean to suggest that there are necessarily any correlations between the activities and thought-processes of the characters contained in this study and those of any human being who has ever actually attempted to develop indigenous networks. It does beg the question, though: Should there be in the future?

Finally, it should be noted again that *The Ugly American* is a factually-based work of fiction that contains several characters based on individuals who actually worked in Asia in the mid-20th century. Biographical accounts of men ranging from T. E. Lawrence to Edward Lansdale (the basis for the character of Colonel Hillandale) and books and studies produced by civilian volunteers and U.S. advisors serving in conflict zones throughout the world also serve to further inform the analysis of each of the four network models presented in this study.

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IV. THE BIG PICTURE

The simple fact is, Mr. Ambassador, that average Americans, in their natural state . . . are the best ambassadors a country can have. . . . They are not suspicious, they are eager to share their skills, they are generous. But something happens to most Americans when they go abroad. Many of them are not average . . . they are second-raters. Many of them, against their own judgment, feel that they must live up to their commissaries and big cars and cocktail parties. But get an unaffected American, sir, and you have an asset. And if you get one, treasure him—keep him out of the cocktail circuit, away from bureaucrats, and let him work in his own way.

– *Magsaysay to Gilbert MacWhite, U.S. Ambassador to Sarkhan*⁴⁷

Prior to delving into an in-depth analysis of each of the networks presented from *The Ugly American*, it is beneficial to present a visualization of the entire aggregated network as a starting point. As illustrated in Figure 7, by the conclusion of the book (and shortly before his termination) the U.S. Ambassador to Sarkhan, Gilbert MacWhite, has developed an extensive network consisting of individuals who have successfully proven their ability to create their own networks and influence local populations from the ground-level up (i.e., Homer Atkins, Father Finian, and Colonel Hillandale). While Ambassador MacWhite has sought out and developed ties with these *change agents*, the subnetworks that they generate are not directly tied to formal U.S. or Sarkhanese governmental or diplomatic efforts to influence the Sarkhanese population. They therefore meet the previously presented definition of grey networks. Each of the subnetworks generated through the American change agents, as well as MacWhite's larger network, will be described in subsequent chapters based on their unique approach to network development and influencing specific populations.

⁴⁷ Lederer and Burdick, *The Ugly American*, 108.

1. Major James Wolchek

Major James “Tex” Wolchek is a U.S. Army observer attached to the French Foreign Legion in Indochina when Ambassador MacWhite meets him during one of his fact-finding trips around Southeast Asia. For several weeks, Major Wolchek and the ambassador, along with Wolchek’s French counterpart, Major Monet, discuss the Communist situation in Indochina at length. MacWhite accompanies Wolchek and Monet’s Legionnaire company as the French struggle to find a way to apply their advantage in firepower and numerical strength against the elusive Viet Minh guerrillas. The men study the writings of Mao Tse-tung in an effort to develop an appreciation for the unconventional tactics being used by the Communist guerrillas against French and Vietnamese soldiers. The Legionnaires eventually adopt some of Mao’s tactics and use them against the Viet Minh guerrillas with considerable success. Predictably, the French generals running the war in Indochina refuse to accept the junior officer’s pleas (and those of Ambassador MacWhite) to re-look how the war is being fought. Near the end of MacWhite’s visit, the French sign an armistice and hand over Hanoi to the Viet Minh. MacWhite eventually gets Wolchek to Sarkhan to help oversee the training of the Sarkhanese military in guerrilla tactics, but the text does not reveal how MacWhite got him to Sarkhan or provide any detail about what Wolchek actually does when he gets there.

2. Emma Atkins

The wife of the Ugly American, Emma Atkins, not only directly influences the success of her husband’s effort to improve Sarkhanese irrigation methods (detailed in Chapter VI) but also considerably improves the lives of the Sarkhanese villagers by her own actions. Shortly after moving with her husband to the village of Chang ‘dong where Homer Atkins establishes his pump manufacturing business, Emma notices that the elderly villagers are severely stooped and all seem to be in considerable pain due to the bend in their backs. Emma surmises that this deformity is the result of the villagers’ use of brooms made from the short stalks of reeds found in the immediate vicinity of Chang ‘dong. Wood was scarce in the region and the elders of the village had always assumed

that their advanced age was the main reason for their hunched posture, not their use of a two-foot long broom handle. Emma eventually locates a longer reed growing forty miles from Chang 'dong that she brings back to the village and plants near her home.

Rather than trying to force the new broom handles on the local population, Emma simply uses the longer broom handle herself while cleaning around her house. She is eventually approached by several villagers who ask her about her new tool. Emma tells the villagers where they can find the new reeds and they promptly retrieve enough to make sure that they will no longer have to bend over to sweep. Interestingly, four years after the Atkins return to the United States, Emma receives a letter from the village headman of Chang 'dong informing her that the villagers have erected a shrine in her honor and that they wanted to let her know how much she had improved their lives (there is no mention of any homage paid to Homer).

3. John Colvin

Another change agent that Ambassador MacWhite accepts into his network is John Colvin, a former OSS operative who served in Sarkhan during World War II. Colvin devises a plan to gradually introduce a particular breed of cattle into Sarkhan that can digest the tough, thick grasses that carpet the country's hillsides. The cattle could graze on vast tracts of otherwise unusable land and would both improve the local diet and bolster the regional economy. Colvin plans to get the Sarkhanese to eventually accept the cattle into their everyday lives by first introducing them to powdered milk. A year after he opened the first of several milk distribution centers in Sarkhan, Colvin hoped to begin importing the cattle to provide fresh milk and byproducts to the population. He then intended to sell his stake in the operation and return to the United States.

In contrast to the other change agents presented in this study, Colvin's efforts are entirely his own and are not part of a larger attempt to develop an indigenous network. His manner is most similar to that of Colonel Hillandale who chooses to forego the use of a local proxy and instead presents himself and his own actions as a primary means of influence. However, Colvin's endeavor centers on the production of a tangible product (i.e., milk and cattle) while Hillandale focuses on the production of intangible social

capital. Hillandale builds personal relationships and provides indigenous populations with an American that they can identify with. Colvin simply wants to progressively and gradually introduce a product that will help the Sarkhanese people. His solitary approach serves as a useful comparison to the other network models and a viable course of action for appropriately qualified and similarly motivated individuals to follow.

V. THE ORCHESTRATOR

The little things we do must be moral acts and they must be done in the real interest of the peoples whose friendship we need—not just in the interest of propaganda. . . . to the extent that our foreign policy is humane and reasonable, it will be successful. To the extent that it is imperialistic and grandiose, it will fail.

– Ambassador MacWhite⁴⁹

A. NETWORK BACKGROUND⁵⁰

The Honorable Gilbert MacWhite, United States Ambassador to Sarkhan, is one of the few characters that maintain a recurring role throughout *The Ugly American*. Although not the work's title character, MacWhite serves as the book's principal protagonist, intent on using a culturally attuned approach and his skill as a veteran Foreign Service officer to assist the people of Sarkhan. Sarkhan finds itself at the center of the Cold War ideological struggle between the capitalist West and the Soviet-led Communist bloc—a struggle that the Communists are winning when MacWhite assumes his position in part due to his predecessor's poorly executed ambassadorial mission (described above in Chapter IV). MacWhite faces entrenched local Communist agents, entrepreneurial Russian diplomats, a largely incompetent American embassy staff, and a detached and unimaginative bureaucracy back in Washington as he fights to regain influence among the predominantly rural and agrarian Sarkhanese population. Through dedicated study of local and regional issues, Communist methodologies, and various successful approaches used in other parts of Southeast Asia, MacWhite devises a long-term plan for the country and is able to slowly cobble together an extended network of individuals (i.e., the *change agents*) who prove effective at stemming the progress of the Communist movement in Sarkhan.

⁴⁹ Lederer and Burdick, *The Ugly American*, 267.

⁵⁰ Ambassador MacWhite's aggregate network was extracted from chapters 1–5, 10, 15, 17, 18, and 21 in *The Ugly American*. While every character that appears in the text is not included here, key relationships that are critical to the theories and analysis presented throughout this work have been coded according to the metrics defined in Chapter III. The three additional change agents introduced in the previous chapter have the potential to yield additional implications relevant to host nation network development in the course of future research.

Unfortunately, MacWhite's somewhat unorthodox measures are not appreciated by his superiors in the State Department, and his efforts are ultimately cut short. He is abruptly recalled back to the United States after his boss rejects his demands for a major restructuring of how his embassy was to conduct operations.⁵¹ *The Ugly American* emphasizes the irony of MacWhite's dismissal after he had made considerable gains in improving America's status in Sarkhan and was well on his way to dramatically disrupting Communist designs on the region. The removal of the effective diplomat, MacWhite, when juxtaposed with Ambassador Sears receiving the federal judgeship he desired and the replacement of MacWhite by the ostentatious and culturally inept Joe Bing, serves as the authors' most glaring illustration of what they perceived as a tremendous misappropriation of resources and talent in the execution of U.S. foreign policy.

⁵¹ Ambassador MacWhite informed the Secretary of State that he would tender his resignation if five conditions for restructuring his ambassadorial mission were not approved. His ultimatum required that: 1) all embassy personnel complete at least twelve weeks of Sarkhanese language instruction; 2) no dependent travel be approved for embassy employees serving less than a two year assignment; 3) the American commissary and Post Exchange (PX) be withdrawn from Sarkhan (he insisted that embassy personnel should live off of the local economy); 4) privately owned vehicles of embassy personnel no longer be permitted in Sarkhan; and 5) all embassy personnel must read the writings of the major Communist theorists and leaders prior to traveling to Sarkhan.

B. NETWORK OVERVIEW




Figure 9. Ambassador MacWhite's Extended Network

Figure 9 provides a NetDraw generated visualization of a portion of the relationships that Ambassador MacWhite develops throughout *The Ugly American*. While this sociogram does not include all of the actors the ambassador interacts with in the book, the aggregate network presented here (along with the three subnetwork analyses contained in this study) serves both to illustrate the value of SNA as an analytical tool and to assist in further revealing the poignant and still relevant lessons contained in the text. All six of the formal and informal ties defined in Chapter III are included in this sociogram.

The dense clique in the center of the graph consisting of eight red squares and two blue triangles represents the key characters in the U.S. embassy subnetwork. The six blue squares to the left of the embassy subgroup are the inner circle of the Sarkhanese national government. The three subnetworks that are examined later in this study are outlined in green (Colonel Hillandale), blue (Homer Atkins), and grey (Father Finian). Also depicted

are two Russians, Ambassador Louis Krupitzyn and Vladimir Vinich (a veteran political agent charged with leading Communist activities in Burma), and several other tangential characters that are indirectly associated with the various subnetworks. Finally, the three change agents discussed in the previous chapter who are not analyzed in detail in this study are circled in orange.

C. NETWORK ANALYSIS




Figure 10. Ambassador MacWhite's Network Design

1. Level of Openness

In contrast to the closed embassy network that was cultivated by the previous ambassador to Sarkhan, Ambassador MacWhite purposefully sought out key individuals who he believed could assist him in countering Communist efforts to pull Sarkhan into the Sino-Soviet domain. He adopted two new approaches in his quest to broaden the scope of American influence that would eventually be used against him as his superiors back in Washington began questioning his unconventional methods. First, MacWhite recognized that he needed help and actively sought the advice of a handful of his indigenous Southeast Asian counterparts who had been dealing with Communist aggression in their own countries for some time. Two of the change agents that MacWhite would eventually recruit were recommended to him during these meetings. Secondly, MacWhite believed that the best way for him to improve his understanding of the Communist situation in Sarkhan was to travel throughout the region and experience first-hand what nations at various stages of Communist insurrection looked like. During

his travels, MacWhite was exposed to several other individuals who further shaped his approach in Sarkhan. He even managed to convince two of them, Homer Atkins and Major Wolchek, to join his network.

Despite his willingness to incorporate a diverse assortment of individuals into his network, MacWhite understood that there were risks associated with his counter-Communist campaign. The network faced challenges both from Communist sympathizers who actively sought to derail its activities and from a large portion of the Foreign Service community who wished to maintain the status quo and did not recognize MacWhite's efforts as necessary or appropriate in the broader context of executing U.S. foreign policy. Recruitment into the network, therefore, was open to a wide range of innovative, proactive characters but was also tempered by MacWhite's desire to maintain overall operational security of his comprehensive efforts and his insistence on personally establishing a foundation of person-based trust with each of the change agents that he brought on board.⁵²

2. Level of Formality

While MacWhite's extended network was not bounded by formal standards and procedures, he understood that the literal and figurative space that the network occupied still existed within the context of his overall diplomatic mission.⁵³ Those change agents that operated out of the U.S. embassy, for instance, could not simply ignore the constraints placed upon them by bureaucratic procedure or the ineptitude of other Americans serving in Sarkhan, they had to deal with them and work their way around them. MacWhite did endeavor, however, to grant the change agents as much freedom of action and delegation of authority as was feasible for someone in his position. This conscious decision to *orchestrate* a network of networks (i.e., those of the change agents), rather than to micro-manage the affairs of the various activities that were being

⁵² Person-based trust is often characterized in trust literature as originating primarily from an individual's favorable assessment of the trustee's competence, benevolence, and integrity. See Adams and Webb, "Trust in Small Military Teams," 5–6.

⁵³ For a discussion of the "locus" of networks, which includes the real place or virtual space that an individual network occupies, see Anklam, *Net Work*, 81–88.

undertaken, allowed each subnetwork to flourish and each change agent to use his or her own unique approach to its fullest capacity.⁵⁴ MacWhite recognized that this methodology produced a greater number and wider variance of direct challenges to Communist expansionism than he could have created on his own. As will be discussed in detail below, this informal network structure was not without its weaknesses, particularly in matters of resilience at both the local level in Sarkhan and within the broader context of the larger diplomatic effort in which the network ultimately operated.

3. Level of Planning

MacWhite's extended network can be characterized as slightly more emergent than planned primarily due to his decision to not dictate the manner in which each of the subnetworks executed their individual tasks. The overarching goal of exposing the Sarkhanese population to a wide array of programs championed by Americans and promoting Western ideals was ultimately geared at disrupting Communist efforts to do the same thing for the Soviet cause. This purpose, however, was not central to all of the subnetworks, nor was it necessary for all of the change agents to be dedicated anti-Communists. Homer Atkins, the focus of Chapter VI, and Tom Knox, an agricultural advisor working in Cambodia, approached their tasks from a purely altruistic position and were intent on using their education and expertise to find simple, locally sustainable solutions to basic problems impacting the indigenous populations of Southeast Asia. Their contributions substantially improved local conditions and, by extension, increased America's standing in the eyes of the people while contravening much of the anti-Western Communist propaganda directed at the masses that depicted Americans as uncaring, xenophobic capitalists. Unlike Father Finian and John Colvin, however, Atkins and Knox were not risking their lives and livelihood in Southeast Asia solely to impede the spread of Communism—they were there simply to help people who could use their assistance. Ambassador MacWhite recognized the “second-order” effects of these types of efforts and co-opted their use within the larger planned purpose of his extended network.

⁵⁴ For Anklam's description of the role of choreographers and orchestrators in network design, see Anklam, *Net Work*, 137–138.

	Purpose	
	• Defeat Communist attempts to overthrow the government of Sarkhan	
	Structure	
	• Federated	
	Style	
	• Geographically expanded • More open • Discovery and knowledge-based facilitation	
	Value	
	• Regionally attuned, effective counters to Communist political entrepreneurship	

Table 3. MacWhite's Network Summary

D. IMPLICATIONS

1. Weak Ties

During the development of Ambassador MacWhite's extended network, it is evident that his reliance on "weak" ties is significant to the greater realization of the U.S. government's potential to impact the Sarkhanese population. Granovetter suggests that the strength of an interpersonal tie is directly related to "the amount of time, the emotional intensity, the intimacy...and the reciprocal services which characterize the tie."⁵⁵ MacWhite's "weak" connections to Homer Atkins, Father Finian, and John Colvin (all of whom prove to be influential change agents) are all founded on a considerable amount of trust that is established in a relatively short amount of time based primarily on MacWhite's personal research, input from local nationals, and his willingness to support their efforts to help the people of Sarkhan.

⁵⁵ Granovetter, "The Strength of Weak Ties," 1361.

Anklam suggests that network structures with “extensive weak ties to diverse groups” are ideal for innovation and “learning networks” (see Table 4).⁵⁶ Network members who have close personal and professional connections (i.e., strong ties) tend to think along similar lines and have access to the same resources.⁵⁷ By purposefully seeking out new ideas and involvement from external actors and then consciously keeping these new network members at arm’s length, MacWhite allows the subnetworks to learn and grow on their own and in ways that would not have been feasible if he would have taken a more direct and personal involvement in their evolution. While MacWhite’s relationship to Colonel Hillandale might be considered a “strong” tie based on their work together in the U.S. Embassy, MacWhite does not interfere with Hillandale’s efforts in Sarkhan and therefore refrains from imposing the constraints that could easily arise from MacWhite’s authoritative relationship to Hillandale.

Functional Need	Effective Network Pattern
Complex knowledge transfer (teams)	Strong ties People aware of each other’s knowledge
Simple knowledge transfer	Weak ties are sufficient
Simple coordination	Hub and spoke network
Transformation, change management	Strong ties from the hub to central connectors in sub-networks
Complex coordination	Dense, de-centralized network
Innovation	Extensive weak ties to diverse groups
Public good, field & policy networks	Strong and multiple ties to diverse groups

Table 4. Structural Patterns for Different Network Functions⁵⁸

⁵⁶ Anklam, *Net Work*, 78.

⁵⁷ Christakis and Fowler, *Connected*, 158.

⁵⁸ Anklam, *Net Work*, 78. The table presented is a modified version of the table from *Net Work* that the author used in a May 2010 presentation titled “Creating and Sustaining Successful Networks.” From <http://www.slideshare.net/panklam/net-work-creating-and-sustaining-successful-networks>.

2. Empowering Orchestration

MacWhite's decision to orchestrate rather than direct his network presents a viable, if somewhat oversimplified, model for network designers to consider when working with foreign populations. In addition to Anklam's apt analogy of orchestration, other notable authors have recently explored leadership roles in social movements and networks in ways that offer added insight into Ambassador MacWhite's approach to network development.

Gladwell's "law of the few" is part of a larger "influentials hypothesis" that posits that certain people possess a unique capacity to affect the lives of others—far more so than the average person.⁵⁹ In his book, *The Tipping Point*, Gladwell separates these influential people into three categories—connectors, mavens, and salesmen.⁶⁰ MacWhite is neither a "maven" (a recognized expert who actively accumulates knowledge in his chosen field and is relied upon by others to inform their decisions) nor a "salesman" (one skilled in the art of persuasion); what he is good at is actively seeking out people who then connect him to other people who can assist him in his efforts—he connects with connectors. He engineers his role as the central hub in his network and grows it through numerous relationships that he establishes and exploits throughout his travels. In doing so, he exemplifies the characteristics of another archetype described in a recent study of "leaderless" organizations—that of the catalyst.

In *The Starfish and the Spider: The Unstoppable Power of Leaderless Organizations*, Brafman and Beckstrom define a catalyst as any person who initiates a decentralized organization without hierarchy or structure and then "fades away into the background."⁶¹ MacWhite did not intend to depart Sarkhan as early as he did but it is evident that the extended network he created during his tenure was intended to persist—although, as previously discussed, he arguably could have done more to ensure its survival. Throughout the evolution of his network, Ambassador MacWhite uses several

⁵⁹ Watts, "Challenging the Influentials," 202–203.

⁶⁰ Gladwell, *The Tipping Point*, 30–88.

⁶¹ Ori Brafman and Rod A. Beckstrom, *The Starfish and the Spider: The Unstoppable Power of Leaderless Organizations* (New York: Portfolio, 2006), 88, 90, 92.

of the catalyst's tools that Brafman and Beckstrom describe in their work. Among the most notable are: 1) a genuine interest in others, 2) loose connections (i.e., weak ties); 3) meeting people where they are; 4) trusting the network; 5) a tolerance for ambiguity; 6) a hands-off approach; and 7) the ability to recede and let the network grow after the initial framework is established. Finally, a useful comparison for network designers between catalysts and more authoritarian leaders (i.e., “CEOs”) like Ambassador Sears is shown in Figure 11.




Figure 11. The Catalyst versus the CEO⁶²

3. Network Design and Resilience

Designers who are intent on developing indigenous networks must realize the unique circumstances and opportunities that present themselves in each particular situation. MacWhite's larger agenda of countering the spread of Communist propaganda and influence was subsumed, yet eventually bolstered, by the individualized and narrower focus of each of the subnetworks. The “federated” network structure that emerged is characterized by the core of the extended network (in this case, MacWhite


⁶² From Brafman and Beckstrom, *The Starfish and the Spider*, 130.

himself) serving as the central hub around which other relatively autonomous hubs (i.e., the change agents) are arranged.⁶³ This method worked in Sarkhan where there had not been any notable American efforts to help the people and any enterprise that made contact with the masses was a step in the right direction. MacWhite could see that initiatives aimed at improving farming techniques or educational opportunities (Father Finian's contribution in Sarkhan), for instance, could have dramatic indirect effects on Communist expansion. The results might not have been the same in another region of the world and, importantly, MacWhite's work was somewhat incomplete in that the network was not fully prepared to continue to function upon his unexpected removal.

MacWhite's central role in the overall development of his network is undoubtedly a weakness that should be addressed. Without a clear understanding of an overall purpose and goal for each of the subnetworks present in his larger network, MacWhite's removal had the potential to dramatically degrade U.S. assistance to the people of Sarkhan—no one else knew where he wanted to take things or at what point they could consider their efforts a success. However, when compared to MacWhite's predecessor's close-knit, "provincial" network (see Figure 12),⁶⁴ it is apparent that the expanded vision that MacWhite brought to the Sarkhanese situation stood a much greater chance of actually proving effective, regardless of the larger issues of sustainability.

⁶³ Anklam, *Net Work*, 67.

⁶⁴ Negative relations appear as dotted lines in this Pajek sociogram.



Establishing redundancy and a greater shared understanding of the role each of the actors assumed within the network could certainly have added to its resiliency.⁶⁵ Unfortunately, MacWhite's frustrations with the state of the Foreign Service community, his frequent travel, and his overtaxed schedule contributed to him missing several opportunities to further strengthen the network during its development. Perhaps a concerted effort early in his tenure to find and vet a trusted second-in-command or even to assemble a close-knit staff that shared his approach to de-centralized, population-centric initiatives and his anti-Communist agenda could have enabled the network to continue to grow and achieve its desired effects upon his departure.

Network designers operating within a larger context or at the behest of a parent organization (e.g., the Department of State) should also ensure that the methods

⁶⁵ Zolli and Healy note that while redundancy (“the ability of a system to persist even when compromised”) is not synonymous with resiliency (“the capacity of a system, enterprise, or person to maintain its core purpose and integrity in the face of dramatically changed circumstances”), it is frequently a principal component of highly resilient systems. Additional principles of resiliency include: diversity, simplicity, trust and cooperation, adaptive governance, and the ability to self-organize to “heal in the wake of a breach.” MacWhite’s network design approach contained many of the qualities that are helpful in establishing systemic resilience. However, while focusing so much of his attention on getting the network off the ground, he never made a concerted effort to align these characteristics towards the goal of preparing the network for a disruption. Zolli and Healy, *Resilience*, 6–16.

employed either fit into the accepted practices of the parent organization or can be explained in such a way that the parent organization does not interfere with the network's emergence or administration. MacWhite's approach ran counter to what the authors viewed as the commonly accepted practices of the Foreign Service in the mid-20th century. Partly because he truly viewed his efforts as necessary and effective and partly due to his frustration with the way foreign policy was being executed, MacWhite was either unable or unwilling to devise a viable way to placate his superiors in Washington while accomplishing his work in Sarkhan. The result was that his network faced disruption not only from Communist agents in Sarkhan but also from bureaucrats in the U.S. government. Those bureaucrats ultimately possessed the power to impact the network to a far greater extent than any of the challenges MacWhite and the other change agents faced on the ground in Sarkhan—the State Department sent MacWhite home.

4. Letting Go to Get More

Despite the considerable emphasis placed on cross-cultural understanding and linguistic capabilities in recent years, Americans continue to face multi-dimensional and often distinctly localized conditions that challenge even the most experienced and knowledgeable advisors, non-governmental organization (NGO) workers, and Foreign Service professionals. Allowing innovative initiatives the latitude to address these localized challenges without dictating their actions undoubtedly poses risks to those charged with overseeing the execution of foreign policy and on whose shoulders success or failure ultimately rests. In some ways, the “zero-defect” mentality that exists today is not all too different from the narrow, domestically-oriented mentality of Ambassador Sears, Joe Bing, and several other antagonists presented in *The Ugly American*. Today's leaders operating on foreign soil might possess a far greater capacity to execute their responsibilities but the potential ramifications of just one mistake or the lack of quantifiable signs of “progress” contribute to a similar mind-set that influenced many of the characters in *The Ugly American* to ignore the realities on the ground, isolate themselves from the local population, and hope to return to the United States without being associated with any negative incidents. This condition often manifests itself in risk aversion and micro-management by those administrators who have the unenviable task of

approving a wide range of regional or local programs without the ability to personally oversee them or, in some cases, to even be able to fully grasp the fundamentals of a specific approach. Without the de-centralized, trust-based foundations of a more adhocratic organization—like those present in MacWhite’s network—comprehensive efforts to bring change or to influence populations will be shackled by the limits of the imagination and the individual proclivities of the man or woman in charge. As MacWhite’s character illustrates, one person can only do so much.

While the federated structure that MacWhite developed based on weak ties, proactive recruitment, and a de-centralized approach to network governance might not be the “right” fit for all attempts at indigenous network development, the method deserves consideration and undoubtedly contains beneficial lessons for those attempting the difficult task of finding practical solutions to unfamiliar problems in faraway places.

VI. THE CONFEDERATE

You want big industry. You want big factories. You want big T.V.A.'s scattered all over the countryside. That all takes skilled workmen, and mines, and a lot of money, and a whole lot of people who are production-minded. Of course you've got good people out there in the boondocks, good hardworking people who are plenty savvy. But they don't want what you want yet. It takes time for that. That's why I recommended in my report that you start small, with little things. And then after you lick them, go on to the bigger things.

—Homer Atkins (*the Ugly American*)⁶⁶

A. NETWORK BACKGROUND⁶⁷

Homer Atkins is the title character of *The Ugly American*. He epitomizes what Americans are capable of accomplishing when truly and imaginatively committing themselves to working with indigenous populations. Homer's ugliness is literal, not figurative, and his actions are in no way reflective of the negative connotations associated with the modern colloquial meaning that the pejorative "ugly American" has come to denote.⁶⁸ The example that Homer provides stands in stark contrast to the insouciant, bourgeois demeanor of men like Ambassador Sears and Joe Bing who appear in the novel—characters inspired by real men who unfortunately hijacked Homer's moniker and robbed generations of Americans working overseas of a simple metaphorical goal to strive for: to be *like* the ugly American.

Homer is a retired American engineer who answers a State Department recruiting drive promising the opportunity of overseas service. He is assigned as an engineering advisor in Vietnam and spends the first ten months of his tour surveying the countryside,

⁶⁶ Lederer and Burdick, *The Ugly American*, 208.

⁶⁷ Homer Atkins' network was extracted from chapters 17, 18, and 21 in *The Ugly American*.

⁶⁸ The *Merriam-Webster Dictionary* currently defines an "ugly American" as "an American in a foreign country whose behavior is offensive to the people of that country." The *Encarta Dictionary* elaborates further by describing an "ugly American" as "a loud, boorish, nationalistic American, especially one traveling abroad, who is regarded as conforming to a stereotype that gives Americans a bad reputation."

living among the locals, and gaining an appreciation for the needs of the indigenous population. By the time Ambassador MacWhite meets Atkins at a conference in Saigon, Homer's efforts to assist the people of Vietnam have been repeatedly frustrated by American, French, and Vietnamese diplomats who are not interested in what Homer believes are the truly important issues facing the greater Vietnamese population. Homer's recommendations to pursue smaller projects that have the potential to address local grievances and improve the Vietnamese quality of life are brushed aside in favor of large-scale, national-level infrastructure development and proposals for increased military spending.

Ambassador MacWhite observes the bureaucrats in Saigon rejecting Atkins' plea for the delegation to approve the construction of brick factories, quarries, canning plants, and smaller, non-military grade roadways designed for improving commerce and access to resources, not for moving large military equipment between major population centers. While Homer does not completely discount the value of dams, utility projects, airfields, and other large-scale endeavors, he insists that those projects should be pursued at a later date, after more immediate concerns that are affecting the Vietnamese people have been addressed. A more measured approach would allow enough time for an improved Vietnamese infrastructure and education system to set the conditions for the Vietnamese, not foreign companies, to assume responsibility for these bigger projects when the time came for them to be initiated. The assembly of urban elite decision-makers—none of whom had ventured out among the people to actually assess the situation for themselves—rejects all of Homer's advice. Disgusted by the delegation's lack of insight, Homer decides he has finally had enough and walks out of the meeting. Ambassador MacWhite seizes on this unexpected opportunity, invites Homer for a drink, and successfully convinces him to bring his skills and needs-based approach to Sarkhan.

Atkins and his wife, Emma, eventually travel to a rural region of Sarkhan where he works to develop a new pump for irrigating farmland. As MacWhite had explained to Homer shortly after they met in Vietnam, the rolling countryside of Sarkhan made it difficult to transport water from low-lying water sources up to the hillside paddies where Sarkhanese farmers planted their crops. MacWhite believed that Homer might be able to

use his engineering skills to devise a more efficient irrigation method than the traditional practice of using primitive dip lifts to water the fields. Soon after his arrival in Sarkhan, Homer completes a design for a rudimentary pump that he believes has the potential to vastly improve Sarkhanese irrigation techniques.

Homer, with Emma's help, proves adept not only at engineering a locally sustainable solution to the irrigation problem but also at engineering an ingenious approach to getting his network started and his idea approved and endorsed by the local population. First, at Emma's behest, Homer travels to the remote village of Chang 'dong and initiates his endeavor by meeting with the village headman. Through negotiations with the headman and the village elders, Atkins finds an indigenous counterpart (a local engineer named Jeepo) who is capable of assisting Homer in finalizing his design and implementing his plans for producing the pump. Secondly, Atkins insists up front that a business contract is agreed to that splits any profits made in the manufacture of the pump equitably between Atkins and any Sarkhanese directly involved in the enterprise. Jeepo later adds specific provisions to the contract that stipulate that the design will not be patented and that the newly formed Jeepo-Atkins Company will make the pump design available to all of Sarkhan by printing design schematics and distributing them throughout the countryside.

A third occurrence that aided the network's emergence was completely unanticipated. Emma had suggested to Homer that bicycles, which were ubiquitous in Sarkhan, could be used as the pump's source of power. Homer followed Emma's advice and the pump—consisting now of bamboo piping, a pumping mechanism fashioned out of pistons and cylinders from the engine blocks of abandoned jeeps (which were also in great supply), some simple mechanical linkages, and a modified bicycle frame to power the entire apparatus—appeared ready to be put to use. What the couple had not anticipated, however, was that there was probably no more important mechanical device to the average Sarkhanese than a fully functioning bicycle. There were no spare bicycles that could be put out of commission as a means of transportation in order to power the pumps. Jeepo, Homer's local engineer, fixed this design flaw by devising a rack and treadmill system that allowed a bicycle to be fitted to the pump temporarily and then

easily removed when the bicycle's owner needed it to travel. Because of Jeepo's contribution, the Sarkhanese were now not only directly invested in the pump's manufacture and sale, but they also could legitimately claim to have played a major role in the pump's evolution and in the development of its final design.⁶⁹

1. A Note on Homer's "Ugliness"

Long before Homer first journeyed to Asia he had developed a habit of looking at his calloused, freckled hands to remind himself that he was an ugly man. He looked at his hands often when meeting with government officials or corporate executives who seemed predisposed to casually disregard input from someone like Homer who did not share their well-groomed comportment and willingness to not buck the system. Homer was neither well-groomed nor a yes-man. He was different, and he begrudgingly embraced his differences and used them to his advantage. Homer's frequent hand-checking constantly reminded him of his outsider status; it also forced him to take pause and to think more about what he would like to say and how he might best approach a particular situation. He assumed that he could not rely on charm, charisma, or physical attractiveness to get people to listen to him or to manipulate them into doing what he felt needed to be done. He had to work hard, know what he was talking about, and carefully navigate negotiations if he wanted to get his way.

The unique qualities that the authors bestow upon Homer Atkins present an ideal, if not archetypal, mentality for those involved in host nation network development to aspire to. Too often and too easily, Americans working overseas may view their way as the "only" way, are more concerned with appearances than with substance, or are unwilling to speak up when they believe things are not being done the way they should

⁶⁹ Jeepo's contribution to the irrigation pump's final design illustrates a commonly oversimplified dictum of foreign advising that appears in T. E. Lawrence's famous "Twenty-Seven Articles." Article 15 counsels: "Do not try to do too much with your own hands...your practical work will not be as good as, perhaps, you think it is." Homer's "practical work" went far in developing a viable improvement to Sarkhanese irrigation methods. However, for the design to truly be practical in Sarkhan, it needed Jeepo's input. Americans intent on host nation network development must be cautious in their approach to devising solutions to local problems—an overreliance on technology, the introduction of esoteric methodologies, or an unwillingness to accept input from the indigenous population can all contribute to the failure of even the most well-intentioned, if myopic, attempts to provide goods or services to indigenous peoples. For the full text of Lawrence's "Twenty-Seven Articles," see John E. Mack, *A Prince of Our Disorder: The Life of T. E. Lawrence* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1975), 463–467.

be. It is truly unfortunate that the lessons contained in Homer's ugliness have been largely overshadowed by the misappropriation of his apt and illustrative title. More American men and women serving on foreign soil should strive to follow Homer's example and remind themselves, as often as he did, to pause and take a true account of what they are trying to accomplish and how they might best approach their tasks.

The physical ugliness that separates Homer from the apathetic and often ostentatious diplomats that he encounters in Asia (who represent the modern perception of "ugly Americans") can also be viewed as symbolic of the cultural divide that inescapably separates even the most seasoned Foreign Service worker from a host nation population. No matter how familiar or knowledgeable an external change agent may become with an indigenous population, he or she will *always* be an outsider. Americans working with foreign populations would do well to remind themselves of their "ugliness"—their cultural and often physical foreignness as viewed through the eyes of native populations. Indeed, the habit of many Americans who refuse to accept that they are interlopers and should avoid patronizing or offending the very people they are trying to assist contributed to the unfortunate idiomatic misrepresentation of what it means to be an "ugly American."

B. NETWORK OVERVIEW




Figure 13. The Jeepo-Atkins Company Network

Figure 13 depicts Homer's network following his negotiations with the leaders of the village of Chang 'dong (the three blue triangles at left-center) that led to his partnership with Jeepo. Homer and Jeepo, with permission from the village headman, form the Jeepo-Atkins Company (the dense core at center) and hire 12 local workers who both manufacture the pumps at the company's warehouse in Chang 'dong and assume the role of salesmen to market the pump across the region. The sociogram depicts Homer's network as the 12 salesmen have each departed Chang 'dong with two sample pumps and started to sell their product.⁷⁰ Business, advice, and trust ties were utilized to produce this network.

⁷⁰ Although the text of the book does not detail exactly how many contacts were made by the individual salesmen, it does relate that the first salesman to return to Chang 'dong had sold his two samples and received orders for eight more pumps. Rather than attempting to extrapolate the business ties created based on this sole account, for the purposes of this coding it is assumed that each of the salesmen was at least able to make contact with two farmers and sell the sample pumps that he had departed with. Subsequent depictions of Chang 'dong do not describe the exact extent of the success of the company but do refer to the village as possessing a small but thriving industrial sector where none had existed before.

C. NETWORK ANALYSIS




Figure 14. Homer Atkins' Network Design

1. Level of Openness

Membership in Homer's network was somewhat constrained by his desire to produce a tangible product (i.e., pumps) for the Sarkhanese people. Prior to departing for Chang 'dong Homer had developed the basic design for the pump on his own. Following Jeepo's unanticipated yet necessary assistance in completing the design, the two men were no longer concerned with further innovation—they wanted to get the pumps built and put to use. The network, at that point, was closed to outside actors apart from the twelve Sarkhanese workers that they hired. These workers eventually opened the network's membership up again to include the farmers that they interacted with as they travelled the countryside and sold their newly manufactured pumps. This controlled recruitment limited the influx of new ideas and the discovery of new problems (what might be considered a critical capability of other networks) but was effective at methodically expanding the reach of the network by providing practical, affordable assistance through indigenous channels in the form of a locally derived and locally sustainable product.

The birth of the Jeepo-Atkins Company further reveals the closed nature of Homer's network design model. For Homer's approach to work, a discrete group of men, the village elders, had to be convinced to not only support the project but also to provide

Homer with a proxy (Jeepo) who was a capable engineer willing to help Homer get the network off the ground. The village headman could easily have chosen a less-qualified family member who might have profited from an association with Atkins. The elders might also have been tempted to try to sabotage the effort in any manner of ways to discredit the American entrepreneur. The Sarkhanese had never witnessed a white man actually working with his hands and suspected that Homer might be trying to use them and the labor they provided for his own benefit at their expense. These were risks that Homer felt were necessary to take and without taking them his effort could not have succeeded the way that it did. As Emma presciently cautioned Homer before he solidified his plan: “You’ve got a good machine there....But don’t think that just because it’s good the Sarkhanese are going to start using it right away....You have to let them use the machines themselves and in their own way. If you try to jam it down their throats, they’ll never use it.”⁷¹

2. Level of Formality

Homer’s network is the most formalized and least adhocratic of the four networks contained in this study. Homer insisted that written documents be produced to formally bind his agreements with the villagers of Chang ‘dong. He did this partly due to the inherent requirements for standardization of the manufacturing and marketing procedures involved in the business of selling pumps and partly as a means of establishing mutual trust with the local leaders and the indigenous population. The simple organizational structure that emerged limited the amount of innovation and knowledge sharing both within the network and from external actors but was efficient at creating a stable environment conducive to the production of a much needed product for the Sarkhanese people.⁷²

⁷¹ Lederer and Burdick, *The Ugly American*, 218.

⁷² Mintzberg describes the simple organizational structure as having “little or no technostructure, few support staffers, a loose division of labor, minimal differentiation among its units, and a small managerial hierarchy.” Mintzberg, *Structure in Fives*, 157. For additional detail concerning simple organizational structures as well as background on five other organizational structures (including the adhocracy), see Mintzberg, *Structure in Fives*, 157–297.

As Anklam suggests, no network design structure is inherently superior to any other. The ideal design “will vary based on the purpose, style, and value-creating characteristics of a [particular] network.”⁷³ The formalized, structured approach that Homer adopted proved to be exactly what was necessary for the Sarkhanese villagers to accept the help of an outsider, especially one who was attempting to modify their centuries-old irrigation methods. Even though the network emerged as a mesh as the Jeepo-Atkins Company was being formed, once the salesmen began to venture into the countryside, the network establishes a periphery that has the potential to bring new members and fresh ideas back into the network’s sphere. This type of locally legitimized, practical, and indigenously run mechanism for generating new stakeholders and expanding the reach of the network has the capacity to not only get needed assistance out to the people but also to serve as the foundation for the establishment of an enduring network capable of supporting other tasks.

3. Level of Planning

While Homer deliberately and literally planned (in the form of design schematics) many of the steps that he would take in developing his network, there were several critical junctures along the way that relied on forces and factors beyond his immediate control. The end result of his pump design, for instance, could not have been anticipated when Ambassador MacWhite first challenged Homer to improve Sarkhanese irrigation methods while they were both in Vietnam. Homer had to be in Sarkhan so he could work with readily available materials that existed in sufficient quantities to support his task. He could not complete the plans for a practical and locally sustainable pump until he was actually there. Likewise, Homer could not anticipate how various inputs from the village elders and from Jeepo would affect the emergence of his pump-building network until he was actually in Chang ‘dong. He certainly had a basic plan and he had experience in building things and making organizations function, but the realities of the Jeepo-Atkins Company were different than anything he had been exposed to back in the

⁷³ Anklam further reveals that “studies are showing that different structures are more or less suitable for different categories of work. It has become conventional wisdom...that the core/periphery model appears to be best for vibrant innovation...and that closed, highly connected teams are required for focused detail work.” Anklam, *Net Work*, 77–78.

United States. Homer did not force his plan to unfold in a prescribed manner. He remained flexible and adapted his approach based on the resources and capabilities that he had on hand.

Purpose
• Provide inexpensive, efficient, sustainable, and locally accepted improvements to Sarkhanese agricultural production techniques
Structure
• Mesh (Jeepo-Atkins Company) • Core/Periphery (post-product launch)
Style
• Production-based (pumps) • More planned • Balanced interaction (personal, skill, and task-based)
Value
• Tangible financial capital; intangible social capital

Table 5. Homer’s Network Summary

D. IMPLICATIONS

1. Collaboration

Homer’s successful collaboration with Sarkhanese villagers, initiated through the village leadership and expanded by the villagers themselves, represents a highly effective, “grassroots” approach to identifying and generating stakeholders and building consensus with a host nation population.⁷⁴ This process accomplished more than simply producing a pump that was acceptable and sustainable throughout the Sarkhanese

⁷⁴ Straus defines collaboration as “the process people employ when working together in a group, organization, or community to plan, create, solve problems, and make decisions.” Straus, *How to Make Collaboration Work*, 5. While this chapter focuses on Homer’s successful collaboration with the Sarkhanese population, the title “confederate” is utilized (instead of “collaborator”) to forego any possible confusion regarding the network model’s association with enemy or adversarial entities.

countryside. It also set the foundation for future small-scale Sarkhanese-owned industry, improved local agricultural production, and helped to dispel the cornerstone of the Communist dialectic that relied on Westerners being viewed as more interested in exploiting Sarkhanese labor than in addressing the needs of the Sarkhanese people.⁷⁵

Well before contemporary academics had fashioned the robust canon of organizational behavior and management theory that exists today, Homer's achievements exemplified how a careful approach to collaboration can yield tremendous results when working with foreign populations. Straus contends that two of the most important steps in the process of collaboration are obtaining the participation of all of the relevant stakeholders and building consensus among these stakeholders during each phase of an operation.⁷⁶ Homer's decision to go to the elders first, interact with Jeepo as a peer and not from a position of authority, and his willingness to live among the people of Chang 'dong all contributed to the Atkins' ability to identify and get to know everyone in the village who had a stake in the operation. From his first meeting with the village headman to Homer's recruitment of Jeepo and the numerous contractual agreements established with the village elders and the workforce of the Jeepo-Atkins Company, Homer carefully ensured that the needs of all of the stakeholders that became involved were met—he built consensus phase-by-phase. Additionally, Emma's involvement in the collaborative process (see Figure 15) prior to their journey to Chang 'dong further illustrates how

⁷⁵ Homer's model not only reveals an effective approach to assisting a host nation population but also illustrates how a well-rounded, carefully executed program can confront and even reverse anti-Americanism among indigenous peoples. In their discussion of how to win a foreign publics' support during counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations, Campbell and Weitz caution: "...pursuing an effective strategy to neutralize anti-American sentiment is not easy. Strategic influence campaigns regularly encounter problems with cultural and linguistic misunderstandings, ingrained distrust and prejudices, and competing sources of information and perceptions. Much anti-U.S. feeling results from a deeply rooted alienation from American culture and values." Kurt Campbell and Richard Weitz, *Non-Military Strategies for Countering Islamist Terrorism: Lessons Learned from Past Counterinsurgencies* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Project on National Security, 2005), 22.

⁷⁶ For additional detail regarding stakeholder involvement and consensus building see chapters two and three in Straus, *How to Make Collaboration Work*.

Homer’s dedication to collaboration—with the indigenous population as well as with his wife—proved critical to his eventual success.⁷⁷




Figure 15. Straus’ Pathways to Action Model⁷⁸

While the resulting network centered on tangible production (i.e., pumps), Homer’s dense, mesh-like network (of which he is a part) ultimately manifests a substantial ability to influence a large number of individuals throughout a broad geographic region. The sustained involvement of an American civilian working with Sarkhanese citizens in an equal capacity in a for profit business also produced strong social capital with numerous local nationals that undoubtedly had the potential to counter Communist entrepreneurship at both the individual and collective level.⁷⁹ This type of network is ideal for building lasting and deep-rooted informal ties (e.g., trust, friendship,

⁷⁷ The “pathways to action model” provides the foundation for Straus’ third key element of collaboration: designing a process map. Importantly, he suggests that this approach can be used “to design in advance a collaborative process—a pathway to reaching consensus—without knowing what the consensus will look like.” Emma’s suggestion for Homer to approach the village elders first proved to be a critical factor in how Homer would try to obtain the indigenous population’s cooperation in the execution of his plan—even though he could not envision exactly what the desired cooperation would ultimately produce. Straus, *How to Make Collaboration Work*, 81–84.

⁷⁸ Ibid., 83.

⁷⁹ For additional detail related to social capital, see Anklam, *Net Work*, 13–15, 101–102, 151–153.

and advice) and has the potential for several collateral applications such as gaining accurate information concerning local grievances and obtaining actionable intelligence on adversarial activity.⁸⁰

2. Relevance

In this modern era of globalization, amidst massive U.S. foreign aid programs and population-focused counterinsurgency initiatives, the wild, untouched interior of New Guinea may seem an odd place to find anecdotal insight germane to the issue of sustainability. However, when attempting to discern what types of programs indigenous network developers might best pursue at the local or regional level, the observations of several Westerners visiting the primitive tribes of New Guinea may prove enlightening.⁸¹ On multiple occasions the tribesmen were noted as being enthralled not by the plethora of modern tools and equipment that tourists and anthropologists brought with them on their exhibitions but by the awe-inspiring possibilities harnessed in the small, intense flame of the common candle. Even after exposure (albeit quite limited exposure) to modern inventions including the airplane and the battery-powered flashlight the natives were fascinated by the candle.

One theory for this peculiar behavior holds that the tribesmen could more easily grasp the concept of the candle than, for instance, the notion that light was being emitted from a small piece of hardened plastic that had no flame and did not even get hot.⁸² The controlled flame of the candle contrasted markedly with the erratic flames generated by cords of burning grass or raging cook-fires but it was still close enough to what the tribesmen knew and understood that it demanded contemplation and became highly desired. In this regard, indigenous network designers should carefully assess the introduction of measures that differ considerably from established local practices to ensure that “progress” is made incrementally and within the bounds of a target

⁸⁰ Adversarial entrepreneurship and collateral applications are discussed in further detail in Chapter IX.

⁸¹ Lawrence Osborne, “Letter From New Guinea: Stranger in the Forest,” *New Yorker* 81, no. 9 (Apr 18, 2005): 124–142. Tim F. Flannery, *Throwim Way Leg* (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1998), 134–135.

⁸² Anna Simons, “First Contact,” lecture, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 9 January 2012.

population's ability to appreciate and absorb the proposed changes. Failing to identify a "candle"—whether in terms of imposing new forms of governance or introducing new economic or agricultural practices—may doom an initiative to failure from the start. If a change agent is unable to comprehend when a population may not need or even want what is being offered, or cannot grasp when a population has no viable frame of reference from which to consider the benefits of a particular enterprise, the likelihood of that change agent succeeding will be markedly reduced.

Homer Atkins seemed to intuitively grasp that the solution to improving irrigation in Sarkhan, as well as countless other problems facing the people of Vietnam, should be approached from the local's perspective, using the status quo as a point of departure and an anchor to which new initiatives should remain somewhat tethered. As Homer informed Emma after she suggested that he simply import hand pumps from the United States to power his apparatus: "[The power source] has got to be something they use out here . . . something right here, something the natives understand."⁸³

3. Local Sustainability and the Dependency Paradox

Having considered the important step of identifying what programs might reasonably be presumed to have a chance of success within a specific target population (i.e., the "candles"), indigenous network designers assisting foreign populations should also ensure that their initiatives remain viable and sustainable after their departure. Homer's approach to improving Sarkhanese irrigation methods provides a noteworthy example of how an external change agent can seek to avoid creating an undesirable dependence on their continued presence from the very outset of network development. For most aid workers, Foreign Service professionals, or military advisors, fulfilling a need or addressing a local grievance is an important initial step towards being able to exert positive influence on a specific organization or population. Indeed, entire networks may be built with the purpose of helping a community in distress or importing new and more efficient ways of conducting simple tasks (e.g., irrigating farmland). However, the fulfillment of this need, if not properly planned and executed in a manner that promotes

⁸³ Lederer and Burdick, *The Ugly American*, 216.

local sustainability, can lead to a less than ideal situation that requires external assistance to be maintained in order to continue to alleviate whatever condition caused the need in the first place.

This dependency paradox (also referred to as a dependency trap, aid dependency, or a “resource curse”) can complicate long-term attempts to influence host nation networks and popular support.⁸⁴ To establish the basic conditions necessary for influence to be feasible, external military, interagency, or even civilian change agents typically need to be able to offer goods and services relevant and necessary for a particular target population. Utilizing external resources or applying levels of expertise that are not readily available in the host nation country may prove tempting and expedient as an effective means of providing assistance, but these steps have the potential to only exacerbate conditions when the initiative cannot be maintained following the departure of the change agent or the withdrawal of external resources. Additionally, external change agents must carefully assess the likelihood that their efforts may impinge on the population’s perception of the host nation government’s ability to provide for their citizens. Homer Atkins worked side-by-side with his proxy, Jeepo, ensuring that the Sarkhanese community developed the skills and locally sustainable infrastructure necessary to continue and even to expand their industrial capacity once Homer left Sarkhan.⁸⁵

⁸⁴ For a macro-level review of issues relevant to aid dependency, see Todd Moss, Gunilla Pettersson, and Nicolas van de Walle, “An Aid-Institutions Paradox? A Review Essay on Aid Dependency and State Building in Sub-Saharan Africa,” *Center for Global Development Working Paper 74* (January 2006), accessed October 30, 2012, [http://www.eboyuju.givewell.org/files/DWDA 2009/Interventions/Moss, Pettersson, and van de Walle. 2006. An aid-institutions paradox.pdf](http://www.eboyuju.givewell.org/files/DWDA%2009/Interventions/Moss,%20Pettersson,%20and%20van%20de%20Walle.%202006.%20An%20aid-institutions%20paradox.pdf).

⁸⁵ Near the end of *The Ugly American*, readers are informed that an engineer in Chang ‘dong (presumably Jeepo) has designed and is manufacturing an inexpensive processor for canning fish (one of the ideas that Homer advocates while in Vietnam as a simple solution to improving the way of life of the Vietnamese population).

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VII. THE FACILITATOR

The sage manages affairs without action and spreads doctrines without words. . . . He acts but does not rely on his own ability. He accomplishes his task but does not claim credit for it. It is precisely because he does not claim credit that his accomplishment remains with him.

—*Tao-te Ching*⁸⁶

A. NETWORK BACKGROUND⁸⁷

Prior to being drawn to Sarkhan and recognized by Ambassador MacWhite as a potential asset, Father John X. Finian exhibited yet another distinctive approach to network development in the rural regions of northern Burma. Finian, a Jesuit missionary who had devoted his life to combating the spread of Communism, began his effort in a manner reminiscent of the famed military advisor, T. E. Lawrence. Upon arriving in Arabia to aid Arab partisans fighting against the Ottoman Empire during World War I, Lawrence carefully measured the potential Arab leaders to whom he could offer assistance, finally backing Faisal bin Hussein (who would later become the King of Iraq) after four other men had failed to meet his standards.⁸⁸ In *The Ugly American*, Father Finian embarks on a concerted effort to first locate and then vet a local Burmese Catholic who could serve as Finian's proxy—the critical node around which an anti-Communist network would emerge. He eventually finds U Tien, a devout Catholic from northern

⁸⁶ Wing-Tsit Chan trans., *The Way of Lao Tzu (Tao-te Ching)* (New York: Bobbs-Merrill Co, 1963), 101.

⁸⁷ Father Finian's network was extracted from chapters 3, 4, and 21 in *The Ugly American*.

⁸⁸ T. E. Lawrence, *Seven Pillars of Wisdom: A Triumph* (New York: Anchor Books, 1991), 4. Aside from Lawrence's own account of his choosing Faisal as it appears in *Seven Pillars of Wisdom*, some scholars have suggested that the decision to back Faisal involved a more comprehensive assessment and was the most practical choice based on intelligence reports compiled by the British staff in Cairo and correspondence from Faisal's father, Hussein bin Ali (the Sharif of Mecca), to the British that stated that Faisal could raise an Arab revolt in Syria. However, Lawrence's continued backing of Faisal throughout the endeavor, his successful efforts to channel British support to Faisal's fledgling army, and, finally, Faisal's ultimate success, all suggest that Lawrence made the correct decision when he chose to personally and professionally endorse Faisal as the best choice for leading Arab partisans in support of broader British goals in Arabia. For additional detail on Lawrence's selection of Faisal, see Mack, *A Prince of Our Disorder*, 148–149, 202–204; Karl E. Meyer and Shareen Blair Brysac, *Kingmakers: The Invention of the Modern Middle East* (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2008), 206–207; and James Barr, *Setting the Desert on Fire: T. E. Lawrence and Britain's Secret War in Arabia, 1916–1918* (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2008), 32, 71, 104–106.

Burma working as a driver on the Archbishop of Mokthu's staff. After a series of tests designed to determine U Tien's trustworthiness, Father Finian finally reveals that he wishes for U Tien to aid him in disrupting Communist operations and influence in northern Burma.

In a matter of days, U Tien finds seven other Burmese who he believes might be willing to join the enterprise. The men are all invited to a clandestine meeting where Father Finian sparingly facilitates a lengthy discussion among the gathered men. Throughout the meeting, Finian avoids giving advice or direction to the assembled group. Instead, he purposefully chooses to merely help solicit thoughts and opinions from the locals concerning what, if any, problems they believed were confronting the common Burmese citizen. Eventually the Burmese surmise that their primary collective concern is the impingement of individual freedom perpetrated by local Communist party members who denied their countrymen the ability to worship and live according to their own individual desires. From this inauspicious, "self-organized" beginning, Finian's clandestine network eventually became highly effective at producing and disseminating anti-Communist messages through radio broadcasts and newspapers. In time, the network would even infiltrate the local Communist apparatus and play a major role in destabilizing the entire Communist infrastructure in northern Burma.

B. NETWORK OVERVIEW




Figure 16. Finian's "Nine Friends" Network

Figure 16 provides a NetDraw generated visualization of the trust and organizational relationships that existed in Father Finian's extended network. The dense, mesh-like group at left consists of the eight Burmese men who comprise the network's core membership. While Father Finian interacts with all of these core members, his vetting of U Tien and reliance on U Tien to choose the remaining members of the group and serve as their *de facto* leader suggests that the relationships that Finian develops with the other Burmese men are purposefully limited and reveal a distinct approach centered on relying on a trusted proxy to oversee critical network functions.⁸⁹ The implications of this method and how they tie to matters of trust and risk acceptance will be discussed below. Also depicted are individuals on the periphery of the core—the Archbishop of Mokthu, a senior Catholic official in Burma; Ruth Jyoti, a journalist who spends a month

⁸⁹ The relationships that developed between Father Finian and the other seven core members (excluding U Tien) were not based on trust, advice, friendship, organizational, operational, or business ties as defined in Chapter III. Finian purposefully avoided establishing those relationships with the other core members. He only vetted (and truly trusted) U Tien; he actually refused to give direct advice when solicited by the other Burmese; only when he is leaving does he think that one of the Burmese finally considers him a friend; and the actual operations conducted by the network were planned and executed by the Burmese.

in northern Burma documenting Father Finian’s exploits; and two Russians, Ambassador Louis Krupitzyn and Vladimir Vinich, who share organizational ties with Toki, the network member who successfully infiltrates the local Communist apparatus in northern Burma.

C. NETWORK ANALYSIS




Figure 17. Father Finian’s Network Design

1. Level of Openness

The security concerns that confronted Finian’s network as it operated in an unconventional warfare capacity necessarily demanded careful consideration of prospective members and limited the level of interaction with anyone outside of the group.⁹⁰ Importantly, Finian himself played a pivotal role only in deciding to establish his proxy, U Tien, as the central hub of the network. U Tien then selected the remaining members of the core group. This decision required Finian to accept a substantial amount of both operational and personal risk; the plausible betrayal of Finian by one of U Tien’s associates could easily have resulted in Finian being physically harmed (personal risk) or in the entire network being compromised and unable to meet its broader goals (operational risk).

⁹⁰ Unconventional warfare is defined by current U.S. joint military doctrine as “activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a denied area. See Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. Joint Publication (JP) 1-02* (March 2012), 343.

However, by carefully choosing his proxy and then letting U Tien lead the next phase of recruitment, the resulting core network possessed a unique capacity to define its own purpose without the appearance of it being completely manufactured by a foreign external agent (i.e., Finian). This method also set the stage for the emergence of an internally-generated, localized approach to meeting the network's goals and a level of motivation that would have been extremely difficult to achieve had Finian sought to take a more active role in the group's genesis.

2. Level of Formality

The clandestine, self-organizing nature of the network also affected the group's level of formalization. Finian purposefully did not define the style or procedures that the network adopted, choosing instead to let the network members work through their problems and potential solutions in their own manner and at their own pace. Anklam describes the prospect of "letting go" as "the most difficult task for network leadership" and contends that "it is...desirable to shift decision making as close as possible to the source of the problem or opportunity."⁹¹ Finian was determined to refrain from imposing any set formality on his network—the extent to which formalization did emerge (which was limited due to the clandestine nature of the effort and the largely rural environment where the network operated) was dependent on the input and desire of the network as a whole, not on Father Finian.

3. Level of Planning

In analyzing Finian's approach to network design, it is apparent that his method contained a mix of both intent and discovery as he assisted the emergence of a common purpose among the core members of his network. Finian's true intentions were to organize a group of Burmese to fight the spread of Communism; however, he deliberately risked failure by allowing the eight Burmese to decide for themselves—to *discover on their own*—that Communism was antithetical to their desire for a free Burma and warranted them risking their lives to help the Burmese society. The Burmese could

⁹¹ Anklam, *Net Work*, 111–113.

easily have questioned Finian’s intentions and doubted his sincere concern for their desires had he started by promulgating a concrete purpose for the group and prescribing exactly how the network should function.




Table 6. Finian’s Network Summary

D. IMPLICATIONS

1. Trust and Risk

Finian’s network is the only one presented in this study that fits into an unconventional warfare style scenario. Due to an overwhelming Communist presence and considerable Communist influence over the Burmese population, the network is forced to remain clandestine and, as a consequence, faces more immediate challenges not present during the other networks’ emergence. Personal and operational security are of necessarily paramount concern in such an environment, and trust relations, while crucial

to many successful network forms, take on an entirely new dimension when a breach of faith could easily result in torture or execution.⁹²

The concept of trust has been defined as “a bet about the future contingent actions of others.”⁹³ Perhaps no greater calculation exists in an unconventional warfare operation (specifically at the beginning) than the decision to “bet” that an indigenous individual or group will perform in the manner desired by the external agent. Indigenous personnel may make mistakes or fail to meet the desired standards imposed by foreign advisors, but breaches of trust can easily produce irrecoverable consequences, lead to bloodshed, or force a particular endeavor to be abandoned completely. This is precisely why Finian’s insistence on carefully vetting U Tien and waiting until he believed he had found a trustworthy proxy before moving forward demonstrates a credible approach to host nation network development.

At the outset of Finian’s endeavor into the Burmese countryside, he decided to limit his search for a suitable proxy to Burmese Catholics. This reliance on what is referred to as “category” or “group-based trust” among trust researchers allowed Finian to narrow the prospective candidates that he had to choose from.⁹⁴ Finian believed that among all of the ethnic, religious, and ideological groups residing in northern Burma, the Catholic population offered a greater chance of providing someone who could identify with the priest and who might be willing to join him on his mission. His development of “person-based trust” in the Catholic that he eventually identified for recruitment, U Tien, demanded a prolonged effort to ensure that the risk that Finian was taking would be mitigated to the greatest extent possible. This process included numerous small tests of U Tien’s character and a final test that resulted in U Tien being beaten by Communist agents who came to his home searching for a nonexistent pistol that Finian had told locals he had given to U Tien for protection.

⁹² For additional insight into the history and importance of “trust networks”—defined as “ramified interpersonal connections within which people set valued, consequential, long-term resources and enterprises at risk to the malfeasance of others”—see Charles Tilly, “Trust and Rule,” *Theory and Society* 33 (2004): 1–30.

⁹³ Sztompka, *Trust*, 25.

⁹⁴ For a summary of “category-based” and “person-based” trust, see Adams and Webb, “Trust in Small Military Teams,” 3–8.

At various times throughout the development of the relationship between Finian and U Tien, Sztompka's qualities of primary trust (i.e., reputation, performance, and appearance) and secondary or derived trustworthiness (i.e., accountability, pre-commitment, and trust-inducing situations) played a crucial role in Finian's ultimate decision to trust U Tien and move forward in the development of his network with U Tien as its indigenous hub.⁹⁵ These six factors of trust estimation all influenced Finian's decision to choose U Tien, not just as the right Catholic, but as the right man for the job—a trustworthy anti-Communist willing to risk his life supporting Finian's cause.

2. Facilitation

From a network design perspective, Finian's decision to facilitate, rather than direct, the crucial first meeting of the eight Burmese allowed the network's members to participate in establishing value and purpose for their effort. Finian was solicited for advice repeatedly and several Burmese expected him to either tell them what he wanted them to do or at the very least demand that they should attempt to expand Catholicism in the region. Finian did neither; instead he merely listened and helped clarify and amplify the group's ideas. Through prolonged internal discussion, the group collectively determined that their chief concern was securing individual freedom for the people of Burma and that the Communists stood directly in the way of them realizing that goal. The text further amplifies Finian's unique approach to facilitating network emergence: "This was, [Finian] was sure, the first time that these men had ever been told that a big and important decision was entirely their own ...and would be followed by the white man."⁹⁶

The day following the crucial first meeting, the group met again and discussed the considerable amount of knowledge that each man already possessed concerning Communist activity in the region. Having determined a broad purpose for their network and with all of the relevant intelligence each of the network members possessed shared throughout the collective group, the men then spent the next two weeks (with Father

⁹⁵ Sztompka, *Trust*, 69–97.

⁹⁶ Lederer and Burdick, *The Ugly American*, 54.

Finian assisting along the way) determining what course of action they should take to confront the Communist threat.

Straus contends that in addition to ideally representing a neutral third party, a facilitator must also be a process guide, a tool giver, and a process educator. While Father Finian may not have been truly “neutral” (he was, after all, a dedicated anti-Communist), his efforts otherwise follow Straus’ definition of the four functions of a “process facilitator.”⁹⁷ As the network grew and began conducting operations, Finian continued guiding and educating the network’s members on establishing and maintaining effective processes and developing appropriate tools to be successful as their activities expanded. By the time Finian left Burma to confront the Communist threat in Sarkhan, his network was self-sufficient and no longer required the priest’s assistance as it shifted its attention to other provinces throughout Burma.

⁹⁷ Straus, *How to Make Collaboration Work*, 117–128.

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VIII. THE PERSUADER

When I was asked to read palms at the Philippine Ambassador's dinner, it was a God-given opportunity. All of the Sarkhanese brass except the King were present. And then that knucklehead of an assistant of yours started laughing at me and trying to make a fool out of me. If he had an ounce of brains, he would have noticed how serious the Sarkhanese were. And if those fools at the State Department had briefed him properly, he would have known all about palmistry and astrology before he even came here.

– COL Hillandale to Ambassador MacWhite⁹⁸

A. NETWORK BACKGROUND⁹⁹

Colonel Edwin B. Hillandale has extensive experience in Southeast Asian affairs by the time he joins Ambassador MacWhite's staff in Sarkhan as a military attaché on loan from the Philippines. The character of Colonel Hillandale closely resembles the real-life OSS veteran and Air Force officer, Edward G. Lansdale, whose exploits in the Philippines and Vietnam are often regarded as one example of how to successfully interact with and advise host nation governments in Asia.¹⁰⁰ Like Lansdale, the fictional Colonel Hillandale shares a close personal relationship with Ramon Magsaysay, the Filipino Secretary of National Defense from 1950 to 1953 and President of the Philippines from 1953 until his death in an airplane crash in 1957. The network presented in this chapter is derived from Hillandale's work for Magsaysay in the run up to the 1953 Presidential election.

Although Hillandale uses similar techniques to persuade members of the Sarkhanese government later in the book, his efforts in the Filipino countryside to sway

⁹⁸ Lederer and Burdick, *The Ugly American*, 182.

⁹⁹ Colonel Hillandale's network was extracted from chapters 9, 10, 15, and 21 in *The Ugly American*.

¹⁰⁰ Both Lederer and Burdick knew Lansdale personally. It is widely believed and often acknowledged that he was the basis for the fictional Hillandale. Lansdale's activity in Asia from the end of World War II to his last assignment in Vietnam in 1968 has been the subject of several books—not all of which paint him in the favorable light that Lansdale himself sets forth in his autobiography, *In the Midst of Wars*. For a more comprehensive view of Lansdale's role as a military advisor and CIA operative in Asia, see Cecil B. Currey, *Edward Lansdale: The Unquiet American* (Washington, D.C.: Brassey's, 1998) and Jonathan Nashel, *Edward Lansdale's Cold War (Culture, Politics, and the Cold War)* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2005).

Communist-influenced villagers towards Magsaysay provide ample evidence of yet another distinct approach to developing indigenous networks presented in *The Ugly American*. Over the course of several weeks, Hillandale journeys alone to the province of Cuenco where Communist propagandists had successfully convinced the majority of the population that Magsaysay and his imperialist American backers could not relate to the problems of the common Filipino and did not deserve their support. Colonel Hillandale initially uses his knowledge of the local language and his appreciation for local music and food to establish relationships with several local men (the “Cuenco 10” from the network sociogram, see Figure 18). After earning the villagers’ trust by providing them an American with whom they could identify, Hillandale continues to journey to the area week after week to socialize with the locals and counter the Communist anti-American rhetoric.¹⁰¹ Lansdale eventually convinces the villagers that they have no reason to distrust Magsaysay simply because he associates with Americans and the province ends up heavily favoring Magsaysay in the ensuing Presidential election.

1. The Network That Could Have Been

Following Hillandale’s arrival in Sarkhan to help Ambassador MacWhite confront the growing Communist threat in that country, Hillandale devotes considerable effort towards developing an appreciation for Sarkhanese culture and identifying what in particular is important to the average Sarkhanese citizen. In addition to his learning to play popular local songs on his harmonica and immersing himself for days in the study of Sarkhanese history and the dossiers of Sarkhanese leaders, Hillandale observed that astrology and palmistry were held in remarkably high esteem among the native

¹⁰¹ In Lansdale’s autobiography, he describes two instances where he uses his personal example to persuade Filipino villagers that the Communist propaganda concerning Americans was nothing more than a self-serving myth intended to manipulate the indigenous population. Near the beginning of the Communist insurgency in the Philippines, Lansdale happened upon a Communist political officer decrying “American imperialism” in a town square in Pampanga province. Lansdale interrupted the political officer by asking “What’s the matter? Didn’t you ever have an American friend?” The assembled villagers flocked to Lansdale and assured him that they did not share the Communist agent’s views of Americans. A second event somewhat more removed from the positive American influence associated with U.S. assistance to the Philippines during World War II occurred in 1951: Lansdale recalls Communist Huk guerrillas attempting to hunt him down after he had spent time on the island of Panay happily socializing with villagers and playing popular Filipino music with them on his harmonica. Lansdale, *In the Midst of Wars*, 10, 83.

population.¹⁰² Hillandale, who had previously studied the occult sciences while stationed in China, uses his palm reading skills at a diplomatic reception to impress the Prime Minister of Sarkhan and to successfully influence him to order two Sarkhanese generals who were competing for power to depart the country before they made problems for the government (they were both given ambassadorships). The Prime Minister was so impressed with Hillandale that he insisted that the colonel read the King of Sarkhan's palm at the King's private residence. This was exactly what Hillandale had hoped would happen. He carefully prepared a series of astrological readings that he believed could persuade the King to initiate military maneuvers in northern Sarkhan near where Communist Chinese troops had been massing on the Chinese side of the border. Hillandale presumed that the international community would view such an action as a display of solidarity with the West in an attempt by the Sarkhanese to ostensibly deter Chinese Communist aggression against the free nation of Sarkhan. Unfortunately, Hillandale's plan is undermined by George Swift, the Deputy Chief of Mission, who offends the Sarkhanese leadership by not following the strict protocol surrounding a visit to the Sarkhanese Royal Palace. Because of Swift's breach of etiquette, Hillandale is never given the opportunity to meet with the King.

¹⁰² While in Vietnam in early 1955, Lansdale, who had previously noted the population's reverence for astrology, convinced the South Vietnamese government to institute a psychological warfare initiative consisting of an astrological almanac supposedly written by several respected occult scholars that predicted a "dark future" for the Communists in 1955. In fact, Lansdale's American staff assisted the South Vietnamese in manufacturing the entire account. The almanac became a best seller in North Vietnam and sold out of several printings. See Lansdale, *In the Midst of Wars*, 226–227 and Nashel, *Lansdale's Cold War*, 177.

B. NETWORK OVERVIEW




Figure 18. Hillandale's "Cuenco 10" Network

Figure 18 depicts the portion of Colonel Hillandale's ego-network that he developed during his frequent visits to the province of Cuenco preceding the Filipino Presidential election in 1953.¹⁰³ Magsaysay, who loans Colonel Hillandale to Ambassador MacWhite to assist him in Sarkhan, and Ambassador MacWhite are also included in the sociogram for context. The hub-and-spoke network structure that emerged from the NetDraw analysis consists of the friendship ties established between Hillandale and the ten Cuenco villagers that he continued to meet with over the course of several

¹⁰³ Ego-networks consist of the ties between a specific individual (i.e., the ego) and those actors (also known as alters) that he or she is directly connected to. Ego-networks are a subset of "complete networks" that attempt to capture all relevant actors and relational ties within a particular network at a given time. See Everton, *Disrupting Dark Networks*, 81–82. Hillandale's complete ego-network would include members of the U.S. Embassy staff in Sarkhan, several Asian diplomats, and other lesser characters that are shown to have ties to Hillandale throughout *The Ugly American*. The network presented here consists only of Hillandale's "Cuenco 10" ego-network.

weeks and the advice, friendship, and organizational (i.e., U.S. Embassy) ties between Hillandale, Magsaysay, and Ambassador MacWhite.¹⁰⁴

C. NETWORK ANALYSIS




Figure 19. Colonel Hillandale’s Network Design

1. Level of Openness

In many regards, Colonel Hillandale’s network was open to anyone who was drawn to his harmonica. His public display of affection for local foods, music, and customs earned him attention from villagers and dignitaries alike and, although his behavior was somewhat contrived, his true appreciation for the peoples he found himself among was at the core of his ability to influence them. Hillandale learned a tremendous amount about the lands that he visited by submersing himself among the indigenous population—even at the risk of exposing himself to violence at the hands of Communist agents or criminals who may have capitalized on his frequent choice to travel alone when venturing out among the locals.

The network model, however, is not completely open. The people that Hillandale chose to concentrate his attention on tended to offer something in return for the risks that

¹⁰⁴ There were, quite possibly, many more Filipinos that were drawn to Hillandale during his visits to Cuenco and still more that were conceivably influenced by word of mouth emanating from those who actually socialized with him. However, the text directly refers to “about ten Filipinos” that originally asked Hillandale to lunch on his first visit to Cuenco and subsequently asked him to return to spend more time with them. Lederer and Burdick, *The Ugly American*, 113.

he was taking by attempting to personally influence them. The villagers in Cuenco province, for instance, had votes to give to Magsaysay; and the Sarkhanese government had the ability to display closer relations to the West if they had followed the advice that Hillandale was attempting to provide them (albeit through the mechanism of manufactured astrological advice). Hillandale carefully selected the targets of his persuasion and then used a decidedly atypical approach to make it appear that he was someone that the locals should want to get to know and who truly had their best intentions in mind.

2. Level of Formality

Hillandale's network design did not include formal standards dictating how the network's members should interact or what roles network members were intended to assume. However, his knowledge of local customs and courtesies allowed him to act in a manner that was deferential to whatever indigenous population he was working with. This was not common among the Americans that the local populations often encountered. The *localized formalities* that Hillandale's personal actions adhered to ensured that he did not offend anyone and that his presence was accepted. Although his activities appeared to be informal and based on his true desire to get to know the local people and their way of life, in reality he worked diligently to develop an acute awareness of how best to influence the host nation population within the bounds of what was considered culturally acceptable.

3. Level of Planning

Part of Hillandale's unique approach to designing indigenous networks that could serve his purposes involved an indirect method of manipulation. Like Father Finian, Hillandale did not simply tell the Filipinos or Sarkhanese what he had planned for them to do—he wanted them to figure it out on their own and hopefully decide on a course of action that met with his expectations. Unlike all of the other network designers presented in this study, Hillandale did not seek out a proxy (MacWhite had several) who could assist him in his endeavors. He went directly to the source of the problem (i.e., the Communist-influenced province of Cuenco and the non-aligned leadership of Sarkhan)

and attempted to persuade them to act in a manner that supported his ultimate goals. In the Philippines this meant traveling to Cuenco to dispel Communist myths of American malevolence. In Sarkhan it entailed carefully and surreptitiously persuading the Sarkhanese government to conduct military maneuvers that appeared to signal that they were siding with the West in the Cold War. While he could not foresee what his actions would produce, Hillandale did carefully plan how he would attempt to build his networks and what would be needed to ensure that the network served its desired purpose.




Table 7. Hillandale's Network Summary

D. IMPLICATIONS

1. Cross-Cultural Understanding

The quest for developing an appreciation for different cultures and an understanding for how societal differences impact one's ability to build networks and work with indigenous populations is at the heart of most writing and discussion concerning working with foreign populations. Institutions ranging from the Peace Corps

to the U.S. military portray displaying “cultural understanding” as a critical component of successful overseas service. This section will focus on three aspects of *cross-cultural understanding* that Colonel Hillandale’s actions can serve to illustrate. His methodology included learning as much as he could about the collective consciousness of the populations that he worked among; uncovering the inner motivations, strengths, and weaknesses of the individuals he worked with directly; and consciously concealing his American ideological constructs that could easily have derailed his efforts if the native populations had not believed that he was looking out for their interests first and not those of the American government.

a. *National Character*

Even though Colonel Hillandale is ultimately interested in combating the spread of Communism throughout Asia, he approaches the process of identifying and developing effective programs to counter Communist expansion by first getting to know the population and finding out what makes them tick. As he explains to Ambassador MacWhite, “Every person and every nation has a key which will open their hearts. If you use the right key, you can maneuver any person or any nation any way you want.”¹⁰⁵

Despite the reluctance of some social psychologists and anthropologists to agree that there is such a thing as a collective “mind” shared by members of specific societies, Raphael Patai suggests that it is possible to discern a society’s “national character,” which he defines as “the sum total of the motives, traits, beliefs, and values shared by the plurality in a national population.”¹⁰⁶ In his book, *The Arab Mind*, Patai describes the evolution of the Arabic national character and details how its current manifestation has been molded and is still being influenced by a variety of Arab practices ranging from how they choose to raise their children to the unique qualities of the Arabic language and the impact of centuries of Bedouin and Islamic traditions on their way of life. Discovering the national characters of the various Asian populations that Colonel Hillandale worked with in Asia was a *sine qua non* of his methodology—that is where he

¹⁰⁵ Lederer and Burdick, *The Ugly American*, 181.

¹⁰⁶ Raphael Patai, *The Arab Mind* (New York: Hatherleigh Press, 2002), 17–19.

started from and the most important aspect of his technique. Only when he felt that he knew the people well enough did he carefully move on to discovering what “keys” were needed to persuade specific individuals to do what he wanted them to do.

b. Mind-Models

Hillandale proved exceedingly adept at recognizing what Flick refers to as the “mind-models” of the host nation counterparts and local nationals that he seeks to influence. Flick describes the process of developing a true appreciation for another individual’s point of view as discovering that person’s “internal logic”—the thread that binds the multiple “mind-models” that a person has developed over the course of their lifetime that affect how they view and interact with the world around them.¹⁰⁷ Mind-models are the “mental mechanisms . . . we use to attribute meaning to our experiences and make sense of them.”¹⁰⁸ In a manner similar to how Patai describes the evolution of a collective “mind,” Flick observes that multiple factors affect the formation of an individual’s mind-models. From basic demographic differences regarding race and gender to an individual’s own prior experiences, their profession, and the unique impact of cultural values and religion, Flick notes that every individual accumulates a variety of specific thought processes throughout their lifetime that impact what they feel and how they act.¹⁰⁹ The conglomeration of these various mind-models can result in significant dissimilarities among individuals who come from different backgrounds—differences that can be even more pronounced when dealing with people from other parts of the world. Just as Edward Lansdale encountered and attempted to overcome extreme variations in the personalities of Ramon Magsaysay in the Philippines and Ngo Dinh Diem in Vietnam, Colonel Hillandale seeks to discover the individual “keys,” the mind-models, of the Filipinos and Sarkhanese that he attempts to persuade in *The Ugly American*.

¹⁰⁷ Flick, *From Debate to Dialogue*, 69.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, 59.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, 60.

Flick contends that it is not enough to simply listen to someone else's point of view or acknowledge that another society might have a different way of doing things. To truly "understand" someone else, one must be able to grasp: 1) what they do and do not consider important and valuable; 2) how they interpret events and experiences; 3) how assumptions influence their thinking; and 4) what effect circumstance has on their perception of events.¹¹⁰ As one scholar responsible for preparing U.S. personnel for deployment to the Middle East has noted: "Simply observing a culture through the prism of our own beliefs and cultural worldview leads to many misconceptions. More often than not, this results in a form of cultural shock that can be totally debilitating . . ."¹¹¹ Taking the leap from simply being "open-minded" or knowledgeable of a foreign culture to truly appreciating national character and what it takes to uncover someone else's individual mind-models goes far towards developing comprehensive cross-cultural understanding. The final step, however, involves the equally important task of realizing how one's own mind-models can inadvertently and unconsciously impact successful host nation interaction before it even really begins.

c. Cognitive Bias

Colonel Hillandale demonstrates how change agents can mitigate the negative effects of one's own natural and unavoidable cognitive biases by addressing problems and people from the locals' perspective, not from an American one. For the broader purposes of this work, the term *cognitive bias* (i.e., seeing what one expects to see) relates to the inability of most Americans working abroad to remain objective and separate themselves from the problem-solving and decision-making methods developed throughout their American upbringing. Change agents must be able to acknowledge their bias towards their own way of thinking, their own cultural norms and values, and their individual perceptions of reality and yet still be able to ascertain how members of an indigenous population view the world around them and approach the task of problem-solving. To be truly adept at cross-cultural understanding, change agents must know

¹¹⁰ Ibid., 68–69.

¹¹¹ Norvell B. De Atkine, foreword to *The Arab Mind*, by Raphael Patai (New York: Hatherleigh Press, 2002), xi.

themselves—their own strengths, weaknesses, and motivations—as well as they know the people they are trying to work with.

One specific manifestation of cognitive bias, that of *naïve realism*, is strikingly indicative of the behavior displayed by Ambassador Sears and several other characters in *The Ugly American* whose ethnocentrism borders on outright racism. Ross and Ward contend that a naïve realist thinks that his or her own perception of reality is objective, comprehensive, and rational and assumes that other rational human beings who have access to identical information will think and react to experiences and stimuli the same way that they do.¹¹² A third tenet of naïve realism (and the most illustrative for the purposes intended here) suggests that if other human beings do not share a naïve realist's viewpoint when exposed to the same information it must be because of one of three possible reasons: 1) they are incapable of reaching reasonable conclusions from objective evidence (e.g., they are irrational or lazy); 2) their views are distorted due to an underlying bias; or 3) they must have been exposed to a different set of facts and information.¹¹³ Ross and Ward further elaborate: encumbered blinded saddled

Given the naïve realist's conviction that he or she sees things "naturally"—sees them as they "really are"—then other actors' differing views and responses must reflect something other than a natural, unmediated registering of objective reality. The naïve realist's initial interpretation of differences of opinion is apt to be relatively charitable—that the other party has not yet been exposed to the "way things really are" that the other party has not yet been privy to the "real" facts and considerations.¹¹⁴

¹¹² Baritz describes the American propensity to perceive the world "as populated by frustrated or potential Americans" as "solipsistic thinking." *Solipsism* is defined as "extreme egocentrism" and the belief "that the self is the only existent thing." Similarly to naïve realists, Baritz argues that American solipsists believe that other cultures would behave more like Americans if they were simply given the chance and were freed of "ignorance and poverty." Baritz notes that solipsism not only supported the general "American optimism" that led the U.S. into the Vietnam War but also served to justify the "ignorance" that impeded American efforts throughout the entire conflict. Loren Baritz, *Backfire: A History of How American Culture Led Us Into Vietnam and Made Us Fight the Way We Did* (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), 30–34.

¹¹³ Lee Ross and Andrew Ward, "Naïve Realism in Everyday Life: Implications for Social Conflict and Misunderstanding," in *Values and Knowledge*, ed. Edward S. Reed et al. (Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum, 1996), 110–111. <http://www.mediate.com/GeoffSharp/docs/NaiveRealism.pdf>.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 116.

2. A Note on Edward Lansdale

By most accounts, Edward G. Lansdale could be considered an expert in cross-cultural understanding. In the parlance of modern writers, he was also a “champion” or a “salesman” who pushed indigenous causes that inevitably (and often not obviously) coincided with American objectives.¹¹⁵ He grasped that to be trusted enough to change what the locals thought and did—rather than what they professed to believe or said they would do—he needed to establish what French and Raven term “referent power”—the ability to influence rather than simply control the decisions made by another individual based on that individual’s real or unconscious desire to identify with the source of influence and gain “satisfaction by conformity.”¹¹⁶ Lansdale also focused on increasing what Cialdini calls his “likeability” by conforming to local customs and developing an appreciation for the local language, food, and music.¹¹⁷ He got to know the people; he carefully assessed the men he wanted to influence; and he refused to let his own personal views interfere with his carefully constructed methods of persuasion. This approach worked to varying degrees of success throughout his protracted and personal involvement in the formation of two modern states (one of which still exists today).

It is necessary to observe that the reality of Lansdale’s skillfully contrived performance in Asia became a source of criticism of *The Ugly American* in the years following its publication. Lansdale, like the fictional Hillandale and Ambassador MacWhite, was consumed with his anti-Communist crusade. It did not really matter how he and his colleagues spread across the globe achieved their goals so long as the countries that comprised the Third World leaned towards the West and were pushed or manipulated away from Soviet and Chinese influence. The obsession with “modernization theory” and the idea that “developing countries” around the world could be drawn into the Western sphere of influence if they were simply exposed, however slowly, to capitalism and

¹¹⁵ Gladwell describes “salesmen” as those individuals “with the ability to persuade us when we are unconvinced of what we are hearing” and who are “critical to the tipping of word-of-mouth epidemics.” Gladwell, *Tipping Point*, 70. Brafman and Beckstrom impart similar characteristics on their “champions” who they describe as “relentless in promoting a new idea.” Brafman and Beckstrom, *Starfish and the Spider*, 99.

¹¹⁶ French and Raven, “The Bases of Social Power,” 161–163.

¹¹⁷ Cialdini, *Influence*, 167–176.

liberal democratic ideals smacks of naïve realism in and of itself.¹¹⁸ However, this study is not concerned with a critique of the motives behind the networks that are produced by the change agents identified in *The Ugly American*; it is about the methods those change agents employed while designing their networks. Lansdale's underlying desire to export American ideas did not diminish his effectiveness at persuading people to act the way he wanted them to act. His skillful manipulation was directed at Americans as well as foreigners and his approach (represented by the actions of the fictional Hillandale) would have been just as unique and deserving of attention had he not been secretly pushing an agenda. His method is what makes the network design model stand out, not the results or intended results of his actions.

Lansdale further elaborates on his true intentions in his autobiography: "When we Americans give of our substance to the people of other countries, we should give as generously of our ideology as we do of our money, our guns, our cereal grains, and our machinery."¹¹⁹ The important thing for both Lansdale and Hillandale is that they did not publically declare their desire to export American ideals to the nations that they visited. They established cross-cultural understanding and worked by, with, and through the indigenous peoples to great effect and prodded them in a direction that supported U.S. foreign policy. In the unending contest between various dogmas and ideologies that pull the nations of the world together and apart, those who are more skilled at *how* they send their messages will inevitably be likely to succeed than those who simply insist that their message is right and demand that it be heard. This lesson is as applicable today as it was at the height of the Cold War and is ultimately what this study is about.

¹¹⁸ For a brief overview of modernization theory—the concept that “American institutions, ideas, and technology not only could but should be transplanted into other areas of the world”—and how it relates to a critique of Lansdale's actions and *The Ugly American*, see Nashel, *Lansdale's Cold War*, 182–186.

¹¹⁹ Lansdale, *In the Midst of Wars*, 105.

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IX. IMPACTING DARK NETWORKS

While considerable progress has been made to incorporate SNA and network theory into the mapping and interdiction of adversarial or “dark” networks, the potential for utilizing these methods to strengthen friendly networks and influence non-aligned parties remains largely untapped. The Anbar Awakening and subsequent Sons of Iraq (SoI) initiative and ongoing Village Stability Operations (VSO) in Afghanistan provide two prominent examples of how tactical leaders and operational planners in today’s irregular warfare and counterinsurgency environments are faced with the daunting challenge of navigating (and in most cases manipulating) dynamic, culturally-attuned relationships to indirectly impact the sources of power and legitimacy that America’s enemies rely upon to remain solvent. These initiatives, and many others like them, are typically undertaken in areas where allegiance to the host nation government may be suspect and where the populations are at risk, both physically and psychologically, from insurgent or terrorist groups. These initiatives occur in “grey” areas.

Most of the junior officers and senior non-commissioned officers (as well as their civilian counterparts) that are tasked with implementing these types of efforts are only briefly exposed to two extremely relevant fields that address what they are attempting to accomplish: complex network theory and social network analysis. Grey network developers face a wide variety of unique challenges and circumstances wherever they may be tasked or may decide themselves to implement these types of initiatives. While Father Finian’s network development occurs in an unconventional warfare environment and Ambassador MacWhite’s from a much more comfortable, empowered, and non-threatened position, this study is not suggesting that any particular model is best for any specific situation. Further study may demonstrate or disprove such a possibility, but this work means to propose that the main tenets of the network approaches adopted by each change agent can be absorbed and then adapted to any given situation when a network designer assesses that they might prove effective. Not everyone possesses the strong interpersonal skills of a Colonel Hillandale or the engineering skills of a Homer Atkins. But it is not beyond reason to assume that a network designer can work to develop

Hillandale-like cross-cultural understanding or, like the Ugly American himself, specifically tailor a collaborative approach that focuses on local problems and is perceived as both legitimate and necessary by the indigenous people. Additionally, countless other fictional and non-fictional accounts of men and women who have built networks on foreign soil undoubtedly have the potential to produce still more distinctive network models and unique network design approaches that can further increase our capacity to prepare future network developers for success in the challenging arena of irregular warfare.

While this work focuses primarily on illuminating characteristics of network design models useful for indigenous network development, it is beneficial to briefly address the potential that grey network development in general possesses to assist in the broader effort to combat dark network operations and influence. Further research could elaborate significantly on this particular aspect of grey network utility. However, three examples are presented here: directed collateral applications, identifying adversarial entrepreneurship (i.e., adversarial utilization of grey networks), and shrinking the “white space.” Each of these uses is introduced following a brief discussion of contemporary approaches to network targeting.

A. STRATEGIC OPTIONS

Despite a decidedly robust effort by the U.S. military and interagency communities to map dark networks using social network analysis, efforts to incorporate SNA-related data into the formulation of strategic options for disrupting adversarial networks have only recently become more frequent. Military strategists and SNA theorists now regularly distinguish between two distinct approaches to dark network interdiction when formulating options. Although it can be argued that the terminology used by the two fields contain significant semantic differences, the theorists’ distinction of kinetic and non-kinetic strategies closely align with what the U.S. military currently refers to as the direct and indirect targeting approaches (see Figure 20).¹²⁰ A decade-old

¹²⁰ For a review of various strategic approaches to countering dark networks, see Everton, *Disrupting Dark Networks*, Chapter 2; and Roberts and Everton, “Strategies for Combating Dark Networks.”

reliance on direct, kinetic targeting of key terrorist leaders and facilitators is now supplemented by an indirect approach as well—what Joint Publication 2–36, *Counterterrorism*, describes as “actions taken...to enable partners to conduct operations against terrorists and their organizations as well as actions taken to shape and stabilize those environments as a means to erode the capabilities of terrorist organizations and degrade their ability to acquire support and sanctuary.”¹²¹ By comparison, SNA theorists Dr. Nancy Roberts and Dr. Sean Everton define their non-kinetic strategies of institution building, psychological operations, information operations, and rehabilitation along a similar line of thinking, suggesting that this approach “involves a more subtle and patient application of power...to undermine terror networks.”¹²² It is within the realm of non-kinetic and indirect approaches to countering dark networks that grey networks have the potential to prove influential.




Figure 20. Strategic Campaign Framework¹²³

¹²¹ CJCS, *Counterterrorism*, III-5.

¹²² Roberts and Everton, “Strategies for Combating Dark Networks,” 5.

¹²³ From CJCS, *Counterterrorism*, III-2.

Direct, kinetic interdiction of dark networks has proven effective in meeting the immediate goals of identifying and removing critical actors in terrorist and insurgent organizations. However, these efforts should be combined with an equal or perhaps greater determination to impact the influence of dark networks through proactive grey and light network analysis and non-kinetic, indirect operations. The U.S. must be cautious in relying on technologically-driven, kinetic-based approaches that have the potential to supplant the more indiscriminate kinetic approaches (e.g., carpet bombing, burning villages, etc.) that ultimately yielded negative effects in past counterinsurgencies. While the current counterterrorism and counterinsurgency techniques that are utilized by the United States and its allies are undoubtedly better at limiting the number of civilian casualties and collateral damage during kinetic operations, the question of whether or not drone strikes and night raids create more support for insurgent and terrorist groups still remains unanswered.

1. Collateral Applications

U.S. strategists should acknowledge the need for a comprehensive strategic communications plan that addresses the potential impact of kinetic operations on non-aligned individuals and communities—even those not directly targeted or affected by those specific operations. Such information campaigns, designed and executed with host nation considerations in mind and, when possible, through host nation channels, have the potential to not only mitigate the negative effects of kinetic operations but also to promote greater overall support from the populations that are at the center of counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations.¹²⁴ Grey networks are ideal for assisting these types of information operations by helping to identify grievances (with the host nation government, U.S., or insurgent groups), test messages, assist in message dissemination, and provide relevant and prompt feedback. This example of a collateral application could feasibly be applied to a mature and well-designed grey network (e.g., Father Finian or Homer Atkins' network).

¹²⁴ See Campbell and Weitz, “Non-Military Strategies for Countering Islamist Terrorism,” 25–31.

A wide variety of additional secondary uses can potentially be applied to established grey networks ranging from providing assistance in reconstruction or disaster relief operations to supporting personnel recovery efforts or unconventional warfare scenarios. These applications are principally ancillary—they must be based on effective relationship building and trust establishment and only enacted if and when the network’s U.S. manager views that they are feasible. This approach holds the potential to bypass problems associated with working through traditional “blue” or “green” networks (those of the U.S. or host national government respectively).¹²⁵ These inherent shortcomings can include but are not limited to the prospect that U.S. or host nation programs or personnel might be perceived as illegitimate, detached, or threatening to certain populations who may be sympathetic to adversarial organizations or passively tolerant of insurgent or terrorist activity.

2. Identifying Adversarial Entrepreneurship

While terrorist and insurgent organizations are typified by their close association with violent tactics and asymmetric warfare, it should not be assumed that their approaches to gaining and maintaining the popular support that they need to survive, grow, and eventually succeed are confined to the use of force or coercion. Communist agents throughout the Cold War successfully utilized political and social entrepreneurship at a localized level to modify the policies that they were espousing in a manner that accommodated each targeted population and often addressed their specific unique grievances. By not necessarily revealing the overall final goal of the Communist agenda, these agents were able to garner support from local nationals (particularly farmers and peasants) who rarely fully appreciated the impact that a socialist or communist administration would eventually have on their everyday lives. In this regard, a greater understanding of the techniques associated with grey network development is beneficial to being able to recognize and possibly interdict efforts by terrorist and insurgent groups who may use the more subtle methods associated with political and social entrepreneurship. By countering adversarial grey network development, whether it is

¹²⁵ USJFCOM, *Attack the Network*, GL-11, GL-19.

centered on ideological, political, economic, educational, religious, or social principles, U.S. and allied counterterrorism and counterinsurgency efforts stand a greater chance of eliminating the critical support and perceptions of legitimacy that adversarial networks need to exist.

3. Shrinking the “White Space”

Just as enemy formations in conventional military struggles require “freedom of maneuver” to be effective on the battlefield, today’s terrorist and insurgent organizations must be able to find sanctuary and support in areas and among populations that are not controlled or influenced by U.S. or host nation government forces. For dark networks to remain viable, they must continue to maintain some semblance of a foothold among the “relevant population.” As T. E. Lawrence once observed: “Rebellion . . . must have . . . a population . . . sympathetic to the point of not betraying rebel movements to the enemy. Rebellions can be made by two percent active in a striking force, and 98 percent passively sympathetic.”¹²⁶

While it is critical for adversarial networks to maintain at least a minimum level of popular support, it must be acknowledged that U.S. or host nation counterterrorist or counterinsurgency forces do not necessarily require populations to actively support the government, they only must deny popular support to the enemy. Populations can and have turned against insurgent and terrorist forces while not simultaneously and unequivocally deciding to support the ruling powers. These individuals or groups who choose to support neither the government nor the enemy (in either a passive or active manner) may find nonviolent protest or even political activism as a means to address whatever grievances they might have with the government that precludes their outright support. To the counterinsurgent, while pro-government support is a goal, it is not a necessary requirement to defeat an insurgency. To use Mao’s analogy, simply denying the insurgent “fish” access to certain areas of the population’s “water” (regardless of

¹²⁶ Nathan Leites and Charles Wolf, *Rebellion and Authority: An Analytic Essay on Insurgent Conflicts* (Chicago: Markham, 1970), 11–12.

whether or not U.S. or host nation forces are welcomed there) is a step in the right direction. Grey network development along the lines that are discussed in this study has the potential to accomplish this task.

B. REVIEW AND ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

Grey networks can serve as a means to indirectly bolster support for the government through identifying grievances, promoting economic stability, and possibly diminishing anti-Americanism through the development of localized solutions to local problems (as evidenced through Homer Atkins' network) or simply by countering misperceptions of Americans and broader U.S. policy (as evidenced through Colonel Hillandale's network). They can also serve to simply shrink the amount of "white space" available for terrorist and insurgent use. This "neutral" area consists of physical land, individuals, and communities that are vulnerable to political entrepreneurship and intimidation by enemy networks. By designing and implementing grey networks in these regions, it is likely that adversarial groups would find it more difficult to gain support there and would be inclined to seek backing elsewhere.

Although not included as a part of this study, several aspects of social movement theory provide a useful framework through which this type of approach to denying collective action mechanisms may be applied. Among other key components necessary for insurgent and terrorist movements to manifest and survive, social movement theory addresses the impact of resource availability and utilization, the importance of opportunity, and the manner in which collective action (support or active participation) is framed. Grey networks have the capacity to be leveraged, either directly or collaterally, against a number of these collective action requirements.

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X. CONCLUSION

A. EVOLUTION OF RESEARCH AGENDA

This study originally began as part of a project intended to familiarize the author with the steps involved in encoding data for social network analysis. Any number of corporate hierarchies, military organizations, or even terrorist groups with sufficient documentation could have been used to extract the formal and informal relationships necessary to build a database for the various SNA software programs with which the author was working. However, due to the overlap of several other fields of study with the subject matter contained in *The Ugly American*, applying the relatively new concepts of network theory and SNA to the 54-year-old text seemed to be a novel idea that at the least could provide the author with hours upon hours of data-coding and an appreciation for the work that is involved in the SNA process.

The first network visualization that was produced contained 89 of the 95 characters presented in this study (see Figure 7). This aggregate network appeared to be in line with what was to be expected and did not result in any further assessment of the project beyond its immediate intended purpose. However, when the various subnetworks were extracted from the aggregate network they unexpectedly appeared to represent several of the network structures that are found frequently throughout network literature (i.e., core/periphery, hub-and-spoke, and mesh). This unforeseen occurrence led to more analysis and a concerted effort to try to identify any characteristics that might have contributed to the formation of these distinct network models.

The ensuing research crossed over multiple academic fields from organizational management theory and behavioral studies to anthropology and emerging thought concerning the future of irregular warfare. The core of this study, despite borrowing from other disciplines, remains anchored to the study of complex networks and the use of SNA network visualization to reveal characteristics of human interaction that may not be readily apparent when experienced first-hand or read in a book. While the focus of this work is primarily on implications for military and interagency network design, the

observations discussed are largely drawn from studies conducted outside of military or governmental spheres and are intended to be applicable across the whole-of-government approach as well as with civilian efforts.

B. METHODS

This work has concentrated on combining relatively recent discoveries in the field of network analysis with the decades-old truisms of how to successfully work with indigenous populations that are illustrated in Lederer and Burdick's *The Ugly American*. SNA software offers the ability to look at the distinct approaches to host nation interaction presented in *The Ugly American* in a new light, specifically through network visualizations. These visualizations, when combined with relevant observations by contemporary network theorists, provide "models" for host nation network development. These models are intended to offer insight for any individual or group working to build trust and influence indigenous populations.

To produce the network sociograms central to this study, 95 of the characters that appear throughout *The Ugly American* were encoded into UCINET software based on their trust, advice, friendship, organizational, operational, and business ties to one another. Individual attributes consisting of each character's nationality and general role were also identified and added to the analysis. The resulting conglomeration of social ties and attributes then was processed through UCINET's visualization software, NetDraw, to generate the aggregate network picture seen in Figure 7. To separate each change agent's subnetwork from the aggregate network, extended ego-networks were isolated that contained all of the relevant actors that were directly involved with each change agent's individual efforts. The network of MacWhite's predecessor, Ambassador Sears, also was coded and isolated to illustrate the closed and "provincial" nature of the U.S. Embassy in Sarkhan prior to MacWhite's arrival.

C. SUMMARY OF RESULTS

Each of the networks described in this study offer unique examples of key components associated with network design and group collaboration. This study is not meant to be comprehensive either in terms of the analysis of each of the separate

networks or in the illumination of all of the networks present in the entire book. The four principle change agents discussed here approach their networks in different manners and eventually occupy different positions within their networks' structure (see Figure 21). John Colvin, who is not analyzed in detail in this work, works *by himself* as a change agent to help the people of Sarkhan. Colonel Hillandale draws local nationals and host nation government personnel *directly to him* through his gifts of persuasion and high levels of cross-cultural understanding. Father Finian purposely keeps himself segregated from the core of his network while working primarily *through a proxy*. Homer Atkins relishes the opportunity to become one with his network; he seeks local solutions and methods to solve local problems and *works side-by-side with the locals* to implement them. And, finally, Ambassador MacWhite's comprehensive efforts to pull effective people into his network are successful largely due to his ability to remain supportive while *actively detached* from the day-to-day operations of his network's members. The distinctive results that each of these approaches produce are evident in their respective sociograms.




Figure 21. The “Ugly” Networks

Throughout the book, the vast majority of the characters are Americans truly intent on helping other people. They approach their counterparts from a position of mutual respect, they make mistakes and ask for help from their foreign friends, and they appreciate foreign culture and do not try to impose an American way-of-life on indigenous populations. With the exception of the broader attempt to promote the ideals of freedom and self-determination in the face of Communist expansion, the principal characters in *The Ugly American* seek to work by, with, and through locals to help them achieve their goals and to realize their own version of a better life.

Ambassador MacWhite's methodology illustrates how network designers can orchestrate the emergence of a far-reaching, decentralized network that is capable of producing innovative solutions that would not have been likely had he taken a more active role in their management. He uses his weak ties to find other change agents then maximizes the effectiveness of their individual approaches by not micro-managing their efforts. MacWhite also provides a lesson in network resiliency by not preparing his network for his departure or for the poor reception that his unconventional approach garners from veteran diplomats. He arguably could have done more to ensure that his methods were understood and appreciated back in Washington while simultaneously preparing the network for the inevitable disruptions that would challenge its continued existence.

Homer Atkins demonstrates principles of effective collaboration during his work in Sarkhan by carefully building consensus among all of the Sarkhanese villagers who had a stake in his planned endeavor. Throughout the entire process of developing and manufacturing a locally sustainable irrigation pump, Homer and his wife Emma work diligently to ensure that their efforts are relevant to the indigenous situation and that the initiative is self-sustaining and will not require external support once they depart.

Father Finian reveals how facilitating group collaboration rather than dictating organizational roles and functions can result in the emergence of a self-organizing network with tremendous internalized credibility and an innovative approach to problem-solving. Finian carefully vetted his proxy, U Tien, and then accepted the risk that his efforts could be compromised by other members of the network that U Tien selected

without Finian's direct involvement. This approach ensured that Finian remained far enough removed from the actual formation of the network that his personal influence would not appear to be the driving factor behind the group coming together. He was then able to assist the network in its subversion campaign against the Communist infrastructure in Burma without it appearing (either to the network's members or to external scrutiny) that the network was being manipulated by an outside actor.

Colonel Hillandale's exploits in the Philippines and Sarkhan show how achieving high levels of cross-cultural understanding can provide a mechanism for subtle yet profoundly effective influence on indigenous populations and host nation counterparts. His quest to grasp what motivated the various societies and individuals that he found himself working among was central to his technique. By combining his cultural knowledge and ability to skillfully manipulate people with a check on his own cognitive biases, he frequently became a trusted insider who the locals identified with and listened to.

All of these examples of grey network development provide discrete methods for designing or altering indigenous networks that have the capacity to indirectly assist broader efforts to target adversarial organizations (like the Communist apparatus that MacWhite was ultimately trying to defeat). By undertaking similar tasks, network developers have the potential to build networks in areas that may otherwise be used or influenced by adversarial elements. Once properly established these networks may also be used for a wide variety of collateral applications that can support irregular warfare activities while not compromising their initial and predominant purpose. Finally, gaining an increased understanding of how grey network development can be initiated to subtly or indirectly influence neutral or non-aligned communities can provide knowledgeable parties with indications of adversarial entrepreneurship (i.e., enemy efforts to develop grey networks). Adversarial grey network development, as evidenced by decades of Communist political entrepreneurship throughout the Third World, may actually be more effective at influencing the outcome of an internal struggle than any form of violent, kinetic activity.

D. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER ANALYSIS

Although the study of networks is a relatively young field, scholars have already identified numerous components, distinctions, and ways of analyzing networks that reveal nearly endless variation between individual networks. By applying network analytical approaches to a study of *The Ugly American*, this work aims to generate further discussion and consideration concerning how specific approaches to network development might be identified, categorized, and summarized—all with the intention of being able to recreate the types of successful grey network development presented not only in *The Ugly American* but also in other texts and from other sources.

Further analysis of *The Ugly American* has the capacity to reveal even more examples of specific manifestations of modern theories and long-standing truisms from a wide array of academic fields. There are many other characters whose inclusion in a more comprehensive study could reveal much more about the complex nature of designing indigenous networks and executing foreign policy abroad—even as it existed in a fictionalized account over half a century ago. Additionally, consideration could be given to the evolution of the Foreign Service by juxtaposing how the State Department was characterized and caricatured by Lederer and Burdick and how it exists today or how it may be counter-argued that it even existed back when the book was first written. Finally, although not included in this study, an in-depth analysis of the SNA metrics that correspond to each network model (e.g., network topography, centrality measures, or subgroup cohesion) may reveal additional characteristics, strengths, and weaknesses inherent in each approach.

While the task of network analysis is currently being undertaken on an incredibly large scale in numerous fields of study, Roberts' Continuum of Network Designs and Anklam's Network Components (i.e., purpose, structure, style, and value) offer an extremely accessible method of introducing basic network analysis to a wide audience who may not possess the levels of esoteric knowledge related to the more conventional metrics-based and software intensive SNA approaches. Applying a similar analytical approach to network development outside of *The Ugly American* holds the potential to further illustrate the utility of complex network theory and basic SNA and to prove or

disprove some of the assertions contained in this work. Of the many questions that should emerge from this study of *The Ugly American* is: Are the principle characteristics assigned to each change agent truly indicative of a unique approach to network design or in any way representative of a specific network structure? Only one book, a factually-based fictional account at that, was used. Without further research it is not possible to predict whether or not the network structures that were presented in this study exist elsewhere as a result of similar approaches to network design and interpersonal interaction.

Being able to analyze or perhaps design networks based on the principles highlighted in this study provides tremendous potential for U.S. military personnel (particularly Special Forces and Civil Affairs personnel). Cell phones and the Internet are helping to rapidly “flatten” the world and are bringing people and organizations in contact and communication with one another with unprecedented frequency and fidelity. Traditional, hierarchical organizational structures are finding it increasingly difficult to keep up with rapidly changing situations in a dynamic interconnected global environment. Military professionals trained in network analysis and design are prepared not only to help streamline and maximize efficiency within military organizations, but possess the ability to initiate or modify networks and organizations in foreign countries—regardless of whether or not their ultimate purpose is to assist local communities, impact or interdict adversarial networks, or either directly or indirectly promote U.S. interests in the target region.

Ongoing and subsequent study of the various irregular warfare and counterinsurgency initiatives undertaken in Iraq and Afghanistan will undoubtedly reveal additional best practices and lessons learned that must be included in how future military leaders are trained to conduct irregular operations. However, the scope of this work is limited to advancing an operational understanding of how irregular warfare activities can be augmented by utilizing the network approach to influence populations and popular support. New analytical approaches and SNA software tools have the potential to greatly enhance traditional methods (e.g., link-analysis) that are used to both assess friendly and adversarial groups and inform strategists and planners of how best to design operations

aimed at influencing those actors. However, the U.S. military and interagency apparatus must remain cautious and not be too hasty in applying 21st-century solutions to what are frequently 19th- and 20th-century problems. It has proven exceedingly difficult for members of one of the most technologically advanced nations on earth to find a way to forego reliance on advanced education and computer-aided analysis in favor of measured, locally relevant initiatives like those presented in *The Ugly American*. Achieving a balance between modern technology and good old-fashioned people skills is needed now more than ever.

As mentioned previously, the inferences made and implications presented here are not intended to be comprehensive or concrete. They are intended primarily as a thought exercise concerning what techniques and principles drawn from contemporary academia might best explain the SNA-based visualizations that were produced by coding a portion of the relationships in *The Ugly American*. In the end, this study is intended to generate discussion about how best to design host nation networks and how to deal with indigenous populations respectfully and effectively. We need to talk about “getting ugly.”

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