



Navy Irregular Warfare and Counterterrorism Operations: Background and Issues for Congress

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Summary

The Navy for several years has carried out a variety of irregular warfare (IW) and counterterrorism (CT) activities. Among the most readily visible of the Navy's recent IW operations have been those carried out by Navy sailors serving ashore in Afghanistan and Iraq. Many of the Navy's contributions to IW operations around the world are made by Navy individual augmentees (IAs)—individual Navy sailors assigned to various DOD operations.

The May 1-2, 2011, U.S. military operation in Abbottabad, Pakistan, that killed Osama bin Laden reportedly was carried out by a team of 23 Navy special operations forces, known as SEALs (an acronym standing for Sea, Air, and Land). The SEALs reportedly belonged to an elite unit known unofficially as Seal Team 6 and officially as the Naval Special Warfare Development Group (DEVGRU).

The Navy established the Navy Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC) informally in October 2005 and formally in January 2006. NECC consolidated and facilitated the expansion of a number of Navy organizations that have a role in IW operations. The Navy established the Navy Irregular Warfare Office in July 2008, published a vision statement for irregular warfare in January 2010, and established “a community of interest” to develop and advance ideas, collaboration, and advocacy related to IW in December 2010.

The Navy's riverine force is intended to supplement the riverine capabilities of the Navy's SEALs and relieve Marines who had been conducting maritime security operations in ports and waterways in Iraq.

The Global Maritime Partnership is a U.S. Navy initiative to achieve an enhanced degree of cooperation between the U.S. Navy and foreign navies, coast guards, and maritime police forces, for the purpose of ensuring global maritime security against common threats.

The Southern Partnership Station (SPS) and the Africa Partnership Station (APS) are Navy ships, such as amphibious ships or high-speed sealift ships, that have deployed to the Caribbean and to waters off Africa, respectively, to support U.S. Navy engagement with countries in those regions, particularly for purposes of building security partnerships with those countries and for increasing the capabilities of those countries for performing maritime-security operations.

The Navy's IW and CT activities pose a number of potential oversight issues for Congress, including the definition of Navy IW activities and how much emphasis to place on IW and CT activities in future Navy budgets.

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Introduction

This report provides background information and potential issues for Congress on the Navy's irregular warfare (IW) and counterterrorism (CT) operations. The Navy's IW and CT activities pose a number of potential oversight issues for Congress, including the definition of Navy IW activities and how much emphasis to place on IW and CT activities in future Navy budgets. Congress's decisions regarding Navy IW and CT operations can affect Navy operations and funding requirements, and the implementation of the nation's overall IW and CT strategies.

Background¹

Navy Irregular Warfare (IW) Operations

Shift in Terminology from IW to Confronting Irregular Challenges (CIC)

Use of the term irregular warfare has declined within DOD since 2010. DOD's report on the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, for example, avoids the term and instead uses the phrase counterinsurgency, stability, and counterterrorism operations. Consistent with DOD's declining use of the term irregular warfare, the Navy increasingly is using the phrase confronting irregular challenges (CIC) instead of the term irregular warfare. For purposes of convenience, this report continues to use the term irregular warfare and the abbreviation IW.

Navy IW Operations in Afghanistan and Iraq

Among the most readily visible of the Navy's IW operations in recent years have been those carried out by Navy sailors serving ashore in Afghanistan and (until recently) Iraq. The Navy states that

Navy and Marine Forces were removed from Iraq upon completion of operational commitments there. [The proposed] FY 2013 [budget] continues supporting Navy and Marine Corps operations in Afghanistan. Today the Marine Corps has a robust presence of over 19,000 Marines in the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) with 18,000 in Afghanistan....

Beyond the 19,000 Marines participating in counterinsurgency, security cooperation, and civil-military operations in Afghanistan and throughout CENTCOM, on any given day there are approximately 10,000 Sailors ashore and another 12,000 afloat throughout U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). These Sailors are conducting, maritime infrastructure protection, explosive ordnance disposal/(Counter-IED), combat construction engineering, cargo handling, combat logistics, maritime security, customs inspections, detainee operations, civil affairs, base operations and other forward presence activities. In collaboration with the U.S. Coast Guard, the Navy also conducts critical port operations and maritime interception operations....

¹ Unless otherwise indicated, information in this section is taken from a Navy briefing to CRS on July 31, 2009, on Navy IW activities and capabilities.

Our Sailors and Marines are fully engaged on the ground, in the air, and at sea in support of operations in Afghanistan. Navy Commanders are leading seven of the thirteen U.S.-lead Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan. A significant portion of the combat air missions over Afghanistan are flown by naval air forces. Our elite teams of Navy SEALs are heavily engaged in combat operations and Navy Explosive Ordnance Disposal platoons are defusing improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and landmines. Our SEABEE construction battalions are rebuilding schools and restoring critical infrastructure. Navy sealift will return heavy war equipment from CENTCOM as the drawdown progresses, while Navy logisticians are ensuring materiel arrives on time. Our Navy doctors, nurses, and corpsmen are providing medical assistance in the field and at forward operating bases.... On the water, Navy forces are intercepting smugglers and insurgents and protecting our interests since global security and prosperity are increasingly dependent of the free flow of goods. We know the sea lanes must remain open for the transit of oil and our ships and Sailors are making that happen.²

Navy IW Operations Elsewhere

In addition to participating in U.S. military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Navy states that its IW operations also include the following:

- **security force assistance operations**, in which forward-deployed Navy ships exercise and work with foreign navies, coast guards, and maritime police forces, so as to improve their abilities to conduct maritime security operations;
- **civic assistance operations**, in which forward-deployed Navy units, including Navy hospital ships, expeditionary medical teams, fleet surgical teams, and naval construction units provide medical and construction services in foreign countries as a complement to other U.S. diplomatic and development activities in those countries;
- **disaster relief operations**, of which Navy forces have performed several in recent years; and
- **counter-piracy operations**.³

² Department of the Navy, *Highlights of the Department of the Navy FY 2013 Budget*, February 2012, pp. 2-2 and 2-4. The Navy also states that

Having completed operations in Iraq, the Department has maintained over 23,000 Marines and Sailors in Afghanistan, largely associated with Regional Command-Southwest based in Helmand province. This force provides security and seeks to build the self defense capacity of our Afghan partners. Currently the Navy has deployed just over 8,000 Sailors on the ground, 2,920 of whom are Reservists, across the Central Command supporting joint and coalition efforts. Another 10,000 Sailors are in the Arabian Gulf and the Indian Ocean supporting combat operations from destroyers, submarines, supply vessels and aircraft carriers, which launch around 30 percent of the aircraft conducting combat air patrols over Afghanistan.

(Statement of The Honorable Ray Mabus, Secretary of the Navy, Before the House Armed Services Committee [Hearing] on [FY2013 Department of Navy Posture], February 16, 2012, p. 16.)

³ For more on counter-piracy operations, see CRS Report R40528, *Piracy off the Horn of Africa*, by Lauren Ploch Blanchard et al..

Navy Individual Augmentees (IAs)

Many of the Navy's contributions to IW operations around the world are made by Navy individual augmentees (IAs)—individual Navy sailors assigned to various DOD operations. The Department of the Navy (DON) states that:

Navy IAs are providing combat support and combat service support for Army and Marine Corps personnel in Afghanistan. As IAs they are fulfilling vital roles by serving in traditional Navy roles such as USMC support, maritime and port security, cargo handling, airlift support, Seabee units, and as a member of joint task force/Combatant Commanders staffs. Non-traditional roles include detainee operations, custom inspections teams, civil affairs, and provincial reconstruction teams.⁴

November 2011 Navy Testimony

The Navy outlined its IW activities in its prepared statement for a November 3, 2011, hearing on the services' IW activities before the Emerging Threats and Capabilities subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee. For the text of the Navy's prepared statement, see **Appendix A**.

2012 RAND Corporation Report

A 2012 report on maritime irregular warfare from RAND Corporation, a research firm, provides additional background information on U.S. maritime irregular warfare operations, both recent and historical.⁵ The report also made a series of findings and recommendations relating to U.S. maritime irregular warfare; for a summary of these findings and recommendations, see **Appendix B**.

Navy Counterterrorism (CT) Operations

In General

Navy CT operations include the following:

- Operations by Navy special operations forces, known as SEALs (an acronym standing for Sea, Air, and Land), that are directed against terrorists;⁶
- Tomahawk cruise missile attacks on suspected terrorist training camps and facilities, such as those reportedly conducted in Somalia on March 3 and May 1, 2008,⁷ and those conducted in 1998 in response to the 1998 terrorist bombings of U.S. embassies in East Africa;⁸

⁴ Department of the Navy, *Highlights of the Department of the Navy FY 2013 Budget*, February 2012, p. 2-4.

⁵ Molly Dunigan, et al, *Characterizing and Exploring the Implications of Maritime Irregular Warfare*, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica (CA), 2012, 111 p.

⁶ For an account of a series of missions reportedly conducted by SEALs over a six-week period in November and December 2003 to plant cameras in Somalia for the purpose of conducting surveillance on terrorists, see Sean D. Naylor, "Hunting Down Terrorists," *Army Times*, November 7, 2011: 22.

⁷ Edmund Sanders, "U.S. Missile Strike in Somalia Kills 6," *Los Angeles Times*, March 4, 2008; Stephanie (continued...)

- surveillance by Navy ships and aircraft of suspected terrorists overseas;
- maritime intercept operations (MIO) aimed at identifying and intercepting terrorists or weapons of mass destruction at sea, or potentially threatening ships or aircraft that are in or approaching U.S. territorial waters—an activity that includes Navy participation in the multilateral Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI);⁹
- protection of forward-deployed Navy ships, an activity that was intensified following the terrorist attack on the Navy Aegis destroyer *Cole* (DDG-67) in October 2000 in the port of Aden, Yemen;¹⁰
- protection of domestic and overseas Navy bases and facilities;
- working with the Coast Guard to build maritime domain awareness (or MDA, meaning a real-time understanding of activities on the world's oceans), and engaging with the U.S. Coast Guard to use the National Strategy for Maritime Security to more rapidly develop capabilities for Homeland Security, particularly in the area of MDA;
- assisting the Coast Guard in port-security operations;¹¹
- developing Global Maritime Intelligence Integration (GMII) as part of Joint Force Maritime Component Command (JFMCC) and Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA); and
- operations by the Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS), for which combating terrorism is a core mission area.¹²

(...continued)

McCrummen and Karen DeYoung, "U.S. Airstrike Kills Somali Accused of Links to Al-Qaeda," *Washington Post*, May 2, 2008: A12; Eric Schmitt and Jeffrey Gettleman, "Qaeda Leader Reported Killed In Somalia," *New York Times*, May 2, 2008.

⁸ For a recent article on the 1998 strikes, see Pamela Hess, "Report: 1998 Strike Built bin Laden-Taliban Tie," *NavyTimes.com (Associated Press)*, August 22, 2008.

⁹ For more on the PSI, see CRS Report RL34327, *Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)*, by Mary Beth Nikitin.

¹⁰ For a discussion of the attack on the *Cole*, see CRS Report RS20721, *Terrorist Attack on USS Cole: Background and Issues for Congress*, by Raphael F. Perl and Ronald O'Rourke.

¹¹ See, for example, Emelie Rutherford, "Navy's Maritime Domain Awareness System 'Up And Running,'" *Defense Daily*, September 4, 2008; and Dan Taylor, "New Network Allows Navy To Track Thousands of Ships Worldwide," *Inside the Navy*, September 8, 2008. For more on the Coast Guard and port security, see CRS Report RL33383, *Terminal Operators and Their Role in U.S. Port and Maritime Security*, by John Frittelli and Jennifer E. Lake, and CRS Report RL33787, *Maritime Security: Potential Terrorist Attacks and Protection Priorities*, by Paul W. Parfomak and John Frittelli.

¹² NCIS states on its website that "the NCIS mission is to investigate and defeat criminal, foreign, and terrorist intelligence threats to the United States Navy and Marine Corps, wherever they operate: ashore, afloat, or in cyberspace," and that combating terrorism is a core mission area for NCIS. Regarding this mission, the website states that

Protecting the naval forces from violent extremist organizations and individuals is one of NCIS' highest priorities. As the primary law enforcement and counterintelligence component for the naval services, NCIS is focused on countering threats to the physical security of Sailors, Marines, and Department of the Navy (DON) civilian personnel and on preventing terrorist attacks against installations and ships.

NCIS is responsible for detecting, deterring, and disrupting terrorism worldwide through a wide array of offensive and defensive capabilities. Offensive operations aim at identifying and

(continued...)

The Navy states that

Maintaining security in the world involves putting constant pressure on terrorist organizations. The Navy will continue global efforts to reduce terrorism by disrupting, dismantling, and defeating terrorist organizations through a variety of techniques, including irregular warfare. We will increase sea-based support of our special forces and maintain persistent intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance programs. As efforts in Afghanistan continue to drawdown, our global efforts will become more widely distributed.¹³

May 1-2, 2011, U.S. Military Operation That Killed Osama Bin Laden

The May 1-2, 2011, U.S. military operation in Abbottabad, Pakistan, that killed Osama bin Laden—reportedly called Operation Neptune’s Spear—reportedly was carried out by a team of 23 Navy special operations forces, known as SEALs (an acronym standing for Sea, Air, and Land). The SEALs reportedly belonged to an elite unit known unofficially as Seal Team 6 and officially as the Naval Special Warfare Development Group (DEVGRU). The SEALs reportedly were flown to and from Abbottabad by Army special operations helicopters. Bin Laden’s body reportedly was flown by a U.S. military helicopter from Abbottabad to a base in Afghanistan, and from there by a Marine Corps V-22 tilt-rotor aircraft to the aircraft carrier *Carl Vinson* (CVN-70), which was operating at the time in the Northern Arabian Sea. A few hours later, bin Laden’s body reportedly was buried at sea from the ship. Differing accounts have been published regarding certain details of the operation.¹⁴

Press reports in July 2010 stated that U.S. forces in Afghanistan included at that time a special unit called Task Force 373, composed of Navy SEALs and Army Delta Force personnel, whose mission is “the deactivation of top Taliban and terrorists by either killing or capturing them.”¹⁵

(...continued)

interdicting terrorist activities. In defensive operations, NCIS supports key DON leaders with protective services and performs physical security assessments of military installations and related facilities—including ports, airfields, and exercise areas to which naval expeditionary forces deploy.

(Source: <http://www.ncis.navy.mil/CoreMissions/CT/Pages/default.aspx>, accessed on November 29, 2011.)

¹³ Department of the Navy, *Highlights of the Department of the Navy FY 2013 Budget*, February 2012, p. 1-4.

¹⁴ For one account, see Nicholas Schmidle, “Getting Bin Laden,” *The New Yorker*, August 8, 2011, accessed online August 10, 2011 at http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2011/08/08/110808fa_fact_schmidle. For a press report commenting on Schmidle’s sources for the article, see Paul Farhi, “Journalist Details Raid On Bin Laden Camp,” *Washington Post*, August 3, 2011: C1. For another account, see Peter Bergen, “The Last Days Of Osama Bin Laden,” *Time*, May 7, 2012. For another account, see Mark Bowden, “The Hunt For ‘Geronimo,’” *Vanity Fair*, November 2012: 144. For a very different account, see Chuck Pfarrer, *SEAL Target Geronimo: The Inside Story of the Mission to Kill Osama bin Laden* (St. Martin’s Press, 2011), 240 pp. For news reports based on this book, see Susannah Cahalan, “Real Story Of Team 6’s Charge,” *New York Post*, November 6, 2011: 18; Christina Lamb, “Bitter Seals Tell of Killing ‘Bert’ Laden,” *The Australian* (www.theaustralian.com.au), November 6, 2011. See also Chris Carroll, “Pentagon Says New Bin Laden Raid Book Gets Details Wrong,” *Stripes.com*, November 7, 2011; and Associated Press, “Spec-Ops Command: SEAL Raid Book ‘A Lie,’” *NYTimes.com*, November 15, 2011. For another, and also different, account, see Mark Owen (pseudonym) and Kevin Maurer, *No Easy Day: The Firsthand Account of the Mission That Killed Osama Bin Laden* (Dutton Adult, 2012), 336 pp. For an article regarding details reported in this book, see Barbara Starr, “Pentagon Double Checked Actions Of Seals During Bin Laden Raid,” *CNN.com*, September 7, 2012. See also Eric Schmitt, “Book On Bin Laden Killing Contradicts U.S. Account,” *New York Times*, August 30, 2012; Joby Warrick, “For Bin Laden, A Passive End,” *Washington Post*, August 30, 2012: 1; Cynthia R. Fagen, “‘The Night I Killed Obama,’” *New York Post*, September 2, 2012: 18.

¹⁵ Matthias, et al, “US Elite Unit Could Create Political Fallout For Berlin,” *Spiegel (Germany)*, July 26, 2010. See also (continued...)

Another CRS report provides additional background information on the SEALs,¹⁶ and another provides further discussion of the operation that killed Osama bin Laden.¹⁷

Detention of Terrorist Suspects on Navy Ships

On July 6, 2011, it was reported that

The U.S. military captured a Somali terrorism suspect [named Ahmed Abdulkadir Warsame] in the Gulf of Aden in April and interrogated him for more than two months aboard a U.S. Navy ship before flying him this week to New York, where he has been indicted on federal charges....

Other U.S. officials, interviewed separately, said Warsame and another individual were apprehended aboard a boat traveling from Yemen to Somalia by the U.S. military's Joint Operations Command. The vessel was targeted because the United States had acquired intelligence that potentially significant operatives were on board, the officials said. Court documents said the capture took place April 19.

One of the senior administration officials who briefed reporters said that the other suspect was released "after a very short period of time" after the military "determined that Warsame was an individual that we were very much interested in for further interrogation."

According to court documents, Warsame was interrogated on "all but a daily basis" by military and civilian intelligence interrogators. During that time, officials in Washington held a number of meetings to discuss the intelligence being gleaned, Warsame's status and what to do with him.

The options, one official said, were to release him, transfer him to a third country, keep him prisoner aboard the ship, subject him to trial by a military commission or allow a federal court to try him. The decision to seek a federal indictment, this official said, was unanimous.

Administration officials have argued that military commission jurisdiction is too narrow for some terrorism cases - particularly for a charge of material support for terrorist groups - and the Warsame case appeared to provide an opportunity to try to prove the point.

But some human rights and international law experts criticized what they saw as at least a partial return to the discredited "black site" prisons the CIA maintained during the Bush administration....

Warsame was questioned aboard the ship because interrogators "believed that moving him to another facility would interrupt the process and risk ending the intelligence flow," one senior administration official said.

(...continued)

C. J. Chivers, et al, "Inside the Fog Of War: Reports From The Ground In Afghanistan," *New York Times*, July 26, 2010: 1.

¹⁶ CRS Report RS21048, *U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF): Background and Issues for Congress*, by Andrew Feickert.

¹⁷ CRS Report R41809, *Osama bin Laden's Death: Implications and Considerations*, coordinated by John Rollins.

The official said Warsame “at all times was treated in a manner consistent with all Department of Defense policies” - following the Army Field Manual - and the Geneva Conventions.

Warsame was not provided access to an attorney during the initial two months of questioning, officials said. But “thereafter, there was a substantial break from any questioning of the defendant of four days,” court documents said. “After this break, the defendant was advised of his Miranda rights” - including his right to legal representation – “and, after waiving those rights, spoke to law enforcement agents.”

The four-day break and separate questioning were designed to avoid tainting the court case with information gleaned through un-Mirandized intelligence interrogation, an overlap that has posed a problem in previous cases. The questioning continued for seven days, “and the defendant waived his Miranda rights at the start of each day,” the documents said....

U.S. Navy Vice Adm. William H. McRaven alluded to the captures in testimony before a Senate committee last week in which he lamented the lack of clear plans and legal approvals for the handling of terrorism suspects seized beyond the war zones of Iraq and Afghanistan.

At one point in the hearing, Sen. Carl Levin (D-Mich.), the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, referred to “the question of the detention of people” and noted that McRaven had “made reference to a couple, I think, that are on a ship.”

McRaven replied affirmatively, saying, “It depends on the individual case, and I'd be more than happy to discuss the cases that we've dealt with.”¹⁸

Another press report on July 6, 2011, stated:

In a telephone briefing with reporters, senior administration officials said Mr. Warsame and another person were captured by American forces somewhere “in the Gulf region” on April 19. Another official separately said the two were picked up on a fishing trawler in international waters between Yemen and Somalia. That other person was released.

Mr. Warsame was taken to a naval vessel, where he was questioned for the next two months by military interrogators, the officials said. They said his detention was justified by the laws of war, but declined to say whether their theory was that the Shabab are covered by Congress’s authorization to use military force against the perpetrators of the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks; whether the detention was justified by his interactions with Al Qaeda’s Yemen branch; or something else.

The officials also said interrogators used only techniques in the Army Field Manual, which complies with the Geneva Conventions. But they did not deliver a Miranda warning because they were seeking to gather intelligence, not court evidence. One official called those sessions “very, very productive,” but declined to say whether his information contributed to a drone attack in Somalia last month.

After about two months, Mr. Warsame was given a break for several days. Then a separate group of law enforcement interrogators came in. They delivered a Miranda warning, but he waived his rights to remain silent and have a lawyer present and continued to cooperate, the officials said, meaning that his subsequent statements would likely be admissible in court.

¹⁸ Karen DeYoung, Greg Miller, and Greg Jaffe, “Terror Suspect Detained On Ship,” *Washington Post*, July 6, 2011: 6.

Throughout that period, administration officials were engaged in deliberations about what to do with Mr. Warsame's case. Eventually, they "unanimously" decided to prosecute him in civilian court. If he is convicted of all the charges against him, he would face life in prison.

Last week, Vice Adm. William H. McRaven, who was until recently in charge of the military's Joint Special Operations Command, told a Senate hearing that detainees are sometimes kept on Navy ships until the Justice Department can build a case against them, or they are transferred to other countries for detention.

Another senior administration official said Tuesday that such detentions are extremely rare, and that no other detainees are now being held on a Navy ship.¹⁹

A July 7, 2011, press report stated:

In interrogating a Somali man for months aboard a Navy ship before taking him to New York this week for a civilian trial on terrorism charges, the Obama administration is trying out a new approach for dealing with foreign terrorism suspects.

The administration, which was seeking to avoid sending a new prisoner to Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, drew praise and criticism on Wednesday [July 6] for its decisions involving the Somali suspect, Ahmed Abdulkadir Warsame, accused of aiding Al Qaeda's branch in Yemen and the Shabab, the Somali militant group.²⁰

A July 6, 2011, entry in a blog that reports on naval-related events stated that the U.S. Navy ship to which Warsame was taken was the amphibious assault ship *Boxer* (LHD-4).²¹

An October 24, 2012, press report stated:

Over the past two years, the Obama administration has been secretly developing a new blueprint for pursuing terrorists, a next-generation targeting list called the "disposition matrix."

The matrix contains the names of terrorism suspects arrayed against an accounting of the resources being marshaled to track them down, including sealed indictments and clandestine operations. U.S. officials said the database is designed to go beyond existing kill lists, mapping plans for the "disposition" of suspects beyond the reach of American drones.

Although the matrix is a work in progress, the effort to create it reflects a reality setting in among the nation's counterterrorism ranks: The United States' conventional wars are winding down, but the government expects to continue adding names to kill or capture lists for years....

The database is meant to map out contingencies, creating an operational menu that spells out each agency's role in case a suspect surfaces in an unexpected spot. "If he's in Saudi Arabia,

¹⁹ Charlie Savage and Eric Schmitt, "U.S. To Prosecute A Somali Suspect In Civilian Court," *New York Times*, July 6, 2011: 1.

²⁰ Charlie Savage, "U.S. Tests New Approach To Terrorism Cases On Somali Suspect," *New York Times*, July 7, 2011: 10. See also Dave Boyer, "Interrogation At Sea Skirts Obama Pledge," *Washington Times*, July 7, 2011: 1.

²¹ See "The STRATCOM [Strategic Communications] Opportunity of Ahmed Abdulkadir Warsame," *Information Dissemination* (www.informationdissemination.net), July 6, 2011, accessed online July 6, 2011, at <http://www.informationdissemination.net/2011/07/stratcom-opportunity-of-ahmed.html>.

pick up with the Saudis,” the former official said. “If traveling overseas to al-Shabaab [in Somalia] we can pick him up by ship. If in Yemen, kill or have the Yemenis pick him up.”

Officials declined to disclose the identities of suspects on the matrix. They pointed, however, to the capture last year of alleged al-Qaeda operative Ahmed Abdulkadir Warsame off the coast of Yemen. Warsame was held for two months aboard a U.S. ship before being transferred to the custody of the Justice Department and charged in federal court in New York.

“Warsame was a classic case of ‘What are we going to do with him?’” the former counterterrorism official said. In such cases, the matrix lays out plans, including which U.S. naval vessels are in the vicinity and which charges the Justice Department should prepare.²²

Navy Initiatives to Improve Its IW and CT Capabilities

The Navy in recent years has implemented a number of organizational and program initiatives intended to improve its IW and CT capabilities and activities, including those discussed below.

Navy Irregular Warfare Office

The Navy in July 2008 established the Navy Irregular Warfare Office, which is intended, in the Navy’s words, to “institutionalize current ad hoc efforts in IW missions of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency and the supporting missions of information operations, intelligence operations, foreign internal defense and unconventional warfare as they apply to [CT] and [counterinsurgency].” The office works closely with U.S. Special Operations Command, and reports to the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for information, plans, and strategy.²³

2010 Navy Vision Statement for Countering Irregular Challenges

The Navy in January 2010 published a vision statement for countering irregular challenges, which states in part:

The U.S. Navy will meet irregular challenges through a flexible, agile, and broad array of multi-mission capabilities. We will emphasize Cooperative Security as part of a comprehensive government approach to mitigate the causes of insecurity and instability. We will operate in and from the maritime domain with joint and international partners to enhance regional security and stability, and to dissuade, deter, and when necessary, defeat irregular forces.²⁴

The full text of the vision statement is reproduced in the **Appendix C**.

²² Greg Miller, “The Permanent War, U.S. Set To Keep Kill Likes For Years,” *Washington Post*, October 24, 2012: 1. Bracketed material as in original.

²³ Zachary M. Peterson, “New Navy Irregular Warfare Office Works to Address ISR Shortfall,” *Inside the Navy*, September 1, 2008.

²⁴ Department of the Navy, Chief of Naval Operations, *The U.S. Navy’s Vision for Confronting Irregular Challenges*, January 2010, p. 3.

Navy Community of Interest for Countering Irregular Challenges

The Navy in December 2010 established “a community of interest to develop and advance ideas, collaboration and advocacy related to confronting irregular challenges (CIC).” The community, which includes a number of Navy organizations, is to be the Navy’s “standing authority to facilitate: implementation of the *U.S. Navy Vision for Confronting Irregular Challenges (Vision)*; promotion of increased understanding of confronting irregular challenges; and synchronization of CIC-related initiatives within the navy and with its external partners.”²⁵

Navy Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC)

The Navy Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC), headquartered at Naval Amphibious Base, Little Creek, VA, was established informally in October 2005 and formally on January 13, 2006. NECC consolidated and facilitated the expansion of a number of Navy organizations that have a role in IW operations. Navy functions supported by NECC include the following:

- riverine warfare;
- maritime civil affairs;
- expeditionary training;
- explosive ordnance disposal (EOD);
- expeditionary intelligence;
- naval construction (i.e., the naval construction brigades, aka CBs or “Seabee”);
- maritime expeditionary security;
- expeditionary diving;
- combat camera;
- expeditionary logistics;
- guard battalion; and
- expeditionary combat readiness.

DON states that:

Navy Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC) is a global force provider of expeditionary combat service support and force protection capabilities to joint warfighting commanders, centrally managing the current and future readiness, resources, manning, training, and equipping of a scalable, self-sustaining and integrated expeditionary force of active and reserve sailors. Expeditionary sailors are deployed from around the globe in support of “A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower.” NECC forces and capabilities are integral to executing the maritime strategy which is based on expanded core capabilities of maritime power: forward presence, deterrence, sea control, power projection, maritime security,

²⁵ Source: Memorandum dated December 22, 2010, from S. M. Harris, Director, Navy Irregular Warfare Office, on the subject, “Confronting Irregular Challenges Community of Interest (COI) Charter.” A copy of the memorandum was posted at InsideDefense.com (subscription required). For an article discussing the Navy’s establishment of this community of interest, see Christopher J. Castelli, “Navy Taps Other Services, Elite Forces For Irregular Warfare Advice,” *Inside the Navy*, January 17, 2011.

humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. To enable these, NECC provides a full spectrum of operations, including effective waterborne and ashore anti-terrorism force protection; theater security cooperation and engagement; and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. NECC is also a key element of the Navy's operational Irregular Warfare (IW) efforts in the area of operational support to the Navy forces in OEF.

As we begin to reshape our forces to ensure that our military is agile, flexible, and ready for the full range of contingencies, we have determined that our current Navy expeditionary force structure can be realigned and ultimately reduced throughout the FYDP. Beginning in FY2013, one Seabee Battalion is converting from a Reserve to an Active unit. In addition, the merger of Riverine and Mobile Expeditionary Security Force Squadrons results in an increase of one Active unit and a reduction of three Reserve units.

NECC is not a standalone or combat force, but rather a force protection and combat service force of rapidly deployable mission specialists that fill the gaps in the joint battle space and compliment joint and coalition capabilities....

The Reserve Component expeditionary forces are integrated with the Active Component forces to provide a continuum of capabilities unique to the maritime environment within the NECC. Blending the AC and RC brings strength to the force and is an important part of the Navy's ability to carry out the Naval Maritime Strategy from blue water into green and brown water and in direct support of the Joint Force. The Navy Reserve trains and equips over half of the Sailors supporting NECC missions, including naval construction and explosive ordnance disposal in the CENTCOM region, as well as maritime expeditionary security, expeditionary logistics (cargo handling battalions), maritime civil affairs, expeditionary intelligence, and other mission capabilities seamlessly integrated with operational forces around the world.²⁶

On October 1, 2012, the Navy established NECC Pacific (NECC PAC) "to provide administrative control for Navy expeditionary forces assigned to the Pacific theater." The new organization, the Navy says, "formalizes a direct administrative relationship between NECC and Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet—a linkage that hasn't existed since NECC's establishment in 2006."²⁷

Global Maritime Partnership

The Global Maritime Partnership is a U.S. Navy initiative to achieve an enhanced degree of cooperation between the U.S. Navy and foreign navies, coast guards, and maritime police forces, for the purpose of ensuring global maritime security against common threats. The Navy states that "Building partnerships elsewhere is also important to protect freedom of access throughout the global commons. Through partnerships with a growing number of nations, including those in Africa and Latin America, we will strive for a common vision of freedom, stability, and prosperity."²⁸ The Navy also states that

²⁶ Department of the Navy, *Highlights of the Department of the Navy FY 2013 Budget*, February 2012, pp. 4-16, 4-17, and 4-26.

²⁷ Navy Expeditionary Combat Command Public Affairs, "#Warfighting: Navy Expeditionary Combat Command Pacific Established," *Navy News Service*, October 3, 2012, accessed October 18, 2012, at http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=69947.

²⁸ Department of the Navy, *Highlights of the Department of the Navy FY 2013 Budget*, February 2012, p. 2-1. For more on the Navy's contribution to multinational antipiracy operations near the Horn of Africa, see CRS Report R40528, *Piracy off the Horn of Africa*, by Lauren Ploch Blanchard et al..

While today DDGs [guided missile destroyers] and amphibious ships conduct security cooperation operations with partners in Latin America and Africa, our FY2013 budget submission funds procurement of JHSV [a Joint High Speed Vessel], AFSB [an Afloat Forward Staging Base], MLP [Mobile Landing Platform Ships], and LCS [Littoral Combat Ships] and sustainment of PC [patrol craft] and T-AH [hospital ships] to take on these missions in the future. To support an expanding range of partnership missions, they will increasingly carry tailored force packages of U.S. Marines to conduct security cooperation activities with partner armies and marines.²⁹

Partnership Stations

The Southern Partnership Station (SPS) and the Africa Partnership Station (APS) are Navy ships, such as amphibious ships or high-speed sealift ships, that have deployed to the Caribbean and to waters off Africa, respectively, to support U.S. Navy engagement with countries in those regions, particularly for purposes of building security partnerships with those countries, and for increasing the capabilities of those countries for performing maritime-security operations. The SPS and APS can be viewed as specific measures for promoting the above-discussed global maritime partnership. A July 2010 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report discusses the APS.³⁰

Coastal Riverine Force

The Navy in May 2006 reestablished its riverine force by standing up Riverine Group 1 at Naval Amphibious Base, Little Creek, VA (now part of Joint Expeditionary Base Little Creek-Fort Story, or JEBLC-FS). Riverine Group 1 included three active-duty riverine squadrons of 12 boats each that were established in 2006-2007. Operations of the squadrons from 2006 to 2011 included multiple deployments to Iraq for the purpose, among other things, of relieving Marines who until 2006 had been conducting maritime security operations in Iraqi ports and waterways.

On June 1, 2012, the Navy merged the riverine force and the Maritime Expeditionary Security Force (MESF) to create Coastal Riverine Force (CORIVFOR). The Navy states that CORIVFOR “performs core maritime expeditionary security missions in the green and brown waters, bridging the gap between traditional Navy blue water operations and land-based forces, providing port and harbor security for vital waterways and protection of high value assets and maritime infrastructure.”³¹ The Navy states that CORIVFOR is scheduled to reach initial operating capability (IOC) in October 2012 and full operational capability (FOC) in October 2014, and that “all current and scheduled routine deployments will continue as normal.”³²

²⁹ Statement of Admiral Jonathan Greenert, Chief of Naval Operations, Before the House Armed Services Committee [Hearing] on FY 2013 Department of Navy Posture, February 16, 2012, pp. 20-21.

³⁰ Government Accountability Office, *Defense Management[:]Improved Planning, Training, and Interagency Collaboration Could Strengthen DOD’s Efforts in Africa*, GAO-10-794, July 2010, 63 pp.

³¹ Kay Savarese, “NECC Establishes Coast Riverine Force,” *Navy News Service*, June 1, 2012, accessed June 27, 2012, at http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=67545. See also Corinne Reilly, “New Navy Command To Incorporate Riverines,” *Norfolk Virginian-Pilot*, May 16, 2012; Megan Eckstein, “Coastal Riverine Force Expanding Its Reach Following June 1 Merger,” *Inside the Navy*, June 11, 2012; and Christopher P. Cavas, “U.S. Navy Reorganizes Post-War Riverine Forces,” *Defense News*, May 7, 2012: 4.

³² Naval Expeditionary Combat Command Public Affairs, “NECC Announces Formation of Coastal Riverine Force,” *Navy News Service*, May 14, 2012, accessed May 15, 2012, at http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=67167.

CORIVFOR consists of about 2,500 active-duty sailors and 2,000 reserve sailors, and includes Coastal Riverine Groups (CORIVGRUs) 1 and 2. CORIVGRU 1 is homeported at Imperial Beach, CA, with squadrons located at the Naval Amphibious Base in San Diego. CORIVGRU 2 is homeported at Portsmouth, VA, with active-duty squadrons located at Norfolk Naval Shipyard at Portsmouth, VA, JEBLC-FS, and a forward-deployed detachment in Bahrain, and with reserve squadrons located at Newport, RI, and Jacksonville, FL.³³ The Navy states that under its proposed FY2013 budget, “the merger of Riverine and Mobile Expeditionary Security Force Squadrons results in an increase of one Active unit and a reduction of three Reserve units.”³⁴ On August 1, 2012, the Navy established Coastal Riverine Squadron (CORIVRON) 4, merging Riverine Squadron (RIVRON) 1 and Maritime Expeditionary Security Squadron (MSRON) 4. CORIVRON 1 is the first squadron to merge since the establishment of CORIVFOR.³⁵

A November 1, 2012, press report stated:

In Iraq, Riverine forces became a quick reaction force — capable of search-and-seizure, insertion or extraction — on swift, agile boats with heavy-caliber weaponry. Between March 2007 and October 2011, the Riverines carried out more than 2,000 missions, trained Iraqi River Police, screened detainees and discovered weapons caches while flying 667 unmanned aerial vehicle hours.

Army and Navy river units were dismantled after the Vietnam War ended in 1975 and the Riverines's future was in limbo when the Iraq war wound down last year. The Navy, however, has decided it has an enduring need for these quick and lethal small boat fighters....

The Navy has decided to merge the more offensive Riverine Group 1 and the more defensive Maritime Expeditionary Security Force to form the Coastal Riverine Force. The hybrid command is designed to operate in rivers, coastal waterways and possibly even in open ocean, bridging the gap between land-based forces and the Navy ships that operate off the coast.

The 5,000-strong force should be up and running initially this month, a Navy statement said, although it is not expected to be fully merged and operational for two years.

It will be broken up into two groups. Coastal Riverine Group 1 will be based at Imperial Beach, Calif., with a squadron at the Naval Amphibious Base in San Diego. Coastal Riverine Group 2 will have its headquarters in Portsmouth, Va., with additional squadrons in Bahrain, Rhode Island and Florida.

Each squadron will feature a headquarters element and four distinct companies, three of which will handle security operations, to include protecting ships and shore facilities, carrying out search-and seizure-operations and providing security for aircraft.

The fourth, Delta company, will specialize in traditional Riverine duties, such as insertions and extractions, boardings on rivers and other inland waters, intelligence collection and more

³³ Kay Savarese, “NECC Establishes Coast Riverine Force,” *Navy News Service*, June 1, 2012, accessed June 27, 2012, at http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=67545.

³⁴ Department of the Navy, *Highlights of the Department of the Navy FY 2013 Budget*, February 2012, p. 4-2. The same statement occurs on p. 4-17.

³⁵ Steven C. Hoskins, “Coastal Riverine Force Establishes Squadron,” *Navy News Service*, August 2, 2012, accessed October 18, 2012, at http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=68790.

offensive combat operations, said Capt. James Hamblet, Coastal Riverine Group 2's commander.

The new force will focus primarily in the Navy's 5th Fleet area of operations, which includes the Persian Gulf and waterways, Navy Expeditionary Combat Command skipper Rear Adm. Michael Tillotson said at the establishment ceremony for Coastal Riverine Group 2 in June. But, he expects that focus to shift to the Pacific over time.

"We will work with partners along the areas known as Oceania, which includes Indonesia, Papua New Guinea and Malaysia; we'll work in the areas and help build relationships with those countries in order to provide security in those areas," Tillotson said. "The challenges are out there."

The force features a mix of maritime expeditionary security and Riverine gear and apparatus, with plans to obtain more advanced craft in the future. The Coastal Riverines now operate 113 boats, ranging from rubber combat raiding crafts to 53-foot command boats that can carry up to 26 personnel. The force has 2,657 active and 2,507 Reserve personnel, Navy Expeditionary Combat Command spokeswoman Barbara Wilcox wrote to Stars and Stripes.

The force's future is the MK-VI patrol boat, which will allow Coastal Riverine sailors the ability to operate farther off the coast and will improve boarding capabilities as it is brought into service, Hamblet said. The 78-foot boat is capable of speeds in excess 30 knots with twin diesel engines and water jets. It has a range of 600 nautical miles.³⁶

A January 18, 2013, Navy news report stated:

Sailors, former Riverines, and family members attended a disestablishment ceremony for Naval Expeditionary Combat Command's Riverine Squadron (RIVRON) 3 at Naval Weapons Station Yorktown, Jan. 17.

The disestablishment marks the merger of offensive Riverine forces with defensive Maritime Expeditionary Security Forces to form the Coastal Riverine Force (CORIVFOR), formally established June 1[, 2012]....

CORIVFOR's primary mission is to conduct maritime security operations across all phases of military operations by defending high value assets, critical maritime infrastructure, ports and harbors, both inland and on coastal waterways, and when commanded, conduct offensive combat operations.

The budget-initiated merger moved portions of the force to San Diego as part of the National Defense Strategy's rebalance to the Pacific, which will bring Riverine capability to the West coast for the first time since 1974, according to Capt. Eric B. Moss, commander of Coastal Riverine Group 1, formerly Maritime Expeditionary Security Group 1.

"The Riverine forces will do what they've always done, which is continuing to hone their skills and work in brown water and green water areas," said Moss. "There is no abatement of requirements. We continue to get missions and are sourced to meet those requirements. We're doing the same with less."

³⁶ Matthew M. Burke, "Reviving the Riverines," *Stars and Stripes*, November 1, 2012: 1.

The merge cuts the former seven active Maritime Expeditionary Security Force (MESF) squadrons and three active RIVRONs down to three active Coastal Riverine squadrons and four reserve squadrons.

“This is a reduction in capacity, but not in capability,” said Moss. “I would say this is a very affordable force. We are light, expeditionary, and bring a lot capability in small packages. We are familiar with disaggregated operations, so immediately we give the combatant commander a tailor-able and scalable force.”...

Commissioned July 6, 2007, RIVRON 3 served two deployments in Iraq, fulfilling a total of 502 combat missions, 268 water security operations and countless U.S./Iraq tactical convoy operations.³⁷

Other Organizational Initiatives

Other Navy initiatives in recent years for supporting IW and CT operations include establishing a reserve civil affairs battalion, a Navy Foreign Area Officer (FAO) community consisting of officers with specialized knowledge of foreign countries and regions, a maritime interception operation (MIO) intelligence exploitation pilot program, and an intelligence data-mining capability at the National Maritime Intelligence Center (NMIC).

FY2013 Funding

Afloat Forward Staging Base (AFSB)

The Navy states that

Navy [as part of its FY2013 budget submission] is proposing to procure a fourth Mobile Landing Platform (MLP) [ship] in fiscal year 2014, configured to serve as an Afloat Forward Staging Base (AFSB). This AFSB will fulfill an urgent Combatant Commander request for sea-based support for mine warfare, Special Operations Forces (SOF), Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR), and other operations. To speed this capability into the fleet, and to ultimately provide for continuous AFSB support anywhere in the world, we also intend to request Congressional approval to convert the FY12 MLP into the AFSB configuration, resulting in a final force of two MLPs and two AFSBs. This mix will alleviate the demands on an already stressed surface combatant and amphibious fleet while reducing our reliance on shore-based infrastructure.³⁸

Funding in Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) Account

The Navy states that

The [Navy’s FY2013 budget] request for Overseas Contingency Operations] continues support for the fighting force in Afghanistan and the refurbishment costs associated with equipment returning from theater. Operational realities have maintained the demand signal

³⁷ Shannon M. Smith, “RIVRON 3 Disestablishes at Naval Weapon Station Yorktown,” *Navy News Service*, January 18, 2013.

³⁸ Statement of The Honorable Ray Mabus, Secretary of the Navy, Before the House Armed Services Committee [Hearing] on [FY2013 Department of Navy Posture], February 16, 2012, p. 8.

for Departmental assets in theater for irregular capabilities as well as outside of the more traditional boots-on-the-ground support. ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance], airborne electronic attack, combat support missions flown from carrier decks with long transit times, and expanded counter-piracy missions are all areas that have shown persistent high demand signals from CENTCOM.³⁹

Potential Oversight Issues for Congress

Degree of Emphasis on IW and CT in Future Navy Budgets

One potential oversight issue for Congress is how much emphasis to place on IW and CT activities in future Navy budgets.

Supporters of placing increased emphasis on IW and CT activities in future Navy budgets could argue that the experience of recent years, including U.S. operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, suggests that the United States in coming years will likely need to be able to conduct IW and CT operations, that the Navy has certain specialized or unique IW and CT capabilities that need to be supported as part of an effective overall U.S. IW or CT effort, and that there are programs relating to Navy IW and CT activities that could be funded at higher levels, if additional funding were made available.

Opponents of placing an increased emphasis on IW and CT activities in future Navy budgets could argue that these activities already receive adequate emphasis on Navy budgets, and that placing an increased emphasis on these activities could reduce the amount of funding available to the Navy for programs that support the Navy's role in acting, along with the Air Force, as a strategic reserve for the United States in countering improved Chinese maritime military forces and otherwise deterring, and, if necessary, fighting in potential conventional interstate conflicts.

Potential oversight questions for Congress include the following:

- To what degree can or should Navy IW and CT activities be used to reduce the burden on other services for conducting such activities?
- Is the Navy striking an appropriate balance between IW and CT activities and other Navy concerns, such as preparing for a potential future challenge from improved Chinese maritime military forces?⁴⁰

Additional Oversight Questions

In addition to the issues discussed above, the Navy's IW and CT activities pose some additional potential oversight issues for Congress, including the following:

³⁹ Department of the Navy, *Highlights of the Department of the Navy FY 2013 Budget*, February 2012, pp. 4-16, 4-17, and 2-8.

⁴⁰ For additional discussion of this issue, see CRS Report RL33153, *China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress*, by Ronald O'Rourke.

- How many Navy personnel globally are involved in IW and CT activities, and where are they located? How much funding is the Navy expending each year on such activities?
- What are estimated costs of the Navy's proposed Afloat Forward Staging Bases (AFSBs)? How will the AFSBs be used? From an acquisition policy perspective, does the AFSB program amount to a new start, and if so, what are the implications for review and oversight of the program?
- Is the Navy adequately managing its individual augmentee (IA) program?⁴¹
- Is the Navy devoting sufficient attention and resources to riverine warfare?⁴²
- Is the Navy adequately coordinating its IW and CT activities and initiatives with other organizations, such as the Special Operations Command (SOCOM) and the Coast Guard?
- Are the Navy's recent IW and CT organizational changes appropriate? What other Navy organizational changes might be needed?

Legislative Activity for FY2013

FY2013 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 4310/P.L. 112-239)

House

Section 1040 of the FY2013 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 4310 of the 112th Congress) as reported by the House Armed Services Committee (H.Rept. 112-479 of May 11, 2012) states:

SEC. 1040. NOTICE AND REPORT ON USE OF NAVAL VESSELS FOR DETENTION OF INDIVIDUALS CAPTURED OUTSIDE AFGHANISTAN PURSUANT TO THE AUTHORIZATION FOR USE OF MILITARY FORCE.

(a) Notice to Congress- Not later than 5 days after first detaining an individual who is captured pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force on a naval vessel outside the United States, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and House of Representatives notice of the detention.

(b) Report-

(1) IN GENERAL- Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and House of Representatives a report on the use of naval vessels for the detention outside the United States of any individual who is captured pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force (P.L. 107-40; 50 U.S.C. 1541 note). Such report shall include—

⁴¹ For a discussion of the Navy's management of the IA program, see Andrew Scutro, "Fleet Forces Takes Charge of IA Program," *NavyTimes.com*, July 7, 2008.

⁴² For an article that discusses this question from a critical perspective, see Daniel A. Hancock, "The Navy's Not Serious About Riverine Warfare," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, January 2008: 14-19.

(A) procedures and any limitations on detaining such individuals at sea on board United States naval vessels;

(B) an assessment of any force protection issues associated with detaining such individuals on such vessels;

(C) an assessment of the likely effect of such detentions on the original mission of the naval vessel; and

(D) any restrictions on long-term detention of individuals on United States naval vessels.

(2) FORM OF REPORT- The report required under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form but may contain a classified annex.

H.Rept. 112-479 states:

Critical Gaps in Undersea Mobility Capabilities

The budget request [for Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation, Defense-Wide] contained \$26.4 million in Program Element (PE)1160483BB for Special Operations Forces Underwater Systems.

The committee is aware that U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) has realigned the Undersea Mobility Program to comply with the additional oversight requirements pursuant to Section 144 of the National Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 2012 (Public Law 112–81). The committee is also aware that the proposed program structure for fiscal year 2013 includes scaled-down requirements for dry combat submersibles to operate via host surface ship only with moderate capacity and varying endurance. The committee is concerned that frequent program and strategy changes to the Undersea Mobility Program and a lack of funding priority in critical research, development, testing and evaluation, have delayed the introduction of advanced capabilities for both wet combat submersible replacement and dry combat submersible development.

The committee is concerned that the current program schedule for dry combat submersibles, in particular, will not field an operational evaluation platform until early 2015 with extended integrated testing not taking place until 2016. Given current dry combat submersible capability gaps and a potential shift in strategic emphasis to the Asia-Pacific and other regions that present anti-access and area-denial challenges, the committee is concerned that USSOCOM’s Undersea Mobility Program will be unable to meet potential geographic combatant command requirements to operate in denied maritime areas from strategic distances. Additionally, the committee is concerned that the highly perishable and technical skill sets required to operate wet and dry combat submersibles resident within the Naval Special Warfare community have not been fully exercised and utilized in recent years, thereby increasing capability gaps and risks to the overall program.

The committee has previously expressed concern with these current capability gaps and recognized the operational importance of the Undersea Mobility Program to provide technologically-advanced undersea mobility platforms for U.S. Naval Special Warfare Command and USSOCOM. The committee therefore encourages the Commander of U.S. Special Operations Command to review the current Undersea Mobility Program to mitigate risk, potentially accelerate the fielding of safe, efficient, and financially sound operational wet and dry systems, and to continually communicate with the congressional defense committees to ensure programmatic success and prevent previous program shortfalls.

The committee recommends \$61.4 million, an increase of \$35 million, Special Operations Forces Underwater Systems. (Pages 85-86)

Senate

Section 153 of the FY2013 National Defense Authorization Act (S. 3254 of the 112th Congress) as reported by the Senate Armed Services Committee (S.Rept. 112-173 of June 4, 2012) states:

SEC. 153. SHALLOW WATER COMBAT SUBMERSIBLE PROGRAM.

(a) Initial Report- Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Commander of the United States Special Operations Command shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report setting forth the following:

(1) A description of the efforts of the contractor under the Shallow Water Combat Submersible (SWCS) program and the United States Special Operations Command to improve the accuracy of the tracking of the schedule and costs of the program.

(2) The revised timeline for the initial and full operational capability of the Shallow Water Combat Submersible.

(3) A current estimate of the cost to meet the basis of issue requirement under the program.

(b) Subsequent Reports-

(1) QUARTERLY REPORTS REQUIRED- The Commander of the United States Special Operations Command shall submit to the congressional defense committees on a quarterly basis updates on the metrics from the earned value management system with which the Command is tracking the schedule and cost performance of the contractor of the Shallow Water Combat Submersible program.

(2) SUNSET- The requirement in paragraph (1) shall cease on the date the Shallow Water Combat Submersible has completed operational testing and has been found to be operationally effective and operationally suitable.

Regarding Section 153, S.Rept. 112-173 states:

Shallow Water Combat Submersible Program (sec. 153)

On November 9, 2010, U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) provided the committee with a notification that the Command had awarded a sole source contract for the Shallow Water Combat Submersible (SWCS) program and stated “the contract provides only for firm-fixed-price task orders which are established in the contract.” USSOCOM has requested a modification to its fiscal year 2013 budget request that would transfer \$8.0 million from Procurement, Defense-wide, to Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation, Defense-wide, to pay for cost growth in the engineering and manufacturing development phase of the SWCS program. According to U.S. USSOCOM, “extreme schedule variations from the baseline resulted in the inability to accurately track progress and cost.” In response to an inquiry from committee staff following notification of SWCS cost and schedule variations, USSOCOM indicated “the contract has a combination of cost contract line items and firm fixed price contract line items.”

The committee is concerned by the inaccurate and misleading contract notification described above and that it only learned of the projected SWCS schedule and cost overruns following the release of the fiscal year 2013 budget. The committee expects full and accurate notification of contract awards and reiterates its expectation that USSOCOM will keep it adequately informed of such acquisition program deviations at the time they are identified.

The committee recommends a provision [Section 153] that would require the Commander of USSOCOM, not later than 90 days after enactment of this Act, to provide the congressional defense committees with a report describing: efforts by the contractor and USSOCOM to more accurately track schedule and cost; the revised timeline for SWCS initial and full operational capability; and the projected cost to meet the basis of issue requirement. The provision would also require that the Commander submit quarterly updates on the metrics from the earned value management system with which the Command is tracking cost and scheduled performance of the contractor. That requirement shall lapse once the SWCS has completed operational testing and has been found to be operationally effective and operationally suitable. (Page 21)

The report also states:

Shallow Water Combat Submersible Program

The budget request [for Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation, Defense-Wide] includes \$8.9 million in PE 1160483BB for the continued development of the Shallow Water Combat Submersible. The committee understands that the contractor's failure to meet systems engineering requirements will result in an overall program delay of several months and require at least an additional \$8.0 million to complete research and development activities. According to U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), "extreme schedule variations from the baseline resulted in the inability to accurately track progress and cost." At the request of USSOCOM, the committee recommends a transfer of \$8.0 million from Procurement, Defense-wide, to Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation, Defense-wide, for cost growth in the engineering and manufacturing development phase of the program. (Page 56)

The report also states:

Dry Combat Submersible

The committee notes that U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) has deferred plans for the foreseeable future to procure Dry Combat Submersible-Light and associated Future Dry Deck Shelter Extension Modifications in light of higher priority requirements and budget constraints. The committee also notes USSOCOM intends to continue forward with modified plans to field a single Dry Combat Submersible variant. The committee expects, consistent with the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (Public Law 112-81), that the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics will make a determination, prior to a milestone B decision, on whether to treat the Dry Combat Submersible program as a Major Defense Acquisition Program. (Page 70)

Conference

Section 156 of the conference report (H.Rept. 112-705 of December 18, 2012) on H.R. 4310/P.L. 112-239 of January 2, 2013, states:

SEC. 156. SHALLOW WATER COMBAT SUBMERSIBLE PROGRAM.

(a) INITIAL REPORT.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, in coordination with the Commander of the United States Special Operations Command, shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report setting forth the following:

(1) A description of all efforts under the Shallow Water Combat Submersible program and the United States Special Operations Command to improve the accuracy of the tracking of the schedule and costs of the program.

(2) The revised timeline for the initial and full operational capability of the Shallow Water Combat Submersible, including details outlining and justifying the revised baseline to the program.

(3) Current cost estimates to meet the basis of issue requirement under the program.

(4) An assessment of existing program risk through the completion of operational testing.

(b) SUBSEQUENT REPORTS.—

(1) QUARTERLY REPORTS REQUIRED.—The Assistant Secretary, in coordination with the Commander of the United States Special Operations Command, shall submit to the congressional defense committees on a quarterly basis updates on the schedule and cost performance of the contractor of the Shallow Water Combat Submersible program, including metrics from the earned value management system.

(2) SUNSET.—The requirement in paragraph (1) shall cease on the date the Shallow Water Combat Submersible has completed operational testing and has been found to be operationally effective and operationally suitable.

Section 1024 states:

SEC. 1024. NOTICE AND REPORT ON USE OF NAVAL VESSELS FOR DETENTION OF INDIVIDUALS CAPTURED OUTSIDE AFGHANISTAN PURSUANT TO THE AUTHORIZATION FOR USE OF MILITARY FORCE.

(a) NOTICE TO CONGRESS.—Not later than 30 days after first detaining an individual pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force (Public Law 107–40; 50

U.S.C. 1541 note) on a naval vessel outside the United States, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and House of Representatives notice of the detention. In the case of such an individual who is transferred or released before the submittal of the notice of the individual’s detention, the Secretary shall also submit to such Committees notice of the transfer or release.

(b) REPORT.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and House of Representatives a report on the use of naval vessels for the detention outside the United States of any individual who is detained pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force (Public Law 107–40; 50 U.S.C. 1541 note). Such report shall include—

(A) procedures and any limitations on detaining such individuals at sea on board United States naval vessels;

(B) an assessment of any force protection issues associated with detaining such individuals on such vessels;

(C) an assessment of the likely effect of such detentions on the original mission of such naval vessels; and

(D) any restrictions on long-term detention of individuals on United States naval vessels.

(2) FORM OF REPORT.—The report required under paragraph (1) may be submitted in classified form.

Department of Defense, Military Construction and Veterans Affairs, and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act, 2013 (H.R. 933 of 113th Congress)

House

H.R. 933 of the 113th Congress as passed by the House on March 6, 2013, includes the FY2013 DOD appropriations act as Division A. The explanatory statement for H.R. 933 states that Division A of the bill reduces by \$16.6 million DOD's FY2013 funding request in the defense-wide procurement account for underwater systems for the Special Operations Command, with the reduction consisting of a \$4.6 million reduction for "Program rebaselining excess to need," and a Special Operations Command-requested transfer of \$12.0 million from that line item to the Special Operations Forces Underwater Systems program element in the defense-wide research and development account.⁴³

FY2013 DOD Appropriations Act (H.R. 5856 of 112th Congress)

House

The House Appropriations Committee, in its report (H.Rept. 112-493 of May 25, 2012) on H.R. 5856 of the 112th Congress, states:

SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND UNDERSEA MOBILITY PROGRAM

The Committee is concerned that frequent program and strategy changes to the Undersea Mobility Program have delayed the introduction of advanced capabilities for both wet combat submersible replacement and dry combat submersible development. The current program schedule for dry combat submersibles will not field an operational evaluation platform until early 2015 with extended integrated testing not taking place until 2016. Given current dry combat submersible capability gaps and a potential shift in strategic emphasis to the Asia-Pacific and other regions that present anti-access and area-denial challenges, the

⁴³ Explanatory statement for H.R. 933, pdf pages 194 (line 64) and 255 (line 272) of 394. The explanatory statement shows the amount transferred out of the line item in the defense-wide procurement account for underwater systems for the Special Operations Command (line 64) as \$12 million. The explanatory statement shows the amount transferred into the receiving line item in the defense-wide research and development account for Special Operations Forces Underwater Systems (line 272) as \$14 million.

Committee believes successful development and fielding of undersea mobility capabilities are critical to meeting combatant commanders' needs. Additionally, the Committee is concerned that the highly perishable and technical operational expertise for wet and dry combat submersibles resident within the Naval Special Warfare community have not been fully exercised and utilized in recent years, thereby increasing capability gaps and risks to the overall program. The Committee recommends \$35,000,000 [in Research, Development, Test and Evaluation, Defense-Wide] above the request for the Undersea Mobility Program for the dry combat submersible program to enable the program to undertake risk reduction activities, thereby increasing the likelihood of delivery of a technically satisfactory system that meets the warfighter's requirements. (Pages 254-255)

Senate

The Senate Appropriations Committee, in its report (S.Rept. 112-196 of August 2, 2012) on H.R. 5856 of the 112th Congress, recommends reducing by \$16.6 million DOD's FY2013 funding request in the defense-wide procurement account for underwater systems for the Special Operations Command, with the reduction consisting of an \$8.6 million reduction for "Excess to need due to reviews slipping and program rebaselining in development," and a Special Operations Command-requested transfer of \$8.0 million from that line item to the Special Operations Forces Underwater Systems program element in the defense-wide research and development account. (Page 161, line 64, and page 218, line 272)

Conference

For further action on the FY2013 DOD appropriations act, see H.R. 933 of the 113th Congress above.

Appendix A. November 2011 Navy Testimony on Navy IW Activities

Below is the text of the Navy's prepared statement for a November 3, 2011, hearing before the Emerging Threats and Capabilities subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee on the IW activities of the military services. The text of the statement, by Rear Admiral Sinclair Harris, Director, Navy Irregular Warfare Office, is as follows:

Chairman Thornberry, Congressman Langevin, and distinguished members of the House Armed Services Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee, it is an honor for me to be here with you today to address the U.S. Navy's efforts to institutionalize and develop proficiency in irregular warfare mission areas. These efforts are vital to our national interests and, as part of a comprehensive approach for meeting complex global challenges, remain relevant in a time of uncertainty and constant change. To meet these challenges Admiral Greenert, Chief of Naval Operations, recently provided his Sailing Directions to our Navy emphasizing the mission to deter aggression and, if deterrence fails, to win our Nation's wars. Today, the Navy is engaged around the world conducting preventive activities that stabilize, strengthen, and secure our partners and allies providing regional deterrence against state and non-state actors, while at the same time fighting, and winning, our Nation's wars. We expect the demand for these activities to increase in the future security environment as a capacity constrained Navy seeks to maintain access and presence. Emphasis on increased training and education will enable our continued readiness to effectively meet global demand.

As demand for our Navy continues to grow, we continue to leverage our Maritime Strategy with our partners, the Marine Corps and Coast Guard. The maritime domain supports 90% of the world's trade and provides offshore options to help friends in need, and to confront and defeat aggression far from our shores as part of a defense in depth approach to secure our homeland. CNO's Sailing Directions, coupled with an enduring Maritime Strategy, underscore the Navy's focus on multi-mission platforms and highly trained Sailors that conduct activities across the operational spectrum. Key tenets of the force are readiness to fight and win today while building the ability to win tomorrow; to provide offshore options to deter, influence, and win; and to harness the teamwork, talent and imagination of our diverse force. While the Maritime Strategy spans the spectrum of warfare, the Navy's Vision for Confronting Irregular Challenges (CIC), released in January 2010, addresses mission areas of irregular warfare as well as maritime activities to prevent, limit, and interdict irregular threats and their influence on regional stability through, insurgency, crime, and violent extremism.

The CIC Vision is derived from our Maritime Strategy with the intention to implement steps towards increasing the Navy's proficiency in supporting direct and indirect approaches that dissuade and defeat irregular actors who exploit uncontrolled or ungoverned spaces in order to employ informational, economic, technological, and kinetic means against civilian populations to achieve their objectives. The CIC Vision is guiding the alignment of organizations, investments, innovation, procedures, doctrine, and training needed to mainstream CIC capabilities within the Fleet. These efforts are focused on outcomes of increased effectiveness in stabilizing and strengthening regions, enhancing regional awareness, increasing regional maritime partner capacity, and expanding coordination and interoperability with joint, interagency, and international partners. These outcomes support promoting regional security and stability and advancing the rule of law allowing good governance and promoting prosperity by helping partners better protect their people and resources. In addition to preventive activities, the Vision guides efforts to inhibit the spread

of violent extremism and illicit, terrorist, and insurgent activities. To achieve these outcomes, the Navy is actively reorienting doctrine and operational approaches, rebalancing investments and developmental efforts, and refining operations and partnerships to better support a comprehensive approach to U.S. efforts. These efforts will provide a Navy capable of confronting irregular challenges through a broad array of multi-mission capabilities and a force proficient in the CIC missions of security force assistance, maritime security, stability operations, information dominance, and force application necessary to support counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, and foreign internal defense missions.

In line with its strategy for confronting irregular challenges the Navy has leveraged key force providers, such as the Navy Expeditionary Combat Command, and established Maritime Partnership Stations, and Maritime Headquarters with Maritime Operations Centers to meet the demands and missions consistent with its strategy and vision. The evolution of intelligence and strike capabilities has enabled the Navy to meet urgent Combatant Commander requirements for counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations and highlighted further opportunities for the Navy as an important joint partner. While these operational organizations and activities deliver Navy capabilities in theater, the Navy Irregular Warfare Office, established by the CNO in July 2008, has guided the implementation and institutionalization of the CIC Vision. The Navy Irregular Warfare Office, working closely with USSOCOM, other Combatant Commanders, Services, interagency and international partners, has rapidly identified and deployed Navy capabilities to today's fight, and is institutionalizing confronting irregular challenges concepts in the Navy's planning, investment, and capability development.

The Navy Irregular Warfare Office operates under three primary imperatives consistent with the Maritime Strategy, CNO's Sailing Directions, and the Navy's Vision for Confronting Irregular Challenges. They provide integration and institutionalization in CIC mission areas and are: (1) improve the level of understanding concerning the maritime contribution to the joint force; (2) increase proficiency of the whole of Navy to confront irregular challenges; and (3) drive maritime and special operations forces to seamless integration in addressing irregular challenges. These three imperatives focus the Navy's implementation efforts and mainstream the concept that preventing wars is as important as winning them. Our Navy must be ready to transition seamlessly between operational environments, with the capability and training inherent in the Fleet.

Department of Defense Directive 3000.07 directs the services to "improve DoD proficiency for irregular warfare, which also enhances its conduct of stability operations" and directs reporting to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff annually. Navy efforts to institutionalize and provide proficiency in confronting irregular challenges, includes proficiency in irregular warfare missions along with missions of maritime security operations and information dominance, a key enabler for CIC. Currently, the Navy leverages its access and persistent presence to both better understand and respond to irregular challenges and is actively evolving its proficiency to prevent and counter irregular threats while maintaining its ability to conduct the full spectrum of naval warfare. Its access, presence, and emphasis on maritime partnerships enable broader government efforts to address underlying conditions of instability that enhance regional security. Through its mix of multi-mission capabilities, the Navy provides political leaders with a range of offshore options for limiting regional conflict through assurance, deterrence, escalation and de-escalation, gaining and maintaining access, and rapid crisis response. In addition to its inherent ability to protect the maritime commons, its effectiveness in building maritime partner capability and capacity contributes to achieving partner security and economic objectives. Operating in and from the maritime domain with joint and international partners, the Navy is enhancing regional security while dissuading, deterring, and when necessary, defeating irregular threats.

The Navy acknowledges the complexity of the future security environment and continues to explore balanced approaches. Following are the Navy's current focus areas:

Fleet-SOF Integration: Navy's afloat basing support to special operations forces has extended their reach into denied or semi-permissive areas enabling highly successful counterterrorism missions. Navy provides inherent combat capabilities, multi-mission ships and submarines collecting mission critical information, approval for 1052 support billets for Naval Special Warfare, two dedicated HCS squadrons, and shipboard controlled UAV orbits supporting counterterrorism operations. The Navy is aligned to improve this integration through pre-deployment training, mission rehearsals, improvements to fleet bandwidth allocation, shipboard C4I enhancements, and C2 relationships needed to prosecute time sensitive targets.

Maritime Partnerships: Establishing enduring maritime partnerships is a long-term strategy for securing the maritime commons. Legal, jurisdictional, and diplomatic considerations often complicate efforts to secure the maritime commons, especially from exploitation by highly adaptive irregular actors. In recognition of these considerations, the Navy is emphasizing partnership engagements with U.S. and international maritime forces to strengthen regional security.

Information Sharing Initiatives: In an information dominated environment, initiatives that link joint warfighters, the technology community, and academia are crucial to rapidly fielding solutions to emerging irregular challenges. These initiatives are the basis for longer-term efforts to adapt and improve proficiency of Navy platforms to address irregular challenges.

Doctrine: Development of Tri-Service (Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard) Maritime Stability Operations doctrine that will enable a more effective response to instability in the littorals.

Organization: Navy Expeditionary Combat Command, which continues to provide in-demand capabilities such as Maritime Civil Affairs Teams, Riverine Forces, Maritime Security Forces, Explosive Ordnance Disposal Teams, and Expeditionary Intelligence Teams.

Today, the Navy continues to meet planned global operational commitments and respond to crises as they emerge. Overseas Contingency Operations continue with more than 12,000 active and reserve Sailors serving around the globe and another 15,000 at sea in Central Command. Navy's Carrier Strike Groups provide 30 percent of the close air support for troops on the ground in Afghanistan and our Navy and Marine Corps pilots fly almost 60% of electronic attack missions. Yet, as our national interests extend beyond Iraq and Afghanistan, so do the operations of our Navy. Over the last year, more than 50 percent of our Navy has been underway daily; globally present, and persistently engaged. Last year, our Navy conducted counter-piracy operations in the Indian Ocean and North Arabian Sea with a coalition of several nations, trained local forces in maritime security as part of our Global Maritime Partnership initiatives in Europe, South America, Africa and the Pacific and forces in the Sixth Fleet supported NATO in complex operations in Libya. Navy responded with humanitarian assistance and disaster relief to the earthquake in Haiti, the flooding in Pakistan, and the earthquake and tsunami in Japan; and, conducted the world's largest maritime exercise, Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC), which brought together 14 nations and more than 20,000 military personnel, to improve coordination and trust in multi-national operations in the Pacific. Our Sailors continue to deploy forward throughout the world, projecting US influence, responding to contingencies, and building international relationships that enable the safe, secure, and free flow of commerce that underpins our economic prosperity and advances the mission areas that address irregular challenges.

The future vision of the Navy in meeting the uncertain challenges around the globe remains a force forward, present, and persistent in areas critical to the national interests of the United States. CNO, in previous testimony,⁴⁴ stated: *Our Navy continues to conduct a high tempo of global operations, which we expect to continue even as forces draw down in Afghanistan. Global trends in economics, demographics, resources, and climate change portend an increased demand for maritime presence, power, and influence. America's prosperity depends on the seas... and as disruption and disorder persist in our security environment, maritime activity will evolve and expand. Seapower allows our nation to maintain U.S. presence and influence globally and, when necessary, project power without a costly, sizeable, or permanent footprint ashore. We will continue to maintain a forward-deployed presence around the world to prevent conflict, increase interoperability with our allies, enhance the maritime security and capacity of our traditional and emerging partners, confront irregular challenges, and respond to crises.* To continue as a global force in the preventive and responsive mission areas that confront irregular challenges, including those of irregular warfare, the Navy will be faced with increasing demand in a fiscally induced capacity constrained environment. Constrained capacity requires a prioritization of areas requiring persistent presence, to include those regions of current or forecast instability. Also required is an understanding of the risk incurred to mission, and to force, if we do not get that priority correct. We must ensure our Navy remains the finest, best trained, and most ready in the world to sustain key mission areas that support confronting irregular challenges, and has the ability to face a highly capable adversary. The Navy looks forward to working with Congress to address our future challenges and thank you for your support of the Navy's mission and personnel at this critical crossroads in U.S. history.⁴⁵

⁴⁴ At this point, the statement includes a footnote citing the prepared statement of Admiral Jonathan Greenert before the House Armed Services Committee on July 26, 2011. Greenert became the Chief of Naval Operations on September 23, 2011.

⁴⁵ Statement of Rear Admiral (Lower Half) Sinclair Harris, Director, Navy Irregular Warfare Office, before the House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities, November 3, 2011. Italics as in original.

Appendix B. 2012 RAND Corporation Report Findings and Recommendations

This appendix presents findings and recommendations from a 2012 report on maritime regular warfare by RAND Corporation, a research firm.

Findings

The report made the following findings, among others:

The study's main findings span the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. Several are specific to MIW, while others have implications both for MIW [maritime irregular warfare] and for IW operations more broadly.

First, the maritime force is generally considered to play a supportive role to ground forces in IW and therefore has the potential to be underutilized even in IW operations conducted in a predominantly maritime environment....

Second, countries that have a prevalent maritime dimension associated with an insurgency could potentially benefit from the enhancement of civil-military operations (CMOs) in the maritime arena....

Third, maritime operations in IW can allow the United States to scale its ground involvement in useful ways....

Fourth, if one assumes that future MIW engagements that entail building a partner's capacity will resemble OEF-P [Operation Enduring Freedom—Philippines], it is important to manage strategic expectations based on realistic assessments of the partner's capabilities....

Fifth, when building partner capacity, either in MIW or land-based IW, the United States should make efforts to provide equipment and technology that the partner will be able to maintain and operate without difficulty....

Sixth, with regard to operational methods, coastal maritime interdiction can play an instrumental role in setting the conditions for success in IW by cutting the supply lines that sustain an insurgency....

Seventh, as the [1980s] Nicaragua case illustrates, U.S. partners in MIW may only have to influence and monitor the sensibilities of a local population, but the legitimacy of U.S. involvement may be tested in worldwide public opinion....

Finally, international cooperation in confronting MIW adversaries is often necessary, and the U.S. Navy should make an effort to ensure that it is tactically and operationally interoperable with partner navies in order to facilitate coordination....⁴⁶

⁴⁶ Molly Dunigan, et al, *Characterizing and Exploring the Implications of Maritime Irregular Warfare*, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica (CA), 2012, pp. xv-xviii (italics as in original).

Recommendations

The report made the following recommendations, among others:

The findings presented here have several direct implications for the U.S. conventional Navy and Naval Special Warfare Command (NSW). First, U.S. naval forces should continue to provide U.S. partners with suitable equipment that they will be able to operate and maintain and should continually strive to increase their interoperability with partner forces. Second, U.S. naval forces may have to continue or expand training of partner forces to confront future MIW threats. Third, when conducting MIW, operating from a sea base offers advantages to NSW. However, due to the costs of such a practice, both NSW and the conventional Navy must also recognize that decisions regarding when and where to support sea basing of this sort need to be made carefully. Fourth, in support of future MIW operations, NSW is likely to have ongoing requirements for maritime interdiction and containment. Fifth, the United States could benefit from maintaining operational and tactical capabilities with which to assist its partners in surveillance, particularly against small submarines and mining threats. Sixth, NSW should consider increasing its capacity to conduct maritime-based CMOs.

Conventional U.S. naval forces should similarly consider their role in supporting significant irregular ground operations launched from the sea, as well as their role in interdiction and containment campaigns. In contrast to those of NSW, conventional U.S. Navy capabilities to support IW might entail CMOs and related activities to a greater extent than direct action.⁴⁷

⁴⁷ Molly Dunigan, et al, *Characterizing and Exploring the Implications of Maritime Irregular Warfare*, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica (CA), 2012, pp. xix-xx.

Appendix C. 2010 Navy Irregular Warfare Vision Statement

This appendix reproduces the Navy's January 2010 vision statement for irregular warfare.⁴⁸

⁴⁸ Department of the Navy, Chief of Naval Operations, *The U.S. Navy's Vision for Confronting Irregular Challenges*, January 2010, 7 pp. (including the cover page).

**The U.S. Navy's
Vision for Confronting Irregular Challenges**



January 2010

CNO Foreword

Our Navy has a history of confronting *irregular challenges* at sea, in the littorals, and on shore. In the face of significant shifts in the nature and character of the threats our nation faces, this Navy Vision for Confronting Irregular Challenges will guide our efforts to prevent, limit, and interdict irregular threats and adversaries. We will focus on the full range of capabilities the Naval force can uniquely project, in and from the maritime domain, in countering *irregular challenges* associated with regional instability, insurgency, crime, and violent extremism.

The *Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower* places as much emphasis on preventing wars as it does on winning wars, and is the cornerstone of our approach to confronting *irregular challenges*. The six capabilities of our Maritime Strategy, from winning the nation's wars to stabilizing regions with our partners, draws upon the cooperative and preventive capabilities of maritime and joint forces. Our Navy will realize the broadened and balanced capabilities directed in our Maritime Strategy and Defense guidance by making investments to ensure the agility, flexibility, and adaptability necessary to address the range of emergent challenges to our national security. We will enhance integration and interoperability with our traditional maritime partners, the U.S. Marine Corps and U.S. Coast Guard, along with other joint, interagency, private and non-governmental organizations, and international partners in all stages of this effort.

This Vision emphasizes the importance of the maritime contribution to addressing *irregular challenges* in a dynamic and evolving global security environment. The steps we take now will ensure our Navy is prepared fully to work with partners to stabilize regions at risk, and when necessary, dissuade, deter, and defeat irregular actors who seek to undermine security, stability, and prosperity.



G. ROUGHHEAD
Admiral, U.S. Navy

I. The Vision for Confronting Irregular Challenges - Pursuing a Capability Balance for 21st Century Operations

Vision Statement

The U.S. Navy will meet irregular challenges through a flexible, agile, and broad array of multi-mission capabilities. We will emphasize Cooperative Security as part of a comprehensive government approach to mitigate the causes of insecurity and instability. We will operate in and from the maritime domain with joint and international partners to enhance regional security and stability, and to dissuade, deter, and when necessary, defeat irregular threats.

Recognizing the strategic impact of global threats associated with regional instability and insecurity, our Navy has instituted this Vision to guide efforts aimed at confronting *irregular challenges*. In today's interconnected and technically advanced world, **terrorists and criminals prey upon unstable and failing regions and pose an increasing threat to our national interests.** With three-quarters of the world's population, four-fifths of its capital cities, and almost all of its productive capacity located within 200 miles of a coastline, **our Navy is uniquely positioned and suited to counter threats to stability, while operating in and from the maritime domain.** This includes helping countries at risk build sustainable indigenous capacity to secure their resources, protect their populations, and stabilize their regions.

Our Navy must continue efforts to balance emphasis and investments between countering irregular threats and countering near peer forces to successfully meet today's and tomorrow's dynamic and interrelated security challenges. This Vision is derived from our Maritime Strategy and sets a course toward increasing proficiency in supporting direct and indirect approaches to dissuade and defeat *irregular challenges* -- wherein states and non-state actors leverage uncontrolled or ungoverned space to employ informational, economic, technological, and kinetic methods against civilian populations and targets to achieve their objectives. **We will confront *irregular challenges* by focusing on the following outcomes:**

- **Increased effectiveness in stabilizing and strengthening regions**, by securing and leveraging the maritime domain, with and in support of national and international partners.
- **Enhanced regional awareness** of activities and dynamics to include a deeper understanding of ethnic, cultural, and socioeconomic characteristics and norms.
- **Increased regional partner capacity** for maritime security and domain awareness.
- **Expanded coordination and interoperability** with joint, interagency, and international partners.

These outcomes support promoting regional security and stability, advancing the rule of law, promoting good governance and prosperity, and help partners better protect their people and resources. They will inhibit the spread of violent extremism and its associated terrorist, insurgent, and criminal activities.

The Navy will leverage its history of presence, international engagement, and security enforcement, and will ensure our sailors, platforms, and systems are ready to address the hybrid nature of 21st Century challenges. The Navy brings global scope, unique access, and a breadth of capabilities to confront *irregular challenges*. We will promote Cooperative Security to mitigate instability in regions with limited governance that give rise to *irregular challenges*. We will enhance proficiency and effectiveness in security force assistance, maritime security, stability operations, information dominance, and other force applications necessary to support U.S. and partner counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, and foreign internal defense operations.

II. Opportunity: Leveraging the Maritime Domain to Confront Irregular Challenges

“Covering three-quarters of the planet, the oceans make neighbors of people around the world. They enable us to help friends in need and to confront and defeat aggression far from our shores.”

A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower

Our Navy’s inherent contribution to the irregular contest is our capacity and ability to leverage access to the maritime domain and cooperate with partner navies and security forces to dissuade, deter, and defeat irregular threats at sea and ashore. While often overlooked in the context of *irregular challenges*, **the maritime domain enables proximate populations to partner and enhance their wealth and well-being, but also provides sanctuary and freedom of movement to criminals, terrorists, and insurgents.** The maritime domain provides for over 90% of the flow of information, people, goods, and services that sustain and create opportunities for regional economic prosperity. This economic opportunity promotes stability and helps prevent vulnerable populations from turning to terrorist or criminal enterprises.

The maritime domain similarly provides irregular actors with operating space and the ability to conduct the illicit flow of information, weapons, money, technicians, and cadres upon which much of their income and effectiveness relies. As such they are able to use the maritime environment to exploit, disrupt, or destabilize regions or governments, and to affect the will of civilian populations through insurgency, terrorism, crime, and the proliferation of radical ideologies.

The Navy’s global maritime access and sustained presence forward enable U.S. Government-wide partnerships with nations and their forces to provide security and training assistance. At sea and ashore, the Navy works with partners to secure vulnerable maritime approaches and maritime resources, while improving collective capabilities to counter emerging threats such as piracy, trafficking, and weapons proliferation. Partners can appreciate the Navy’s dependable but impermanent presence, which requires neither a footprint ashore nor infringement on their sovereignty. Our partners in turn add capability and capacity to our own through their contributions of forces, technologies, and operating concepts, as well as the understanding and ability to navigate local political, ethnic, and cultural contexts.

Today, the Navy is globally engaged to confront *irregular challenges* in sustained joint and interagency operations at sea and ashore. This includes support for counter-terrorist and counterinsurgency missions, development, humanitarian assistance, disaster response, and maritime security capacity building with partner militaries. Some examples include:

- Support for Joint Special Operations Task Force – Philippines which provides security force training, anti-terrorist forces, and delivered humanitarian relief and disaster response following storm induced flooding.
- Contributions to Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa whose East African Maritime Center of Excellence, security capacity building, and interagency policy efforts are enhancing indigenous capacities to stabilize the region and counter threats of piracy.
- Counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden and the Horn of Africa which remove financial support to terrorists ashore and reduce instability and criminality at sea.
- Training and equipping partners for maritime security and fisheries enforcement in the Gulf of Guinea that many of the region's countries depend for economic stability.
- With coalition partners, the protection of oil platforms in the northern Arabian Gulf, that includes training for Iraqi naval personnel to assume this economically critical mission.
- Expeditionary Training Teams and Global Fleet Stations (Africa, South America, Pacific) dedicated to security force training and assistance through multi-mission employment of amphibious ships, tactical aircraft, and helicopters.
- The over 23,000 Navy personnel engaged in CENTCOM, with 14,000 ashore, conducting maritime security, river patrol, ordnance disposal, surveillance and reconnaissance, electronic warfare, and combat support operations, as well as providing non-naval augmentation for detainee affairs, security, and reconstruction.
- The procurement and employment of evolving multi-mission platforms oriented to lower end operations against *irregular challenges* including: Littoral Combat Ship mission modules, Riverine squadrons tailored for security force assistance, persistent manned and unmanned surveillance platforms, and investments in training capacity for language, cultural, and hybrid mission sets.
- The employment of multi-mission platforms able to work across the spectrum of conflict to include P-3 for surveillance against terrorists and insurgents, tactical aircraft for armed reconnaissance, and submarines and surface combatants in counter-drug operations.

The Navy will continue to pursue balanced approaches to confronting evolving irregular and conventional challenges by maximizing the multi-purpose effectiveness of our Navy's capabilities, personnel, and platforms. We will emphasize building partner capacity using dedicated training forces, periodic deployments and recurring exercises. In the end we will achieve the greatest effectiveness against the most likely 21st Century threats through an agile, flexible, and adaptable force.

These goals support the outcomes presented in this Vision:

- **Enhance and formalize interoperability** with U.S. government, public and private organizations, allied maritime and land forces, and regional partners.
- **Build partner capacity** by forming enduring, trust-based relationships, promoting shared interests in collective security, and providing training and resources to enhance indigenous security force capacity.
- **Improve our regional awareness and understanding of complex environments and challenges** through intelligence and information systems, training, education, and more culturally adept approaches.
- **Achieve an improved understanding and ability to counter illicit and extremist actors** as they leverage and maneuver in their maritime and shore environments.
- **Enhance and broaden the multi-mission capabilities and applications of today's force** to maximize effectiveness in complex regions and scenarios.
- **Identify necessary and distinct shifts in emphasis and investment to confront irregular challenges**, to include modifications to training, doctrine, and existing forces, and where necessary, new investments in processes, platforms, and systems.

In pursuing these goals for confronting *irregular challenges* the Navy will employ its broad capabilities to enable partners, improve maritime security, and conduct cooperative and decisive operations at sea and ashore. Specifically, we will operate to deny unregulated actors use of the maritime and littoral environment, assist in securing critical infrastructure to ensure the safe flow of resources, and apply a broad spectrum of maritime and overland capabilities to combat irregular threats while improving the lives of affected populations.

III. Implementing the Vision

Implementation will require a Navy-wide organizational approach. This effort demands changes in our thinking, our force and its preparation, and requires clear strategic communications within and outside the organization. We will comprehensively align our organizations, investments, procedures, doctrine, and training with the set of emerging approaches necessary to address these challenges.

Our Navy will pursue the outcomes and goals outlined in this Vision through these supporting implementation objectives.

1. **Advance our Navy's doctrinal, strategic, and operational approaches to addressing irregular challenges.**
 - Increase our Navy's application of related Defense and Joint strategic and operational guidance.
 - Define the strategic and operational tenets and approaches for our Navy to apply across our general purpose and special operation forces.
 - Integrate the desired outcomes, priorities, and capabilities needed to confront *irregular challenges* into Navy's force development and management processes.

2. **Organize, train, and equip our Navy to confront *irregular challenges* more effectively through balancing shifts in our investments and efforts.**
 - Enhance our ability to address, refine, validate, and incorporate urgent and emerging requirements to confront *irregular challenges* in the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution process.
 - Identify the advocates and resource sponsors responsible for resource allocation and comprehensive program execution for existing and emerging Navy-unique and joint multi-mission capabilities to confront *irregular challenges*.
 - Introduce the necessary supporting training and education requirements, to include organizations, curricula, and processes across our manpower enterprise.
 - Institutionalize concepts, processes, and organizations for training and building the capacity of partners through dedicated assistance operations, regular exercises, and the deployments and visits of multi-mission ships and aircraft.
3. **Emphasize interoperability and effectiveness for confronting *irregular challenges* across U.S. government, public, private, and international partners.**
 - Leverage Navy's multi-mission capabilities with other services, interagency and coalitions to build partner security capacity.
 - Integrate and coordinate efforts with the U.S. Marine Corps and U.S. Coast Guard in support of the imperatives and approaches in the Maritime Strategy.
 - Support the development of joint, interagency, and international operational concepts and supporting CONOPS.
 - Support Defense efforts to integrate joint and interagency planning processes.
 - Ensure capabilities to confront *irregular challenges* are addressed and captured in U.S. Navy and Defense legal policy development.
 - Provide Combatant Commanders with applicable naval capabilities to support critical mission requirements outside the scope of Navy core mission areas.

IV. Conclusion

Our Navy recognizes the importance of developing opportunities while being prepared to address irregular threats. Our general and special purpose forces are immediately applicable to the broad array of capabilities required to achieve regional security and stability. The Navy is uniquely positioned to assist emerging nations and fragile states, and to dissuade, deter, and when necessary, defeat irregular threats. We will build on our inherent strengths to lead and support national and international efforts.

The *Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower* places as much emphasis on preventing conflicts as on winning conflicts. This underscores the importance of securing and fostering long-term cooperative relationships based on mutual understanding and respect for each party's strategic interests, as well as increasing partners' ability to ensure their own security and stability. It recognizes the value of presence, of "being there," to maintain adequate levels of security and awareness across the maritime domain, and restrain the destabilizing activities of non-state actors. It makes clear our Navy will work alongside other U.S. services and agencies through a comprehensive government approach to advance international partnerships.

This Vision will guide and shape our Navy's actions, and will enhance our Navy's proficiency in capabilities to counter *irregular challenges*, now and in the future.

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