Governance, Identity, and Counterinsurgency: Evidence from Ramadi and Tal Afar
Abstract
With the last departure of U.S. combat forces from Iraq in 2011 and a drawdown in Afghanistan already underway, the current era of American counterinsurgency may be coming to a close. At the same time, irregular threats to U.S. national interests remain, and the future may hold yet more encounters with insurgents for the U.S. military. Accordingly, the latest Defense strategic guidance has called on the Department of Defense (DoD) to "retain and continue to refine the lessons learned, expertise, and specialized capabilities" from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. This monograph is a contribution to this ongoing effort to institutionalize the military's understanding of counterinsurgency, building on its hard-won recent experience. Michael Fitzsimmons examines two case studies drawn from some of the darkest months of conflict in Iraq to illuminate an important refinement of traditional counterinsurgency theory and doctrine: that when it comes to building legitimacy, "good governance" may take a back seat to the politics of ethnic and religious identity. Dr. Fitzsimmons's use of comparative case studies and a simple framework for systematically reviewing evidence accumulated through first-hand accounts of strategy, operations, and tactics, should serve as a compelling model for what will likely be many studies in the years to come of the U.S. military's experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Mar 01, 2013
- Accession Number
- ADA577975
Entities
People
- Michael R Fitzsimmons
Organizations
- United States Army War College