



*KNOWLEDGE ENHANCEMENT WORKING GROUP:
MULTI-AGENCY COORDINATION
AFTER ACTION REPORT*

JEFFERSON COUNTY FAIRGROUNDS
GREEN MOUNTAIN CONFERENCE ROOM
FEBRUARY 23, 2012

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14. ABSTRACT This working group was designed to provide an environment for participants to: (1) Determine efficacy of application of a Multi-Agency Coordination System (MACS)/Multi-Agency Coordination Group (MACG) in the State of Colorado, and (2) Establish a structure to work through requirements to establish and manage a MACG. The meeting was supported by FEMA Region VIII and facilitated by Chuck Mills, President, Emergency Management Services, International. Mr. Mills provided an academic overview of the National Incident Management System (NIMS) Incident Command System (ICS) and MACS; including specifically roles and responsibilities of both Area Command and a MACG, influences affecting response and recovery operations, and how to determine the most appropriate organizations to establish following a large incident.					
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1.0 Executive Summary

This After Action Report (AAR) was developed following the Multi-Agency Coordination Knowledge Enhancement Working Group (KEWG) meeting, which occurred on February 23, 2012 at the Jefferson County Fairgrounds in Golden, Colorado. This AAR incorporates information from recorder notes, including questions, comments, and recommendations.

This meeting was designed to provide an environment for participants to: 1.) Determine efficacy of application of a Multi-Agency Coordination System (MACS)/Multi-Agency Coordination Group (MACG) in the State of Colorado, and 2.) Establish a structure to work through requirements to establish and manage a MACG. The meeting was supported by FEMA Region VIII and facilitated by Chuck Mills, President, Emergency Management Services, International. Mr. Mills provided an academic overview of the National Incident Management System (NIMS) Incident Command System (ICS) and MACS; including specifically *roles and responsibilities of both Area Command (AC) and a MACG, influences affecting response and recovery operations, and how to determine the most appropriate organizations to establish following a large incident*. A radiological scenario was used to discuss various levels of coordination required to meet overall needs as the size and complexity of the incident increases and to assist with work group exercises used to further explore key issues involving coordination structures. Participants included representatives from various local and state agencies and organizations, including North Central Region (NCR) Emergency Managers, Colorado Division of Emergency Management (CDEM), FEMA, and local Fire and Health Departments. A key document used during the discussions was *Draft Colorado MACG and Flow Chart*.

The results of this meeting will be used to further validate or eliminate the need for MACS guidance in the State and Region. It should also be noted that the *Denver UASI and State of Colorado All-Hazards Regional Recovery Framework with CBR Annexes* writing team that is part of the Wide Area Recovery and Resiliency Program (WARRP) will use lessons learned from this event to update the framework.

The content of this After Action Report represents the best efforts of the participants based on the information available at the time of publication, but is not intended to convey formal guidance or policy of the federal government or other participating agencies. The views and opinions expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of their respective organizations or the US Government.

2.0 Background

The Departments of Defense and Homeland Security, in close coordination with the Denver UASI and State of Colorado, have partnered to establish the Wide Area Recovery and Resiliency Program. The purpose of this collaborative program is to study, develop and demonstrate frameworks, operational capabilities and interagency coordination, enabling a timely return to functionality and re-establishment of socio-economic order and basic services through execution of recovery and resiliency activities, as applicable. In particular, WARRP looks at a coordinated systems approach to the recovery and resiliency of wide urban areas, including meeting public health requirements and restoring all types of critical infrastructure, key resources (both civilian and military) and high traffic areas (transit/transportation facilities) following chemical, biological or radiological (CBR) incident.

3.0 Goal & Objectives

Goal

The purpose of this meeting was to explore the rationale, concepts, procedures and agency structure required for *a specific governmental organization (city, county or state)* to establish an integrated, coordination process to respond to large-scale multi-jurisdictional incidents. The session also explored the concepts, procedures and communications necessary to have multi-jurisdictional coordination (*between various government organizations*). These two levels of coordination will, in theory, facilitate the various levels of government, private sector, military and other disciplines to work together to develop and operate a regional recovery structure for all-hazards incidents and CBR events.

Objectives

- Through discussion, provide an opportunity for State and local Emergency Managers to gain a better understanding of a MACS/MACG and associated influences while managing a complex all-hazard or CBR incident in today's response environment
- Using a scenario-based exercise, have participants determine what levels of coordination are required to meet overall needs as the size and complexity of the incident increases

4.0 Scope & Format

Scope

This event was designed to provide an environment for participants to better understand how a MACG may be used following a large scale or catastrophic incident. This meeting combined academic overview of subject matter, presentation of a scenario, workgroup exercises, followed by free flow discussion.

Format

The Multi-Agency Coordination Working Group was a one day meeting, for additional information on format, see [Annex A – Agenda](#). Participants from various organizations attended and are listed in [Annex B – Participants](#). Feedback was captured using a standard feedback form and a summary of workshop findings are found in [Annex C – Participant Feedback](#). For information on the planning team, or to get more information on this AAR, see [Annex D – Key Points of Contact](#).

The MAC used the standard WARRP radiological scenario to base workshop content. For a summary of the scenario as well as an evaluation of economic impact, see [Annex E – Scenario](#).

5.0 Key Discussion Areas & Outcomes

Following the presentation of the scenario, an overview of NIMS ICS based response to a catastrophic incident was provided by Chuck Mills as well as a theoretical overview of MACS/MACG. Expected roles and responsibilities within Unified and Area Command (managed by operators) and MAC organizations (managed by agency administrators) were presented with the caveat that ***although there is a national doctrine for a MACS, it is “practitioner driven” at the State level***; whatever structure is used must ensure organizations “remain in their lane” and have a mechanism in place for “changing lanes” when appropriate. The goal is to avoid functional or geographical “silos” – Unified Command (UC) should ensure unified delegation of authority and functions (i.e., EOC, UC, AC, JIC, etc.) should never integrate but rather maintain separation while remaining coordinated. ***It was noted that “Home Rule” which exists in Colorado as well as many other western states is often a major barrier to MACS. The Ultimate goal is clearly defined and agreed upon roles & responsibilities for all response organizations with clear process for documentation.***

Mr. Mills pointed out that it’s better to start with organic resources. This type of incident will be federalized quickly with resources/agencies pushing into area. FEMA/DHS will be the coordinating agency for federal agencies and resources and will evolve into a JFO. Must separate response from recovery, locals will be expected to have responsibility initially but simultaneous push will occur from outside local jurisdictions.

FBI will set up a Joint Operations Center (JOC) and should have liaisons at UC, AC, and MACG levels. Consequence Management should occur with FEMA supporting the State’s priorities. During Katrina, organizations did a poor job of coordinating with the State (had plenty of resources in place but coordination was a problem). The following are *Major Influences (based on lessons learned from previous large-scale incidents), Coordination Challenges, and Decision Criteria* that were recommended that the group consider prior to breaking into Working Group Sessions.

- *Major Influences.* Industry/Private Sector equities, Continuity of Government and Essential Services, Global Concerns, Political Considerations, Terrorism vs. Natural Disaster, Media, Information Flow/management, Accountability, Localized Experts, Finance Costs & Considerations, Legal Issues/Liability, Technology, Home Rule, Academia, Public Expectations, Interdependencies, Situational Awareness, Access & Functional Needs. It was pointed out that very few of these are operational issues for most local emergency managers yet they play a major role in the management of the incident.

- *Lessons Learned from Large-scale Incidents.* Increased Political Intervention (all levels of government and within the various command structures), Complexity of Multi-Hazard Incidents, Public Expectations, Expanded Stakeholder Demands, Competing Interests of National Departments and Agencies, Integration of Federal Law Enforcement/Investigations and Intelligence into the Command Structure, More Demanding Reporting Requirements/Information Management (e.g., during Deepwater Horizon they had to create a group (apart from Situation Unit) whose function was solely reporting, due to the constant need for information), 24/7 Media Expectations (including enormous social media demands), Influx of New Regulations and Enforcement Impacts (i.e., new regulations from HHS, EPA, DOI, etc.), Short and Long-Term Economic Impacts (local to global), Natural Resource Damage Assessment Requirements (i.e., Environmental Organizations concerned about natural resources that may have been damaged by the disaster), Environmental Health Considerations (short and long-term), especially for a CBR incident, Demand for Alternative Technology (e.g., during Deepwater Horizon there was so much that was pushed at the cleanup that they needed a separate function to manage it), Advanced IT Capabilities and Networks, Robust Documentation (litigation a major issue), in Louisiana they had to rent a warehouse for document storage (the need for business and government continuity was stressed as immediate claims processing will be required, Animal and Agriculture Issues cannot be neglected).
- *Coordination Challenges.* Prioritization of Incidents vs. Prioritization of Resources – politically it's nearly impossible to prioritize an incident but you can prioritize resources. At incident and coordination level, challenges exist when multi-jurisdictional priorities are in play, a grey area and commanders must get together and make collaborative decisions in a timely manner. It is imperative to get the right people in the room to make these decisions in a timely manner. Risk Management must be used to provide commanders with courses of action based on cost/benefit analysis. Using mapping resources (e.g., GIS) can help inform this process.
- *Decision criteria for establishing most appropriate response or recovery organization:* Incident Complexity, Incident Type and Potential (level of contamination, areas impacted, etc.), Length of Resource/Facility Commitments, Political/Jurisdictional Issues - AC vs. MACG (see pre-decisional draft, [Annex F – MACG vs. Area Command Functions](#)), Populations and Resources at Risk (natural, historic, cultural), Access to Mutual Aid (use of EMAC)), IMT access and availability (i.e., different thresholds for how long staff can be on call). MACG functions may also include: Intelligence/Information, Incident Prioritization, Resource Sourcing, Mobilization, and Allocation, Top Level Political Coordination, Decision Support Information, Interagency Coordination, Coordination of Summary Information, Public Information, Subject Matter Experts/Technical Specialists, Aviation Coordination, Finance and Accounting Services.

Figures 1.0 and Figure 2.0 were reviewed with participants (see also: Overview of Stafford Act Support to States located within the National Response Framework (NRF)):

INCIDENT COMPLEXITY					
INCIDENT COMMAND SYSTEM			MULTIAGENCY COORDINATION SYSTEMS (MACS)		
A standardized on-scene emergency management construct specifically designed to provide for the adoption of an integrated organizational structure that reflects the complexity and demands of single or multiple incidents, without being hindered by jurisdictional boundaries. Used to organize field-level incident management operations.			An activity or a formal system used to coordinate resources and support between agencies or jurisdictions. A MAC Entity functions within MACS. <u>MACS interact with agencies or jurisdictions, not with incidents.</u> MACS are useful for regional situations. A MACS can be established at a jurisdictional EOC or at a separate facility.		
SINGLE COMMAND	UNIFIED COMMAND	AREA COMMAND	MAC ENTITY	MAC CENTER	EOC
An application of ICS used when there is only one agency with incident jurisdiction or responsibility. One Incident Commander is designated to command the incident.	An application of ICS used when there is more than one agency with incident jurisdiction. Agencies work together through their designated agency representatives at a single ICP to establish a common set of objectives and strategies, and a single Incident Action Plan (IAP).	Established as necessary to provide command authority for two or more incidents in close proximity or one incident spread over a larger geographic area. Area Command works directly with Incident Commanders. Area Command becomes Unified Area Command when incidents are multijurisdictional. Area Command may be established at an EOC facility or at some location other than an ICP.	Consists of agency representatives with policy decision making authority who facilitate strategic coordination by: • Providing policy direction • Resolving issues • Ensuring resource sourcing and allocation	Consists of agency representatives who provide operational support and coordination by: • Facilitating logistics support and resource tracking • Gathering and providing information • Implementing multiagency coordination entity decisions	EOCs are used in varying ways at all levels of government and within private industry to provide coordination, direction, during emergencies. EOC facilities can be used to house MACS activities as determined by agency or jurisdiction policy.
ON-SCENE		CLOSE-TO-SCENE	OFF-SCENE		
COMMAND & CONTROL			COORDINATION & SUPPORT		

Figure 1.0 – NIMS ICS & MACS (source: EMSI)




Figure 2.0 –MACS Coordination (source: NRF)

AM Working Group Sessions

Lori Hodges (CDEM) – Reviewed Draft Colorado MACS Concept and requested group provide feedback as they discuss issues and the need for MACS. See [Annex G – Colorado MACS Process \(Local & State\)](#).

Mr Mills then presented the following assumptions as part of the scenario prior to working group sessions:

- Two Explosions occurred (Denver and Aurora) – assume two incidents with one area command
- EOC's are activated immediately (would limit number of facilities for sustainment reasons and keep the separation of ICP's, JIC etc.)
- Agencies are alerted at the federal level and would start pushing resources to the incident. FEMA will coordinate at a federal level (hopefully not interfering with local coordination). FEMA will support the state's priorities. Goal is to have various agencies stay in own lane with clean lines of communication and collaboration.

Based on the scenario and ICS and MACS information presented, breakout groups responses to the following questions are listed below:

1. What are the major functions/activities to which the ICS and MACS will have to respond?
 - Some believed MACS might not be needed at this stage (**need defined trigger points**). The Colorado Emergency Operations Center and [Multi-Agency Coordination Center \(MACC\)](#) would be activated as well as a JFO. Public Safety, Public Messaging, Public Health would become major functions/activities for initial response and would continue during recovery phase.
 - Most agreed that Public Messaging, Public Health & Medical Services, Public Safety, Post Disaster Housing, Restoration of CIKR and Essential Services, and Prioritization of Cleanup would be priorities well into the recovery phase (not certain how ICS or MACS would be used).
 - ICS is viewed as an operational organization that would operate weeks and possibly months into incident and would remain focused on Public Information, Debris Management, Resource Management/Prioritization, Decontamination, EMS, Search & Rescue, LE-Investigation/Evidence Collection, Enforcing Safety & Security Zones, and Ensuring Safety of Responders and Public.
2. What Incident facilities/organizations will most likely be activated (within 30 days) and how many?
 - Denver EOC, Aurora EOC, State EOC would all be activated as well as Arapahoe, and all cities and counties under the plume. The region's first responders, CDPHE DOC, Tri-County DOC, National Guard/CST. Area Command (Denver) & ICP (Aurora) [**key discussion point: some in group expressed concern that "Home Rule" would prevent the use of an Area Command in Colorado – State may push for the use of two ICPs with two policy groups that would come together when resources are scarce. Any kind of MACG would be non-tactical (not giving up jurisdictional control) within the two areas (intent is to prioritize resources), State would allocate scarce resources as opposed to Area Command – it was highly recommended that MACG be predefined and that training occur within the State.**]
 - Policy Groups would include local & state EOCs, FBI-JOC, Red Cross DOCs (Disaster Operation Centers), Regional Response Coordination Center (RRCC - based on ESFs), Federal Coordination (DHS/FEMA/Supporting Agencies in JFO), and Media/PIO's located in the JIC.
 - MACG would serve as a policy level group to manage (**or provide input?**) hard decisions for critical resources and would consist of Federal and State representatives, Adams, Denver,

Jefferson, and Arapahoe Counties, and the cities under the plume and determined to be impacted. **The State would recommend establishment of a MACG.**

3. What criteria should be considered when activating using the MACS?
 - The State would coordinate activation of the MACS; any MACG should be composed of staff that has the authority to move resources. **The facilitator recommended that MACG may co-locate with EOC, but should not integrate.**
 - The State explained that they are trying to get in place a MACG that meets regularly and establishes itself ahead of time at a local/county level. The local policy group can be a MACG but cannot allocate resources. If the entities you stand up are really doing their job, the needs may be different.
 - Jurisdictional capabilities will be overwhelmed. Local emergency operations plans (EOPs) provide guidance based on “level of activation” (level of resource drawdown based on scale, type, and numbers of incidents).
4. What MACS related facilities will have to be activated and how does coordination occur?
 - The State EOC already has elements within its Multi-Agency Coordination Center (MACC). State, Private Sector, Federal Representatives (e.g., DCE, EPA, DHS, PH/HHS) (DCE @ state - DCO @ JFO) should be integrated, higher level staff but not elected officials. Other facilities: same building should not include a policy group with elected officials. Local EOCs should also co-locate a MACG - similar composition as State but with elected official’s representatives, agency representatives.
 - **Larger MACS structure needs to be clear for effective coordination. Recommend evaluating how the EOCs, JIC, MACC, JFO, ROCC, NOC are connected and coordinated at all levels.**
5. What criteria should be considered when activating MACS?
 - The State would make the recommendation. Triggers should be used to activate at each level (initiated at lowest level (local), UC or Area Command would also be involved in decision.
 - Jurisdictions affected, who has authority (state/local), as well as who has resources.
6. Who selects the location for the Area Command and MACG?
 - It is a joint decision that should involve incident/area commanders and lead agency representatives.
 - Jurisdictions affected, who has authority and resources based on type of incident.
 - Area Command – should be a joint decision between the IC’s that are part of the incident.
 - **MACG – should be a joint decision by impacted jurisdictions but should be pre-planned locations**
7. Who decides the division of responsibilities between the activated facilities (these additional questions were presented for the group to consider as they write the MACS plan)?
 - Are teams trained and qualified to carry out their assignments?
 - If a MACG is activated, to whom will the leader report?
 - What level of authority will the leader have? (policy level decisions will need to be made)
 - What would a MAC organization look like?
 - How would a MACG interact with all of the mutual aid systems?
 - Critical function of MACS is assisting with resources and money – does the plan cover this?

PM Working Group Discussion

The afternoon group discussion mainly focused on perceived gaps with the MACS as well as solutions to address gaps.

- The gaps are that **no one has applied them to anything, or educated anyone**
- No buy in from the decision makers, right people aren't at the table. **There isn't a coordination system between states.**
- **Everyone continues to work in silos**
- There is a **lack of manpower, and money**
- A big problem is **lack of continuity among elected officials** (change out every four years)
- It **takes a disaster or an incident to apply these theories** and it can't happen in a virtual setting
- Emergency Managers may agree on a framework, however **MACS is expected to hit a roadblock when presented to policy makers**
- Bottom line is there is a **need for training & education**
- There **will always be a battle for resources** that will not change
- **Each jurisdiction has to figure out how it is going to structure itself** and in turn how it fits into the region and State's plan
- The only thing that comes close to what we are doing here is a NSSE national security set up by the Secret Service, but it is a pre-planned event and resources aren't scarce.
- MAC process is already in use but we call it a different name but it is in use every day...the problem is that **common terminology is not understood or agreed to – MACS may be overkill**. Most agreed there is a need to identify the processes already used and need to define criteria for deploying resources.
- The State of Colorado needs to decide if this is something they even need
- If used, local jurisdictions that expects to participate in the larger MACS needs to have their own MACG & need to designate who would represent them within the State's MACG
- **Triggers for MACS activation are needed and should consider policy and financial issues** that affect prioritization of resources
- **State Plan should include an IGA** to solidify the process with continued review and adoption among counties and jurisdictions based on premise that if you cannot handle an incident then MACS will be used to help
- **Clear understanding of the definition of MAC vs. Area Command is needed** in context of State's Home Rule policy
 - MACS is the system
 - MACG is the group (also referred to as "entity") of people that work together
 - MACC is the center (i.e., physical location where the group works together)
 - Then there are levels... a local level and a state level
- **Pre designated locations must be identified within any MACS plan**

Table 1 - Summary of PM Working Group Action Items:

Category	Discussion Items	Recommendations
Jurisdiction	Uncertainty regarding use of IC/UC, Area Command and MACS. [Key discussion point: some in group expressed concern that “Home Rule” would prevent the use of an Area Command in Colorado – State may push for the use of two ICPs with two policy groups that would come together when resources are scarce. Any kind of MACG would be non-tactical (not giving up jurisdictional control) within the two areas (intent is to prioritize resources), State would allocate scarce resources as opposed to Area Command – it was highly recommended that MACG be predefined and that training occur within the State.]	State should determine applicability of IC/UC, Area Command, and MACS and work toward consensus among counties and jurisdictions
	Colorado has very few multi-jurisdictional disasters and therefore there is not a clear understanding of the MACS process	State should provide training/education on how it is applied in other states with Home Rule
	The state does not want to have to manage requests from hundreds of jurisdictions/agencies during a disaster	Local MACGs should be established at the County level which include all agencies, jurisdictions, special districts within the county
Prioritization	Need to establish criteria for how resources are prioritized	Should pre-identify criteria on how resources are prioritized (criteria is defined in the Area Command process – maybe we could use this same process)
Roles & Responsibilities	There is no clear understanding of who would staff the MACS/MACGs and what their roles & responsibilities and authorities for decision-making	Pre-identify the personnel that will make up the MACS/MACGs - define roles & responsibilities and authorities (each jurisdiction should define what their local structure would look like. Also should pre-determine what authority each person has – (i.e., do you need to coordinate with chain-of-command whenever a decision needs to be made or will they have certain given authority up front.
Structure/Organization	Pre-determine location of MACS facilities/groups. (MACG - should be a joint decision by impacted jurisdictions but should be pre-planned locations)	Determine if MACGs and EOCs should be co-located. (The State does co-locate their MACC but facilitator did not recommend this).
	Larger MACS structure needs to be clear for effective coordination	Evaluate how the EOCs, JIC, MACC, JFO, ROCC, NOC, etc. are connected and coordinated at all levels

Category	Discussion Items	Recommendations
Communication	There was no group consensus for the need for MACS for the region and State of Colorado	Confirm the need for MACS for the region and State of Colorado
	The MAC terminology continues to confuse people	Consider avoiding calling it a MACS/MACG, possibly call it a process or something similar or don't give it a name
	Consider providing a short summary within Denver UASI RRF that references State's MACS effort.	<i>Denver UASI and State of Colorado All-Hazards Regional Recovery Framework</i> Writing Team (facilitated by PNNL) should consider including a short summary within framework that references State's MACS effort.
	How counties can have “one voice” when having discussions with the State	The counties and jurisdictions should create an entity (some sort of emergency committee) that includes representatives from all agencies and special districts, etc. from within the county and they make decisions locally and present as one voice to the state. This avoids having the state hear from a multiple entities/agencies. (Unsure if this was stated but this is essentially a local MAC).

6.0 Conclusion

The concepts of multi-agency/multi-jurisdictional coordination are not well understood among locals or State, in Colorado or anywhere else in the Nation. Most agreed that half the battle is terminology but there are other issues such as defining differences in functions of NIMS structures (e.g., Area Command vs. IC/UC, MACS/MACG, and managing resources vs. making policy decisions). This confusion is reflected by a perceived lack of national doctrine and training program/materials and the identification of any best practices of the use of multi-agency/multi-jurisdictional coordination operations in any area other than wildfires. *While “MACS” may be widely discussed, it is not understood and has not been widely implemented.*

There is an effort underway by the State to develop a structure that results in statewide agreement regarding coordination. This may not be referred to as MACS so that the concept is adopted without a great deal of disagreement regarding terminology. The goal is to have a statewide multi-jurisdictional coordination framework in place in the next 6 months. Colorado DEM is coordinating this effort currently. A draft concept paper on multi-agency/multi-jurisdictional coordination was used as the reference document during this meeting and discussed and generally well received by participants -- goal will be to refine and submit to all counties in the state through the regions for their review and concurrence with the completion target of September 2012.

WARRP will continue to support the State's efforts. If and when the concept is adopted and approved, it is recommended that coordination occur with FEMA for review and consideration nationwide. The State's coordination framework will reference other state multi-agency, multi-jurisdictional coordination plans. While this meeting highlighted a significant gap in the knowledge and use of multi-agency/multi-jurisdictional coordination at all levels of government it served to further the development of an approach for multi-jurisdictional coordination for the State of Colorado.

Annex A - Agenda

February 23, 2012

0730 - 0830	Registration
0830 – 0900	Welcome: Introductions, Review of Meeting Objectives, Agenda, Scenario Mr. Garry Brieze, Wide Area Recovery & Resiliency Program
0900 - 1000	Guest Speaker Mr. Chuck Mills President, Emergency Management Services International
1000 – 1015	Break
1015 – 1130	AM Working Group Sessions Facilitator: Chuck Mills
1130 – 1200	Brief Back Group Spokespersons
1200 – 1240	Lunch
1240 – 1300	Recap Morning Discussions & Discuss Afternoon Sessions Garry Brieze
1315 – 1345	PM Working Group Discussion Facilitator: Chuck Mills
1400 – 1415	Break
1415 – 1530	Brief Back Facilitator: Chuck Mills
1530 – 1600	Review Lessons Learned and Next Steps

Annex B –Participants


Last Name	First Name	Organization
Bakersky	Pete	FEMA Region VIII
Bonesteel	Lin	Denver UASI
Briese	Garry	WARRP (onsite integrator)
Cantrell	Nicole	University of Colorado Hospital
Cochran	Joel	Summit County Sheriff's Office
Conroy	Patrick	University of Colorado Hospital
Daley	Dave	NCR/South Metro Fire Department
Deal	Tim	FEMA Region VIII
DiPaolo	Elizabeth	WARRP
Foote	Deborah	COVOAD
Hancock	John	Xcel Energy
Hard	Dave	Colorado Division Emergency Management
Hodges	Lori	Colorado Division Emergency Management
Holloman	Bruce	Colorado Division Emergency Management
Holmes	Lanney	FEMA Region VIII
Johnson	Melinda	Metropolitan Medical Response System (MMRS)
Kaski	Charles	Denver Office of Emergency Management
Kellar	Scott	Arapahoe County/NCR Coordinator
Krebs	Kathleen	Clear Creek County
Krugman	Jim	USDA Forest Service

Last Name	First Name	Organization
Lancy	Jim	Arvada
Lynch	Rose	City of Englewood and PNNL Contractor
McDermott	Heather	Adams County Office of Emergency Management
Meiderhoff	Bill	Colorado Department of Public Safety
Midgley	Mike	Cubic Applications, Inc.
Miller	Rachelle	Arapahoe County/North Central Region
Mills	Chuck	Emergency Management Services International
Morreale	Steve	United States Department of Energy
Mower	John	Cubic Applications, Inc.
Mueller	Matt	Denver Office of Emergency Management
Ridley	Teri	WARRP
Rubenstein	Mike	Jefferson County Incident Management Team (IMT)
Russell	Chris	Department of Homeland Security
Small	Carol	Jefferson County Emergency Management
Stewart	David	Denver Parks & Recreation
Sullivan	George	American Red Cross
Thomas	Jane	Clear Creek County Office of Emergency Management
Ulrick	Brannen	FEMA Region VIII
Walker	Ann	Western Governors Association
Walker	Ray	Managing Director at Walker Engineering Solutions
Wallis	Bill	Jefferson County Incident Management Team (IMT)
Williams	Patricia	Denver Office of Emergency Management
Santagata	Fran	Douglas County Office of Emergency Management


Last Name	First Name	Organization
Drennan	Charlie	Denver Fire Dept
Stelter	Cassandra	Arapahoe County
Hackett	Stephanie	Aurora Office of Emergency Management
Pfenning	Deon	Colorado University Boulder Office of Emergency Management

Annex C – Participant Feedback


Working Group Was Valuable Use of Time




Working Group Expanded Professional Network




Facilities Contributed to Success




Working Group Increased Awareness of CBR Incident




Professional Staff




Recommend WARRP Working Groups to Colleagues




Learned Something New From Working Group



Working Group Identified & Addressed Relevant Issues



Working Group Met Expectations



Annex D – Key Points of Contact

Planning Team

- Adams County: Heather McDermott
- Aurora Office of Emergency Management: Matt Chapman
- Boulder County: Mike Chard
- Brighton County: Becky Martinez
- Buckley Air Force Base: Armando Argiz
- Buckley Air Force Base: Matt Mueller
- Colorado Department of Emergency Management: Dave Hard
- Colorado Department of Emergency Management: Lori Hodges
- Colorado Department of Emergency Management: Marilyn Gally
- Colorado Department of Emergency Management: Bruce Holloman
- Denver American Red Cross: Nathan Roberts
- Denver Health & Hospital Authority: James Robinson
- Denver Office of Emergency Management: Matt Mueller
- Denver Office of Emergency Management: Scott Field
- Denver Office of Emergency Management: Pat Williams
- Douglas County: Fran Santagata
- Douglas County: Steve Boand
- FEMA Region VIII: Tim Deal
- FEMA Region VIII: Judy McWilliams
- Jefferson County OEM/IMT: Tim McSherry
- US Forest Service: Jim Krugman (Table Coach)
- US Forest Service (retired): Bill Wallace (Table Coach)
- WARRP Local Integrators (Cubic): Gary Brieze, Elizabeth DiPaolo (Coordinator)
- WARRP Integrators (Cubic): Mike Midgley, John Mower, Stacey Tyler

Key Points of Contact: The following personnel are key points of contact for this report:

Cubic Applications, Inc.

Garry Brieze, WARRP Local Integrator

Phone: (571) 221-3319 (mobile)

E-mail: gbrieze@briezeandassociates.com

John Mower, WARRP Integrator

Phone: (858) 810 -5778 (office)

E-mail: john.mower@cubic.com

Dave Hard, Director of Colorado Division of Emergency Management

Email: Dave.Hard@state.co.us

Annex E - Scenario

General

A radiological scenario was presented to provide meeting participants with relevant background and event information to stimulate discussions on various aspects of recovery planning. The scenario was based on National Planning Scenario (NPS) #11: Radiological Attack – Radiological Dispersal Devices, and involved back to back explosions in the greater Denver metropolitan area. The first explosion is the result of terrorists who detonate a large truck bomb (~3/4 the detonation size of the OK city bomb) containing a significant source of 137-Cesium (137Cs) outside the U.S. Mint in the downtown business district of Denver. The second identical explosion occurs at the Anschutz Medical Campus, in Aurora. This bomb collapsed a significant section of a campus building resulting in hundreds of injuries.



Economic Impact & Multi-Agency Coordination



Over 3000 commercial and industrial buildings were in the area of potential clean up and nearly 500 businesses would be expected to be closed as a result. Many of them are critical to the Denver and Aurora area. Furthermore, postal and shipping services e.g., rail transport and trucking, came to halt due to concerns regarding spread of contaminated goods and products. This led to a significant decline in the regional distribution of energy resources, manufacturing materials, and agricultural products. For these reasons, the cities and State's tax revenue would have been severely impacted. The need for multi-agency coordination in order to accelerate restoration of the region's economy was established as a high priority.

Annex F – MACG vs. Area Command Functions

MAC GROUP	AREA COMMAND
Off-scene coordination and support organization with no direct incident authority or responsibility.	Management function of ICS with oversight responsibility and authority of IMTs assigned at multiple incidents. Area Command may be established as Unified Area Command.
Expansion of the off-site coordination and support systems.	Expansion of the on-site Incident Command functions of the ICS.
Members are trained Agency Administrators/ Executives who can act regarding allocation of resources on behalf of their agency or designees from the agencies involved or heavily committed to the incidents.	Members are the most highly skilled incident management personnel.
Organization generally consists of multiagency coordination personnel (Agency Administrators/Executives), MAC Group Coordinator, and an intelligence and information support staff.	Organization generally consists of an Area Commander, an Area Command Planning Chief, an Area Command Intelligence Chief, an Area Command Logistics Chief, and an Area Command Aviation Coordinator.
Is the Agency Administrator/Executive (line officer) or designee.	Is delegated authority for specific incident(s) from the Agency Administrator(s)/Executive(s).
Prioritizes incidents based on complexity, impact, and severity. Allocates unassigned or transitioning resources based on incident need and priority to support incidents and continuity of management.	Assigns and reassigns and/or demobilizes critical assigned resources allocated by MAC or the normal dispatch system organization. Provides management and command direction to Incident Commanders.
Coordinates Agency Administrator/Executive-level decisions on issues that affect multiple agencies.	Ensures incident objectives and strategies are complementary between Incident Management Teams under their supervision.

Pre-decisional draft

Annex G – Colorado MACS Process (Local & State)



Annex H – Acronyms

After Action Report (AAR)
Area Command (AC)
Chemical, Biological, Radiological (CBR)
Colorado Division of Emergency Management (CDEM)
Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources (CIKR)
Disaster Emergency Communications (DEC)
Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
Data Operations Center (DOC)
Department of Interior (DOI)
Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC)
Emergency Management (EM)
Emergency Operations Center (EOC)
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
Emergency Support Functions (ESF)
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
Frequently Asked Question (FAQ)
Geographical Information Systems (GIS)
Health and Human Services (HHS)
Incident Command Post (ICP)
Incident Command System (ICS)
Incident Management Team (IMT)
Information Technology (IT)
Joint Field Office (JFO)
Joint Information Center (JIC)
Joint Information System (JIS)
Multi-Agency Coordination (MAC)
Multi-Agency Coordination Center (MACC)
Multi-Agency Coordination Group (MACG)
Multi-Agency Coordination System (MACS)
National Incident Management System (NIMS)
National Planning Scenario (NPS)
National Special Security Event (NSSE)
National Operations Center (NOC)
National Response Framework (NRF)
North Central Region (NCR)
Office of Emergency Management (OEM)
Public Health (PH)
Public Information Officer (PIO)
Program Manager (PM)
Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL)
Point of Contact (POC)

Regional Operations Control Center (ROCC)
Regional Response Coordination Center (RRCC)
Situation Unit (SITU)
Subject Matter Expert (SME)
Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI)
Unified Command (UC)
Wide Area Recovery & Resiliency Program (WARRP)