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UNITED STATES-VIETNAM RELATIONS
1945–1967

STUDY PREPARED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

BOOK 7 OF 12

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Committee on Armed Services

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UNITED STATES-VIETNAM RELATIONS
1945–1967

STUDY PREPARED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE



Printed for the use of the House Committee on Armed Services

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INTRODUCTION

The following is the unclassified text of the 1968 Department of Defense study, "United States Vietnam Relations, 1945–1967," popularly known as the Pentagon Papers.

At the time the existence of this study became known, through unauthorized public disclosures, the Committee on Armed Services requested a copy of the study, which was provided to the Committee and which has been continually available for inspection by Members of Congress. At the same time, as Chairman of the Armed Services Committee and with the concurrence of the senior minority member, Rep. Leslie C. Arends, I asked the Department of Defense to declassify the study on an expedited basis so that it could be made available to Members of Congress and to the American people.

I am now directing that it be printed as a Committee document and that a copy be provided to each Member of the House of Representatives. Copies will also be on sale to the public at the Government Printing Office. The 12-volume text here contains the first 43 volumes of the original 47-volume study. The last four volumes have not as yet been declassified because they deal with negotiations which are still in progress.

F. EDW. HÉBERT, *Chairman,*
Committee on Armed Services.

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Washington, D.C., September 20, 1971.

Honorable F. EDWARD HÉBERT,
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: In accordance with the discussions which took place at the time of the delivery to the Congress of the classified version of the 47-volume 1968 study of "U.S. Vietnam Relations, 1945–1967," we are transmitting herewith for your use four sets of the declassified study. You will note that the declassified review contains 43 volumes. The last four volumes of the 47-volume set have not been declassified because they deal exclusively with sensitive negotiations seeking peace and the release of prisoners of war. Their disclosure would adversely affect continuing efforts to achieve those objectives.

As I am sure you can appreciate, the review of approximately 7,000 pages has been a difficult task, complicated by the pattern of prior unauthorized disclosures and pending and potential actions in the courts. Of course, some of the material has been declassified solely on the basis of prior disclosures. The review has been accomplished on an expedited basis in order to comply with your request for the material on a declassified basis for hearings which the Congress has indicated are in prospect. Because of the time constraint imposed on the review, it is possible, even probable, that errors of omission and commission have been made during the review. This, however, represents the best possible effort taking into consideration the time available and the numerous complicating factors which influenced the review. Other than the last four volumes, we have been able to make available to you in unclassified form the bulk of the study.

Sincerely,

RADY A. JOHNSON,
Assistant to the Secretary for Legislative Affairs.

FINAL REPORT—OSD Task Force, Vietnam

and

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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

THROUGH: Mr. Paul C. Warnke, ASD/ISA
Dr. Morton H. Halperin, DASD/Policy Planning and Arms Control/ISA

SUBJECT: Final Report, OSD Vietnam Task Force

15 January 1969.

On June 17, 1967, Secretary Robert S. McNamara directed that a Task Force be formed to study the history of United States involvement in Vietnam from World War II to the present. Mr. McNamara's guidance was simply to do studies that were "encyclopedic and objective." With six full-time professionals assigned to the Task Force, we were to complete our work in three months. A year and a half later, and with the involvement of six times six professionals, we are finally done to the tune of thirty-seven studies and fifteen collections of documents contained in forty-three volumes.

In the beginning, Mr. McNamara gave the Task Force full access to OSD files, and the Task Force received access to CIA materials, and some use of State Department cables and memoranda. We had no access to White House files. Our guidance prohibited personal interviews with any of the principal participants.

The result was not so much a documentary history, as a history based solely on documents—checked and rechecked with ant-like diligence. Pieces of paper, formidable and suggestive by themselves, could have meant much or nothing. Perhaps this document was never sent anywhere, and perhaps that one, though commented upon, was irrelevant. Without the memories of people to tell us, we were certain to make mistakes. Yet, using those memories might have been misleading as well. This approach to research was bound to lead to distortions, and distortions we are sure abound in these studies.

To bring the documents to life, to fill in gaps, and just to see what the "outside world" was thinking, we turned to newspapers, periodicals, and books. We never used these sources to supplant the classified documents, but only to supplement them. And because these documents, sometimes written by very clever men who knew so much and desired to say only a part and sometimes written very openly but also contradictorily, are not immediately self-revealing or self-explanatory, we tried both to have a number of researchers look at them and to quote passages liberally. Moreover, when we felt we could be challenged with taking something out of context, we included the whole paper in the Documentary Record section of the Task Force studies (Parts V and VI. A and B). Again seeking to fend off inevitable mistakes in interpretation and context, what seemed to us key documents were reviewed and included in several overlapping in substance, but separate, studies.

The people who worked on the Task Force were superb—uniformly bright and interested, although not always versed in the art of research. We had a sense of doing something important and of the need to do it right. Of course, we all had our prejudices and axes to grind and these shine through clearly at times, but we tried, we think, to suppress or compensate for them.

These outstanding people came from everywhere—the military services, State, OSD, and the "think tanks." Some came for a month, for three months, for six months, and most were unable, given the unhappiness of their superiors, to finish the studies they began. Almost all the studies had several authors, each heir dutifully trying to pick up the threads of his predecessor. In all, we had thirty-six professionals working on these studies, with an average of four months per man.

The quality, style and interest of the studies varies considerably. The papers in Parts I, II, III, and IV.A, concerning the years 1945 to 1961 tend to be generally non-startling—although there are many interesting tidbits. Because many of the documents in this period were lost or not kept (except for the Geneva Conference era) we had to rely more on outside resources. From 1961 onwards (Parts IV.B and C and VI.C), the records were bountiful, especially on the first Kennedy year in office, the Diem coup, and on the subjects of the deployment of ground forces, the decisions surrounding the bombing campaign against North Vietnam, US–GVN relations, and attempts at negotiating a settlement of the conflict.

Almost all the studies contain both a Summary and Analysis and a Chronology. The chronologies highlight each important event or action in the monograph by means of date, description, and documentary source. The Summary and Analysis sections, which I wrote, attempt to capture the main themes and facts of the monographs—and to make some judgments and speculations which may or may not appear in the text itself. The monographs themselves stick, by and large, to the documents and do not tend to be analytical.

Writing history, especially where it blends into current events, especially where that current event is Vietnam, is a treacherous exercise. We could not go into the minds of the decision-makers, we were not present at the decisions, and we often could not tell whether something happened because someone decided it, decided against it, or most likely because it unfolded from the situation. History, to me, has been expressed by a passage from Herman Melville's *Moby Dick* where he writes: "This is a world of chance, free will, and necessity—all interweavingly working together as one; chance by turn rules either and has the last featuring blow at events." Our studies have tried to reflect this thought; inevitably in the organizing and writing process, they appear to assign more and less to men and free will than was the case.

LESLIE H. GELB,
Chairman, OSD Task Force.

OSD VIETNAM TASK FORCE
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LESLIE H. GELB,
Chairman, OSD Task Force.

UNITED STATES - VIETNAM RELATIONS

1945 - 1967

IV. C. 9. (a)

EVOLUTION OF THE WAR

US/GVN Relations: 1963-1967

PART I

67-244 O—71—vol. 7——2

US-GVN RELATIONS: 1964 - JUNE 1965

SUMMARY and ANALYSIS

In 1964 the U.S. tried to make GVN strong, effective, and stable, and it failed. When the U.S. offered more aid, GVN accepted it without improving; they promised to mobilize, but failed to speed up the slow buildup of their forces. When the U.S. offered a firmer commitment to encourage them, including possible later bombing of North Vietnam, the GVN tried to pressure us to do it sooner. When the U.S. endorsed Khanh, he overplayed his hand, provoked mob violence, and had to back down to a weaker position than before. When Taylor lectured them and threatened them, the ruling generals of GVN defied him, and allied themselves with the street rioters. After several changes of government in Vietnam, the U.S. could set no higher goal than GVN stability. During this period, the USG was already starting to think about doing the job ourselves if our Vietnamese ally did not perform.

At first the U.S. thought that the power of the Vietnamese generals would make GVN strong and effective. In fact, the U.S. preference, at this time, was for military leadership in the GVN. However, the generals proved to be less than perfectly united. They found they had to bow to the power of student and Buddhist street mobs, and they lacked the will and the ability to compel the civil government to perform. Yet, the U.S. saw no alternative but to back them -- to put up with Vietnamese hypersensitivity, their easy compliance combined with non-performance, and their occasional defiance. Moreover, MACV was even less ready to pressure the generals than was the Embassy and the Embassy less willing than Washington. MACV controlled the resources that mattered most to the South Vietnamese.

Pacification lagged, and the military picture steadily worsened. Planning of pressures against the North became more urgent, and the prospect of increasing U.S. inputs to all phases of the war loomed larger. The U.S. was more and more abandoning the hope that the Vietnamese could win the war by themselves. At the same time, the U.S. was preparing itself internally (NSAM 288 with the objective of an "independent non-communist Vietnam") and readying the American people (the Tonkin Gulf Resolution) for deeper commitments.

The period saw six major changes of government. At the end of January, 1964, Khanh seized power from the Minh government. In August, after his attempt to formalize military control, mob violence forced him to give way and to join a Triumvirate. It presided over formation of the civilian High National Council, which wrote a Constitution and elected the civilian President Suu and Prime Minister Huong to replace the Triumvirate. In December the military dissolved the High National Council, and in January 1965 they dismissed Huong, replacing him by Khanh as caretaker. In February,

they appointed a new civilian government, with Suu still President and with Quat as Prime Minister. In June, Ky took over. Besides all this, coup groups seized Saigon twice before being faced down each time.

During the first few months of this period the U.S. abandoned the plan for the phased withdrawal of most of our military assistance personnel, and stopped believing that the main-force war would come to a successful end by the close of 1965. With the start of planning pressures against the North, the U.S. first hoped that repeated preliminary signals to Hanoi would bring a response before bombing began; and we hoped that the promise of U.S. force commitments would strengthen Vietnamese unity and resolve. Both hopes proved vain, and we started bombing North Vietnam systematically without getting anything from either Hanoi or GVN. Then the bombing itself failed to stop Hanoi's intervention. Seeing no other choice, the U.S. poured troops into the country.

Throughout 1964, the U.S. pursued the objective of a strong, effective GVN like the Holy Grail. Increasingly, we felt we had to reassure our Saigon ally about the U.S. resolve, and hoped that a firm U.S. commitment through extending advisors and through bombing would improve GVN performance. Recurrently, we looked to the military as the one coherent, anti-communist force in the country. We leaned on them and on their strong-man, who for most of the period was Khanh, at first hoping that he or Minh would play the role that Magsaysay did in the Philippines. We were interested in legitimacy and democratic forms only as a long-run deferrable proposition; although more and more we recognized the need for broad political support -- especially after the Buddhist crisis in August, 1964, had proved its importance.

As early as the Honolulu Conference in June, 1964, we worried about the possible emergence of a hostile government or anarchy; and the South Vietnamese played effectively on our fears. We lectured them repeatedly on the importance of national unity, both in periods of political calm and in crises. When the mobs in the streets faced down the generals, we then clung to the position that no one should rock the boat.

Yet, well beyond our control, General Khanh was a central figure in most of these changes. He took over in a coup in January, 1964, and played one role after another, for over twelve turbulent months. Then when a coup attempt failed against a newly installed government in February, 1965, the generals turned on Khanh and exiled him. Only the final coup, in which Ky took over, saw Khanh absent from the scene.

Withall, the military improved their hold on GVN machinery. The high turnover of district and province officials around the time of the Khanh coup put ARVN officers everywhere; and the corps commanders gradually consolidated their power throughout 1964. This tendency reached a climax and received a temporary setback in the rebellion that followed the August constitution. As a result of the successful Buddhist opposition, cabinet changes and the charter of the government in Saigon required Buddhist acquiescence.

These problems were aggravated by the clear and growing lack of legitimacy of GVN. The generals led by Minh, who overthrew Diem, gained an aura of respectability by this act because Diem had so completely alienated the people. Whatever their "respectability" may have been worth went down the drain, however, when Khanh seized power and then later maneuvered Minh out of the country. Khanh's position as a brash usurper gave him little room for maneuver among Saigon's complex political currents, although for a time the U.S. counted on his "raw power." With subsequent shifts in the form and composition of government, the expediency and lack of legitimacy of GVN grew more conspicuous and more debilitating.

Leverage

U.S. attempts to strengthen the GVN's will to govern and to pacify the countryside failed. Moreover, the attempts, conceived in haste, often backfired. In contrast to the steady discussion of alternatives among Washington agencies, the Embassy, and MACV on the subject of pressures on the North, the idea of pressures on GVN seldom surfaced. When it did surface, it was either brushed aside or rushed into. Leverage planning failed to receive even that quality and quantity of attention that pressures against North Vietnam planning did.

As a general rule, Washington was more interested in putting pressure on GVN than was the Embassy, with the notable exception of Taylor's initiatives in December, and MACV was the least interested of all. But these differences were less notable than was the almost universal consensus (most of the time) that the Vietnamese were too sensitive for such pressures to work, and that we had to accept the GVN's non-performance as the best available.

Starting with Rusk's conversation with Khanh at the end of May, 1964, and ending with Taylor's initiative in early December, the U.S. tried to use the prospect of U.S. force commitment as an inducement to the Vietnamese to do better. However, Taylor said that if this inducement were to fail, the U.S. should go ahead with its pressures against the North anyway. Taking this position meant that the attempted inducement was bluff. There is every sign, both in their non-performance and in their December-January defiance, that the GVN sized it up that way and called the bluff.

Our attempted leverage included both inducements and threats at one time and another; and neither worked out well. Rusk's May, 1964, conversation with Khanh, the intensification of pressures planning following the Honolulu Conference in June, and the shift of the Chairman, JCS to the post of Ambassador to SVN, all showed U.S. commitment. We hoped these measures and talks would directly contribute to GVN morale and effectiveness. However, they were followed by the July press leaks and by direct pressure to bomb North immediately. The July public endorsement of Khanh was intended to reassure all concerned of our support, and so to strengthen GVN. Then,

the Gulf of Tonkin incidents were followed promptly by Khanh's Constitution, which backfired against him and against us, weakening rather than strengthening GVN.

Taylor's bill of particulars against GVN in December was followed immediately by attacks on GVN by the Buddhists, and then shortly by the military, bringing down the government. Taylor's stern lecture to the Young Turks at this time met only with their defiance. They agreed to a compromise solution to the crisis when Taylor held up the GVN Defense Budget, and then reversed themselves after he released it. The first Flaming Dart raids, opening the deliberate U.S. bombing campaign against the North, were followed shortly by another coup attempt.

There was no disagreement among Washington, the Embassy, and MACV that U.S. commitments should be used to improve GVN's morale and performance. In contrast, however, they often disagreed about putting pressure on GVN. In January, 1964, State showed far more interest than did Lodge in using the AID negotiations to press GVN for more effort; in the upshot we gave them an AID increase with no strings attached. This disagreement continued for several months. McNamara leaned consistently toward giving GVN whatever it needed; only later did he begin to mention increasing our influence. But McNamara and JCS did prod Lodge into asking GVN why they were not progressing well. In May, 1964, Sullivan proposed direct entry of U.S. personnel into the Vietnamese chain of command; his idea was watered down considerably in the State Department, and disappeared at the Honolulu Conference because of opposition by Lodge and Westmoreland. Other proposals agreed to at the conference, relating to new actions and improved programs by GVN, interested State far more than they did the Embassy and MACV, as revealed in the follow-up.

By and large the same contrasts prevailed when Taylor was the Ambassador, although in December he was far more willing to press GVN than Lodge ever was. Even then, at the peak of the crisis, Taylor expressly rejected sanctions. MACV generally rejected sanctions also, and seemed less willing to apply leverage in day-to-day matters than were U.S. civilians in the field. MACV studies on GVN ineffectiveness usually proposed more studies and never proposed pressure on GVN.

If U.S. force commitments and the record of GVN non-performance reflect the failure of leverage, what does the record tell us about how leverage could be made to work? Regrettably, the record tells us nothing about that; it merely shows that everything we tried went wrong. As noted, attempts at leverage or pressure on GVN were seldom thought through and studied carefully. One searches in vain for studies, memoranda, or widespread discussion of alternative techniques for leverage and of what our experience shows about how they might work. Pressures against the North, whose results have disappointed us, were a model of planning, foresight, and detailed consideration, compared to the subject of pressures on GVN. Yet GVN's failure was the heart of our policy problem throughout the period, as many feel it still is.

The Embassy's Lack of Political Contact

The shifts of political loyalties, coups, rebellions, and major changes of public figures often caught the Embassy by surprise. It had no effective system, either through overt or covert contacts, for finding out what was going on. CAS people talked to a few official contacts, who told them things the Vietnamese wanted the U.S. to believe; but CAS had and has no mandate or mission to perform systematic intelligence and espionage in friendly countries, and so lacks the resources to gather and evaluate the large amounts of information required on political forces, corruption, connections, and so on. Moreover, there is no sign that the Embassy understood events after the fact, or saw the connection between what we did and what the Vietnamese did next. It appears that the U.S. had few people experienced at maneuvering and manipulating among oriental politicians.

In the following cases the Embassy was in the dark. (1) We had no information on the degree of truth of Khanh's charges against the four "pro-neutralist" generals plus Minh, and we knew about his coup a day in advance only because he sounded us out on it. (2) During the months of maneuvering between Khanh and Minh after the coup, we had no way to evaluate the coup rumors that always went around, and that peaked around moments of crisis like the trial of the four generals in May. (3) Khanh's complaints of Vietnamese war-weariness starting in late May, in retrospect a transparent tactic to pressure the U.S. to bomb North, took in the USG completely; we eagerly went ahead and planned to bomb "to improve their unity and resolve." (4) Khanh's defiant leaks on cross-border operations in July surprised and perplexed the Embassy; Taylor described them as an attempt to improve his own people's morale, not as an attempt to stampede us. (5) When Khanh asked for our public endorsement and then talked about "reorganization," we failed to see the connection. When he tried to reorganize Minh out of the government, Taylor made no move to save Minh until after street rioting had broken up the whole plan. (6) The September 13 coup attempt surprised everybody. (7) The HNC decision to make Suu President and Huong Prime Minister surprised and angered us. (8) Taylor's December plan to strengthen GVN by lecturing to it about its failures provoked a completely unexpected reaction; both Buddhists and the military turned against the GVN. Taylor's subsequent stern lecture to the Young Turks likewise produced the opposite of the desired result. (9) The generals' January, 1965, moves to renege on the agreed crisis settlement and to dismiss Huong surprised us. (10) The February 19 coup attempt surprised everybody. (11) We did not know what to think of the alleged coup attempt in May, 1965.

In some noteworthy cases we did better. (1) Taylor correctly foresaw that Khanh's August constitution would cause trouble. (2) Westmoreland detected Ky's budding coup attempt in November and, with Embassy authority, squelched it. (3) Taylor foresaw (and tacitly accepted) the Ky coup.

The MACV Role

The MACV organization played an important, mostly hidden, role in US/GVN relations. At every level from Saigon to the districts, the advisory structure was the most pervasive instrument of intergovernmental contact. ARVN officers were accustomed to being spoon-fed military advice; so when military dominance of GVN brought these same officers to high positions in government, the advisor relationship conferred a latent diplomatic role upon MACV. Advisors were used as channels of communications on political matters and became the most reliable sources of information on impending coups. (On occasions such as the Rhade uprising and Ky's first attempt at a coup, senior MACV officers openly became diplomatic emissaries.)

We have less record than we would like of COMUSMACV's influence. He reported regularly to his military seniors only on strictly military matters. Detailed reports of his routine, daily dealings with counterparts were not required of MACV as they were of the Embassy.

From time to time COMUSMACV revealed his own independent objectives. He sought protection of the ARVN officer corps from political machinations and from unfavorable press stories in order to preserve their solidarity and morale; he pressed zealously for early introduction of U.S. ground forces and for their rapid build-up; he opposed encadrement and combined command with ARVN; he resisted exclusion of the military from pacification; he rejected sanctions against ARVN; he objected to the initial constraints on the use of American forces and wanted to be free to operate independently of ARVN.

General Westmoreland's strong position usually assured that his view prevailed. Extension of advisors, increased MAP resources, and the introduction of U.S. ground forces enhanced his relative position. His freedom from detailed reporting of daily contacts was itself an element of strength. When he received unwanted advice and directives, he set up studies (as in the Civic Action Program) to stall for time; when he lacked authority to operate freely, he planned ahead with the Vietnamese (as in the use of U.S. forces for independent offensive operations) and then presented the matter to Washington as a virtual fait accompli.

Vietnamese Non-Performance and Sensitivity

Throughout this period the GVN failed to perform in almost every constructive respect. Pacification lagged, when not visibly retreating, even though the GVN was always willing to issue decrees, set up organizations we suggested, and so on. Khanh's promise to mobilize came to nothing. The VC defeated ARVN in bigger and bigger battles, until the military assessment of the situation permitted Westmoreland to call for over 200,000 U.S. troops.

Moreover, on issues purportedly relating to sovereignty or "face," the Vietnamese were and are quite sensitive, and the U.S. was consistently afraid to inflame this sensitivity. Both sides avoided many delicate topics. A prime example is the matter of the lack of a bilateral treaty. The U.S. operated, and still operates, under a Pentalateral protocol signed by the French and Bao Dai under the U.S. military assistance program to France before 1954. It gave U.S. advisers and officials virtual diplomatic status, which was reasonable back when there were less than two hundred of them in all Indochina. But it now applies to all U.S. personnel, and no one has wanted to stir things up.

The sensitivity problem cropped up often. For a time early in 1964, the GVN backed off from an agreement to extend U.S. advisors to district level, and when GVN did approve, they insisted that the advice be strictly military and that the advisors be labelled "subsector." In like manner, the III Marine Expeditionary Force became the III Marine Amphibious Force, because the French had called their Indochina force "expeditionary." But the GVN, and especially the military, agreed readily to new U.S. troop commitments.

The Vietnamese would often greet a U.S. representative, in moments of tension, with false or exaggerated stories of U.S. dealings, such as a complaint in January, 1964, about U.S. training and CIA contacts with the Cao Dai and Hoa Hao. In contrast, on cabinet appointments they often asked the Ambassador's opinion, and he customarily leaned over backward to avoid giving specific recommendations. Shared sensitivity, closely related to the lack of a treaty governing status of U.S. forces, prevented any move toward joint command and U.S. control of all military operations in Vietnam; both Westmoreland and the Vietnamese preferred to operate separately. The Embassy looked the other way from repressive police measures and political arrests unless these led to embarrassing press stories. When the Ambassador would raise this type of issue with the GVN, it proved always to be touchy.

Vietnamese sensitivity sometimes led to open displays of anti-Americanism. These happened on three main occasions: (1) when Khanh grumbled about being a puppet after the go-North leaks in July, 1964; (2) in the open rupture between Khanh and Taylor in December-January; and (3) in the January riots when rioters overran USIS buildings in Saigon and Hue.

Vietnamese Compliance More in Form Than in Substance

The Vietnamese nevertheless showed a ready willingness throughout the period to declare new policies, sign decrees, and engage in joint studies at our request. But as noted above, that did not mean we got the substance of what we wanted on such matters. The most important case of this kind was Khanh's ready agreement in March to "mobilize" South Vietnam. He promptly made a token announcement; and while students and other potential draft-eligibles waited anxiously to learn what he meant (as did we), he delayed

several weeks before any further announcement. Starting in May, he began announcing specifics and signing decrees, and kept the idea live for several months. However, strength of the RVNAF rose less in 1964 than it did in 1963*, and the talk of non-military mobilization came to nothing.

The military and the more militant civilians, on whom the U.S. counted most heavily and regularly supported, turned out to have far more enthusiasm for going North and for other external adventures than they did for getting on with the job of effective government and pacification. They promised much on this latter score, but could not or would not deliver. Knowing that we had no one else to turn to, they continued their old habits and often openly did what they pleased about important matters. The go-North problem was particularly troublesome because the militants rejected the permanent division of Vietnam at the 17th parallel, upheld in practice by the U.S.

The following are interesting instances, among many, of their superficial compliance. They agreed readily to use U.S. advisers at the ministerial level (the brain trust), although there is no sign that the brain-trusters accomplished anything. Indeed, on all ten suggestions that accompanied President Johnson's 1964 New Year's Message to Minh, only the one on amnesty found them hesitant to express their full agreement. They regularly agreed on budgetary limits to keep inflation from getting out of hand, but never satisfied us on specifics through 1964 or the first half of 1965. They repeatedly agreed to relieve ineffective, corrupt commanders and officials, but delayed endlessly on doing it and generally promoted those whom they relieved. At Westmoreland's request, Khanh created the Hop Tac plan for pacification around Saigon; but it foundered, and eventually the Vietnamese killed it. When Lodge left Vietnam in June, 1964, he sealed his tour with a general agreement with Khanh on concept, scope, and organization of the pacification efforts; obtaining such agreements presented absolutely no problem. In December, 1964, the JGS issued a directive containing every MACV suggestion on how RVNAF should help pacification.

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* The end-year figures are as follows:

South Vietnam	1962	1963	1964
Infantry-type Battalions	107	123	133
RVNAF Strength ('000)	397	514	571
Total Armed Strength ('000) (Included CIDG, police, etc.)	526	612	692

SOURCE: OSD SEA Statistical Summary, Tables 1 and 2

In July, 1964, Khanh created a National Security Council similar to ours, and it met regularly with the top group of Embassy people to talk agreeably about pacification and manpower problems. MACV set up joint inspection teams and joint studies with JGS people several times a year. The only thing of this class that had any visible follow-through was the joint planning group on bombing North and on other cross-border operations. Two battalions specifically declared ineffective by MACV suffered no penalty or improvement.

The militants' predilection for external adventures began to show in May, 1964, after the Embassy started pressing Khanh about his March agreements with McNamara. Khanh responded within a few days by saying he wanted to declare war, bomb the North with U.S. participation, bring 10,000 U.S. Army Special Forces troops into South Vietnam, "get rid of the politicians," and put Saigon strictly on a war footing. Lodge tried to cool him off, but Khanh brought up a less extreme version again with Rusk at the end of the month, saying that his government could not win without action outside South Vietnam. When Lodge returned from the Honolulu Conference in early June, Khanh responded to discussions of ARVN strength by trying to draw Lodge out on actions against the North. Then, when we did not move fast enough to suit him and Ky, they started a press campaign on the subject, and pressed Taylor more insistently. Finally, in December, when Taylor told GVN all the many ways they should improve to justify further U.S. involvement, their immediate reply included the comment that the U.S. program said nothing about Viet Cong use of Cambodia.

The press leaks about going North were the first major instance of their defiantly going ahead as they pleased against our wishes. Khanh's August constitution was a less flagrant case, because Taylor's words of caution were comparatively diffident. (Moreover, in the following August-September turbulence, Khanh let himself become clearly dependent on the Embassy when he talked to the Buddhist leaders.) In the December crisis the Young Turks defied Taylor at every turn following their dissolution of the HNC; and after a temporary agreement in January double-crossed Taylor, dismissed Huong, and took control of the formation of a new government. They guessed correctly that we saw no choice but to go along.

DATE	EVENT OR DOCUMENT	DESCRIPTION
1 Jan 64	State to Saigon 1000 30 Dec 63	President's New Year's message to Minh contains reassurance; advice also rendered. Brain trust approved.
10 Jan 64	Lodge to State 1287 10 Jan	Lodge and Minh discuss President's advice agree they're doing fine except on anmesty. GVN backs away from previously agreed extension of advisors to districts.
30 Jan 64	Saigon to State 1433 30 Jan	Khanh seizes power, arrests four top generals of MRC, but lets Minh continue as President at USG urging.
13 Feb 64	Memorandum to Secretary of State	Rostow recommends enforcing NVN compliance with 1962 Geneva agreement.
21 Feb 64	COMUSMACV to CINCPAC 25104Z Feb 64	GVN accepts advisors in 13 districts of the Delta.
21 Feb 64	Saigon to AID 2334 21 Feb	GVN asks USG for rice standby commitment, for the first time.
8 Mar 64	SD PM 16 Mar Sec. III; and Memorandum of Conversation at JGS Hqtrs. 12 Mar	Secretary McNamara arrives in Saigon for several days of talks, including talks with GVN. Goes away pessimistic, recommends more AID and larger RVNAF, plus unqualified backing for Khanh. Khanh promises mobilization.
17 Mar 64	NSAM 288	President approves Secretary of Defense recommendations, directs their execution.
20 Mar 64	White House Press Release	White House announces Khanh's mobilization plan.
4 Apr 64	State to Saigon 1602 4 Apr	Mobilization decree, dissolution of Council of Notables, promise of eventual Constituent Assembly and civil government.
10 Apr 64	Saigon to State 1964 11 Apr	Beginning of AID and related economic negotiations for fiscal 1965.
29 Apr 64	Saigon to State 2089 30 Apr	Khanh renews request for brain trust; Lodge euphoric.
30 Apr 64	Saigon to State 2091 30 Apr	USOM and GVN badger each other on pacification and economic delays.

4 May 64	Saigon to State 2108 4 May	Khanh wants to bomb NVN, have 10,000 US troops, and set up all-military government in SVN. Lodge says no, no, yes.
13 May 64	Saigon to State 2203 14 May	McNamara sees Khanh in Saigon; they reach agreement on desirability of progress.
13-27 May 64	Saigon to State DTG 271200Z May	Forrestal of White House staff "negotiates" AID with GVN, gives GVN AID increases.
25 May 64	Memorandum to President	McGeorge Bundy recommends force against NVN as the only path to success.
27 May 64	State to Saigon 1251 18 Feb.	Sullivan distributes proposal for semi-encadrement of GVN as a necessary step for progress.
28-29 May 64	Saigon to State 2332 and 2338 28 May	MRC censures four "neutralist plot" generals that had been arrested in Khanh coup. Keeps Minh, as urged by Lodge.
30 May 64	CINCPAC to State 37 2 Jun	Rusk sees Khanh, leaves nothing to the imagination on possible US all-the-way commitment, stresses need for GVN unity.
2-3 Jun 64	Memo for the Record, Special Meeting on SE Asia. CINCPAC 000211 DTG 8 Jun and Memo for Secretary (State) "Highlights of Honolulu Conference" from W. P. Bundy DTG 3 Jun	Honolulu Conference. Conferees (include Rusk, McNamara, Lodge, Taylor and Westmoreland) agree on increased advisory effort, agree to refine plans for pressures on NVN.
4 Jun 64	Saigon to State 2405 4 Jun	Lodge hints to Khanh that USG will prepare US public opinion for actions against NVN.
29 Jun 64	COMUSMACV Command History 1964, p. 69.	AID sets up sector adviser fund, with troika signoff to bypass GVN-Saigon.
30 Jun 64	COMUSMACV 011057Z Jul	US and GVN agree to joint planning for cross-border operations in Laos.
8 Jul 64	Saigon to State 56 8 Jul	Ambassador Taylor presents his credentials to Khanh.

9 Jul 64	Saigon to State 65 9 Jul	Ambassador Taylor hears the complaints of civilian cabinet members.
17 Jul 64	Saigon to State 124 17 Jul	USOM starts periodic meetings with GVN's National Security Council.
19 Jul 64	Saigon to State 185 23 Jul	Khanh and Ky lobby publicly for cross-border operations and air strikes into Laos and NVN.
23 Jul 64	Saigon to State 185 23 Jul	Khanh presses Taylor for action, keeps up the lobbying.
24 Jul 64	Saigon to State 203 24 Jul	Khanh asks Taylor if he (Khanh) should resign; Taylor says no. Khanh asks for publicly stated US backing and gets it.
25 Jul 64	Saigon to State 232 27 Jul	Khanh promises to quit lobbying, reacts favorably to proposed joint planning for air strikes on NVN, and says he plans GVN reorganization.
2-4 Aug 64	Shaplen, Lost Revolution, p. 269	Gulf of Tonkin incidents, US retaliation.
7 Aug 64	Shaplen, Lost Revolution, p. 270	Khanh proclaims state of emergency, with press censorship.
8 Aug 64	COMUSMACV to CINCPAC DTG 080715Z Aug	Westy and Khanh discuss joint planning, agree not to discuss combined command.
12 Aug 64	Saigon to State 393 12 Aug	Khanh's "reorganization" is a new constitution with military openly on top, and with Khanh President. Taylor sceptical, counsels caution.
16 Aug 64	Saigon to State 415 15 Aug	Khanh gets MRC approval of constitution after hurried USOM drafting assistance.
18 Aug 64	Shaplen, Lost Revolution, pp. 270-71	Ambassador Taylor firmly recommends plans for gradual pressures North to start 1 January contingent on improved GVN performance, or not contingent if things get bad enough. Suggests the package include Marines at Danang.
21-27 Aug 64	Shaplen, Lost Revolution, pp. 272-74.	Student demonstrations followed by general rioting.

24 Aug 64	Saigon to State 542 24 Aug	Taylor advises Khanh to move fast on new cabinet.
25 Aug 64	Shaplen, Lost Revolution, pp. 274-75	One o'clock A.M. Taylor advises Khanh to make some concessions but keep constitution. Khanh does and riots continue. Khanh "resigns." Riots continue.
27 Aug 64	Shaplen, Lost Revolution, pp. 275-78	MRC revokes constitution, keeps Khanh now as member of temporary triumvirate (including Minh and Khiem.) New HNC to be appointed.
29 Aug 64	State to Saigon 555 29 Aug	Paratroopers with bayonets restore order in Saigon.
6 Sep 64	Saigon to State 785 8 Sep	Taylor takes off on a trip to Washington. Recommends pressures on NVN to begin 1 December.
10 Sep 64	NSAM 314 10 Sep	Says strengthen GVN.
13 Sep 64	Shaplen, Lost Revolution, pp. 287-290; Saigon to State 836 13 Sep; Saigon to State 878 16 Sep	Abortive coup attempt temporarily captures Saigon. Ky and Thieu back Khanh, defeat coup forces.
20 Sep 64	Shaplen, Lost Revolution, p.290; Saigon to State 923 22 Sep; 936 23 Sep 937, 952, and 954 24 Sep; 985 29 Sep; and 1046 7 Oct. COMUSMACV to CINCPAC DTG 031137Z Oct	Rhade tribesmen in 4 CIDG camps rebel against GVN.
24 Sep 64	Saigon to State 938 24 Sep	The new HNC begins deliberations to write a constitution.
30 Sep 64	NYTimes Article	W. Bundy predicts publicly that bombing NVN would cut down the threat to GVN in a matter of months.
27 Oct 64	Saigon to State 1292 27 Oct; State to Saigon 944 29 Oct. Shaplen Lost Revolution, pp. 290-9.	HNC finishes on time, surprises by naming Suu President, not Minh.

30 Oct 64	Shaplen, Lost Revolution, p.293; State to Saigon 978 1 Nov; CINCPAC to JCS DTG 020400Z Nov; Saigon to State 1382 2 Nov	Mortar attack on Bien Hoa airbase. State rejects Taylor's recommendation of immediate reprisal raid on NVN.
11 Nov 64	Saigon to State 1452 and 1460 10 Nov	MRC publishes military reorganization without MACV review; MACV protests and MRC withdraws it for changes.
26 Nov 64	COMUSMACV to CINCPAC DTG 0260945Z Nov	Westmoreland slaps Ky down just before apparent coup attempt. Taylor is in Washington.
7 Dec 64	Embassy to State Airgram A-468 15 Dec	Taylor, just back from Washington with fresh guidance, presents GVN with a candid statement of its failures and couples demands for progress in stated areas to promises of US escalation.
8-20 Dec 64	Shaplen, Lost Revolution, pp. 294-95	Student and Buddhist demonstrations against Huong government and growing crisis.
20 Dec 64	Saigon to State 1869, 1870, and 1874 20 Dec; MACV to CINCPAC rec'd NMCC 200816Z Dec	Khanh and Generals disregard Taylor's protests, dissolve HNC and arrest opposition; "Young Turks" (Ky, Thieu, Thi and Cang) condolidate their dominance by creating a small Armed Forces Council (AFC) as the top governing body. Taylor reads them the riot act.
21 Dec 64	Saigon to State 1881 21 Dec	Taylor asks Khanh to resign and leave the country.
23 Dec 64	Saigon to State 1914 23 Dec; 1929 and 1930 24 Dec	Young Turks attack Taylor publicly, and privately seek his recall.
24 Dec 64	Shaplen, Lost Revolution, pp. 295-97.	Taylor tells press that Khanh has outstayed his usefulness.
25 Dec 64	COMUSMACV Command History 1965, p. 229.	Vietnamese JGS issues Directive A-B 139, at MACV request, on how RVNAF should be employed to improve pacification program.

7 Jan 65	Saigon to State 2081 7 Jan 2089 8 Jan 2102 9 Jan	AFC Generals decide to give way by restoring civilian government under a new name (i.e. without MNC) leaving Suu-Huong combination in.
9 Jan 65	Shaplen, Lost Revolution, pp. 297-98	With Taylor's reluctant concurrence, the AFC announces the 7 January decision.
11 Jan 65	Saigon to State 2112 and 2120 11 Jan	US and GVN publicly patch up relations. Young Turks will enter cabinet.
12 Jan 65	Shaplen, Lost Revolution, pp. 298-99	New demonstrations begin, demanding Huong's resignation.
14 Jan 65	Saigon to State 2155 14 Jan	Khanh shows Taylor a new cabinet list; Taylor tries to slow him down.
18 Jan 65	Saigon to State 2176 18 Jan	Khanh gives Taylor completed cabinet list and schedules installation for the next day.
19 Jan 65	COMUSMACV to CINCPAC DTG 191235Z Jan	Khanh tries to reassure Westmoreland on military repercussions of tying up some generals in the cabinet; then Khanh suddenly "postpones" cabinet installation.
19-24 Jan 65	Shaplen, Lost Revolution, pp. 298-99	Buddhist demonstrations build up, including sacking of USIS buildings in Saigon and Hue. Buddhist merchants respond to campaign to boycott Americans. Buddhists demand military take-over.
25 Jan 65	Saigon to State 2276 and 2283 25 Jan	Khanh tells Deputy Ambassador Alex Johnson that Huong and Suu want to resign and let the military take over. Johnson says no.
27 Jan 65	Shaplen, Lost Revolution, pp. 299-302; Saigon to State 2322 27 Jan; State to Saigon 1542 27 Jan and 1565 29 Jan	AFC topples Suu-Huong government, openly puts Khanh back in charge. JCS approves COMUSMACV request to use US jet aircraft in a strike role in-country in emergencies, subject to Embassy approval in each instance.
3-4 Feb 65	Saigon to State 2399 4 Feb	McGeorge Bundy visits Saigon, has tea with Khanh and the generals.

7-12 Feb 65	Shaplen, Lost Revolution, pp. 305-6 State to Saigon 1438 6 Feb; Saigon to State 2426 7 Feb 2495 11 Feb	Flaming Dart bombings in North Vietnam. All US dependents ordered to leave Vietnam.
7 Feb 65	Memorandum to the President	McGeorge Bundy says the military are the backbone of the country, that the Buddhists should be constructive, and that Vietnam needs a social revolution.
16 Feb 65	Saigon to State 2617 16 Feb	After two false starts, AFC selects Quat to form a new cabinet.
18 Feb 65	Shaplen, Lost Revolution, pp. 306-7	Quat cabinet installed; Buddhists acquiesce.
19 Feb 65	Shaplen, Lost Revolution, pp. 307-12	New coup groups seizes Saigon, then bows to superior AFC force.
20 Feb 65	Shaplen, Lost Revolution, pp. 307-12	AFC votes Khanh out.
24 Feb 65	Saigon to State 2685 20 Feb; 2698 22 Feb; 2720 23 Feb; 2731 24 Feb; and COMUSMACV to CINCPAC DTG 241600Z Feb	Khanh goes abroad; Rolling Thunder rolls.
27 Feb 65	Saigon to State 2787 27 Feb	USOM resumes action level meetings with GVN; voth sides agreed to prepare proposals for accelerating pacification and to go forward together with effective execution.
28 Feb 65	Saigon to State 2800 1 Mar	State issues White Paper on Vietnam.
6 Mar 65	COMUSMACV Command History, 1965, p. 132	MACV gives budget guidelines to RVN Ministry of Defense.
8 Mar 65	Saigon to State 2991 8 Mar	Quat discusses sensitive combined-command issue with Taylor.

8-9 Mar 65	Saigon to State 2908 1 Mar	Two battalions of Marines land at Danang.
24 Mar 65	Saigon to State 2065 24 Mar	Ambassador Taylor formulates a 41-point program for stability and pacification.
26 Mar 65	COMUSMACV Commander's Estimate of the Situation 26 Mar	Westmoreland issues Commander's Estimate of the Situation, which treads lightly on combined-command issue.
1-2 Apr 65	NSAM 328 6 Apr	Taylor (in Washington) talks to President and NSC, who approve Taylor's 41-point program and General Johnson's 21 recommendations.
15 Apr 65	Saigon to State 3419 17 Apr	Taylor objects to proposed Peers mission.
15 Apr 65	DOD 9164 15 Apr	The 7-point message from State/Defense tells Saigon to encadre RVNAF/GVN and to expect additional US forces, with new missions.
17 Apr 65	Saigon to State 3421, 3422 and 3423 17 Apr	Taylor objects to 7-point message, and Westmoreland objects to encadrement.
19-20 Apr 65	ASD McNaughton's Minutes of Honolulu Meeting 23 Apr	Honolulu Conference meets to resolve disagreements on 7-point message. Conferees agree on force increase and medcap, scuttle encadrement, and agree on studies of combined command.
5 May 65	Saigon to State 3097 and 3100 26 Mar; and 2140 31 Mar	AFC dissolves itself.
20-21 May 65	Saigon to State 3878 25 May	Abortive coup attempt alleged by GVN, though not firmly confirmed by US observers.
22 May-12 Jun 65	Shaplen, Lost Revolution, pp. 342-45	Suu-Quat disagreement on cabinet changes.
27 May 65	Joint State/Defense 80466 27 May	State/Defense message agrees to defer approaching GVN on combined command.
12 Jun 65	COMUSMACV MAC J-3, 19912 to CINCPAC DTG 120828Z Jun	Westmoreland presses for commitment of US forces to offensive operations, has already planned it hand-in-hand with our Vietnamese ally.

12 Jun 65	Shaplen, Lost Revolution, pp. 345-46. Saigon to State 4065 4 Jun, 4119 9 Jun, 4156 11 Jun, 4190 14 Jun, 4312 21 Jun.	Generals fire Suu and Quat, create National Leadership Council of ten Generals chaired by Thieu, and make Ky Prime Minister. Taylor reluctantly acquiesces to Ky's appointment.

US-GVN RELATIONS, 1964-JUNE 1965

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I

AFTERMATH OF THE DIEM COUP

First Half of 1964

1. The Inheritance From 1963

The top ruling body of the Government of Vietnam at the end of 1963 was a Military Revolutionary Council of twelve generals, under the chairmanship of the affable and popular but seak General Duong Van "Big" Minh. The Council governed through an all-civilian cabinet headed by Premier Tho, having forbade all military officers to engage in politics. A Council of Notables served as a pseudo-parliament, with a purely advisory role; it included well-known Vietnamese politicians, but could not claim support of a broad popular base or the main political forces in Vietnam. While Premier Tho's previous connection with the Diem government was now a political liability, there was a shortage of national figures who were not tarred with this brush one way or another. 1/

On the U.S. side, General Harkins, COMUSMACV, who had long been known to be pro-Diem, was clearly on his way out, although his departure was to be delayed until the middle of 1964. Ambassador Lodge had replaced Nolting just before the Diem coup, and was held in that cautious respect appropriate to the widespread belief among Vietnamese that he had engineered it.

In the last weeks of 1963, the U.S. government reassessed the progress of the counterinsurgency effort and the policy options. Plans for phased withdrawal of 1,000 U.S. advisers by end-1963 went through the motions by concentrating rotations home in December and letting strength rebound in the subsequent two months. A realistic appraisal by Secretary McNamara showed that the VC were continuing to gain steadily, especially in the Delta. 2/ U.S. policy continued to be to provide U.S. resources and personnel to the extent necessary. 3/

The tone of USG internal documents and of its dealings with GVN was that of a benevolent big brother anxious to see little brother make good on his own -- but with the benefit of extensive advice. U.S. pressure induced the GVN to break up the palace guard and to move coup-protection Ranger units out into the countryside, though it turned out that other units stayed near Saigon for this purpose. A proposal to put all ammunition stocks in Vietnam under U.S. control surfaced in November, only to sink without a trace. 4/ There was gentle pressure to persuade the GVN to allow USOM economics staffs to share the offices of their counterparts, and to let them get involved extensively in GVN budgeting. 5/ The USIS and Ambassador

The overall USG appraisal was that the GVN was weak and drifting at the top level, failing to set firm national policies and to issue detailed instructions, and that at lower levels it was in complete turmoil because of the turnover of personnel following the coup and because of the lack of firm national leadership. 7/

Whether to push the GVN harder was a subject of disagreement between State and Ambassador Lodge. The State view was that the GVN must prove its resolution to adopt economic, social and political measures to support the effort against the VC, and must move toward self-support. Moreover, State said:

> "We will obscure the actual need for GVN adjustments if we yield too easily at this stage to GVN pressure for more commercial import aid." 8/

In contrast, Lodge said it was essential

> "to provide some increase in overall level of economic aid...It is in my view politically unacceptable and psychologically impossible to tell Big Minh that he is going to get less than Diem." 9/

Besides wanting to go easy on the GVN on aid leverage, he opposed pressure for early elections. Lodge's position is clear from the Honolulu Conference (November 1963) Report, which stated:

> "The Ambassador...considers it essential that the U.S. not press the new government unduly. He stated that they are in a most delicate state, and are not ready for a system which replaces governments by elective process rather than by violence; that this is beyond their horizon at this time and we should not seek to recreate in Vietnam our image of the democratic ideal."

Early in January, 1964, Lodge restated this view in a cable:

> "It is obvious that [the Vietnamese generals] are all we have got and that we must try as hard to make them into successful politicians as we are trying to make them into successful military men." 10/

Behind these differences within the USG and between the USG and the GVN lay a certain lack of confidence in future behavior. Some in the U.S. were concerned that the GVN might drift toward a "neutralism" like that of Laos. 11/ At the same time, the GVN feared the U.S. would negotiate behind its back or force it to accept an unfavorable settlement. 12/ These concerns made it appropriate for the President to issue his New Year's greeting to the GVN:

"As we enter the New Year of 1964, I want to wish you, your revolutionary government, and your people full success in the long and arduous war which you are waging so tenaciously and bravely against the Viet Cong forces directed and supported by the Communist regime in Hanoi...Our aims are, I know, identical with yours: to enable your government to protect its people from the acts of terror perpetrated by Communist insurgents from the North. As the forces of your government become increasingly capable of dealing with this aggression, American military personnel in South Viet-Nam can be progressively withdrawn.

"The United States Government shares the view of your government that 'neutralization' of South Viet-Nam is unacceptable. As long as the Communist regime in North Viet-Nam persists in its aggressive policy, neutralization of South Viet-Nam would only be another name for a Communist take-over. Peace will return to your country just as soon as the authorities in Hanoi cease and desist from their terrorist aggression."

In keeping with the attitude of concern but not alarm about the GVN's conduct of the war, SecState's cable transmitting the President's message directed Lodge to offer the following eleven points of confidential advice on behalf of the President:

"1. It is vitally important to act now to reverse the trend of the war as rapidly as possible.

2. We trust that personnel changes are now virtually complete and that both military commanders and province chiefs can now get down to the job at hand.

3. We hope that General Minh can designate a Chief of the Joint General Staff and a commander of the III Corps who will have no other responsibilities and can devote themselves exclusively to these mammoth tasks.

4. We assume that, as General Don promised Secretary McNamara, the GVN will make available sufficient troops in the six key provinces in the III Corps to give its forces the necessary numerical superiority.

5. We have been glad to learn of the stress which General Minh places on small-unit actions, particularly in the Mekong Delta. We hope that equal stress will be placed on night actions, both for ambushing Viet Cong and for relieving villages under attack. To win the support of the population it needs to be emphatically demonstrated that the Viet Cong are being beaten precisely at their own game.

6. We consider it extremely important that the necessary civil-military coordinating machinery for clear-and-hold operations

followed by an effective program to give the villages protection and security be established in Saigon.

7. It is likewise extremely important that program directives be issued at an early stage by the central government to lower echelons for proper implementation of all aspects of the program for giving villagers protection.

8. We also urge early revitalization of the amnesty program.

9. We are encouraged by the exploratory talks which the Vietnamese Government has held with Cambodian Government officials for improving relations between the two countries. We hope that both Governments can proceed to actual negotiations for the settlement of their bilateral problems.

10. We accept with pleasure General Minh's invitation to set up an American brain-trust to work with his government and we are prepared to furnish any personnel needed for this purpose.

11. General Minh can also be sure that he has the complete support of the United States Government as the leader of Viet-Nam. We believe he can magnetically rally the Vietnamese people if he will really try to do so. He should be told leadership is an essential political ingredient of victory such as was the case with Magsaysay in the Philippines." 13/

In this overall context the U.S. had already moved discreetly toward greater involvement in Vietnamese administration at lower levels. Late in 1963, the USG and GVN agreed on a "Decentralization of Action" package. Using AID de facto control of AID commodities to the province level (even though they passed to Vietnamese ownership at the dock), U.S. advisers could assure that no AID commodities came out to the province without their consent. They could and did extend this control to cover releases of these commodities from province warehouses. U.S. officials controlled the distribution of AID commodities because they controlled all Saigon warehouses set aside for these commodities, even though the warehouses, like the commodities, belonged to the Vietnamese. 14/

Among the many problems that were to keep recurring was that of freedom of the press. Following an initial honeymoon period after the coup, trouble broke out between GVN and the U.S. press corps. This reached a climax with the temporary barring of the New York Times from Vietnamese distribution channels when it ran a story reporting dissension among the Vietnamese Generals. 15/ In general, Lodge sided with GVN on this issue, as shown in his reported views at the November, 1963, Honolulu Conference:

"The U.S. press should be induced to leave the new government alone. They have exerted great influence on

events in Vietnam in the past, and can be expected to do so again. Extensive press criticism, at this juncture, could be disastrous." 16/

On January 1, 1964, there were 15,914 U.S. military personnel in South Vietnam. Fewer than 2,000 of these were advisors to RVNAF, but the advisor structure extended down to ARVN line battalions, and advisors accompanied combat units on operations. 17/ The MAP budget for South Vietnam in FY 1964 was $175 million, although it was expected that an additional $12.5 million would be required before the end of the year. 18/

In summary, the USG's decisions near the end of 1963 started modest changes in our Vietnam programs. Program levels held even, and earlier hopes of immediate phasedown faded. The USG moved toward more involvement in Vietnamese day-to-day administration, particularly at the province level. The move was gentle, and stopped far short of a takeover; nothing of the sort was contemplated at that time. The USG was sceptical of GVN's leadership and administration at all levels, and continued to offer extensive and detailed advice, but had no drastic policy changes in mind.

2. The First Minh Government Goes Down, January, 1964

The year began with increasing Vietnamese criticism of the Minh government. It had done little to gain popularity in the country, and felt the sting of accusations of discrimination from both Buddhists and Catholics. Buddhists attacked Prime Minister Tho, who was Vice President under Diem. Catholics accused the GVN of having gone too far to placate the Buddhists in reaction to repressions under Diem. There were also accusations of secret negotiations with the French to neutralize South Vietnam. 19/

A spate of news stories about U.S. advisor disgust over ARVN's timid attitude toward combat provoked a cable from State to Saigon asking the Ambassador to prevent such stories in the future. (This standard phrase meant to tell the advisors to stop talking to the press.) Thus the Department aligned itself with Lodge's view of bad press stories, which emphasized news silence rather than corrective action. 20/

The Lodge idea of making politicians out of the members of the Military Revolutionary Council translated into a plan for them to send out carefully watched political action teams. (He also suggested ways for the generals to improve their speech-making style.) For example, he proposed there should be three teams of eight men each in each district of Long An Province. He pressed the MRC to produce a program along these lines with priority attention to security. "The workers would be technically government employees, but most of the work they will do would be what we would call political work." On the U.S. role, he said, "U.S. personnel should inspect, without looking as though they were doing it, and see to it that a very high standard is set." 21/

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are best assurance that the U.S. material we supply is used to full advantage. Beyond this, we cannot give adequate justification for our great involvement in Vietnam...if we are to be denied access to the facts."

However, State indicated a willingness to limit subsector advisors to an experimental program in a few districts, as suggested by Col. Thang, with a review of the question to follow a few weeks later. State suggested that General Minh's erroneous statement regarding U.S. training of Cao Dai and Hoa Hao deserved prompt refutation. "It is suggested Harkins accompany you to meetings where military matters may come up." 26/

In contrast to their reticence about extending U.S. advisors to lower levels, Minh's government had volunteered the idea in December of a group of high-level U.S. advisors to work with the top levels of the GVN. The State Department replied enthusiastically:

"In elaboration of the brain trust concept suggested by General Minh and accepted by President Johnson (DepTel 1000), our view is that high-level advisors may be essential key to ingredient most sorely lacking in GVN: Efficiency and urgency of action. Minh's invitation to establish brain trust and readiness to accept U.S. advice and cooperate...should be seized upon...We have in mind advisors working directly with VN officials on day-to-day implementation of agreed policy lines. They would of course be completely responsible to you for policy guidance and would in no sense supplant your policy role with top GVN officials nor would they infringe direct and comprehensive military advisory role of COMUSMACV...We recognize such advisors must operate behind the scenes and that their persistent prodding must be done with great tact...."

The guidance continued that the department specifically had in mind the assignment of three experienced full-time advisors (and senior assistants) to work with top levels of GVN. One senior FSO would work with Minh and Tho on broad program implementation, one ranking AID official would be with GVN counterinsurgency and economic officials, one high-ranking military would work with the Minister of Defense and JGS. Both advisors and assistants would have office space in a GVN building close to the office they would advise. Authority was given to discuss this with GVN. Lodge was told to ask them whom they would like for these positions. 27/

Meanwhile, political tension increased. Then on January 28, General Nguyen Khanh told his U.S. advisor and friend, Col. Jasper Wilson, that a group of generals, including Minh and Don, were plotting with the French to stage a pro-neutralist "coup" by January 31. He asked whether the U.S. would support him in staging a counter-coup which would assure a stepped-up GVN effort against the Viet Cong. There is no record of an official U.S. reply before Khanh resolved to act. 28/ The evening of January 29, Khanh told Wilson he would take over the GVN at 4 a.m. the next morning. Lodge informed State, which directed him to keep a hands-off attitude and

to make it clear that the USG had nothing to do with the coup. It also directed Lodge

29/ The next morning, right on schedule, Khanh took over.

3. The USG Accepts Khanh and Opens the Bidding Against the North, February, 1964

Keeping Minh was to prove difficult. Khanh wanted to try four arrested generals for conspiring with the French to neutralize SVN; and not only were these officers Minh's close friends, but Khanh said Minh was a party to the plot also. 30/ The affair was to drag on into September, adding to the political uncertainties and thus to the paralysis of government. 31/

To improve government stability, Khanh broadened his government to make the cabinet more representative of all the political and religious groups, and expanded the MRC to include 17 generals and 32 other officers. (By the end of March the MRC had 53 members.) Partly at USOM urging, General Minh travelled around the country and reportedly gained popularity. The Council of Notables continued in its advisory role. 32/

Following the coup, the USG reopened the question of extending U.S. advisors into the districts. On February 7, 1964, the State Department told Saigon:

> "Inasmuch as recently displaced government evidently took no definitive position on extension U.S. advisory structure to subsector level...we believe /the/ Ambassador and General Harkins should raise this subject at early date with General Khanh. It might be useful to point out to Khanh that in addition reasons cited in our 1072, proposed extension U.S. advisory structure would represent expansion U.S. commitment to support GVN in war against VC."

State anticipated that Khanh might object but believed the possible harm would be more than counterbalanced by improved effectiveness of GVN operations in countryside:

> "...if Khanh will not accept subsector advisors on scale originally envisaged he should be urged to agree at least to their establishment on experimental basis in few districts in order to lay basis for determining whether there is any substantial ill effect in political sense from their presence." 33/

Two weeks later COMUSMACV reported Vietnamese acceptance of district advisors in 13 districts of central Delta provinces. MACV J-3 had casually arranged it with General Khiem, apparently without any new top-level U.S./GVN discussion. 34/

Khanh's government was as receptive at first to top-level U.S. advice as it was to advisors at lower levels, although the "brain trust"

idea dropped between the cracks. General Khanh made two requests for U.S. recommendations of Vietnamese persons to be members of his cabinet. Ambassador Lodge furnished a list from which a panel could be picked, but refused to make specific recommendations for particular positions. 35/

However, there was still no sign of effective GVN action, with or without U.S. advice. In mid-February JCS recommended a concentrated "counterinsurgency offensive" in Long An province to restore GVN control and to make that a model for other critical provinces. 36/ Deputy Ambassador Nes, in Lodge's absence, objected strongly; for he said such a proposal was based on the false assumptions that:

> "(1) Indigenous Communist insurgency with full external support could be defeated by an 'offensive' of finite duration.
>
> (2) GVN had adequate political cohesion, leadership, etc., to launch an offensive.
>
> (3) The U.S. Mission had sufficient influence and control over GVN to persuade it to do so." 37/

A February 19 report from COMUSMACV tells of continuing delay on pacification because the Dien Huang (or Dong Hien) had to be revalidated by the new government. A new plan was presented to General Khanh on the 17th and was to be called Chien Thang ("struggle for victory"). 38/

On February 21, 1964, Ambassador Lodge, Admiral Felt, and General Harkins saw Khanh with a proposal for creating a corps of civil administrators to take over the villages and hamlets as soon as pacification was complete. Khanh replied that he was just about to put into effect a program in the seven key provinces around Saigon which would provide the help of doctors, teachers, and government advisors from Saigon. 39/

The subject of funds for ARVN and para-military pay increases came up because counterpart and PL 480 proceeds were U.S. contributions to the GVN budget. Washington requested additional facts and recommendations on how added U.S. input could best be channeled but advised that an outright U.S. grant would be highly undesirable. USOM and MAAG were told to analyze the situation and develop joint U.S./GVN action to meet the threat of inflation. 40/ Saigon replied that their analysis indicated (1) the budget deficits would probably be smaller than originally expected, and (2) the economic consequences were extremely difficult to predict. Economic Minister Oanh shunned any immediate "complex study" of the economic outlook because he was completely tied up with a series of important planning exercises for the government, and Oanh felt the potential cost of the pay raise (700 million piasters in 1964) could be absorbed within the present expenditure levels. 41/

The Embassy reported being informed on February 21 by the Minister of National Economy of a threatened Saigon rice shortage. He requested that

the U.S. stand ready to provide 40,000 tons under title II, PL 480 for distribution to the Armed Forces. No U.S. commitments were made. Talks were exploratory. 42/

Although the USG recognized the weaknesses of GVN, as noted at the end of Section 1, these merely aroused concern at the highest levels, not alarm. An extreme example of the emphasis of this period is found in W.W. Rostow's memorandum to the Secretary of State dated February 13, 1964. In a context emphasizing the importance of success in Vietnam to U.S. interests everywhere, Rostow wrote only about the role of North Vietnam in the insurgency, relegating South Vietnam's governmental problems (and those of Laos) to a vague clause in one sentence:

> "South Vietnam is in danger. The internal position in South Vietnam created by the systematic operations conducted from North Vietnam is precarious...although difficult tasks would still be faced in South Vietnam and Laos if North Vietnamese compliance with the 1962 agreement was enforced, we see no possibility of achieving short-run or long-run stability in the area until it is enforced."

In a cable to the President, Lodge expressed the same view. In addition, he compared the sanctions used against Diem with the sanctions being considered against the North, and thus by implication treated the fall of Diem as the end of the problem of good government in the South. 43/ Rightly or wrongly, the USG viewed North Vietnamese support and direction of the insurgency as the overriding problem, not merely in its public posture (as represented by President Johnson's new year's greeting to General Minh, quoted on page 3, above, and by the State White Paper, "Aggression From the North," issued February 27), but also in its internal policy discussions. Rostow's statement says that there is no way to achieve short-run or long-run stability in Southeast Asia without putting a stop to this support and direction, and gives short shrift to GVN reform. To the extent that this view was accepted, it tended to set the face of U.S. policy looking outward across South Vietnam's borders, putting South Vietnamese weaknesses in the background, mainly to be dealt with after the 1962 Agreement is enforced.

When the issue came up of the GVN's internal military and political failures, all agreed that these were serious, but there was seldom any action. Occasional references (e.g., Honolulu, 1964), and conversations with some of the principals, make it clear that the explanation for this lack of action was the fear that the GVN was a house of cards, which would collapse if we pushed too hard. This fear of GVN weakness proved to be a consistent source of strength to GVN in its negotiations with the Embassy and with the USG.

4. McNamara's March Trip and NSAM 288

For several days beginning on March 8, 1964, Secretary McNamara conferred with GVN leaders and with U.S. officials in Saigon. The trip

reinforced his pessimistic views of the previous December. In his trip report to the President, he said:

"C. The situation has unquestionably been growing worse, at least since September:

1. In terms of government control of the countryside, about 40% of the territory is under Viet Cong control or predominant influence....

2. Large groups of the population are now showing signs of apathy and indifference, and there are some signs of frustration within the U.S. contingent:

a. The ARVN and paramilitary desertion rates, and particularly the latter, are high and increasing.

b. Draft dodging is high while the Viet Cong are recruiting energetically and effectively.

c. The morale of the hamlet militia and of the Self Defense Corps, on which the security of the hamlets depends, is poor and falling.

3. In the last 90 days the weakening of the government's position has been particularly noticeable....

4. The political control structure extending from Saigon down into the hamlets disappeared following the November coup. Of the 41 incumbent province chiefs on November 1, 35 have been replaced (nine provinces had three province chiefs in three months; one province had four). Scores of lesser officials were replaced. Almost all major military commands have changed hands twice since the November coup. The faith of the peasants has been shaken by the disruptions in experienced leadership and the loss of physical security. In many areas, power vacuums have developed causing confusion among the people, and a rising rate of rural disorders."

"D. The greatest weakness in the present situation is the uncertain viability of the Khanh government...After two coups, as was mentioned above, there has been a sharp drop in morale and organization, and Khanh has not yet been able to build these up satisfactorily. There is a constant threat of assassination or of another coup, which would drop morale and organization nearly to zero. Whether or not French nationals are actively encouraging such a coup, de Gaulle's position and the continuing pessimism and anti-Americanism of the French community in South Vietnam provide constant fuel to neutralist sentiment and the coup possibility. If a coup is set underway, the odds of our detecting and preventing it in the tactical sense are not high.

"E. On the positive side, we have found many reasons for encouragement in the performance of the Khanh government to date. Although its top layer is thin, it is highly responsive to U.S. advice, and with a good grasp of the basic elements of rooting out the Viet Cong. Opposition groups are fragmentary, and Khanh has brought in at least token representation from many key groups hitherto left out. He is keenly aware of the danger of assassination or coup and is taking resourceful steps to minimize these risks. All told, these evidences of energy, comprehension, and decision add up to a sufficiently strong chance of Khanh's really taking hold in the next few months for us to devote all possible energy and resources to his support." 44/

A memorandum of the conversation held at Joint General Staff (JGS) headquarters between Secretary McNamara and General Khanh, the Prime Minister, on March 12, shows that the U.S. pressed for a national service act. General Khanh agreeably assured the Secretary that the GVN was prepared to embark on a program of national mobilization. The principal question raised by the Vietnamese was the desirability of raising the Civil Guard to the same relative status as ARVN on such matter as salary, pensions, and survivor benefits at a total additional cost of 1 billion piasters. Mr. McNamara's reply that he thought this highly desirable was obviously interpreted by the Vietnamese as an agreement to underwrite much of the bill. 45/

After considering various options in his reports, McNamara recommended the following basic U.S. posture:

"1. The U.S. at all levels must continue to make it emphatically clear that we are prepared to furnish assistance and support for as long as it takes to bring the insurgency under control.

"2. The U.S. at all levels should continue to make it clear that we fully support the Khanh government and are totally opposed to any further coups. The ambassador should instruct all elements, including the military advisors, to report intelligence information of possible coups promptly, with the decision to be made by the ambassador whether to report such information to Khanh....

"3. We should support fully the Pacification Plan now announced by Khanh...This so-called "oil spot" theory is excellent, and its acceptance is a major step forward. However, it is necessary to push hard to get specific instructions out to the provinces, so that there is real unity of effort at all levels....

Many of the actions described in succeeding paragraphs fit right into the framework of the Plan as announced by Khanh. Wherever possible, we should tie our urging of such actions to Khanh's own formulation of them, so that he will

be carrying out a Vietnamese plan and not one imposed by the U.S.

"4. To put the whole nation on a war footing...a new National Mobilization Plan (to include a National Service Law) should be urgently developed by the Country Team in collaboration with the Khanh Government....

"5. The strength of the Armed Forces (regular plus paramilitary) must be increased by at least 50,000 men....

"6. A Civil Administrative Corps is urgently required to work in the provincial capitals, the district towns, the villages, and the hamlets...The U.S. should work with the GVN urgently to devise the necessary recruiting plans, training facilities, financing methods, and organizational arrangements, and should furnish training personnel at once, under the auspices of the AID Mission....

"7. The paramilitary forces are now understrength and lacking in effectiveness. They must be improved and reorganized.

d. Additional U.S. personnel should be assigned to the training of all these paramilitary forces.

e. The National Police require special consideration. Their strength in the provinces should be substantially increased and consideration should be given to including them as part of an overall 'Popular Defense Force'....

"8. An offensive guerrilla force should be created to operate along the border and in areas where VC control is dominant...." 46/

He recommended more military equipment for ARVN, which along with the expansion recommendations above, added up to a total cost to the U.S. of some $50-60 million in the first year and $30-40 million thereafter. He reasoned:

"There were and are sound reasons for the limits imposed by present policy -- the South Vietnamese must win their own fight; U.S. intervention on a larger scale, and/or GVN actions against the North, would disturb key allies and other nations; etc. In any case, it is vital that we continue to take every reasonable measure to assure success in South Vietnam. The policy choice is not an 'either/or' between this course of action and possible pressures against the North; the former is essential without regard to our decision with respect to the latter. The latter can, at best, only reinforce the former.

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"The following are the actions we believe can be taken in order to improve the situation both in the immediate future and over a longer term period. To emphasize that a new phase has begun, the measures to be taken by the Khanh government should be described by some term such as 'South Vietnam's Program for National Mobilization.'" 47/

Two courses of action that Secretary McNamara considered and rejected were destined to come up time and again. With respect to the suggestion that the U.S. furnish an American combat unit to secure Saigon, the Secretary reported "It is the universal opinion of our senior people in Saigon, with which we concur, that this action would now have serious adverse psychological consequences and should not be undertaken."

On U.S. assumption of command, he said:

"...the judgments of all senior people in Saigon, with which we concur, is that the possible military advantages of such action would be far outweighted by its adverse psychological impact. It would cut across the whole basic picture of the VN running their own war and lay us wide open to hostile propaganda both within SVN and outside. Moreover the present responsiveness of the GVN to our advice -- although it has not yet reduced military reaction time -- makes it less urgent. At the same time MACV is steadily taking actions to bring U.S. and GVN operating staff closer together at all levels, including joint operating rooms at key command levels." 48/

The President met with the National Security Council on March 17 and approved McNamara's recommendations; NSAM 288 of that date directed all agencies to execute the parts applying to them. To underline one point further, State cabled USOM Saigon on March 18 to make sure to report all rumors of coups heard by any U.S. personnel to the Ambassador at once; and it gave the Ambassador full reaction authority. 49/ Then the President summarized his view of the main thrust of the new policy, in a cable to Lodge on March 20:

"As we agreed in our previous messages to each other, judgment is reserved for the present on overt military action in view of the consensus from Saigon conversations of McNamara mission with General Khanh and you on judgment that movement against the North at the present would be premature. We here share General Khanh's judgment that the immediate and essential task is to strengthen the southern base. For this reason our planning for action against the North is on a contingency basis at present, and immediate problem in this area is to develop the strongest possible military and political base for possible later action." 50/

Anticipating great things, the White House announced Khanh's "mobilization plan" on March 17, and implied USG support for him:

"To meet the situation, General Khanh and his government are acting vigorously and effectively. They have produced a sound central plan...To carry out this plan...General Khanh has informed us that he proposes in the near future to put into effect a National Mobilization Plan....

"The policy should continue of withdrawing United States personnel where their roles can be assumed by South Vietnamese and of sending additional men if they are needed. It will remain the policy of the United States to furnish assistance and support to South Vietnam for as long as it is required....

"Secretary McNamara and General Taylor reported their overall conclusion that with continued vigorous leadership from General Khanh and his government, and the carrying out of these steps, the situation can be significantly improved in the coming months." 51/

In a speech in Washington on March 26, Secretary McNamara more explicitly supported the Khanh government, and gave the accepted priorities of U.S. policy:

"...In early 1963, President Kennedy was able to report to the nation that 'the spearpoint of aggression has been blunted in South Vietnam.' It was evident that the Government had seized the initiative in most areas from the insurgents. But this progress was interrupted in 1963 by the political crises arising from troubles between the Government and the Buddhists, students, and other non-Communist oppositionists. President Diem lost the confidence and loyalty of his people; there were accusations of maladministration and injustice. There were two changes of government within three months. The fabric of government was torn. The political control structure extending from Saigon down into the hamlets virtually disappeared. Of the 41 incumbent province chiefs on November 1 of last year, 35 were replaced. Nine provinces had three chiefs in three months; one province had four. Scores of lesser officials were replaced. Almost all major military commands changed hands twice. The confidence of the peasants was inevitably shaken by the disruptions in leadership and the loss of physical security...Much therefore depends on the new government under General Khanh, for which we have high hopes.

"Today the government of General Khanh is vigorously rebuilding the machinery of administration and reshaping plans to carry the war to the Viet Cong. He is an able and energetic leader. He has demonstrated his grasp of the basic elements -- political, economic and psychological, as well as military -- required to defeat the Viet Cong. He is planning a program of economic and social advances for the welfare of his people.

He has brought into support of the government representatives of key groups previously excluded. He and his colleagues have developed plans for systematic liberation of areas now submissive to Viet Cong duress and for mobilization of all available Vietnamese resources in the defense of the homeland.

"At the same time, General Khanh has understood the need to improve South Vietnam's relations with its neighbors... In short, he has demonstrated the energy, comprehension, and decision required by the difficult circumstances that he faces....

"The third option before the President [after withdrawal and neutralization, both rejected] was initiation of military actions outside South Vietnam, particularly against North Vietnam, in order to supplement the counterinsurgency program in South Vietnam.

"This course of action -- its implications and ways of carrying it out -- has been carefully studied.

"What ever ultimate course of action may be forced upon us by the other side, it is clear that actions under this option would be only a supplement to, not a substitute for, progress within South Vietnam's own borders.

"The fourth course of action was to concentrate on helping the South Vietnamese win the battle in their own country. This, all agree, is essential no matter what else is done....

"We have reaffirmed U.S. support for South Vietnam's Government and pledged economic assistance and military training and logistical support for as long as it takes to bring the insurgency under control.

"We will support the Government of South Vietnam in carrying out its Anti-Insurgency Plan...." 52/

The next day McNamara formally ended the hope of phased withdrawal, by stopping the lower-echelon joint planning activities that had aimed at replacing U.S. elements in Vietnam by Vietnamese. Although the Vietnamese knew that the "withdrawal" of 1000 men in December 1963 had been a pretense, his action now removed any remaining doubt about our intentions. The message was brief:

"Model Plan projection for phasedown of U.S. forces and GVN forces is superseded. Policy is as announced by White House on 17 March 64." 53/

5. Opening Bids on Advice, Leverage, and AID, April-May, 1964

Armed with our declaration of support and with the promised further material assistance, General Khanh signed a mobilization decree on April 4; at the time the decree satisfied the USG as meeting McNamara's recommendation on the subject. 54/ However, Khanh delayed signing implementing decrees for the mobilization decree indefinitely; and it has never become clear what it would have meant, if implemented. In May, Khanh purportedly broadened the draft to include older and younger men, and announced formation of a new "Civil Defense Corps"; but neither came to anything. On April 4, Khanh also abolished the Council of Notables. This latter step he did on his own, without prior discussion with Lodge. As noted in section 1, Lodge, who always believed in the need and importance of constitutional government in SVN, felt no urgency for creating a democratic form of government, although many in State may have wanted to object to Khanh's actions. 55/ Such actions without prior consultation were to become a sore point later on with both State and the Embassy. Thus, what the USG actually got for the recognition and material support it gave Khanh in March was the dissolution of the Council of Notables. 56/

During April, Lodge and State continued to debate how hard to push GVN using AID leverage. Lodge agreed with the general principle that the Commercial Import Program (CIP) should not be increased until increased GVN expenditures quickened the economy and drove imports up. However, he noted that GVN had been given to understand that they could expect at least the $95 million CIP in 1964 that Diem had in 1963, and that McNamara had said in Saigon and Washington that U.S. assistance to Vietnam would increase by about $50 million. These assurances had spurred Oanh, Minister of National Economy, to ask for specific increases in CIP. Lodge thought the time unpropitious for detailed joint planning and for austerity measures as conditions for the last increment of 1964 CIP. Oanh received credit for being too busy with pacification planning and other matters to discuss such matters. Therefore, Lodge proposed to use the planning of the CY 1965 program as the right place to apply leverage. 57/

State reacted sharply, questioning whether the USG should let GVN off the hook on its March commitments that easily. Nevertheless, State acknowledged that "formal negotiations may not be desirable at this time," and settled instead for "constant dialogue to keep GVN aware of U.S. adherence to the new approach and of firm desire to see it implemented." The desired GVN actions included drawdown of foreign exchange reserves, promotion of exports, import austerity, and an anti-inflationary domestic policy. 58/

USOM then talked to Oanh about the commitments on the two sides. USOM felt that Oanh understood that GVN was to move first and be backed up by the USG as needed, but thought that some segments of GVN were dragging their heels to avoid living up to their commitments. USOM estimated a $15-30 million drawdown of GVN foreign exchange reserves in 1964. 59/

In the last week of April, General Khanh asked Lodge for one American expert each in the fields of Finance-Economics, Foreign Affairs,

and Press relations to be assigned to him personally and to have offices in "a convenient villa...We Vietnamese want the Americans to be responsible with us and not merely as advisors." This request revived the "brain trust" concept discussed with the Minh government around the first of the year. Commenting, Lodge noted that he had opposed pushing Americans into GVN because of Colonialist overtones; they would cause resentment, and a lessening of effort by the GVN, placing the blame on the U.S. Therefore, he had avoided raising the idea with Khanh. However, that Khanh himself now proposed it removed that objection, and Lodge felt that the U.S. should respond because it was an urgent necessity.

Late in the same meeting, Lodge told Khanh of a State Department proposal for civil administrators on a crash basis in partially pacified areas. His quick reply, "Yes...if you will accept losses."

Lodge recommended a Civil Administrative advisor to join the three others mentioned above, but he advised against more. He said there was no sense dumping several hundred advisors out there. In view of the "trail-blazing" nature of the move, he requested a member of the White House staff, possibly Forrestal, to come out for a conference. 60/ Ordinarily, it would be surprising that Lodge would make such a big issue of Khanh's revival of an idea that GVN had already advanced through Lodge and that the President himself had approved. However, his effusive reaction in this case merely underlines his oft-repeated reluctance to push GVN. Lodge presented the first three advisors to Khanh on May 6. 61/

On April 30, Lodge, Westmoreland, and USOM Director Brent met with several top members of GVN to discuss GVN's failure to disburse operating funds to the provinces, sectors and divisions and to correct the manpower shortage in ARVN and the paramilitary units. Lodge argued that the McNamara program was failing, not because U.S. support lagged, but because the necessary piaster support was missing. Moreover, he said, there was no shortage of piasters available to GVN. In reply, Oanh of the GVN said they had inherited a bad system from the French, and that he was now trying to implement new procedures. Khanh replied on the manpower problem that to raise the strength would require an ultimatum to the Corps Commanders, but then he also said that remedial moves were underway and were known to MACV. Khanh countered the budgetary argument by saying that he had still not received money from the U.S. to support increased pay for the paramilitary; Lodge replied that if he went ahead with the increased pay, the U.S. would meet the bill. Overall, the meeting was one of thrust and parry rather than of consultation. 62/ This meeting followed prodding from McNamara and JCS in a cable sent April 29. 63/

On May 4, Khanh told Lodge he wanted to declare war, bomb North Vietnam with U.S. bombers, put the country on a war footing, including "getting rid of the so-called politicians and having...a government of technicians," and bring in 10,000 U.S. Army special forces to "cover the whole Cambodian-Laotian frontier." Lodge was non-committal on U.S. forces, but said that the war came first and that democratic forms could wait. 64/ However, Khanh publicly called for an election by October of a Constitutional Assembly, apparently to bolster his public support; he had his share of rumors and political infighting. 65/

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IN

ORIGINAL

DOCUMENT

rather be listed as 'assistants' to the Vietnamese principals at the various levels of government...

"Americans should be integrated to all levels of the Vietnamese Government...Americans would be integrated into the Central Government to insure that decisions are taken, orders are issued and funds, supplies and personnel are made available for their implementation, and execution actually takes place. At the regional level Americans, both military and civilian, would also be introduced...Americans would likewise be brought into the government machinery at province and district level to insure that the counterinsurgency programs are actually executed at the level at which the people live.

"Aside from the command aspect which Americans would assume, the principal other new element in this concept would be the introduction of American civilians at the district level. Their purpose would be to insure that programs are put into effect at the village and hamlet level to gain the support of the people...

"Personnel at the district level would confront a maximum risk and casualties are virtually certain. Since the U.S. should take any feasible measure to assure their security, it is important that Vietnamese units of the Civil Guard and Self-Defense Corps, which operate at this level, be encadred with an adequate number of American military personnel to insure that they will operate effectively."

This DPM also proposed extensive reshuffling of the lines of authority in the GVN itself, including the elimination of divisions from the Vietnamese military structure and placing all authority for pacification, military and civilian, in the hands of the province chiefs under the corps commanders. 73/

The Vietnam Committee watered down this proposal immediately, however. On May 27, it went to four high-level addressees as a talking paper, with the second sentence of the above recommendation altered to say, "They should become more than advisors, but should not become an integral part of the chain of command." (Emphasis added.) Recognizing Vietnamese sensitivities and the GVN's political vulnerability, the revised paper recommended a gradual, phased approach. But even the watered-down version was termed "radical" in the cable putting it on the agenda for the upcoming Honolulu Conference. 74/

In the new advisory program already underway, MACV reported a big improvement by late May in the experimental districts with U.S. advisors. People rather than messages moved back and forth. Economic and social bonds were reported improved. Further extension of advisors to districts was put

on the agenda. 75/ In preliminary communications, General Taylor, Chairman of the JCS, assumed that their mission would be to supervise unit training, operational performance, and operational planning of para-military units in the districts; but he also suggested discussion of other ways in which military personnel could be used to advantage in forwarding the pacification program. 76/

The month ended with a Rusk-Khanh meeting that re-emphasized the accepted priorities of U.S. policy, and unquestionably confirmed to the Vietnamese how far we were thinking of going. First, Rusk emphasized to Khanh the effect of Vietnamese quarreling on the U.S. and on other potential allies in the struggle. Second, they discussed immediate extensions of the war, such as attacking the Laotian corridor, and the various further extensions that might follow. Third, Khanh pushed hard on the idea, which as noted above had already been discussed in Washington, that he could not win without extending the war. Finally, Khanh pledged to keep all these matters secret until the U.S. agreed to overt statement or action.

The language of the cable reporting this meeting is candid and revealing:

> "1. Solidarity Within South Vietnam
>
> "...Secretary /Rusk/ stated one of main problems President faces in justifying to American people whatever course of action may be necessary or indicated as matter of internal solidarity of SVN. Secretary noted that if struggle escalates, only U.S. will have the forces to cope with it.
>
> "This basic reality means President has heavy responsibility of making vital decisions and leading American public opinion to accept them. Difficult to do this if SVN appears hopelessly divided and rent by internal quarrels.
>
> "...Secretary said he was not thinking in terms of displaying solidarity so as to convince Paris that struggle could be won, but rather was thinking in terms of sustaining the faith in the possibilities of ultimate success of our Vietnamese effort among those nations we hoped 'would be in the foxholes with us' if escalation became necessary and if enemy forces reacted in strength. For example, UK, Australia, New Zealand. Solidarity and unit of purpose in SVN was keystone of whole effort. Was General Khanh doing all he could to bring about such national unity?
>
> "Khanh replied affirmatively, saying he fully aware of importance of unity. His recent handling of the case of the arrested Generals showed this. His clemency showed he was primarily interested in protecting unity of Army. But there were many problems. Underlying structure and heritage of country was such that only Army could lead Nation in unity. Only

Army had the requisite organization, cadres, discipline, and sense of purpose. The intellectuals would never be able to adopt a common point of view unless it was imposed by a dictatorship -- by a party as the Communists did, of a 'family dictatorship' such as Diem's. This situation was made worse because of disproportion between measure of political and civil liberties granted in wartime situation on one hand and lack of background and sense of responsibility of recipients on [the] other...He was aware he had perhaps given more freedom than really prudent handling of situation would have dictated, but he had to be mindful oft-proclaimed democratic goals of the Vietnamese revolution. All in all, this disunity would not be fatal because Army itself was united, and no potentially disruptive force could hope to oppose Army and overthrow GVN. (N.B. No reference to religious problems, sects, or labor under this heading.)

"2. Need for Action Outside South Vietnam.

"...Khanh dwelt at length on this, laying out some fairly precise ideas about the kind of action that might be taken.

"Basically, he said that despite the pacification plan and some individual successes he and his government were 'on the defensive' against the Viet Cong. He said pretty flatly that they could not win unless action was taken outside South Vietnam, and that this needed a firm U.S. decision for such action.

"...He [Khanh] then said that the 'immediate' response should be to clean out the Communists in Eastern Laos, who were the same kind of threat to him, and that we should not get bogged down in negotiations but act.

"...Secretary then noted we could never predict enemy reaction with certainty. How would SVN people react if NVN and China responded by attacking SVN? Khanh replied this would have even more favorable effect on SVN national unity and faith in victory, and would mobilize usual patriotic reactions in face of more clearcut external threat.

"3. Timing of Action Against the North and Necessary Prior Action Within South Vietnam.

"Khanh asked if Secretary and Ambassador believed he should proclaim state of war existed during next few days and now that Generals' case was settled. Both advised him to wait at least until after Honolulu Conference and in no case ever to take action on such matter without consulting. He agreed, and remarked that if he proclaimed state

of war, NVN would know this was preparatory to some form of escalation and he would never act unilaterally and thereby run risk of tipping America's hand. Although the matter was not specifically mentioned, Khanh appeared to accept as entirely natural that he would not necessarily know in advance if U.S. decided to strike outside VN.

"...Some question as to how enemy camp will react. At various points in conversation Khanh was obviously seeking some more definite statement of specific American intentions in immediate future. Secretary told him he could say nothing on this because he simply did not know. The Honolulu meeting would produce some firm recommendations to the President and some plans, but ultimately only President could decide. His decision would be influenced by consideration of all implications of escalation: On our forces, on our allies, and perhaps even on mankind itself if nuclear warfare should result. Only U.S. had the means to cope with problems escalation would pose, and only President could make the ultimate decisions.

"Nevertheless, Secretary said he wished to emphasize the following:

A. Since 1945 U.S. had taken 165,000 casualties in defense of free world against Communist encroachments, and most of these casualties were in Asia.

B. U.S. would never again get involved in a land war in Asia limited to conventional forces.

D. Regardless what decisions were reached at Honolulu, their implementation would require positioning of our forces. This would take time. Khanh must remember we had other responsibilities in Asia and must be able react anywhere we had forces or commitments. Not by chance

was this Conference being held at Honolulu; the combined headquarters of all American forces in Pacific was there.

"...6. Comment.

"As can be seen, the Secretary let Khanh develop his ideas fairly fully and do most of the talking.* Khanh talked firmly and effectively, and responded well to the Secretary's several points. He showed clearly that he was aware of the gravity of the decisions (tho he did seem a touch cavalier about the political problems of hitting eastern Laos at once), and did not seem to want a firm U.S. answer the day after tomorrow. But it seemed clear that he did want it pretty soon, and was now convinced he could not win in South Vietnam without hitting other areas including the North. He was careful to point out that the pacification campaign was making gains and would continue do so. Still, it was essentially defensive.

"On the timing, the Secretary said that any action would be preceded in any event by some period of time for force deployments. (He did not refer to diplomatic steps re Laos, the UN side, the U.S. Congressional problem, or other types of factors). Khanh understood this, and also accepted the Secretary's point that we would need to consult very closely with Khanh himself, try to bring the British and Australians aboard (the Secretary referred only to these two possible active participants), and generally synchronize and work out the whole plan with great care." 77/

Thus although the USG had pressed GVN on many details of economic policy, administration, and pacification, contacts at the highest level told GVN that if the Vietnamese leaders would only stick together to prosecute the war, and if we compelled the North Vietnamese to cease and desist, everything would be all right. Provided the GVN didn't embarrass the USG too much, there was no limit to how far we would go to support them; and apart from "unity" and a reasonable show of effort, there was no onus on them to deliver the goods. Khanh's claim that he could not win without extending the war, and that the Vietnamese were tired of the long dreary grind of pacification, met no U.S. objection.

7. The Honolulu Conference and Its Follow-Up, June, 1964

The Honolulu Conference met on short notice with an air of urgency; principals included McNamara, Rusk, Lodge, Taylor, and Westmoreland. Presentations of the current situation preceded consideration of additional measures to be taken. Lodge briefed those present on the political status. He said the situation could "jog along," but he thought that some external action would be a big lift to South Vietnamese morale. Lodge's prediction was more optimistic than later events, in August, proved justified; he said "if we bombed Tchepone or attacked the [NVN torpedo] boats and the Vietnamese people knew about it, this would...unify their efforts and reduce [their] quarreling." In reply to a question by Rusk, he opposed the idea of a more

*Comment: Nevertheless, as can be seen, the Secretary spoke freely.

formal joint USG/GVN organization at the top; McNamara hoped that a more formal organization would evolve. Lodge felt that the USG/GVN relationship was harmonious, and that GVN was responsive to advice. He like the present methods of dealing with them. Westmoreland called the military picture "tenuous but not hopeless" and added that a few victories were badly needed. Both were more optimistic than was the prevailing Washington view. 78/

All present agreed that the emergence of a hostile government or anarchy would be a major threat to the U.S. position. 79/ The fear of this threat undoubtedly helps explain the USG's persistent hesitancy to apply leverage to GVN.

Westmoreland circulated a working paper calling for moderate increases in U.S. personnel, both civilian and military, for eight critical provinces. He reported that the GVN had recently responded to massive advisory pressure by increasing the tempo of their military operations. He felt they would similarly respond to a continuing advisory program oriented toward pacification. Both Lodge and Westmoreland rejected, as both unwise and unacceptable to GVN, any major plan for "inter-larding" or "encadrement" which would move U.S. personnel directly into decision-making roles. Their opposition ended conference consideration of the proposals advanced by the Sullivan memorandum.

In a long draft memorandum, dated June 13, 1964, Sullivan added some further insight into US/GVN relations and into the views of Lodge and Westmoreland about national priorities, beyond what is shown in the CINCPAC record of the Conference.

> "In attempting to accomplish many of these programs, we have encountered resistance both from the Vietnamese and from our own U.S. Mission. Ambassador Lodge...fears that the increased introduction of Americans would give a colonial coloration to our presence there and would cause the Vietnamese to depend more and more on our execution of their programs. The Vietnamese...have some fear of appearing to be American puppets...Finally, there is some indication that they are reluctant to associate themselves too closely with the Americans until they feel more confident of ultimate American intentions.
>
> "At the current moment, there is great doubt and confusion in Vietnam about U.S. determination...As a leading Saigon newspaper said on June 12: 'We must be vigilant and we must be ready to meet any eventuality so as to avoid the possible shameful sacrifice and dishonor to our country as in the past.'
>
> "Given this sort of atmosphere in South Vietnam, it is very difficult to persuade the Vietnamese to commit themselves to sharp military confrontations with the communists if they suspect that something in the way of a negotiated deal is being

concocted behind their backs. Consequently, many of the actions which we are pressing on the South Vietnamese are flagging because of this uncertainty...

"Both Ambassador Lodge and General Westmoreland, at the Honolulu Conference expressed the opinion that the situation in South Vietnam would 'jog along' at the current stalemated pace unless some dramatic 'victory' could be introduced to put new steel and confidence into the Vietnamese leadership. General Westmoreland defined 'victory' as a determination to take some new vigorous military commitment, such as air strikes against Viet Cong installations in the Laos corridor. Ambassador Lodge defined 'victory' as a willingness to make punitive air strikes against North Vietnam. The significant fact about both...suggestions was that they looked toward some American decision to undertake a commitment which the Vietnamese would interpret as a willingness to raise the military ante and eschew negotiations begun from a position of weakness.

"While it is almost impossible to establish measurements of Vietnamese morale, we are able to say that there is not at the current moment a single galvanized national purpose, expressed in the government leadership and energizing all elements of the country with a simple sense of confidence." 80/

The selective Westmoreland plan offered hope and was sufficiently general to avoid specific opposition. The conference agreed that Saigon should complete the plan and work urgently on its implementation.

Several more minor decisions were made on unilateral matters. 'Czar' powers for information were put in the hands of Zorthian. It was agreed that the DCM should be strengthened with a "truly executive man," and there was to be a clearing-of-decks on the military side in Saigon through reductions in social activities and cut-downs in dependents. None of these measures was expected to affect the dubious prognosis for the next 3-6 months. The best that could be hoped for was a slight gain by the end of the year.

There was serious discussion of military plans and intelligence estimates regarding wider actions outside South Vietnam. Subjects included the conduct of military operations in Laos, a major build-up of forces, and planning of possible air strikes against North Vietnam. The conclusion reached was that the somewhat less pessimistic estimate of the present situation afforded the opportunity to further refine these plans.

The conference concluded that the crucial actions for the immediate future were (1) to prosecute an urgent information effort in the United States toward dispelling the basic doubts of the value of Southeast Asia which were besetting key members of Congress and the public in the budding "great debate," and (2) to start diplomatic efforts with the Thais, Australians, New Zealanders, Philippines, and the French on matters within

their cognizance which impinged on our effort in South Vietnam.

Upon his return to Washington, the Secretary of State cabled Saigon a specific listing of the Washington understanding of the ten actions that were to be taken to expand U.S. and Vietnamese activities in the super-critical provinces. The gist of the actions is as follows:

(1) Move in additional VN troops to assure numerical superiority over VC.

(2) Assign control of all troops in province to province chief.

(3) Develop and execute detailed hamlet by hamlet "oil spot" and "clear and hold" operations plans for each of the approximate 40 districts.

(4) Introduce a system of population control (curfews, ID papers, intelligence network).

(5) Increase the province police force.

(6) Expand the information program.

(7) Develop a special economic aid program for each province.

(8) Add additional U.S. personnel (initially from within SVN).

320	military province and district advisors
40	USOM province and district advisors
74	battalion advisors (2 from each of 37 battalions)
434	

(9) Transfer military personnel to fill existing and future USOM shortages.

(10) Establish joint US/GVN teams to monitor the program at both national and provincial level.

The message concluded by asking Saigon to forward specific proposals to effect these decisions and a time schedule, "earliest." 81/ The plan to give province advisors a petty cash fund (above, p.19) received so little support that there is no mention of it in either the CINCPAC or the State Conference Record.

Upon his return to Saigon on June 4, Ambassador Lodge went straight from the airport to call on General Khanh. While Lodge mentions in his report that the subject of low ARVN strength was raised as a matter to be

improved upon, the main thrust of his talk with Khanh was to hint that the USG would in the immediate future be preparing U.S. public opinion for actions against North Vietnam. Khanh was reported to be eager to learn more about the details. 82/

On June 13, Saigon replied to the State request for specific proposals. A MACV study had been completed on point 1 and the RVNAF would be approached. On point 2, it was noted that RF and PF were already under the province chiefs; ARVN would be approached on province command of regulars. A wordy description of "concept" spoke to the remainder of State's ten points. 83/ It provoked a long series of specific questions from Washington about the 8 provinces, asking in short, "How soon can action be initiated?" 84/

On June 25, COMUSMACV sent his request to JCS for an increase of 4,200 U.S. personnel to implement this expanded advisory effort. He viewed these as efforts to "influence the successful planning and execution of the National Pacification Plan." Subsector advisors were to be "a general reinforcement of the pacification effort at district level." 85/ Consequently, the MACV terms of reference for subsector advisors were developed to provide that teams would extend the capabilities of USOM and USIS. Guidance was intentionally not specific.

The same day General Westmoreland reported that, with the Ambassador's concurrence, he had called on General Khanh to discuss three military matters: (1) Augmentation of advisors at battalion level and extension of larger advisory teams to most districts; (2) The urgent need to coordinate pacification efforts in the provinces surrounding Saigon; and (3) The necessity of moving a regiment to Long An (the pacification show-case) as soon as possible. General Khanh's reply was very receptive and agreeable on all matters. 86/

On June 26, Lodge sent his last message as Ambassador reporting that he and General Westmoreland had that day met with General Khanh and had reached "general agreement" on the concept, scope, and organization set forth in the Saigon reply of June 13 (referred to above). 87/

Meanwhile the proposal for a province advisors' fund reappeared in a new form, and won quick approval. USOM agreed that AID should spend $200,000 from its contingency funds for direct purchase of piasters, to allocate to sector advisors for small expenditures (usually less than $25 at a time). The funds were to buy local materials and services for projects using AID commodities; and their use was to be coordinated with the Vietnamese Province Chief. 88/ By subsequent US/GVN agreement, all uses of these funds and commodities, and requisitions of the commodities from Saigon warehouses, required unanimous approval of a three-man ("troika") Provincial Coordinating Committee consisting of the Province Chief, the U.S. AID Provincial Representative and the MACV Sector Advisor. The troika sign-off had already applied to the commodities, as the means to the U.S. veto on their use mentioned above in Section 1. Except for a high-level agreement each year on the size and overall allocation of these resources,

Saigon allowed the Provinces full freedom of action in their use. The intent of this arrangement was to permit prompt action on urgent projects, unaffected by the delays in the GVN administration that plagued regular GVN operations. It also interfered with corrupt misuse of the AID commodities and of purchase piasters.

AMBASSADOR TAYLOR'S FIRST SEVEN MONTHS:

Planning for "Bomb North" Amid Turbulence in the South

1. Ambassador Taylor's Initiation, July, 1964

Ambassador Taylor arrived in Saigon amid the start of planning to extend the war outside the borders of South Vietnam. Rusk had discussed the options with Khanh on June 1, and the participants of the Honolulu Conference had mulled them over further. Although there was no formal decision to recommend new operations in Laos or North Vietnam, there was an atmosphere of expectation. A joint State-Defense message on June 27 authorized joint planning with the Vietnamese Joint General Staff for cross border operations in Laos; on June 30, Westmoreland discussed it with General Khiem, who agreed to initiate joint planning. 1/

Taylor came with a letter of support from the President that cleared up any previous doubt about the Ambassador's control over MACV:

> "I want you to have this formal expression not only of my confidence but of my desire that you have and exercise full responsibility for the effort of the United States in South Vietnam...I wish it clearly understood that this overall responsibility includes the whole military effort in South Vietnam and authorizes the degree of command and control that you consider appropriate." 2/

Either the letter was intended to prevent confusion of authority such as existed among Lodge, Felt, and Harkins, or the expectation of greater militarization of the war made it appropriate to appoint Taylor Ambassador and to give him unchallenged authority.

Taylor met Khanh and presented his credentials on July 8. Khanh promised him "the frank cooperation of a soldier." He said the U.S. should not merely advise, but should participate in making and implementing plans; in this he still held the view he had expressed to Taylor when he, Khanh, was still a Corps Commander. (By referring to Zorthian's contacts with the Minister of Information, Khanh made it clear he had the brain trust idea in mind.) However, he noted that this degree of involvement should be kept secret, because of the criticism it would attract if known. They discussed Minh's trips around the country, and agreed these were useful and constructive. Finally, Taylor stressed the importance of Vietnamese unity and resolve. 3/

The next day Taylor called on the three Vice Premiers, Hoan, Do Mau, and Oanh, and received the civilian point of view. Hoan did most

of the talking, saying that civilian politicians like himself wanted the Army to be supported by the people, but that Khanh and the MRC were difficult to work with: The ruling generals control everything. He said the II Corps Commander lived like a playboy, and that the people were outraged; "ever since we came to power we have been telling population we are soon going to have change, but it never comes. The people are becoming impatient." Moreover, he said, something must be done to raise the standard of behavior of the armed forces toward the population. Taylor received these views diplomatically. 4/

For a while there was a serious effort to go through with close meshing of USOM and GVN planning. On July 17 USOM met with Khanh, Hoan, Oanh and others as a group, which Khanh designated the National Security Council. They discussed joint planning and further meshing of US/GVN organizations, putting the stamp of approval on the arrangement in the Ministry of Information. On July 23 Taylor met Khanh and discussed a second meeting of the NSC. Khanh said the Vietnamese had some difficulty in adjusting their ministerial organization to the requirements of meshing with the U.S. mission subdivisions. Taylor responded that reciprocal adjustments were possible. 5/ Planning and discussion of cross-border operations continued actively. Offensive guerrilla operations in Laos were a major idea; small operations had already begun into North Vietnam, under OPLAN 34A. In the meeting on July 23, Khanh told Taylor he wanted to intensify the operations under 34A and to start air strikes against North Vietnam. He said again, as he had to Rusk on June 1, that he didn't like to look forward to the long, indecisive pull of the in-country pacification program, and doubted that the Army and the people would carry on indefinitely. 6/

The events of July 19-23 made it clear that GVN was straining at the leash; it started public lobbying for cross-border operations. On July 19 Air Marshal Ky spilled the beans to reporters on plans for operations into Laos. Khanh committed a similar indiscretion at a "Unification Rally" on the 19th, and these were followed by GVN press releases and editorials in the Saigon press urging a "march to the North." All these leaks directly violated Khanh's promises to Rusk on June 1 (above, p. 24). Taylor spoke to Khanh sharply about them, and pointed out that they could be interpreted as a campaign to force the USG's hand. Khanh insisted that such a campaign was the furthest thing from his mind; and then confirmed that it was exactly what he had in mind. Following a long, eloquent repetition of his remarks of other occasions on Vietnamese war-weariness, he asked: Why does not the USG recognize that the appearance of North Vietnamese draftees among the prisoners taken in the I Corps meant that the war had entered a new phase and the USG and GVN must respond with new measures? He said Vietnamese spirits had been raised by President Johnson's firm statements earlier in the year (specifically, Los Angeles, January 21), but that following them nothing had happened. The effect was wearing off, and the communists would conclude they were only words. Then Khanh took the offensive and complained to Taylor that U.S. officials were contradicting him

in public statements. For example, MACV had denied that there was an invasion of I Corps by DRV units, as Khanh had claimed in a speech at Danang. Zorthian soothed him by saying that MACV merely corrected a misquotation of one of MACV's own officials; Taylor said no U.S. official would knowingly contradict Khanh. 7/

Taylor took all this patiently, as he did an intelligence report that said Khanh was trying to incite the USG to action against North Vietnam. (The report also said that Ky was saying privately that the GVN should go it alone, because the USG was stalling on account of the U.S. election.) USOM conjectured that Goldwater's nomination had precipitated the "go North" movement. Moreover, within two hours after Khanh's long meeting with Taylor, the Ministry of Defense let fly another press release in the teeth of USOM disapproval, when Khanh ordered the Ministry to reject Zorthian's suggested changes. The only explanation offered was that GVN was extremely sensitive about appearing to be a U.S. puppet. 8/

In an analysis of these events, Taylor argued for tolerance and patience with GVN, and showed no hint of a desire to get tough. He noted that political sniping and maneuvering pressed Khanh to do something dramatic to bolster his support. Taylor feared the GVN might get tired and want to negotiate if they could not get the U.S. more involved. He proposed joint contingency planning for bombing North Vietnam as a means to cool GVN off and to reopen communications with them. 9/

In a long conversation on July 24 Khanh discussed his political problems with Taylor and asked him point blank if he should resign. Taylor flatly said no, that the USG still supported him and definitely wanted no further change in GVN. Khanh then asked for a declaration of support and for pressure on the generals to continue to support him; Taylor agreed. (Comment: Much of Khanh's political problem still revolved around Minh, who had long had good relations with Taylor. This relationship may have worried Khanh, and led him to approach Taylor in this way. However, it may have merely been a way to keep up the pressure on USG on the matter of bombing North. A couple of days later Khanh was again grumbling publicly about being a U.S. puppet.) 10/

In response to Taylor's discussion of GVN motives and of ways to make them happy, State authorized him to tell Khanh the USG had considered attacks on North Vietnam that might begin, for example, if the pressure from dissident South Vietnamese factions became too great. He must keep this confidential. It said to tell him that the USG position had not changed, and that it never excluded the possibility of wider action. When Taylor brought this matter to Khanh for discussion, they first agreed on a GVN announcement of an increase in U.S. personnel and discussed the press leaks on going North. Khanh then took the offensive, complaining to Taylor about press stories suggesting the USG was negotiating with the Chinese through the Pakistani Government, behind the back of GVN. Taylor soothed him by saying that the USG was merely letting China know how firm our policy was. When Taylor asked Khanh his views of U.S. policy, Khanh

said he wanted pressure on the North, meaning a bombing campaign. Taylor replied with the position that State had authorized on joint planning. Khanh acted pleased and surprised, promised to think it over, and promised to hold it tightly. He also said he wanted to reorganize GVN to strengthen his own position; Taylor asked for specifics, and urged him not to do anything drastic that would stir up trouble. 11/

2. The Tonkin Incidents and the Policy Prognoses, August, 1964

Within a week, North Vietnamese PT boats attacked the U.S. destroyer Maddox, in admitted retaliation for an attack by South Vietnamese boats on two North Vietnamese islands. Then a disputed further attack of North Vietnamese PT boats on the Maddox and the Turner Joy on August 4 provoked a U.S. retaliatory raid on the main North Vietnamese PT boat base and its support facilities. The raids lifted GVN's spirits, as expected, and encouraged Khanh to clamp down internally. On August 7, he proclaimed a state of emergency, the idea he had been discussing for some time with both Lodge and Taylor. He reimposed censorship and restricted movement; but he left politicians and potential coup-plotters alone. 12/ Also on August 7, the U.S. Congress in joint session passed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution.

On August 8, Westmoreland discussed overall joint planning with Khanh; the question of combined command came up, and Westmoreland mentioned the example of Korea. Both agreed to postpone this issue. 13/

On August 14, State directed Saigon to avoid actions that could be called provocative, like the DESOTO patrols (which the Maddox and the Turner Joy had been doing when attacked) and 34A operations. State noted that the U.S. retaliatory raid's effect on GVN's morale would be temporary, and took a pessimistic view of the USOM reports:

> "Mission's montly report (Saigon 377) expresses hope of significant gains by end of year. But also says Khanh's chances of staying in power are only 50-50, that leadership... has symptoms defeatism and hates prospect of slugging it out within country, that there will be mounting pressures for wider action 'which, if resisted, will create frictions and irritations which could lead local politicians to serious consideration negotiated solution or local soldiers to military adventure without U.S. consent'...Our actions of last week lifted...morale temporarily, but also aroused expectations, and morale could easily sag back again if VC have successes and we do nothing further."

The cable went on to state that an essential element of U.S. policy was, to devise the best possible means of action -- minimum risks for maximum results in terms of SVN morale and pressure on DRV. In the context of a possible new Geneva conference on Laos, its prognosis was that pressure on the North would be the main vehicle for success:

"Basically solution in both South Vietnam and Laos will require combination military pressure and some form of communication under which Hanoi (and Peiping) eventually accept idea of getting out. Negotiation without continued military action will not achieve our objectives in foreseeable future...After, but only after, we have established clear pattern pressure hurting DRV and leaving no doubts in South Vietnam of our resolve, we could even accept conference broadened to include Vietnam issue." (Underlining in original.)

On the touchy aspect of US/GVN relations, it simply said:

"Joint US/GVN planning already covers possible actions against DRV and the Panhandle. It can be used in itself to maintain morale of GVN leadership, as well as to control and inhibit any unilateral GVN moves." 14/

The Taylor reply to the above message differed only in emphasis.

"...Underlying our analysis is the apparent assumption of DepTel 439 (which we believe is correct) that the present in-country pacification plan is not enough in itself to maintain National morale or to offer reasonable hope of eventual success. Something must be added in the coming months.

"Statement of the problem - A. The course which U.S. policy in South Vietnam should take during the coming months can be expressed in terms of four objectives. The first and most important objective is to gain time for the Khanh government to develop a certain stability and to give some firm evidence of viability. Since any of the courses of action considered in this cable carry a considerable measure of risk to the U.S., we should be slow to get too deeply involved in them until we have a better feel of the quality of our ally. In particular, if we can avoid it, we should not get involved militarily with North Vietnam and possibly with Red China if our base in South Vietnam is insecure and Khanh's Army is tied down everywhere by the VC insurgency. Hence, it is to our interest to gain sufficient time not only to allow Khanh to prove that he can govern, but also to free Saigon from the VC threat which presently rings it and assure that sufficient GVN ground forces will be available to provide a reasonable measure of defense against any DRV ground reaction which may develop in the execution of our program and thus avoid the possible requirement for a major U.S. ground force commitment.

"A second objective in this period is the maintenance of morale in South Vietnam, particularly within the Khanh government. This should not be difficult in the case of the government if we can give Khanh assurance of our readiness to bring added pressure on Hanoi if he provides evidence of ability

to do his part. Thirdly, while gaining time for Khanh, we must be able to hold the DRV in check and restrain a further buildup of Viet Cong strength by way of infiltration from the North. Finally, throughout this period, we should be developing a posture of maximum readiness for a deliberate escalation of pressure against North Vietnam, using January 1, 1965, as a target D-Day. We must always recognize, however, that events may force us to advance D-Day to a considerably earlier date..."

"In approaching the Khanh Government, we should express our willingness to Khanh to engage in planning and eventually to exert intense pressure on North Vietnam, providing certain conditions are met in advance. In the first place before we would agree to go all out against the DRV, he must stabilize his Government and make some progress in cleaning up his operational backyard. Specifically, he must execute the initial phases of the Hop Tac Plan successfully to the extent of pushing the Viet Cong from the doors of Saigon. The overall pacification program, including Hop Tac, should progress sufficiently to allow earmarking at least three division equivalents for the Defense in I Corps if the DRV step up military operations in that area.

"Finally, we should reach some fundamental understandings with Khanh and his Government concerning war aims. We must make clear that we will engage in action against North Vietnam only for the purpose of assuring the security and independence of South Vietnam within the territory assigned by the 1954 agreements; that we will not repeat not join in a crusade to unify the North and South; that we will not repeat not even seek to overthrow the Hanoi Regime provided the latter will cease its efforts to take over the South by subversive warfare.

"With these understandings reached, we would be ready to set in motion the following:

(1) Resume at once 34A (with emphasis on Marine operations) and Desoto patrols. These could start without awaiting outcome of discussions with Khanh.

(2) Resume U-2 overflights over all NVN.

(3) Initiate air and ground strikes in Laos against infiltration targets as soon as joint plans now being worked out with the Khanh Government are ready..."

"Before proceeding beyond this point, we should raise the level of precautionary military readiness (if not already done) by taking such visible measures as introducing U.S. hawk units to Danang and Saigon, landing a Marine force

at Danang for defense of the airfield and beefing up MACV's support base. By this time (assumed to be late fall) we should have some reading on Khanh's performance.

"Assuming that his performance has been satisfactory and that Hanoi has failed to respond favorably, it will be time to embark on the final phase of course of action A, a carefully orchestrated bombing attack on NVN, directed primarily at infiltration and other military targets...

"Pros and cons of course of action -- A. If successful, course of action A will accomplish the objectives set forth at the outset as essential to the support of U.S. policy in South Vietnam. I will press the Khanh Government into doing its homework in pacification and will limit the diversion of interest to the out-of-country ventures... It gives adequate time for careful preparation estimated at several months, while doing sufficient at once to maintain internal morale. It also provides ample warning to Hanoi and Peking to allow them to adjust their conduct before becoming over-committed.

"On the other hand, course of action A relies heavily upon the durability of the Khanh Government. It assumes that there is little danger of its collapse without notice or of its possible replacement by a weaker or more unreliable successor ...Also, because of the drawn-out nature of the program, it is exposed to the danger of international political pressure to enter into negotiations before NVN is really hurting from the pressure directed against it.

"Statement of the Problem -- B. It may well be that the problem of U.S. policy in SVN is more urgent than that depicted in the foregoing statement. It is far from clear at the present moment that the Khanh Government can last until January 1, 1965, although the application of course of action A should have the effect of strengthening the Government internally and of silencing domestic squabbling. If we assume, however, that we do not have the time available which is implicit in course of action A (several months), we would have to restate the problem in the following terms. Our objective avoid the possible consequences of a collapse of National morale. To accomplish these purposes, we would have to open the campaign against the DRV without delay, seeking to force Hanoi as rapidly as possible to desist from aiding the VC and to convince the DRV that it must cooperate in calling off the VC insurgency.

"Course of action -- B. To meet this statement of the problem, we need an accelerated course of action, seeking to

obtain results faster than under course of action A. Such an accelerated program would include the following actions:

"Again we must inform Khanh of our intentions, this time expressing a willingness to begin military pressures against Hanoi at once providing that he will undertake to perform as in course of action A. However, U.S. action would not await evidence of performance.

"Again we may wish to communicate directly on this subject with Hanoi or awaiting effect of our military actions. The scenario of the ensuing events would be essentially the same as under Course A but the execution would await only the readiness of plans to expedite, relying almost exclusively on U.S. military means.

"Pros and cons of Course of Action B. This course of action asks virtually nothing from the Khanh Government, primarily because it is assumed that little can be expected from it. It avoids the consequence of the sudden collapse of the Khanh Government and gets underway with minimum delay the punitive actions against Hanoi. Thus, it lessens the chance of an interruption of the program by an international demand for negotiations by presenting a fait accompli to international critics. However, it increases the likelihood of U.S. involvement in ground action, since Khanh will have almost no available ground forces which can be released from pacification employment to mobile resistance of DRV attacks.

"Conclusion: It is concluded that Course of Action A offers the greater promised achievement of U.S. policy objectives in SVN during the coming months. However, we should always bear in mind the fragility of the Khanh Government and be prepared to shift quickly to Course of Action B if the situation requires. In either case, we must be militarily ready for any response which may be initiated by NVN or by CHICOMS.

"Miscellaneous: As indicated above, we believe that 34A operations should resume at once at maximum tempo, still on a covert basis; similarily, Desoto patrols should begin advance operating outside 12-mile limit. We concur that a number of VNAF pilots should be trained on B-57's between now and first of year. There should be no change now with regard to policy on evacuation of U.S. dependents.

"Recommendations: It is recommended that USG adopt Course of Action A while maintaining readiness to shift to Course of Action B." 15/

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withdrawn, and that the MRC would meet the next day to choose a new Chief of State and would then dissolve itself. 23/

Taylor had made it clear to Minh, Khiem, Lam and Khanh that the U.S. favored retaining Khanh as head of the GVN. Both Tri Quang and Tam Chau, fearing a Dai Viet takeover, supported Khanh. Aligned against Khanh were elements of the military angered by Khanh's "down with military dictatorship" statement made from a truck top and the Dai Viet (including Khiem, Hoan and Minh) angered by his appeasement of the Buddhists. 24/

On August 26 and 27, the MRC met, while violence erupted in the streets of Saigon. The evening of the 27th they announced that a triumvirate consisting of Generals Khanh, Minh, and Khiem would rule as an interim government while they tried to form a new one. Khanh withdrew to Dalat, and Vice-Premier Oanh became acting Prime Minister. Violence continued, and coup rumors became especially active. 25/

On August 29, a State Department official briefed the press, interpreting events. He said Buddhists and students interpreted the August 16 charter as a return to Diemism and repression; in meeting their demands the MRC had worried some Catholics, but balanced things out by creating the triumvirate with all views represented. He said the charter had not been the USG's idea, but that we had been consulted and had urged delay. The demonstrations did not contain appreciable anti-Americanism, he said, nor did they arise from differences between the "go North" feelings of the military and refugee Catholics, on the one hand, and neutralist sentiments of students and Buddhists, on the other. However, the cable reporting the press conference to the Embassy showed concern on both these latter points. 26/

4. GVN Acquires a Civilian Flavor, and the USG Reviews Priorities

On August 29th, Vietnamese paratroopers armed with bayonets restored order in Saigon. Khanh rested in Dalat; Taylor called on him on the 31st to try to persuade him to return to Saigon quickly to prove he was in charge. Westmoreland went to see Khanh the next day to urge him to keep ARVN on the offensive and to press on with Hop Tac and other pacification; in exchange for reassurances, Westmoreland revised a previous position 27/ and promised that U.S. advisors through MACV would alert Khanh to unusual troop movements. Westmoreland also obtained reassurances from General Khiem. Rusk suggested a letter from President Johnson urging Khanh to return to Saigon, and then cabled the text of such a letter. A Dai Viet coup attempt was blocked by the junior members of the MRC, who had now become powerful. Several Generals went to Dalat to persuade Khanh to return as Prime Minister, which he promised to do in a few days. Khanh did return to Saigon on September 4. 28/ Minh was to be chairman of the triumvirate, and would appoint a new High National Council to represent all elements in the population. The Council was to prepare a new constitution and return the government to civilian leadership within a month or so. Khanh was taking the line that he wanted to get the Army out of politics. When Taylor cautioned Khanh; just before the latter's return to Saigon, that an all-civilian government

would be too weak and would tend toward neutralism, Khanh replied that the Army would be vigilant. Taylor again advised Khanh to lay the groundwork better before any more changes in government structure. When the Triumvirate announced the creation of the NHC, they also ended the state of emergency and press censorship, which they had declared on September 6. 29/

On the morning of September 6, as he was leaving for Washington, Taylor sent Rusk a full review of the crisis and of its effects on the Embassy-State military and political appraisal of mid-August. He said that the USG now had to give up on the idea of using a plan for pressures on the North as leverage to get the GVN to press on with pacification, and should go ahead with these pressures in the hope that they would raise Vietnamese morale enough to keep up their war effort:

> "...While we must be disappointed by the political turmoil of recent days, we cannot consider it totally unexpected. The very nature of the social, political and ethnic confusion in this country makes governmental turbulence of this type a factor which we will always have with us.
>
> "What has emerged from these recent events is a definition within fairly broad limits of the degree to which perfectability in government can be pushed. It should be remembered that the recent fracas started when Khanh sought to make his broad and cumbersome government more tractable and more effective. His motives were of the best even though his methods were clumsy. But now, after this recent experience at government improvement we must accept the fact that an effective government, much beyond the capacity of that which has existed over the past several months, is unlikely to survive. We now have a better feel for the quality of our ally and for what we can expect from him in terms of ability to govern. Only the emergence of an exceptional leader could improve the situation and no George Washington is in sight.
>
> "Consequently, we can and must anticipate for the future an instrument of government which will have definite limits of performance. At the very worst, it will continue to seek a broadened consensus involving and attempting to encompass all or most of the minority of popular front. This amalgam, if it takes form, may be expected in due course to become susceptible to an accommodation with the liberation front, which might eventually lead to a collapse of all political energy behind the pacification effort.
>
> "At best, the emerging governmental structure might be capable of maintaining a holding operation against the Viet Cong. This level of effort could, with good luck and strenuous American efforts, be expanded to produce certain limited pacification successes, for example, in the territory covered by the Hop Tac plan. But the willingness and ability of such a government to exert itself or to attempt to execute an all-out

National pacification plan would be marginal. It would probably be incapable of galvanizing the people to the heightened level of unity and sacrifice necessary to carry forward the counter-insurgency program to final success. Instead, it would look increasingly to the United States to take the major responsibility for prying the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese off the backs of the South Vietnamese population. The politicians in Saigon and Hue feel today that the political hassle is their appropriate arena: The conflict with the VC belongs to the Americans.

"We may, therefore, expect to find ourselves faced with a choice of (A) passively watching the development of a popular front, knowing that this may in due course require the U.S. to leave Vietnam in failure; or (B) actively assuming increased responsibility for the outcome following a time-schedule consistent with our estimate of the limited viability of any South Vietnamese government.

"An examination of our total world responsibilities and the significance of Vietnam in relationship to them clearly rules out the option of accepting course (A). If we leave Vietnam with our tail between our legs, the consequences of this defeat in the rest of Asia, Africa and Latin America would be disastrous. We therefore would seem to have little choice left except to accept course (B).

"Our previous views on the right course of action to follow in South Vietnam are set forth in EMBTEL 465. The discussion in this present cable amounts to a recognition that course of action A repeat A of EMBTEL 465 no longer corresponds with the realities of the situation. Recent events have revealed the weakness of our ally and have convinced us of the improbability of attaining the level of governmental performance desired under course A before embarking on a campaign of pressure against the DRV. We are forced back on course of action B with certain revised views on timing."

He went on to recommend that escalating pressures on the DRV begin around December 1. 30/

Taylor brought with him General Westmoreland's assessment of the military situation; it included a look at the political situation from a completely different viewpoint from Taylor's:

"...1. In preparation for your trip to Washington, I thought it might be useful to give you my assessment of the military situation. In subsequent paragraphs I outline in some detail the rather substantial progress which we have

already made and, more importantly, the great potential for additional progress. I also describe military problem areas. These, as you know, are many; but all are susceptible to solution assuming that political stability can be achieved, and that armed forces, particularly the Army, remains intact and unified in its purpose. Under the present circumstances, however, the continued solidarity of the armed forces is in doubt. As all else depends on holding the armed forces together, I address this matter first.

"The Key Military Issue.

"2. It seems to me there are certain conditions which must be met in order to preserve the structure and effectiveness of the RVNAF:

A. The officers of the RVNAF must be protected against purge, solely by reason of religious or political affiliation. The Commander in Chief, the officers of the Joint General Staff and commanders down the line, must be given some assurance that their careers and reputations will not be sacrificed, for political expediency to the ambitions or interests of political or religious blocs.

B. The Officers' Corps must be assured that its members will not be punished or expelled from the armed forces if they faithfully execute the orders of constituted authority in connection with the maintenance of law and order. They must be assured that their superiors will not accede to the arbitrary demands of pressure groups whose interest it is to destroy the discipline of the armed forces and to render ineffective the forces of law and order.

"3. If I interpret correctly the events of the past two weeks, neither of these minimum conditions have been met. To the contrary, actions best calculated to destroy the morale, the unity, the pride and confidence of the armed forces have transpired in a manner which leads me to believe that a relative free-hand has been given to those who aim to destroy the armed forces. The demands of the Buddhists for the resignation of the Commander in Chief, the Chief of Staff, Commander of II Corps, the Prefect of Saigon and the Director of National Police, to name a few, appear to be blows directed at the heart of the security forces which stand between the Viet Cong and victory. I cannot believe that it is in the interests of the Nation to accede to these demands. To the contrary, I am persuaded that acceptance is a formula for political and military disaster. While aware that the insurgency cannot be overcome by military means alone, I am equally aware that without a strong military foundation no program will ever achieve

victory. I am concerned that the Government of Vietnam has already moved some distance down the wrong road in dealing with its Armed Forces. I do not know whether the Armed Forces will collapse or whether, finding the present course intolerable, they will make a desperate move to regain power. Neither course of action is compatible with the objective we seek." 31/

In Washington, Taylor, Rusk, McNamara and Wheeler reached a consensus that (1) Khanh and GVN were too exhausted to be thinking about moves against the North, (2) GVN needs reassurance, and (3) Khanh is likely to stay in control, but not to get much done on the pacification program. 32/ There followed NSAM 314, whose main point was that "first order of business at present is to take actions which will help strengthen the fabric of the GVN." 33/

5. The HNC Goes to Work Amid Further Turbulence

Helping strengthen the fabric of GVN proved to be easier said than done.

Another coup attempt on September 13 failed when Ky and Thi, along with other young officers, supported the existing government. The USG opposed the coup, and also opposed overt violence to suppress it; in particular, USG opposed VNAF bombing of Saigon, which was threatened at one point when the coup generals gained control of much of the city. 34/ When Khanh and Ky asked for U.S. Marines, the USG refused; State authorized a strong line in favor of the Triumvirate, and against internecine war:

"(A) It is imperative that there not be internecine war within VN Armed Forces.

(B) The picture of petty bickering among VN leaders has created an appalling impression abroad...

(C) The U.S. has not provided massive assistance to SVN, in military equipment, economic resources and personnel, in order to subsidize continuing quarrels among SVN leaders...

(G) Emphasize that VN leaders must not take the U.S. for granted.

"2. In line with above you should make it emphatically clear whenever useful, that we do not believe a Phat/Duc government can effectively govern the country or command the necessary popular support to carry forward the effort against the VC. U.S. support for the GVN is based on the triumvirate and its efforts to bring about a broadly based and effective government satisfactorily reflecting the interests and concerns of all groups." 35/

After the coup failed, the Embassy pressed Khanh to exile the coup leaders quietly; and in the upshot they were acquitted of the charges against them. 36/

A fresh problem blew up on September 20 when Rhade tribesmen in four CIDG camps advised by U.S. Special Forces revolted against Saigon's authority. It arose from a long-festering mistrust and contempt between the Montagnards, encouraged by the VC, and the lowland Vietnamese. This problem also vexed US/GVN relations, because the U.S. Special Forces advisors generally got along well with the tribesmen, and some may have sympathized with them; and in particular, it added to Khanh's suspicions of U.S. intentions. Two or three Rhades had become officers in ARVN, and Westmoreland suggested using them as intermediaries with the rebelling units; but Khanh turned the idea down flat. He also declined to make concessions to Montagnard discontent. Then Taylor sent General DePuy as his intermediary to tell the Rhades they were off the payroll until they submitted to GVN authority. This move produced a temporary settlement, but trouble continued to boil up for another two or three weeks. 37/

The High National Council began its deliberations on September 24; Taylor took the occasion to comment that Khanh conceded too much to organized pressure groups. Noting that GVN effectiveness and morale had virtually collapsed, he disliked the purely civilian makeup of the Council, and hoped that it would take its time about writing a permanent constitution. GVN set a deadline of October 27 for this exercise. 38/ Watching on the sidelines, here as at other times, Taylor opposed unsettling charge, and opposed excessive civilian influence because of their presumed factionalism and lack of fervor in prosecuting the war.

6. The HNC Installs Civilian Leadership, October, 1964

The view that bombing the North was the key to success received a fresh airing, this time in a public revelation of what USG was thinking. Assistant Secretary of State William Bundy said in a speech delivered in Tokyo on September 30 that such bombing would cut down the threat to GVN in a matter of months.

Early in October, Khanh succeeded in exiling General Khiem, a member of the triumvirate, whom he had suspected of instigating the September 13 coup attempt; Khiem became Ambassador to the U.S. 39/

As the HNC deliberated, State sent Taylor its guidance on the USG position during the formation of the new government-to-be:

> "1. We concur that we must... avoid any public espousal of charter or people, although we will undoubtedly be charged in any event with considerable responsibility for the selection of the form and personnel of any new government...We cannot privately disclaim any preference for individuals or form of government because of our intense interest in seeing a new government having sound organization, able members, and broad basis of popular support. We also

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The new cabinet froze out Minh, no doubt to improve the palatability of the new government to the dominant group in the MRC. Minh then packed up and went abroad on a good will tour; Taylor found the cash cost to the U.S. running high, but recommended paying it. 47/ In his overall assessment of the balance of power in the new government, Taylor thought that the MRC had allowed civilians to get power (as promised in August) because the MRC feared mob violence, and thought it expedient to let the civilians make a mess of it so that military rule would again become acceptable. That is, he hoped and expected that a military return to power would become widely acceptable. Taylor thought the overall political prospects were "faintly encouraging." Commenting in reply, State once again emphasized the accepted links between U.S. commitment and GVN morale and efforts:

> "A key element in either the immediate program or the long-range course of action will be the nature of our discussions with the GVN. Sullivan has impressed on us the seriousness of SVN doubts as to U.S. intentions...More basically, we believe no course of action can succeed unless we are able to stiffen GVN to set its house in order and take every possible measure for political stability and to push forward the pacification program." 48/

These links received a full airing between Taylor and State and between Taylor and Huong. To State, Taylor said:

> "We have had a great deal of discussion here as to the minimum level of government required to justify mounting military pressure against the North. I would describe that minimum government as one capable of maintaining law and order in the urban areas, of securing vital military bases from VC attacks, and giving its efforts with those of USG. As Reference B indicates we do not expect such a government for 3 to 4 months...perhaps not then if the current attempts to chip away at the Huong government continue....However, if the government falters and gives good reason to believe that it will never attain the desired level of performance, I would favor going against the North anyway. The purpose of such an attack would be to give pulmotor treatment for a government in extremis and to make sure that the DRV does not get off unscathed in any final settlement." 49/

In his conversation with Huong, the latter requested:

> "That I obtain a reaffirmation of U.S. policy toward VN. Huong referred to U.S. action in Gulf of Tonkin and the lift in morale VN had received at this display of determination by the U.S. to strike against the North. Subsequently, however, U.S. had appeared to emphasize almost exclusively necessity considering war within SVN

itself. I responded that reciprocal responsibilities were involved. On the GVN side it was essential that a stable government be established capable of directing affairs of the Nation and particularly of directing the national pacification effort...Should his government demonstrate it was capable of achieving satisfactory degree of government stability and effectiveness a wider range of possibilities would undoubtedly be open for discussion...Huong indicated his complete understanding of the situation." 50/

At this time another case of non-consultation blew up. RVNAF reorganization plans had passed back and forth between the MRC and MACV since July. Then, on November 10, the MRC produced a plan that differed materially from the last one MACV had seen, Huong signed it, and it was published on November 11 before MACV could review it. Westmoreland and Taylor both protested to their respective contacts in the strongest terms; the decrees were withdrawn, changed to MACV's satisfaction, and reissued. 51/

On November 26, Westmoreland squelched an apparent coup planned by Ky. He heard of unusual activity at VNAF headquarters and asked Ky to his office. Ky bluntly stated a case for a change of leadership. Westmoreland said:

"After patiently listening to the foregoing, I informed Ky in no uncertain terms that the U.S. government would not support a change of command by other than orderly and legal process. (This statement was cleared in advance with Ambassador Johnson.) Ky was obviously impressed by my statement and said that he would not take action for three months, but if the situation continued to deteriorate he would be constrained to act in national interest." 52/

This episode was the first sign of Young Turk action against the new government, and the first recorded sign of Ky's own ambitions. The U.S. reaction underlined the USG's opposition to sudden change without broad support, even though it was expected that the military would return to power eventually.

8. A Lecture And a Program For GVN

NSAM 314, September 10, which had called for actions to strengthen GVN, had set wheels in motion toward spelling out a U.S. program within SVN to complement the contemplated actions against the North. Taylor returned to Washington for consultations at the end of November. In the NSC, he argued that a strong message to GVN about its problems would most likely produce the optimum response. He said a threat by the U.S. to withdraw unless they improve would be too much of a gamble. There was no discussion of intermediate leverage or sanctions between this extreme threat and none at all. The discussion also highlighted the fear that GVN might collapse or be replaced by neutralists who would ask the U.S. to withdraw; all agreed that neutralism could not be accepted, and that

the U.S. should minimize this risk by full backing of the existing GVN. 53/

Taylor returned to Saigon with an approved statement and program for GVN that embodied his principal recommendations. Its public aspect was an across the board increase in the approved strengths of all elements of RVNAF and the paramilitary, in support of the Hop Tac pacification plan and its outgrowths that had been in the works since July. Its unannounced aspect included a rationale showing a clear shift of emphasis from the views at the highest levels that had developed in the first half of the year. As presented to GVN, it said:

> "It was the clear conclusion of the recent review in Washington of the situation in South Vietnam that the unsatisfactory progress being made in the Pacification Program was the result of two primary causes from which many secondary causes stem. The primary cause has been the governmental instability in Saigon, and the second the continued reinforcement and direction of the Viet Cong by the Government of North Vietnam. It was recognized that to change the downward trend of events, it will be necessary to deal adequately with both of these factors.
>
> "However it was the clear view that these factors are not of equal importance. First and above all, there must be a stable, effective Vietnamese Government able to conduct a successful campaign against the Viet Cong even if the aid from North Vietnam for the Viet Cong should end. It was the view that, while the elimination of North Vietnam intervention would raise morale on our side and make it easier for the Government of Vietnam to function, it would not in itself bring an end to Viet Cong insurgency. It would rather be an important contributory factor to the creation of conditions favoring a successful campaign against the Viet Cong within South Vietnam.
>
> "Thus, since action against North Vietnam would only be contributory and not central to winning the war against the Viet Cong, it would not be prudent to incur the risks which are inherent in an expansion of hostilities until there were a government in Saigon capable of handling the serious problems inevitably involved in such an expansion, and capable of promptly and fully exploiting the favorable effects which may be anticipated if we are successful in terminating the support and direction of the Viet Cong by North Vietnam."

Then it went to the point:

> "...In the view of the United States, there is a certain minimum condition to be brought about in South Vietnam before new measures against North Vietnam would be either justified or practicable. At the minimum, the Government in Saigon

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should be able to speak for and to its people who will need special guidance and leadership throughout the coming critical period. The Government should be capable of maintaining law and order in the principal centers of population, assuring their effective execution by military and police forces completely responsive to its authority. The Government must have at its disposal means to cope promptly and effectively with enemy reactions which must be expected to result from any change in the pattern of our operations.

"To bring about this condition will require a demonstration of far greater national unity against the Communist enemy at this critical time than exists at present. It is a matter of greatest difficulty for the United States Government to require great sacrifices by American citizens on behalf of South Vietnam when reports from Saigon repeatedly give evidence of heedless self-interest and shortsightedness among so many major political groups.

As a quid pro quo, it said:

"...While the Government of Vietnam is making progress toward achieving the goals set forth above, the United States Government would be willing to strike harder at infiltration routes in Laos and at sea. With respect to Laos, the United States Government is prepared, in conjunction with the Royal Laos Government, to add United States air power as needed to restrict the use of Laotian territory as a route of infiltration into South Vietnam. With respect to the sea, the United States Government would favor an intensification of those covert maritime operations which have proved their usefulness in harassing the enemy. The United States would regard the combination of these operations in Laos and at sea as constituting Phase I of a measured increase of military pressures directed toward reducing infiltration and warning the Government of North Vietnam of the risks it is running.

"...If the Government of Vietnam is able to demonstrate its effectiveness and capability of achieving the minimum conditions set forth above, the United States Government is prepared to consider a program of direct military pressure on North Vietnam as Phase II...

"As contemplated by the United States Government, Phase II would, in general terms, constitute a series of air attacks on North Vietnam progressively mounting in scope and intensity for the purpose of convincing the leaders of North Vietnam that it is to their interest to cease aid to the Viet Cong and respect the independence and security of South Vietnam..." 54/

In short, the USG offered to add some of its aircraft immediately to the Vietnamese ones already bombing the Laotian corridor, in exchange for a

GVN promise of a shift to more energy and effectiveness; then when such energy and effectiveness actually became visible, the USG promised, the USG would begin bombing North Vietnam.

The program included the following areas in which progress would aid pacification and would measure the GVN's effectiveness:

1. and 2. Increasing RVNAF, paramilitary, and police to and above existing authorized strengths.

3. Better performance by civilian and military officials.

4. Speeding up budgetary procedures and spending in the provinces.

5. Strengthening the province chiefs.

6. Strengthening police powers.

7. More vigor in Hop Tac.

8. After a delay, "review cases of political prisoners from previous regimes." 55/

To leave no doubt about what it wanted, the program said:

> "Better performance in the prosecution of the war against the Viet Cong needs to be accompanied by actions to convince the people of the interest of their government in their well-being. Better performance in itself is perhaps the most convincing evidence but can be supplemented by such actions as frequent visits by officials and ranking military officers to the provinces for personal orientation and "trouble shooting." The available information media offer a channel of communication with the people which could be strengthened and more efficiently employed. The physical appearance of the cities, particularly of Saigon, shows a let-down in civic pride which, if corrected, would convey a message of governmental effectiveness to their inhabitants. Similarly, in the country an expanded rural development program could carry the government's presence into every reasonably secure village and hamlet.
>
> "If governmental performance and popular appeal are significantly improved, there will be little difficulty in establishing confidence in the government. However, this confidence should be expressed, not merely implied. It is particularly important that the military leaders continue to express public confidence in the government and the firm intention to uphold it. While not giving an impression of submitting to pressure, the government might explore honorable

ways of conciliating its most important opponents among the minority groups. The United States Government is prepared to help by oral statements of support and by further assistance to show our faith in the future of South Vietnam." 56/

Taylor, Westmoreland, and Johnson met Huong, Deputy Premier Vien, and Khanh on December 7 to present them with the new U.S. program. The Vietnamese group politely suggested that they did not know what the USG meant by a stable effective government able to campaign successfully against the Viet Cong, and able to speak for and to its people. Moreover, they noted that the U.S. program said nothing about Viet Cong use of Cambodia. At the next meeting, on December 9, Taylor gave them the paper "Actions Designed to Strengthen the Government of Vietnam," covering the eight areas of desired progress and measures of GVN effectiveness listed above. The Prime Minister replied that the issue of political prisoners from previous regimes was a very delicate matter; Khanh said there was no problem about military support of the existing government. Taylor cabled President Johnson that the USG proposals:

> "have been received with an understanding reasonableness in the light of the current situation but without great enthusiasm since they necessarily omit some of the more dramatic actions which the Vietnamese desire."

The only decisons reached were for joint study and consultation. 57/ This was the last time the USG tried to set GVN performance preconditions for U.S. force use and deployments. Its effect, if any, was the opposite of that intended.

9. The Government's Support Vanishes, and Taylor Confronts the Generals

A new threat of crisis boiled up immediately; first, the leading Buddhists declared their opposition to the government and went on a forty-eight hour hunger strike. Huong stood fast, but then the Young Turks picked a fight through a sudden demand that the HNC dismiss nine generals and thirty other officers. (These included some, like Minh and the "Dalat" generals expelled by Khanh, who no longer had jobs but still held their rank and received Army pay.) Taylor backed Huong and the HNC against all comers, and tried to get Buddhists and others to support them. The HNC refused to retire the 39 officers. But the Young Turks, playing for Buddhist support, would not be denied. In the early morning hours of Sunday, December 20, they arrested twenty-two or more officials and politicians, including several members of the HNC, and made dozens of other political arrests. They also created an "Armed Forces Council" over or replacing the MRC, to consolidate their power. 58/

Through Huong and indirect contacts, Taylor found out about the dissolution of the HNC several hours before Khanh announced it at a press conference; and one hour before the conference Khanh spoke to Taylor about it. Taylor protested in the strongest terms, but without effect; Khanh went ahead with the announcement. Taylor and Johnson also met with the

Young Turk leaders, Ky, Thieu, Thi, and Cang, and gave them a stern lecture, speaking, as he later put it, "as one soldier to another." As recorded just afterward by the U.S. participants, the meeting went as follows:

"...AMBASSADOR TAYLOR: Do all of you understand English? (Vietnamese officers indicated they did, although the understanding of General Thi was known to be weak.) I told you all clearly at General Westmoreland's dinner we Americans were tired of coups. Apparently I wasted my words. Maybe this is because something is wrong with my French because you evidently didn't understand. I made it clear that all the military plans which I know you would like to carry out are dependent on governmental stability. Now you have made a real mess. We cannot carry you forever if you do things like this. Who speaks for this group? Do you have a spokesman?

"GENERAL KY: I am not the spokesman for the group but I do speak English. I will explain why the Armed Forces took this action last night.

"We understand English very well. We are aware of our responsibilities, we are aware of the sacrifices of our people over twenty years. We know you want stability, but you cannot have stability until you have unity...But still there are rumors of coups and doubts among groups. We think these rumors come from the HNC, not as an organization but from some of its members. Both military and civilian leaders regard the presence of these people in the HNC as divisive of the Armed Forces due to their influence.

"Recently the Prime Minister showed us a letter he had received from the Chairman of the HNC. This letter told the Prime Minister to beware of the military, and said that maybe the military would want to come back to power. Also the HNC illegally sought to block the retirement of the generals that the Armed Forces Council unanimously recommended be retired in order to improve unity in the Armed Forces.

"GENERAL THIEU: The HNC cannot be bosses because of the Constitution. Its members must prove that they want to fight.

"GENERAL KY: It looks as though the HNC does not want unity. It does not want to fight the Communists.

"It has been rumored that our action of last night was an intrigue of Khanh against Minh, who must be retired. Why do we seek to retire these generals? Because they had their chance and did badly...

"Yesterday we met, twenty of us, from 1430 to 2030. We reached agreement that we must take some action. We decided to arrest the bad members of the HNC, bad politicians, bad student leaders, and the leaders of the Committee of National Salvation, which is a Communist organization. We must put the trouble-making organizations out of action and ask the Prime Minister and the Chief of State to stay in office.

"After we explain to the people why we did this at a press conference, we would like to return to our fighting units. We have no political ambitions. We seek strong, unified, and stable Armed Forces to support the struggle and a stable government. Chief of State Suu agrees with us. General Khanh saw Huong who also agreed.

"We did what we thought was good for this country; we tried to have a civilian government clean house. If we have achieved it, fine. We are now ready to go back to our units.

"AMBASSADOR TAYLOR: I respect the sincerity of you gentlemen. Now I would like to talk to you about the consequences of what you have done. But first, would any of the other officers wish to speak?

"ADMIRAL CANG: It seems that we are being treated as though we were guilty. What we did was good and we did it only for the good of the country.

"AMBASSADOR TAYLOR: Now let me tell you how I feel about it, what I think the consequences are: first of all, this is a military coup that has destroyed the government-making process that, to the admiration of the whole world, was set up last fall largely through the statesman-like acts of the Armed Forces.

"You cannot go back to your units, General Ky. You military are now back in power. You are up to your necks in politics.

"Your statement makes it clear that you have constituted yourselves again substantially as a Military Revolutionary Committee. The dissolution of the HNC was totally illegal. Your decree recognized the Chief of State and the Huong Government but this recognition is something that you could withdraw. This will be interpreted as a return of the military to power...

"AMBASSADOR TAYLOR: Who commands the Armed Forces? General Khanh?

"GENERAL KY: Yes, sir....

"GENERAL THIEU: In spite of what you say, it should be noted that the Vietnamese Commander-in-Chief is in a special situation. He therefore needs advisors. We do not want to force General Khanh; we advise him. We will do what he orders...

"AMBASSADOR TAYLOR: Would your officers be willing to come into a government if called upon to do so by Huong? I have been impressed by the high quality of many Vietnamese officers. I am sure that many of the most able men in this country are in uniform. Last fall when the HNC and Huong Government was being formed, I suggested to General Khanh there should be some military participation, but my suggestions were not accepted. It would therefore be natural for some of them now to be called upon to serve in the government. Would you be willing to do so?...

"GENERAL KY: Nonetheless, I would object to the idea of the military going back into the government right away. People will say it is a military coup.

"AMBASSADOR TAYLOR and AMBASSADOR JOHNSON: (Together) People will say it anyway....

"AMBASSADOR TAYLOR: You have destroyed the Charter. The Chief of State will still have to prepare for elections. Nobody believes that the Chief of State has either the power or the ability to do this without the HNC or some other advisory body. If I were the Prime Minister, I would simply overlook the destruction of the HNC. But we are preserving the HNC itself. You need a legislative branch and you need this particular step in the formation of a government with National Assembly...

"AMBASSADOR TAYLOR: It should be noted that Prime Minister Huong has not accepted the dissolution of the HNC...

"GENERAL THIEU: What kind of concession does Huong want from us?

"Ambassador Taylor again noted the need for the HNC function.

"GENERAL KY: Perhaps it is better if we now let General Khanh and Prime Minister Huong talk.

"GENERAL THIEU: After all, we did not arrest all the members of the HNC. Of nine members we detained only five. These people are not under arrest. They are simply under controlled residence...

"AMBASSADOR TAYLOR: Our problem now, gentlemen, is to organize our work for the rest of the day. For one thing, the government will have to issue a communique.

"GENERAL THIEU: We will still have a press conference this afternoon but only to say why we acted as we did.

"AMBASSADOR TAYLOR: I have real troubles on the US side. I don't know whether we will continue to support you after this. Why don't you tell your friends before you act? I regret the need for my blunt talk today but we have lots at stake...

"AMBASSADOR TAYLOR: And was it really all that necessary to carry out the arrests that very night? Couldn't this have been put off a day or two?...

"In taking a friendly leave, Ambassador Taylor said: You people have broken a lot of dishes and now we have to see how we can straighten out this mess." 59/

Amid the hustle and bustle of meetings between MACV officers, Embassy officials, and their Vietnamese counterparts, Khanh and the Young Turks, stood fast. 60/

On the next day, December 21, Taylor suggested to Khanh that he resign and leave the country. This meeting brought to a head the Khanh-Taylor personal feud which then became public and continued for the balance of Khanh's tenure. Taylor's report of the meeting said his suggestion that Khanh leave the country came in response to Khanh's asking whether he should leave. But Khanh told a different story to the AFC, who were still smarting from the sharp interchange that Ky, Thieu, Thi and Cang had had with Taylor. Immediately they accused Taylor of interfering in GVN affairs. Commenting afterward, he said:

"If the military get away with this irresponsible intervention in government and with flaunting proclaimed U.S. policy, there will be no living with them in the future."

State supported Taylor in taking a strong line to bring the situation under control. It approved a Westmoreland proposal, sent by military channels to State, that Huong get the credit for dismissing Khanh and that MACV should bargain with the Armed Forces Council to offer a quid pro quo for reinstating the HNC. State spelled out the quid pro quo in detail:

"In support of your efforts persuade military to at least partially undo damage [Sunday's] actions, we have also been considering possible leverage we might apply in event you conclude it was necessary.

"If dispute continues unresolved, most obvious action might be withholding approval any pending U.S. assistance actions and letting this become known. You are in best position to evaluate whether these would impress generals or

conversely hurt Huong's position. In addition, following steps aimed more specifically at military have occurred to us:

1. Suspend operation Barrel Roll -- not certain it would affect generals -- might have wrong impact on Hanoi -- obviously generals couldn't be told because that would imply commitment to resume if they behave.

2. Instruct all or selected Corps or division advisors make known our dissatisfaction, perhaps suspending for time being further contacts with counterparts.

3. Stand down FARMGATE.

4. Suspend logistical airlift where critical supply shortages do not exist.

"On balance, we inclined believe none except possibly 1st and 2nd steps would produce desired results. Obviously any would hamper over-all war effort, especially if continued for very long.

"We have also considered and rejected possibility of cutting essentials POL and direct military supplies. Similarly we do not favor suspension or interruption CIP, since it would primarily affect civilian confidence in Huong government." 61/

Although Khanh talked to Taylor about travel arrangements for himself and several other generals on the 22nd, the Young Turks had their backs up (or were convinced they could do what they pleased), and all stood fast. Khanh having rallied the military behind him, attacked Taylor for his undiplomatic actions. He spoke to the nation attacking communism and colonialism, the latter an inference to the domineering position of Taylor. In a message to the President on the 22nd, Taylor commented:

"Generals acting greatly offended by my disapproval of their recent actions privately expressed to four of their number and resent our efforts to strengthen Huong government against their pressures. One unfortunate effect has been to drive them closer to Khanh who has sensed the opportunity to solidify his position." 62/

He feared Khanh would air the quarrel publicly. Rusk cabled support:

"I wish to compliment you on the vigor with which you have pursued this issue of unity since your return from Washington." 63/

But Taylor backed off from the sanctions idea. Possibly still hoping that Khanh would go, he said there was no need for action but that the option should be kept open. In particular, he saw no value in suspending the bombing of Laos. 64/

Also on the 22nd, while talking to Taylor of leaving, Khanh met with the Young Turks and agreed to break openly with Taylor by seeking his recall. State continued to back a tough line with them, and rejected Taylor's suggestion of a diversion in the form of a reprisal bombing on North Vietnam for the Brinks BOQ bombing early in the week.

> "Hanoi would hardly read into it any strong or continuing signal in view overall confusion in Saigon...There might be suspicion, at least internationally, that BOQ bombing was not in fact done by VC."

Taylor urged Huong to insist on restoration of the HNC and declare the generals insubordinate if they refused. Khanh and the generals attacked Taylor publicly on December 23, as Taylor had feared, charging him with insulting them and abusing his power. Then on December 24, Taylor responded in kind, telling the press his version of the December 20 confrontation, and suggesting that Khanh had outstayed his usefulness.

Khanh then threatened privately to declare Taylor persona non grata; the Embassy replied that asking Taylor to leave was equivalent to asking the U.S. to leave. The implied threat of U.S. withdrawal was enough to stop the Khanh move, if he was ever serious about it. Taylor then suggested that Alex Johnson and the generals should form an ad hoc joint arbitration committee to resolve the differences between Khanh and Taylor. The idea was evidently novel enought to distract Khanh and the generals or to satisfy their dignity; it disconnected the buttons that had been pushed when Khanh and Taylor each said he wanted the other to leave the country. The ad hoc committee never met, but the proposal generated calm discussion between the Embassy and the generals for several days and allowed them to cool off gracefully. 65/

However, the basic issue of the future of the HNC and of civilian government remained unresolved. Huong consulted with Taylor continuously, and followed some of his advice, but stopped short of taking the strong public stance he urged. On December 31, Taylor said to Washington that the USG might have to accept a military government in Saigon, though he said that Khanh must not head it. He said that plans for "Phase II" (bombing the North) should take into account various possibilities within GVN. 66/ Although Taylor had earlier favored the military's return to power, he objected to the means and to the timing of their present action.

10. Ongoing Programs, Second Half 1964

While the political crises of Ambassador Taylor's first six months in Saigon built up to comic opera proportions, MACV and the country team struggled valiantly to conduct business as usual.

In March, MACV J-1 had completed a comprehensive review of ARVN personnel policies, the Murday Report, and forwarded it to JGS for action. A tally at the end of the year indicated progress on only 16 of 28 specific recommendations. One that received no response was the suggestion that the officer appointment base be expanded. 67/ In May, the Secretary of Defense had ordered COMUSMACV to develop, jointly with GVN, procedures for programming pacification operations with time-phased requirements for manpower and money. A joint, combined (MACV-USOM-GVN) committee was established. It had completed a programming document in June. After approval by RVNAF and MACV, joint US-GVN teams visited each Corps to acquaint selected personnel with the documents. As of August 31, fewer than half the provinces had submitted pacification plans; so the teams again visited each province to reinstruct province chiefs and sector advisors. All province reports were finally received by October. 68/ In July, the first Senior Advisors Monthly Report (SAME) was submitted. These put MACV in a better position to advise, and in October it sent a detailed letter of deficiencies to CINCRVNAF.

A joint combat effectiveness inspection team started its work, and at year's end the ARVN IG faced the question whether the refresher course at the National Training Center was needed for two battalions declared ineffective by COMUSMACV. In October, U.S. advisors to RVNAF units submitted the first semi-annual report of their personal observations of the treatment and use of MAP equipment. Deficiencies were noted in a letter to JGS. In one instance it was found that ordnance vans were being converted into rolling quarters for generals. After a threat to withdraw the vans, the fault was corrected and the vans were returned to their authorized use.

On October 5, COMUSMACV forwarded to the Embassy the report of a month-long study instigated by the Ambassador on how to revitalize the entire civic action program. It recommended that a USOM-USIS-MACV study group develop a joint, integrated mechanism to guide and coordinate civic action. The groups' recommendations were to provide a basis for discussions with the Vietnamese on how best to channel and revitalize the combined civic action effort.

On the subject of command relationships, JCS looked ahead to the possible deployment of U.S. ground forces and anticipated operational control of RVN forces in combined operations. However, that idea would be dropped later. 69/

Following a Taylor-Khanh agreement to launch "Hop Tac" on October 1, USOM and the Vietnamese NSC met on September 25 to discuss pacification, after which Taylor commented:

> "In general, I consider the meeting was satisfactory continuation of our bilateral effort and that top priority is at last being given to Hop Tac operation. Also that general result of meeting focused attention on priority problems. The pay-off will be quality of follow-up." 70/

State suggested decentralization of pacification control to Corps and Province, to bypass the central government; USOM disagreed. MACV contacted all senior RVNAF officers and found them taking a responsible attitude toward continuing the war effort; however, MACV noted that the coup leaders had talked the same way just before the September 13 coup attempt. Therefore MACV was candidly sceptical. 71/

In response, a COMUSMACV memorandum of November 14 entitled "Assumption by US of Operational Control of the Pacification Program in SVN," states his position on the US role and is indicative of his later views on combined command. He recognized that any plan to encourage GVN in its efforts should include measures for developing US approved plans, as well as means for controlling money and people during execution of plans, and he envisaged an arrangement whereby GVN agencies would be provided complete planning guidance. He saw a danger of exerting influence over GVN which might be interpreted as excessive and which might boomerang on US interests. Instead, he suggested, "as a less drastic alternative, the Hop Tac idea might be extended to each of the other three tactical zones."

As discussed more fully in Re-emphasis on Pacification 1965-67, Hop Tac (working together) was formally proposed at a high level in the US government by Ambassador Lodge on his way home in July 1964. Ambassador Taylor and General Westmoreland implemented the idea. It tied together the pacification plans of the seven provinces around Saigon to insure security and extend government control. A headquarters for US Hop Tac elements was established in Saigon. The Vietnamese set up a parallel organization primarily to satisfy the US, for their group had no authority or influence.

Meanwhile, the US/GVN study and planning activity continued and gave the impression of accomplishment. A US/GVN Survey Team reviewed RVNAF structure requirements for supporting the GVN National Pacification Plan. After visits to each corps headquarters, it proposed two alternative force increases, one to achieve progress in priority one Hop Tac areas, the other to attain more overall progress. On November 24, COMUSMACV formally requested approval of the first alternative from CINCPAC while at the same time the US Embassy recommended approval to the State Department. 72/ Meetings of USOM/NSC mentioned above (pp. 32 and 39) continued till December 5, after which the crisis of the Ambassador's return and its sequel stopped all pretense of joint pacification planning for several weeks. 73/

But the Joint General Staff accepted all MACV suggestions on how RVNAF should be employed to improve the pacification program and issued its implementing Directive A-B 139 as a Christmas present on December 25, 1964, in mid-crisis. 74/

The USMACV staff reviewed the RVN Defense Budget for 1965 and US Mission approval was received in late 1964. However, on order of the Ambassador, due to the political crisis, MACV withheld the budget from GVN until January 13, 1965. 75/

11. January 1965: Prelude to the Bombing

The first week of January was filled with comings and goings with the issue of the HNC's dissolution still unresolved. The Embassy supported Huong publicly and privately, but stopped short of threatening U.S. withdrawal and admitted indirectly to Huong that the U.S. might be forced to accept military government. Then on January 7, the generals backed off slightly and reached a compromise solution, which they announced January 9 amid rumors of a military takeover. The Armed Forces Council and Khanh agreed to release the HNC prisoners and to continue backing civilian government, referring to their August promises; the civilian GVN would convene a new civilian group to legislate and write a new constitution, preparatory to Assembly elections. Taylor saw the statement before its release, and accepted it as the best available compromise. It was followed by a statement agreed on January 11 to patch up US/GVN relations, at which time Khanh agreed also to put several of the Young Turks in the cabinet. The crisis seemed to be over. 76/

However, the end was not yet in sight. The Buddhists started demonstrating and demanding that Huong resign. On January 14, Taylor reacted to Khanh's proposals on the new cabinet by suggesting that he was moving with unseemly haste. Taylor received a complete cabinet list on January 18, and Khanh conferred with Westmoreland on the effects of cabinet roles for the generals on the 19th. Cabinet installation was scheduled for the 19th. However, at almost the last minute Khanh asked for postponement of the cabinet installation, saying afterward that Huong had defaulted on promises to change some of the civilian ministers. Leading Buddhists went on another hunger strike, and a new crisis built up; in Hue the USIS building was sacked and burned, and the USIS building in Saigon was sacked. On the 24th, they demanded that all Vietnamese businessmen, night clubs, etc., refuse to sell to Americans, and a majority apparently complied. On the 25th, Khanh, having allied himself with the Buddhists, told Deputy Ambassador Johnson that Huong and President Suu wanted to resign and let the military take over, as demanded by the Buddhists. Johnson replied that the Buddhists must not be allowed to veto the government, and that the military must not take over. 77/

Then on January 27, the AFC voted no confidence in the Suu-Huong government and directed Khanh to take charge and resolve the crisis. Taylor's comments to State made it clear that events were entirely out of his control; again he objected to the means and to the timing of the military return to power. When he raised the possibility of non-recognition, State authorized him to use his own judgment but advised him to play along with Khanh for the time being, while scouting around for fresh options. Although Suu was technically ousted, he stayed on at Khanh's request; and Oanh again became acting Prime Minister. 78/

In the midst of the crisis Westmoreland obtained his first authority to use U.S. forces for combat within South Vietnam. Arguing that the VC might go for a spectacular victory during the disorders, he asked for and received authority to use U.S. jet aircraft in a strike role

in emergencies, subject to Embassy approval in each instance. This move finessed all previous ideas of using potential U.S. force commitments as leverage to bring the GVN into line; but these ideas had no doubt been abandoned anyhow. 79/

III

THE U.S. ENTERS THE WAR:

Flaming Dart to the Steady Influx of U.S. Forces, June, 1965

1. "Phase II" Begins and Coups Continue, February, 1965

While the Embassy stood by doing what little it could to undercut Khanh's personal position, VC attacks on the American advisors' barracks at Pleiku, and on three other installations, provided the pretext for US/VNAF bombing attacks on infiltration staging areas in the southernmost province of North Vietnam, February 7-8. Acting Prime Minister Oanh spoke for GVN during the coordination of the attacks and announcements. (The raids were called reprisals, as was the subsequent raid on February 12 following the attacks on the American barracks at Quihon.) U.S. dependents were ordered to leave SVN. 1/

McGeorge Bundy was in town, and in keeping with the going tactics, stayed at arms length from Khanh, though meeting him and the generals socially. As an aside at this point, Taylor gave one last bow to the idea that cutting off the flow of help from the North would turn the tide of the war against the VC: He remarked that perhaps the smell of victory within six months would now lead Khanh to take over again.

On his return to Washington, McGeorge Bundy wrote a Memorandum to the President, dated February 7, 1965. In evaluating the U.S. team and policy, he stated, "U.S. mission is composed of outstanding men and U.S. policy within Vietnam is mainly right and well directed." However, he proceeded to point out two important differences between his current assessment and that of the mission. Taylor had concluded that: (1) the Khanh government was impossible to work with, and (2) the Buddhists (Khanh's ally in the recent struggle) must be confronted and faced down, using force if necessary. Bundy disagreed on both points, stating that Khanh was still the best hope in sight in terms of pursuing the fight against the communists and that the Buddhists should be accommodated and incorporated rather than confronted.

With respect to the scheduled reprisal actions, he stated, "For immediate purposes, and especially for the initiation of reprisal policy, we believe the government need be no stronger than it is today with General Khanh as the focus of raw power, while a weak caretaker government goes through the motions. Such a government can execute military decisions and it can give formal political support to joint US-GVN policy. That is about all it can do." He further stated that reprisal actions themselves

should produce a favorable reaction which would provide an opportunity for increased U.S. influence in pressing for a more effective government.

He acknowledged the latent anti-American sentiments in the country and their potential explosiveness, as had been evidenced in Hue the preceding week. He noted that these feelings limited the pressure that the U.S. could bring to bear on ambitious forces like Khanh and the Buddhists.

On February 9, Taylor again firmly recommended that the program of continuous graduated attacks on North Vietnam should begin. Nothing but political turmoil had followed his early-December attempt to induce the GVN to do better by promising these attacks as a quid pro quo. Now he disregarded this idea, and spoke only of the hope that the attacks would convince North Vietnam to abide by the Geneva Accords of 1954 and 1962, and would unify and encourage the South Vietnamese. On February 13, State cabled authority to begin the plan of graduated strikes with Vietnamese participation. It directed Taylor to get GVN approval and to get their agreement to appear at the UN if that should prove necessary; the condition of stopping the bombing would be the halting of aid by North Vietnam to the VC.

State's guidance to Taylor on political matters was that the U.S. hand should not be too obvious in the government-shuffling outcome and that the power of the Buddhists and of the military must be reflected in the new government being formed. After two political hopefuls failed to round up enough support, Quat formed a cabinet starting February 16. The AFC chose to keep Suu as Chief of State and appointed a National Legislative Council of twenty members balanced to represent all interests including the military. The Buddhists quietly acquiesced in the new government, installed just in time to be greeted by a coup attempt. 2/

On February 19, a new coup group (consisting of Thao and Phat among other neo-Diem proponents) seized most of Saigon, Tan Son Nhut airfield, and the radio station. In this instance, as in September, 1964, MACV had to intervene to stop Ky's threat of VNAF bombing; this time it would have been the airfield, with several thousand Americans in the area. By midnight the leading members of the AFC had rallied forces and faced down the coup group; and the next day they voted Khanh out. On February 24, Khanh left the country; the Embassy and Saigon settled back in relief. The bombing phase of graduated pressures on the North (Rolling Thunder) began, and the decision to land Marines at Danang was in the works. Taylor now opposed the introduction of U.S. combat forces in SVN -- except for base security. His acquiescence in the Marine deployment to Danang was in large part due to Westmoreland's strong recommendation to do so. 3/

2. The Continuing Civilian Interregnum and First U.S. Ground Forces, March-May, 1965

For several weeks an unaccustomed calm settled over US/GVN relations. The USG white paper on Vietnam issued February 28 without prior clearance with GVN caused no visible upset. The proposal to land the first two BLT's of Marines received prompt approval in an amicable atmosphere in the first few days of March, and the III MEF became the III MAF

without fanfare. An abortive Buddhist "peace" movement died away, and religious groups generally laid low. 4/

Following a State message expressing renewed concern, the USOM resumed meetings with the Vietnamese Internal Security Council (an enlargement of its old NSC) on February 27 to discuss pacification.

> "It was agreed that both sides would prepare joint proposals for accelerating pacification and for solving manpower problems and go forward together in program for effective execution of agreed programs."

At a March 13 meeting, General Thang gave a "pessimistic but realistic" account of Binh Dinh Province, and Quat said measures would be taken to prevent the situation from spreading. The USG and GVN reverted to the pattern of a year earlier of urging and advice politely received. 5/

Throughout early 1965, it was evident that Pacification plans were failing. Even Hop Tac was at a standstill. When a stop gap allocation of 3 million piasters per province was made, pending release of regular funds, province chiefs were reluctant to spend the funds. They wanted specific authority and direction from higher authorities.

Planning continued unabated between MACV and GVN. Development of a revised budget began on March 6, 1965, when guidelines for budget preparation were furnished the RVN Ministry of Defense. The proposed revision was duly received from RVN. 6/

On March 24, Ambassador Taylor formulated a 41-point program for stability and pacification in preparation for a trip to Washington. This program, without any hint of leverage on GVN, in fact put pacification on the back burner, while main attention focused on bombing and deployments. 7/

In April 1965, General "Little" Minh, Minister of Armed Forces, directed I, II, and IV Corps commanders to develop Hop Tac plans for their areas. The delay between the COMUSMACV memorandum of the previous December that recommended the extension and the order itself is not explained, but in May the Vietnamese indicated to the U.S. Ambassador their dissatisfaction with the Hop Tac program. The Vietnamese wanted to make Region A of the Hop Tac area part of the Capital Military Region and the remaining regions part of the III Corps Commander's area of responsibility. COMUSMACV told the mission council that the Hop Tac organization should be retained for the foreseeable future because Hop Tac had been unique in providing a forum for military and civil authorities to address common problems.

Quiet consultation continued on the evaluation of Vietnamese counterparts in the provinces, on Third Country Forces, on military and paramilitary pay, and so on. Following Taylor's return from Washington early in April, he presented his pacification ideas (now having the stamp of President Johnson's approval), and discreetly got approval for the

deployment of the third of the Marine BLT's. Quat discussed the military leadership frankly with Taylor and Westmoreland, and around the middle of April started considering a move to clip their wings. On May 5, the AFC obligingly dissolved itself, and seemed to give Quat a free hand. 8/

The Honolulu Conference of April 20, which rebuffed the idea of encadrement and U.S. takeover (discussed later), approved additional deployments and U.S. force to about 80,000 men and to introduce Korean and Australian troops. After several days of hesitation, Quat approved the increases. Pacification, under the new name "Rural Construction," still gave no cause for rejoicing; and GVN resisted Taylor's proposal to install some civilians as province chiefs. 9/

Analysis by members of the U.S. mission council of a RVNAF J-3 paper, "The Organization and Operations of the Pacification System," revealed considerable variance between U.S. and GVN views on:

(1) The role of the corps commander in pacification.

(2) The relationship of provinces with a proposed Bureau for Pacification Affairs.

(3) The position of Minister of Interior in pacification.

MACV forwarded requirements to increase the number of subsector advisory teams to 180, of which 33 in particularly remote locations would be filled initially by Special Forces teams. It was envisioned that in case of escalation by the VC, these teams would perform appropriate civil affairs functions, provide intelligence, and support allied forces in many ways. Should the VC refrain from extensive overt action, the teams would push vigorous rural construction.

In the last half of May, fresh trouble blew up. After an alleged abortive coup attempt on May 20-21, and disorders in the streets, Quat tried to reshuffle his cabinet, without first clearing it with Suu. Suu objected, and the two disagreed on who had the right to decide; such a misunderstanding was understandable, in view of the lack of any recognized constitution and in view of the chaos of the preceding months. The crisis simmered past the end of May, and Taylor correctly predicted the end of civilian government, with evident relief. 10/

3. First Moves on Command and Control, March and April, 1965

When the Marines arrived in March, the control measure devised for the employment was the TAOR. Under the overall suzerainty of the VN Corps Commander, the Marines were given a well defined geographical area in which U.S. forces exercised command authority over military forces and for which the U.S. accepted defensive responsibility." 11/

On March 3, Ambassador Taylor cabled his fears that GVN would "shuck off greater responsibility on the USG," 12/ and the same day, in another message, he said he had no idea what the GVN attitude to a Marine Landing Force might be. 13/

The first battalion of Marines splashed ashore at Danang about 0900, March 8. The next day a second battalion came in by air.

The trip of Army Chief of Staff Johnson to Saigon in mid-March, 1965, signalled the beginning of consideration and planning for the introduction of significant numbers of ground combat forces. General Johnson observed in closing his report:

> "In order for the USG to evaluate his (COMUSMACV's) request properly when submitted, a policy determination must be made in the very near future that will answer the question, what should the VN be expected to do for themselves and how much more the U.S. must contribute directly to the security of VN." 14/

Secretary McNamara answered on the margin of his copy of the report, "Policy is: Anything that will strengthen the position of the GVN will be sent." 15/

On March 8, Taylor talked with Prime Minister Quat about his concept of joint command, a matter which had been raised with General Johnson on the occasion of his visit March 6 (EmbTel 2877). Taylor found Quat's ideas very hazy, but:

> "his purpose was very clear. He hopes by some joint command device to bring his maverick generals under the steadying influence of General Westmoreland. Taylor told him he sympathized with motive but had never hit upon a command relationship which offered much hope of accomplishing this end. Although Quat's ideas hard to disentangle, he seems to have in mind a mixed US/ARVN staff element reporting to General Westmoreland and a VN C/Staff. He visualizes the staff element as a clearing house for joint studies which would pass recommendations on to the two senior officers. By implication General Westmoreland would have the power of ultimate decision based upon an unofficial understanding which Quat hopes generals would accept. Quat concedes their acceptance far from certain." 16/

Washington was looking toward combined command arrangements that would recognize that the U.S. was no longer limited to the role of advisors to RVNAF. When asked for his input COMUSMACV replied that gradual transition would be more palatable to GVN and suggested only cooperation in the initial phase, followed by establishment of a small combined coordinating staff headed jointly by himself and CINCRVNAF. The staff's powers would be limited solely to coordinating combined operations. 17/

These comments were sketchy, but indicative, for in Saigon COMUSMACV and his staff were putting together the Commander's Estimate of the Situation, a standard document in the military planning process. Started on March 13, the day after General Johnson left Saigon and issued on March 26, it more clearly revealed the MACV concept of command. While

recognizing that there was no longer an effective ARVN chain of command because of the irresponsible game of musical chairs among the top leadership, the estimate cautioned that the Vietnamese generals would accept integrated command only to the extent that the United States contributed troops; and it advised against U.S. commitment to any rigid arrangement because GVN and RVNAF had not achieved sufficient political and military maturity. MACV omitted further discussion of the function or authority of such integrated staffs. When command arrangements were covered in the detailed description of the most likely course of action, the intent was clear. U.S. commanders would control American troops except in certain clearly defined zones within which they would also be responsible for "controlling and coordinating" operations of both U.S. and RVN forces. A collateral function envisioned for each U.S. division command was that of Deputy Command Support to the ARVN Corps Commander. 18/

4. The Rise and Decline of Encadrement, April, 1964

Ambassador Taylor returned to Washington in late March and was present at the April 1-2 NSC meeting at which General Johnson's 21 recommendations and Taylor's 41 points were approved. 19/ Almost as soon as Taylor returned to Saigon wide differences of opinion developed on what should happen next.

The State/Defense "7 point message" of April 15 to Ambassador Taylor and General Westmoreland set the pot boiling, following Westmoreland's urgent request via military channels for more forces. The message directed:

(1) Experimental encadrement of U.S. troops into RVNAF.

(2) The introduction of a brigade force into Bien Hoa/Vung Tau for security and later counterinsurgency.

(3) The introduction of several additional U.S. battalions into coastal enclaves.

(4) Expansion of Vietnamese recruiting, using proven U.S. techniques.

(5) Expansion of the MEDCAP program using mobile dispensaries.

(6) Experimentation in 2 or 3 provinces with a team of U.S. civil affairs personnel.

(7) Supplement of low RVNAF pay through provision of a food ration. 20/

Taylor objected to the new forces, to encadrement, and to the whole tone of the 7 point message. He sent two principal messages with these objections, one setting out a reasoned comment on the message and a second, personal to McGeorge Bundy, saying how he really felt about it:

"I am greatly troubled by DOD 152339Z April 15. First, it shows no consideration for the fact that, as a result of

decisions taken in Washington during my visit, this mission is charged with securing implementation by the two month old Quat government of a 21 point military program, a 41 point non-military program, a 16 point Rowan USIS program and a 12 point CIA program. Now this new cable opens up new vistas of further points as if we can win here somehow on a point score. We are going to stall the machine of government if we do not declare a moratorium on new programs for at least six months.

"Next, it shows a far greater willingness to get into the ground war than I had discerned in Washington during my recent trip. Although some additional U.S. forces should probably be introduced after we see how the Marines do in counter-insurgency operations, my own attitude is reflected in Emb-Tel 3384, which I hope was called to the attention of the President.

"My greatest concern arises over para 6 reftel which frankly bewilders me. What do the authors of this cable think mission has been doing over the months and years? We have presumably the best qualified personnel the Washington agencies (State, AID, DOD, USIA and CIA) can find working in the provinces seven days a week at precisely the tasks described in para 6. It is proposed to withdraw these people and replace them by Army civil affairs types operating on the pattern of military occupation? If this is the thought, I would regard such a change in policy which will gain wide publicity, as disastrous in its likely effects upon pacification in general and on US/GVN relations in particular.

"Mac, can't we be better protected from our friends? I know that everyone wants to help, but there's such a thing as killing with kindness. In particular, we want to stay alive here because we think we're winning -- and will continue to win unless helped to death." 21/

Another State/Defense message told the Ambassador to discuss with Quat several possible uses of U.S. combat forces beyond the NSC decisions of April 2. He replied, "I cannot raise these matters with Quat without further guidance...I need a clarification of our purpose for the large scale introduction of foreign troops unless the need is clear and explicit." 22/

The plaintive words did not sound convincing to the JCS, for they told SecDef, almost cavalierly, in JCSM 281/65, "JCS is confident the Ambassador will be able to accomplish such measures as are required for an appropriate acceptance of these deployments as approved by the highest authority."

As directed in the 7 point message, study commenced in Saigon on the matter of combined command. The message suggested two approaches:

Integration of substantial numbers of U.S. combat personnel (e.g., 50) into each of several ARVN battalions (e.g., 10); or combined operations of three additional U.S. battalions with three or more ARVN battalions. General Westmoreland asked his Deputy to give detailed study to three methods:

(1) Assumption of officer and senior NCO command positions within the ARVN battalion by U.S. personnel.

(2) Assignment of U.S. personnel as staff officers, and in technical and specialists positions, within the ARVN battalion.

(3) Employment of U.S. troops as fire support elements within the ARVN battalion.

These approaches were studied in relation to: Language, security, support, mutual US/GVN acceptance, conditions and capabilities within ARVN units. Problems common to all three were the language barrier, increased exposure of U.S. personnel, difficulty of U.S. personnel adapting to ARVN living conditions, and the greatly expanded support requirement that would be generated. The following conclusions were reached:

Method (1) was not feasible nor desirable owing to the language barrier, as well as to probable non-acceptance by GVN.

Method (2) would not materially improve ARVN capabilities.

Method (3), therefore, was the only concept that would benefit ARVN and not detract from GVN morale. A fire support element of six U.S. officers and 49 enlisted men was suggested for each ARVN battalion.

Because of the difficulties of supply and service support, medical support, leadership in ARVN battalions, and anticipated morale problems amongst those U.S. personnel assigned to ARVN battalions, Deputy COMUSMACV opposed the adoption of the principle of encadrement. He recommended that COMUSMACV not support it and that if it were directed, it be initially applied to only one battalion. 23/

At the same time, as a result of the Warrenton conference of mid-January, serious consideration was being given in Washington to the use of military government by means of Army civil affairs procedures. A straw in the wind which indicated what the Saigon reaction was to be at the forthcoming Honolulu conference was the response by Ambassador Taylor on April 15 to notification that General Peers was coming to Saigon. "If GVN gets word of these plans to impose U.S. military government framework on their country...it will have a very serious impact on our relations. We are rocking the boat at a time when we have it almost on an even keel." 24/

5. Honolulu Conference, April 19-20, 1965: Encadrement and Combined Command Fade Out

At Honolulu General Westmoreland had his way with respect to military encadrement. Notes of the meetings reveal:

"General Westmoreland states that individual encadrement of ARVN units neither required nor feasible."

Instead the plan was to "brigade" U.S. forces with ARVN troops. Consideration of the issue was ended with the understanding that General Westmoreland "will submit a written statement describing the command relationships which will prevail when U.S. forces are engaged in offensive combat actions, alone or with Vietnamese or other forces."

The introduction of U.S. Army Civil Affairs teams into the provincial government structure was also considered at Honolulu. It was decided to experiment in three provinces with U.S. teams designed to provide ample civil as well as military initiative and advice. At least one of the three teams was to be headed by a civilian. Ambassador Taylor was instructed to seek the concurrence of GVN, "recognizing that a large number of questions must be worked out subsequently." 25/

Early in May, General Westmoreland submitted his detailed command concept. It traced the evolution of the relationship between U.S. and ARVN armed forces. Initially, U.S. forces were strictly advisory. In the period from 1960 to 1962 the U.S. had in addition provided military capabilities such as helicopters and tactical air support. The advisory effort was extended to ARVN battalions, and advisors accompanied units into combat. With the large scale commitment of U.S. ground forces in Vietnam, a logical extension of this evolution was the suggested command concept of coordination and cooperation. Operational control of each nation's forces was normally to be exercised by commanders of that nation.

COMUSMACV envisioned that the initial mission of U.S. forces would be security of base areas, a function to be coordinated through senior ARVN commanders. Subsequent deep patrolling and offensive operations by U.S. forces would occur within specified Tactical Areas of Responsibility (TAOR's) with ARVN in separate and clearly defined areas. Eventually, on search and destroy operations, U.S. forces would provide combat support at the request of the senior RVNAF commander. The U.S. commander would move to the RVNAF command post to agree on details, but close and intricate maneuver of units of the two nations' forces was to be avoided. 26/

This Saigon proposal did not settle the matter. SecDef urged formation of a joint command with GVN and the creation of a "small combined coordinating staff to be jointly headed by COMUSMACV and CINCRVNAF" as a useful device at this stage of development of the U.S. force structure. 27/

There were continuing indications from USG representatives in Saigon of a sensitivity to South Vietnamese criticism that the United States acted as though we were fighting all by ourselves. On May 17, Ambassador Taylor felt it wise to relay to Washington a Saigon Post column to that effect. 28/

On May 24, both the Ambassador and COMUSMACV sent lengthy messages to their seniors discussing the matter of combined military command. Ambassador Taylor referenced both the JCS and MACV proposals and said, "I must say we are far from ready to propose to GVN anything like a plan for a more formal combined command authority...If USG intends to take the position that U.S. command of GVN forces is a prerequisite to the introduction of more U.S. combat troops, that fact would constitute an additional strong reason for recommending against bringing in the reinforcements." 29/

COMUSMACV also voiced strong opposition to the Washington proposal for combined command. He recalled recent discussion of the subject with General Minh who seemed agreeable at first but then moved perceptibly away from anything suggestive of a combined headquarters. Press reports of the views of General Thieu and Air Marshall Ky, as well as the recent Saigon Post column, were referenced to substantiate that there was no prospect of such a combined staff evolving. Instead, a U.S. Army brigadier general staff. "The positioning and accrediting of Brig. General Collins is as far as we can go." 30/

There appears to have been no strong objection by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In JCSM 516-65 they reviewed the course of events and recommended augmentation of MACV by seven billets (1 Brigadier General, 3 officers, and 3 enlisted) to provide "the requisite staff assistance on combined and operational planning matters associated with the coordinated operations of U.S., RVN, and third country forces in Vietnam."

A joint State/Defense message to Saigon on May 27 deferred any approach to GVN on combined command until it was politically feasible and directed that no planning discussion be undertaken with RVNAF without Ambassador Taylor's approval. 31/

There were two major battles in late May and early June, Ba Gia and Dong Zoai. Although U.S. troops were available to assist in both instances they were not committed and in both cases RVNAF were defeated.

General Westmoreland continued to press Washington for greater freedom of discretion in the use of U.S. ground forces with RVNAF. A June 12 message recalled the three stages envisioned in his May 8 discussion of combined command. So far, in view of statements in Washington by the Secretary of State and by the White House, movement from stage 2 to 3 had been deferred, but it sounded as though some measure of joint planning was in progress.

> "The fact is we have moved some distance down the road toward active commitment of U.S. combat forces and have done so hand-in-hand with our Vietnamese ally. They and we recognize that the time has come when such support is essential to the survival of any government of South Vietnam and the integrity of RVNAF." 32/

The message concluded with a request for modification of the letters of instructions on use of U.S. troops.

A minor note, not unrelated to combined command, was raised in May when Prime Minister Quat pressed within GVN for a status of forces agreement. The matter arose because of concern about Vietnamese sovereignty over areas where U.S. forces were stationed. Relations were being governed by the 15 year old Pentalateral agreement, clearly inapplicable to the present situation. U.S. military forces in Vietnam were enjoying virtual diplomatic immunity; so the MACV senior judge advocate developed arguments to demonstrate that raising the issue was not in the interests of either government. They were passed to the SVN source of the information for use at ministerial meetings on the subject. There is no indication that GVN formally discussed status-of-forces with the Embassy. 33/

6. The Ky Coup, June, 1965

After extended negotiations between Quat, Suu, and other leaders failed to end the government crisis that started in late May, on June 9 Quat asked the generals to mediate the dispute. They did. On June 12 they forced Quat to resign and took over the government. After several days of jockeying among themselves, the generals formed a National Leadership Council of ten members and made Ky Prime Minister. Taylor was out of town at the critical time, and the Embassy found out about the main decisions after they were taken. However, Taylor was back in time to object unsuccessfully to Ky's appointment as Prime Minister before it was announced. Once things had settled down and the USG felt it had no choice but to accept the new government, Taylor cabled State:

> "...It will serve our best interests to strengthen, support and endorse this government." 34/

UNITED STATES - VIETNAM RELATIONS

1945 - 1967

IV. C. 9. (b)

EVOLUTION OF THE WAR

US/GVN Relations: 1963 - 1967

PART II

U.S.-GVN RELATIONS: JUNE 1965 - FALL 1967

SUMMARY and ANALYSIS

By the summer of 1965, the war in Vietnam had dramatically changed its complexion from the previous two years. More and more, with U.S. combat forces pouring into SVN and Rolling Thunder underway, it looked like the U.S. against the DRV. The war was no longer being fought with U.S. advice and aid alone; there was now a massive U.S. presence. While official documents still repeated the credo that it was, in the last analysis, a struggle for the GVN to win or lose, the focus of U.S. concern shifted. As the U.S. role increased and then predominated, the need for GVN effectiveness in the now and short-run received less attention. The U.S. would take care of the war now--defeat the enemy main forces and destroy Hanoi's will to persist--then, the GVN could and would reform and resuscitate itself. Only after the immediate security threat to the GVN was blunted and forced to subside did we expect our South Vietnamese ally to improve its performance on all fronts. Until then and in order to get to that point, the U.S. would concentrate on what it could do.

This view--a massive U.S. effort in the short-run leading to and enabling a GVN effort in the long-run--set the tone and content of U.S.-GVN relations. In policy terms, it meant caution in the use of U.S. leverage. There seemed to be no compelling requirement to be tough with Saigon; it would only prematurely rock the boat. To press for efficiency would be likely, it was reasoned, to generate instability. Our objective became simple: if we could not expect more GVN efficiency, we could at least get a more stable and legitimate GVN. Nation-building was the key phrase. This required a constitution and free elections. Moreover, if we could not have the reality, we would start with appearances. U.S. influence was successfully directed at developing a democratic GVN in form. Beginning in September 1966, a series of free elections were held, first for a Constituent Assembly and later for village officials, the Presidency, House and Senate.

U.S.-GVN relations from June of 1965 to 1968, then, have to be understood in terms of the new parameters of the war. Before this date, our overriding objective had to be and was governmental stability. After the Diem coup, the GVN underwent six changes in leadership in the space of one and a half years. From June 1965 on, there was relative stability. Ky and Thieu, while challenged, proved strong enough to keep their power and position. In putting down the Struggle Movement (following General Thi's dismissal by Ky) in the first half of 1966, and then delivering on the September, 1966 election, GVN effectively discredited the militant Buddhist leadership and for the time being ended its threat to political stability. Concern about possible neutralism or anarchy, which had been

important in U.S. thinking in 1964 and early 1965, subsided accordingly. The uneasy agreement between Thieu and Ky to run on the same ticket, resulting partly from U.S. pressure for military unity, and the subsequent transition to legitimacy, gave the U.S. a sense of relief and satisfaction, although no one suggested that GVN had yet built a broad political base or had solved its effectiveness problems. This GVN stability made possible the increased attention to pacification and nation-building.

The pacification parameter had changed as well. From 1961 to June of 1965, the U.S. flooded SVN with the advisory resources of men and money to keep the GVN afloat and RVNAF fighting. This input lacked a clear plan. After June 1965, we made a concerted effort to organize pacification. We exacted an agreement from the GVN in the fall of 1966 to shift half of its ground forces into pacification--although U.S. forces carried a share of this burden and attempted to show RVNAF how to do it. We tried to centralize pacification programs by creating a new GVN structure to control and allocate resources. This was made manifest by the establishment of a separate Ministry for Revolutionary Development. U.S. moves by stages to the unified civil-military CORDS organization in Vietnam paralleled this super-ministry for pacification. And, pacification statistics showed steady increase of GVN control in the countryside, reversing the downward trend of previous years--but, U.S. dissatisfaction with GVN performance also increased nonetheless.

Beyond and more important than all this were the U.S. efforts themselves. By the close of 1965, 170,000 U.S. combat forces were in SVN. By the end of 1967, this figure was almost half a million. By mid-1965, U.S. air strikes against North Vietnam had extended in geographic coverage up to 20°30', and approved targets had widened beyond LOC's. Total sorties rose to about 900 per week. By 1968, we were bombing throughout the North, with very few though important targets still being prohibited. Total sorties per week reached about 4,000.

It was in this context that U.S.-GVN relations took shape.

Leverage

Having suffered several backfires in the attempts to require or encourage GVN effectiveness in 1964, the Embassy and Washington generally preferred to let well enough alone in 1965 through 1967. The U.S. limited itself to only a few demands, and usually avoided direct confrontations at the top levels of government-to-government contact.

The U.S. had one repetition of its old backfire problem following the Honolulu Conference of February 1966. President Johnson embraced Ky publicly and endorsed his government; Ky then felt strong enough to move against General Thi, who had been making trouble generally and was almost openly waiting for his chance to take over the GVN. Ky eventually succeeded in removing Thi and getting him out of the country, but at the cost of returning

to a degree of chaos in May that was in some ways worse than any suffered in 1964 under Khanh. At the height of the crisis, the U.S. went so far as to use force and the threat of force against both sides to keep the confrontation between GVN and the Struggle Movement within bounds. There was no sign of ill effects from our boldness in this instance.

Whatever interest there was in putting pressure on the top levels of GVN was stronger in Washington than in the Embassy, and stronger in the Embassy than in MACV, as it had been in the past. But the past failures of such pressures made everyone gunshy. At one point, Washington felt so strongly about the high GVN dollar balances that it sent out its own representative to negotiate with GVN, and he freely threatened to cut down U.S. dollar aid. However, neither Washington nor the Embassy suggested doing anything so drastic as holding up aid payments and projects until a satisfactory agreement could be reached. Confident that the threats were empty, GVN dug in its heels and gave us nothing but more promises.

Although the U.S. played down pressure or leverage on the top level of GVN, the idea of leverage at lower levels enjoyed a resurgence. Interest in the subject reached a low point in June 1965, when we abandoned the "troika signoff," which had given U.S. province representatives veto control over the use of AID direct-support commodities. For four months starting October 1, 1965, MACV experimented with giving its sector advisors a petty cash fund for urgent projects; however, MACV then dropped the idea. In April 1966, Lodge urged restoration of these types of leverage, and the idea kept coming up thereafter. Two major studies, one in Saigon in 1966 and one in Washington in 1967, came down strongly for regular procedures to use our material support to put pressure on lower echelons of GVN. They particularly emphasized signoff systems and the like, including U.S. distribution of MAP support within Vietnam. But the fear that such methods would prove counter-productive, either by provoking resistance or by making Vietnamese officials more dependent on our people and less able to perform on their own, prevented adoption of the proposals.

In at least three instances, AID cut off its support to a province in order to pressure the province chief. In September 1965, AID accused the province chief of Binh Tuy of misuse of AID funds, and had to withdraw its personnel from the province and cut off support to it after threats on their lives. The incident got into the papers and embarrassed both GVN and the Embassy; after several weeks GVN moved the accused officer to another job, and AID resumed its program in the province. In June 1966, AID cut off shipments to Kontum province for four days to force the province chief to account for the end uses of AID commodities. In August 1967, CORDS cut off shipments to Bien Hoa province for eleven weeks for similar reasons.

In contrast, MACV scrupulously avoided withholding MAP support from military units, regardless of circumstances. The single case of record of

taking away MAP support involved two fishing boats owned by the Vietnam Navy that were found ineligible for such support. In his reaction to the PROVN Report in May 1966, in his directives to advisers around the time of the Chinh-Hunnicutt affair in the fall of 1966, and in his reaction to Washington inquiries in May 1967, COMUSMACV consistently brushed aside criticism of ARVN and told both his superiors and his subordinates to lay off. Whatever interest in leverage there was at lower levels in the field received no backing from COMUSMACV. In March 1966, a decision to transfer MAP for Vietnam to service funding had no effect on leverage because MACV continued to put material support in Vietnamese hands as soon as it entered the country.

Although AID tried some leverage in this period, and although the Ambassador, the Mission, and officials tuned to U.S. domestic pressures urged U.S. leverage for GVN reforms, there is still no documented study of GVN's failures, of the reasons for it, and of the ways that leverage of different types might help improve GVN permanently. The basic problem of concern is GVN's overall failure to do its civil and military jobs. Leverage in the hands of U.S. personnel might assure that GVN would do particular things we want; but we have no information on what kind of leverage, if any, would reform GVN. From 1964 onwards, high U.S. officials, including McGeorge Bundy and Secretary McNamara, have said at one time and another than thorough reform of GVN is necessary; but no one has found or even seriously proposed a way to do it. Encadrement proposals, prominent before June 1965, still received occasional mention; but these proposed to make up for GVN's deficiencies by substituting U.S. control for GVN control, and do not purport to reform GVN itself. If this problem has a solution, we have yet to find it.

The Embassy's Lack of Political Contact

The turbulent events of 1964 and early 1965 had shown that the Embassy had no effective system, either through overt or covert contacts, for finding out what was going on. Nothing was done subsequently to correct this problem. CAS people talked to a few official contacts, who told them things the Vietnamese wanted the U.S. to believe; but CIA had and has no mandate or mission to perform systematic intelligence and espionage in friendly countries, and so lacks the resources to gather and evaluate the large amounts of information required on political forces, corruption, connections, and so on.

General Thi began sounding out his U.S. contacts on whether the U.S. appreciated his superior qualities as a potential leader of Vietnam as early as August 1965; and in other ways we had plenty of warning that there would be trouble. However, we showed no feel for cause and effect. President Johnson's embrace of Ky at Honolulu in February, 1966, could only have had a divisive effect when Ky commanded so little solid support within his own country. On the one hand, civilians and the military had flouted U.S. wishes so often in the past that express U.S. support scarcely counted for much; but on the other hand, Ky's weakness and Thi's known ambitions tempted Ky to get whatever mileage he could out of our support. In the subsequent turbulence,

all parties again flouted U.S. wishes freely, stopping short only when the U.S. used force and the credible threat of force to oppose them. The maneuverings of the various political groups seemed to surprise the Embassy repeatedly. The same problems arose in the GVN cabinet split and crisis just before the Manila Conference in October 1966. The blandly naive language of the "Blueprint for Vietnam" in late 1967, unmodified by any back channel elaboration, offered no hope of any foreseeable improvement.

The MACV Role

The MACV organization played an important, mostly hidden, role in U.S.-GVN relations. At every level from Saigon to the districts, the advisory structure was the most pervasive instrument of intergovernmental contact. ARVN officers were accustomed to being spoon-fed military advice; so when military dominance of GVN brought these same officers to high positions in government, the advisor relationship conferred a latent diplomatic role upon MACV. Advisors were used as channels of communications on political and pacification matters. (On occasions such as the attempts to get Thi to meet Ky or to leave the country, senior MACV officers openly became diplomatic emissaries.)

We have less record than we would like of COMUSMACV's influence. He reported regularly to his military seniors only on strictly military matters. Detailed reports of his routine, daily dealings with counterparts were not required of MACV as they were of the Embassy.

From time to time, COMUSMACV revealed his own independent objectives. He sought protection of the ARVN officer corps from unfavorable press stories in order to preserve their solidarity and morale; he pressed zealously for the rapid build-up of U.S. ground forces; he opposed encadrement and combined command with ARVN; he rejected sanctions against ARVN; he objected to the initial constraints on the use of American forces and wanted to be free to operate independently of ARVN.

General Westmoreland's strong position usually assured that his view prevailed. Extension of advisors, increased MAP resources, and the build-up of U.S. ground forces enhanced his relative position. By October 1966, MACV had numerical superiority of forces over Regular RVNAF; by late 1967, MACV had over 400 square miles of bases. His freedom from detailed reporting of daily contacts was itself an element of strength. When he received unwanted advice and directives, he set up studies, and, after a time, proceeded as usual. This tendency was most notable in the case of leverage, already noted, and combined command. Likewise, MACV successfully resisted taking over the bulk of Saigon Port operations, despite pressure from Washington, and delayed for about a year the move to take division commanders out of the pacification chain of command. Another instance of MACV independence showed up when Rusk and Lodge wanted to keep U.S. men and equipment out of the confrontation between GVN and the Struggle Movement in I Corps, but they failed to tell MACV about it. On April 5, MACV went ahead and airlifted two battalions of Vietnamese Rangers to Danang; after that Lodge put a stop to it.

Vietnamese Non-Performance and Sensitivity

Although population control statistics began to improve in 1966 and continued to do so in the first half of 1967, and although this seemed partly associated with the creation of the Ministry of Revolutionary Development and with the emphasis on its programs, few suggested that this progress could be held if U.S. forces withdrew. The drumbeat of criticism from field personnel, and the documented cases of non-performance on high-level matters, made it clear that there was no real improvement in GVN performance. Corruption and inaction showed no signs of improvement; province chiefs and military commanders singled out by U.S. advisers as urgently needing removal were simply shuffled around, if moved at all, and often promoted. Increasing traffic in the Port of Saigon led to acute congestion problems, which GVN failed to clear up or materially improve.

Moreover, on issues purportedly relating to sovereignty or "face," the Vietnamese continued to be quite sensitive, and the U.S. was afraid to inflame this sensitivity. Both sides avoided many delicate topics. A prime example is the lack of a bilateral treaty. The U.S. presence has always been based on the Pentalateral Protocol of 1950, signed by France, the Bao Dai government, Laos, Cambodia and the U.S., which gave U.S. advisers and officials virtual diplomatic status--an arrangement reasonable back when there were less than two hundred of them in all Indochina, but of dubious applicability to the hundreds of thousands now there. This matter has cropped up from time to time, as in the case of American civilians being tried for currency violations in Vietnamese courts, where they were subject to extortion. Both governments cooperated in smoothing things over after a momentary disagreement over jurisdiction, and have avoided stirring things up.

Shared sensitivity (and legitimate concern for an independent RVNAF role), closely related to the lack of a bilateral treaty, prevented any move toward joint command and U.S. control of all military operations in Vietnam. Both Westmoreland and the Vietnamese preferred to operate either separately or in loosely coordinated joint operations. The Embassy looked the other way from repressive police measures and political arrests unless these led to embarrassing press stories; and when the Ambassador would raise this type of issue with the GVN, it proved always to be touchy. Especially under Lodge, the Embassy tried to protect GVN from the press and to help it build a favorable image.

Vietnamese sensitivity sometimes led to open displays of anti-Americanism. These displays reached a climax in the Struggle Movement crisis in the first half of 1966, when the Buddhists openly accused the U.S. of helping GVN crush them, and they sacked and burned the U.S. Consulate in Hue. Moreover, newspapers reflecting officials views would occasionally publish stories expressing fear of a U.S. sellout in negotiations, anger at U.S. intervention in Vietnamese affairs (as happened during the Chinh-Hunnicutt affair), and other anti-American themes.

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Vietnamese Compliance More in Form Than in Substance

The Vietnamese, nevertheless, showed a ready willingness to declare new policies, sign decrees, and engage in joint studies at our request. But as noted, that scarcely means that we got what we wanted on such matters. Ky was always willing to issue decrees purporting to clear up the port problem, and to make public declarations against corruption. On economic policy, Ky and Hanh gave us one agreement after another promising to control inflation and to run down their dollar balances. The relations of their military with MACV showed the same pattern.

The Vietnamese military, on whom the U.S. counted most heavily, continued as in earlier periods to have far more enthusiasm for external adventures than they did for getting on with the job of effective government and pacification. They promised much on this latter score, but delivered little. Knowing that we had no one else to turn to, they continued their old habits and often openly did what they pleased about important matters, such as the airlift of troops to Danang in May, 1966.

Examples of superficial compliance are almost too numerous to mention. The Honolulu Conference of February 1966, produced over sixty agreed points between the two governments on all areas of mutual interest; getting any follow-up proved to be like pulling teeth, and then the follow-up we got was nothing more as a rule than more promises. Likewise, at the Manila Conference much the same thing happened, where GVN agreed to programs for social revolution, economic progress, and so on. However, at our insistence they did go ahead with the constitution and elections, and they shifted half of ARVN into pacification. How much substantive improvement these moves will produce still remains to be seen.

GVN taste for foreign adventure showed up in small, irritating ways. In July 1965, Thi planned unauthorized operations in the DMZ, but we stopped him.

Conclusion

Increasingly throughout 1967, GVN legitimacy and performance became a domestic political issue in the U.S. as well as a source of concern for policy-makers. No matter what issue was raised, the central importance of the GVN remained. If we wanted to pacify more, we had to turn to the Vietnamese themselves. If we desired to push for a negotiated settlement, we had to seriously weigh the possibilities of SVN collapse. In the last analysis, it was and is a war which only GVN legitimacy and effectiveness can win.

CHRONOLOGY

DATE	EVENT OR DOCUMENT	DESCRIPTION
22 Jun 65	Memorandum from Vincent Puritano to James P. Grant 25 Sep 65, "Joint Provincial Sign-off Authority," with attachment	Troika sign-off abandoned.
1 Jul 65	SD PM 1 Jul 65 Sec 8B	SecDef Memorandum to the President recommends more aid for Vietnam.
1 Jul 65	Saigon to State 14, 2 Jul	Taylor writes a letter to Ky asking him to support constructive USOM/GVN consultations on economic matters and the port.
8 Jul 65	COMUSMACV to CINCPAC DTG 080020Z Jul	MACV and RVNAF agree on coordination and cooperation, and do not discuss combined command.
20 Jul 65	SD PM 20 Jul para. 8B	SecDef Memorandum to the President recommends U.S. veto on major GVN commanders and on GVN statements about going North.
28 Jul 65	Saigon to State 266, 25 Jul	USOM and GVN agree on AID package with no leverage.
15-26 Aug 65	Saigon to State 626, 26 Aug	Lodge replaces Taylor, takes charge of the Embassy. Ky tells Lodge the U.S. forces should hold strategic points so that RVNAF can concentrate on pacification, and says that the Chieu Hoi Program is a waste of money.
28 Aug 65	Saigon to State 671, 28 Aug	Thi tells Lodge he can govern better than Ky can.
22 Sep 65	COMUSMACV Command History 1965, p. 240	COMUSMACV presents proposals for revitalization of Hop Tac to USOM.
1 Oct 65	COMUSMACV Command History 1965, p. 240	MACV begins four-month experiment with sector and subsector advisor funds.

DATE	EVENT OR DOCUMENT	DESCRIPTION
3 Nov 65	SecDef DPM	McNamara urges more active role for U.S. advisors.
15 Dec 65	COMUSMACV Command History 1965, p. 241.	JGS Directive AB 140 gives GVN military plan to support 1966 Rural Construction program.
24 Dec 65	State to Saigon 1855 31 Dec	Beginning of 37 day bombing pause and peace offensive.
6-8 Feb 66	State to Saigon 2252 4 Feb "Vietnam: Honolulu Conference-Summary of Goals and Status of Activity," 30 Mar	Honolulu Conference to press GVN for action on pacification and on political and economic reforms. Thieu and Ky obligingly agreed to U.S. demands. Vice-President Humphrey flies with them back to Saigon.
10 Mar 66	Kahin and Lewis, The U.S. in Vietnam, p. 244 and passim; Saigon to State 3260 and 3265 9 Mar	Ky persuades military leadership to approve his plan to exile I Corps Commander, General Thi. Thi resigns.
12 Mar 66	Kahin and Lewis, The U.S. in Vietnam, p. 245; and Saigon 3333 14 Mar	Annamese Buddhists and students begin demonstration in Danang and Hue.
16 Mar 66	Saigon to State 3381 17 Mar	Thi permitted to return to Danang to quiet demonstrations.
March 1966	COMUSMACV Command History 1966, p. 510 CINCUSARPAC 240312Z May	PROVN Study completed.
3 Apr 66	COMUSMACV Command History 1966, p. 824.	Ky declares Danang to be in Communist hands.
5 Apr 66	COMUSMACV Command History 1966, p. 824; MACV to CINCPAC DTG 051125Z Apr; Saigon to State 2986 5 Apr	MACV airlifts two ARVN Ranger battalions to Danang. 1st ARVN Division commander declares for the Struggle Movement; U.S. advisors withdrawn.

DATE	EVENT OR DOCUMENT	DESCRIPTION
6 Apr 66	COMUSMACV Command History 1966, p. 824	Non-essential U.S. civilians removed from Hue.
8 Apr 66	COMUSMACV Command History 1966, p. 824	GVN flies two additional Ranger battalions to Danang after MACV refused to do so.
9 Apr 66	COMUSMACV Command History 1966, p. 824	U.S. protest to Struggle Movement leaders induces them to pull back howitzers. Two hundred U.S. and third country civilians evacuated from Danang.
12 Apr 66	COMUSMACV Command History 1966, p. 324; Kahin and Lewis The U.S. in Vietnam, p. 256	GVN withdraws its Ranger battalions from Danang. Relative quiet returns.
14 Apr 66	COMUSMACV Command History 1966, p. 324; Kahin and Lewis The U.S. in Vietnam, p. 256	The Directorate promises elections for a constituent assembly with 3-5 months. Buddhists and others call off demonstrations.
4 May 66	Kahin and Lewis The U.S. in Vietnam, p. 256; Saigon to State 4368 4 May and 4605 15 May	Ky publicly reneges on promises to hold August elections, says perhaps they will be possible by October. Lodge absent on long trip to Washington. Porter follows State guidance closely.
15 May 66	State to Saigon 3448, 3449, 3450 and 3451 15 May	GVN airlifts troops to Danang and Hue to quell new disorders. U.S. witholds airlift protests GVN failure to consult, withdraws advisors from both sides.
16 May 66	Saigon to State 4627 and 4635 16 May	USMC General Walt threatens to use U.S. jets to shoot down any VNAF aircraft used against dissident ARVN units. The threat succeeds.
21 May 66	State to Saigon 3575 21 May	Lodge returns, tells Ky to be conciliatory, use force with restraint. He does around Saigon pagodas, but naked force in Hue produces self-immolations. U.S. evacuates its consulate and other facilities there.

DATE	EVENT OR DOCUMENT	DESCRIPTION
27 May 66	Saigon to State 4837 21 May 4849 and 4878 23 May, 4943 and 4963 25 May, 4966 26 May, 5037 27 May, 5073 28 May, 5178 1 Jun, and 1947 7 Jul; Kahin and Lewis ibid.	Ky and Thi meet; latter offered unspecified ARVN job.
31 May 66	Saigon to State 5163 and 5178 1 Jun	Ky meets leaders of the Buddhist Institute, offers civilian participation in an enlarged Directorate. They appear conciliatory and agree to appointment of General Lam as Commander of I Corps.
1 Jun 66	NYTimes Article	Student mob burns U.S. consulate and consular residence in Hue. Struggle Movement fills the streets with Buddhist altars.
5 Jun 66	NYTimes Article	Electoral Law Commission presents its proposals.
18 Jun 66	NYTimes Article	Piaster devalued to official rate of 80.
18 Jun 66	Kahin and Lewis The U.S. in Vietnam, p. 257	Anniversary of Thieu-Ky government proclaimed a GVN holiday; one-day general strike called by the Buddhists.
19 Jun 66	Kahin and Lewis The U.S. in Vietnam, pp. 258-59.	Directorate schedules elections for the Constituent Assembly for 11 September.
22 Jun 66	Kahin and Lewis The U.S. in Vietnam, p. 257.	Conditions quiet in I Corps; GVN steadily regaining control.
8-9 Jun 66	NYTimes Article	Secretary McNamara visits Honolulu for talks with CINCPAC.
31 Jul 66	State to Saigon 1694 29 Jul 2554 3 Aug	Thi goes into exile.
13-14 Aug 66	NYTimes Article	General Westmoreland reports to the President at his Texas ranch.

DATE	EVENT OR DOCUMENT	DESCRIPTION
24 Aug 66	"Roles and Missions" Study 24 Aug	"Roles and Missions" Study to the Embassy.
11 Sep 66	NYTimes Article	Constituent Assembly elections.
4 Oct 66	Saigon to State 7616 4 Oct, 7732 and 7752 5 Oct, 6043 7 Oct, 8681 17 Oct, 8749 18 Oct, 8833 19 Oct, 8839 20 Oct. State to Saigon 66781 14 Oct and 68339 18 Oct	GVN cabinet crisis brews as six civilian ministers, the only Southern members threaten to resign.
5 Oct 66	COMUSMACV Command History 1966, p. 526	JGS chairs a high level joint conference to develop a schedule of action to implement road development.
6 Oct 66	State to Saigon 49294 16 Sep 49399 17 Sep Saigon to State 6997 27 Sep State to Saigon 58092 30 Sep 61330 6 Oct 58280 2 Oct	Manh and Komer reach vague and general agreement on GVN budget and financial matters.
10-13 Oct 66	NYTimes Article	Secretary McNamara, accompanied by newly appointed Under Secretary of State Katzenback visits Saigon. Saigon Port congestion grows worse.
14 Oct 66	SecDef Memorandum to the President	In M McNamara urges shift of ARVN to pacification, change of US responsibility to MACV, "drastic" reform of GVN.

DATE	EVENT OR DOCUMENT	DESCRIPTION
19 Oct 66	Saigon to State 7616 4 Oct, 7732 and 7752 5 Oct, 8681 17 Oct, 8749 18 Oct, 8833 19 Oct, and 8839 20 Oct, State to Saigon 66781 14 Oct, 68339 18 Oct	Cabinet crisis patched up at least until after Manila Conference.
24-25 Oct 66	NYTimes Article Texts of Communique and Declarations Signed at Close of Manila Conference 26 Oct	Manila conference of the seven nations aiding South Vietnam. Basic problem is still to get GVN commitment to action on non-military measures.
1 Nov 66	Saigon to State 10312 7 Nov, 11958 29 Nov	Promised GVN National Reconciliation proclamation fails to appear; instead only vague reference in a speech on other subjects. Ky promised a NR speech and proclamation in "early December".
2 Nov 66	Saigon to State 9363 3 Nov	Komer and Porter in Saigon reach agreement with GVN on foreign exchange.
2 Nov 66	Saigon to State 7815 6 Oct and 8161 1 Oct	Ky promises a tough decree on port management.
18 Nov 66	Saigon to State 11249 18 Nov 11431 21 Nov State to Saigon 93314 28 Nov	General Quang, deposed IV Corps Commander, appointed to head the new cabinet portfolio "Planning and Development". Concern continues in Washington over AID diversions.
21 Nov 66	COMUSMACV msg 50331 21 Nov	In a policy statement, COMUSMACV tells advisors that deficiencies of non-compliance are to be resolved within RVNAF channels.
29 Nov 66	MACV Commanders Conference 20 Nov	Washington reminds the Mission that GVN has not yet delivered on its Manila promises about NR, pacification, and land reform; suggests Lodge press Ky.

DATE	EVENT OR DOCUMENT	DESCRIPTION
2 Dec 66	Saigon to State 12321 2 Dec	Saigon declines to suggest formation of a joint inspectorate general to follow up AID diversions.
December 1966	Saigon to State 14009 22 Dec, 12733 7 Dec, 12908 and 12950 9 Dec, 13046 10 Dec, 14009 and 13023 22 Dec, 14112 23 Dec, 14230 26 Dec	Further GVN-USOM negotiations on the dollar balance problem.
8 Dec 66	COMUSMACV to CINCPAC 080245Z Dec	Ceremonial singing of the 1967 Combined Campaign Plan by COMUSMACV and Chief, JGS.
December 1966	Saigon to State 15569 13 Jan 67	Saigon Port congestion grows worse during GVN port commander's "great barge" experiment. State authorizes drastic action which Saigon declines to use.
21 Dec 66	COMUSMACV History 1966 pp. 471-72	Chinh-Runnicutt affair terminated with transfer of the U.S. adviser outside the theatre and issuance of a memorandum by the division commander stating that the past must be forgotten.
January 1967	NYTimes Article	U Thant advances proposals for peace. President promises careful evaluation. Ky foresees negotiations nearing. Lodge predicts sensational military gains in 1967.
2 Jan 67	Saigon to State 14725 2 Jan	U.S. Mission estimates GVN inflationary budget gap at 14-20 billion piasters.
7 Jan 67	NYTimes Article	Ky signs laws providing for spring elections in 1000 villages and 4000 hamlets.
13 Jan 67	Saigon to State 15569 13 Jan	Saigon resists Washington suggestion for complete MACV takeover of Saigon port.
20 Jan 67	Saigon to State 16037 20 Jan	GVN issues Cy 1967 budget of 75 billion piasters without prior consultation with U.S.

DATE	EVENT OR DOCUMENT	DESCRIPTION
23 Jan 67	State to Saigon 123223 21 Jan	Renewed economic negotiations forseen with Hanh in Washington.
24 Jan 67	NYTimes Article	JCS Chief of Staff Vien appointed to replace corrupt Defense Minister Co, who is informed on visit to Taiwan not to return.
20 Feb 67	Saigon to State 18646 22 Feb	GVN agrees to work on an interim memorandum of understanding to include implementation of the previous November's foreign exchange agreements. Komer threatens to reduce CIP; Hanh hints at a raise in the piaster rate.
24 Feb 67	NYTimes Article State to Saigon 140250 19 Feb Saigon to State 18303 18 Feb	Ky postpones U.S. visit to assure free and fair elections.
10 Mar 67	Saigon to State 19902 9 Mar, 20053 10 Mar, 20201 13 Mar, State to Saigon 153512 11 Mar	U.S. announces military jurisdiction over American civilians, thus skirts the problems of corrupt GVN justice and status of forces.
17 Mar 67	State to Saigon 157064 17 Mar	Another "Interim Agreement" reached with GVN on foreign exchange.
19 Mar 67	NYTimes Article	Constituent Assembly unanimously approves new consitiution. Next day it is unanimously approved by the military junta and a copy presented to President Johnson at Guam meetings between top level GVN-US leadership.
20-21 Mar 67	NYTimes Article Joint Communique Guam Meetings 21 Mar	Guam meetings between top level GVN-US leadership. President Johnson introduces the new U.S. team in Saigon; Bunker to be Ambassador, Locke his deputy, Komer the new pacification dzar within the MACV framework.
6 Apr 67	NYTimes Article	General Abrams appointed Deputy to COMUSMACV.

DATE	EVENT OR DOCUMENT	DESCRIPTION
18 Apr 67	Saigon to State 23376 18 Apr	GVN issues a National Reconciliation proclamation that proves to be a mirage; it emphasizes solidarity vice reconciliation.
25 Apr 67	NYTimes Article Saigon to State 23749 23 Apr	Lodge completes his stint, leaves Saigon.
27 Apr 67	NYTimes Article	General Westmoreland confers with LBJ in Washington, addresses Congress the next day.
7 May 67	COMUSMACV MAC J 341 15054 to CINCPAC 071035Z May	General Westmoreland reports on his command project to improve RVNAF performance, offers $7800 saving in cut-off of MAP support to two VNN fishing boats as sign of progress. ARVN evaluation only partially completed.
12 May 67	NYTimes Article Saigon to State 25554 12 May	Premier Ky announces he will seek the Presidency. Thieu-Ky rivalry intensifies.
20 Jun 67	Saigon to State 28409 20 Jun	Thieu and Ky invited to informal luncheon hosted by Bunker at which unity of the Armed Forces is discussed.
22 Jun 67	State to Saigon 213380 22 Jun	Mission estimates rate of inflation in SVN to be 45-50% per year.
29-30 Jun 67	Saigon to State 29258 30 Jun	The Armed Forces Council of 50-60 officers holds two day continuous session from which emerges the Thieu-Ky ticket.
7-8 Jul 67	NYTimes Article OSD(SA) Memorandum 25 Jul, "SecDef VN Trip Briefings"	Secretary McNamara makes his 9th visit to SVN.
17 Jul 67	NYTimes Article Saigon to State 1381 19 Jul 1475 20 Jul	CA approves Thieu-Ky ticket; rejects the threatening Big Minh candidacy.
24-25 Jul 67	NYTimes Article	Clifford-Taylor mission receives Saigon briefings.

DATE	EVENT OR DOCUMENT	DESCRIPTION
12 Aug 67	NYTimes Article	Army C/S General H. K. Johnson reports we are winning, latest 45,000 man troop increase to be the last.
26 Aug 67	AmEmb Saigon to SecDef, Blueprint for Viet-Nam, 26 Aug	Mission completes "Blueprint for Vietnam."
3 Sep 67	NYTimes Article	Elections for President and Senate.

IV. C.

US/GVN RELATIONS: 1963 - 1967

PART II

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PART II

US/GVN RELATIONS IN THE KY-THIEU PERIOD
JUNE 1965 - FALL 1967

Chapter I - The Ky Government's Early Months: The Coup to the Embrace at Honolulu, February 1966

1. The Ky Government's Inheritance 1/

Nguyen Cao Ky, Commander of the Vietnamese Air Force, joined with other "Young Turks" of the Vietnamese Armed Forces to overthrow the civilian government of Prime Minister Quat on June 12, 1965. Attempts at civilian government had limped along since October, 1964, following riots in August-September that had forced the generals to withdraw Khanh's military-dictatorial constitution and to promise civilian rule. That entire period had been marked by riots, coups, and attempted coups. By June, when Quat and the civilian President Suu found themselves in an impasse, Ambassador Taylor easily acquiesced in the return to direct military rule.

Pacification kept lagging, and the dark military picture forced the U.S. to decide in June to pour U.S. troops into the country as fast as they could be deployed. The pattern of GVN civil and military ineffectiveness had led the U.S. Government to resolve to do it ourselves, and to abandon any hope of forcing or inducing GVN to do the job without us. All concerned knew that the Young Turks now in open control of GVN had repeatedly defied Ambassador Taylor and had gotten away with it. Attempts at top-level leverage on GVN had produced a virtual diplomatic rupture for a few days at the end of 1964 and the beginning of 1965, and the U.S. was in no mood to try it again.

2. The Ky Government and the U.S. Start Their Dealings, June-July 1965

With Vietnam's return to overt military government, the political blocs with their private armies, perhaps exhausted, bided their time. Communication improved between the U.S. and GVN to a state of cool correctness, gradually revealing lower-level GVN's intention to go on coasting as it always had and higher-level GVN's intention to serve its own interests.

The day after the coup, COMUSMACV cabled CINCPAC in alarm about the military picture, requesting authority to send U.S. troops on offensive missions. He recalled that ARVN had lost five infantry battalions on the battlefield in the last three weeks, and he stated that the only possible U.S. response was the aggressive employment of U.S. troops together with the Vietnamese general reserve forces.

To meet this challenge successfully, troops must be maneuvered fully, deployed and redeployed as necessary. 2/

To demonstrate how completely the initiative changes on the subject of combined command, Saigon announced to Washington in mid-June its intention within the next few days to conduct a backgrounder on command relationships. 3/ A reply from the Secretary of Defense said,

> As basis for Washington review of proposed Westmoreland backgrounder on command relationships and MACV organizational structure, please furnish draft of text he will use... 4/

In late June, General Westmoreland was authorized by Washington to "commit U.S. troops to combat, independent of or in conjunction with GVN forces in any situation in which use of such troops is requested by an appropriate GVN commander and when, in COMUSMACV's judgment, their use is necessary to strengthen the relative position of GVN forces."5/

Premier Ky, obviously wishing to play down an issue sensitive to both governments, told Ambassador Taylor he saw no particular reason for any drastic change from the previous practice of combat support. In any specifice situation, he said that command should be worked out in accordance with "good sense and sound military principles." 6/ Additional deployments caused no problem, and indeed GVN now asked for more US/FW forces than could be deployed or were approved. But in response to a query, Taylor waved aside any hope of using deployments for leverage. Discussions of combined command avoided joining issue and left matters unchanged. 7/

Although Taylor's initial reaction to Ky was one of apprehension, he was soon impressed by Ky's aggressive performance including his 26-point program. He doubted Ky's ability to implement the program, but concluded that military government was less likely to abandon the war effort and thus should be supported. 8/

Early in 1965, AID had decided to stop buying piasters for U.S.-controlled sector funds, and in June agreed with the GVN to change the province procedures. Effective June 22, 1965, the Vietnamese Province Chief would requisition and release AID commodities on his own authority, and all supporting funds came through regular GVN channels. The new procedures included elaborate reporting steps both when the U.S. advisers concurred and when they nonconcurred with the Province Chief's actions. In practice, the change reduced U.S. adviser's leverage. 9/

On July 1, Secretary McNamara submitted a memorandum to the President reviewing all aspects of Vietnam policy. However, he naturally concentrated on U.S. deployments, and had little to say on GVN's problems. In a section titled, "Initiatives Inside Vietnam," his only significant

recommendations were that we should increase our AID to GVN and that Chieu Hoi Program should be improved. However, in another memorandum to the President on July 20, following a trip to Saigon, McNamara suggested that the U.S. Government should lay down some terms for its assistance. GVN was again pressing for more U.S. forces than were available. He mentioned rice policy, plus a "veto on major GVN commanders, statements about invading NVN, and so." 10/

McNamara's overall evaluation was deeply pessimistic, making clear why he recommended increased U.S. forces at that time:

> Estimate of the Situation. The situation in South Vietnam is worse than a year ago (when it was worse than a year before that). After a few months of stalemate, the tempo of the war has quickened. A hard VC push is now on to dismember the nation and to maul the army. The VC main and local forces, reinforced by militia and guerrillas, have the initiative and, with large attacks (some in regimental strength), are hurting ARVN forces badly. The main VC efforts have been in southern I Corps, northern and central II Corps and north of Saigon. The central highlands could well be lost to the National Liberation Front during this monsoon season. Since June 1, the GVN has been forced to abandon six district capitals; only one has been retaken. U.S. combat troops deployments and US/VNAF strikes against the North have put to rest most South Vietnamese fears that the United States will forsake them, and US/VNAF air strikes in-country have probably shaken VC morale somewhat. Yet the government is able to provide security to fewer and fewer people in less and less territory as terrorism increases. Cities and towns are being isolated as fewer and fewer roads and railroads are usable and power and communications lines are cut.
>
> The economy is deteriorating -- the war is disrupting rubber production, rice distribution, Dalat vegetable production and the coastal fishing industry, causing the loss of jobs and income, displacement of people and frequent breakdown or suspension of vital means of transportation and communication; foreign exchange earnings have fallen; and severe inflation is threatened. 11/

In Saigon Ambassador Taylor gave the GVN the first definite sign of U.S. concern about the effects of U.S. deployments on Saigon port operations and on the Vietnamese economy. In a letter to Prime Minister Ky dated July 1, 1965, he said:

> Your experts and ours are in constant contact on [the budgetary deficit] and have always worked effectively together...[They] will need your support in carrying out the anti-inflation measures which they may recommend from

time to time...The rice procurement and distribution agency which you have in mind is an important measure of...a program which should also include the further development of port capacities.

USOM also began talking about devaluing the piaster. 12/ These matters were to come to a head a year later. At this time, however, the Embassy treated these matters routinely and applied no pressure to GVN. GVN officials opened the serious bidding in their meeting with Secretary McNamara on July 16, saying that their gold and foreign exchange reserves had suffered the alarming drop from $175 million to $100 million since January, 1964, and requested a big increase in AID. 13/ Ambassador Taylor preferred to limit our counter-demands to get quick agreement; he said,

> We would avoid giving the impression of asking for new agreements or imposing conditions for our increase AID... We do not want to raise conditions in terms likely to be rejected or to require prolonged debate. 14/

On July 28, the Embassy and GVN settled it. The agreement touched very lightly on GVN obligations and on joint economic planning. It provided for "joint discussions to precede policy decisions...for control of inflation," etc. 15/

On July 8, MACV revieved its relationships with the military leadership. There was no problem; they agreed that operations involving both U.S. and ARVN troops would use the concepts of coordination and cooperation. They did not discuss combined command. 16/ However, a flap developed late in July when General Thi was reported to be planning operations in the DMZ. Both Taylor and Westmoreland took it up with GVN, who reassured them; Thi got back on his leash before it was too late. Such operations commenced more than a year later. 17/
A candid subsequent statement from Saigon shows the Vietnamese desired to have the best of both worlds. Ambassador Lodge reported to Washington the disparaging reactions of ARVN general officers on the JGS staff to the U.S. Marine victory south of Chu Lai. "I flag this small straw in the wind as pointing up the importance of portraying our operations here as combined with the GVN in nature." 18/

3. Quiet Sailing Through January, 1966

In August, Ky wanted to make a trip to Taiwan, being interested in getting Nationalist Chinese troops into Vietnam. The U.S. Government objected both to the trip and to its objective, but failed to persuade him to give up the trip. Later he brought in some Chinats on the sly. An idea floated in Washington that he or Thieu should visit the United States was dropped without having been brought up with the GVN. 19/

Lodge arrived around the middle of August to replace Taylor. Having avoided the confrontations with GVN of the type that Taylor had, he came with a residue of good will. Because he was considered responsible for Diem's overthrow, the Buddhists were pleased, and the militant Catholics dubious. In that connection, State thought it prudent to direct the Embassy to assure GVN that neither Lodge nor Lansdale, whom he was bringing with him, was going to try to make changes in GVN. 20/ On August 26, Ky told Lodge that he thought U.S. forces should "hold strategic points" so that the Vietnamese could concentrate on pacification operations. That is, he wanted the United States to take over the main force war. He also said he thought the Chu Hoi program was a waste of money. 21/

In early August, Ky established a Ministry of Rural Construction (MRC) and a Central Rural Construction Council (CRCC). These absorbed functions and personnel from predecessor groups and other ministries for the announced purpose of providing centralized direction to the pacification effort. Nguyen Tat Ung was made Minister of Rural Construction while the Council was chaired by General Co, Minister of War and Defense. Timing and circumstances give no evidence of a strong U.S. hand at work. The U.S. Embassy viewed the new organization as the result of political maneuvering, but also hoped the change would promote inter-ministerial cooperation. The move signalled renewed emphasis of pacification by both GVN and the mission. In late August, Ambassador Lodge announced the appointment of retired General Lansdale as chairman of the U.S. Mission liaison group to the GVN CRCC.

There followed a period of shuffling and reorganization during which Ung was killed in a plane crash. Two weeks later Prime Minister Ky announced that General Thang would succeed to the Ministry. The appointment was for six months only, and Thang retained his position on the JGS. At the same time, General Co was elevated to Deputy Prime Minister for War and Reconstruction in a realignment that made six ministries including Rural Reconstruction subordinate to him. 22/

On August 28, General Thi told Lodge he thought he could do a better job running the government than Ky was doing. He spoke at some length on Ky's political weaknesses, with particular emphasis on his lack of support in I Corps, where Thi was strong. As was his usual practice, Lodge politely brushed aside this approach. (Later Thi proved harder and harder to control until his dismissal in March.) 23/

In mid-September, Lodge went on an inspection trip to Da Nang and Qui Nhon. On his return he waxed eloquent about the benefits of the U.S. presence:

> All reports indicated that the American troops are having a very beneficial effect on VN troops, giving them greater confidence and courage. I am always mindful of the possibility that the American presence will induce the VN to slump back and "Let George do it." But here seems to be no sign of this.

I wish I could describe the feeling of hope which this great American presence on the ground is bringing. There can no longer be the slightest doubt that persistence will bring success, that the aggression will be warded off and that for the first time since the end of WW II, the cause of free men will be on an upward spiral. 24/

Lodge's end-of-month appraisal was that civil and political progress lagged behind the military. He felt there would be a political vacuum that the VC would fill if the U.S. pulled out. Therefore, he was trying to start a program to provide security and to generate indigenous political activity at the hamlet level. He noted with pleasure that Ky was taking the initiative in bringing his pacification plans to Lansdale, to get U.S. reactions before these plans were too firm to change. 25/

By September, a combination of inflation, black-marketeering by U.S. troops and other related problems led both governments to agree on important steps. The U.S. introduced military payment certificates, and the GVN agreed to exchange 118 piasters to the dollar for personal use of troops and U.S. civilians. Official U.S. purchases of piasters continued at the old exchange rate of 35, however. 26/

September brought an evaluation of the three-month three-province pacification experiment during which each was under the unified control of a team chief; one an embassy FSO, one a MACV sector adviser, and one an AID province representative. COMUSMACV judged that test only partially successful; progress achieved was attributed to the "keen spirit of cooperation" by all team members. Because he believed the results inconclusive and in view of the existing military situation, General Westmoreland concluded that the team chief concept should not be implemented. The experiment was officially ended.

The U.S. also became deeply involved in the rice trade. Vietnam changed over from a rice exporter in the years through 1964 to a heavy importer from 1965 onwards. AID provided the imported rice under CIP. In September, 1964, Ambassador Lodge spoke of measures we are taking to control the price of rice; inasmuch as AID provided the imports, USOM had a say in the GVN's policies on price control, subsidization, and distribution of rice. 27/

During this period a problem flared up over a corrupt Province Chief. Lt. Colonel Chi, Province Chief of Binh Tuy, was accused of misuse of $250,000 of AID funds. After pressure from AID had merely produced threats against the lives of AID personnel in the province, on September 23 AID withdrew them and suspended AID to the province. Chi was a protege of General Co, the Minister of Defense and Deputy Premier, who himself figured in charges of corruption a year later. On October 5, the story got into

the papers, and on the 7th Ky promised publicly to remove Chi. Lodge played no role in starting this episode, and told the Mission Council on October 7 that he did not want it repeated. After a six-weeks delay, Ky did remove Chi on November 25, and gave him a job in the Ministry of Defense. AID to the province resumed. 28/

Advisers in the field kept on complaining about the delays in the Vietnamese system, and pressed for restoration of some resources of their own. On October 1, 1965, MACV began giving its sector and subsector advisers piaster funds they could spend on urgent projects. Each subsector adviser had access to 50,000 piasters which could be replenished as necessary. Toward the end of 1965 it became obvious that this method was highly successful. Consideration was given to permanent establishment of the revolving fund. 29/

However, after the trial period of about four months MACV abandoned the plan because of strong opposition by General Thang, Minister of Revolutionary Development. He argued that under U.S. urging he had been developing an effective, flexible organization that would take care of urgent projects of the type the sector and subsector advisers wanted to promote; letting them bypass his people would encourage the latter to lapse into their old bad habits and thwart both governments' main objectives. 30/

USOM also had second thoughts about abandoning the sign-off system. Early in October 1965, the Mission Council approved a plan to restore the "troika sign-off" procedure as it had existed prior to June. After the Mission had already reopened the issue with the GVN, 31/ the State Department objected, saying that the United States wanted to make the Vietnamese more independent and effective.

After a time the frustrations of the advisers began striking a sympathetic chord at the highest levels. In a draft memorandum to the President dated November 3, 1965, Secretary McNamara stated his own impatience with the GVN and urged a more active role for our advisers at province and district. There is no sign of such high-level interest earlier, except as expressed by decisions to extend the advisory system to lower levels; as just noted State objected to the restoration of troika sign-off on October 16, 1965.

Some uncertainty and disagreement with respect to pacification developed within United States groups in Vietnam. In November, Major General Lansdale, Special Assistant to the Ambassador, asked who on the U.S. side should have the executive role in dealing with the Rural Construction Ministry? Lansdale envisaged that MACV and JUSPAO would be observers only.

COMUSMACV disagreed with the proposed limitation. USMACV was the only structure advising GVN at all levels; so MACV shared responsibility for pacification. Manpower required for cadre teams would impact directly

and seriously on MACV efforts to maintain RVNAF strengths. Minister of Rural Construction was Major General Thang who also was Director of Operations, JGS. He looked to MACV for advice and assistance on the whole spectrum of pacification problems.

On December 15 in a memorandum to Major General Lansdale, the Ambassador said,

> I consider the GVN effort in this domain (apart from the military clearing phase) to be primarily civilian... Consequently, on the American side it is preferable that the two civilian agencies, USAID and CAS, be the operating support agencies. 32/

The GVN military plan in support of the 1966 Rural Construction plan was given in the JGS Directive AB 140 of December 15, 1965, which had been developed in coordination with MACV and the Ministry of Rural Construction. In November onward, portions of the 1966 GVN defense budget prepared in accordance with U.S. guidelines were received by MACV. 33/

At the time of the Christmas truce, President Johnson launched a peace offensive, including a suspension of bombing in North Vietnam that lasted 37 days. The moves were carefully cleared with GVN and with its Ambassador in Washington, and caused no significant problems. Lodge's appraisal was that the "offensive" achieved all its aims, at no significant cost. However, trouble flared up over a plan to release 20 NVA prisoners across the DMZ; General Thi was not consulted, and said he would not permit it (in his Corps). Things were smoothed over amicably by Tet. 34/

One troublesome area was GVN's hawkishness over such issues as border incidents. Ky kept pressing for action against Cambodian sanctuaries; the U.S. stood firm on the rule of self-defense in emergencies only, which could mean shooting across the border but not maneuvering troops across it. Ky wanted to encourage a Khmer Serai expedition, which would cause a flare-up with the Cambodian Government; State directed Lodge to keep him on a tight leash. 35/

Coup rumors started to circulate around the first of the year; Lodge remarked that just before Tet was a normal season for that. On December 29 Ky told Lodge of an alleged assassination plot directed at Ky, Co, the Buddhist leader Thich Tam Chau, and Lodge. On January 15, VNAF took to the air in nervous reaction to some supposedly suspicious troop movements; Lodge reported more rumors on January 19, and took the opportunity to spell out his position:

> If...corridor coup...caused directorate members to fall out, consequences could be disastrous...A peaceful reshuffle within directorate is a continuing possibility. I would deplore it. We take all rumors and reports of government change very seriously and never miss an opportunity to make clear U.S. support for, and the need for, governmental stability. 36/

Around the middle of January 1966, Ky addressed the Armed Forces Convention. He announced the prospective formation, after Tet, of a "Democracy Building Council" to serve as a constituent assembly and legislature. It would write a new constitution by October, 1966, preparatory to elections in 1967. This was the opening shot in what became a big issue within a few weeks. 37/

4. The Honolulu Conference of February 6-8, 1966

By late January, it was clear that Lodge's policy of not pushing GVN too hard may have helped keep things amicable but permitted pacification to keep lagging and permitted economic problems to grow serious. With conspicuous haste that caused GVN some loss of face, the U.S. summoned Thieu, Ky, and other GVN officials to Honolulu to express renewed and heightened U.S. concern. The U.S. wanted to re-emphasize pacification, with a corresponding shift of authority from the ARVN line command to the province chiefs; and it wanted strong action to limit inflation, to clear the Saigon Port, and to limit the unfavorable effect of U.S. deployments on the U.S. balance of payments. 38/

For the first time in over a year, the U.S. bargained hard with GVN on issues of these kinds. The GVN agreed to the main U.S. demands on authority for the provinces chiefs. Moreover, it promised fiscal reform, devaluation, port and customs reform, and the use of GVN dollar balances to finance additional imports. The GVN also agreed that an International Monetary Fund team should be invited to give technical advice on these economic programs. Thieu and Ky promised to go ahead with a new constitution, to be drafted by an appointed Advisory Council, and then ratified by popular vote in late 1966; following that, they promised, the GVN would create an elected government rooted in the constitution. The U.S. promised to increase AID imports to $400 million in 1966, plus $150 million in project assistance.

Altogether the two governments exchanged over 60 agreed points and assurances, ranging over free world (third country) assistance, rural construction (pacification), refugees, political development, Montagnards, Chieu Hoi, health, education, agriculture, and economic and financial programs. This package was far more specific than any previous US/GVN agreement. Their public statements after the conference emphasized social justice, the promise of elected government, and the U.S. lack of interest in bases or permanent alliance in South Vietnam.

In a public appearance at the conference, President Johnson embraced Prime Minister Ky, before photographers. Although it caused no loss of face directly, in the eyes of many observers this act added to the impression that Ky was tied to our apron strings. If Lodge sensed this effect, he said nothing about it; characteristically, he said to State that the Honolulu Conference was good psychologically for Vietnam.

Directly after the conference USOM remained seriously concerned about the high and rising black market piaster rate for dollars, which they and the Vietnamese business community regarded as the bellweather of inflation. Moreover, besides its harmful psychological effect, the high rate tempted U.S. personnel into illegal transactions, causing unfavorable publicity.

The thrust of the Honolulu Conference was clearly to stimulate non-military pacification efforts. Upon his return to Saigon, Lodge issued a memorandum reconstituting the Mission Liaison Group under Deputy Ambassador Porter. Though charged by the memorandum with the management and control of all U.S. civilian agency activities supporting Revolutionary Development, Porter saw his responsibility as primarily a coordinating effort. He said he did not intend to get into individual agency activities. 40/

Chapter II - A Rebellion, A Constituent Assembly, and the Hardships of Negotiating With a "Weak" Government

1. The Rise of the Struggle Movement, March 1966

General Thi, Commander of I Corps, was a thorn in Ky's side as a potential rival. Both private and public disagreements showed there was no love lost between them; and Thi had a considerable base of support in his connections with the Buddhist leadership and in his identification with Annamese sensitivities. These factors also made the other generals of the Military Directorate (formerly National Leadership Council, etc.) suspicious of Thi; they felt better able to cope with Ky. 1/

Armed with President Johnson's public support of him, Ky resolved to exile Thi, and he persuaded his colleagues to go along with the idea in a meeting on March 10. The day before he told Lodge of his intention, saying that Thi had been culpably insubordinate; Lodge replied that he should be sure he could prove the charges, so as to put a good public face on the move, and pave the way carefully. Later in the day Lodge also advised him to make sure he had the votes in the Directorate, saying that for him to lose on the issue and be replaced as Prime Minister would be catastrophic. Ky was sure of himself, although he admitted he could not prove his charges. In a later meeting the same day, Thieu told Lodge Thi "had conducted himself in a way that was not suitable," and was confident Thi could be dismissed without ill effects. 2/

On March 10, when the Directorate voted to fire him, Thi resigned. Ky told Lodge that Thi would go to Da Nang the 11th for the change-of-command ceremony and then leave the country for four months. The same day, Thi told Colonel Sam Wilson that he did not want to leave the country, and that he had been encouraged by the Director of National Police to stay; Wilson suggested that he go gracefully. On the 11th, when the time came for Thi to fly to Da Nang, he was detained at Tan Son Nhut; Ky had got wind of, or suspected, his intentions. Ky then urgently requested Lodge to invite Thi to the United States for a physical examination. 3/

The Annamese Buddhists, led by Tri Quang, who had quietly bided their time for about a year, now entered the action. (Ky later told Lodge that Tri Quang had assented to Thi's dismissal and had then double-crossed him.) They began demonstrations in Da Nang and Hue on March 12, joined by the students, and over the next several days gained control of those cities as the police stood aside. Again Ky used Lodge's good offices to try to persuade Thi to leave the country gracefully; but the 16th, Ky and the Directorate decided to try to use Thi to restore order, and permitted him to return to Da Nang. For a few days things quieted down slightly, but the end was not yet in sight. 4/

State offered Lodge suggestions on how to get things calmed down. First, he might counsel a firm attitude by GVN, saying it would meet with

the Buddhists but not under threats, and that it would not permit disorders. Second, GVN might steal the initiative from the Buddhists by making a generous public offer of elections. Whichever course they followed, State wanted them to be sure it would work and would avoid a head-on collision with the Buddhists. In reply, Lodge agreed on the need to avoid a head-on collision; as for the means, he, like State, simply hoped for the best:

> We should not settle on one solution or another. Rather it is possible, if not probable, that, unless uncontrollable mass reaction is brought about, each side will seek to arrange what can be looked upon as widely acceptable. 5/

On March 22, Lodge and Ky had a long discussion of tactics relating to elections and constitution-writing. Elections were scheduled to come up for the largely powerless but symbolic provincial councils (which advised the Province Chiefs on policy matters), and Ky had reportedly toyed with calling off these elections. He was also far behind schedule on the constituent assembly he had publicly promised on January 19 for just after Tet, and as noted had privately promised the U.S. Government at Honolulu. 6/ Lodge reported:

> 2. ...He is eager for advice and when he received it, he said he agreed with it. Now it remains to be seen whether it will be carried out.
>
> 3. My advice was based on careful reflection and consultation with my associates and was to this effect:
>
> 4. The GVN should not cancel provincial elections as I had heard reported. He said that this was not exactly the case; that there were two provincial councils, which didn't want elections. I said in that event these councils should be made to say publicly that they didn't want elections so that the onus of not holding these elections would not fall on the Government. A public announcement had been made that the Government was in favor of holding these provincial elections; the offices involved have little actual consequence but are of symbolic significance; Washington had been informed of this fact; and if there was some reason why in one or two provinces they should not be held, then the provinces should make the reason plain.
>
> 5. I then advised that he should take the lead and influence opinion, and not be at the mercy of events. I suggested that a list of names for so-called consultative assembly (which I suggested would be better named "preparatory commission") which aims to draft a constitution, should be confirmed by the Generals. When this had been done, I suggested that then Ky

should make a very carefully written and persuasive announcement which would be done on film for use on television and in the movie theaters. The Vietnamese are great movie-goers and it is a very important medium here. I said that he should not read it on film with his head bobbing up and down as he looked down at the text, but should have it put on cue card along side the camera and read it as he looks right into the lens.

6. His statement should be written in such a way as not to exclude the possibility of elections later on for a constitutional convention. In other words, this should be deliberately fuzzed and left open by implication. I said I much preferred the phrase "constitutional convention" to the pernicious French phrase "constituent assembly." The constitutional convention would meet, adopt the constitution and disband, whereas the constituent assembly stays around and makes trouble for an indefinite period.

7. He agreed with all this and seemed to understand it. He said that last night, the Generals had unanimously confirmed the names of the members of the preparatory committee. He would announce all this as I suggested. I wish he would do it quickly.

8. I suggested that impulsive unprepared statements were most dangerous at this time. Experienced politicians often make statements which seem to be "off the cuff," but actually are carefully thought out. His unprepared statements always worry me.

9. He agreed with me that certain Buddhists were unwittingly taking Communist inspired advice, as were the students in Hue who had attacked me...

10. He was absolutely sure that the Buddhists were divided among themselves -- an analysis which I share. He agrees with me that Tri Quang simply has not got the powerful psychological factors working for him now that he had in October '63. All the Communist Propaganda in the world cannot alter these facts: That in '63, the Buddhists were discriminated against, and now they are not; that in the latter days of '63 the Buddhists were persecuted whereas now they are not; and that Tri Quang was an underdog then, and now he is not. Yet Tri Quang is evidently determined.

11. My advice to him was not very drastic and quite simple to do, and yet I believe that if he follows it conscientiously and expeditiously without procrastination that there may be enough of a budding sense of National interest to start moving things along in the right direction.

12. He thanked me more effusively and warmly than he has ever done before and said he was so grateful for my interest in his welfare, physical and political.

13. The situation is not yet out of hand. Ky has had offers from Catholics and Southerners for them to enter the fray on his side and start throwing their weight around, which he so far has been able to prevent them from doing. This is one of the things which I have been fearing. I talked in this vein with the Papal delegate and the Archbishop of Saigon yesterday, and they agreed completely. The leadership of the Southerners is not, I fear, as responsible. 7/

On March 25, Ky followed Lodge's advice more or less closely, and announced the Constitutional Preparatory Commission and said it would finish its work within two months; elections might follow by the end of 1966. However, he insisted that GVN would exclude "Vietcong or corrupt elements" from the elected assembly. The move failed to restore order. On March 26, demonstrators in Hue broke out anti-American banners written in English, and an ugly incident followed in which a Marine tore one down. (After detailed negotiations, an apology was given and accepted.) The radio stations at Da Nang and Hue fell under control of dissident elements.

On March 29, Ky told Lodge that he and the generals wanted to move on Hue and Da Nang with military forces, and said that he could show that an unpublicized Buddhist split had caused the uprising. Lodge concurred in Ky's plan to use forces, but urged him not to try to create an open breach among the Buddhists. 8/

Although Lodge had no objection to using force against the Buddhist movement, both he and Rusk felt that U.S. men and equipment should stay out of it, to avoid heightening anti-American feelings. Rusk told Lodge of his deep concern about Vietnamese internal bickering at a crucial time; he was particularly disturbed by the anti-American propaganda coming from the Hue radio, which was physically defended by the U.S. Marines in that general area. He went on to say,

> We face the fact that we ourselves cannot succeed except in support of the South Vietnamese. Unless they are able to mobilize reasonable solidarity, prospects are grim. I appreciate your frank and realistic reporting and am relying heavily upon your good judgment to exert every effort to get us over the present malaise. 9/

Lodge replied that his influence with the Catholics had kept them out of it, but that his talks with Tri Quang had been unproductive. He estimated that Tri Quang had used the anti-American theme to put

pressure on the GVN. 10/ (Through an intermediary the Embassy learned that General Thi said that the United States was too committed to leave; this belief may have led Thi and the Buddhists to feel free to use the theme as a weapon against GVN.)

On March 29, the Catholic leaders in whom Lodge had placed his hopes came out against the GVN and demanded a return to civilian rule. 11/

2. Ky's First Attempt to Suppress the Struggle Movement, April 1966

Events now happened in rapid succession. Assured of Lodge's sympathy, on April 3 Ky declared that Da Nang was in the hands of Communists. On April 5, despite mild questioning from State, MACV airlifted two battalions of Vietnamese Rangers to Da Nang under personal command of Ky, and they started to seize the city. That same day the 1st ARVN Division Commander declared for the Struggle Movement, with his officers backing him, and U.S. advisers were withdrawn from the Division. On April 6, "non-essential" U.S. civilians withdrew from Hue. On April 8, the GVN flew two more Ranger battalions to Da Nang, using its own airlift after MACV refused to provide any. On April 9, U.S. representatives protested to Struggle Movement leaders about Howitzers under their control positioned within range of the Da Nang airbase; the leaders agreed to pull them back. Two hundred U.S. and third country civilians evacuated Da Nang. 12/

Washington played little role in all this. From time to time it offered mild advice, but Lodge had a free hand. It was his decision to withhold any further U.S. airlift on April 8, although after he acted State agreed by urging him to push GVN toward a political rather than a military solution:

> Accordingly we believe you should not repeat not urge immediate Da Nang operations at present, but rather that entire focus of your efforts at all levels should be to get political process started.

(It was at this time that Lodge wrote his long cable, discussed in the next section below, saying that the U.S. does not have enough influence in Vietnam, and that it should set up a leverage system that bypasses Saigon and works at the Province level.) Lodge accepted the fact of Buddhist power, and wanted to avoid bloodshed, but as always his sympathies were squarely with the military leadership:

> The political crisis which has been gripping VN is now almost one month old. The situation has deteriorated steadily as the Buddhist opposition has increased pressure on the GVN.
>
> Buddhist demands, when stripped of hypocrisy [and,]... boil down to a naked grab for power.

Throughout this period we have sought certain fundamental objectives:

A. To preserve the VN nation, and thus, the present government.

B. To provide for an orderly political evolution from military to civil government.

C. To preserve the Armed Forces as an effective shield against VC.

D. To guard and expand all our political, economic, social and military gains, notably those which flowed from the Honolulu declaration.

E. To maintain the effectiveness of the Free World forces in VN. 13/

On April 12, GVN found a face-saving formula and withdrew its Ranger battalions from Da Nang to Saigon, and the streets became relatively quiet. On the 14th, the Directorate gave way to the demands for elected civilian government by promising elections for a Constituent Assembly within three to five months. For the time being the Buddhists and other political groups, while making additional demands, called off the demonstrations on condition that Ky honor his promises. 14/

On April 23, Lodge reviewed for State all the leverage available that might be used to help bring the I Corps area under government authority, and rejected using any of it.

> We have considered possibility of using U.S. control over economic and military commodities in I Corps to foster re-establishment of government authority in the areas.
>
> The bulk of USAID-controlled commodities are scheduled for use in rural areas. Comparatively little anti-government activity is carried on by the rural population...
>
> The Hue-DaNang area currently is relatively well stocked with basic commodities. There is an estimated four month supply of rice on hand and the countryside is now starting the harvesting of a rice crop...
>
> The U.S. currently controls, through the USAID, the following: (A) Warehouses in the part of DaNang containing quantities of construction material and PL-480 foodstuffs ...(B) Three deep draft vessels and one coastal vessel now

in the DaNang harbor with CIP cement, rice, fertilizer, and miscellaneous commercial cargo... (C) Nine chartered coastal vessels...operated for USAID...

With respect to military commodities, RVNAF maintains a 30-60 day supply of expendable combat items while their rice stocks are maintained at a 30-day level. However, under rationing these rice stocks can be extended to 60 days. The RVNAF items which are in short supply throughout Vietnam, as well as in the Hue-DaNang area, include vehicle batteries, brake shoes, and POL. We consider it unwise to interfere with the flow of supplies to RVNAF at this time since it would limit effectiveness of operations against Viet Cong forces...

Indeed any U.S. effort to withhold resources which it controls in this area may stimulate excesses by the struggle movement even though an attempt is made to conceal the U.S. role in the imposition of sanctions. 15/

3. Violence Explodes in May, 1966

After promising the elections by August 15, against Lodge's public disagreement, Ky said in a public statement on May 4 that "we will try to hold elections by October." In Lodge's absence, on a long trip to Washington, Porter protested privately to Ky that once he had made a public commitment on election timing he was risking further disorders to appear to shirk it. Nevertheless, Ky added to the flames by a further public statement that he expected to remain in office for another year. New disorders broke out, and DaNang and Hue again fell under overt control of the Struggle Movement. Without consulting the Embassy, the Directorate laid plans for several days and then on May 15 airlifted troops to DaNang and then to Hue. 16/

State first reaction showed unrestrained fury, and sanctioned "rough talk" to stop the fighting:

This may require rough talk but U.S. cannot accept this insane bickering...do your best in next few hours. Intolerable that Ky should...move...against DaNang without consultation with us. Urgent now to insist that fighting stop. 17/

State did not, at first, sanction the threat of force; for example, it said Gen. Walt should continue to harbor the dissident General Dinh in III MAF Headquarters, and that Walt should tell GVN he "can't foresee the U.S. Government reaction" if GVN forces should break into his Headquarters. Its overall guidance was to use persuasion, withdrawal of advisers, and a public posture of non-intervention, with the following specifics:

1. Announce that the U.S. was not consulted, gave no help. Ky's use of T39 routine, "not material assistance."

2. Furnish no airlift.

3. Withdraw all advisers from I CTZ, including from loyal GVN units, except for any clearly in position to fight VC. Keep U.S. forces out, except maybe to fight VC.

4. Inasmuch as withdrawal of civilians and military from DaNang in early April had a sobering effect, State authorized withdrawing them again (including combat forces).

5. Exeption to 3: Keep contacts with Thi and 1st Division, and make other like exceptions. (Purpose of withdrawal is to avoid appearance of involvement.)

6. Use contacts to get a compromise that avoids bloodshed.

7. Find out "soonest" the effect on election preparations.

8. Do not throw U.S. weight behind GVN effort. 18/

However, the "rough talk" actually used did reach the point of a clear threat of force. General Walt heard of a possible VNAF attack on dissident ARVN units in their compounds, and threatened to use U.S. jets to shoot down the VNAF aircraft if they did. (The pretext was that U.S. advisers would be threatened if they did, and did not apply to VNAF self-defense against dissident ARVN units closing on DaNang.) If such an attack was planned, the threat succeeded. 19/

Porter followed State's guidance closely; he put it strongly to Ky and Thieu that the failure to consult was unacceptable, withheld airlift from GVN and withdrew advisers from units on both sides, and obtained from Thieu the assurance that the election would be held as promised. He refused to give public backing or opposition to either side, and tried to mediate. State sent several more messages with guidance along the same lines, and directed him to tell both sides of USG's impatience with Vietnamese factionalism:

> The American people are becoming fed up with the games they are playing while the Americans are being asked to sustain such major burdens. 20/

On May 17, a U.S. helicopter received small arms fire from a dissident ARVN unit when carrying a GVN officer to parley with them; the helicopter returned the fire, causing several casualties. In a stormy meeting the next day with Corcoran, the U.S. Consul in Hue, Tri Quang

accused the U.S. of joining forces with GVN in attacking his people, and threatened violence against U.S. forces and facilities. Corcoran stood firm, saying that U.S. forces would defend themselves. State's guidance the same day, reaffirming the previous guidance, was to limit U.S. assistance to administrative aircraft, and then only when GVN had none available, to reassure Thi and the leaders of the Struggle Movement about U.S. support for free elections, to bring opposite sides (especially Ky and Thi) to face to face discussions, and to intervene as needed to end the squabbling. On May 20, Tri Quang complained to another U.S. official about the administrative aircraft who pointed out to him that the U.S. also provided such aircraft to Thi and other dissident military officers. That same day a dissident leader threatened to attack GVN forces at DaNang, and State directed that he be reminded that the U.S. forces also in DaNang would have to defend themselves. State also authorized the threat of total U.S. withdrawal. 21/

On Lodge's return to Vietnam at this time, he received detailed guidance from State, very similar to that previously given to Porter, for his first meeting with Ky. The guidance re-emphasized the demand for prior consultation by GVN before it made any important move, and directed him to urge GVN to be conciliatory and to use its forces with the utmost restraint:

1. We must have absolute candor from Ky as to his plans, and opportunity to comment before significant actions.

2. Tell him to leave pagodas alone, except for surveillance and encirclement.

3. Keep ARVN out of Saigon demonstrations.

4. Elections vs military role: Sound out.

5. Encourage election progress.

6. Keep GVN in contact with Buddhist leaders.

7. Help Ky meet Thi.

8. Consider further the suggestion of withdrawal from DaNang and Hue.

9. Give us "your judgment as to whether we ought to move forcefully and drastically to assert our power" to end strife.

10. Suggest broadening the Directorate with civilians. 22/

By this time, Ky had begun leaning over backward to consult Porter, and then Lodge, before every move. GVN forces overpowered roadblocks

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and controlled DaNang, but demonstrators were operating freely from pagodas in Saigon, and the Struggle Movement had absolute control of Hue, where in the next few days they surrounded and blockaded the consulate. In Saigon GVN followed Lodge's advice and neutralized the pagodas by surrounding them without violating them; but in the I Corps he was preparing to occupy Hue forcefully as he had DaNang. The Buddhists began a series of self-immolations. Amid mounting threats, the U.S. evacuated the consulate and its other facilities in Hue. 23/

Lodge was unreservedly sympathetic to Ky, as in April, and viewed the Buddhists as equivalent to card-carrying Communists; but he followed instructions and pressed Ky to be conciliatory. When Ky would blurt out fire-eating statements and whittle down his previous promises on elections, Lodge would patiently urge him to avoid off-the-cuff statements and to limit himself to prepared statements on radio and TV. Lodge and Westmoreland repeatedly pressed Ky and Thi to get together, which they did on May 27; Ky offered Thi and Dinh unspecified Army jobs. 24/ State was gratified, but cautious. 25/

4. Ky Restores GVN Control in I Corps, June 1966

One of the main subjects of Lodge's conferences in Washington was what the U.S. Government position should be on elections for the Constituent Assembly. Having finished deliberations and drafting after Lodge returned to Saigon, State cabled the principles it thought should guide the Mission's operations on election matters:

A. General Principles of U.S. Action

The U.S. Mission should seek to exert maximum influence toward the achievement of the substantive objectives stated in B. below. At the same time, this must be done with recognition that a key objective is to avoid anti-Americanism becoming a major issue; we shall be accused of interferences in any event, but it is vitally important not to give potential anti-American elements (or the press and outside observers) any clear handle to hit us with.

B. Objectives

1. Elections should be held as announced by GVN on April 15th, that is by September 15 of this year.

2. The issue of anti-Americanism should be kept out of the election campaign as far as possible.

3. The question as to whether the constitutional assembly will only have the role of drafting the constitution or will have some further function should not be allowed to become an active pre-election issue and the U.S. should take no position on this question.

4. The elections should be conducted so as to produce a constitutional assembly fairly representing the various regions and groups within South Vietnam (except those actively participating with the Viet Cong), including the Army, Montagnards, Khmer minorities, et. al.

5. The elections should be conducted so as to gain a maximum improvement in the image of the GVN in the United States and internationally; this calls for a wide turnout, scrupulously correct conduct of the voting and counting process, as little political limitation on voter eligibility as possible and vigorous efforts to avoid voter intimidation from any quarter. Ideas to be explored are a brief election period ceasefire, international observation of the elections, students participating as poll watchers. etc.

6. The emphasis in the campaign should be on the selection of good men to draft the constitution; political parties are not expected to play a major role although the campaign may provide the occasion for laying foundations for future party organization.

7. Unless new developments change our assessment, major efforts should be devoted not to stimulating the formation of a large nationalist party but rather to the adoption of the concept that these elections bring together all non-communist groups who are pledged, among other things, to their country's independence and the continuing need to defend it with American help. Specifically, efforts should not be made to split the Buddhists or isolate the militant Buddhist faction.

8. The election process should be a vehicle for educating and engaging the population in the democratic process and it should be used to launch political and psychological initiatives with youth groups, students, labor, etc.

9. Restore as far as possible the unity of the Directorate and promote a reconciliation between Generals Ky and Thi. However, discourage efforts by the Directorate to form a government party designed purely to perpetuate the Directorate in power to the exclusion of other significant political groups. 26/

At the end of May things seemed to settle down. McNamara sounded out the Embassy about a trip in early June, but Lodge talked him out of it on the grounds that it might tempt the Buddhists to start demonstrating again. Ky met Buddhist Institute leaders on May 31 and offered civilian participation in an enlarged Directorate. He reported that the Buddhists accepted this along with reassurances about elections, and agreed with Ky's new appointment of General Lam as Commander of I Corps. Lodge was skeptical:

The above is what Ky said and it stood up to questioning. It sounds too good to be true, and we will await next steps. 27/

The next day, June 1, a mob of students burned the consulate and consular residence in Hue. When GVN forces prepared to move on Hue, the Struggle Movement filled the streets with Buddhist altars, serving as roadblocks the GVN forces hesitated to disturb, while dissident ARVN units deployed in the city. 28/

The Directorate's April 14 promise of elections of a Constituent Assembly on August 15 had led to the creation of an Electoral Law Commission, which the Buddhists boycotted as a result of the subsequent disagreements. The Commission presented its proposals on June 5, and they included several features unacceptable to the Directorate, especially those related to the powers and tenure of the Assembly. Ky reacted publicly on June 7, saying that if military-civil unity proceeded smoothly enough over the next few months it would be possible to postpone elections. Demonstrations continued in Saigon, while a combination of negotiations and force gradually brought Hue under GVN control. 29/

On June 15, Ky made it clear that the Assembly would not be permitted to continue and to legislate after drafting a constitution, and that the Military Directorate would continue in power until promulgation of the new constitution and the seating of a subsequently elected Assembly in 1967. (Note that Lodge backed this attitude.) The Buddhist Institute called a general strike in response to the GVN declaration that June 18, the anniversary of the Thieu-Ky government, would be a national holiday. On June 19, the Directorate scheduled the elections for the Constituent Assembly for September 11, 1966. The announcement had a calming effect, and the disorders came under control within a few days. The approved electoral law gave the Directorate ample scope to exclude unwanted candidates, and prevented the Buddhists from putting their symbol, the red lotus, on the ballot. 30/ (Again, note Lodge's concurrence.)

On July 31, Thi went into exile. 31/

5. Revolutionary Development, March - June, 1966

To help implement the increased emphasis given pacification at Honolulu. President Johnson in late March appointed Robert Komer as his Special Assistant for "peaceful reconstruction." The creation of a high level focal point for pacification planning and coordinating had the effect of supplanting the interagency Vietnam Coordinating Committee (created in 1964 and originally headed by William Sullivan.) Though Komer's charter was more limited than that of the VCC, his direct access to the President conferred particular importance to this position. To his desk came the MACV and Mission reports on the progress of pacification that struck the same gloomy note month after month. 32/ The Status Report

of March 30 on the Honolulu agreements said:

> 1. Assure that Province Chief actually retains op con over necessary military forces to support program in his Province. Status: In Long An Province two regiments of the 25th Division are under Province control. This is encouraging, but tactical situation elsewhere makes it difficult. MACV plans to augment regular forces by 120 companies in 1966-67 (approximately 47 will go to priority areas.) This augmentation if successful will be major step forward.
>
> 2. Areas where the program is underway and four priority areas in particular should be placed under superior Province Chiefs who should not be removed while program is underway without serious cause. Status: Since Honolulu, eight Province Chiefs have been replaced. Most fall within category mentioned by General Co at Honolulu when he said GVN was about to make several changes to strengthen their ability to achieve plans. The Mission continues to emphasize at every level the need for continuity, but in most cases it is dangerous for U.S. to go down the line in support of individual Province Chiefs. 33/

The Mission report on the status of "Revolutionary Development" for April said:

> RD remains behind schedule with progress slow. As reported in March, lack of effective leadership, military as well as governmental, marginal local security, and late availability RD cadre teams, continue to hamper program accomplishments. 34/

The corresponding report for May said:

> Lack of effective low-level leadership and lack of local security continued to have adverse effects on RD program ...progress primarily reflects consolidation of hamlets and population already under a lesser degree of GVN control rather than direct gains from VC control. There was no appreciable expansion in secured area or reduction in VC-controlled population. 35/

An incident in June highlighted the frustrations of U.S. field representatives, and showed that leverage could work, at least on procedural matters. In Kontum, the Province Chief flatly refused to set up any end-use control procedures (filling out requisitions, etc.) for USAID commodities. This refusal could not be accepted, and AID suspended all commodity shipments to the Province. After four days, the Province Chief gave in, and AID resumed shipments. 36/

Meanwhile, the GVN was doing nothing about its Honolulu promises in the areas of administration, economic reform, and dollar balances. There were several U.S.Government reactions to these failures and continuing weaknesses. There was a series of studies and proposals for leverage, and there was rising pressure for renewed direct negotiations with GVN.

An example of the studies was the U.S. Army's "Program for the Pacification and Long-Term Development of South Vietnam," (PROVN).

The PROVN study was completed in March 1966 by a Department of the Army staff team and briefed on May 17 at CINCPAC Headquarters during a visit by COMUSMACV to Hawaii. His comments at that time were that most of the recommendations already had been acted on. He emphasized that particular care should be exercised to avoid conditions which would cause RVN officials to be branded as U.S. puppets. 37/

The study results were presented in the MACV conference room on May 21. In response to a JCS request, COMUSMACV commented in detail on May 27. He noted that PROVN recommended two major initiatives: (1) creation of an organization to integrate the total U.S. civil-military effort, and (2) exercise of greatly increased U.S. involvement in GVN activities.

COMUSMACV agreed with the first recommendation but felt it was already being accomplished. COMUSMACV agreed that immediate and substantially increased U.S. involvement in GVN activities, in the form of constructive influence and manipulations was essential to achievement of U.S. objectives in Vietnam. He felt there was great danger that the involvement envisioned would become excessive and boomerang on U.S. interests; U.S. manipulations could become an American takeover justified by U.S compulsion to get the job done.

COMUSMACV saw the advantages in removing ARVN divisions from positions of command over provinces, and attaching some of their units to provinces, but this action would require a major shift of Vietnamese attitudes. Assignment of ARVN units to provinces in the past had had limited success because of restrictions on employment and command jealousies.

Accordingly MACV recommended that PROVN, reduced primarily to a conceptual document, carrying forward the main thrusts and goals of the study, be presented to the National Security Council for use in developing concepts, policies, and actions to improve effectiveness of the American effort in Vietnam. 38/

Subsequently, JCS inquired about Revolutionary Development effectiveness. They asked why RD objectives could not be more effectively achieved with the program under military execution. COMUSMACV's reply repeated the views of the Ambassador's December memorandum to Lansdale and said the program was primarily civilian.

6. Lodge Favors Decentralized Leverage

Embassy officials, meanwhile, continued to press for the restoration of the leverage that was lost with the dropping of the troika sign-off in June, 1965. There is no indication that the issue of sign-off came up at Honolulu, very likely because of disagreement on it between State and Saigon. But in April, Ambassador Lodge went on the record in favor of the sign-off system, and against civil encadrement in the Ministries.

> Experience and study have made it apparent that the United States has not the influence which it should have in Viet Nam and also that [we] could be organized so as to be relatively much more immune from some of the worst effects of changes of government in Saigon.
>
> I refer to influence in the provinces, and lower units of government, and not to our influence at the top of the Government in Saigon, which is just about as good as it can be. The GVN in Saigon sometimes disagrees, often agrees, and is rarely able to get much done...
>
> An error was made in giving up our right to withhold funds from USAID projects until we have conducted a successful bargain with the Vietnamese in which they agreed to carry out certain things which we wanted... 39/
>
> There are two ways of not solving this problem of contact: (a) One is for a US agency head with big administrative responsibilities to pop over to the ministry to argue briefly and intensely, American-fashion, with the Minister -- a system which is almost guaranteed not to produce results. (b) Nor do I believe the problem is solved by putting American offices in the Vietnamese Ministries. This was the French practice, and it too does not prevent bureaucratic paralysis...
>
> We should always be on the lookout for Americans who have the sympathy with and the knack of getting along with these people, and we might find some good material among the young men who are in the provinces.
>
> Another idea is to bring about a situation where we are really economic partners of the GVN and not merely the people who pay for the CIP Program without effective participation in the use of the piaster proceeds of that program. At present we have very little say in the disposition of such piaster funds. Somewhere along the line we gave up this very important leverage. In fact, we are now trying to recover joint authority over those funds, but

progress is difficult... If we had this joint GVN/US authority, we could get at corruption, provided we also had advisers with the Ministries who were really "persona grata." 40/

In the first week of May, Porter put the sector fund idea to Ky, who rebuffed him. Lodge tried to keep the idea alive, but without success. 41/

7. The Military Advisory Program, March-July 1966

COMUSMACV's concern over declining present for combat strength of ARVN units resulted in a study which showed that as of February 28, only 62% of their authorized strength were mustered for operations. There were two principal reasons: (1) Division and regimental commanders had organized non-TOE units such as strike/recon, recon and security, recruiting teams, and (2) Large numbers of deserters, long-term hospital patients, and KIA had not been removed from rolls. MACV instructed JGS to disband non-TOE units and give increased attention to improving administrative procedures. Senior advisers were told to monitor their counterparts and use their influence to bring present for operations strengths up to at least 450 men (75%) per battalion.

At the same time, MACV had a study made to determine the need for reconnaissance units. When field advisers were asked, all replies were favorable; so JGS was asked to develop the organization for a regimental reconnaissance company. 42/

Training was another problem. One adviser stated, "It is more accurate to describe the training program as non-existent instead of unsatisfactory." Another said, "It appears that the battalion commander desires the deterioration of the training status of the battalion so that higher authority will place the unit in a training center to be retrained." COMUSMACV wrote to the Chief JGS in March on the subject of training, but training progress did not change appreciably through 1966 from the level recorded during the first four months. 43/

There was a question of what to do about units which advisers rated ineffective. The combat effectiveness of the 5th and 25th ARVN Divisions was the subject of a staff study completed April 19. Five courses of action were considered:

(1) Deactivate division headquarters and place subordinate units under province chiefs.

(2) Exchange the divisions with two other divisions from different CTZ's.

(3) Relieve the key leaders at all levels who were marginal or unsatisfactory.

(4) Relieve the divisions of their primary responsibility of fighting VC and leave them to pacification.

(5) By expression of COMUSMACV's concern, encourage intensification of adviser efforts to solve the divisions' underlying problems. If there were no improvement, withdraw all advisers. If there were still no improvement, withdraw all MAP support.

COMUSMACV vetoed the last proposal and had it removed from the study. His guidance was to avoid sanctions against GVN, to intensify the effort to associate and integrate the 5th and 25th ARVN Divisions with the 1st and 25th U.S. Division, and to consider the possibility of greater U.S. participation in pacification in Hau Nghia and Binh Duong provinces. 44/

In April, a study based on exhaustive analysis of field adviser reports and interviews was presented to RVNAF. It concerned itself with several major problem areas: Leadership, discipline, and personnel management. RVNAF reacted positively and quickly to the recommendations by establishing a committee to develop a leadership program. 45/

In response to COMUSMACV guidance in May, J-5 studied courses of action to produce more dynamic progress in the counterinsurgency effort in RVN. It recommended establishing a Deputy COMUSMACV for RVNAF matters as a way to influence RVNAF more. General Westmoreland said in his endorsement that this step had already been taken with the appointment of Brigadier General Freund as Deputy Assistant to COMUSMACV. At the same time, he directed J-5 to review Brigadier General Freund's Terms of Reference and recommend changes or extensions. The completed J-5 study was forwarded to Chief of Staff Army on July 23, recommending that the Special Assistant to COMUSMACV not be given responsibility for any portion of the U.S. Advisory effort. 46/

Low personnel strength was another critical factor in ARVN effectiveness. Only one of 22 battalions rated combat ineffective or marginally effective in July did not report a shortage of personnel. COMUSMACV advised Chief JGS to form an inspection team at general officer level to inspect the strength situation of ARVN division. The Inspector General, JGS, headed the team and was assisted by COMUSMACV's personal representative. The team began its inspection with the 25th Division. 47/

8. Economic Policy and the Port of Saigon, April-June 1966

As noted, this period saw rising pressure for renewed direct negotiations with GVN. When the first phase of the Struggle Movement ended in mid-April, Washington was thoroughly dissatisfied with accumulated delays on the economic program agreed at Honolulu. The USG had gone ahead and delivered on its side of the bargain, but GVN had done nothing. State proposed the threat of sanctions; without apparently going that far, Lodge

persuaded GVN to cooperate fully with the IMF team, then on its way, to work out an anti-inflationary and balance-of-payments program. 48/

The IMF team worked through late May and at the end of the month agreed with GVN on a program with the following main points:

(1) The exchange rate for imports, including tariff, would be increased from 60 to 118 piasters to the dollar except for rice, which would be brought in at 80. Purchases of piasters by U.S. troops and civilians, and other "invisibles," would have the 118 rate in both directions.

(2) A new tax on beverages would raise about 1.5 billion piasters in revenue.

(3) The GVN would sell gold to jewelers to push the price down closer into line with black market dollar exchange rate.

(4) The GVN would raise wages and salaries of its employees by 20% immediately, with a further 10% to follow in six months if necessary.

The GVN asked the USG for assurance on the following points:

(1) The GVN/IMF plan would substitute for the fiscal and customs reforms promised at Honolulu.

(2) The USG would liberalize the Commodity Imports Program to cover all importers' requests.

(3) The USG would buy all its piasters for official programs at the exchange rate of 80 (versus the previous 35).

(4) All appropriated Commodity Import Funds not used up would be applied to economic development projects in Vietnam. 49/

The USG raised no problem about points (1) and (3) of the GVN requests, but for obvious reasons could give only vague and non-committal assurances on the amount of AID that Congress would authorize and reprogram. However, it made other concessions to increase total economic aid. 50/ The two governments reached prompt agreement on these points, and the piaster was devalued as proposed on June 18, along with the associated fiscal reforms. The GVN's promise to hold down its dollar holdings (given at Honolulu) remained "binding," although the generous AID package of the previous July was now raising GVN's dollar balances at a rate of about $100 million per year. 51/

These decisions overrode a proposal from OSD (Systems Analysis) to get tough with GVN and to get deeper and more enforceable reforms. The DASD (Economics) predicted that the GVN would fail to carry out any

reforms other than changing the exchange rate, and proposed to force the GVN to maximize its legal revenues from CIP by threatening to curtail the program. Without reform of the licensing, high market prices for CIP commodities yielded extortionate profits to those merchants who could get licenses, with a presumption of kickbacks to the licensing agencies. The proposed reform was to auction the licenses in the presence of US observers. He also proposed direct US purchases of piasters, in a "grey" market. 52/

Upon settling the devaluation package, the Embassy immediately pressed for drastic changes in Saigon port management; the pile-up of civilian cargoes had grown so much as to add to the already serious congestion. Lodge proposed a complete MACV takeover of the port and warehouses with a Vietnamese general to be appointed as figurehead port director. 53/ However, the Mission backed away from the idea of complete takeover for the time being, and settled for MACV handling of AID direct assistance commodities, not including CIP. 54/

The agreement reached with GVN at the end of June said:

> The United States Military Agency appointed by COMUSMACV ...shall forthwith assume responsibility and all necessary authority for...
>
> A. The receipt and discharge of all AID-financed commodities consigned to CPA.
>
> B. The obtaining of customs clearances and all other clearances...for such commodities.
>
> C. The storage and warehousing of such commodities intransit as necessary.
>
> D. The transport of such commodities to such first destinations, including GVN holding areas and/or CPA/ministerial depots as may be designated by USAID/CPA. 55/

9. Political Affairs in the Third Quarter, 1966

This period was comparatively quiet, and transactions between the two governments were routine. Late in June, Ky had brought up with Lodge the idea of a cabinet reshuffle, and Lodge had advised him to go slow. In July, Ky agreed to put it off. In August Ky volunteered to do something about the most corrupt generals in the Directorate, especially Co and Quang. Again, Lodge, who had frankly given up on corruption in the highest places, cautioned him to go slow, and Ky decided to put off any action until after the September elections. Lodge's advice, with State concurrence, concentrated on making sure Ky had definitive evidence of the alleged corruption; Lodge was sure that following this advice would delay things sufficiently. 56/ Late in August, Ky received an invitation to

talk to a press group in Los Angeles, and Ky tentatively accepted. Both Lodge and State panicked, especially when the group started to set up a debate between Ky and Senator Fulbright; and in the upshot they talked Ky out of going. 57/

GVN launched its transition to legitimate government on September 11, electing the long-promised Constituent Assembly. Although GVN systematically excluded from the elections all persons connected with the Struggle Movement, and although the Buddhists declared a boycott, the electorate turned out in large numbers and the results gratified the Embassy. State had reservations about the exclusion of Struggle Movement people, but Lodge unreservedly backed this exclusion, on the ground that GVN "should not be discouraged from taking moderate measures to prevent elections from being used as a vehicle for a Communist takeover of the country." 58/ As the election approached, Washington and the Embassy began to think about what they wanted to see in the new constitution. Lodge's view listed the following minimum essentials for the US best interests:

A. A strong, stable executive.

B. Executive control of the military.

C. Emergency powers, so that the legislature can't hamstring the executive during the war emergency.

D. Appropriate provision for the people's aspirations and rights.

E. Minority group representation.

Lodge also listed lower priority requirements for the new constitution:

A. Relative ease of amendment of the constitution.

B. Removal of either the President or the Legislature should be very difficult.

C. A limited term for the President.

D. Appropriate provision for establishment and improvement of the judiciary.

E. A superior court for constitutional review of laws and decrees.

F. Expansion of the powers of provincial councils and other forms of local government.

State expressed broad agreement with Lodge's views, with reservations about emergency powers and about constitutional provisions to forbid communism and neutralism. 59/

16. The Roles and Missions Study

In response to a May 27 directive from Deputy Ambassador Porter, the Director JUSPAO had named Colonel George Jacobson chairman of a study group to define RD strategy and the roles and missions of the various elements. The group submitted its report on August 24, 1966.

The major recommendations of Roles and Missions Study were:

(1) The many elements and echelons charged with destroying VC infrastructure are confusing. The National Police should have the primary mission and responsibility for this goal.

(2) Reforms in basic GVN attitudes are necessary. Many rural residents believe that the US condones corrupt practices. This must be changed.

(3) ARVN forces should be encouraged to increase participation in pacification activities.

(4) PF/RF should be developed into a constabulary-type organization.

(5) PF/RF should be transferred from the Ministry of Security to the Ministry of Revolutionary Development.

(6) CIDG should be stationed only in remote areas.

(7) The Vietnamese Information Service is not effective at local level. It should assume supporting role to propaganda activities of other agencies.

(8) A Directorate of Intelligence should be established to coordinate all intelligence activities.

(9) Reinstitution of the MACV Subsector Advisor Fund is urged.

(10) ARVN Divisions (eventually Corps as well) should be removed from the chain of command in RD affairs. For instance, there were no USAID, JUSPAO, or CAS representatives at ARVN division headquarters.

(11) Because of generally bad behavior of ARVN Ranger units, they should be disbanded with Rangers reassigned as individuals throughout the Army.

(12) The physical and attitudinal consequences of present air and artillery employment policies should be studied.

(13) A logistic system which provides for US government control until delivery of material to end users should be substituted for the present MAP procedures.

(14) The Provincial Committee "signoff" provision should be reinstated for the Revolutionary Development budget.

On September 7 COMUSMACV made the following comments with respect to the Roles and Missions Study:

(1) Action had been taken to increase ARVN participation in RD, but removal of Division from the chain of command in RD activities appeared illogical. If ARVN combat battalions were dispersed to all 43 provinces, the Corps span of control would be ineffective and this arrangement would risk having these units defeated in detail. The proposed placement of battalions under sector commanders was feasible only in some areas -- to be considered on an individual basis. The 1967 Combined Campaign Plan would clarify the functions of ARVN. Other things such as the buddy system with US units were the realistic ways of accomplishing the goal.

(2) The recommended disbandment of Ranger Battalions would seriously reduce ARVN combat strength. They should be retained and reorganized under new commanders.

(3) Recruitment of PF personnel for RD would weaken hamlet security.

(4) Although the study recommended giving primary responsibility for intelligence to the National Police, the nature of the problem dictated that all US and GVN military and quasi-military elements contribute to this important goal.

(5) The idea of a single intelligence director seems sound theoretically, but it is not realistic when DIA and CIA are not amalgamated in Washington.

(6) RD requires both military and civil participation. Continued emphasis on military participation would be given but the major change in the MACV organization suggested by the study did not seem necessary.

One of the year's changes that could have led to implementation of a major recommendation of the Roles and Missions Study, but didn't, was the March decision in Washington to transfer the support of FWMAF and RVNAF from MAP funding to service funding. Studies were made by MACV on how best to implement this change, which became effective in September. It was decided that only the logistic advisory function would be transferred to USARV. Programming budgeting and executing programs remained under MACV. 60/ Most important, MAP goods were still put into RVNAF logistic channels, although under the new funding they could have been held in US channels down to the receiving unit.

11. Economic Policy and The Port, Third Quarter, 1966

Although in political affairs there was no significant friction between USG and GVN in the Third Quarter, GVN's accumulation of dollar balances and its inaction on economic matters caused growing impatience in USOM and in Washington.

In late July, 1966, Komer and Ambassador Lodge laid the basis for the US position, including a suggestion that from now on USOM should make sure it has the means to monitor and enforce GVN compliance with its commitments.

Komer said:

> Devaluation, port takeover, CIP expansion, RD reorganization if all skillfully meshed -- could yet have early impact on VN public and do much in these critical weeks to refurbish GVN image at home and abroad.
>
> So far, however, GVN has failed to move aggressively enough with supplies in country to curb rice and port speculation; has been unwilling to try to develop wage restraint policy in private sector, has dithered on promulgating and carrying out promised regulations re Warehouse removals; has gone about moving expanded CIP goods up country on business as usual basis; has shuffled about on RD reorganization, and Thang's or Ky's famous report to the nation. 61/

Lodge proposed specific means to monitor GVN, and wished to urge the GVN to fund Revolutionary Development with counterpart piasters, so that USG could assure that the funding was adequate. Komer agreed with these proposals. Porter further proposed:

> We intend using budget review process and counterpart releases on leverage on GVN CY 67 programs and to seek GVN acceptance of both overall ceiling and commitment to essential revolutionary development programs before we agree to support any part of the budget.
>
> Note degree our effectiveness dependent on credibility our leverage by GVN, which may not be great. 62/

But Porter opposed a complete takeover of the Saigon port, proposed by Komer. 63/

Chapter III - A Seven Nation Conference, Legitimate Government, and High Hopes for the Future, October 1966 - September 1967

1. The Manila Conference, October 1966

In the first week of October, just as planning was beginning for a seven-nation conference at Manila on Southeast Asia, latent mistrust between Southerners and Northerners in Ky's cabinet broke into an open split. A Northerner persuaded Colonel Loan, the Police Director, to arrest one of the Southerners, and although Loan released him on Ky's order a few hours later, six Southerners took it as an affront to all of them and threatened to resign from the cabinet. While conference planning was going forward, the crisis simmered on for almost three weeks, up to the eve of the conference. Lodge tried to mediate, but the six proved difficult to mollify; he conjectured that they were trying to get all the mileage they could out of the embarrassment the crisis would cause Thieu and Ky if it were not resolved before the conference. It was patched up at the last minute. 1/

In preparing for the conference, Lodge was particularly concerned that Ky or Thieu, if put in the limelight through the opening speech to the conference, should avoid embarrassing the USG:

> One crucial factor must be degree to which you believe they can be persuaded to make constructive and reasonable speech, avoiding talk of invasion of the North or any other subjects that put us openly at variance with each other...We hope that the GVN can delegate Tran Van Do and Bui Diem as its drafting representatives so that even before they arrive in Manila we would be a long way toward common agreement on the kinds of language we need. 2/

The USG was also concerned that GVN should announce a broad and attractive program that would put a good face on itself and its prosecution of the war:

> We welcome your news that Tran Van Do and Bai Diem will arrive Manila October 21...
>
> Since this gives us at least a solid day, the 22d, to refine drafts, we are inclined here not repeat not to ask you to work with GVN on detailed submissions... Rather and absolutely vital to favorable conference result, we believe you should be working with Ky to get his concurrence on the following list of action areas in which we believe forthcoming statement by GVN is not only wise in itself, but essential to US strong and successful public statement from the conference.

A. Land Reform
B. Constitutional Evolution
C. National Reconciliation
D. Economic Stabilization
E. Improved Local Government
F. Radically Increased Emphasis on RD/Pacification
G. Postwar Planning
H. Corruption
I. Port Congestion
J. GVN Reserves

In each of above categories, basic problem is to get GVN commitment and willingness to state its intentions. 3/

Secretary McNamara put down his views on priorities in a Memorandum to the President on October 14. He noted that the US had not yet found the formula for training and inspiring the Vietnamese. The main thrust of the memorandum concerned shifting ARVN more into pacification and shifting the US pacification responsibility to MACV. But in discussing GVN's weaknesses, he commented, "drastic reform is needed." He let that one drop without any recommendation.

The conferees met in Manila on October 24-25, 1966, and after due deliberation issued a long communique on policies for Southeast Asia in general and South Vietnam in particular. They backed the defense of South Vietnam against North Vietnamese aggression, and supported the major outlines of US policy. The GVN emphasized its promises of social revolution, economic progress, and political freedom. They concluded with the declaration of intent to withdraw all US and Free World forces under specified conditions:

> 29. In particular, they declared that allied forces are in the Republic of Vietnam because that country is the object of aggression and its Government requested support in the resistance of its people to aggression. They shall be withdrawn, after close consultation, as the other side withdraws its forces to the North, ceases infiltration, and the level of violence thus subsides. Those forces will be withdrawn as soon as possible and not later than six months after the above conditions have been fulfilled. 4/

2. Bargaining Begins on National Reconciliation, October-December 1966

The USG, having chafed at the lack of action on the Chieu Hoi Program, wanted GVN to broaden it to attract high-level defectors by offering them posts comparable to their existing ones in the VC organization. This idea went down poorly with the Vietnamese. Lodge was pressing the idea from the beginning of October, and although they were reluctant, Thieu and Ky finally agreed on October 20 to proclaim the new program, called

"National Reconciliation," on November 1, a national holiday. As noted above, Washington wanted and got a public commitment on this subject at Manila. 5/

Then on November 1, the promised proclamation failed to appear; instead, there was a vague reference to it in a speech on other subjects. When the Embassy inquired, Ky said the speech had to be prepared very carefully, and that he had not had time before November 1; he promised he would have the speech and proclamation ready in early December. Lodge found this explanation hard to swallow, but had to accept it. When "early December" arrived, there was a dead silence; and the end of this exercise was not yet in sight. 6/

3. More Hard Bargaining on Economic Policy and the Port, October - December 1966

Economic policy negotiations had the same flavor as those relating to National Reconciliation. The USG was dissatisfied, in the third quarter 1966, as noted, on the lack of GVN follow-up on budgetary and foreign exchange promise in June following the IMF agreement. And in the fall, the Saigon Port congestion problem grew serious again; the June agreement had not gone far enough.

At the end of September, Governor Hanh of the RVN National Bank came to Washington to negotiate specifics on economic policy. During the negotiations, Komer cabled Lodge:

> /We are pressing GVN/ hard to agree to spend rapidly growing foreign exchange reserves on imports. Otherwise, it will appear and rightly so, that GVN is getting rich at US taxpayer's expense. It is apparent that GVN's chief reluctance on this score is that Thanh/Hanh want to squirrel away reserves for postwar rehabilitation in case US goes away and leaves them. 7/

In the upshot, however, they reached only a vague and general agreement, on October 6, the most specific item being that GVN would limit its inflationary gap to 10 billion piasters in 1967. Dollar balances were deferred to later negotiations. 8/

There was some effort to resolve disagreements on economic matters and the Port just before the Manila Conference, but no progress. Komer went to Saigon after the Conference and, assisting Porter in the negotiations, reached the following agreement with GVN on November 2:

> (1) GVN will use all gold and foreign exchange available to it in excess of $250 million, not including commercial bank working balances, to finance invisibles and imports, including import categories now financed by the US.
>
> (2) GVN will place at least $120 million of its reserves in US dollar instruments of at least 2 year maturity.

(3) During US FY 67 USG will make available at least $350 million of grant aid for imports, not including PL 480 Title 1 Commodities. Any portion of the $350 million not required for such imports will be used during the US FY 67 as grant assistance for economic development projects.

(4) Within the balance of payments accounts, the amounts or categories to be financed by each of the governments will be determined through joint consultation on a quarterly basis. 9/

The putting of GVN dollar reserves into US two-year or longer-term bonds would technically improve the US balance of payments, though the gain would be more nominal than real. The agreement left plenty of room for further problems and State recognized that each item would probably have to be pressed again. 10/

Following this agreement, the Embassy prepared to negotiate a GVN budgetary ceiling and related matters. The strategy would be to seek agreement on a firm budget ceiling for GVN without committing the USG on its spending in Vietnam. But the Embassy had misgivings about this approach:

...It deprives US of the monetary gap analysis as a hinge on which stabilization agreements can be hung...Note that Komer-Hanh memorandum signed in Washington used 10 Billion gap figure as objective.

GVN officials are anxious to resume discussions. Prime Minister now has on his desk proposed GVN CY 67 budget of 100 billion piasters. The differences between that figure and acceptable one is much greater than the differences in US ceiling estimates last discussed here during McNamara's visit. 11/

State cabled its agreement that showing GVN the US plan to limit its own piaster spending would help get GVN to accept tight ceilings itself. 12/

In December, Embassy negotiators tried to pin down GVN on the means to limit its accumulation of dollar balances, talking mainly with Governor Hanh. To evade specific commitment, he repeatedly talked as though he could not determine GVN budget policy (which he had negotiated in Washington two months before) and that he could not as a good banker make the bookkeeping transactions that would be required to permit GVN to run them down by buying imports. The Embassy negotiators then turned to the idea of asking for a GVN contribution of 8 billion piasters to the Free World Forces' operating budget in Vietnam as a cost-sharing arrangement, which would incidentally reduce GVN's receipts of dollars and so help run down the balances. GVN's reply was that that was impossible. After a series

of talks that read like haggling in an Arabian marketplace, Porter went to Ky about it and got the following understanding:

> The GVN accepts the principle of contributing to free world forces local expense and will make a contribution of 1 billion piasters for that purpose at the end of March 1967. The matter of further contribution would be considered at that time. I would send him a letter of understanding on that subject. 13/

The story was much the same on GVN support for AID projects. 14/

The Saigon Port congestion problem led to discussions starting around the 1st of October, which produced nominal, ineffective agreements in the first week. When McNamara went to Saigon to discuss new major troop deployments with MACV, he talked to Ky on October 11, Ky kept talking about infiltration whenever McNamara brought up the subject of the Port. Finally, Ky said he had solved the Port problem by telling the Minister of Finance "to write a decree to get rid of the mafia which was dominating the port." 15/

That did not solve the problem; the Embassy kept pressing. On November 2, Ky promised a tough decree on port management and a deliver-or-get-fired order to the General who had been put in charge of the Port after the June agreement. (Accepting merely this order would permit further delay before any change in the system, of course.) Later on in November, Ky changed port charges and accepted some increase in US military personnel there, but both GVN and MACV strongly resisted any increase in MACV responsibility for the port. The GVN also refused to confiscate goods left unclaimed over 30 days in the port warehouses. Further talks in December got nowhere, although State authorized drastic leverage to move GVN:

> To this end you might also tell Ky that I have gone so far as to propose a two month moratorium on shipment of US financed CIP goods beginning 1 January to permit backlog in transit warehouses and on barges to be removed. You could cite my view as being that if GVN won't clear port, why should US add to congestion by continuing to ship goods?
>
> I recognize that actual moratorium would be draconian measure and perhaps unrealistic, but citing it...might help move Ky. 16/

4. Corruption Becomes an Issue at Year's End

The issue of corruption came up in several ways in November and December, 1966. On November 10, Ky told Lodge he was now prepared to relieve General Quang of his command of IV Corps, following up on intentions he first told Lodge about in August. Lodge again urged caution, saying Ky should carefully avoid starting "another General Thi incident." But Lodge was satisfied that by this time Ky had prepared well for the move. 17/

He had: on November 18, the Embassy got word that General Quang would head a newly-created Ministry of Planning and Development; the Ministry would deal primarily with postwar planning. The command changed and Quang moved up on November 23. Possibly Ky's idea of how to deal with Quang came from an end-October suggestion from the Embassy for a joint postwar study team, to which Ky had agreed and was to announce jointly with the White House. (Creating the Ministry scrambled the plans for the study team and announcement, so the Embassy had to go to work on a new plan.) 18/

A couple of weeks later, following allegations of corruption in news stories, State cabled the Embassy that the President wanted accelerated efforts both to cope with diversions and to deflate distorted allegations. State was also considering sending a "blue ribbon panel" from Washington to assess the problem of AID misuse. Responding to the stories and to the Washington concern, Ky said he planned a national campaign against corruption. State told the Embassy on November 25 of suggestions in Washington for a joint US/GVN inspectorate general to follow up AID diversions, and asked for a reaction. After a delay due to active truce discussions with the VC, Saigon replied on December 2:

> There is already an interchange of information on the working level between Ky's investigative staff and our responsible people in USAID. We doubt GVN would respond positively to idea of joint US/GVN inspectorate to work on AID diversions. This would touch very sensitive areas. While we want to expose and cut diversions to maximum extent possible, we doubt that this rather public way is best suited to achieve GVN cooperation. 19/

On December 3, Lodge and Ky had an "amiable discussion" on corruption, and Ky agreed to study and consider all these suggestions. 20/

5. Political Matters at Year's End, 1966

Washington and the Saigon Mission watched closely as the Constituent Assembly did its work. Concern arose at word that GVN was providing a complete draft constitution either formally or through sympathetic Deputies, particularly because it provided that ultimate political power would be vested in the Armed Forces Council. 21/

Washington, consistent in its championing of National Reconciliation, urged the Mission to make the USG's views known both to GVN and to key CA members before the matter became a major issue. 22/ Lodge spoke with Ky who said he was at that very moment about to leave to talk with Thieu on the matter. Lodge further encouraged Ky to state his views on the constitution to the Chairman of the Drafting Committee and reminded Ky that the American constitutional expert, Professor Flanz, was available to go to Ky at any time to give advice in complete confidence. 23/

General Thieu concluded one of his regular discussions of the military situation with General Westmoreland by making a few pronouncements on political matters. Westmoreland stressed what was to become a persistent American theme, the importance of unity in the GVN leadership. Unabashedly Thieu said that the key question was whether the Army would stay in power and what power they would retain. 24/

6. Pacification and the Shift of ARVN

Komer, in Washington, continued to prod the Mission to goad GVN. It seemed time to remind them, he thought, of their Manila promise to give top priority to land reform. Lodge was asked to press Ky for vigorous application of existing laws. 25/

Continuing emphasis on pacification and increased impatience at the lack of progress brought another reorganization of the US Mission effort. To unify and streamline the civilian side, the Office of Civil Operations (OCO) was established in late November under Deputy Ambassador Porter. An OCO Director in Saigon and a single Director of Civil Affairs for each of the four corps became responsible for the Mission's civil support of Vietnamese Revolutionary Development. 26/ Within GVN General Thang not only lasted beyond the originally envisaged six months but was elevated to Commissioner-General for Revolutionary Development with supervision over the Ministries of RD, Public Works, Agriculture, and Administration (Interior). 27/ These changes seemed to enhance the chances for substantive improvements. Washington wired,

> Why not approach Thang and after telling him about your reorganization and new faces you plan to put in region and then provinces, suggest he essay a shake-up too.... As I recall, around Tet GVN issues a new promotion list, which usually also entails some joint shifts. This might provide a good cover. 28/

The reply offered now familiar themes as the reasons for inaction,

> Specifically, if we were to give Thang a list of district chiefs and ask that they be removed, we do not think any significant change would result. In the past this tactic has proved cumbersome, even counterproductive, and tends to lead either to reshuffling of positions with little or no positive end result or to the Asian deep freeze treatment.
>
> ...At times we will have to make our views known on particular personalities if we find an intolerable situation in key leadership positions, as we have done in Long An and the ARVN 25th Div. Basically, however, we will seek to avoid too deep an immersion in Vietnamese personalities,

which can so easily become a quagmire from which there is no escape and concentrate instead on encouraging the GVN/RVNAF to take the initiative in a situation they know best how to tackle in specific tactical terms. 29/

Meanwhile, efforts went forward to convert half of ARVN to the primary mission of supporting Revolutionary Development. On October 5, the Chief of the Central Training Agency, Major General Vy, chaired the high level joint conference which assigned administrative tasks and developed a schedule of required actions. Subsequently, a joint MACV/JGS team visited a few ARVN division headquarters and found that personnel had not understood the July JGS directives and thus had not undertaken the actions directed. 30/

At about the same time, Revolutionary Development Minister Thang entered one of his recurring periods of pouting because he considered recent American criticism of slowness to imply their evaluation of the program as a failure. He told Ky he was ready to resign if Americans were so critical that they wanted to take it over and run it. Lansdale was able to placate Thang, but ARVN reluctance continued. 31/

The conversion to RD was fraught with criticism on both sides, for the American press continued to suggest that the ARVN shift to pacification meant Americans would bear the brunt of the fighting and take the bulk of the casualties. 32/ State considered this line tendentious and urged Lodge and MACV to use "all leverage provided through MAP and advisor program" to shift ARVN to RD. 33/

7. Military Advisory Matters at Year's End, 1966

COMUSMACV backed out of ARVN personnel selection by serving notice in a message to Corps Senior Advisors that only policy matters, not the detailed problems of failure to perform, were to be referred to him.

> In reviewing the deficiencies discussed in the Senior Advisor's Monthly Reports, it is noted that many items are correctable in command channels at unit, division, or corps level; yet it is not apparent that such action is being taken aggressively at local and intermediate command levels. Deficiencies involving policy are referable appropriately to this headquarters; deficiencies involving non-compliance with directives, apathy on the part of a command, etc., are to be resolved in RVNAF channels.
>
> The role of the advisor is difficult and often frustrating. It requires military acumen, dedication, selflessness, and perserverance. It is desired that addressees channel the professional abilities of the advisory

apparatus into efforts designed to complement tactical advice with improvement in the quality, efficiency, and reliability of the RVNAF structure as a whole. 34/

Shortly afterward the Chinh-Hunnicutt affair erupted. As it unfolded it revealed the near impossibility of eliciting satisfactory performance by means of the existing advisory system. CG 25th Division published an order of the day accusing the Senior Advisor of trying to have the CG removed, of attempting to dismiss other division officers, of bypassing the chain of command, and of destroying the "spirit of cooperation between Americans and Vietnamese."

The MACV command history describes General Chinh as extremely weak, afraid to command. The Senior Advisor was a dynamic, competent officer assigned to improve effectiveness. He pursued his objective in a firm manner.

COMUSMACV felt the incident received distorted press coverage in the US where it was portrayed as a challenge to the entire position of the US advisory effort. He noted that the Vietnamese were sensitive to real or imagined infringements on their sovereignty. Great care had to be exercised to avoid even the appearance of violating their pride; an officer who yielded too readily to US advice was regarded as a puppet. He felt the most effective way to work with the Vietnamese was to discuss matters with them and then allow them to resolve their problems. CG 25th Division did have redeeming qualities. He was considered honest; and for his stand at the coup trials in the early 1960's, when he had accepted punishment while many others were running; he had acquired a sizeable following among ARVN officers. He was, in addition, a boyhood friend of CG III Corps, who was said to recognize the CG's fault but felt that his hands were tied.

Deputy COMUSMACV who enjoyed good rapport with CG 25th ARVN Division, visited General Chinh. In a two-hour meeting, the Vietnamese spoke freely and openly. He displayed genuine and extreme concern and admitted his error in issuing the Order of the Day. He had already apologized to CG III Corps. Deputy COMUSMACV received the impression that the advisor might have been a little too aggressive with the Vietnamese general, who was hypersensitive. Deputy COMUSMACV suggested that a memorandum be published to the division which would mention that the Order of the Day had leaked to the press which had taken it out of context and that there was no intention to disparage the advisory effort. The memorandum was published on December 21. It said the past must be forgotten and that cadre of all ranks should display warm, courteous, and friendly attitudes toward their American counterparts. General Chinh appeared to turn over a new leaf. Colonel Hunnicutt was reassigned to an apparent terminal assignment in the United States. 35/

COMUSMACV addressed a letter to all advisors in December, 1966, to again emphasize the importance of rapport. He said, the key to success or failure was the relationship achieved and maintained by the advisor

with his counterpart. The natural tendency of the US professional soldier was toward immediate reaction. He expected the same in others, but it was necessary to temper counterpart relationships with patience and restraint.

General Westmoreland affirmed this view in his remarks at a conference of his senior subordinate commanders.

> In order for ARVN to be successful, a re-education process is necessary, from the generals on down...The attitude of the soldiers toward the people frequently is poor....We must do all we can toward to change this...
>
> ...In conduct of operations in support of Revolutionary Development, we will frequently have units buddy up with ARVN units...A word on command relations in these combined operations is appropriate. We have had great success with our cooperative efforts in the past. We should establish a proper relationship from a technical command standpoint. Proper types of missions are general support and direct support. When conducting operations where we have the preponderance of forces committed...their association will be in direct support or general support of our operations. This is good military terminology and quite proper for us here. General Vien agrees in this terminology. 36/

Sometimes ARVN was not receptive to advice. In November, recognizing the validity of a recommendation from the Corps Advisor that an additional battalion be activated in the ARVN 23d Battalion, COMUSMACV suggested this to JGS. Inactivation of a marginally effective battalion in another division was suggested as compensation. Chief JGS, for reasons of his own, declined to authorize the 23d Division to have an additional battalion.

Still, the effort moved forward. Training of RD Mobile Training Teams from each ARVN Division was conducted in December. The actual conversion training of divisions started in early 1967, and a similar program for RF/PF was planned. In fact, planning was viewed as the surest sign of progress. The 1967 Combined Campaign Plan was ceremoniously signed by Generals Westmoreland and Vien on December 8. Its significant innovations were requirements for subordinate commands to prepare supporting plans and for quarterly reviews to maintain the plan's viability. 37/

8. Constitution-Writing in January, 1967

Progress within the Constituent Assembly and preliminary jockeying over the new constitution were persistent concerns during the first quarter of 1967.

At times the Assembly seemed remarkably independent. It publicly fought against a law which gave the military junta the right to over-rule

its decisions. The controversy subsided in January with Junta assurance that it would not use the law. There was considerable discussion within USG circles as to how American influence should be disposed in supporting presidential candidates. Marshall Ky was already making noises about running. Washington cautioned Saigon not to automatically oppose a Ky candidacy. While State would prefer a civilian president, the most important matter was to effect transition to a constitutional government that was strong and unified enough to continue to prosecute the war effort (or negotiate a peaceful settlement),

> ...and at the same time broadly enough based to attract increasing local and national political strength away from VC. 38/

Ambassador Lodge's reply was, "the continued viability of SVN depends very heavily on the cohesiveness of the military." 39/ This had been and remained his evaluation of the political situation.

> ....Unity of the miltary is essential to government stability in VN. From the standpoint of stability, this is the Law and the Prophets.
>
> Movement toward a broadly based, truly popular government is impossible without stability.
>
> The military is also the chief nation-building group in the country. It has education, skills, experience, and discipline which no other group can offer. 40/

State acquiesced in this argument but continued to hope for a government broadly enough based so that the VC would find avenues to conquest of South Vietnam effectively blocked.

> ...In our view it is less a question of any civilian candidate controlling the military and more a question of the military being educated to accept a sharing of power and responsibility with civilians as a necessary elementary political progress. This means a readiness to accept the outcome of a free and open election in which the candidate favored by the directorate may not win. 41/

9. Foreign Exchange Negotiations and the GVN Budget, January - March 1967

The problem of GVN dollar balances remained a thorn. GVN did nothing to carry out its November agreements. With scarcely concealed impatience, Ambassador Porter offered GVN a tough economic program, in a meeting in the first week of January, 1967, with special emphasis on the dollar balances. Reporting on the meeting, he said:

> We underlined many times the very high level of the US commitment and said that we could not make this commitment unless we had /an/ iron-clad guarantee that the GVN would live up /to/ the foreign exchange agreement...we stated that this was the minimum the US could accept. 42/

Hard bargaining continued, including another Hanh trip to Washington. 43/ Preliminary to the Conference, Washington considered several steps which might be taken:

> ...1. Agreement on a piaster/dollar rate of 118 for official US purchases.
>
> 2. US use of all counterpart over P-30 billion.
>
> 3. Increase of Assistance In Kind from GVN.
>
> 4. Possible transfer of some official purchases from the 80 to a 118 exchange rate without changing the official rate.
>
> 5. Transfer of DoD contracts to the 118 rate.
>
> 6. Tying all 80 rate dollars to US procurement.
>
> 7. 100% US use of PL 480 sales. 44/

Saigon's opinion was that for these negotiations there were two main routes:

> (1) A switch of counterpart funds from their use to ours, and
>
> (2) A change in the exchange rate.

The first seemed preferable because it was more negotiable. The second might be counter-productive by "simply angering Hanh without moving him."45/ On February 20, GVN merely agreed to work on an "interim memorandum of understanding which would include actions to implement the foreign exchange agreement of last November."46/ When Komer went to Saigon later in February to negotiate, he found it necessary to threaten specifically to reduce the CIP program to force down GVN's dollar balances, noting that once the program was cut Congress would be unlikely to restore the cuts. The negotiations amply demonstrated the truth of Hanh's remark that Orientals only act after much bargaining. As Komer started to walk out the door after a meeting, Hanh hinted at a raise in the official purchase piaster rate from 80 to 118, but made no other concession. 47/ (At no time did the USG threaten explicitly to buy piasters in the open market, as Porter and DASD (Economics) had earlier proposed, a procedure that would knock down GVN dollar balances to whatever extent we wanted while using fewer dollars to get the required piasters.) In an exchange of letters early in March, Hanh said he understood the US was willing to

establish $50 million development fund in return for their purchase of 300 thousand tons of rice on a 100% US use basis and repayment of $25 million ICA loan. 48/

From Komer, now back in Washington, came this reply,

> There is in my view no doubt whatever that Hanh, and for that matter Ky, understood full well that we did not agree to the $50 million GVN Development Fund as part of interim package. Nor do I regard our credibility as enhanced if we now retreat even more on this issue. Finally, I regard the Development Fund as a sweetener so clearly wanted by the GVN that we need not give it away too cheaply.
>
> While in one sense we have little immediate leverage to use on the GVN so long as we do not choose to withhold aid in one form or another, in another sense we clearly have the GVN worried. I believe that, either through a definitive solution this June or more likely via Salami tactics, we can keep GVN reserves from rising too far. 49/

In mid-March Komer reached another "Interim Agreement" with GVN on foreign exchange. 50/ It provided that:

(1) The United States would supply at least an additional 100,000 tons of PL 480 rice and a further 300,000 tons of rice under terms providing for 100% USG use of proceeds.

(2) GVN would make available up to $120 million of foreign exchange for financing commodities previously imported under the CIP.

(3) The United States would make available for economic development projects the balance of FY 67 funds unused as a result of the reduction of the CIP program and would proceed to initiate and make grants for several interim projects.

(4) The United States agreed to the establishment by GVN of a $50 million development fund for purchase of US goods and services, such fund to be considered as use of Vietnamese foreign exchange resources under the November 4, 1966 agreement.

(5) GVN would repay US loans totalling $53 million. 51/

Closely related on the economic front was the GVN budget. Estimates of the CY 1967 inflationary gap grew during the quarter from 14 to 20 billion piasters. 52/ The United States exercised only spotty influence on their budget, specifically on those items receiving direct American support; and general persuasion was used to hold down the overall limit. Governor Hanh tried to transfer all US counterpart funds to the military budget with the explanation that only the US military could adequately control the South Vietnamese military, but the guessing was that this might also be his way of freeing GVN civilian agencies from any American interference.

Washington efforts to get more information on the GVN budget only brought educated guesses and a reminder that the Mission did not participate in a review of the GVN civil budget as was the practice for the military part. 53/ The CY 1967 budget of 75 billion piasters was issued without prior discussion with AID. It was unsatisfactory. USAID had the leverage to negotiate because of counterpart funds and PL 480 receipts, but the major problem was how to provide AID the necessary funding mechanics to implement programs at levels sufficient to meet established requirements. 54/

10. The Saigon Port Again

Severe congestion continued to plague the Port of Saigon. A drop in CIP/GVN cargo discharged in December brought queries from Washington. Saigon replied that the drop was due to the GVN port director's abortive great barge experiment and listed a number of corrective steps taken. In fact all were peripheral to the central problem, the failure of commercial importers to remove their goods from crowded warehouses. Saigon warned,

> Any additional actions...would require high-level government to government agreements which in our estimation would not be appropriate at this time. 55/

Highest authorities in Washington remained concerned and pressed for a complete military takeover or at least a comprehensive alternate plan which would demonstrably meet the problem. 56/ Saigon held back with the view that progress was being made, that Ky was persuaded of the need to eliminate port congestion and that he was doing his utmost to solve the problem. 57/ A US takeover was once again viewed as neither politically possible nor desirable. 58/ CINCPAC chimed in to support strongly the Saigon position, 59/ and at the end of the quarter Washington was still peppering Saigon with comment:

> We here do not take same relaxed view of barge situation Saigon port as Saigon...Highest authorities have been consistently concerned. 60/

At the same time an overlooked aspect of the earlier extension of US control of the port was being bounced back and forth. MACV clearance of AID financed project and procured commodities was estimated to have made AID liable for one billion piasters for port clearance costs previously financed by GVN. Nobody was quite certain how to approach GVN on the matter or how the US should pay the bill within existing dollar and piaster ceilings. 61/

11. Minor But Prickly Problems, January - March 1967

The clearance costs problem was an example of several minor matters which arose between the governments, problems that were often difficult to handle because prestige and sovereignty were involved. GVN National Bank Governor Hanh and the Embassy tangled over GVN issuance of instructions to commercial banks operating facilities for US military forces. 62/

The Embassy became concerned because American civilians, tried and punished in GVN courts on the basis of American-supplied evidence, were subjected to extortion. The ticklish part of the problem was how to investigate the practice without jeopardizing those in the midst of buying their way out. 63/ Soon there were ill-considered remarks to the press by Brigadier General Loan who said that GVN had sole jurisdiction over civilians. 64/ State instructed Saigon to keep mum on the subject. 65/ Finally, in March it was publicly announced that the United States would exercise court martial jurisdiction over civilians but "only rarely, in exceptional cases." The US did not question, as a matter of law, the existence of a basis for court martial jurisdiction over civilians and indicated that our policy would be to handle the problem of civilians in other ways. The statement was careful to reaffirm US respect for GVN sovereignty, so as to avoid the issue of a formal status of forces agreement. 66/

Whether GVN could levy requirements for reports and payments upon US contract airlines caused bantam-like stances on each side. 67/ GVN demanded that contract flights pay landing charges. Porter replied that was improper and offered GVN notification of flights as a sop. Ky's retort was a demand for copies of contracts and schedules, restrictions on in-country flights and limitation of loads to personnel and equipment strictly military. We rejected those terms and the military nature of the problem probably saved a contract flight from becoming the "example" later in January when one plane-load of Pan American passengers baked in tropical heat for several hours while GVN refused them permission to disembark at Tan Son Nhut.

Premier Ky's implied intention in February to accept an invitation to speak in the United States produced an apprehensive reaction from Washington. Ambassador Lodge cautioned, "We have twice headed him off and to object a third time might create strain." 68/ Eventually Ky was able to publicly postpone his visit on the grounds that his presence was needed to insure a free and fair election.

Diversion of MAP material remained a closet skeleton to be rattled periodically. In February, MACV performed estimative gymnastics to suggest that no more than 0.3% of MAP material had been so lost. 69/ CINCPAC quickly suggested that valid data did not exist and would be hard to compile. He said that the differences between manifests and the material actually received should be otherwise identified, and his thoughts seemed for the moment to take care of a potentially embarrassing need to explain a $5 million problem without even bothering GVN. 70/

Throughout the quarter there were periodic flurries of talks about negotiations with North Vietnam. U Thant was especially active and these maneuvers caused an uneasiness in US/GVN relations because Saigon was never completely certain what role it would have in such discussions. 71/

12. The Other War

Top levels in Washington realized that not much progress was being made in Revolutionary Development and exhorted Saigon to integrated, detailed civil/military planning. 72/ COMUSMACV waffled once again on whether ARVN battalions supporting RD should actually be retained under the operational control of the province chief. 73/ US Army units continued their work in the densely populated Delta provinces. On one occasion Premier Ky called Colonel Sam Wilson in for his view of progress there as well as to ask for an evaluation of the ARVN 46th Regiment. Wilson was able to say plainly that the unit was poor and that its commander was ineffective and, without a doubt, corrupt. Ky explained that the commander in question was a close friend of the division commander who was a close friend of the corps commander who was a close friend of Ky. That seemed to explain the matter. 74/

The US continued to press national reconciliation upon the Saigon government. Unger and CAS assets worked with the Constituent Assembly to get NR into the constitution. The lack of enthusiasm was alleged to be fear of unilateral US peace action. 75/ The present GVN continued, as they had so often before, to agree readily in conversations with us to the principle of national reconciliation; yet any concrete implementation remained illusive even through another top level meeting with the President. 76/

13. Guam Meetings, March 20 and 21, 1967

President Johnson announced that his purpose in calling the Conference at Guam was to introduce the newly appointed US team to the leaders of GVN. The shift of personnel represented the largest shake-up in US leadership in South Vietnam since August 1965. Ambassador Bunker was designated as the replacement for Lodge, and Locke took Porter's place. In a move to resolve the controversy over military versus civil control of Revolutionary Development, Robert Komer took charge with the rank of Ambassador under the COMUSMACV organizational structure with czar powers and a strong mandate to produce progress.

Most happily, the Constituent Assembly completed its work on the constitution just in time to permit Premier Ky to present a copy to President Johnson at Guam. As had been the case on the two previous occasions of top US/GVN talks, the communique which resulted from the 2-day meeting lay primary emphasis on political, economic, and social matters. 77/ The military picture was presumed to be so encouraging and improving as to need no special attention.

14. Routine Matters, April - September 1967

Most of the previous problems persisted during this period. By June the rate of inflation was predicted to be 45 - 50 percent per year, and the piaster gap was to be 17.3 billion greater than projected. 78/ Hanh, now GVN Economic Minister, scheduled a September trip to Washington and the list of expected topics read very much the same as agendas for many previous such meetings. 79/ Hanh could upon occasion get very excited, as in the case where a suit by a Greek shipping line froze the GVN account in a New York City bank; 80/ but despite repeated urging from Washington, nobody in Saigon could get up courage enough to approach GVN on those retroactive port clearing charges. 81/

On April 18, GVN finally issued a National Reconciliation Proclamation which stated that "All citizens who rally to the national cause can be employed by the government in accordance with their ability," 82/ but the decree proved to be a mirage. It used the Vietnamese words for solidarity rather than those for reconciliation and the program proceeded in consonance with that distinction. Saigon reminded State that Premier Ky had recently told the Ambassador that meaningful progress on national reconciliation could only come after a constitutional government was established. 83/

On the MACV side, Ambassador Komer was getting organized. In response to a Washington query on land reform he recalled his consistent position but pointed out that it was not an important issue in Vietnam. Far more important was the matter of security in the countryside. 84/

The US continued to deliver material assistance to improve the morale of ARVN troops. A $2.83 million program for 913 ARVN dependent houses was upgraded to provide more modern structures with utilities. 85/ USAID helped the RVNAF commissary system for RVNAF and dependents. Although rice was eliminated to avoid lowering its open market price, GVN sought compensating increases in the meat and fish supplied. 86/ MACV programmed over $3 million to the RVNAF Quartermaster Corps which supplied field and garrison rations. 87/

But there were continuing signs that ARVN as a fighting force needed propping up. Sporadic efforts at encadrement appeared. The USMC Combined Action Companies in I Corps were well publicized. In April, the US 25th Division completed studies, and transmitted to General Chinh, still CG

ARVN 25th Division, the Combined Lighting Concept. It brought together in one outpost a US squad, an ARVN squad, and a PF squad.

In response to Washington inquiries, General Westmoreland reported by message in May, 1967, "A command project was initiated on January 26, 1967, to review the performance of RVNAF units and to identify those considered ineffective and non-productive. Units so identified are being evaluated with a view to withdrawal or reduction of military assistance support unless improvement in these units is possible. The evaluation will be conducted every six months resulting in a final determination each June and December...

The methodology for evaluation includes:

(1) Identification of units judged ineffective or nonproductive.

(2) Evaluation of credibility or feasibility of present plans to guarantee increased effectiveness.

(3) Study of unit performance trends during the past six months.

(4) Determination of the availability of plans to train personnel.

(5) Evaluation of command interest at all levels for improvement.

Units will be classified as Improvement Probable, Improvement Doubtful, and Improvement Unlikely. Those in the latter two groups must justify continued military assistance or action will be initiated to reduce FY 68 support.

Current Status: All VNAF and VNMC units are effective and productive. Support to VNN reduced by $7800 which reflects discontinuance of support for two fishing boats which are not configured to support any role assigned to VNN. The evaluation of ARVN is only partially completed." 88/

In July, the MACV staff briefed Secretary McNamara in Saigon and touched again on the subject of encadrement. One concept considered was VATUSA (Vietnamese Augmentation to US Army) whereby two or three Vietnamese would be assigned to each squad in US combat battalions. While this scheme offered the advantages of improving ARVN skills and of utilizing additional RVN troops without further strains on already limited ARVN leadership, the only real gain for the US was viewed to be a possible reduction in US strength. The disadvantages pointed out were the political climate, the language barrier, the danger to US unit security, the administrative and disciplinary difficulties and the probable irritation between VATUSA and regular ARVN unit soldiers. These, it was judged, dictated against its adoption.

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A second concept considered was salting ARVN forces with US leadership in command positions. The analysis indicated that for political and psychological reasons, it would probably be best to put two US officers and three US NCO's in an instructor's role with each RF company rather than in a command role. Command would be exercised by the RF company commander but he would be required to follow the directions of the US training team leaders.

The conclusion reached was to continue the "salting" experiment with expansion in view if the initial results were good. There is no evidence that anything became of the experiment. 89/

None of this seriously worried top RVNAF leadership; so they indulged in more interesting international activities.

. The occasion was planning for barrier extension westward, but Washington realized at once that there was little the US could do to limit the contacts to that subject. 90/

1/ In September, MACV reported that GVN had occupied Pattle Island in the Crescent Group about 170 miles south of Hainan with the intention of constructing an airfield there. Because these islands are already claimed by Communist and Nationalist Chinas and the Philippines as well, MACV advised against US cooperation in the adventure. 92/

15. The GVN Presidential Election

Pre-nomination maneuvering and legitimacy of the Presidential campaign were the subjects which occupied American attention above all else. The first task facing Ambassador Bunker as he arrived on station in April was to oversee the delicate transition of GVN to a government based upon a popular election recognized by the world to be fair.

Premier Ky was already openly acting like a Presidential candidate in April. General Thieu was informed that the generals had endorsed Ky while Thieu was absent from the scene recovering from an appendectomy. 93/ That was not sufficient to scare Thieu from the race; so the US Mission became increasingly worried that the Thieu-Ky competition threatened the indispensable unity of the military. 94/ Dickering remained behind the scenes until Ky formally announced his candidacy on May 12. 95/

This served only to intensify the rivalry. By mid-June, the Thieu-Ky confrontation showed no signs of moving toward satisfactory resolution. 96/ Basically, Ambassador Bunker believed in an indirect approach. He did not hesitate to approach Ky and Thieu individually on the broader issues of arbitrary press censorship, questionable tactics being pursued by Ky supporters six weeks before it was legal to campaign, or unity of the Armed Forces. 97/ But, on the confrontation between the two candidates, Bunker's ploy was to hold an informal luncheon to which the two principals were invited. In the end they had to work out their own solution. 98/ They did. At the end of June the 50-60 officers of the Armed Forces Council met in a 2-day, continuous session at which both Thieu and Ky performed histrionics. The surprising result was that Ky agreed to run for the Vice-Presidency on Thieu's ticket. 99/ The Mission sighed in relief and agreed that Bunker's approach had worked. The Ambassador congratulated the candidates, and Thieu obligingly announced that if elected he would appoint a civilian as Premier. Ky agreed. The RVNAF chief of staff had earlier announced that there would be no officially endorsed military candidate; yet the Constituent Assembly conveniently approved a draft article which permitted Thieu and Ky to run without resigning from the Armed Forces. By mid-July, the Assembly had voted acceptance of the Thieu-Ky ticket while disallowing one headed by Big Minh who remained in nearby Bangkok as a potential threat to the younger pair. 100/ With only a few hitches, the campaigning proceeded so as to satisfy American observers that it was acceptably fair; and the resultant Thieu-Ky victory was a surprise only in its smaller-than-expected plurality.

16. Blueprint For Vietnam, August 1967

State suggested that completion of the election process was a proper occasion upon which to consider several proposals, including increased leverage, for advancing the total American effort in South Vietnam. 101/ Bunker also mentioned this when he transmitted the paper, "Blueprint for Viet-Nam." The "Blueprint" ranged widely over all topics and struck a consistently optimistic note

> Progress in the war has been steady on all fronts. We can defeat the enemy by patient, continued, and concerted effort. The way to do this is for the GVN and its allies (a) to reinforce and accelerate the progress already made; (b) to markedly improve the interdiction of infiltration of North Vietnamese troops and supplies; (c) to upgrade, accelerate, and coordinate the pacification program in the countryside; and (d) to maintain political and economic stability and support the development of the constitutional process.
>
> ... We still have a long way to go. Much of the country is still in VC hands, the enemy can still shell our bases and commit acts of terrorism in the securest areas, VC units still mount large scale attacks, most of the populace has not actively commited itself to the Government, and a VC intrastructure still exists throughout the country. Nevertheless, the situation has steadily improved since the spring of 1965...
>
> Now, that the initiative is ours and the enemy is beginning to hurt, maximum pressure must be maintained on him by (a) intensifying military activity in the South; (b) developing new methods of interdicting infiltration; (c) bombing all targets in the North connected with the enemy's war effort that do not result in unacceptable risk of uncontrolled escalation; (d) accelerating the program of pacification (including better security more effective attacks on the infrastructure, stepped up National Reconciliation and Chieu Hoi programs, a greater involvement of the people in solving their own problems at the village and hamlet level); (e) encouraging reforms in the government structure and continued improvement in the armed forces; (f) attacking the problem of corruption; (g) using influence to effect a strong, freely elected government with political stability; and (h) taking actions necessary to the continued growth and stability of the economy... 102/

In a subsequent message Ambassador Bunker stated more specifically that the United States should use its influence to get GVN to do the following:

A. Seek broad based popular support.

(1) Appoint prominent civilians, including some leading opposition candidates, in new government.

(2) Use appointments to insure association of a new government with various religious and political groups.

(3) Adopt a program and identify it with that of a former national hero, "so as to give the new government an idealistic appeal or philosophy which will compete with that declared by the VC." Bunker suggested Nguyen Hue.

B. Work on a more continuous, although informal basis with US Mission. Bunker suggests regular weekly or semi-monthly lunches.

C. Adopt a program to include the following:

(1) Public recognition of the

(a) Necessity for every Vietnamese to contribute to the war effort.

(b) Need to change draft laws.

(2) Reaffirm on-going programs relating to RVNAF, including

(a) MACV program of ARVN improvement through merit promotions and a military inspectorate.

(b) Elimination of corrupt, inefficient leaders.

(c) Expansion of RF/PF and adoption of the MACV recommended system of US advisory teams operating with RF/PF for 6-month period.

(d) Greater integration of US forces or joint operations.

(e) Reorientation of the concept of the Pacification Role of ARVN, RF, and PF in accordance with MACV suggestions -- from static support to mobile, area security with night patrolling and a system of inspection and grading to insure implementation.

(3) Make the Privince Chief the "key" man in pacification -- giving him operational control over all military and paramilitary forces engaged in pacification. He should appoint district chiefs. He should report to Corps commander on military matters and to central government on civil matters. An inspection, training, and rates system should be established.

(4) Centralize all rural development efforts in non-RD hamlets under one coordinated control in some manner as is now done in the Ministry of Revolutionary Development for RD hamlets.

(5) Construct an adequate number of processing and detention centers in provinces and permanent prisons on islands on priority basis together with passing of laws that it is a crime to be a VC civilian cadre.

(6) Pay higher salaries to selected GVN officials, including the military, particularly those officials able to control corruption or in a position to be tempted by corruption.

(7) Reaffirm National Reconciliation and Chieu Hoi programs.

(8) Grant villages the power to enforce land rental laws.

(9) Adopt the whole of the "operation Take-off" pacification program prepared by MACCORDS.

(10) Establish joint council procedures over expenditure of counterpart piasters by reinstituting sign-off by US advisorys at province level.

(11) Revitalize the veteran's program.

(12) Increase receipts from domestic taxes and tariffs, and revise monetary policies. 103/

17. The Leverage Study

On August 31 State transmitted a study by Hans Heymann and Col. Volney Warner on the subject of leverage. It reviewed the rationale for leverage and considered a whole array of possible techniques:

> ... In anticipating the US/GVN relationship in the post-election period, it is generally agreed that the US should find ways to exercise leverage with the Vietnamese government which are more commensurate in degree with the importance of the US effort to South Vietnam's survival and which reflect the climate of growing restiveness in the US... In its impatience to get results and make progress, the US has increasingly resorted to unilateral programs and action with inadequate consultation with the Vietnamese. On the other hand, the indiscriminate and careless exercise of US leverage could undermine the self-respect of the Vietnamese government in its own eyes and in the eyes of the South Vietnamese people.
>
> .. To be effective, US leverage must be exercised in the context of a relationship of mutual respect and confidence, and in ways

commensurate with the objective sought. It must also be backed by credible sanctions.

.. The various tools of leverage available to us are described below. It is not proposed that all of these tools be used at any given time or that some of them be used at all. However, they represent a selection of arrows that might be placed in the US Mission quiver for use as the Mission Council deems appropriate. It will be particularly important to construct a credible and effective system of US leverage for use as necessary and appropriate in connection with the list of priority program objectives which we shall be seeking to achieve with the newly elected government in the immediate post-election period.

Tools of Leverage

.. A wide range of possible techniques and forms of influence is available at each level of the American presence in Vietnam. A few of these leverage devices are now in use, mostly at the initiative of individual Americans on the spot, but not as part of an organized framework of influence. Other devices have been instituted in the past, only to be subsequently abandoned because of fear of their misuse, actual misuse, or inadequate understanding of their value.

In the following list we array a range of possible instruments of influence that the US might employ, with some indication of their applicability.

A. Rapport...

B. Joint Planning and Evaluation...

C. Joint Inspection and Audit...

D. Joint Secretariats...

E. The JCRR approach: Establishing a joint, autonomous, dually-staffed, foundation-like organization headed by a board of commissioners appointed by the two heads of state, to administer all forms of non-military AID...

F. Contingency Funds and Special Resources...

G. Control Over Expenditure of Counterpart Piasters...

H. Retention of Resources in US Channels...

I. Joint Personnel Management -- to institute career incentive, selection, and removal policies...

J. Joint Command...

K. Policy-level Monitoring System -- to monitor the exercise of authority of key officials of the GVN...

L. Withholding US Support -- at levels below Saigon, the authority of US senior advisors to cut off or withdraw US civil and military support from Vietnamese activities or operations within their area of responsibility would constitute powerful leverage...

At the Saigon level, a range of extremely tough options is available, encompassing selective withdrawal of US support for Vietnam persuading the GVN that these are in fact available requires the will to use them and the political ability to follow through if our hand is called. Options would include halting further troop deployments, standing down US unit operations, suspending CIP and MAP assistance, and so forth. 104/

Ambassador Komer replied on September 19. He recalled his deep interest in this subject and discussed at length both present and potential techniques. His views seemed considerably mitigated by his several months in Saigon, for "rapport" and "persuasion with implied pressure" headed the list of what was presently being done. He concluded by saying, "All of the above forms of leverage, and yet others, could be useful at the proper time and in an appropriate way. But they must be applied with discretion, and always in such manner as to keep the GVN foremost in the picture presented to its own people and the world at large... The exercise of leverage in a personal manner and hidden from the public view is likely to be most effective, while of the more operational means establishment of combined organization under a JCRR-type concept, to include joint control of resources, would be most desirable. In sum, we're gradually applying more leverage in Pacification, but wish to do so in ways that least risk creating more trouble than constructive results." 105/

18. Postlogue

New plans and new hopes marked the immediate post-election period. The story of US-GVN relations continues, but this narrative must end. In conclusion it seems appropriate to quote from the MACCORDS report covering Bien Hoa province for the period ending December 31, 1967.

1. Status for the RD Plan:

The GVN in Bien Hoa Province has not met with any measure of success in furthering the pacification effort during 1967.

Those areas that do represent advances (such as road openings or repairs or construction, breaking up of main line VC units, etc.) have all been the result of unilateral US actions. It was perhaps naively thought that these US accomplishments would stand as an inspiring example to the GVN and would prompt them to not only continue their efforts but, further, to expand and intensify the fight. However, during 1967 in Bien Hoa Province, this has not been the case. The GVN at all levels has grown weaker, become more corrupt and, today, displays even less vitality and will than it did one year ago...

Advisory Leverage: This subject has been an extremely sensitive and controversial issue in both GVN and US circles. However, as painful as it must be to address, the harsh truth is that given a showdown situation or an intolerable divergence between GVN and US methods, the US advisor will lose. CORDS, Bien Hoa has gone to extraordinary lengths in reporting on both corrupt and incompetent officials and practices. The reason for these efforts has been to illustrate clearly to higher US authorities, the enormity of the problems facing the advisor on the province/District level. CORDS Bien Hoa, as perhaps all other echelons of US advisors, is ultimately powerless to rectify or even significantly alter the GVN intentions and performance. The Vietnamese in the street is firmly convinced that the US totally dominates the GVN and dictates exactly what course shall be followed. However, the bitter and tragic truth is that the US has been kept at such a distance from GVN circles and power that in joint councils or plans our views may be heard, some portions of our logic may be endorsed but with confrontations or matters that represent any truly revolutionary departure from existing GVN practices etc, we are light weights and presently do not possess the leverage or power to carry the day.

ARVN Performance: There are presently two ARVN battalions (3/43 and 2/48) who are directly assigned to support RD in Bien Hoa. With the exception of the 1st Bn, 48th Regt which served in the Phu Hoi Campaign area earlier in the year, ARVN performance has been less than satisfactory. The units have demonstrated the same age-old ills that have collectively led to our present commitment of US forces...

GVN Officials Interests: The primary interest of GVN officials in Bien Hoa Province is money. The lucrative US presence with all the various service trades that cater to the soldier, have created a virtual gold mine of wealth which is directly or indirectly syphoned off and pocketed by the officials. Thus, revolutionary development with all the ultimate implications of broadening the governing base of this society, is viewed

as some sort of necessary device that needs to be propped up and nominally catered to by the GVN in order to keep US and Free World's interest and faith intact. However, any serious or meaningful gesture in support of a program which ultimately is designed to displace the powers-to-be (or at least force them to become accountable or share in the power) is not forthcoming. Infrastructure is not attacked even though the target is known; budgets are not spent although the funds are available; GVN officials steadfastly refuse to visit their districts or villages or hamlets although it is there that most immediate problems exist. The list of limpid, half-hearted efforts to prosecute the war is endless.

Material Cutoffs and Shortages: In August after several months of negotiation, CORDS, Bien Hoa was forced to cut off further shipment of replenishment stocks into province. The reasons for this action were many but could be reduced to sloppy, shoddy and highly questionable logistical practices and procedures on the part of the GVN. After eleven weeks, the Provincial GVN finally agreed to carry out the reforms and renovations as suggested by CORDS. However, that eleven-week gap in the flow of materials (particularly during a period most noted for its relatively high degree of GVN action) had a significant effect on curbing construction programs and causing even more delays. Then, as soon as this issue was resolved, it was learned that cement and roofing weren't in supply and rationed quotas for the remainder of the year further compounded the damage caused by earlier material shortages.

To compensate, in part, for these factors, CORDS has had to increasingly rely on the resources, skills and capabilities of resident US military units. These units have, without exception, effectively filled the gaps and their efforts have succeeded in reducing the critical road situation that has been worsening throughout the years. Their action in many other areas has been highly commendable and CORDS Bien Hoa (as well as the GVN itself) owes a great deal to these units and their commanders who have unselfishly devoted themselves to furthering pacification. However, for all their efforts, for all the resources either expended or on hand, the disturbing truth in Bien Hoa is that it still remains for the government, with forceful and meaningful direction from above, to begin to assume the responsibility for prosecuting this war and the pacification effort. Thus far, the GVN has not done this and it is the considered opinion of CORDS Bien Hoa that unless major revisions are brought about in the factors raised here, there is only to be a continuation of the same ordeal with the accompanying frustrations, inaction, corruption and incompetence. A continuation of this does not

connotate stability or even maintenance of the status quo; it spells regression and an ever widening gap of distrust, distaste and disillusionment between the people and the GVN. 106/

UNITED STATES - VIETNAM RELATIONS

1945 - 1967


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
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
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

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
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

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1966
1967



RATIO OF U.S. INFANTRY - TYPE TO NVA INFILTRATED BATTALIONS
U.S. Bns. Per NVA Bns.
1.75
1.50
1.25
1.00
.75
.50
.25
0
QTRS.
I
II
III
IV
1965
1966
1967
Buddhists demonstrete
Premier Huong ousted
U.S. issues White Paper
U.S. dependents evacuated
U.S. air strikes on NVN
Quat named new premier
General Khanh resigns
600 ROK's arrive in SVN
U.S. White Paper
First Marines Battalion lands at Da Nang
U.S. acft. hit NVN radar site
VC bomb U.S. Embassy
U.S. announces troop build-up
SecDef Conference at Honolulu
Cambodia breeks relations with U.S.
173d Abn Bde arrives in SVN
Two U.S. Marine bns deployed
Armed Forces Council dissolved
U.S. halts NVN bombing
U.S. resumes NVN bombing
U.S. resumes NVN air raids
U.S. strength in VN is 50,000
Dong Xoai battle
Quat resigns
B-52's bomb SVN
Marshal Ky forms new government
1st Major U.S. ground offensive
U.S. troops 1st major attack
Lodge repleces Taylor
U.S. 1st Div lands in SVN
SecDef Conference in Saigon
NVA 101st Regiment confirmed in SVN
SecDef arrives in VN
First U.S. plane hit by SAM
Elements of 101 Abn arrive in SVN
SecDef Honolulu Conference
Republican "White Paper"
Montagnards reaffirm GVN loyalty
ROK troops arrive SVN
Plei Me Battle
U.S. strength is 148,000
Pacifist suicides in U.S.
5 NVA Regiments confirmed in SVN
Ia Drang Valley Battle
35,000 pacifists march on White House
SecDef conference in Saigon
U.S. AF strikes major industry in NVN
Christmas ceasefire
U.S. begins 37 days suspension of air raids
Christman truce
25th Inf Div arrives in SVN
U.S. strength in SVN is 184,000
Tet truce begins
U.S. resumes NVN air strikes
Honolulu conference
V-P Humphrey visits SVN
U.S. cites legality under SEATO
U.S. strength at 213,000
Buddhists protest Thi's removal
10,000 Buddhists demonstrate
Ky quells Da Nang Buddhists
B-52's bomb Mu Gia pass
VC mortar Tan Son Nhut
NVN MIG's join fight
Buddhist strife renewed
Operation El Paso II
ARVN troops move against Buddhists
U.S. acft. attack NVN POL instaliations
B-52's bomb DMZ
B-52's use Thai airbase
U.S. strength at 306,000
SVN elections held
Operation Attleboro
SecDef visits Saigon
Operation Paul Revere
Manila Conference opens
Operation Thayer II
President Johnson visits SVN
U.S. planes bomb targets in Hanoi
U.S. strength is 389,000
2-dey truce
Operetion Ceder Falls
Tet truce begins
Tet truce ends
NVN bombing resumes
Operetion Junction City
U.S. planes hit NVN steel works
Bunker to replece Lodge
SVN adopts constitution
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Peece marches in U.S.
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LBJ rebukes war dissenters
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U.S. resumes NVN air raids
U.S. strength in VN is 68,000
Dong Xoai battle
Quat resigns
B-52's bomb SVN
Marshal Ky forms new government
1st Major U.S. ground offensive
U.S. troops 1st major attack
Lodge replaces Taylor
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Operation El Paso II
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U.S. strength at 306,000
SVN elections held
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U.S. planes bomb targets in Cambodia
U.S. strength is 389,000
2-day truce
Operation Cedar Falls
Tet truce begins
Tet truce ends
NVN bombing resumes
Operation Junction City
U.S. planes hit NVN steel works
Bunker to replace Lodge
SVN adopts constitution
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NUMBER OF VC MAIN/LOCAL FORCE BATTALIONS
Number of Battalions
225
150
75
0
QTRS.
I
II
III
IV
1965
1966
1967



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B-52's bomb DMZ
B-52's use Thai airbase
U.S. strength at 306,000
SVN elections held
Operation Attleboro
SecDef visits Saigon
Operation Paul Revere
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Operation Thayer II
President Johnson visits SVN
U.S. planes bomb targets in Hanoi
U.S. strength is 389,000
2-day truce
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Tet truce ends
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TOTAL VC/NVA BATTALIONS
Number of Battalions
225
150
75
0
QTRS.
I
II
III
IV
I
II
III
IV
I
II
III
IV
1965
1966
1967



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U.S. LAND OPERATIONS
Number of Operations
0
100
200
300
400
QTRS.
I
II
III
IV
I
II
III
IV
I
II
III
IV
1965
1966
1967



Deaths Per Quarter
30,000
20,000
10,000
0
QTRS. I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV
1965
1966
1967
Buddhists demonstrate
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ENEMY KIA
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

Deaths Per Quarter
3000
2000
1000
0
QTRS.
I
II
III
IV
1965
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U.S. KIA
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

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U.S. strength is 148,000
Pacifist suicides in U.S.
5 NVA Regiments confirmed in SVN
Ia Drang Valley Battle
35,000 pacifists march on White House
SecDef conference in Saigon
U.S. AF strikes major industry in NVN
Christmas ceasefire
U.S. begins 37 days suspension of air raids
Christman truce
25th Inf Div arrives in SVN
U.S. strength in SVN is 184,000
Tet truce begins
U.S. resumes NVN air strikes
Honolulu conference
V-P Humphrey visits SVN
U.S. cites legality under SEATO
U.S. strength at 213,000
Buddhists protest Thi's removal
10,000 Buddhists demonstrate
Ky quells Da Nang Buddhists
B-52's bomb Mu Gia pass
VC mortar Tan Son Nhut
NVN MIG's join fight
Buddhist strife renewed
Operation El Paso II
ARVN troops move against Buddhists
U.S. acft. attack NVN POL installations
B-52's bomb DMZ
B-52's use Thai airbase
U.S. strength at 306,000
SVN elections held
Operation Attleboro
SecDef visits Saigon
Operation Paul Revere
Manila Conference opens
Operation Thayer II
President Johnson visits SVN
U.S. planes bomb targets in Hanoi
U.S. strength is 389,000
2-day truce
Operation Cedar Falls
Tet truce begins
Tet truce ends
NVN bombing resumes
Operation Junction City
U.S. planes hit NVN steel works
Bunker to replace Lodge
SVN adopts constitution
Johnson meets Ky at Guam
NVN rejects U.S. peace bid
Peace marches in U.S.
U.S. planes hit Haiphong power plants
COMUS MACV addresses Congress
LBJ rebukes war dissenters
Marines capture Hill 881
US-ARVN forces enter DMZ
Thieu announces candidacy
Full scale Israeli-Arab war
U.S. jets attack Kep
U.S. apologizes for damage to Russian ship
Ky withdraws candidacy
VC attacks on Con Thien
SecDef visits SVN
Clifford-Taylor mission
Congress debate
2 U.S. jets downed over China
SVN elects Thieu as President
DMZ "barrier plan" announced
NVA shells Con Thien
Ashmore-Boggs accusations on peace feelers
U.S. to build anti-missile defense
DRV rejects Goldberg's peace plan
Hanoi-Moscow sign aid pact
Anti-war march on Pentagon
U.S. reveals USSR "FOBS"
RATIO: ENEMY K I A PER U.S. K I A
Enemy KIA Per US. KIA
0
10
20
30
40
QTRS.
I
II
III
IV
I
II
III
IV
I
II
III
IV
1965
1966
1967



Enemy KIA Per Land Operation
0
20
40
60
80
100
QTRS.
I
II
III
IV
1965
1966
1967
ENEMY KIA PER U.S. LAND OPERATION
Buddhists demonstrate
Premier Huong oustad
U.S. issues White Paper
U.S. dependants avacueted
U.S. air strikes on NVN
Quat named new premier
Ganeral Khanh resigns
600 ROK's arrive in SVN
U.S. White Paper
First Marines Bettalion lands at Da Nang
U.S. acft. hit NVN radar site
VC bomb U.S. Embassy
U.S. announces troop build-up
SecDef Conference at Honolulu
Cambodia breaks relations with U.S.
173d Abn Bde arrives in SVN
Two U.S. Marine Bns deployed
Armed Forces Council dissolved
VC attack Song Be
U.S. halts NVN bombing
U.S. resumes NVN bombing
U.S. resumes NVN air raids
U.S. strength in VN is 50,000
Dong Xoei battle
Quat resigns
B-52's bomb SVN
Mershal Ky forms new government
1st Major U.S. ground offensive
U.S. troops 1st major atteck
Lodge replaces Taylor
U.S. 1st Div lands in SVN
SecDef Conference in Saigon
NVA 101st Regimant confirmed in SVN
SecDef arrives in VN
First U.S. plane hit by SAM
Elements of 101 Abn arrive in SVN
SecDaf Honolulu Conference
Republican "White Peper"
Montagnards reaffirm GVN loyelty
ROK troops arrive SVN
Plai Me Battle
U.S. strength is 148,000
Pacifist suicides in U.S.
5 NVA regiments confirmed in SVN
Ia Drang Valley Battle
35,000 pacifists march on White House
SecDef conferenco in Saigon
U.S. AF strikes major industry in NVN
Christmas ceasefire
U.S. begins 37 days suspension of air raids
Christman truce
25th Inf Div arrives in SVN
U.S. strength in SVN is 184,000
Tet truce begins
U.S. resumes NVN air strikes
Honolulu conference
V-P Humphrey visits SVN
U.S. cites legality under SEATO
U.S. strength at 213,000
Buddhists protest Thi's removal
10,000 Buddhists demonstrate
Ky quells Da Nang Buddhists
B-52's bomb Mu Gia pass
VC mortar Tan Son Nhut
NVN MIG's join fight
Buddhist strife renewed
Operation El Paso II
ARVN troops move against Buddhists
U.S. acft. attack NVN POL installations
B-52's bomb DMZ
B-52's use Thai airbase
U.S. strength at 306,000
SVN elections held
Operation Attleboro
SecDef visits Saigon
Operation Paul Revere
Manila Conference opens
Operation Thayer II
President Johnson visits SVN
U.S. planes bomb tergets in Hanoi
U.S. strength is 389,000
2-day truce
Operation Cedar Falls
Tet truce begins
Tet truce ends
NVN bombing resumes
Operation Junction City
U.S. planes hit NVN steel works
Bunker to replace Lodge
SVN adopts constitution
Johnson meets Ky at Guam
NVN rejects U.S. peace bid
Peace marches in U.S.
U.S. planes hit Haiphong power plants
COMUS MACV addresses Congress
LBJ rebukes war dissenters
Marines capture Hill 881
US-ARVN forces enter DMZ
Thieu announces candidacy
Full-scale Israeli-Arab war
U.S. jets attack Kep
U.S. apologizes for damage to Russian ship
Ky withdraws candidacy
VC attacks on Con Thien
SecDaf visits SVN
Clifford-Taylor mission returns
Congress debate Tonkin crisis
2 U.S. jets downed over China
SVN elects Thieu as President
DMZ "barrier plan" announced
NVA shells Con Thien
Ashmore-Boggs accusations on peace feelers
U.S. to build anti-missile defense
DRV rejects Goldberg's peace plan
Hanoi-Moscow sign aid pact
Anti-war march on Pentagon
U.S. reveals USSR "FOBS"



US KIA Per Land Operation
0
2
4
6
8
10
QTRS.
I
II
III
IV
1965
1966
1967
U.S. KIA PER U.S. LAND OPERATION
Buddhists demonstrate
Premier Huong ousted
U.S. issues White Paper
U.S. dependents evacuated.
U.S. air strikes on NVN
Quat named new premier
General Khanh resigns
600 ROK's arrive in SVN
U.S. White Paper
First Marines Battalion lands at Da Nang
U.S. acft. hit NVN radar site
VC bomb U.S. Embassy
U.S. announces troop build-up
SecDef Conference at Honolulu
Cambodia breaks relations with U.S.
173d Abn Bde arrives in SVN
Two U.S. Marine Bns deployed
Armed Forces Council dissolved
VC attack Song Be
U.S. halts NVN bombing
U.S. resumes NVN bombing
U.S. resumes NVN air raids
U.S. strength in VN is 50,000
Dong Xoai battle
Quat resigns
B-52's bomb SVN
Marshal Ky forms new government
1st Major U.S. ground offensive
U.S. troops 1st major attack
Lodge replaces Taylor
U.S. 1st Div lands in SVN
SecDef Conference in Saigon
NVA 101st Regiment confirmed in SVN
SecDef arrives in VN
First U.S. plane hit by SAM
Elements of 101 Abn arrive in SVN
SecDef Honolulu Conference
Republican "White Paper"
Montagnards reaffirm GVN loyalty
ROK troops arrive SVN
Plei Me Battle
U.S. strength is 148,000
Pacifist suicides in U.S.
5 NVA Regiments confirmed in SVN
Ia Drang Valley Battle
35,000 pacifists march on White House
SecDef conference in Saigon
U.S. AF strikes major industry in NVN
Christmas ceasefire
U.S. begins 30 days suspension of air raids
Christmas truce
25th Inf Div [illegible] in SVN
U.S. strength in SVN is 184,000
Tet truce begins
U.S. resumes NVN air strikes
Honolulu conference
V-P Humphrey visits SVN
U.S. cites legality under SEATO
U.S. strength at 213,000
Buddhists protest Thi's removal
10,000 Buddhists demonstrate
Ky quells Da Nang Buddhists
B-52's bomb Mu Gia pass
VC mortar Tan Son Nhut
NVN MIG's join fight
Buddhist strife renewed
Operation El Paso II
ARVN troops move against Buddhists
U.S. acft. attack NVN POL installations
B-52's bomb DMZ
B-52's use Thai airbase
U.S. strength at 306,000
SVN elections held
Operation Attleboro
SecDef visits Saigon
Operation Paul Revere
Manila Conference opens
Operation Thayer II
President Johnson visits SVN
U.S. planes bomb targets in Hanoi
U.S. strength is 389,000
2-day truce
Operation Cedar Falls
Tet truce begins
Tet truce ends
NVN bombing resumes
Operation Junction City
U.S. planes hit NVN steel works
Bunker to replace Lodge
SVN adopts constitution
Johnson meets Ky at Guam
NVN rejects U.S. peace bid
Peace merches in U.S.
U.S. planes hit Haiphong power plants
COMUS MACV addresses Congress
LBJ rebukes war dissenters
Marines capture Hill 881
US-ARVN forces anter DMZ
Thieu announces candidacy
Full scale Israeli-Areb war
U.S. jets attack Kep
U.S. apologizes for damage to Russian ship
Ky withdraws candidacy
VC attacks on Con Thien
SecDef visits SVN
Clifford-Taylor mission returns
Congress debate Tonkin crisis
2 U.S. jets downed over China
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NVA shells Con Thien
Ashmore-Boggs accusations on peace feelers
U.S. to build anti-missile defense
DRV rejects Goldberg's peace plan
Hanoi-Moscow sign aid pact
Anti-war march on Pentagon
U.S. reveals USSR "FOBS"


ENEMY KIA PER U.S. INFANTRY - TYPE BATTALION IN SVN
Enemy KIA Per U.S. Battalion
400
300
200
100
QTRS.
I
II
III
IV
1965
1966
1967
Buddhists demonstrate
Premier Huong ousted
U.S. issues White Paper
U.S. dependents evacuated
U.S. air strikes on NVN
Quat named new premier
General Khanh resigns
600 ROK's arrive in SVN
U.S. White Paper
First Marines Battalion lands at Da Nang
U.S. acft. hit NVN radar site
VC bomb U.S. Embassy
U.S. announces troop build-up
SecDef Conference at Honolulu
Cambodia breaks relations with U.S.
173d Abn Bde arrives in SVN
Two U.S. Marine Bns deployed
Armed Forces Council dissolved
VC attack Song Be
U.S. halts NVN bombing
U.S. resumes NVN bombing
U.S. resumes NVN air raids
U.S. strength in VN is 50,000
Dong Xoai battle
Quat resigns
B-52's bomb SVN
Marshal Ky forms new government
1st Major U.S. ground offensive
U.S. troops 1st major attack
Lodge replaces Taylor
U.S. 1st Div lands in SVN
SecDef Conference in Saigon
NVA 101st Regiment confirmed in SVN
SecDef arrives in VN
First U.S. plane hit by SAM
Elements of 101 Abn arrive in SVN
SecDef Honolulu Conference
Republican "White Paper"
Montagnards reaffirm GVN loyalty
ROK troops arrive SVN
Plei Me Battle
U.S. strength is 148,000
Pacifist suicides in U.S.
5 NVA Regiments confirmed in SVN
Ia Drang Valley Battle
35,000 pacifists march on White House
SecDef conference in Honolulu
U.S. AF strikes petroleum industry in NVN
Christmas ceasefire
U.S. begins 37 days suspension of air raids
Christman truce
25th Inf Div arrives in SVN
U.S. strength in SVN is 184,000
Tet truce begins
U.S. resumes NVN air strikes
Honolulu conference
V-P Humphrey visits SVN
U.S. cites legality under SEATO
U.S. strength at 213,000
Buddhists protest Thi's removal
10,000 Buddhists demonstrate
Ky quells Da Nang Buddhists
B-52's bomb Mu Gia pass
VC mortar Tan Son Nhut
NVN MIG's join fight
Buddhist strife renewed
Operation El Paso II
ARVN troops move against Buddhists
U.S. acft. attack NVN PDL installations
B-52's bomb DMZ
TFS's use Thai airbase
U.S. strength at 306,000
SVN elections held
Operation Attleboro
SecDef visits Saigon
Operation Paul Revere
Manila Conference opens
Operation Thayer II
President Johnson visits SVN
U.S. planes bomb targets in Hanoi
U.S. strength is 389,000
2-day truce
Operation Cedar Falls
Tet truce begins
Tet truce ends
NVN bombing resumes
Operation Junction City
U.S. planes hit NVN steel works
Bunker to replace Lodge
SVN adopts constitution
Johnson meets Ky at Guam
NVN rejects U.S. peace bid
Peace marches in U.S.
U.S. planes hit Halphong power plants
COMUS MACV addresses Congress
LBJ rebukes war dissenters
Marines capture Hill 881
US-ARVN forces enter DMZ
Th eu announces candidacy
Full scale Israeli-Arab war
U.S. jets attack Kep
U.S. apologizes for damage to Russian ship
Ky withdraws candidacy
VC attacks on Con Thien
SecDef visits SVN
Clifford-Taylor mission returns
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SVN elects Thieu as President
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NVA shells Con Thien
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U.S. to build anti-missile defense
DRV rejects Goldberg's peace plan
Hanoi-Moscow sign aid pact
Anti-war march on Pentagon
U.S. reveals USSR "FOBS"


U.S. KIA Per U.S. Battalion
40
30
20
10
QTRS.
I
II
III
IV
1965
1966
1967
Buddhists damonstrate
Premier Huong ousted
U.S. issues White Paper
U.S. dapendents evacuatad
U.S. air strikes on NVN
Quat named new premier
Ganaral Khanh rasigns
600 ROK's arriva in SVN
U.S. White Paper
First Marines Battalion lands at De Nang
U.S. acft. hit NVN radar sita
VC bomb U.S. Embassy
U.S. announces troop build-up
SacDef Conferenca et Honolulu
Cambodia braaks ralations with U.S.
173d Abn Bda arrivas in SVN
Two U.S. Marine Bns deployad
Armed Forces Council dissolved
VC attack Song Ba
U.S. halts NVN bombing
U.S. rasumas NVN bombing
U.S. resumas NVN air raids
U.S. strangth in VN is 50,000
Dong Xoai battla
Quat resigns
B-52's bomb SVN
Marshal Ky forms nav govarnment
1st Major U.S. ground offensiva
U.S. troops 1st major attack
Lodge raplaces Taylor
U.S. 1st Div lands in SVN
SacDef Conferenca in Saigon
NVA 101st Regiment confirmad in SVN
SecDaf arrivas in VN
First U.S. plana hit by SAM
Elamants of 101 Abn arrive in SVN
SacDaf Honolulu Conferance
Rapublican "White Paper"
Montagnards reaffirm GVN loysity
RDK troops arriva SVN
Plai Ma Battla
U.S. strength is 148,000
Pacifist suicides in U.S.
5 NVA Regiments confirmad in SVN
Ia Drang Valley Battla
35,000 pacifists march on White House
SacDaf confarance in Seigon
U.S. AF strikas major industry in NVN
Christmas caesefira
U.S. bagins 37 days suspension of air raids
Christman truce
25th Inf Div arrives in SVN
U.S. strength in SVN is 184,000
Tat truce begins
U.S. resumes NVN air strikes
Honolulu confarance
V-P Humphrey visits SVN
U.S. cites legality under SEATO
U.S. strength at 213,000
Buddhists protest Thi's ramoval
10,000 Buddhists demonstrata
Ky quells Da Nang Buddhists
B-52's bomb Mu Gia pass
VC morter Tan Son Nhut
NVN MIG's join fight
Buddhist strife renewed
Operation El Paso II
ARVN troops move against Buddhists
U.S. acft. attack NVN POL instaliations
B-52's bomb DMZ
B-52's use Thai airbese
U.S. strength at 306,000
SVN alections held
Operation Attleboro
SecDef visits Saigon
Operation Paul Revere
Manila Confarance opens
Operation Thayer II
President Johnson visits Saigon
U.S. planes bomb targets in Hanoi
U.S. strength is 389,000
2-day truce
Operation Cedar Falls
Tat truce begins
Tat truce ends
NVN bombing resumas
Operation Junction City
U.S. planes hit NVN steal works
Bunker to replaca Lodga
SVN adopts constitution
Johnson meets Ky at Guam
NVN rejects U.S. peace bid
Peace marches in U.S.
U.S. planes hit Haiphong power plants
COMUS MACV addresses Congress
LBJ rebukas war dissenters
Marinas capture Hill 881
US-ARVN forcas enter DMZ
Thieu announces candidacy
Full scale Israali-Arab war
U.S. jets attack Kep
U.S. apologizas for damage to Russian ship
Ky withdraws candidacy
VC attacks on Con Thien
Rusk visits SVN
Ford-Taylor mission returns
Congress debate Tonkin crisis
2 U.S. jets downed over China
SVN alects Thieu as President
DMZ "barrier plan" announced
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U.S. to build anti-missila dafansa
DRV rejects Goldberg's peaca plan
Hanoi-Moscow sign aid pact
Anti-war march on Pentagon
U.S. reveals USSR "FOBS"
U.S. KIA PER U.S. INFANTRY - TYP BATTALION IN SVN



U.S. KIA Per Enemy Battalion
0
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U.S. KIA PER
NVA BATTALION
QTRS.
I
II
III
IV
1965
1966
1967
Buddhiate damonstrate
Pramier Huong ousted
U.S. issues White Paper
U.S. dependents evacuated
U.S. air strikes on NVN
Quat named new premier
General Khanh resigns
600 ROK's arrive in SVN
U.S. White Paper
First Marines Battalion lands at Da Nang
U.S. acft. hit NVN radar site
VC bomb U.S. Embassy
U.S. announces troop build-up
SecDef Conference at Honolulu
Cambodia breaks relations with U.S.
173d Abn Bde arrives in SVN
Two U.S. Marine Bns deployed
Armed Forces Council dissolved
VC attack Song Be
U.S. halts NVN bombing
U.S. resumes NVN bombing
Dong Xoai battle
Quat resigns
B-52's bomb SVN
Marshal Ky forms new government
1st Major U.S. ground offenaiva
U.S. troops 1st major attack
Lodge replaces Taylor
U.S. 1st Div lands in SVN
SecDef Conference in Seigon
NVA 101st Regiment confirmed in SVN
SecDef arrives in VN
First U.S. plane hit by SAM
Elements of 101 Abn arrive in SVN
SecDef Honolulu Conferance
Republican "White Paper"
Montagnards reaffirm GVN loyalty
ROK troops arriva SVN
Plei Me Battle
U.S. strength is 148,000
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Christmas ceasefire
U.S. begins 37 days auspension of air raids
Christmas truce
25th Inf Div arrives in SVN
U.S. strength in SVN is 184,000
Tet truca begins
U.S. resumes NVN air strikes
Honolulu conferanca
V-P Humphrey visits SVN
U.S. cites legality under SEATO
U.S. strength at 215,000
Buddhists protest Thi'e ramoval
10,000 Buddhists damonstrate
Ky quells Da Nong Buddhists
B-52's bomb Mu Gia paas
VC mortar Tan Son Nhut
NVN MIG's join fight
Buddhist strife renewed
Operation El Paso II
ARVN troops move against Buddhists
U.S. acft. attack NVN POL installations
B-52's bomb DMZ
B-52's usa Thai airbase
U.S. strength at 306,000
SVN alections held
Operation Attleboro
SecDef visits Saigon
Operation Paul Revera
Manile Conferenca opens
Operation Thayar II
Preaidant Johnson visits SVN
U.S. planes bomb targets in Henoi
U.S. strength is 389,000
2-day truce
Operation Cedar Falls
Tet truca begins
Tet truce ends
NVN bombing resumes
Operation Junction City
U.S. planes hit NVN steel works
Bunker to replace Lodge
SVN adopts constitution
Johnson meets Ky at Guam
NVN rejects U.S. peace bid
Paaca merches in U.S.
U.S. planes hit Haiphong power plants
COMUS MACV addresses Congress
LBJ rebukes war diasentars
Marines capture Hill 881
US-ARVN forces enter DMZ
Thieu announces candidacy
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U.S. jets attack Kep
U.S. apologizes for damage to Russian ship
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DRV rejects Goldberg's peace plan
Henoi-Moscow sign aid pact
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

U.S. KIA Per Enemy Battalion
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
QTRS.
I
II
III
IV
1965
1966
1967
U.S. KIA PER VC/NVA BATTALION
Buddhists demonstrate
Premier Huong ousted
U.S. issues White Paper
U.S. dependents evacuated
U.S. air strikes on NVN
Quat named new premier
General Khanh resigns
600 ROK's arrive in SVN
U.S. White Paper
First Marines Battalion lands at Da Nang
U.S. acft. hit NVN radar site
VC bomb U.S. Embassy
U.S. announces troop build-up
SecDef Conference at Honolulu
Cambodia breaks relations with U.S.
173d Abn Bde arriyes in SVN
Two U.S. Marine Bns deployed
Armed Forces Council dissolved
VC attack Song Be
U.S. halts NVN bombing
U.S. resumes NVN bombing
U.S. resumes NVN air raids
U.S. strength in VN is 50,000
Dong Xoai battle
Quat resigns
B-52's bomb SVN
Marshal Ky forms new government
1st Major U.S. ground offensive
U.S. troops 1st major attack
Lodge replaces Taylor
U.S. 1st Div lands in SVN
SecDef Conference in Saigon
NVA 101st Regiment confirmed in SVN
SecDef arrives in VN
First U.S. plane hit by SAM
Elements of 101 Abn arrive in SVN
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Republican "White Paper"
Montagnards reaffirm GVN loyalty
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U.S. strength is 148,000
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Christmas ceasefire
U.S. begins 37 days suspension of air raids
Christman truce
25th Inf Div arrives in SVN
U.S. strength in SVN is 184,000
Tet truce begins
U.S. resumes NVN air strikes
Honolulu conference
V-P Humphrey visits SVN
U.S. cites legality under SEATO
U.S. strength at 213,000
Buddhists protest Thi's removal
10,000 Buddhists demonstrate
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B-52's bomb Mu Gia pass
VC mortar Tan Son Nhut
NVN MIG's join fight
Buddhist strife renewed
Operation El Paso II
ARVN troops move against Buddhists
U.S. acft. attack NVN POL installations
B-52's bomb DMZ
B-52's use Thai airbase
U.S. strength at 306,000
SVN elections held
Operation Attleboro
SecDef visits Saigon
Operation Paul Revere
Manila Conference opens
Operation Thayer II
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Operation Cedar Falls
Tet truce begins
Tet truce ends
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Operation Junction City
U.S. planes hit NVN steel works
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

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35,000 pecifists merch on White House
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Christmas ceesefire
U.S. begins 37 days suspension of air reids
Christman truce
25th Inf Div arrives in SVN
U.S. strength in SVN is 184,000
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BUILD-UP OF VIET CONG GUERRILLA FORCES
Manpower Strength
(000)
240
180
120
60
0
QTRS.
I
II
III
IV
1965
1966
1967


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

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SecDef Conference at Honolulu
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Armed Forces Council dissolved
VC attack Song Be
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U.S. resumes NVN bombing
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U.S. strength in VN is 50,000
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

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(000)
240
180
120
60
0
Manpower Strength
QTRS.
I
II
III
IV
I
II
III
IV
I
II
III
IV
1965
1966
1967



TOTAL U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL IN SVN
Manpower Strength
(000)
500
400
300
200
100
0
QTRS. I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV
1965
1966
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VIET CONG INITIATED INCIDENTS
Number of Incidents
12,000
11,000
10,000
9,000
8,000
7,000
6,000
5,000
QTRS.
I
II
III
IV
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Number of Sorties
35,000
30,000
25,000
20,000
15,000
10,000
5,000
0
QTRS.
I
II
III
IV
1965
1966
1967


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Number of Sorties
50,000
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DRV rejects Goldberg's peace plan
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Anti-war march on Pentagon
U.S. reveals USSR "FOBS"


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JUSTIFICATION OF THE WAR -

PUBLIC STATEMENTS

A. Truman Administration
B. Eisenhower Administration
C. Kennedy Administration

PART V.

JUSTIFICATION OF THE WAR -- PUBLIC STATEMENTS

Foreword

This portion of the study consists of an examination of the public statements justifying U.S. involvement in Vietnam. Only official statements contained in either the U.S. Department of State Bulletins or the Public Papers of the Presidents were reviewed. Although conclusions are based primarily on the statements of the President, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense, the statements of other high-ranking government officials were also studied in ascertaining the policy context of the quoted material. This report includes analyses of the Truman, Eisenhower and Kennedy periods. The statements are organized chronologically within each Administration, and are summarized at the head of each section.

A. Truman Administration

B. Eisenhower Administration

C. Kennedy Administration

TRUMAN ADMINISTRATION

SUMMARY

The statements enclosed are from the period 1950 - 1952: from the Secretary of State's announcement marking the beginning of the U.S. involvement in Vietnam to the NATO resolution supporting the French fight in Indochina. The justifications advanced for the U.S. commitment in Indochina include the following:

a. The Soviets are engaged in a "monstrous conspiracy to stamp out freedom all over the world," and Soviet imperialism, with Communist China as its instrument, poses a direct threat to the independence of the Associated States of Indochina.

b. The defense of Indochina is an integral part of the worldwide resistance by free nations to communist aggression and subversion.

c. The raw materials and agricultural products of Southeast Asia are "vitally needed" by the free nations of the world.

d. The United States, in the interest of preventing a third world war, has provided aid to the Associated States and France.

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5.	Communique acknowledging the primary role of U.S. in Korea and its secondary role of assisting French in Indochina in combatting Communist imperialism (18 June 1952).....	A-5
6.	Resolution adopted by North Atlantic Council of NATO support for French role in Indochina and its importance to Atlantic Community (17 December 1952).....	A-5

V. JUSTIFICATION OF THE WAR -- PUBLIC

A. Truman Administration

1. Secretary of State Statement on Extension of Military and Economic Aid, May 8, 1950, Department of State Bulletin, May 22, 1950, p. 821:

* * *

"The United States Government, convinced that neither national independence nor democratic evolution exist in any area dominated by Soviet imperialism, considers the situation to be such as to warrant its according economic aid and military equipment to the Associated States of Indochina and to France in order to assist them in restoring stability and permitting these states to pursue their peaceful and democratic development."

2. President's Radio Report to the American People on Korea and on U.S. Policy in the Far East, April 11, 1951, Public Papers of the Presidents, p. 223.

"I want to talk to you plainly tonight about what we are doing in Korea and about our policy in the Far East.

"In the simplest terms, what we are doing in Korea is this: We are trying to prevent a third world war.

* * *

"The Communists in the Kremlin are engaged in a monstrous conspiracy to stamp out freedom all over the world. If they were to succeed, the United States would be numbered among their principal victims. It must be clear to everyone that the United States cannot -- and will not -- sit idly by and await foreign conquest. The only question is: What is the best time to meet the threat and how is the best way to meet it?

"The best time to meet the threat is in the beginning. It is easier to put out a fire in the beginning when it is small than after it has become a roaring blaze. And the best way to meet the threat of aggression is for the peace-loving nations to act together. If they don't act together, they are likely to be picked off, one by one.

"If they had followed the right policies in the 1930's -- if the free countries had acted together to crush the aggression of the dictators, and if they had acted in the beginning when the aggression was small -- there probably would have been no World War II.

"If history has taught us anything, it is that aggression anywhere in the world is a threat to the peace everywhere in the world. When that aggression is supported by the cruel and selfish rulers of a powerful nation who are bent on conquest, it becomes a clear and present danger to the security and independence of every free nation.

* * *

"I have another secret intelligence report here. This one tells what another Communist officer in the Far East told his men several months before the invasion of Korea. Here is what he said: 'In order to successfully undertake the long-awaited world resolution, we must first unify Asia...Java, Indochina, Malaya, India, Tibet, Thailand, Philippines, and Japan are our ultimate targets....The United States is the only obstacle on our road for the liberation of all the countries in southeast Asia. In other words, we must unify the people of Asia and crush the United States.'

* * *

"The dangers are great. Make no mistake about it. Behind the North Koreans and Chinese Communists in the front lines stand additional millions of Chinese soldiers. And behind the Chinese stand the tanks, the planes, the submarines, the soldiers, and the scheming rulers of the Soviet Union."

* * *

3. President Truman's Special Message to Congress on Mutual Security Program, May 24, 1951, Public Papers of the Presidents, p. 309:

* * *

"In Asia, in a vast area stretching from Afghanistan to Korea, free countries are struggling to meet communist aggression in all its many forms. Some of these countries are battling the communist armies of Soviet satellites; some are engaged in bitter civil strife against communist-led guerrillas; all of them face the immediate danger of communist subversion.

"Soviet intentions with regard to these countries are unmistakably clear. Using the weapons of subversion, false propaganda and civil war, the Kremlin has already reduced China to the status of a satellite. The Soviet rulers have turned their satellite armies loose on the Republic of Korea. Communist rebellion is raging in Indochina. In Burma, the Philippines, and other places, communist-inspired groups are stirring up internal disorder. In all countries, they are trying to exploit deep-seated economic difficulties -- poverty, illiteracy and disease.

"This campaign threatens to absorb the manpower and the vital resources of the East into the Soviet design of world conquest. It threatens to deprive the free nations of some of their most vitally needed raw materials. It threatens to turn more of the peaceful millions of the East into armies to be used as pawns at the disposal of the Kremlin.

"Aside from immediate considerations of security, the continued independence of these nations is vital to the future of the free world. Many of these nations are new to self government. They have dedicated themselves to the ideals of national independence, of human liberty, and social progress. Their hundreds of millions of citizens are eager for justice and liberty and a stake in the future.

"These countries demonstrate the power and vitality of the ideals of our own American Revolution; they mark the sweeping advance across the world of the concepts of freedom and brotherhood. To lose these countries to the rulers of the Kremlin would be more than a blow to our military security and our economic life. It would be a terrible defeat for the ideals of freedom -- with grave spiritual consequences for men everywhere who share our faith in freedom.

"All these considerations make it essential for the United States to help the free countries of Asia in their struggle to make good their independence and bring economic and social progress to their people. Where the governments of these countries are striving to establish free and stable political institutions, to build up their military defenses, and to raise the standard of living above the level of bare subsistence, we can and should give them assistance. We cannot replace their own strong efforts, but we can supplement them.

"This Mutual Security Program is intended to do that. On the military side, it will supply certain of the Asian countries with items of military equipment and the training they need for their defense forces. On the economic side, it will provide a number of the Asian countries with the most urgently needed commodities, machinery, and tools, and with technical advice in such fields as agriculture, industry, health, and governmental administration.

"The assistance I am recommending for Asian countries, 555 million dollars in military aid and 375 million dollars in economic aid, is so planned as to meet the most pressing needs in the various countries, and is intended to provide the crucial margin of resources which will enable them to move forward.

"Military assistance under this program will go to the Chinese armies on Formosa, to help keep that island out of the hands of Communist China. It will go to Indo-China, where over 100,000 French troops are fighting side-by-side with the forces of Viet Nam, Laos, and Cambodia against communist-led forces. It will go to the Philippines and to Thailand, to help build forces strong enough to insure internal security and discourage outside attack. Some of these military assistance funds will also be available for allocation to other countries in the area if a critical need arises.

"The military aid under this program will supplement other military efforts against communism in Asia. The countries we will be aiding, and a number of others, are supporting military forces with their own funds. France is supplying the largest part of the military supplies needed in Indo-China, and Britain is supplying her forces which are fighting guerrillas in the Malay States. The substantial military aid we are giving to the forces of the Republic of Korea is included in the budget for our military services.

"The struggle for security and peace in Asia is far more than a military matter. In many of the Asian countries, including all the countries which need military aid, economic assistance is also required.

* * *

4. The Military Aid Program: Statement by the Departments of State and Defense, September 23, 1951, Department of State Bulletin, October 8, 1951, p. 570:

* * *

"The participants were in complete agreement that the successful defense of Indochina is of great importance to the defense of all Southeast Asia...."

* * *

5. The Defense of Indochina: Communique Regarding Discussions Between Representatives of the United States, France, Viet-Nam, and Cambodia, June 18, 1952, Department of State Bulletin, June 30, 1952, p. 1010:

"The principle which governed this frank and detailed exchange of views and information was the common recognition that the struggle in which the forces of the French Union and the Associated States are engaged against the forces of communist aggression in Indochina is an integral part of the world-wide resistance by the Free Nations to Communist attempts at conquest and subversion...."

* * *

6. Support by NATO of the French Union Defense Efforts in Indochina: Resolution Adopted by the North Atlantic Council, December 17, 1952, Department of State Bulletin, January 5, 1953, p. 4:

"The North Atlantic Council

"Recognizes that resistance to direct or indirect aggression in any part of the world is an essential contribution to the common security of the free world;

"HAVING BEEN INFORMED at its meeting in Paris on the 16th December of the latest developments in the military and political situation in Indo-China;

"Expresses its wholehearted admiration for the valiant and long continued struggle by the French forces and the armies of the Associated States against Communist aggression; and

"Acknowledges that the resistance of the free nations in South East Asia as in Korea is in fullest harmony with the aims and ideals of the Atlantic Community;

"And therefore agrees that the campaign waged by the French Union forces in Indo-China deserves continuing support from the NATO governments."

EISENHOWER ADMINISTRATION

SUMMARY -

President Eisenhower took office in the context of negotiations for a settlement in Korea and the portending defeat in France in Indochina. His Administration early faced the crisis surrounding the Geneva Conference of 1954, in which direct U.S. intervention in Vietnam was a distinct prospect. Having pressed diplomatically for a constructive outcome at Geneva, the United States threw its support behind Ngo Dinh Diem and the Government of Vietnam. With U.S. support, that government, despite a series of severe tests, succeeded in consolidating itself and making significant progress. U.S. justification for its policy toward Vietnam in this period included the following:

a. The "domino principle": the loss of Vietnam, the most vulnerable state of Southeast Asia, would imperil the other nations of the region, and ultimately lead to a seriously weakened U.S. strategic position. Vietnam was a key to continued free world access to the human and material resources of Southeast Asia.

b. Communist China was pursuing an expansionist foreign policy relying upon subversive aggression, as well as armaments. China thus continued to reflect the unchanging Soviet objective of conquest of the world, and both had manifest designs on Southeast Asia.

c. The United States proposed, through its aid programs, to help the small and weak nations contiguous with communist powers to maintain their freedom and independence lest aggression and expansion be encouraged, and the world moved thereby toward a third world war.

d. In the words of President Eisenhower, "We gave military and economic assistance to the Republic of Vietnam. We entered into a treaty -- the Southeast Asia Security Treaty -- which plainly warned that an armed attack against this area would endanger our own peace and safety and that we would act accordingly."

e. U.S. aid for Vietnam -- economic and military -- has made possible not only its survival, but also genuine progress toward a stable society, a modern economy, and internal and external security.

V. B. JUSTIFICATION OF THE WAR -- PUBLIC STATEMENTS

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4.	Secretary of State presents a most revealing assessment of administration's thinking on Indochina and the threat of Red China. He cites expansion of communist domination, the increased dangers to other nearby countries, the loss of food supply to Japan and India, the strategic location of Indochina and the military bases as paramount concerns (29 March 1954).....	B-6
5.	Alfred le Sesne Jenkins (Officer in Charge, Chinese Political Affairs) discusses Chinese Communist regime and its relationship to Soviet Union (2 April 1954).....	B-9
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10. Dulles summarizes U.S. position on Indochina in light of Geneva: communization of the civil war; U.S. intervention; French armistice; collective security; possibility of U.S. intervention (7 May 1954)..... B-15

11. Eisenhower assesses progress at the Geneva Conference; cites plans for collective security arrangement in Southeast Asia (5 May 1954)..... B-16

12. Eisenhower reaffirms his "domino" concerns in response to press questioning (12 May 1954)..... B-18

13. Secretary of State Dulles analyzes developments to date in Indochina; he discusses the conditions under which U.S. would intervene directly (11 June 1954)..... B-18

14. Eisenhower states U.S. position on Geneva Accords (21 July 1954)..... B-20

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16. U.S.-French communique announcing desire to aid directly the newly independent states of Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam (29 September 1954)..... B-25

17. Eisenhower informs President of Vietnam's Council that aid will be conditioned on his government's giving the U.S. "assurance as to standard of performance" (23 October 1954)..... B-26

18. Eisenhower notes but questions the moderation in Soviet policy; refers to Diem's successes in South Vietnam (21 April 1956)..... B-27

19. Assistant Secretary of State Robertson restates American policy in Vietnam at a time of relative stability (1 June 1956).. B-28

20. Eisenhower emphasizes role of aid program in achieving Asian goals; cites susceptibility of underdeveloped nations to communist probings (21 May 1957)..... B-32

21. Eisenhower justifies foreign aid to American people as necessary for U.S. security; cites its "returns" in Vietnam (21 May 1957)..... B-33

22. Eisenhower reports to the nation on the Red Chinese shelling of Quemoy; relates U.S. security interests to Formosa; cites lesson of Munich and the militant statements of Chinese Communists as requiring a firm U.S. stand (11 September 1958)..... B-35

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23. Eisenhower attempts at news conference to put communist aggression in perspective (1 October 1958)..... B-42

24. Eisenhower in special message to Congress discusses communist threat to developing nations and need for U.S. aid to maintain collective defense (13 March 1959)..... B-43

25. Eisenhower discusses importance of Vietnam to free world; he shows specifically how its economy compliments Japan's (4 April 1959)..... B-46

26. Eisenhower stresses threat posed by economic and military power of China and Russia in defense of foreign aid (16 February 1960)..... B-51

27. Eisenhower reminds Diem of the responsibility that the Vietnamese people have in safeguarding their independence (22 October 1960)..... B-52

B. Eisenhower Administration

1. President Eisenhower's Remarks at Governors' Conference, August 4, 1953, Public Papers of the Presidents, 1953, p. 540:

* * *

"I could go on enumerating every kind of problem that comes before us daily. Let us take, though, for example, one simple problem in the foreign field. You have seen the war in Indochina described variously as an outgrowth of French colonialism and its French refusal to treat indigenous populations decently. You find it again described as a war between the communists and the other elements in southeast Asia. But you have a confused idea of where it is located -- Laos, or Cambodia, or Siam, or any of the other countries that are involved. You don't know, really, why we are so concerned with the far-off southeast corner of Asia.

"Why is it? Now, first of all, the last great population remaining in Asia that has not become dominated by the Kremlin, of course, is the sub-continent of India, including the Pakistan government. Here are 350 million people still free. Now let us assume that we lose Indochina. If Indochina goes, several things happen right away. The Malayan peninsula, the last little bit of the end hanging on down there, would be scarcely defensible -- and tin and tungsten that we so greatly value from that area would cease coming. But all India would be outflanked. Burma would certainly, in its weakened condition, be no defense. Now, India is surrounded on that side by the Communist empire. Iran on its left is in a weakened condition. I believe I read in the paper this morning that Mossadegh's move toward getting rid of his parliament has been supported and of course he was in that move supported by the Tudeh, which is the Communist Party of Iran. All of that weakening position around there is very ominous for the United States, because finally if we lost all that, how would the free world hold the rich empire of Indonesia? So you see, somewhere along the line, this must be blocked. It must be blocked now. That is what the French are doing.

"So, when the United States votes $400 million to help that war, we are not voting for a giveaway program. We are voting for the cheapest way that we can to prevent the occurrence of something that would be of the most terrible significance for the United States of America -- our security, our power and ability to get certain things we need from the riches of the Indonesian territory, and from southeast Asia."

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2. Joint Franco-American Communique, Additional United States Aid for France and Indochina, September 30, 1953, Department of State Bulletin, October 12, 1953, p. 486:

"The forces of France and the Associated States in Indochina have for 8 years been engaged in a bitter struggle to prevent the engulfment of Southeast Asia by the forces of international communism. The heroic efforts and sacrifices of these French Union allies in assuring the liberty of the new and independent states of Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam has earned the admiration and support of the free world. In recognition of the French Union effort the United States Government has in the past furnished aid of various kinds to the Governments of France and the Associated States to assist in bringing the long struggle to an early and victorious conclusion.

"The French Government is firmly resolved to carry out in full its declaration of July 3, 1953, by which is announced its intention of perfecting the independence of the three Associated States in Indochina, through negotiations with the Associated States.

"The Governments of France and the United States have now agreed that, in support of plans of the French Government for the intensified prosecution of the war against the Viet Minh, the United States will make available to the French Government prior to December 31, 1954 additional financial resources not to exceed $385 million. This aid is in addition to funds already earmarked by the United States for aid to France and the Associated States.

"The French Government is determined to make every effort to break up and destroy the regular enemy forces in Indochina. Toward this end the government intends to carry through, in close cooperation with the Cambodian, Laotian, and Vietnamese Governments, the plans for increasing the Associated States forces while increasing temporarily French forces to levels considered necessary to assure the success of existing military plans. The additional United States aid is designed to help make it possible to achieve these objectives with maximum speed and effectiveness.

"The increased French effort in Indochina will not entail any basic or permanent alteration of the French Government's plans and programs for its NATO forces."

3. President Eisenhower's News Conference, February 10, 1954, Public Papers of the Presidents, 1954, p. 253:

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"Q. Daniel Shorr, CBS Radio: Mr. President, should your remarks on Indochina be construed as meaning that you are determined not to become involved or, perhaps, more deeply involved in the war in Indochina, regardless of how that war may go?

"THE PRESIDENT. Well, I am not going to try to predict the drift of world events now and the course of world events over the next months. I say that I cannot conceive of a greater tragedy for America than to get heavily involved now in an all-out war in any of those regions, particularly with large units.

"So what we are doing is supporting the Vietnamese and the French in their conduct of that war; because, as we see it, it is a case of independent and free nations operating against the encroachment of communism."

4. Address by Secretary Dulles before the Overseas Press Club of America at New York City on March 29, 1954, The Threat of a Red Asia. Department of State Bulletin, April 12, 1954, p. 539:

"This provides a timely occasion for outlining the administration's thinking about two related matters -- Indochina and the Chinese Communist regime.

"Indochina is important for many reasons. First, and always first, are the human values. About 30 million people are seeking for themselves the dignity of self-government. Until a few years ago, they formed merely a French dependency. Now, their three political units -- Viet-Nam, Laos, and Cambodia -- are exercising a considerable measure of independent political authority within the French Union. Each of the three is now recognized by the United States and by more than 30 other nations. They signed the Japanese peace treaty with us. Their independence is not yet complete. But the French Government last July declared its intention to complete that independence, and negotiations to consummate that pledge are actively under way.

"The United States is watching this development with close attention and great sympathy. We do not forget that we were a colony that won its freedom. We have sponsored in the Philippines a conspicuously successful development of political independence. We feel a sense of kinship with those everywhere who yearn for freedom.

"The Communists are attempting to prevent the orderly development of independence and to confuse the issue before the world. The Communists have, in these matters, a regular line which Stalin laid down in 1924.

"The scheme is to whip up the spirit of nationalism so that it becomes violent. That is done by professional agitators. Then the violence is enlarged by Communist military and technical leadership and the provision of military supplies. In these ways, international communism gets a stranglehold on the people and it uses that power to 'amalgamate' the peoples into the Soviet orbit.

"'Amalgamation' is Lenin's and Stalin's word to describe their process.

"'Amalgamation' is now being attempted in Indochina under the ostensible leadership of Ho Chi Minh. He was indoctrinated in Moscow. He became an associate of the Russian, Borodin, when the latter was organizing the Chinese Communist Party which was to bring China into the Soviet orbit. Then Ho transferred his activities to Indochina.

"Those fighting under the banner of Ho Chi Minh have largely been trained and equipped in Communist China. They are supplied with artillery and ammunition through the Soviet-Chinese Communist bloc. Captured materiel shows that much of it was fabricated by the Skoda Munition Works in Czechoslovakia and transported across Russia and Siberia and then sent through China into Viet-Nam. Military supplies for the Communist armies have been pouring into Viet-Nam at a steadily increasing rate.

"Military and technical guidance is supplied by an estimated 2,000 Communist Chinese. They function with the forces of Ho Chi Minh in key positions -- in staff sections of the High Command, at the division level, and in specialized units such as signal, engineer, artillery, and transportation.

"In the present stage, the Communists in Indochina use nationalistic anti-French slogans to win local support. But if they achieved military or political success, it is certain that they would subject the people to a cruel Communist dictatorship taking its orders from Peiping and Moscow.

"The tragedy would not stop there. If the Communist forces won uncontested control over Indochina or any substantial part thereof, they would surely resume the same pattern of aggression against other free peoples in the area.

"The propagandists of Red China and Russia make it apparent that the purpose is to dominate all of Southeast Asia.

"Southeast Asia is the so-called 'rice bowl' which helps to feed the densely populated region that extends from India to Japan. It is rich in many raw materials, such as tin, oil, rubber, and iron ore. It offers industrial Japan potentially important markets and sources of raw materials.

"The area has great strategic value. Southeast Asia is astride the most direct and best-developed sea and air routes between the Pacific and South Asia. It has major naval and air bases. Communist control of Southeast Asia would carry a grave threat to the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand, with whom we have treaties of mutual assistance. The entire Western Pacific area, including the so-called 'offshore island chain,' would be strategically endangered.

"President Eisenhower appraised the situation last Wednesday (March 24) when he said that the area is of 'transcendent importance.'

"The United States has shown in many ways its sympathy for the gallant struggle being waged in Indochina by French forces and those of the Associated States. Congress has enabled us to provide material aid to the established governments and their peoples. Also, our diplomacy has sought to deter Communist China from open aggression in that area.

"President Eisenhower, in his address of April 16, 1953, explained that a Korean armistice would be a fraud if it merely released aggressive armies for attack elsewhere. I said last September that if Red China sent its own army into Indochina, that would result in grave consequences which might not be confined to Indochina.

"Recent statements have been designed to impress upon potential aggressors that aggression might lead to action at places and by means of free-world choosing, so that aggression would cost more than it could gain.

"The Chinese Communists have, in fact, avoided the direct use of their own Red armies in open aggression against Indochina. They have, however, largely stepped up their support of the aggression in that area. Indeed, they promote that aggression by all means short of open invasion.

"Under all the circumstances it seems desirable to clarify further the United States position.

"Under the conditions of today, the imposition on Southeast Asia of the political system of Communist Russia and its Chinese Communist ally, by whatever means, would be a grave threat to the whole free community. The United States feels that that possibility should not be passively accepted but should be met by united action. This might involve serious risks. But these risks are far less than those that will face us a few years from now if we dare not be resolute today.

"The free nations want peace. However, peace is not had merely by wanting it. Peace has to be worked for and planned for. Sometimes it is necessary to take risks to win peace just as it is necessary in war to take risks to win victory. The chances for peace are usually bettered by letting a potential aggressor know in advance where his aggression could lead him.

"I hope that these statements which I make here tonight will serve the cause of peace.

"Let me now discuss our political relations with Red China, taking first the matter of recognition.

"The United States does not recognize the Chinese Communist regime. That is well known. But the reasons seem not so well known. Some think that there are no reasons and that we are actuated purely by emotion. Your Government believes that its position is soberly rational.

"Let me first recall that diplomatic recognition is a voluntary act. One country has no right to demand recognition by another. Generally, it is useful that there should be diplomatic intercourse between those who exercise de facto governmental authority, and it is well established that recognition does not imply moral approval.

"President Monroe, in his famous message to Congress, denounced the expansionist and despotic system of Czarist Russia and its allies. But he said that it would nevertheless be our policy 'to consider the government de facto as the legitimate government for us.' That has indeed been the general United States policy, and I believe that it is a sound general policy. However, where it does not serve our interests, we are free to vary from it.

"In relation to Communist China, we are forced to take account of the fact that the Chinese Communist regime has been consistently and viciously hostile to the United States.

"A typical Chinese Communist pamphlet reads: 'We Must Hate America, because She is the Chinese People's Implacable Enemy.' 'We Must Despise America because it is a Corrupt Imperialist Nation, the World Center of Reaction and Decadency.' 'We Must Look down upon America because She is a Paper Tiger and Entirely Vulnerable to Defeat.'

"By print, by radio, by drama, by pictures, with all the propaganda skills which communism has devised, such themes are propagated by the Red rulers. They vent their hatred by barbarous acts, such as seizures and imprisonments of Americans.

"Those responsible for United States policy must ask and answer 'Will it help our country if, by recognition, we give increased prestige and influence to a regime that actively attacks our vital interests?' I can find only the answer: 'No.'"

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5. Address by Alfred le Sesne Jenkins, Officer in Charge, Chinese Political Affairs, before the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Philadelphia, Pa., Present United States Policy Toward China, April 2, 1954, Department of State Bulletin, April 26, 1954, p. 624:

"In recent years we have often heard it said that more heat than light has been cast on the China question. I am not surprised at the heat, nor do I object to it, provided there is also sufficient light. The fate of one-fourth of the world's population is not a matter which can be taken lightly, and the addition of China's vast material and manpower resources to the Soviet bloc is a matter involving not only the security interests of the United States but those of the entire free world. I do not see how one can help feeling strongly about these matters. We need not apologize that our thinking about China is charged with feeling. National policies are an expression of national interests concerning which there is naturally much feeling, and our policies are an expression both of what we are and of what we want. We are a nation of free peoples. We want to remain free to pursue in peace our proper national destiny, and we want the same freedom and rights for others.

"We do not believe that the Chinese Communist regime represents the will of the people it controls. First capitalizing on the natural desire of the Chinese people to enjoy full recognition and respect for their importance in the world community, the regime then proceeded by its 'lean-to-one-side' policy to betray the powerful Chinese longings to stand up straight. It has followed slavishly the leadership of the Soviet Union and attempted to emulate it in all its ways. With the aid of thousands of Soviet advisers it has set about methodically to change the entire fabric of traditional Chinese culture, substituting communism's materialistic, atheistic doctrines wherein the state is the be-all and end-all and the individual its pawn.

"The regime at first attracted considerable support, principally through its sponsorship of a land redistribution program, but is now, after establishment of the prerequisite police-state controls, taking the land away from the owners in the same collectivization process which is familiar in other Communist countries and which invariably has brought suffering in its wake. China's much advertised 'New Democracy' is of course in reality 'old communism.'

"From its inception the regime has proclaimed a 'lean-to-one-side' policy in foreign affairs, and has left no doubt about its dedication to the proposition of world Communist revolution under the leadership of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. While its 'leaning-to-one-side' has not brought it to the position of complete 'prostration-to-one-side' characteristic of the Eastern European Soviet satellites, there is not the slightest evidence that this indicates any separatist tendencies. The difference in status of Peiping in its relationship with Moscow (as distinguished from that of the Eastern European satellites) is rather due chiefly to its having come to power without benefit, except in Manchuria, of Soviet Army occupation; to the prestige of Mao Tse-tung, arising from his long history of leadership of Chinese communism and his literary contributions to theoretical communism; to China's assumption of the role of leadership...."

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6. President Eisenhower's News Conference, April 7, 1954, Public Papers of the Presidents, 1954, p. 382:

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"Q. Robert Richards, Copley Press: Mr. President, would you mind commenting on the strategic importance of Indochina to the free world? I think there has been, across the country, some lack of understanding on just what it means to us.

"THE PRESIDENT. You have, of course, both the specific and the general when you talk about such things.

"First of all, you have the specific value of a locality in its production of materials that the world needs.

"Then you have the possibility that many human beings pass under a dictatorship that is inimical to the free world.

"Finally, you have broader considerations that might follow what you would call the 'falling domino' principle. You have a row of dominoes set up, you knock over the first one, and what will happen to the last one is the certainty that it will go over very quickly. So you could have a beginning of a disintegration that would have the most profound influences.

"Now, with respect to the first one, two of the items from this particular area that the world uses are tin and tungsten. They are very important. There are others, of course, the rubber plantations and so on.

"Then with respect to more people passing under this domination, Asia, after all, has already lost some 450 million of its peoples to the Communist dictatorship, and we simply can't afford greater losses.

"But when we come to the possible sequence of events, the loss of Indochina, of Burma, of Thailand, of the Peninsula, and Indonesia following, now you begin to talk about areas that not only multiply the disadvantages that you would suffer through loss of materials, sources of materials, but now you are talking really about millions and millions and millions of people.

"Finally, the geographical position achieved thereby does many things. It turns the so-called island defensive chain of Japan, Formosa, of the Philippines and to the southward; it moves in to threaten Australia and New Zealand.

"It takes away, in its economic aspects, that region that Japan must have as a trading area or Japan, in turn, will have only one place in the world to go -- that is, toward the Communist areas in order to live.

"So, the possible consequences of the loss are just incalculable to the free world."

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"Q. Robert G. Spivack, New York Post: Mr. President, do you agree with Senator Kennedy that independence must be guaranteed the people of Indochina in order to justify an all-out effort there?

"THE PRESIDENT. Well, I don't know, of course, exactly in what way a Senator was talking about this thing.

"I will say this: for many years, in talking to different countries, different governments, I have tried to insist on this principle: no outside country can come in and be really helpful unless it is doing something that the local people want.

"Now, let me call your attention to this independence theory. Senator Lodge, on my instructions, stood up in the United Nations and offered one country independence if they would just simply pass a resolution saying they wanted it, or at least said, 'I would work for it.' They didn't accept it. So I can't say that the associated states want independence in the sense that the United States is independent. I do not know what they want.

"I do say this: the aspirations of those people must be met, otherwise there is in the long run no final answer to the problem.

"Q. Joseph Dear, Capital Times: Do you favor bringing this Indochina situation before the United Nations?

"THE PRESIDENT. I really can't say. I wouldn't want to comment at too great a length at this moment, but I do believe this: this is the kind of thing that must not be handled by one nation trying to act alone."

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7. Remarks Made by Under Secretary Smith in Answer to Questions Prepared for Use on "The American Week" over the CBS Television Network, April 11, 1954, on the Importance of Indochina, Department of State Bulletin, April 19, 1954, p. 589:

"Q. Why is Indochina important to Americans?

"MR. SMITH: For one vital basic and two special additional reasons. In the first place, the vital basic question is: Shall we or can the free world allow its position anywhere and particularly in Asia to be eroded piece by piece? Can we allow, dare we permit, expansion of Communist Chinese control further into Asia? Propagandists of the Soviet Union and of Communist China have made it clear that their purpose is to dominate all of Southeast Asia. Remember that this region helps to feed an immense population. It stretches all the way from India to Japan. It's a region that is rich in raw materials, full of tin, oil, rubber, iron ore.

"Now, from the strategic point of view, it lies across the most direct sea and air route between the Pacific and South Asia. There are major naval and air bases located in the area. Communist control of Southeast Asia would threaten the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand directly, would threaten Malaya; it would have a very profound effect upon the economy of other countries in the area, even as far as Japan.

"Q. The President, at his news conference on April 7, described the process of Communist conquest as the 'falling domino' principle. Is that a good description of the threat in Southeast Asia?

"MR. SMITH: Yes, it is. If Indochina is lost to the Communists, Burma is threatened, Thailand is threatened, the Malay Peninsula is exposed, Indonesia is subject to the gravest danger, and, in addition to these countries and their possible loss, there is the possible loss of food source. I have already mentioned the strategic raw materials, the bases in the area; and, while they are of enormous importance, the most important thing of all is the possible loss of millions and millions of people who would disappear behind the Iron Curtain. There are enough millions behind the Iron Curtain now. So what's at stake in Indochina? It is the human freedom of the masses of people for all that enormous area of the world."

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8. Statement by Secretary Dulles Made at Augusta, Georgia, April 19, 1954, on Conversations in London and Paris Concerning Indochina, Department of State Bulletin, May 3, 1954, p. 668:

"I have reported to President Eisenhower on my recent trip to London and Paris, where I discussed the position in Indochina.

"I found in both Capitals recognition that the armed Communist threat endangered vital free world interest and made it appropriate that the free nations most immediately concerned should explore the possibility of establishing a collective defense. This same recognition had already been expressed by other nations of the Southeast Asian area.

"The Communists in Viet-Nam, spurred on by Red China, have acted on the assumption that a quick, easy victory at Dien-Bien-Phu would open the door to a rapid Communist advance to domination of the entire Southeast Asian area. They concluded they were justified in recklessly squandering the lives of their subjects to conquer this stronghold so as to confront the Geneva Conference with what could be portrayed as both a military and political victory for communism.

"The gallant defenders of Dien-Bien-Phu have done their part to assure a frustration of the Communist strategy. They have taken a toll such that, from a military standpoint, the attackers already lost more than they could win. From a political standpoint, the defenders of Dien-Bien-Phu have dramatized the struggle for freedom so that the free world sees more clearly than ever before the issues that are at stake and once again is drawing closer together in unity of purpose.

"The Communist rulers are learning again that the will of the free is not broken by violence or intimidation.

"The brutal Soviet conquest of Czechoslovakia did not disintegrate the will of the West. It led to the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty alliance.

"The violent conquest of the China mainland followed by the Korean aggression did not paralyze the will of the free nations. It led to a

series of Pacific mutual security pacts and to the creation under the North Atlantic Treaty of a powerful defensive force-in-being.

"The violent battles now being waged in Viet-Nam and the armed aggressions against Laos and Cambodia are not creating any spirit of defeatism. On the contrary, they are rousing the free nations to measures which we hope will be sufficiently timely and vigorous to preserve these vital areas from Communist domination.

"In this course lies the best hope of achieving at Geneva the restoration of peace with freedom and justice."

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9. Statement by Jameson Parker, Department Press Officer, Made to Correspondents April 17, 1954, on U.S. Policy Toward Indochina, Department of State Bulletin, April 26, 1954, p. 623:

"Certain remarks with regard to United States policy toward Indochina have been attributed to a high Government official [Vice President Nixon]. The contents of the speech referred to and questions and answers which followed were off the record, but a complete report of the speech has been made available to the State Department.

"The speech enunciated no new United States policy with regard to Indochina. It expressed full agreement with and support for the policy with respect to Indochina previously enunciated by the President and the Secretary of State.

"That policy was authoritatively set forth by the Secretary of State in his speech of March 29, 1954, in which he said:

'Under the conditions of today, the imposition on Southeast Asia of the political system of Communist Russia and its Chinese Communist ally, by whatever means, would be a grave threat to the whole free community. The United States feels that that possibility should not be passively accepted but should be met by united action. This might involve serious risks. But these risks are far less than those that will face us a few years from now if we dare not be resolute today.'

"In regard to a hypothetical question as to whether United States forces should be sent to Indochina in the event of French withdrawal, the high Government official categorically rejected the premise of possible French withdrawal. Insofar as the use of United States forces in Indochina was concerned, he was stating a course of possible action which he was personally prepared to support under a highly unlikely hypothesis.

"The answer to the question correctly emphasized the fact that the interests of the United States and other free nations are vitally

involved with the interests of France and the Associated States in resisting Communist domination of Indochina."

10. Address by Secretary Dulles Delivered to the Nation over Radio and Television, May 7, 1954, The Issues at Geneva, Department of State Bulletin, May 17, 1954, p. 740 and p. 744:

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"Let me turn now to the problem of Southeast Asia. In that great peninsula and the islands to the south live nearly 200 million people in 7 states -- Burma; the three states of Indochina -- Laos, Cambodia, and Viet-Nam; Thailand; Malaya; and Indonesia. Communist conquest of this area would seriously imperil the free world position in the Western Pacific. It would, among other things, endanger the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand, with all of which the United States has mutual-security treaties. It would deprive Japan of important foreign markets and sources of food and raw materials.

"In Viet-Nam, one of the three Indochinese states, war has been going on since 1946. When it began, Indochina was a French colony just liberated from Japanese occupation. The war started primarily as a war for independence. What started as a civil war has now been taken over by international communism for its own purposes. Ho Chi Minh, the Communist leader in Viet-Nam, was trained in Moscow and got his first revolutionary experience in China."

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"In Indochina, the situation is far more complex. The present conditions there do not provide a suitable basis for the United States to participate with its armed forces.

"The situation may perhaps be clarified as a result of the Geneva Conference. The French have stated their desire for an armistice on honorable terms and under proper safeguards. If they can conclude a settlement on terms which do not endanger the freedom of the peoples of Viet-Nam, this would be a real contribution to the cause of peace in Southeast Asia. But we would be gravely concerned if an armistice or cease-fire were reached at Geneva which would provide a road to a Communist takeover and further aggression. If this occurs, or if hostilities continue, then the need will be even more urgent to create the conditions for united action in defense of the area.

"In making commitments which might involve the use of armed force, the Congress is a full partner. Only the Congress can declare war. President Eisenhower has repeatedly emphasized that he would not take military action in Indochina without the support of Congress. Furthermore, he has made clear that he would not seek that unless, in his opinion, there would be an adequate collective effort based on genuine mutuality of purpose in defending vital interests.

"A great effort is being made by Communist propaganda to portray it as something evil if Asia joins with the nations of the Americas and Europe to get assistance which will help the peoples of Asia to secure their liberty. These Communist nations have, in this connection, adopted the slogan 'Asia for the Asians.'

"The Japanese war lords adopted a similar slogan when they sought to subject Asia to their despotic rule. The similar theme of 'Europe for the Europeans' was adopted by Mr. Molotov at the Berlin Conference when he proposed that the Europeans should seek security by arrangements which would send the United States back home.

"Great despotic powers have always known that they could impose their will and gain their conquests if the free nations stand apart and none helps the other.

"It should be observed that the Soviet Communist aggression in Europe took place only against countries which had no collective security arrangements. Since the organization of the North Atlantic Treaty, there has been no successful aggression in Europe.

"Of course, it is of the utmost importance that the United States participation in creating collective security in Asia should be on a basis which recognizes fully the aspirations and cultures of the Asian peoples. We have a material and industrial strength which they lack and which is an essential ingredient of security. Also they have cultural and spiritual values of their own which make them our equals by every moral standard.

"The United States, as the first colony of modern history to win independence for itself, instinctively shares the aspirations for liberty of all dependent and colonial peoples. We want to help, not hinder the spread of liberty.

"We do not seek to perpetuate Western colonialism and we find even more intolerable the new imperialist colonialism of communism.

"That is the spirit that animates us. If we remain true to that spirit, we can face the future with confidence that we shall be in harmony with those moral forces which ultimately prevail."

11. President Eisenhower's News Conference, May 5, 1954, Public Papers of the Presidents, 1954, p. 451:

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"United States foreign policy has consistently supported the principles on which was founded the United Nations. The basic expression of this policy was the Vandenberg resolution in 1948. The United States believes in assuring the peace and integrity of nations through collective

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action and, in pursuance of the United Nations principle, has entered into regional security agreements with other nations. Examples are the Inter-American Agreement, the NATO Agreement, and numerous pacts in the Pacific. These arrangements are invariably to assure the peaceful security of the contracting nations and to prevent likelihood of attack; they are not arrangements designed primarily for waging war.

"The Geneva conference, now 9 days old, has produced no surprises. The expressed fears of some have proved unfounded.

"It has not been a 'Five-Power' conference as the Soviet Union tried to make it.

"It has not involved establishing express or implied diplomatic recognition by the United States of the Chinese Communist aggressors.

"The Korean phase of the conference has been organized. Here the Communists came up with a scheme for Korean unification which was a Chinese copy of the Soviet scheme for the unification of Germany. Under their proposal no election measures could be taken without Communist consent, and there could be no impartial supervision of the election conditions or of the voting.

"This scheme was rejected for Germany. Secretary Dulles tells me that is equally unacceptable to the Republic of Korea and to the United Nations members which took part in the Korean war under the United Nations Command now represented at Geneva.

"The Indochina phase of the conference is in process of being organized and the issues have not yet been clarified. In this matter a large measure of initiative rests with the governments of France, Viet-Nam, Laos, and Cambodia, which are the countries most directly concerned.

"Meanwhile, plans are proceeding for the realization of a Southeast Asia security arrangement. This was publicly suggested by Secretary Dulles in his address of March 29. Of course, our principal allies were advised in advance. This proposal of the Secretary of State was not a new one; it was merely reaffirmation of the principles that have consistently guided our post-war foreign policy and a reminder to interested Asian friends that the United States was prepared to join with others in the application of these principles to the threatened area. Most of the free nations of the area and others directly concerned have shown affirmative interest, and the conversations are actively proceeding.

"Obviously, it was never expected that this collective security arrangement would spring into existence overnight. There are too many important problems to be resolved. But there is a general sense of urgency. The fact that such an organization is in the process of formation could have an important bearing upon what happens at Geneva during the Indochina phase of the conference.

"The countries of the area are now thinking in constructive terms, which include the indispensable concept of collective security. Progress in this matter has been considerable, and I am convinced that further progress will continue to be made."

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12. President Eisenhower's News Conference, May 12, 1954, Public Papers of the Presidents, 1954, p. 473:

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"Q. George Herman, CBS Radio: Mr. President, since we seem to be going into the past, a few weeks ago you told us of your theory of dominoes about Indochina, the neck of the bottle --

"THE PRESIDENT. Yes.

"Q. Mr. Herman: Since the fall of Dien Bien Phu, there has been a certain amount of talk of doing without Indochina. Would you tell us your administration's position; is it still indispensable to the defense of southeast Asia?

"THE PRESIDENT. Again I forget whether it was before this body I talked about the cork and the bottle. Well, it is very important, and the great idea of setting up an organism is so as to defeat the domino result. When, each standing alone, one falls, it has the effect on the next, and finally the whole row is down. You are trying, through a unifying influence, to build that row of dominoes so they can stand the fall of one, if necessary.

"Now, so far as I am concerned, I don't think the free world ought to write off Indochina. I think we ought to all look at this thing with some optimism and some determination. I repeat that long faces and defeatism don't win battles."

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13. Address by the Secretary of State, June 11, 1954, (Excerpt) The Threat of Direct Chinese Communist Intervention in Indochina, Department of State Bulletin, June 28, 1954, p. 971:

"At the moment, Indochina is the area where international communism most vigorously seeks expansion under the leadership of Ho Chi Minh. Last year President Eisenhower, in his great 'Chance for Peace' address, said that 'aggression in Korea and Southeast Asia are threats to the whole free community to be met by united action.' But the French were then opposed to what they called 'internationalizing' the war. They preferred to treat it as a civil war of rebellion. However, on July 3, 1953, the French Government made a public declaration of independence for the three Associated States, and in September it adopted the so-called

Navarre plan, which contemplated a rapid buildup of national native forces. The United States then agreed to underwrite the costs of this plan.

"But last winter the fighting was intensified and the long strain began to tell in terms of the attitude of the French people toward a war then in its eighth year. Last March, after the siege of Dien-Bien-Phu had begun, I renewed President Eisenhower's proposal that we seek conditions which would permit a united defense for the area. I went to Europe on this mission, and it seemed that there was agreement on our proposal. But when we moved to translate that proposal into reality, some of the parties held back because they had concluded that any steps to create a united defense should await the results of the Geneva Conference.

"Meanwhile, the burdens of a collective defense in Indochina have mounted. The Communists have practiced dilatory negotiating at Geneva, while intensifying their fighting in Indochina. The French and national forces feel the strain of mounting enemy power on their front and of political uncertainty at their rear. I told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee last week that the situation is grave but by no means hopeless. The future depends largely on decisions awaited at Paris, London, and Geneva.

"The situation in Indochina is not that of open military aggression by the Chinese Communist regime. Thus, in Indochina, the problem is one of restoring tranquillity in an area where disturbances are fomented from Communist China, but where there is no open invasion by Communist China. This task of pacification, in our opinion, cannot be successfully met merely by unilateral armed intervention. Some other conditions need to be established. Throughout these Indochina developments, the United States has held to a stable and consistent course and has made clear the conditions which, in its opinion, might justify intervention. These conditions were and are (1) an invitation from the present lawful authorities; (2) clear assurance of complete independence to Laos, Cambodia, and Viet-Nam; (3) evidence of concern by the United Nations; (4) a joining in the collective effort of some of the other nations of the area; and (5) assurance that France will not itself withdraw from the battle until it is won.

"Only if these conditions were realized could the President and the Congress be justified in asking the American people to make the sacrifices incident to committing our Nation, with others, to using force to help to restore peace in the area.

"Another problem might, however, arise. If the Chinese Communist regime were to show in Indochina or elsewhere that it is determined to pursue the path of overt military aggression, then the situation would be different and another issue would emerge. That contingency has already been referred to publicly by the President and myself. The

President, in his April 16, 1953, address, and I myself, in an address of September 2, 1953, made clear that the United States would take a grave view of any future overt military Chinese Communist aggression in relation to the Pacific or Southeast Asia area. Such an aggression would threaten island and peninsular positions which secure the United States and its allies.

"If such overt military aggression occurred, that would be a deliberate threat to the United States itself. The United States would of course invoke the processes of the United Nations and consult with its allies. But we could not escape ultimate responsibility for decisions closely touching our own security and self-defense.

"There are some, particularly abroad, who seem to assume that the attitude of the United States flows from a desire for a general war with Communist China. That is clearly false. If we had wanted such a war, it could easily have been based on the presence of Chinese aggressors in Korea. But last July, in spite of difficulties which at times seemed insuperable, we concluded a Korean armistice with Communist China. How could it be more surely demonstrated that we have both the will to make peace and the competence to make peace?

"Your Government wants peace, and the American people want peace. But should there ever be openly launched an attack that the American people would clearly recognize as a threat to our own security, then the right of self-preservation would demand that we -- regardless of any other country -- meet the issue squarely.

"It is the task of statesmanship to seek peace and deter war, while at the same time preserving vital national interests. Under present conditions that dual result is not easy to achieve, and it cannot be achieved at all unless your Government is backed by a people who are willing, if need be, to sacrifice to preserve their vital interests.

"At the Geneva Conference I said: 'Peace is always easy to achieve -- by surrender.' Your Government does not propose to buy peace at that price. We do not believe that the American people want peace at that price. So long as that is our national will, and so long as that will be backed by a capacity for effective action, our Nation can face the future with that calm confidence which is the due of those who, in a troubled world, hold fast that which is good."

14. President Eisenhower's News Conference, July 21, 1954, Public Papers of the Presidents, 1954, p. 642:

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"/Reading/ I am glad, of course, that agreement has been reached at Geneva to stop the bloodshed in Indochina. The United States has not

been a belligerent in the war in which thousands of brave men, while defending freedom, have died during the past 7 years.

"The primary responsibility for the settlement in Indochina rested with those nations which participated in the fighting.

"Our role at Geneva has been at all times to try to be helpful where desired, and to aid France and Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam, to obtain a just and honorable settlement which will take into account the needs of the interested people.

"Accordingly, the United States has not itself been a party to or bound by the decisions taken by the conference, but it is our hope that it will lead to the establishment of peace consistent with the rights and needs of the countries concerned. The agreement contains features which we do not like, but a great deal depends on how they work in practice.

"The United States is issuing at Geneva a statement to the effect that it is not prepared to join in the conference declaration but, as loyal members of the United Nations, we also say that in compliance with the obligations and principles contained in article II of the United Nations Charter, the United States will not use force to disturb the settlement. We also say that any renewal of Communist aggression would be viewed by us as a matter of grave concern.

"As evidence of our resolve to assist Cambodia and Laos to play their parts in full independence and sovereignty, in the peaceful community of free nations, we are requesting the agreement of the governments of Cambodia and Laos to our appointment of an ambassador or minister to be resident at their respective capitals. We already have a Chief of Mission at Saigon, the capital of Viet-Nam, and this embassy will, of course, be maintained.

"The United States is actively pursuing discussions with other free nations with a view to the rapid organization of a collective defense in southeast Asia in order to prevent further direct or indirect Communist aggression in that general area. [Ends reading]"

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"Q. Mrs. May Craig, Maine Papers: Mr. President, President Rhee of Korea will be here soon. Do you regard the partition of Korea as permanent, short of war, and are you including, planning to include, Korea and Free China in any kind of a southeast Asia pact?

"THE PRESIDENT. Well, of course, Korea is not in southeast Asia.

"Already we have, you know, a treaty of mutual defense with Korea. It has been enacted, it has been approved, by the Senate.

"Now, as I understand it, when the Korean war started, the purpose of the United Nations was to prevent any advance by force into South Korea; they did do that.

"I know of no one that has ever proposed that we go to war to free North Korea.

"As it is, it is an unsatisfactory situation, exactly as exists in Germany, and now apparently is going to exist in part of Indochina.

"These are very unsatisfactory situations and, to my mind, will always give reason for aggravating situations that are difficult, at best. But there is no thought on the part of any of us to start an aggressive move for the freeing of that country."

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"I have never felt that, except through these satellite excursions, that the Communist world wants any war at this time; in other words, I don't believe they would deliberately challenge us, challenge the free world, to a war of exhaustion.

"So the problem, no matter whether you happen to be fighting in one of these areas, remains the same. The loss of great areas through propaganda and deceit and subversion and coup d'etat, and every means available to a secret, well-financed conspiracy, they are all there. I personally think that if there is one good that can come out of this whole southeast Asian experience, it is this: to get the free world to looking facts in the face, and to seeing what we must do, what we should do, what sacrifices we are ready to make, in order to preserve the essentials of our system.

"I think that when the freedom of a man in Viet-Nam or in China is taken away from him, I think our freedom has lost a little. I just don't believe that we can continue to exist in the world, geographically isolated as we are, if we just don't find a concerted, positive plan of keeping these free nations so tightly bound together that none of them will give up; and if they are not weakened internally by these other methods, I just don't believe they will give up. I believe we can hold them.

"Q. Robert E. Clark, International News Service: Mr. President, along that line, a number of Congressmen today are branding the Geneva settlement as appeasement. Do you think there are any elements of appeasement in the cease-fire agreement?

"THE PRESIDENT. Well, I hesitate, Mr. Clark, to use such words, as I have told you so often. I find that so many words mean so many different things to different people. I would say this, as I said in my statement: this agreement, in certain of its features, is not satisfactory to us. It is not what we would have liked to have had.

"But I don't know, when I am put up against it at this moment, to find an alternative, to say what we would or could do. Then if I have no better plan, I am not going to criticize what they have done."

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15. Final Declaration of Geneva Conference, July 21, 1954, IC/43 Rev. 2, July 21, 1954, Original: French:

"Final declaration, dated July 21, 1954, of the Geneva Conference on the problem of restoring peace in Indo-China, in which the representatives of Cambodia, the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, France, Laos, the People's Republic of China, the State of Viet-Nam, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America took part.

"1. The Conference takes note of the agreements ending hostilities in Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam and organizing international control and the supervision of the execution of the provisions of these agreements.

"2. The Conference expresses satisfaction at the ending of hostilities in Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam; the Conference expresses its conviction that the execution of the provisions set out in the present declaration and in the agreements on the cessation of hostilities will permit Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam henceforth to play their part, in full independence and sovereignty, in the peaceful community of nations.

"3. The Conference takes note of the declarations made by the Governments of Cambodia and of Laos of their intention to adopt measures permitting all citizens to take their place in the national community, in particular by participating in the next general elections, which, in conformity with the constitution of each of these countries, shall take place in the course of the year 1955, by secret ballot and in conditions of respect for fundamental freedoms.

"4. The Conference takes note of the clauses in the agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Viet-Nam prohibiting the introduction into Viet-Nam of foreign troops and military personnel as well as of all kinds of arms and munitions. The Conference also takes note of the declarations made by the Governments of Cambodia and Laos of their resolution not to request foreign aid, whether in war material, in personnel or in instructors except for the purpose of the effective defence of their territory and, in the case of Laos, to the extent defined by the agreements on the cessation of hostilities in Laos.

"5. The Conference takes note of the clauses in the agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Viet-Nam to the effect that no military base under the control of a foreign State may be established in the regrouping zones of the two parties, the latter having the obligation to see that the zones allotted to them shall not constitute part of

any military alliance and shall not be utilized for the resumption of hostilities or in the service of an aggressive policy. The Conference also takes note of the declarations of the Governments of Cambodia and Laos to the effect that they will not join in any agreement with other States if this agreement includes the obligation to participate in a military alliance not in conformity with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations or, in the case of Laos, with the principles of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Laos or, so long as their security is not threatened, the obligation to establish bases on Cambodian or Laotian territory for the military forces of foreign Powers.

"6. The Conference recognizes that the essential purpose of the agreement relating to Viet-Nam is to settle military questions with a view to ending hostilities and that the military demarcation line is provisional and should not in any way be interpreted as constituting a political or territorial boundary. The Conference expresses its conviction that the execution of the provisions set out in the present declaration and in the agreement on the cessation of hostilities creates the necessary basis for the achievement in the near future of a political settlement in Viet-Nam.

"7. The Conference declares that, so far as Viet-Nam is concerned, the settlement of political problems, effected on the basis of respect for the principles of independence, unity and territorial integrity, shall permit the Viet-Namese people to enjoy the fundamental freedoms, guaranteed by democratic institutions established as a result of free general elections by secret ballot. In order to ensure that sufficient progress in the restoration of peace has been made, and that all the necessary conditions obtain for free expression of the national will, general elections shall be held in July 1956, under the supervision of an international commission composed of representatives of the Member States of the International Supervisory Commission, referred to in the agreement on the cessation of hostilities. Consultations will be held on this subject between the competent representative authorities of the two zones from 20 July 1955 onwards.

"8. The provisions of the agreements on the cessation of hostilities intended to ensure the protection of individuals and of property must be most strictly applied and must, in particular, allow everyone in Viet-Nam to decide freely in which zone he wishes to live.

"9. The competent representative authorities of the Northern and Southern zones of Viet-Nam, as well as the authorities of Laos and Cambodia, must not permit any individual or collective reprisals against persons who have collaborated in any way with one of the parties during the war, or against members of such persons' families.

"10. The Conference takes note of the declaration of the Government of the French Republic to the effect that it is ready to withdraw its troops from the territory of Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam, at the request

of the governments concerned and within periods which shall be fixed by agreement between the parties except in the cases where, by agreement between the two parties, a certain number of French troops shall remain at specified points and for a specified time.

"11. The Conference takes note of the declaration of the French Government to the effect that for the settlement of all the problems connected with the re-establishment and consolidation of peace in Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam, the French Government will proceed from the principle of respect for the independence and sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam.

"12. In their relations with Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam, each member of the Geneva Conference undertakes to respect the sovereignty, the independence, the unity and the territorial integrity of the above-mentioned states, and to refrain from any interference in their internal affairs.

"13. The members of the Conference agree to consult one another on any question which may be referred to them by the International Supervisory Commission in order to study such measures as may prove necessary to ensure that the agreements on the cessation of hostilities in Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam are respected."

16. Direct Aid to the Associated States: Communique Regarding Franco-American Conversations, September 29, 1954, Department of State Bulletin, October 11, 1954, p. 534:

"Representatives of the two Governments have had very frank and useful talks which have shown the community of their views, and are in full agreement on the objectives to be attained.

"The conclusion of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty in Manila on September 8, 1954, has provided a firmer basis than heretofore to assist the free nations of Asia in developing and maintaining their independence and security. The representatives of France and the United States wish to reaffirm the support of their Governments for the principles of self-government, independence, justice and liberty proclaimed by the Pacific Charter in Manila on September 8, 1954.

"The representatives of France and the United States reaffirm the intention of their governments to support the complete independence of Cambodia, Laos, and Viet-Nam. Both France and the United States will continue to assist Cambodia, Laos, and Viet-Nam in their efforts to safeguard their freedom and independence and to advance the welfare of their peoples. In this spirit France and the United States are assisting the Government of Viet-Nam in the resettlement of the Vietnamese who have of their own free will moved to free Viet-Nam and who already number some 300,000.

"In order to contribute to the security of the area pending the further development of national forces for this purpose, the representatives of France indicated that France is prepared to retain forces of its Expeditionary Corps, in agreement with the government concerned, within the limits permitted under the Geneva agreements and to an extent to be determined. The United States will consider the question of financial assistance for the Expeditionary Corps in these circumstances in addition to support for the forces of each of the three Associated States. These questions vitally affect each of the three Associated States and are being fully discussed with them.

"The channel for French and United States economic aid, budgetary support, and other assistance to each of the Associated States will be direct to that state. The United States representatives will begin discussions soon with the respective governments of the Associated States regarding direct aid. The methods for efficient coordination of French and United States aid programs to each of the three Associated States are under consideration and will be developed in discussions with each of these states.

"After the bilateral talks, the chiefs of diplomatic missions in Washington of Cambodia, Laos and Viet Nam were invited to a final meeting to have an exchange of views and information on these matters. The representatives of all five countries are in complete agreement on the objectives of peace and freedom to be achieved in Indochina."

17. Aid to the State of Viet-Nam: Message from the President of the United States to the President of the Council of Ministers of Viet-Nam, October 23, 1954, Department of State Bulletin, November 15, 1954, pp. 735-736:

"Dear Mr. President: I have been following with great interest the course of developments in Viet-Nam, particularly since the conclusion of the conference at Geneva. The implications of the agreement concerning Viet-Nam have caused grave concern regarding the future of a country temporarily divided by an artificial military grouping, weakened by a long and exhausting war and faced with enemies without and by their subversive collaborators within.

"Your recent requests for aid to assist in the formidable project of the movement of several hundred thousand loyal Vietnamese citizens away from areas which are passing under a de facto rule and political ideology which they abhor, are being fulfilled. I am glad that the United States is able to assist in this humanitarian effort.

"We have been exploring ways and means to permit our aid to Viet-Nam to be more effective and to make a greater contribution to the welfare and stability of the Government of Viet-Nam. I am, accordingly, instructing the American Ambassador to Viet-Nam to examine with you in your capacity as Chief of Government, how an intelligent program of

American aid given directly to your Government can serve to assist Viet-Nam in its present hour of trial, provided that your Government is prepared to give assurances as to the standards of performance it would be able to maintain in the event such aid were supplied.

"The purpose of this offer is to assist the Government of Viet-Nam in developing and maintaining a strong, viable state, capable of resisting attempted subversion or aggression through military means."

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18. Address by President Eisenhower before the American Society of Newspaper Editors, April 21, 1956, Public Papers of the Presidents, 1956, p. 417 and p. 423:

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"The ideas of freedom are at work, even where they are officially rejected. As we know, Lenin and his successors, true to Communist doctrine, based the Soviet State on the denial of these ideas. Yet the new Soviet rulers who took over three years ago have had to reckon with the force of these ideas, both at home and abroad.

"The situation the new regime inherited from the dead Stalin apparently caused it to reappraise many of his mistakes.

"Having lived under his one-man rule, they have espoused the concept of 'collective' dictatorship. But dictatorship it still remains. They have denounced Stalin for some of the more flagrant excesses of his brutal rule. But the individual citizen still lacks the most elementary safeguards of a free society. The desire for a better life is still being sacrificed to the insatiable demands of the state.

"In foreign affairs, the new regime has seemingly moderated the policy of violence and hostility which has caused the free nations to band together to defend their independence and liberties. For the present, at least, it relies more on political and economic means to spread its influence abroad. In the last year, it has embarked upon a campaign of lending and trade agreements directed especially toward the newly-developing countries.

"It is still too early to assess in any final way whether the Soviet regime wishes to provide a real basis for stable and enduring relations."

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"For example, why was there such a sudden change in the Soviet policy? Their basic aim is to conquer the world, through world revolution if possible, but in any way. Anyone that has read any of their books knows that their doctrine is lies, deceit, subversion, war if necessary, but in any way: conquer the world. And that has not changed.

"But they changed their policies very markedly. They were depending on force and the threat of force only. And suddenly they have gone into an entirely different attitude. They are going into the economic and political fields and are really wearing smiles around the world instead of some of the bitter faces to which we have become accustomed.

"Now any time a policy is winning and the people are completely satisfied with it, you don't change. You change policies that markedly, you destroy old idols as they have been busy doing, only when you think a great change is necessary. So I think we can take some comfort; at least we can give careful consideration to the very fact they had to change their policies.

"And I think the whole free world is trying to test and determine the sincerity of that plan, in order that the free nations themselves, in pursuing their own policies, will make certain that they are not surprised in any place.

"We look at some of the advances we think they have made, but let us remember: they did not conquer Korea, which they announced they were going to do. They were stopped finally in the northern part of Vietnam; and Diem, the leader of the Southern Vietnamese, is doing splendidly and a much better figure in that field than anyone even dared to hope.

"The Iranian situation which only a few short years ago looked so desperate that each morning we thought we would wake up and read in our newspapers that Mossadegh had let them under the Iron Curtain, has not become satisfactory, but that crisis has passed and it is much better."

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19. United States Policy with Respect to Viet-Nam: Address by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (this address by Assistant Secretary of State Robertson restated American policy and was delivered at a time of relative stability in South Viet-Nam). Washington, June 1, 1956, Department of State Bulletin, June 11, 1956, pp. 972-974:

"This past March, I had the pleasure of accompanying the Secretary of State on his visit to Saigon where we conversed with President Diem on the present and future problems of Viet-Nam. I was struck, as so many other recent observers have been, at the progress Free Viet-Nam has made in a few short months toward stability, security, and strength. President Diem seemed to reflect this progress in his own person. On the occasion of our earlier visit some 15 months ago, he seemed tense and gravely concerned about the problems facing Viet-Nam. This time he was reposed, poised, and appeared confident of the future of his country.

"Among the factors that explain the remarkable rise of Free Viet-Nam from the shambles created by 8 years of murderous civil and international war, the division of the country at Geneva and the continuing

menace of predatory communism, there is in the first place the dedication, courage, and resourcefulness of President Diem himself. In him, his country has found a truly worthy leader whose integrity and devotion to his country's welfare have become generally recognized among his people. Asia has given us in President Diem another great figure, and the entire free world has become the richer for his example of determination and moral fortitude. There is no more dramatic example of this fortitude than President Diem's decisions during the tense and vital days of the battle against the parasitic politico-religious sects in the city of Saigon in the spring of 1955. These decisions were to resist the multiple pressures to compromise that were building up around him, and to struggle to the victorious end for the sake of a just cause. The free world owes him a debt of gratitude for his determined stand at that fateful hour.

"Consider Viet-Nam at three stages in its recent history:

"First, in mid-1954, partitioned by fiat of the great powers against the will of the Vietnamese people, devoid of governmental machinery or military strength, drifting without leadership and without hope in the backwash of the defeat administered by the combined weight of Communist-impressed infantry and of Chinese and Russian arms.

"Secondly, in early 1955, faced with the military and subversive threat of the Communists north of the 17th parallel, confronted with internal strife, its government challenged by the armed, self-seeking politico-religious sects, its army barely reformed and of uncertain loyalty, assailed from within by the most difficult problems, including that of having to absorb the sudden influx of three-quarters of a million refugees who would rather leave their ancestral lands and homes than suffer life under Communist tyranny:

"And finally Viet-Nam today, in mid-1956, progressing rapidly to the establishment of democratic institutions by elective processes, its people resuming peaceful pursuits, its army growing in effectiveness, sense of mission, and morale, the puppet Vietnamese politicians discredited, the refugees well on the way to permanent resettlement, the countryside generally orderly and calm, the predatory sects eliminated and their venal leaders exiled or destroyed.

"Perhaps no more eloquent testimony to the new state of affairs in Viet-Nam could be cited than the voice of the people themselves as expressed in their free election of last March. At that time the last possible question as to the feeling of the people was erased by an overwhelming majority for President Diem's leadership. The fact that the Viet Minh was unable to carry out its open threats to sabotage these elections is impressive evidence of the stability and prestige of the government.

"The United States is proud to be on the side of the effort of the Vietnamese people under President Diem to establish freedom, peace, and

the good life. The United States wishes to continue to assist and to be a loyal and trusted friend of Viet-Nam.

"Our policies in Viet-Nam may be simply stated as follows:

"To support a friendly non-Communist government in Viet-Nam and to help it diminish and eventually eradicate Communist subversion and influence.

"To help the Government of Viet-Nam establish the forces necessary for internal security.

"To encourage support for Free Viet-Nam by the non-Communist world.

"To aid in the rehabilitation and reconstruction of a country and people ravaged by 8 ruinous years of civil and international war.

"Our efforts are directed first of all toward helping to sustain the internal security forces consisting of a regular army of about 150,000 men, a mobile civil guard of some 45,000, and local defense units which are being formed to give protection against subversion on the village level. We are providing budgetary support and equipment for these forces and have a mission assisting the training of the army. We are also helping to organize, train, and equip the Vietnamese police force. The refugees who have fled to South Viet-Nam to escape the Viet Minh are being resettled on productive lands with the assistance of funds made available by our aid program. In various ways our aid program also provides assistance to the Vietnamese Government designed to strengthen the economy and provide a better future for the common people of the country. The Vietnamese are increasingly giving attention to the basic development of the Vietnamese economy and to projects that may contribute directly to that goal. We give our aid and counsel to this program only as freely invited.

"I do not wish to minimize the magnitude of the task that still remains and of the problems that still confront this staunch and valiant member of the free world fighting for its independence on the threshold of the Communist heartland of Asia.

"The Communist conspiracy continues to threaten Free Viet-Nam. With monstrous effrontery, the Communist conspirators at Hanoi accuse Free Viet-Nam and its friends of violating the armistice provisions which the Vietnamese and their friends, including ourselves, have scrupulously respected despite the fact that neither the Vietnamese nor ourselves signed the Geneva Accords while they, the Communists who have solemnly undertaken to be bound by these provisions, have violated them in the most blatant fashion.

"The facts are that while on the one hand the military potential of Free Viet-Nam has been drastically reduced by the withdrawal of nearly 200,000 members of the French Expeditionary Corps and by the reduction of the Vietnamese Army by more than 50,000 from the time of the armistice to the present as well as by the outshipment from Viet-Nam

since the cessation of hostilities of over $200 million worth of war equipment, we have on the other hand reports of steady constant growth of the warmaking potential of the Communists north of the 17th parallel.

"Our reports reveal that in complete disregard of its obligations, the Viet Minh have imported voluminous quantities of arms across the Sino-Viet Minh border and have imported a constant stream of Chinese Communist military personnel to work on railroads, to rebuild roads, to establish airports, and to work on other projects contributing to the growth of the military potential of the zone under Communist occupation.

"As so eloquently stated by the British Government in a diplomatic note released to the press and sent to Moscow in April of this year, and I quote:

'The Viet Minh army has been so greatly strengthened by the embodiment and re-equipment of irregular forces that instead of the 7 Viet Minh divisions in existence in July 1954 there are now no less than 20. This striking contrast between massive military expansion in the North and the withdrawal and reduction of military forces in the South speaks for itself.'

"By lies, propaganda, force, and deceit, the Communists in Hanoi would undermine Free Viet-Nam, whose fall they have been unable to secure by their maneuverings on the diplomatic front. These people, whose crimes against suffering humanity are so vividly described in the book by Lt. Dooley who addressed you this morning, have sold their country to Peiping. They have shamelessly followed all the devious zigzags of the Communist-bloc line so that their alliance with Communist China and the Soviet Union is firmly consolidated. These are the people who are now inviting President Diem to join them in a coalition government to be set up through so-called 'free elections.'

"President Diem and the Government of Free Viet-Nam reaffirmed on April 6 of this year and on other occasions their desire to seek the reunification of Viet-Nam by peaceful means. In this goal, we support them fully. We hope and pray that the partition of Viet-Nam, imposed against the will of the Vietnamese people, will speedily come to an end. For our part we believe in free elections, and we support President Diem fully in his position that if elections are to be held, there first must be conditions which preclude intimidation or coercion of the electorate. Unless such conditions exist there can be no free choice.

"May those leaders of the north in whom the spirit of true patriotism still survives realize the futility of the Communist efforts to subvert Free Viet-Nam by force or guile. May they force the abandonment of these efforts and bring about the peaceful demobilization of the large standing armies of the Viet Minh. May they, above all, return to the just cause of all those who want to reunify their country in peace and independence and for the good of all the people of Viet-Nam."

20. Special Message to the Congress on the Mutual Security Programs, May 21, 1957, Public Papers of the Presidents--Eisenhower, 1957, p. 373.

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"First is defense assistance--our and other free nations' common effort to counter the Soviet-Chinese military power and their drive to dominate the world. That power continues to grow--in armaments, in nuclear capability, in its economic base. The Communist goal of conquering the world has never changed.

"For our nation alone to undertake to withstand and turn back Communist imperialism would impose colossal defense spending on our people. It would ultimately cost us our freedom.

"For other free nations to attempt individually to counter this menace would be impossible.

"We in our own interest, and other free nations in their own interest, have therefore joined in the building and maintenance of a system of collective security in which the effort of each nation strengthens all. Today that system has become the keystone of our own and their security in a tense and uncertain world."

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"The second major element of our mutual security programs is economic development assistance and technical cooperation.

"This part of the programs helps less developed countries make the social and political progress needed to preserve their independence. Unless these peoples can hope for reasonable economic advance, the danger will be acute that their governments will be subverted by Communism.

"To millions of people close to the Soviet and Chinese Communist borders political freedom is still new. To many it must still prove its worth. To survive it must show the way to another and equally essential freedom--freedom from the poverty and hopelessness in which these peoples have lived for centuries. With their new freedom their desire and their determination to develop their economies are intense. They are fixed upon raising their standards of living. Yet they lack sufficient resources. Their need for help is desperate--both for technical know-how and capital.

"Lacking outside help these new nations cannot advance economically as they must to maintain their independence. Their moderate leaders must be able to obtain sufficient help from the free world to offer convincing hope of progress. Otherwise their peoples will surely turn elsewhere. Extremist elements would then seize power, whip up national hatreds and incite civil dissension and strife. The danger would be grave that these free governments would disappear. Instability and threats to peace would result. In our closely-knit world, such events would deeply concern and potentially endanger our own people.

"The help toward economic development that we provide these countries is a means to forestall such crises. Our assistance is thus insurance against rising tensions and increased dangers of war, and against defense costs that would skyrocket here at home should tragedy befall these struggling peoples.

"These revolutionary developments in distant parts of the world are borne on the crest of the wave sent out a century and a half ago by the example of our own successful struggle for freedom. The determination of the people of these nations to better their lot and to preserve their newly gained liberty awakens memories of our own noblest traditions. Our helping hand in their struggle is dictated by more than our own self-interest. It is also a mirror of the character and highest ideals of the people who have built and preserved this nation."

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"In the many unstable regions of the world, Communist power is today probing constantly. Every weakness of free nations is being exploited in every possible way. It is inevitable that we shall have to deal with such critical situations in the future. In America's own interest, we must stand ready to furnish special assistance when threatened disaster abroad foretells danger to our own vital concerns."

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21. Radio and Television Address to the American People on the Need for Mutual Security in Waging the Peace, May 21, 1957, Public Papers of the President--Eisenhower, 1957, p. 386.

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"The common label of 'foreign aid' is gravely misleading--for it inspires a picture of bounty for foreign countries at the expense of our own. No misconception could be further from reality. These programs serve our own basic national and personal interests.

"They do this both immediately and lastingly.

"In the long term, the ending or the weakening of these programs would vastly increase the risk of future war.

"And--in the immediate sense--it would impose upon us additional defense expenditures many times greater than the cost of mutual security today.

"This evening it is my purpose to give you incontestable proof of these assertions.

"We have, during this century, twice spent our blood and our treasure fighting in Europe--and twice in Asia. We fought because we saw--too late to prevent war--that our own peace and security were imperilled, by the urgent danger--or the ruthless conquest--of other lands.

"We have gained wisdom from that suffering. We know, and the world knows, that the American people will fight hostile and aggressive despotisms when their force is thrown against the barriers of freedom, when they seek to gain the high ground of power from which to destroy us. But we also know that to fight is the most costly way to keep America secure and free. Even an America victorious in atomic war could scarcely escape disastrous destruction of her cities and a fearful loss of life. Victory itself could be agony.

"Plainly, we must seek less tragic, less costly ways to defend ourselves. We must recognize that whenever any country falls under the domination of Communism, the strength of the Free World--and of America--is by that amount weakened and Communism strengthened. If this process, through our neglect or indifference, should proceed unchecked, our continent would be gradually encircled. Our safety depends upon recognition of the fact that the Communist design for such encirclement must be stopped before it gains momentum--before it is again too late to save the peace.

"This recognition dictates two tasks. We must maintain a common worldwide defense against the menace of International Communism. And we must demonstrate and spread the blessings of liberty--to be cherished by those who enjoy these blessings, to be sought by those now denied them.

"This is not a new policy nor a partisan policy.

"This is a policy for America that began ten years ago when a Democratic President and a Republican Congress united in an historic declaration. They then declared that the independence and survival of two countries menaced by Communist aggression--Greece and Turkey--were so important to the security of America that we would give them military and economic aid.

"That policy saved those nations. And it did so without the cost of American lives.

"That policy has since been extended to all critical areas of the world. It recognizes that America cannot exist as an island of freedom in a surrounding sea of Communism. It is expressed concretely by mutual security treaties embracing 42 other nations. And these treaties reflect a solemn finding by the President and by the Senate that our own peace would be endangered if any of these countries were conquered by International Communism.

"The lesson of the defense of Greece and Turkey ten years ago has since been repeated in the saving of other lands and peoples. A recent example is the Southeast Asian country of Viet-Nam, whose President has just visited us as our honored guest.

"Two years ago it appeared that all Southeast Asia might be overrun by the forces of International Communism. The freedom and security of nations for which we had fought throughout World War II and the Korean War again stood in danger. The people of Viet-Nam responded bravely--under steadfast leadership.

"But bravery alone could not have prevailed.

"We gave military and economic assistance to the Republic of Viet-Nam. We entered into a treaty--the Southeast Asia Security Treaty--which plainly warned that an armed attack against this area would endanger our own peace and safety, and that we would act accordingly. Thus Viet-Nam has been saved for freedom.

"This is one of the nations where we have been spending the largest amounts of so-called 'foreign aid.' What could be plainer than the fact that this aid has served not only the safety of another nation--but also the security of our own.

"The issue, then, is solemn and serious and clear.

"When our young men were dying in the Argonne in 1918 and on the beaches of Normandy and in the Western Pacific in 1944 and at Pusan in 1950--and when the battlefields of Europe and Africa and Asia were strewn with billions of dollars worth of American military equipment, representing the toil and the skills of millions of workers--no one for an instant doubted the need and the rightness of this sacrifice of blood and labor and treasure.

"Precisely the same needs and purposes are served by our Mutual Security programs today--whether these operate on a military or an economic front. For on both fronts they are truly defense programs."

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22. Radio and Television Report to the American People Regarding the Situation in the Formosa Straits, September 11, 1958, Public Papers of the Presidents--Eisenhower, 1958, p. 694.

"My Friends:

"Tonight I want to talk to you about the situation, dangerous to peace, which has developed in the Formosa Straits, in the Far East. My purpose is to give you its basic facts and then my conclusions as to

our nation's proper course of action.

"To begin, let us remember that traditionally this country and its government have always been passionately devoted to peace with honor, as they are now. We shall never resort to force in settlement of differences except when compelled to do so to defense against aggression and to protect our vital interests.

"This means that, in our view, negotiations and conciliation should never be abandoned in favor of force and strife. While we shall never timidly retreat before the threat of armed aggression, we would welcome in the present circumstances negotiations that could have a fruitful result in preserving the peace of the Formosa area and reaching a solution that could be acceptable to all parties concerned including, of course, our ally, the Republic of China.

"On the morning of August 23rd the Chinese Communists opened a severe bombardment of Quemoy, an island in the Formosa Straits off the China Coast. Another island in the same area, Matsu, was also attacked. These two islands have always been a part of Free China--never under Communist control.

"This bombardment of Quemoy has been going on almost continuously ever since. Also Chinese Communists have been using their naval craft to try to break up the supplying of Quemoy, with its 125,000 people. Their normal source of supply is by sea from Formosa, where the government of Free China is now located.

"Chinese Communists say that they will capture Quemoy. So far they have not actually attempted a landing, but their bombardment has caused great damage. Over 1,000 people have been killed or wounded. In large part these are civilians.

"This is a tragic affair. It is shocking that in this day and age naked force should be used for such aggressive purposes.

"But this is not the first time that the Chinese Communists have acted in this way.

"In 1950 they attacked and tried to conquer the Republic of Korea. At that time President Truman announced the intention of protecting Formosa, the principal area still held by Free China, because of the belief that Formosa's safety was vital to the security of the United States and the free world. Our government has adhered firmly ever since 1950 to that policy.

"In 1953 and 1954 the Chinese Communists took an active part in the war in Indo-China against Viet Nam.

"In the fall of 1954 they attacked Quemoy and Matsu, the same two islands they are attacking now. They broke off that attack when, in January 1955, the Congress and I agreed that we should firmly support Free China.

"Since then, for about four years, Chinese Communists have not used force for aggressive purposes. We have achieved an armistice in Korea which stopped the fighting there in 1953. There is a 1954 armistice in Viet Nam; and since 1955 there has been quiet in the Formosa Straits area. We had hoped that the Chinese Communists were becoming peaceful--but it seems not.

"So the world is again faced with the problem of armed aggression. Powerful dictatorships are attacking an exposed, but free, area.

"What should we do?

"Shall we take the position that, submitting to threat, it is better to surrender pieces of free territory in the hope that this will satisfy the appetite of the aggressor and we shall have peace?

"Do we not still remember that the name of 'Munich' symbolizes a vain hope of appeasing dictators?

"At that time, the policy of appeasement was tried and it failed. Prior to the second World War, Mussolini seized Ethiopia. In the Far East, Japanese warlords were grabbing Manchuria by force. Hitler sent his armed forces into the Rhineland in violation of the Versailles Treaty. Then he annexed little Austria. When he got away with that, he next turned to Czechoslovakia and began taking it, bit by bit.

"In the face of all these attacks on freedom by the dictators, the powerful democracies stood aside. It seemed that Ethiopia and Manchuria were too far away and too unimportant to fight about. In Europe, appeasement was looked upon as the way to peace. The democracies felt that if they tried to stop what was going on, that would mean war. But because of these repeated retreats, war came just the same.

"If the democracies had stood firm at the beginning, almost surely there would have been no World War. Instead they gave such an appearance of weakness and timidity that aggressive rulers were encouraged to overrun one country after another. In the end the democracies saw that their very survival was at stake. They had no alternative but to turn and fight in what proved to be the most terrible war that the world has ever known.

"I know something about that war, and I never want to see that history repeated. But, my fellow Americans, it certainly can be repeated if the peace-loving democratic nations again fearfully practice a policy of standing idly by while big aggressors use armed force to conquer the small and weak.

"Let us suppose that the Chinese Communists conquer Quemoy. Would that be the end of the story? We know that it would not be the end of the story. History teaches that when powerful despots can gain something through aggression, they try, by the same methods, to gain more and more and more.

"Also, we have more to guide us than the teachings of history. We have the statements, the boastings, of the Chinese Communists themselves. They frankly say that their present military effort is part of a program to conquer Formosa.

"It is as certain as can be that the shooting which the Chinese Communists started on August 23rd had as its purpose not just the taking of the island of Quemoy. It is part of what is indeed an ambitious plan of armed conquest.

"This plan would liquidate all of the free world positions in the Western Pacific area and bring them under captive governments which would be hostile to the United States and the free world. Thus the Chinese and Russian Communists would come to dominate at least the Western half of the now friendly Pacific Ocean.

"So, aggression by ruthless despots again imposes a clear danger to the United States and to the free world.

"In this effort the Chinese Communists and the Soviet Union appear to be working hand in hand. Last Monday I received a long letter on this subject from Prime Minister Khrushchev. He warned the United States against helping its allies in the Western Pacific. He said that we should not support the Republic of China and the Republic of Korea. He contended that we should desert them, return all of our naval forces to our home bases, and leave our friends in the Far East to face, alone, the combined military power of the Soviet Union and Communist China.

"Does Mr. Khrushchev think that we have so soon forgotten Korea?

"I must say to you very frankly and soberly, my friends, the United States cannot accept the result that the Communists seek. Neither can we show, now, a weakness of purpose--a timidity--which would surely lead them to move more aggressively against us and our friends in the Western Pacific area.

"If the Chinese Communists have decided to risk a war, it is not because Quemoy itself is so valuable to them. They have been getting along without Quemoy ever since they seized the China mainland nine years ago.

"If they have now decided to risk a war, it can only be because they, and their Soviet allies, have decided to find out whether threatening war is a policy from which they can make big gains.

"If that is their decision, then a Western Pacific Munich would not buy us peace or security. It would encourage the aggressors. It would dismay our friends and allies there. If history teaches anything, appeasement would make it more likely that we would have to fight a major war.

"Congress has made clear its recognition that the security of the Western Pacific is vital to the security of the United States and that we should be firm. The Senate has ratified, by overwhelming vote, security treaties with the Republic of China covering Formosa and the Pescadores, and also the Republic of Korea. We have a mutual security treaty with the Republic of the Philippines, which could be next in line for conquest if Formosa fell into hostile hands. These treaties commit the United States to the defense of the treaty areas. In addition, there is a Joint Resolution which the Congress passed in January 1955 dealing specifically with Formosa and the offshore islands of Free China in the Formosa Straits.

"At that time the situation was similar to what it is today.

"Congress then voted the President authority to employ the armed forces of the United States for the defense not only of Formosa but of related positions such as Quemoy and Matsu, if I believed their defense to be appropriate in assuring the defense of Formosa.

"I might add that the mandate from the Congress was given by an almost unanimous bipartisan vote.

"Today, the Chinese Communists announce, repeatedly and officially, that their military operations against Quemoy are preliminary to attack on Formosa. So it is clear that the Formosa Straits Resolution of 1955 applies to the present situation.

"If the present bombardment and harassment of Quemoy should be converted into a major assault, with which the local defenders could not cope, then we would be compelled to face precisely the situation that Congress visualized in 1955.

"I have repeatedly sought to make clear our position in this matter so that there would not be danger of Communist miscalculation. The Secretary of State on September fourth made a statement to the same end. This statement could not, of course, cover every contingency. Indeed, I interpret the Joint Resolution as requiring me not to make absolute advance commitments, but to use my judgment according to the circumstances of the time. But the statement did carry a clear meaning to the Chinese Communists and to the Soviet Union. There will be no retreat in the face of armed aggression, which is part and parcel of a continuing program of using armed force to conquer new regions.

"I do not believe that the United States can be either lured or frightened into appeasement. I believe that in taking the position of opposing aggression by force, I am taking the only position which is consistent with the vital interests of the United States, and, indeed with the peace of the world.

"Some misguided persons have said that Quemoy is nothing to become excited about. They said the same about South Korea--about Viet Nam, about Lebanon.

"Now I assure you that no American boy will be asked by me to fight just for Quemoy. But those who make up our armed forces--and I believe the American people as a whole--do stand ready to defend the principle that armed force shall not be used for aggressive purposes.

"Upon observance of that principle depends a lasting and just peace. It is that same principle that protects the Western Pacific free world positions as well as the security of our homeland. If we are not ready to defend this principle, then indeed tragedy after tragedy would befall us.

"But there is a far better way than resort to force to settle these differences, and there is some hope that such a better way may be followed.

"That is the way of negotiation.

"That way is open and prepared because in 1955 arrangements were made between the United States and the Chinese Communists that an Ambassador on each side would be authorized to discuss at Geneva certain problems of common concern. These included the matter of release of American civilians imprisoned in Communist China, and such questions as the renunciation of force in the Formosa area. There have been 73 meetings since August 1955.

"When our Ambassador, who was conducting these negotiations, was recently transferred to another post, we named as successor Mr. Beam, our Ambassador to Poland. The Chinese Communists were notified accordingly the latter part of July, but there was no response.

"The Secretary of State, in his September fourth statement, referred to these Geneva negotiations. Two days later, Mr. Chou En-lai, the Premier of the Peoples' Republic of China, proposed that these talks should be resumed 'in the interests of peace.' This was followed up on September eighth by Mr. Mao Tse-tung, the Chairman of the Peoples' Republic of China. We promptly welcomed this prospect and instructed our Ambassador at Warsaw to be ready immediately to resume these talks. We expect that the talks will begin upon the return to Warsaw of the Chinese Communist Ambassador who has been in Peiping.

"Perhaps our suggestion may be bearing fruit. We devoutly hope so.

"Naturally, the United States will adhere to the position it first took in 1955, that we will not in these talks be a party to any arrangements which would prejudice rights of our ally, the Republic of China.

"We know by hard experiences that the Chinese Communist leaders are indeed militant and aggressive. But we cannot believe that they would now persist in a course of military aggression which would threaten world peace, with all that would be involved. We believe that diplomacy can and should find a way out. There are measures that can be taken to assure that these offshore islands will not be a thorn in the side of peace. We believe that arrangements are urgently required to stop gun fire and to pave the way to a peaceful solution.

"If the bilateral talks between Ambassadors do not fully succeed, there is still the hope that the United Nations could exert a peaceful influence on the situation.

"In 1955 the hostilities of the Chinese Communists in the Formosa area were brought before the United Nations Security Council. But the Chinese Communists rejected its jurisdiction. They said that they were entitled to Formosa and the offshore islands and that if they used armed forces to get them, that was purely a 'civil war,' and that the United Nations had no right to concern itself.

"They claimed also that the attack by the Communist North Koreans on South Korea was 'civil war,' and that the United Nations, and the United States, were 'aggressors' because they helped South Korea. They said the same about their attack on Viet Nam.

"I feel sure that these pretexts will never deceive or control world opinion. The fact is that Communist Chinese hostilities in the Formosa Straits area do endanger world peace. I do not believe that any rulers, however aggressive they may be, will flout efforts to find a peaceful and honorable solution, whether it be by direct negotiations or through the United Nations.

"My friends, we are confronted with a serious situation. But it is typical of the security problems of the world today. Powerful and aggressive forces are constantly probing, now here, now there, to see whether the free world is weakening. In the face of this, there are no easy choices available. It is misleading for anyone to imply that there are.

"However, the present situation, though serious, is by no means desperate or hopeless.

"There is not going to be any appeasement.

"I believe that there is not going to be any war.

"But there must be sober realization by the American people that our legitimate purposes are again being tested by those who threaten peace and freedom everywhere.

"This has not been the first test for us and for the free world. Probably it will not be the last. But as we meet each test with courage and unity, we contribute to the safety and the honor of our beloved land--and to the cause of a just and lasting peace."

23. The President's News Conference of October 1, 1958, Public Papers of the Presidents--Eisenhower, 1958, p. 715.

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"THE PRESIDENT. Well, sir, all I can tell you about that is that I conceive of no possible solution that we haven't studied, pondered, discussed with others in the very great hope that a peaceful solution can come about.

"As you well know, the basic issue, as we see it, is to avoid retreat in the face of force, not to resort to force to resolve these questions in the international world. And we believe if we are not faithful to that principle in the long run we are going to suffer.

"Now, Mr. Dulles, who had a very long conference yesterday morning and almost solely on this subject, did one thing that I would commend to all of you: he quoted paragraphs, two paragraphs I think, from Mr. Spaak's speech recently in the United Nations, where Mr. Spaak said: 'The whole free world must realize that it is not Quemoy and the Matsus that we are talking about, we are talking about the Communists' constant, unrelenting pressure against the free world, against all of it.'

"As a matter of fact, a magazine just, I guess, out last evening, U.S. News and World Report, gives quite a detailed and documented story of Communist aggression and activities in 72 countries.

"I commend that to your reading, because we are very apt, by focusing our eyes on some geographical point, to neglect the great principles for which a country such as ours has stood, for all these years, and for which Western civilization has largely stood.

"So, I should say, we want to get these things in perspective.

"Now, you mentioned the question of it would be foolish for them keeping large forces there for a long time.

"I believe, as a soldier, that was not a good thing to do, to have all these troops there. But, remember, we have differences with our allies all over the world. They are family differences, and sometimes they are acute; but, by and large, the reason we call it 'free world' is because each nation in it wants to remain independent under its own government and not under some dictatorial form of government. So, to the basic ideals, all of us must subscribe.

"Q. Peter Lisagor, Chicago Daily News: In the light of Mr. Spaak's statement, can you tell us what your view is of why so many of our allies fail to see this point you have just made?

"THE PRESIDENT. Well, it's a very difficult thing, and of course an answer is speculative. But when we go back to the Manchurian incident of 1931, when we go back to Hitler's marching into the Rhineland, when we take his taking over the Sudetenland and the Anschluss with Austria by force, when finally he took over all of Czechoslovakia, where was the point to stop this thing before it got into a great major war?

"Why did not public opinion see this thing happening?

"Now, in hindsight, most of us have condemned these failures very bitterly, going right back to 1931 in Manchuria. I don't know why the human is so constructed that he believes that possibly there is an easier solution--that you can by feeding aggression a little bit, a teaspoonful of something, that he won't see that they are going to demand the whole quart.

"I don't know any real answer to that thing; it is puzzling. And, of course, for those who have to carry responsibility, it is a very heavy weight on their spirits and minds; there is no question about that. But there it is."

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24. Special Message to the Congress on the Mutual Security Program, March 13, 1959, Public Papers of the Presidents--Eisenhower, 1959, p. 256.

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"I believe that these events of the past year and the stern, indeed harsh, realities of the world of today and the years ahead demonstrate the importance of the Mutual Security Program to the security

of the United States. I think four such realities stand out.

"First, the United States and the entire free world are confronted by the military might of the Soviet Union, Communist China, and their satellites. These nations of the Communist Bloc now maintain well-equipped standing armies totaling more than 6,500,000 men formed in some 400 divisions. They are deployed along the borders of our allies and friends from the northern shores of Europe to the Mediterranean Sea, around through the Middle East and Far East to Korea. These forces are backed by an air fleet of 25,000 planes in operational units, and many more not in such units. They, in turn, are supported by nuclear weapons and missiles. On the seas around this land mass is a large navy with several hundred submarines.

"Second, the world is in a great epoch of seething change. Within little more than a decade a world-wide political revolution has swept whole nations--21 of them--with three-quarters of a billion people, a fourth of the world's population, from colonial status to independence--and others are pressing just behind. The industrial revolution, with its sharp rise in living standards, was accompanied by much turmoil in the Western world. A similar movement is now beginning to sweep Africa, Asia, and South America. A newer and even more striking revolution in medicine, nutrition, and sanitation is increasing the energies and lengthening the lives of people in the most remote areas. As a result of lowered infant mortality, longer lives, and the accelerating conquest of famine, there is underway a population explosion so incredibly great that in little more than another generation the population of the world is expected to double. Asia alone is expected to have one billion more people than the entire world has today. Throughout vast areas there is a surging social upheaval in which, overnight, the responsibilities of self-government are being undertaken by hundreds of millions, women are assuming new places in public life, old family patterns are being destroyed and new ones uneasily established. In the early years of independence, the people of the new nations are fired with a zealous nationalism which, unless channelled toward productive purposes, could lead to harmful developments. Transcending all this there is the accompanying universal determination to achieve a better life.

"Third, there is loose in the world a fanatic conspiracy, International Communism, whose leaders have in two score years seized control of all or parts of 17 countries, with nearly one billion people, over a third of the total population of the earth. The center of this conspiracy, Soviet Russia, has by the grimmest determination and harshest of means raised itself to be the second military and economic power in the world today. Its leaders never lose the opportunity to declare their determination to become the first with all possible speed.

"The other great Communist power, Red China, is now in the early stages of its social and economic revolution. Its leaders are showing the same ruthless drive for power and to this end are striving for ever increasing economic output. They seem not to care that the results--which thus far have been considerable in materialistic terms--are built upon the crushed spirits and the broken bodies of their people.

"The fact that the Soviet Union has just come through a great revolutionary process to a position of enormous power and that the world's most populous nation, China, is in the course of tremendous change at the very time when so large a part of the free world is in the flux of revolutionary movements, provides Communism with what it sees as its golden opportunity. By the same token freedom is faced with difficulties of unprecedented scope and severity--and opportunity as well.

"Communism exploits the opportunity to intensify world unrest by every possible means. At the same time Communism masquerades as the pattern of progress, as the path to economic equality, as the way to freedom from what it calls 'Western imperialism', as the wave of the future.

"For the free world there is the challenge to convince a billion people in the less developed areas that there is a way of life by which they can have bread and the ballot, a better livelihood and the right to choose the means of their livelihood, social change and social justice--in short, progress and liberty. The dignity of man is at stake.

"Communism is determined to win this contest--freedom must be just as dedicated or the struggle could finally go against us. Though no shot would have been fired, freedom and democracy would have lost.

"This battle is now joined. The next decade will forecast its outcome.

"The fourth reality is that the military position and economic prosperity of the United States are interdependent with those of the rest of the free world.

"As I shall outline more fully below, our military strategy is part of a common defense effort involving many nations. The defense of the free world is strengthened and progress toward a more stable peace is advanced by the fact that powerful free world forces are established on territory adjoining the areas of Communist power. The deterrent power of our air and naval forces and our intermediate range missile is materially increased by the availability of bases in friendly countries abroad.

"Moreover the military strength of our country and the needs of our industry cannot be supplied from our own resources. Such basic necessities as iron ore, bauxite for aluminum, manganese, natural rubber, tin, and many other materials acutely important to our military and industrial strength are either not produced in our own country or are not produced in sufficient quantities to meet our needs. This is an additional reason why we must help to remain free the nations which supply these resources."

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"Two fundamental purposes of our collective defense effort are to prevent general war and to deter Communist local aggression.

"We know the enormous and growing Communist potential to launch a war of nuclear destruction and their willingness to use this power as a threat to the free world. We know also that even local aggressions, unless checked, could absorb nation after nation into the Communist orbit--or could flame into world war.

"The protection of the free world against the threat or the reality of Soviet nuclear aggression or local attack rests on the common defense effort established under our collective security agreements. The protective power of our Strategic Air Command and our naval air units is assured even greater strength not only by the availability of bases abroad but also by the early warning facilities, the defensive installations, and the logistic support installations maintained on the soil of these and other allies and friends for our common protection.

"The strategy of general defense is made stronger and of local defense is made possible by the powerful defensive forces which our allies in Europe, in the Middle East, and the Far East have raised and maintain on the soil of their homelands, on the borders of the Communist world."

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25. Address at the Gettysburg College Convocation: The Importance of Understanding, April 4, 1959, Public Papers of the Presidents--Eisenhower, 1959, p. 310.

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"I shall not attempt to talk to you about education, but I shall speak of one vital purpose of education--the development of understanding--understanding, so that we may use with some measure of wisdom the knowledge we may have acquired, whether in school or out.

"For no matter how much intellectual luggage we carry around in our heads, it becomes valuable only if we know how to use the information--only if we are able to relate one fact of a problem to the others do we truly understand them.

"This is my subject today--the need for greater individual and collective understanding of some of the international facts of today's life. We need to understand our country's purpose and role in strengthening the world's free nations which, with us, see our concepts of freedom and human dignity threatened by atheistic dictatorship.

"If through education--no matter how acquired--people develop understanding of basic issues, and so can distinguish between the common, long-term good of all, on the one hand, and convenient but shortsighted expediency on the other, they will support policies under which the nation will prosper. And if people should ever lack the discernment to understand, or the character to rise above their own selfish short-term interests, free government would become well nigh impossible to sustain. Such a government would be reduced to nothing more than a device which seeks merely to accommodate itself and the country's good to the bitter tugs-of-war of conflicting pressure groups. Disaster could eventually result.

"Though the subject I have assigned myself is neither abstruse nor particularly difficult to comprehend, its importance to our national and individual lives is such that failure to marshal, to organize, and to analyze the facts pertaining to it could have for all of us consequences of the most serious character. We must study, think, and decide on the governmental program that we term 'Mutual Security.'

"The true need and value of this program will be recognized by our people only if they can answer this question: 'Why should America, at heavy and immediate sacrifice to herself, assist many other nations, particularly the less developed ones, in achieving greater moral, economic, and military strength?'

"What are the facts?

"The first and most important fact is the implacable and frequently expressed purpose of imperialistic communism to promote world revolution, destroy freedom, and communize the world.

"Its methods are all-inclusive, ranging through the use of propaganda, political subversion, economic penetration, and the use or the threat of force.

"The second fact is that our country is today spending an aggregate of about 47 billion dollars annually for the single purpose of preserving the nation's position and security in the world. This includes the costs of the Defense Department, the production of nuclear weapons, and mutual security. All three are mutually supporting and are blended into one program for our safety. The size of this cost conveys something of the entire program's importance--to the world and, indeed, to each of us.

"And when I think of this importance to us, think of it in this one material figure, this cost annually for every single man, woman, and child of the entire nation is about 275 dollars a year.

"The next fact we note is that since the Communist target is the world, every nation is comprehended in their campaign for domination. The weak and the most exposed stand in the most immediate danger.

"Another fact, that we ignore to our peril, is that if aggression or subversion against the weaker of the free nations should achieve successive victories, communism would step-by-step overcome once free areas. The danger, even to the strongest, would become increasingly menacing.

"Clearly, the self-interest of each free nation impels it to resist the loss to imperialistic communism of the freedom and independence of any other nation.

"Freedom is truly indivisible.

"To apply some of these truths to a particular case, let us consider, briefly, the country of Viet-Nam, and the importance to us of the security and progress of that country.

"It is located, as you know, in the southeastern corner of Asia, exactly halfway round the world from Gettysburg College.

"Viet-Nam is a country divided into two parts--like Korea and Germany. The southern half, with its twelve million people, is free, but poor. It is an under-developed country--its economy is weak--average individual income being less than $200 a year. The northern half has been turned over to communism. A line of demarcation running along the 17th parallel separates the two. To the north of this line stand several Communist divisions. These facts pose to South Viet-Nam two great tasks: self-defense and economic growth.

"Understandably, the people of Viet-Nam want to make their country a thriving, self-sufficient member of the family of nations. This means economic expansion.

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"For Viet-Nam's economic growth, the acquisition of capital is vitally necessary. Now, the nation could create the capital needed for growth by stealing from the already meager rice bowls of its people and regimenting them into work battalions. This enslavement is the commune system--adopted by the new overlords of Red China. It would mean, of course, the loss of freedom within the country without any hostile outside action whatsoever.

"Another way for Viet-Nam to get the necessary capital is through private investments from the outside, and through governmental loans and, where necessary, grants from other and more fortunately situated nations.

"In either of these ways the economic problem of Viet-Nam could be solved. But only the second way can preserve freedom.

"And there is still the other of Viet-Nam's great problems--how to support the military forces it needs without crushing its economy.

"Because of the proximity of large Communist military formations in the North, Free Viet-Nam must maintain substantial numbers of men under arms. Moreover, while the government has shown real progress in cleaning out Communist guerrillas, those remaining continue to be a disruptive influence in the nation's life.

"Unassisted, Viet-Nam cannot at this time produce and support the military formations essential to it, or, equally important, the morale--the hope, the confidence, the pride--necessary to meet the dual threat of aggression from without and subversion within its borders.

"Still another fact! Strategically, South Viet-Nam's capture by the Communists would bring their power several hundred miles into a hitherto free region. The remaining countries in Southeast Asia would be menaced by a great flanking movement. The freedom of twelve million people would be lost immediately, and that of 150 million others in adjacent lands would be seriously endangered. The loss of South Viet-Nam would set in motion a crumbling process that could, as it progressed, have grave consequences for us and for freedom.

"Viet-Nam must have a reasonable degree of safety now--both for her people and for her property. Because of these facts, military as well as economic help is currently needed in Viet-Nam.

"We reach the inescapable conclusion that our own national interests demand some help from us in sustaining in Viet-Nam the morale, the economic progress, and the military strength necessary to its continued existence in freedom.

"Viet-Nam is just one example. One-third of the world's people face a similar challenge. All through Africa and Southern Asia people struggle to preserve liberty and improve their standards of living, to maintain their dignity as humans. It is imperative that they succeed.

"But some uninformed Americans believe that we should turn our backs on these people, our friends. Our costs and taxes are very real, while the difficulties of other peoples often seem remote from us.

"But the costs of continuous neglect of these problems would be far more than we must now bear--indeed more than we could afford. The added costs would be paid not only in vastly increased outlays of money, but in larger drafts of our youth into the Military Establishment, and in terms of increased danger to our own security and prosperity.

"No matter what areas of Federal spending must be curtailed--and some should--our safety comes first. Since that safety is necessarily based upon a sound and thriving economy, its protection must equally engage our earnest attention.

"As a different kind of example of free nation interdependence, there is Japan, where very different problems exist--but problems equally vital to the security of the free world. Japan is an essential counterweight to Communist strength in Asia. Her industrial power is the heart of any collective effort to defend the Far East against aggression.

"Her more than 90 million people occupy a country where the arable land is no more than that of California. More than perhaps any other industrial nation, Japan must export to live. Last year she had a trade deficit. At one time she had a thriving trade with Asia, particularly with her nearest neighbors. Much of it is gone. Her problems grow more grave.

"For Japan there must be more free world outlets for her products. She does not want to be compelled to become dependent as a last resort upon the Communist empire. Should she ever be forced to that extremity, the blow to free world security would be incalculable; at the least it would mean for all other free nations greater sacrifice, greater danger, and lessened economic strength.

"What happens depends largely on what the free world nations can, and will, do.

"Upon us--upon you here--in this audience--rests a heavy responsibility. We must weigh the facts, fit them into place, and decide on our course of action.

"For a country as large, as industrious, and as progressive as Japan to exist with the help of grant aid by others, presents no satisfactory solution. Furthermore, for us, the cost would be, over the long

term, increasingly heavy. Trade is the key to a durable Japanese economy.

"One of Japan's greatest opportunities for increased trade lies in a free and developing Southeast Asia. So we see that the two problems I have been discussing are two parts of a single one--the great need in Japan is for raw materials; in Southern Asia it is for manufactured goods. The two regions complement each other markedly. So, by strengthening Viet-Nam and helping insure the safety of the South Pacific and Southeast Asia, we gradually develop the great trade potential between this region, rich in natural resources, and highly industrialized Japan to the benefit of both. In this way freedom in the Western Pacific will be greatly strengthened and the interests of the whole free world advanced. But such a basic improvement can come about only gradually. Japan must have additional trade outlets now. These can be provided if each of the industrialized nations in the West does its part in liberalizing trade relations with Japan."

* * *

26. Special Message to the Congress on the Mutual Security Program, February 16, 1960, Public Papers of the Presidents--Eisenhower, 1960, p. 176.

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"The Mutual Security Program is a program essential to peace. The accomplishments of the Mutual Security Program in helping to meet the many challenges in the mid-20th Century place it among the foremost of the great programs of American history. Without them the map of the world would be vastly different today. The Mutual Security Program and its predecessors have been an indispensable contributor to the present fact that Greece, Turkey, Iran, Laos, Vietnam, Korea and Taiwan, and many nations of Western Europe, to mention only part, remain the home of free men.

"While over the past year the Soviet Union has expressed an interest in measures to reduce the common peril of war, and while its recent deportment and pronouncement suggest the possible opening of a somewhat less strained period in our relationships, the menace of Communist imperialism nevertheless still remains. The military power of the Soviet Union continues to grow. Increasingly important to free world interests is the rate of growth of both military and economic power in Communist China. Evidence that this enormous power bloc remains dedicated to the extension of Communist control over all peoples everywhere is found in Tibet, the Taiwan Straits, in Laos and along the Indian border.

"In the face of this ever-present Communist threat, we must, in our own interest as well as that of the other members of the free world community, continue our program of military assistance through the various

mutual security arrangements we have established. Under these arrangements each nation has responsibilties, commensurate with its capabilities, to participate in the development and maintenance of defensive strength. There is also increasing ability of other free world nations to share the burden of this common defense.

"Obviously, no one nation alone could bear the cost of defending all the free world. Likewise, it would be impossible for many free nations long to survive if forced to act separately and alone. The crumbling of the weaker ones would obviously and increasingly multiply the threats to those remaining free, even the very strongest.

"Collective security is not only sensible--it is essential."

* * *

27. U.S. Sends Greetings to Viet-Nam on Anniversary of Independence, White House Press Release dated October 25, 1960, Department of State Bulletin

"The White House on October 25 made public the following message from President Eisenhower to Ngo Dinh Diem, President of the Republic of Viet-Nam.

"OCTOBER 22, 1960

"DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: My countrymen and I are proud to convey our good wishes to you and to the citizens of Viet-Nam on the fifth anniversary of the birth of the Republic of Viet-Nam.

"We have watched the courage and daring with which you and the Vietnamese people attained independence in a situation so perilous that many thought it hopeless. We have admired the rapidity with which chaos yielded to order and progress replaced despair.

"During the years of your independence it has been refreshing for us to observe how clearly the Government and the citizens of Viet-Nam have faced the fact that the greatest danger to their independence was Communism. You and your countrymen have used your strength well in accepting the double challenge of building your country and resisting Communist imperialism. In five short years since the founding of the Republic, the Vietnamese people have developed their country in almost every sector. I was particularly impressed by one example. I am informed that last year over 1,200,000 Vietnamese children were able to go to elementary school; three times as many as were enrolled five years earlier. This is certainly a heartening development for Viet-Nam's future. At the same time Viet-Nam's ability to defend itself from the Communists has grown immeasurably since its successful struggle to become an independent Republic.

"Viet-Nam's very success as well as its potential wealth and its strategic location have led the Communists of Hanoi, goaded by the bitterness of their failure to enslave all Viet-Nam, to use increasing violence in their attempts to destroy your country's freedom.

"This grave threat, added to the strains and fatigues of the long struggle to achieve and strengthen independence, must be a burden that would cause moments of tension and concern in almost any human heart. Yet from long observation I sense how deeply the Vietnamese value their country's independence and strength and I know how well you used your boldness when you led your countrymen in winning it. I also know that your determination has been a vital factor in guarding that independence while steadily advancing the economic development of your country. I am confident that these same qualities of determination and boldness will meet the renewed threat as well as the needs and desires of your countrymen for further progress on all fronts.

"Although the main responsibility for guarding that independence will always, as it has in the past, belong to the Vietnamese people and their government, I want to assure you that for so long as our strength can be useful, the United States will continue to assist Viet-Nam in the difficult yet hopeful struggle ahead.

"Sincerely,

"DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER."

KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION

SUMMARY -

The Administration of President Kennedy justified the growing U.S. involvement in Vietnam utilizing much the same rationale that had been employed by the Administrations of President Truman and President Eisenhower. Initially, the situation in Vietnam received less emphasis than the crisis in Laos, although the principles cited for U.S. concern for Laos -- the identification of U.S. interests with its independence; SEATO obligations -- were couched in terms of collective security for Southeast Asia. Thereafter, as insurgency in Vietnam itself came to the fore, the Administration's public statements stressed the following:

a. The struggle against the worldwide communist offensive had to confront the danger that through "subversion, infiltration, and a host of other tactics...our security may be lost piece by piece, country by country, without the firing of a single missile or the crossing of a single border."

b. The "domino principle": the countries of Southeast Asia are interdependent for security, and the independence of each is important to the United States.

c. ICC reports, as well as U.S. and South Vietnamese intelligence, demonstrate that Communist North Vietnam has provided illegally, armed and unarmed personnel, arms, munitions, and other supplies from North Vietnam to insurgents in South Vietnam for the purpose of supporting an organized attempt to overthrow the government there.

d. "Now our great responsibility is to be the chief defender of freedom, in this time of maximum danger. Only the U.S. has the power and the resources and the determination."

e. The United States, although not a party to the Geneva Accords, declared at Geneva in 1954 that it would "view any renewal of the aggression in violation of the agreements with grave concern and as seriously threatening international peace and security." President Kennedy assured President Diem that "in accordance with that declaration, and in response to your request, we are prepared to help the Republic of Vietnam to protect its people and to preserve its independence."

f. The SEATO Pact, by a protocol, extended the protection of the treaty to Vietnam; hence the treaty, in President Kennedy's words, "stated that the United States recognized that aggression by means of armed attack against Vietnam would threaten our own peace and security... the attack on the government by the communist forces, with assistance from the north, became of greater and greater concern to the Government of Vietnam and the Government of the United States."

V. C. JUSTIFICATION OF THE WAR -- PUBLIC STATEMENTS

KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION

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38. Kennedy confirms his belief in "domino theory" and emphasizes need to remain and help government strengthen and reform (9 September 1963)..... C-41

39. Kennedy admits to the presence of 25,000 Americans in South Vietnam with a primary goal of winning the war (12 September 1963)..... C-42

40. Kennedy gives excellent assessment of U.S. role and responsibility to lead the defense of the world's free nations (25 September 1963)..... C-42

41. Kennedy cites U.S. role as leader of Free World (26 September 1963)..... C-43

42. Policy statement reaffirming U.S. intent to fight aggression in Vietnam and elsewhere where independence and freedom are threatened (2 October 1963)..... C-44

43. Kennedy had planned in his Dallas speech to emphasize that work alone cannot defend the Free World from Communist advances; military and economic assistance must be available to back U.S. promises (22 November 1963)..... C-45

C. Kennedy Administration

1. Senator John F. Kennedy, Congressional Record, February 29, 1960, p. 3582:

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"But both before and after 1953 events have demonstrated that our nuclear retaliatory power is not enough. It cannot deter Communist aggression which is too limited to justify atomic war. It cannot protect uncommitted nations against a Communist takeover using local or guerrilla forces. It cannot be used in so-called brush-fire peripheral wars. In short, it cannot prevent the Communists from gradually nibbling at the fringe of the free world's territory and strength, until our security has been steadily eroded in piecemeal fashion - each Red advance being too small to justify massive retaliation, with all its risks.

* * *

"In short, we need forces of an entirely different kind to keep the peace against limited aggression, and to fight it, if deterrence fails, without raising the conflict to a disastrous pitch.

"And our capability for conventional war is insufficient to avoid the hopeless dilemma of choosing between launching a nuclear attack and watching aggressors make piecemeal conquests."

2. Senator John F. Kennedy's statement in Congressional Record, June 14, 1960, p. 11631:

* * *

"We must regain the ability to intervene effectively and swiftly in any limited war anywhere in the world -- augmenting, modernizing and providing increased mobility and versatility for the conventional forces and weapons of the Army and Marine Corps. As long as those forces lack the necessary airlift and sealift capacity and versatility of firepower, we cannot protect our commitments around the globe - resist non-nuclear aggressions - or be certain of having enough time to decide on the use of our nuclear power."

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3. Senator John F. Kennedy's statement as quoted in the Washington Daily News, September 22, 1960:

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"The recognition is not really the crux of our foreign policy. The real question is what should be done about the harsh facts that China is a powerful and aggressive nation. The dangerous situation now existing

can be remedied only by a strong and successful India, a strong and successful Japan, and some kind of regional group over Southeast Asia which gives these smaller countries the feeling that, in spite of their distaste for a military alliance, they will not be left to be picked off one by one at the whim of the Peiping regime."

4. Senator John F. Kennedy Interview as Reported in The Washington Post, October 22, 1960:

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"Cronkite: '...What areas do you see where the United States might take the offensive in a challenge to communism over the next 4 to 8 years?'

"Kennedy: '...the most vulnerable area, I have felt, has been eastern Europe. I have been critical of the Administration's failure to suggest policies which would make it possible for us to establish, for example, closer relations with Poland, particularly after the '55-'56 period and the Hungarian revolution. We indicated at that time that we were not going to intervene militarily. There was a period there when Poland demonstrated a national independence, and even the Polish Government moved some distance away from the Soviet Union.

"...Secondly, the relations between Russia and China. They are now engaged in a debate over whether war is the means of communizing the world, or whether they should use subversion and infiltration, economic struggles and all the rest. No one can say what that course of action will be, but I think the next President of the United States should watch it carefully. If those two years should split, it could have great effects throughout the entire world.

"Thirdly, I believe that India represents a great area for affirmative action by the Free World. India started from about the same place that China did. The Chinese Communists have been moving ahead the last 10 years. India...has been making some progress, but if India does not succeed with her 450 million people, if she can't make freedom work, then people around the world are going to determine, particularly in the underdeveloped world, that the only way they can develop their resources is through the Communist system."

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5. Kennedy Presidential News Conference as Quoted in the New York Times, March 24, 1961. News Conference of March 23, 1961:

* * *

"My fellow Americans, Laos is far away from America, but the world is small. Its 2,000,000 people live in a country three times the size of Austria. The security of all Southeast Asia will be endangered if Laos loses its neutral independence. Its own safety runs with the safety of us all, in real neutrality observed by all.

"I want to make it clear to the American people and to all of the world that all we want in Laos is peace and not war, a truly neutral government and not a cold war pawn, a settlement concluded at the conference table and not on the battlefield.

* * *

"Q. 'Mr. President, there appears to be some national unawareness of the importance of a free Laos to the security of the United States and to the individual American. Could you spell out your views on that a little further?

"A. 'Well, quite obviously geographically Laos borders on Thailand, which is, to which the United States has treaty obligations under the SEATO agreement of 1954, it borders on South Vietnam - it borders on Vietnam - to which the United States has very close ties, and also which is a signatory of the SEATO pact.

"The aggression against Laos itself was referred to in the SEATO agreement, so that given this, the nature of the geography, its location the commitments which the United States and obligations which the United States has assumed towards Laos as well as the surrounding countries - as well as other signatories of the SEATO pact - it's quite obvious that if the Communists were able to move in and dominate this country, it would endanger the security of all, and the peace of all of Southeast Asia.

"And as a member of the United Nations and as a signatory to the SEATO pact, and as a country which is concerned with the strength of the cause of freedom around the world, that quite obviously affects the security of the United States."

6. President Kennedy's Special Message to Congress on the Defense Budget, March 28, 1961, Public Papers of the Presidents, Kennedy; 1961, p. 229:

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"The strength and deployment of our forces in combination with those of our allies should be sufficiently powerful and mobile to prevent the steady erosion of the Free World through limited wars; and it is this role that should constitute the primary mission of our overseas forces. Non-nuclear wars, and sub-limited or guerrilla warfare, have since 1945 constituted the most active and constant threat to Free World security. Those units of our forces which are stationed overseas, or designed to fight overseas, can be most usefully oriented toward deterring or confining those conflicts which do not justify and must not lead to a general nuclear attack. In the event of a major aggression that could not be repulsed by conventional forces, we must be prepared to take whatever action with whatever weapons are appropriate. But our objective now is to increase our ability to confine our response to non-nuclear weapons, and to lessen the incentive for

for any limited aggression by making clear what our response will accomplish. In most areas of the world, the main burden of local defense against overt attack, subversion and guerrilla warfare must rest on local populations and forces. But given the great likelihood and seriousness of this threat, we must be prepared to make a substantial contribution in the form of strong, highly mobile forces trained in this type of warfare, some of which must be deployed in forward areas, with a substantial airlift and sealift capacity and prestocked overseas bases.

"In this area of local wars, we must inevitably count on the cooperative efforts of other peoples and nations who share our concern. Indeed, their interests are more often directly engaged in such conflicts. The self-reliant are also those whom it is easiest to help -- and for these reasons we must continue and reshape the Military Assistance Program which I have discussed earlier in my special message on foreign aid.

"Strengthened capacity to meet limited and guerrilla warfare -- limited military adventures and threats to the security of the Free World that are not large enough to justify the label of 'limited war.' We need a greater ability to deal with guerrilla forces, insurrections, and subversion. Much of our effort to create guerrilla and anti-guerrilla capabilities has in the past been aimed at general war. We must be ready now to deal with any size of force, including small externally-supported bands of men; and we must help train local forces to be equally effective."

7. President Kennedy's Address to American Society of Newspaper Editors, April 20, 1961, Public Papers of the Presidents, Kennedy, 1961, p. 306:

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"...we face a relentless struggle in every corner of the globe that goes far beyond the clash of armies or even nuclear armaments. The armies are there, and in large number. The nuclear armaments are there. But they serve primarily as the shield behind which subversion, infiltration, and a host of other tactics steadily advance, picking off vulnerable areas one by one in situations which do not permit our own armed intervention.

"Power is the hallmark of this offensive -- power and discipline and deceit. The legitimate discontent of yearning people is exploited. The legitimate trappings of self-determination are employed. But once in power, all talk of discontent is repressed, all self-determination disappears, and the promise of a revolution of hope is betrayed, as in Cuba, into a reign of terror. Those who on instruction staged automatic 'riots' in the streets of free nations over the efforts of a small group of young Cubans to regain their freedom should recall the long roll call of refugees who cannot now go back -- to Hungary, to North Korea, to North Viet-Nam, to East Germany, or to Poland, or to any of the other lands from which a steady stream of refugees pours forth, in eloquent testimony to the cruel oppression now holding sway in their homeland.

"We dare not fail to see the insidious nature of this new and deeper struggle. We dare not fail to grasp the new concepts, the new tools, the new sense of urgency we will need to combat it -- whether in Cuba or South Viet-Nam. And we dare not fail to realize that this struggle is taking place every day, without fanfare, in thousands of villages and markets -- day and night -- and in classrooms all over the globe.

"The message of Cuba, of Laos, of the rising din of Communist voices in Asia and Latin America -- these messages are all the same. The complacent, the self-indulgent, the soft societies are about to be swept away with the debris of history. Only the strong, only the industrious, only the determined, only the courageous, only the visionary who determine the real nature of our struggle can possibly survive.

"No greater task faces this country or this administration. No other challenge is more deserving of our every effort and energy. Too long we have fixed our eyes on traditional military needs, on armies prepared to cross borders, on missiles poised for flight. Now it should be clear that this is no longer enough -- that our security may be lost piece by piece, country by country, without the firing of a single missile or the crossing of a single border.

"We intend to profit from this lesson. We intend to re-examine and re-orient our forces of all kinds -- our tactics and our institutions here in this community. We intend to intensify our efforts for a struggle in many ways more difficult than war, where disappointment will often accompany us.

"For I am convinced that we in this country and in the free world possess the necessary resource, and the skill, and the added strength that comes from a belief in the freedom of man. And I am equally convinced that history will record the fact that this bitter struggle reached its climax in the late 1950's and the early 1960's. Let me then make clear as the President of the United States that I am determined upon our system's survival and success, regardless of the cost and regardless of the peril!"

8. President Kennedy's Address, in Chicago to Democratic Party Dinner, April 28, 1961, Public Papers of the Presidents, Kennedy, 1961, p. 340:

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"We live in a hazardous and dangerous time. I do not think it's possible to overstate it. We live in a world which has changed tremendously in our lifetime -- history only will secure a full perspective on that change. But here is Africa, which was held by Western European powers for several centuries, now independent -- which holds within its countries masses of people, many of them illiterate, who live on average incomes of 50 or 60 or 75 dollars a year, who want a change, who now are the masters of their own house but who lack the means of building a viable economy, who are impressed by the example of the Soviet Union and the Chinese, who -- not

knowing the meaning of freedom in their own lives -- wonder whether the Communist system holds the secret of organizing the resources of the state in order to bring them a better life.

"And what is true of Africa is true of Asia, and what is true of Africa and Asia is true in some degree of Latin America. The Communists move among them, disciplined, organized, subject to an international discipline, promising under their system that all will be well, knowing that if they can win just once, then the iron grip of the totalitarian state goes upon the population -- those who resist become refugees, or are shot -- and they manage to control the population.

"Tonight, in Viet-Nam, where the President was re-elected recently in the last 2 weeks by a majority of 75 to 80 percent, yet a small army of guerrillas, organized and sustained by the Communist Viet Minh in the north, control most of the countryside in the nighttime -- in the last 12 months have assassinated over four thousand civil officers, two thousand state employees and two thousand police, believing if they can 'spill the wine,' that then they can win control of the population. And when they have won, they do not intend to give way.

"Now our great responsibility is to be the chief defender of freedom, in this time of maximum danger. Only the United States has the power and the resources and the determination. We have committed ourselves to the defense of dozens of countries stretched around the globe who look to us for independence, who look to us for the defense of their freedom.

"We are prepared to meet our obligations, but we can only defend the freedom of those who are determined to be free themselves. We can assist them -- we will bear more than our share of the burden, but we can only help those who are ready to bear their share of the burden themselves.

"The Russians and the Chinese, containing within their borders nearly a billion people, totally mobilized for the advance of the Communist system, operating from narrow, interior lines of communication, pressuring on Southeast Asia with the masses of the Chinese armies potentially ready to move -- of the Russians who hold great power potentially in the Middle East and Western Europe -- the United States stands as the chief defender of freedom.

"I said in my Inaugural Address that no group of people in any generation since democracy was first developed by the ancient Greeks nearly twenty-four or -five hundred years ago, have ever borne a responsibility as great as ours. And I welcome it -- and I welcome it tonight.

"There is no easy answer to the dilemmas that we face. Our great ally is the fact that people do desire to be free, that people will sacrifice everything in their desire to maintain their independence. And as the true nature of the Communist conspiracy becomes better known around the globe, when people come to realize -- as they surely will -- that the Communist advance does not represent a means of liberation but represents a final

enslavement, then I believe that they will rally to the cause to which we have given our support and our commitment.

"I believe that we must build our country well, also. Senator Douglas described what we are attempting to do.- The burdens are heavy upon us. We have to make this society an example to the world, strong enough to serve not only as an example but strong enough to maintain the commitments that we have assumed.".

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9. President Kennedy's Presidential News Conference, May 5, 1961, Public Papers of the Presidents, Kennedy, 1961, p. 356:

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"Q. 'There have been reports that you would be prepared to send American forces into South Vietnam if that became necessary to prevent Communist domination of that country. Could you tell us whether that is correct and also anything else you have regarding plans for that country?

"A. 'Well, we have had a group working in the Government and we've had a Security Council meeting about the problems which are faced in Vietnam by guerrillas and by the barrage which the present Government is being subjected to. The problem of troops...the matter of what we're going to do to assist Vietnam to obtain its independence it...a matter still under consideration!..."

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10. Joint Communique Issued at Saigon by the Vice President of the United States and the President of Viet-Nam, May 13, 1961, Department of State Bulletin, June 19, 1961, p. 956:

"The United States, for its part, is conscious of the determination, energy and sacrifices which the Vietnamese people, under the dedicated leadership of President Ngo Dinh Diem, have brought to the defense of freedom in their land.

"The United States is also conscious of its responsibility and duty, in its own self-interest as well as in the interest of other free peoples, to assist a brave country in the defense of its liberties against unprovoked subversion and Communist terror. It has no other motive than the defense of freedom."

11. President Kennedy's Special Message to Congress, May 25, 1961, Public Papers of the Presidents, Kennedy, 1961:

"The great battleground for the defense and expansion of freedom today is the whole southern half of the globe -- Asia, Latin America, Africa and

the Middle East -- the lands of the rising peoples. Their revolution is the greatest in human history. They seek an end to injustice, tyranny, and exploitation. More than an end, they seek a beginning.

"And theirs is a revolution which we would support regardless of the Cold War, and regardless of which political or economic route they should choose to freedom.

"For the adversaries of freedom did not create the revolution; nor did they create the conditions which compel it. But they are seeking to ride the crest of its wave -- to capture it for themselves.

"Yet their aggression is more often concealed than open. They have fired no missiles; and their troops are seldom seen. They send arms, agitators, aid, technicians and propaganda to every troubled area. But where fighting is required, it is usually done by others -- by guerrillas striking at night, by assassins striking alone -- assassins who have taken the lives of four thousand civil officers in the last twelve months in Vietnam alone -- by subversive and saboteurs and insurrectionists, who in some cases control whole areas inside of independent nations.

"With these formidable weapons, the adversaries of freedom plan to consolidate their territory -- to exploit, to control, and finally to destroy the hopes of the world's newest nations; and they have ambition to do it before the end of this decade. It is a contest of will and purpose as well as force and violence -- a battle for minds and souls as well as lives and territory. And in that contest, we cannot stand aside.

"We stand, as we have always stood from our earliest beginnings, for the independence and equality of all nations. This nation was born of revolution and raised in freedom. And we do not intend to leave an open road for despotism.

"There is no single simple policy which meets this challenge. Experience has taught us that no one nation has the power or the wisdom to solve all the problems of the world or manage its revolutionary tides -- that extending our commitments does not always increase our security -- that any initiative carries with it the risk of a temporary defeat -- that nuclear weapons cannot prevent subversion -- that no free people can be kept free without will and energy of their own -- "

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12. President Kennedy's Address to the United Nations, September 25, 1961, Public Papers of the Presidents, Kennedy, 1961, p. 624:

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"Finally, as President of the United States, I consider it my duty to report to this Assembly on two threats to the peace which are not on your crowded agenda, but which causes us, and most of you, the deepest concern.

"The first threat on which I wish to report is widely misunderstood: the smoldering coals of war in Southeast Asia. South Vietnam is already under attack -- sometimes by a single assassin, sometimes by a band of guerrillas, recently by full battalions. The peaceful borders of Burma, Cambodia and India have been repeatedly violated. And the peaceful people of Laos are in danger of losing the independence they gained not so long ago.

"No one can call these 'wars of liberation.' For these are free countries living under governments. Nor are these aggressions any less real because men are knifed in their homes and not shot in the fields of battle.

"The very simple question confronting the world community is whether measures can be devised to protect the small and weak from such tactics. For if they are successful in Laos and South Vietnam, the gates will be opened wide.

"The United States seeks for itself no base, no territory, no special position in this area of any kind. We support a truly neutral and independent Laos, its people free from outside interference, living at peace with themselves and with their neighbors, assured that their territory will not be used for attacks on others, and under a government comparable (as Mr. Khrushchev and I agreed at Vienna) to Cambodia and Burma.

"But now the negotiations over Laos are reaching a crucial stage. The ceasefire is at best precarious. The rainy season is coming to an end. Laotian territory is being used to infiltrate South Vietnam. The world community must recognize -- all those who are involved -- that this potent threat to Laotian peace and freedom is individible from all other threats to their own."

13. President Kennedy's News Conference, October 11, 1961, Public Papers of the Presidents, Kennedy, 1961, p. 660:

"Troops to Vietnam?

"Q. Mr. President, in reference to your decision to send General Taylor to Vietnam, there may be some interpretation of that decision as implying confirmation of reports that you intend to send American forces to Vietnam or Thailand or Laos. Can you give us your appraisal of the conditions under which you might find it necessary to send troops?

"THE PRESIDENT: We are going to wait until General Taylor comes back and brings an up-to-date description of the situation, particularly in Vietnam. As you know, in the last two or three months there has been a large increase in the number of the forces that have been involved. There has been evidence that some of these forces have come from beyond the frontiers. General Taylor will give me and the Joint Chiefs of Staff an educated

military guess as to what the situation is that the government there faces. Then we can come to conclusions as to what is the best thing to do."

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14. President Kennedy letter to President Diem, December 14, 1961, Department of State Bulletin, January 1, 1962, p. 13:

"Dear Mr. President: I have received your recent letter in which you described so cogently the dangerous condition caused by North Viet-Nam's efforts to take over your country. The situation in your embattled country is well known to me and to the American people. We have been deeply disturbed by the assault on your country. Our indignation has mounted as the deliberate savagery of the Communist program of assassination, kidnapping and wanton violence became clear.

"Your letter underlines what our own information has convincingly shown -- that the campaign of force and terror now being waged against your people and your Government is supported and directed from the outside by the authorities at Hanoi. They have thus violated the provisions of the Geneva Accords designed to ensure peace in Viet-Nam and to which they bound themselves in 1954.

"At that time, the United States, although not a party to the Accords, declared that it 'would view any renewal of the aggression in violation of the agreements with grave concern and as seriously threatening international peace and security.' We continue to maintain that view.

"In accordance with that declaration, and in response to your request, we are prepared to help the Republic of Viet-Nam to protect its people and to preserve its independence. We shall promptly increase our assistance to your defense effort as well as help relieve the destruction of the floods which you describe. I have already given the orders to get these programs underway.

"The United States, like the Republic of Viet-Nam, remains devoted to the cause of peace and our primary purpose is to help your people maintain their independence. If the Communist authorities in North Viet-Nam will stop their campaign to destroy the Republic of Viet-Nam, the measures we are taking to assist your defense efforts will no longer be necessary. We shall seek to persuade the Communists to give up their attempts of force and subversion. In any case, we are confident that the Vietnamese people will preserve their independence and gain the peace and prosperity for which they have sought so hard and so long.

"JOHN F. KENNEDY

"His Excellency Ngo Dinh Diem
President and Secretary of State for
National Defense
The Republic of Viet-Nam
Saigon, Viet-Nam"

15. President Kennedy's State of the Union Message, January 11, 1962, Public Papers of the Presidents, Kennedy, 1962, p. 12:

* * *

"A satisfactory settlement in Laos would also help to achieve and safeguard the peace in Viet Nam -- where the foe is increasing his tactics of terror -- where our own efforts have been stepped up -- and where the local government has initiated new programs and reforms to broaden the base of resistance. The systematic aggression now bleeding that country is not a 'war of liberation' -- for Viet Nam is already free. It is a war of attempted subjugation -- and it will be resisted.

16. President Kennedy's News Conference, January 15, 1962, Public Papers of the Presidents, Kennedy, 1962, p. 18:

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"Q. In the past it would seem that coalition governments lean towards Communist control. Are we then taking a chance in supporting a coalition-type government in Southeast Asia?

"A. We are taking a chance in all of Southeast Asia and we're taking a chance in other areas.

"Nobody can make any predictions sure for the future really on any matter in which there are powerful interests at stake. I think, however, that we have to consider what our alternatives are and what the prospects for war are in that area if we fail in our present efforts, and the geographic problems which would have to be surmounted in such a military engagement where there is no easy entrance by sea and where the geographic location is extremely -- a long way from us and very close to those who might become involved. So that there is no easy sure answer for Laos.

"But it is my judgment that it is in the best interests of our country to work for a neutral and independent Laos. We are attempting to do that and I can assure you that I recognize the risks that are involved. But I also think we should consider the risks if we fail. And particularly of the possibility of escalation of a military struggle in a place of danger. So we're going to attempt to work out this matter in a way which permits us to try."

17. President Kennedy's News Conference, February 7, 1962, Public Papers of the Presidents, Kennedy, 1962, p. 121:

"The Subterranean War

"Q. Mr. President, there seems to be some doubt, at least on the local level and in the region where this is going on, as to the right of the American people and the rest of the world to know the extent of the battle

in South Vietnam. Could you tell us, sir, what the situation is there? How deeply are we involved in what seems to be a growing war and what are the rights of the people to know what our forces are doing?

"THE PRESIDENT: There is a war going on in South Vietnam, and I think that last week there were over 500 killings, and assassinations and bombings and the casualties are high. As I said last week, it is a subterranean war, a guerrilla war of increasing ferocity. The United States, since the end of the Geneva Accord, setting up the South Vietnamese government as an independent government, has been assisting Vietnam economically to maintain its independence, viability and also sent training groups out there, which have been expanded in recent weeks, as the attacks on the government and the people of South Vietnam have increased.

"We are out there on training and on transportation, and we are assisting in every way we properly can the people of South Vietnam, who with the greatest courage and under danger are attempting to maintain their freedom.

"Now, this is an area where there is a good deal of danger and it is a matter of information. We don't want to have information which is of assistance to the enery and it is a matter which I think will have to be worked out with the government of Vietnam which bears the primary responsibility."

18. President Kennedy's News Conference, February 14, 1962, Public Papers of the Presidents, Kennedy, 1962, p. 136:

"Involvement in Vietnam

"Q. Mr. President, the Republican National Committee publication has said that you have been less than candid with the American people as to how deeply we are involved in Vietnam. Could you throw any more light on that?

"THE PRESIDENT: Yes, as you know, the United States for more than a decade has been assisting the government, the people of Vietnam, to maintain their independence. Way back on Dec. 23, 1950, we signed a military assistance agreement with France and with Indo-China which at that time included Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. We also signed in December of 1951 an agreement directly with Vietnam.

"Now in 1954, the Geneva agreements were signed, and while we did not sign those agreements, nevertheless Under Secretary Bedel Smith stated that he would view any renewal of aggression in Vietnam in violation of the aforesaid agreements with grave concern, and as seriously threatening international peace and security. At the time that the SEATO Pact was signed in 1954, Sept. 8, Vietnam was not a signatory, it was a protocol state, and, therefore, this pact which was approved by the Senate with only, I think, two against it, under Article 4, stated that the United States

recognized that aggression by means of armed attack against Vietnam would threaten our own peace and security. So since that time the United States has been assisting the government of Victnam to maintain its independence. It has had a military training mission there and extensive economic assistance.

"As you know, in the last two years the war has increased. The Vice President visited there last spring. The war became more intense every month; in fact, every week. The attack on the government by the Communist forces with assistance from the north became of greater and greater concern to the government of Vietnam and the Government of the United States.

"We sent -- I sent General Taylor there to make a review of the situation. The President of Vietnam asked us for additional assistance. We issued, as you remember, a white paper which detailed the support which the Viet Minh in the north were giving to this Communist insurgent movement and we have increased our assistance there. And we are supplying logistic assistance, transportation assistance, training, and we have a number of Americans who are taking part in that effort.

"We have discussed this matter -- we discussed it with the leadership of the Republicans and Democrats when we met in early January and informed them of what we were doing in Vietnam. We -- Mr. Rusk has discussed it with the House and Senate Foreign Affairs Committee. Mr. McNamara has discussed it with the Armed Services Committee. The leadership on both sides, Republicans and Democrats -- we have explained to them our concern about what is happening there, and they have been responsive, I think, to evidence their concern. So that there is a long history of our efforts to prevent Victnam from falling under control of the Communists. That is what we are now attempting to do. And as the war has increased in scope, our assistance has increased as a result of the request of the government. So that I think we should -- as it is a matter of great importance, a matter of great sensitivity -- my view has always been that the headquarters of both of our parties should really attempt to leave these matters to be discussed by responsible leaders on both sides. In my opinion, we have had a very strong bi-partisan consensus up to now, and I am hopeful that it will continue in regard to the action that we are taking.

"Q. Mr. President, do you feel that you have told the American people as much as can be told, because of the sensitivity of the subject? Is that right?

"THE PRESIDENT: I think I have just indicated what our role is. We have increased our assistance to the government, its logistics, and we have not sent combat troops there, although the training missions that we have there have been instructed that if they are fired upon they are, of course, to fire back, to protect themselves, but we have not sent combat troops, in the generally understood sense of the word. We have increased our training mission, and we have increased our logistics support, and we are attempting to prevent a Communist take-over of Victnam, which is in

accordance with a policy which our Government has followed for the last -- certainly since 1954, and even before then as I have indicated. We are attempting to make all of the information available that we can, consistent with our security needs in the area. So I feel that we are being as frank as we can be, and I think what I have said to you is a description of our activity there."

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19. President Kennedy's Speech at University of California, March 23, 1962, Public Papers of the Presidents, Kennedy, 1962, p. 265:

"The leaders of the Communist world are not only confronted by acute internal problems in each Communist country -- the failure of agriculture, the rising discontent of the youth and the intellectuals, the demands of technical and managerial groups for status and security. They are confronted in addition by profound divisions within the Communist world itself -- divisions which have already shattered the image of communism as a universal system guaranteed to abolish all social and international conflicts, the most valuable asset which the Communists had for many years.

"Wisdom requires the long view. And the long view shows us that the revolution of national independence is a fundamental fact of our era. This revolution cannot be stopped.

"As new nations emerge from the oblivion of centuries, their first aspiration is to affirm their national identity. Their deepest hope is for a world where, within a framework of international cooperation, every country can solve its own problems according to its own traditions and ideals.

"It is in the interests of the pursuit of knowledge -- and it is in our own national interest -- that this revolution of national independence succeed. For the Communists rest everything on the idea of a monolithic world -- a world where all knowledge has a single pattern, all societies move toward a single model, all problems have a single solution, and all roads lead to a single destination.

"The pursuit of knowledge, on the other hand, rests everything on the opposite idea -- on the idea of a world based on diversity, self-determination and freedom. And that is the kind of world to which we Americans, as a nation, are committed by the principles on which this republic was formed.

"As men conduct the pursuit of knowledge, they create a world which freely unites national diversity and international partnership. This emerging world is incompatible with the Communist conception of world order.

"It will irresistibly burst the bonds of Communist organization and Communist ideology. And diversity and independence, far from being opposed to the American conception of world order, represent the very essence of our vision of the future.

"There used to be much talk a few years ago about the inevitable triumph of communism. We hear such talk mueh less now. No one who examines the modern world can doubt that the great eurrents of history are earrying the world away from the monolithie idea toward the pluralist idea -- away fro: eommunism and toward national independence and freedom.

"No one ean doubt that the wave of the future is not the eonquest of the world by a single dogmatic creed, but the liberation of the diverse energies of free nations and free men. No one ean doubt that cooperation in the pursuit of knowledge must lead to freedom of the mind and of the soul.

"The speeter of thermonuelear war will hang over mankind; and we must heed the adviee of Oliver Wendell Holmes of 'freedom leaning on her spear' until all nations are wise enough to disarm safely and effectively.

* * *

"We must seize the vision of a free and diverse world -- and shape our polieies to speed progress toward a flexible world order.

"This is the unifying spirit of our polieies in the world. The purpose of our aid programs must be to help developing eountries to move forward as rapidly as possible on the road to genuine national independenee.

"Our military polieies must assist nations to proteet the processes of democratic reform and development against disruption and intervention."

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20. President Kennedy's News Conferenee, April 11, 1962, Publie Papers of the Presidents, Kennedy, 1962, p. 322:

"VIET-NAM

"Q: Sir, what are you going to do about the Ameriean soldiers getting killed in Viet-Nam?

"A: ...We are attempting to help Viet-Nam maintain its independenee and not fall under the domination of the communists...But we eannot desist in Viet-Nam..."

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21. President Kennedy's News Conference, May 9, 1962, Publie Papers of the Presidents, Kennedy, 1962, p. 377:

"THE BROKEN CEASE-FIRE

"Q: Mr. President, last February at a news eonference you told us that the cease-fire was becoming frayed in Laos and in the event that it

was broken, it could lead to a very serious decision. I wonder, Mr. President, now that the cease-fire has been broken, if efforts should fail to re-establish it, would it cause a re-examination on the part of the United States towards its policy there?

"THE PRESIDENT: Well, we are concerned about the break in the cease-fire. As you know, the State Department, the Acting Secretary of State, and the Assistant Secretary of State, met today with Ambassador Dobrynin, this afternoon. We have already indicated to one of the co-chairmen, the British government, our great concern about it. Our ambassador in Moscow met with the foreign secretary of the Soviet Union, Mr. Gromyko.

"We do believe, and have said from the beginning, that the negotiations should move much more quickly than they have. The longer this rather frayed cease-fire continues, the more chance we will have of the kind of incidents we have had in the past few days. That is why we were hopeful, after the meetings at Geneva last summer and fall, that the negotiations between the parties involved would take place last fall, and we could organize a government, rather than trying to continue to hold lines which in some cases are exposed, and which are subject to this kind of pressure. So that has been our view.

"So that has been our view, and the longer it goes on, and the longer there is not an agreement on a government, the longer some groups stand out from these kinds of conversations, then the more hazardous the situation becomes.

"Now, on the particular incident, it is a clear breach of the cease-fire. We have indicated and we hope that the Soviet Union, which is committed to a policy based on the statement at Vienna, in regard to Laos, we are hopeful that we can bring about a restoration of the cease-fire. But we have got to use the time to try to move ahead in our political negotiations.

"I agree it is a very hazardous course, but introducing American forces is the other one -- let's not think there is some great third course. That also is a hazardous course and we want to attempt to see if we can work out a peaceful solution, which has been our object for many months. I believe that these negotiations should take place quickly. This is not a satisfactory situation today."

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22. White House Statement of the President, May 15, 1962, Public Papers of the Presidents, Kennedy, 1962, p. 396:

"Following joint consideration by the governments of the United States and Thailand of the situation in Southeast Asia, the Royal Thai Government has invited, and I have today ordered, additional elements of the United States military forces, both ground and air, to proceed to

Thailand and to remain there until further orders. These forces are to help ensure the territorial integrity of this peaceful country.

"The dispatch of United States forces to Thailand was considered desirable because of recent attacks in Laos by Communist forces, and the subsequent movement of Communist military units toward the border of Thailand.

"A threat to Thailand is of grave concern to the United States. I have, therefore, ordered certain additional American military forces into Thailand in order that we may be in a position to fulfill speedily our obligations under the Manila Pact of 1954, a defense agreement which was approved overwhelmingly by the U.S. Senate, and to which the Secretary of State and Foreign Minister of Thailand referred in their joint statement of March 6, 1962. We are in consultation with SEATO Governments on the situation.

"I emphasize that this is a defensive act on the part of the United States and wholly consistent with the United Nations Charter which specifically recognizes that nations have an inherent right to take collective measures for self-defense. In the spirit of that Charter, I have directed that the Secretary General of the United Nations be informed of the actions that we are taking.

"There is no change in our policy toward Laos, which continues to be the re-establishment of an effective cease-fire and prompt negotiations for a government of national union."

23. President Kennedy's News Conference, May 17, 1962. Public Papers of the Presidents, Kennedy, 1962, p. 402:

"No Further Breach in Laos

"Q: Mr. President, could you bring us up to date on the Laotian situation since the dispatch of our troops in Thailand? Specifically, do you feel that we have increased the chances of our getting caught in a Communist shooting war in Southeast Asia?

"THE PRESIDENT: We are continuing to hope that there will be a national government or national union, which has been our policy, as you know, for a year. We are going into Thailand, at the decision of the Thai government, our own decision to provide for the defense of Thailand. The latest information indicates no further breach of the cease-fire. We also have indications that the three princes will engage in conversation shortly. I hope they will produce a government. That is our object. I have already indicated the great hazards of a shooting war in Asia. In Asia, it is our object to bring about a diplomatic solution which will make the chances of such a war far less likely.

"Troops in Thailand

"Q: Mr. President, in light of your answer to this question, sir, could you give us any idea how long the American troops will be needed in Thailand?

"THE PRESIDENT: I cannot at this time.

"Q: Have you any idea under what conditions they might return?

"THE PRESIDENT: I cannot at this time. They have only been in there for a very short while, and we can't tell when they will come out. It will depend a good deal on what conditions are in Thailand and the neighboring countries.

"Restoring the Cease-Fire

"Q: Mr. President, could you tell us, please, what you would consider the restoration of an effective cease-fire? Would this involve the withdrawal of the Communist forces to their position before the attack on Nam Tha, or more or less a quiescence which would permit the talks to go forward on the government?

"THE PRESIDENT: Obviously, we would prefer as great a withdrawal to the line that was in effect a week or so ago as we could get. I would think, however, that the peace along the line which now may exist, of course, is essential.

"Objectives in Laos

"Q: Mr. President, would you review for us the considerations that you had in mind last weekend when you took this rather swift action to move more American troops into Thailand?

"THE PRESIDENT: Yes. We are concerned about the breach of the cease-fire, the sign of deterioration in Laos, which brought Communist forces to the border of Thailand up in the Mekong River section, up not too far from Nam Tha, and we did not know whether this was an indication of a general breach of the cease-fire which, of course, would immediately imperil Thailand. So in our desire to stabilize the situation, we got in touch with the government, which was already in touch with us, and worked out the proposed course of action.

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"Legality of Thailand Move

"Q: Mr. President, what was the legal basis for our sending troops to Thailand? Was it a bilateral arrangement that we have with the Thai government, or was it possibly secret arrangements?

"THE PRESIDENT: No, the actual legal basis was to put us in a position to fulfill our obligations under the SEATO Treaty.

"Q: Mr. President, are the other members of the SEATO Treaty organization doing the same?

"THE PRESIDENT: They have been asked to do so, and there have been indications of a favorable response from several of them. This is a decision for them. But we have responded and met our obligations.

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"The Intentions of Pathet Lao

"Q: Mr. President, back on the subject of Southeast Asia, has there been any indication that the Pathet Lao intended to march against Thailand or against the capital of Laos, and, second, under what conditions would the United States send its troops into Laos?

"THE PRESIDENT: In answer to your first question, I don't know what their intentions may be. I am hopeful their intentions will be to maintain a cease-fire. Obviously, as I have said, the breech of the cease-fire in the case of Nam Tha was a blow to the concept of the cease-fire. That is what initiated our action in the case of Thailand. On the second matter, we have to wait and see. I think it is very important that the princes form a government of national union for the preservation of their own country."

24. President Kennedy's Address at Graduation Exercises of the U.S. Military Academy, Public Papers of the Presidents, Kennedy, 1962, p. 453:

"Korea has not been the only battle ground since the end of the Second World War. Men have fought and died in Malaya, in Greece, in the Philippines, in Algeria and Cuba, and Cyprus and almost continuously on the Indo-Chinese Peninsula. No nuclear weapons have been fired. No massive nuclear retaliation has been considered appropriate. This is another type of war, new in its intensity, ancient in its origin -- war by guerrillas, subversives, insurgents, assassins, war by ambush instead of by combat; by infiltration, instead of aggression, seeking victory by eroding and exhausting the enemy instead of engaging him. It is a form of warfare uniquely adapted to what has been strangely called 'wars of liberation,' to undermine the efforts of new and poor countries to maintain the freedom that they have finally achieved. It preys on economic unrest and ethnic conflicts. It requires in those situations where we must counter it, and these are the kinds of challenges that will be before us in the next decade if freedom is to be saved, a whole new kind of strategy, a wholly different kind of force, and therefore a new and wholly different kind of military training."

25. President Kennedy's News Conference, June 14, 1962, Public Papers of the Presidents, Kennedy, 1962, p. 492:

"Mansfield's Criticisms

"Q: Mr. President, Senator Mansfield a few days ago suggested a review of Far Eastern policies because he said they seem to him either marking time, or at least on a collision course.

"Do you think such a review is necessary?

"THE PRESIDENT: Well, we have been reviewing. As you know, we have been attempting in the case of Laos to work out a policy which would prevent either one of those situations, whether we shall be successful or not, only time will tell.

"I know that we have put large sums of money, and the situation there is still hazardous, what is true there of course is true all around the world. This is a period of great tension and change. But if the United States had not played a part in Southeast Asia for many years, I think the whole map of Southeast Asia would be different.

"I am delighted, as you know, I have the highest regard for Senator Mansfield, and I think that we should constantly review, and I think that he suggested we should make judgments between what is essential to our interest and what is marginal. We have been attempting with great difficulty to carry out a policy with Laos which would permit a neutral and independent government there, and in Senator Mansfield's speech he used the examples of Burma and Cambodia. Those were the examples that were also used at the Vienna meeting by Chairman Khrushchev and myself in which we stated the kind of government that we both said we hoped would emerge in Laos. That is the commitment that was made by the Soviet Union, and by the United States.

"Now we have moved to a different plateau, and we are going to see whether that commitment can be maintained. But on the other hand, I am sure and I know Senator Mansfield would not think we should withdraw, because withdrawal in the case of Vietnam and in the case of Thailand might mean a collapse of the entire area."

26. U.S. Comments on Report of Control Commission for Viet-Nam, Department of State Bulletin, July 16, 1962, p. 109:

"Department Statement

"The report just issued by the International Control Commission for Viet-Nam demonstrates that the Communist North Vietnamese are engaged in a campaign of aggression and subversion aimed at the violent overthrow of the Government of South Viet-Nam. It indicates clearly that the hostilities

in Viet-Nam, which in the first 5 months of this year alone resulted in the death of more than 9,000 people, are planned, caused, and led by the Communist authorities in North Viet-Nam. These are the conclusions of the Commission's Legal Committee:

> '...there is evidence to show that armed and unarmed personnel, arms, munitions and other supplies have been sent from the Zone in the North to the Zone in the South with the object of supporting, organizing and carrying out hostile activities, including armed attacks, directed against the Armed Forces and Administration of the Zone in the South... there is evidence to show that the PAVN /People's Army of Viet-Nam/ has allowed the Zone in the North to be used for inciting, encouraging and supporting hostile activities in the Zone in the South, aimed at the overthrow of the Administration in the South.'

"The Commission accepted these conclusions of the Legal Committee that there was sufficient evidence to show 'beyond reasonable doubt' that the authorities in Communist North Viet-Nam committed these violations. The Commission also cited the Republic of Viet-Nam for its activities in importing military equipment and personnel above the limits imposed by the 1954 Geneva Accords. The report clearly demonstrates, however, that these actions were taken by South Viet-Nam as part of its effort to defend itself against aggression and subversion from the North. In December of last year President Diem requested increased military assistance from the United States. We have responded to this request.

"President Diem and President Kennedy have both stated that they look forward to the discontinuance of the present level of military assistance when the Communist North Vietnamese halt their campaign to destroy the Republic of Viet-Nam. The report of the International Control Commission takes note of this position. The United States welcomes the Commission's report and recommends it for world attention. We hope that the Commission will continue its efforts to restore peace in Viet-Nam."

27. President Kennedy's Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union, January 14, 1963, Public Papers of the Presidents, Kennedy, 1963, p. 17:

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"Third, what comfort can we take from the increasing strains and tensions within the Communist bloc? Here hope must be tempered with caution. For the Soviet-Chinese disagreement is over means, not ends. A dispute over how best to bury the free world is no grounds for Western rejoicing.

"Nevertheless, while a strain is not a fracture, it is clear that the forces of diversity are at work inside the Communist camp, despite all the iron disciplines of regimentation and all the iron dogmatisms

of ideology. Marx is proven wrong once again: for it is the closed Communist societies, not the free and open societies which carry within themselves the seeds of internal disintegration.

"The disarray of the Communist empire has been heightened by two other formidable forces. One is the historical force of nationalism -- and the yearning of all men to be free. The other is the gross inefficiency of their economies. For a closed society is not open to ideas of progress -- and a police state finds that it cannot command the grain to grow.

"New nations asked to choose between two competing systems need only compare conditions in East and West Germany, Eastern and Western Europe, North and South Viet-Nam. They need only compare the disillusionment of Communist Cuba with the promise of the Alliance for Progress. And all the world knows that no successful system builds a wall to keep its people in and freedom out -- and the wall of shame dividing Berlin is a symbol of Communist failure.

"Finally, what can we do to move from the present pause toward enduring peace? Again I would counsel caution. I foresee no spectacular reversal in Communist methods or goals. But if all these trends and developments can persuade the Soviet Union to walk the path of peace, then let her know that all free nations will journey with her. But until that choice is made, and until the world can develop a reliable system of international security, the free peoples have no choice but to keep their arms nearby.

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"In short, let our adversaries choose. If they choose peaceful competition, they shall have it. If they come to realize that their ambitions cannot succeed -- if they see their 'wars of liberation' and subversion will ultimately fail -- if they recognize that there is more security in accepting inspection than in permitting new nations to master the black arts of nuclear war -- and if they are willing to turn their energies, as we are, to the great unfinished tasks of our own peoples -- then, surely, the areas of agreement can be very wide indeed: a clear understanding about Berlin, stability in Southeast Asia, an end to nuclear testing, new checks on surprise or accidental attack, and, ultimately, general and complete disarmament.

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"My friends: I close on a note of hope. We are not lulled by the momentary calm of the sea or the somewhat clearer skies above. We know the turbulence that lies below, and the storms that are beyond the horizon this year. But now the winds of change appear to be blowing more strongly than ever, in the world of communism as well as our own...

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28. President Kennedy's Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union, January 14, 1963, Public Papers of the Presidents, Kennedy, 1963, p. 16:

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"Second, what of the developing and non-aligned nations? They were, I believe, shocked by the Soviets sudden and secret attempt to transform Cuba into a nuclear striking base -- and by Communist China's arrogant invasion of India.

"They have been reassured by our prompt assistance to India, by our support through the United Nations of the Congo's unification, by our patient search for disarmament, and by the improvement in our treatment of citizens and visitors, whose skin does not happen to be white. And as the older colonialism recedes, and the neo-colonialism of the Communist powers stands out more starkly than ever, they realize more clearly that the issue in the world struggle is not communism versus capitalism, but coercion versus a free choice.

"They realize that the longing for independence is the same the world over, whether it is the independence of West Berlin or Viet-Nam. They realize that such independence runs athwart all Communist ambitions, but is in keeping with our own -- and that our approach to their needs is resilient and resourceful, while the Communists rely on ancient doctrines and old dogmas.

"Nevertheless, it is hard for any nation to focus on an external or subversive threat to its independence when its energies are drained in daily combat with the forces of poverty and despair. It makes little sense for us to assail in speeches and resolutions the horrors of communism, to spend $50 billion a year to prevent its military advance -- and then to begrudge spending, largely on American products, less than one-tenth of that amount to help other nations strengthen their independence and cure the social chaos in which communism has always thrived."

29. President Kennedy's News Conference, March 6, 1963, Public Papers of the Presidents, Kennedy, 1963, p. 243:

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"Q: Mr. President, the Mansfield committee, sent at your suggestion to the Far East and Europe, has recommended a thorough security reassessment in the Far East and a clamp down, if not a reduction in our aid to that part of the world. Would you have any comment on this, sir?

"THE PRESIDENT. I don't see how we are going to be able, unless we are going to pull out of Southeast Asia and turn it over to the Communists, how we are going to be able to reduce very much our economic programs and military programs in South Viet-Nam, in Cambodia, in Thailand.

"I think that unless you want to withdraw from the field and decide that it is in the national interest to permit that area to collapse, I would think that it would be impossible to substantially change it particularly, as we are in a very intensive struggle in those areas.

"So I think we ought to judge the economic burden it places upon us as opposed to having the Communists control all of Southeast Asia with the inevitable effect that this would have on the security of India and, therefore, really begin to run perhaps all the way toward the Middle East. So I think that while we would all like to lighten the burden, I don't see any real prospect of the burden being lightened for the U.S. in Southeast Asia in the next year if we are going to do the job and meet what I think are very clear national needs."

30. U. Alexis Johnson's Address Made Before the Economic Club of Detroit, "The United States and Southeast Asia," April 8, 1963, Department of State Bulletin, April 29, 1963, p. 630:

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"What is the attraction that Southeast Asia has exerted for centuries on the great powers flanking it on all sides? Why is it desirable, and why is it important? First, it provides a lush climate, fertile soil, rich natural resources, a relatively sparse population in most areas, and room to expand. The countries of Southeast Asia produce rich exportable surpluses such as rice, rubber, teak, corn, tin, spices, oil, and many others. It is especially attractive to Communist China, with its burgeoning population and its food shortages.

"Militarily and strategically, Southeast Asia has great assets. It stands astride of east-west trade routes. It stands in a critical, strategic relationship not only to China and India but to Australia, the western Pacific, and Japan. Bearing in mind the implications of the recent Chinese attack on India, Southeast Asia takes on an additional significance, since its domination by the Communist powers would outflank the Asian subcontinent.

"Although still thinly populated for the most part, the human resources of this area are considerable and growing. Taken together, the peoples of Southeast Asia represent an important segment of the free world and a target of prime importance to Communist imperialism.

"There is a rhythm to the tides of history. Just as the pressures on Southeast Asia have in the past come alternately from China in the north, India in the west, and the maritime powers along the sea, so Southeast Asia is again threatened by a resurgence of pressure from the north. But today the danger from this quarter is multiplied a hundredfold by the virulence of the political doctrine which now rides on the backs of the Chinese people.

"As my colleague Under Secretary Averell Harriman said recently, 'I don't know how you can distinguish between Chinese communism and Chinese imperialism. Chinese communism and all communism is imperialist.'

"Even before World War II, Communist parties of varying strengths existed in all Southeast Asian countries, from Burma to the Philippines. After the war the signal was given for armed Communist-led uprisings, and these occurred in Burma, Indonesia, Malaya, Indochina, and the Philippines. Even Thailand, the one country in Southeast Asia that had not known colonial rule, was threatened. By 1952 the revolts were crushed in all but Malaya and Indochina. It took the British and the new Malay Federation until 1958 to quell Communist guerrilla forces there. This struggle, incidentally, provided valuable lessons which are now being applied in Viet-Nam. We also might note that, except for Japan, Malaya is now the most prosperous country in Asia.

"The efforts of some powers following World War II to restore colonial rule along the pre-war pattern permitted the Communists more effectively to wave the banner of anticolonialism and, for example, through Ho Chi Minh, at that time largely to capture the nationalist movement in Viet-Nam.

"After the Geneva Agreements of 1954 on Indochina we took the lead in the establishment of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, an alliance of the Philippines, Thailand, Pakistan, Australia, New Zealand, France, Great Britain, and ourselves, with the objective of providing security to Southeast Asia through collective military action if the Communists embarked on outright military aggression. The opening of the eighth meeting of ministers of this organization was attended by Secretary Rusk this morning in Paris.

"Whatever may be the criticisms of SEATO, the fact remains that, since its inception, the Communists have not attempted open military action in the area. Instead they have turned to the more subtle tactics of subversion and insurgency, the prime example being the guerrilla warfare in Viet-Nam carried on in the method made classic in China by Mao Tse-tung. Whereas the method employed by the Communists has changed, the objective remains the same -- destruction of the independence of the Southeast Asian countries one by one and return to the days when they bore their tribute to Peiping. While the armed struggle is manifest now only in Viet-Nam, it ceased in Laos through the settlement reached just last year at Geneva, after 14 months of negotiation.

"Implications of Struggle in Viet-Nam

"I have pointed out that Southeast Asia is not a homogeneous region but rather a geographic expression. By this same token of geographic interrelation, the security of the area is not stronger than that of its component countries. All of us who were at Geneva in 1954 recognized that Communist domination of the Red River Delta of North Viet-Nam would make it much more difficult to defend the remaining areas. This has been true.

However, for the Communists to advance any further in the area would render the defense problem very much more difficult, if not well-nigh impossible. This is why the valiant struggle now being waged in South Viet-Nam has implications far beyond the borders of that troubled country.

"Our massive assistance to free Viet-Nam is designed to avoid just such a catastrophe."

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31. President Kennedy's News Conference, April 24, 1963, Public Papers of the Presidents, Kennedy, 1963, p. 343:

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"'Falling Dominoes'

"Q: Mr. President, on Laos again, several years ago we heard a great deal about the 'falling domino' theory in Southeast Asia.

"Do you look upon Laos in terms of that country alone, or is your concern the effect that its loss would have in Thailand, Vietnam, and so on?

"Would you discuss that?

"THE PRESIDENT: That is correct. The population of Laos is 2 million and it is scattered. It is a very rough country. It is important as a sovereign power. The people desire to be independent, and it is also important because it borders the Mekong River and, quite obviously, if Laos fell into Communist hands it would increase the danger along the northern frontiers of Thailand. It would put additional pressure on Cambodia and would put additional pressure on South Vietnam which in itself would put additional pressure on Malaya.

"So I do accept the view that there is an interrelationship in these countries and that is one of the reasons why we are concerned with maintaining the Geneva Accords as a method of maintaining stability in Southeast Asia. It may be one of the reasons why others do not share that interest.

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32. President Kennedy's News Conference, May 8, 1963, Public Papers of the Presidents, Kennedy, 1963, p. 375:

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"Q: Back on the subject of Vietnam. Could you explain to us, sir, why we have committed ourselves militarily in Vietnam but have not committed

ourselves militarily in Laos, depending instead upon this neutralist government?

"A: Because the situations are different. That's why the remedy has been different. We have had a commitment for a good many years to the integrity of South Vietnam. We are anxious to maintain the neutrality of Laos. It may not be possible to do so and it may be necessary to seek other remedies. But we have adopted what we considered to be, considering the geography, the history, the nature of the threat and the alternate solution -- we've adopted for each country what we regarded as the best strategy. And we'll have to wait and see what happens on them."

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33. Secretary Rusk's Address Before the Economic Club of New York, at New York, April 22, 1963, "The Stake in Viet-Nam," Department of State Bulletin, May 13, 1963, p. 727:

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"Viet-Nam is a narrow strip along the South China Sea, nearly as large as California, with a population of some 30 million people -- about 16 million in the North and 14 million in the South.

"With Cambodia and Laos, Viet-Nam formed what was formerly known as French Indochina. During the Second World War, the Vichy regime yielded control of French Indochina to the Japanese. In the spring of 1945 the Japanese proclaimed the independence of Viet-Nam. And in August of that year they permitted the Communist-oriented Viet Minh to seize rule.

"In the Indian subcontinent and in Burma and the Philippines, Western countries recognized at war's end that national demands for independence would have to be met promptly. But this was not the case with Indochina. Instead, we ourselves were somewhat at a loss for a policy with regard to that particular part of the world. So our people in charge of war plans in 1944 sent a colonel out there who sent a cable back to the Joint Chiefs of Staff saying 'Request policy guidance on American policy toward Indochina, because we are beginning to get military access to that country and we need direction.'

"Well, there ensued a vast silence which lasted for months. We sent staff officers back to try to find the answer. We sent cables out there, and after about 6 months the reply came and it said, 'When asked by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for a statement of American policy toward Indochina, the President' -- that was President Roosevelt -- 'replied, I don't want to hear any more about Indochina.'

"Well, now the result of no significant Allied policy at that point was that the French did return and take over where they left off at the time of the Japanese occupation, and they encountered therefore a militant resistance movement. For 8 years, with material help from the United States, they sought to pacify the country. At the same time they granted increasing

autonomy to non-Communist Vietnamese. But the Viet Minh, reforms in Japan and on Taiwan, was pressed forward -- 123,000 heads of families became small landowners. A comprehensive system of agricultural credit was set up. Thousands of Vietnamese were moved into the highlands to raise industrial crops. Rubber production rose, and new plantings of better varieties promised still higher production for the future. Sugar production doubled in 1958. South Viet-Nam was soon producing enough rice to resume exports on a rising scale. Various small industries were established. Textile production rose from near zero to near self-sufficiency. Electric power nearly doubled. Per capita national income rose by 20 percent.

"Thousands of new schools were built. Between 1956 and 1960, enrollment in the elementary schools rose from 400,000 to 1,500,000. The expansion of health facilities included new hospitals and 3,500 village health stations. Rail transportation was restored. Roads were repaired and improved, and three new major highways were built.

"The Communists were not completely eliminated -- especially along the land and sea frontiers, where they could be supplied -- but most of South Viet-Nam became, for a period, safe for travel.

"Although North Viet-Nam inherited most of the industry of Viet-Nam, and although its population is larger, it fell rapidly behind South Viet-Nam in food production, the number of children in school, and in standards of living. While per capita food production rose 20 percent in the South, it fell 10 percent in the North.

"This was competition which the Communists apparently could not endure. Very likely it was one of the reasons why they decided in 1959 to renew their assault on South Viet-Nam. And in 1960 the Lao Dong Party -- that is, the Communist Party -- ordered the 'liberation' of South Viet-Nam.

"According to Communist propaganda, the war in South Viet-Nam is a civil war, a local uprising. The truth is that it is an aggression organized, directed, and partly supplied from North Viet-Nam. It is conducted by hardened Communist political organizers and guerrilla leaders trained in North Viet-Nam, who, upon their arrival in the South, recruit local assistance. This has been done in a variety of ways, including terror and assassination. Schoolteachers, health workers, malaria eradication teams, local officials loyal to the Republic -- these were the first targets of the assassins. But many ordinary villagers who refused to cooperate with the Communist guerrillas likewise have been ruthlessly killed.

"Strategic Importance of South Viet-Nam

"This assault on South Viet-Nam was a major Communist enterprise, carefully and elaborately prepared, heavily staffed, and relentlessly pursued. It made headway. In 1961 President Diem appealed for further assistance and President Kennedy responded promptly and affirmatively.

"The strategic importance of South Viet-Nam is plain. It controls the mouth of the Mekong River, the main artery of Southeast Asia. The loss of South Viet-Nam would put the remaining states of Southeast Asia in mortal danger.

"But there are larger reasons why the defense of South Viet-Nam is vital to us and to the whole free world. We cannot be indifferent to the fate of 14 million people who have fought hard against communism -- including nearly 1 million who fled their former homes to avoid living under Communist tyranny. Since we went to the aid of Greece and Turkey 16 years ago, it has been the attitude of the United States to assist peoples who resist Communist aggression. We have seen this form of attack fail in Burma, Malaya, and the Philippines. The South Vietnamese are determined to win their battle, and they deserve our help.

"Critics have complained that South Viet-Nam is not a full constitutional democracy and that our aid has been subject to waste and mismanagement. Let us be clear that these criticisms are not merely alibis for inaction. For in passing judgement, let us recall that we are talking about a nation which has been responsible for its own affairs for less than a decade, about a people who have had no peace since 1941 and little experience in direct participation in political affairs. Their four national elections, their thousands of elected hamlet councils, and their forthcoming village council elections show steady movement toward a constitutional system resting upon popular consent."

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34. Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs, Roger W. Hilsman, Address Made at 1963 Conference on Cold War Education, Tampa, Florida, June 14, 1963, "The Challenge to Freedom in Asia," Department of State Bulletin, July 8, 1963, p. 44:

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"As to the nature of the danger, the ideology of communism is a threat to the United States today mainly because it is joined with the population, resources, and military strength of the countries of the Soviet Union and Communist China, because it is joined with two bases of power.

"But the fact that ideology has been joined to these two bases of power should not be misinterpreted: the threat is not just military; it is also political. And of the two, the political threat is probably the more pervasive. This is true because this nation and its allies have made sure that their military defenses are adequate and up to date.

"The political threat is also serious because of the Communists' skill in manipulating all the elements of power -- political, economic, and psychological as well as military. They use these instruments with considerable sophistication, playing first one then another according to the

opportunities open to them in any given situation. Mao Tse-tung has described this alternation of tactics and instruments as 'talk/fight; talk/fight,' and it describes the technique very well. This sudden alternation between talking and fighting is designed also to induce a maximum amount of confusion, instability, and trouble in the free world. One of the latest examples of their use of this tactic occurred last October in the Chinese Communist attack along the Indian border, followed by their withdrawal beginning a month later.

"The immediate goal of the Communists is, of course, to capture the in-between nations, those smaller and weaker nations which today are struggling against odds to remain independent. If the Communists can capture such free nations, turning them against the United States and making them feel that it is the U.S. which poses the danger or forms an obstacle to their goals, then the Communists could win without using military power. Moreover, the Communists have waged an unremitting attack on the foundations of our way of life, just as they are a threat to freedom elsewhere in the world. Although they argue over differences in emphasis as to how the Communist world should carry out its attacks on free men, their common goal is plain enough: to further the destruction of the values all free men cherish.

"In Asia the greatest danger to independent nations comes from Communist China, with its 700 million people forced into the service of an aggressive Communist Party. We can't ignore that problem, and we don't ignore it. Communist China lies in direct contact with, or very close to, a whole series of free nations ranged in an arc from Afghanistan, India, Pakistan, and Nepal in South Asia; through Burma, Malaya, Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, and Viet-Nam in Southeast Asia; and on up through the Republic of China, on its island base of Taiwan, to Japan and Korea. Indonesia, the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand are also alive to the threat posed by the Communist Chinese.

"All these free nations must deal with the facts of Communist China and its ambitions. No matter what response each has made, be it nonalinement or alliance with friendly nations, they all are aware that the aim of the Chinese Communists is to gain predominant control in Asia and eventually to secure the establishment of Communist regimes throughout the world. The reaction of each nation is determined by its own material circumstances and, sometimes more importantly, by its own national psychology.

"The United States is determined that communism shall not take over Asia.

"For this reason we do not recognize Communist China and seek in all possible ways to limit the ability of Communist China to implement its threat to obtain hegemony in the Far East. We recognize the Republic of China as the legal government of China and support is position in the United Nations. We are aware that the economic and social progress on

Taiwan, carried out by free Chinese, stands in stark contrast to the failures of the mainland Communist government. Also the existence on Taiwan of a well-trained and -equipped force of 600,000 men, dedicated to the fight against communism, must have a restraining effect on any expansionist ambitions of the Communist Chinese. Furthermore the spirit of the people of the Republic of China, and of their leader, President Chiang Kai-shek, who have conducted a 40-year struggle against Communist imperialism, is an inspiration to free peoples everywhere.

"We stand ready to help peoples who want to help themselves to maintain their independence. Sometimes this involves outright alliance, as with the Republic of China, Japan, South Korea, and, through the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, with the Philippines, Thailand, and Pakistan. If any of these nations is attacked the United States is committed to help defend it. Our contribution to security in the Far East also takes other forms, forms designed to meet threats of varying nature.

"These threats are never simple ones; some are extremely subtle and sophisticated. If we are to meet these threats successfully, certain qualities of mind must be stressed and certain dangers avoided. Governor Bryant, in a recent address, referred to the danger that the 'timid American' poses for our democracy. I think he is quite right. I have often had a similar thought, which I would like to emphasize in what I have to say today.

"What has often occurred to me is that, if the United States is not only going to meet the Communist threat but carry off the difficult task of helping to create a new and stable world in the process, then Americans are going to need very steady nerves.

"By this phrase 'steady nerves,' I mean not only not being timid but two additional qualities: first, the capacity for cold, deliberate analysis in order to know when to act and when to bide one's time; second, the unemotional self-discipline and self-control that enables one to act effectively as a result of that analysis. I mean the kind of self-control that enabled President Kennedy to use United States power with such coolness and skill as he did during the Cuban crisis. In negotiations, also, extraordinary qualities of mind and will are demanded, among which the element of cold calm in dealing with complex situations is increasingly important. President Kennedy was speaking of this in his inaugural address when he said: 'Let us never negotiate out of fear. But let us never fear to negotiate.'

"The quality of 'steady nerves' is needed in both of the fundamental tasks before us. For there are two separate tasks.

"One is the meeting of crises; the other is the slower, but more positive, task of nation building, of helping to build a system of stable, strong, and independent states which have solved the problem of both political and economic development."

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"By 1960 the situation had so deteriorated that it seemed possible the Viet Cong would be able to establish a territorial base in South Viet-Nam, the next step in the Mao formula for a successful 'national liberation movement.' At this point, President Kennedy sent General Maxwell Taylor to South Viet-Nam to confer with the Vietnamese Government and to observe the situation for himself. General Taylor reported that the Vietnamese people retained the will to fight communism and that, given more extensive support, had a chance to defeat the Viet Cong.

"While this support has come predominantly from the United States, a number of other countries have provided significant support, moral and material.

"The first requirement of the struggle today is to pull the teeth of the Viet Cong terrorist campaign. This can best be done not so much by killing the terrorists but by depriving them of the opportunity to coerce the farmers into providing supplies and recruits. This can only be done by providing practical protection to the farming population. The technique which has been adopted to achieve this protection is the construction of fortified villages, called strategic hamlets. This technique was used successfully in Malaya against the Communist movement there. The same concept had been applied successfully in the late 1790's by the Manchu dynasty of China against the White Lotus sect, a fanatical group whose use of terror resembled closely the methods of the present-day Viet Cong."

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"The struggle in Viet-Nam gains the headlines in today's newspapers. But throughout Asia, new nations, in varying degrees, are facing the challenge of creating progressive, yet stable, societies in a world of uncertainty. American policy aims to provide our experience, our enthusiasm, and, insofar as our resources permit, our material aid to this great enterprise of nation building."

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"Thirdly, while we are combating Communist imperialism in all its forms, we must remember that it is not enough to be against something and that in the last analysis success depends upon our ability to build, to construct, to contribute to man's spiritual and material welfare. We are cooperating with many free peoples in great efforts at nation building, while the Communists try to tear down, in order to impose their hold and their system on the world.

"Fourthly, there is a larger need for tolerance in international life. Happily there is a growing understanding among us of the diverse ways by which different peoples seek to obtain happiness and security in a troubled world. In passing I also wish to observe that, remembering our own unfinished business in fulfilling the ideals of the American Constitution,

we must be tolerant of the shortcomings we may see in other societies. While we are justifiably proud of our institutions and our freedoms and stand as leaders in the democratic world, our prestige and influence in the world suffer whenever we fall short of our own ideals."

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35. President Kennedy's News Conference, July 17, 1963, Public Papers of the Presidents, Kennedy, 1963, p. 569:

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"Q: Mr. President, there has been a good deal of public concern about the political situation in South Viet-Nam, and I would like to ask you whether the difficulties between the Buddhist population there and the South Vietnamese Government has been an impediment to the effectiveness of American aid in the war against the Viet Cong?

"THE PRESIDENT. Yes, I think it has. I think it is unfortunate that this dispute has arisen at the very time when the military struggle has been going better than it has been going in many months. I would hope that some solution could be reached for this dispute, which certainly began as a religious dispute, and because we have invested a tremendous amount of effort and it is going quite well.

"I do realize of course, and we all have to realize, that Viet-Nam has been in war for 20 years. The Japanese came in, the war with the French, the civil war which has gone on for 10 years, and this is very difficult for any society to stand. It is a country which has got a good many problems and it is divided, and there is guerrilla activity and murder and all of the rest. Compounding this, however, now is a religious dispute. I would hope this would be settled, because we want to see a stable government there, carrying on a struggle to maintain its national independence.

"We believe strongly in that. We are not going to withdraw from that effort. In my opinion, for us to withdraw from that effort would mean a collapse not only of South Viet-Nam, but Southeast Asia. So we are going to stay there. We hope with the great effort which is being carried by the Vietnamese themselves, and they have been in this field a lot longer than we have, and with a good deal more deaths and casualties, that behind this military shield put up by the Vietnamese people they can reach an agreement on the civil disturbances and also in respect for the rights of others. That's our hope. That's our effort. That -- we're bringing our influence to bear. And the decision is finally theirs, but I think that before we render too harsh a judgment on the people, we should realize that they are going through a harder time than we have had to go through."

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36. Deputy Director of Viet-Nam Working Group, Theodore J.C. Heavner, Address Made Before National Sec & Leg Committee at the National Convention of Veterans of Foreign Wars, in Seattle, Washington, August 25, 1963. "The Viet-Nam Situation," Department of State Bulletin, September 9, 1963, p. 392:

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"In the light of long-term trends in Communist and free Asia let me now review the elements of U.S. strategy and policy. Our policy in the Far East can be summed up in these four points:

"1. To stand firmly behind our commitments to the defense of independent nations and to turn back any aggressive thrust from communism;

"2. To contribute as we are able to the prosperity and development of nations which request our assistance as the surest way of helping to build a system of free, viable, and strong nations in Asia;

"3. To recognize the value of initiatives by the Pacific nations themselves to develop their own modes of cooperation and communication, and to stand ready to assist when called upon to do so;

"4. To work patiently for the realization of a Pacific community of nations so prosperous and progressive that its attraction will prove, in the long run, irresistible to those peoples now kept by their rulers from participation in it."

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"The Guerrilla War in Viet-Nam

"To understand why President Kennedy said in his state of the Union message that 'The spearpoint of aggression has been blunted in South Viet-Nam,' we need to consider the situation in the fall of 1961 and early 1962. The Vietnamese were quite plainly losing their fight against the Communist guerrillas then.

"The Communist guerrillas, 1,500 strong, took and held overnight a provincial capital in September of 1961, and, to underline the fact, they publicly beheaded the Chief of Province there. The flow of rice into Saigon, normally a rice export center, was choked off by the guerrillas to the point where the United States sent P.L. 480 rice to Saigon in early 1962. Enemy attacks in January of last year were running at the rate of more than 120 per week. We even feared that the Communist Viet Cong might soon be able to declare 'a liberated area' somewhere in the highlands.

"Faced with this deteriorating situation, President Diem in December of 1961 sent a letter to President Kennedy in which he outlined the nature of the attack on his government and asked for increased American assistance. The United States considered this request very carefully. Vice President Johnson had visited Viet-Nam in May of 1961, and President Kennedy had sent General [Maxwell D.] Taylor to Viet-Nam again in the fall of that year. So we were very clear about the nature of the threat.

"We knew that the Viet Cong attack was caused, led, and directed by the Communist authorities in North Viet-Nam. This was a case of Communist aggression, although the Communists made great efforts to conceal the fact, aggression against a friendly people with whom the United States had strong ties. There could be little question about our decision. We promptly agreed to step up our military and economic assistance.

"When we increased our assistance to Viet-Nam we issued a study of the evidence of Communist infiltration into South Viet-Nam and Communist direction of the war against the Government of South Viet-Nam. This was necessary, not just out of a 'decent respect for the opinions of mankind,' but because of the great and continuing Communist effort to portray the Viet Cong as an indigenous and legitimate popular movement against a repressive government. I think it is worth noting in this connection that the international body specifically established in 1954 at the Geneva conference to oversee and keep the peace in Viet-Nam -- the International Control Commission, composed of India, Canada, and Poland -- has confirmed the fact that Communist North Viet-Nam is engaged in an attempt to overthrow by violence the Government of South Viet-Nam. After sifting the evidence for almost a year, the International Control Commission in June of 1962 issued a special report which makes it clear that the Viet Cong are the instruments of Hanoi's deliberate attack on South Viet-Nam.

"If we were losing the war in the fall of 1961 and early 1962, where are we today? I think it is fair to say that the tide has now turned and that the Government of Viet-Nam is with our help slowly overcoming the Communist guerrillas. No more provincial capitals have been taken, the Communists have not 'liberated' any part of South Viet-Nam, and Saigon is once again exporting rice. In fact we anticipate that Saigon will export 300,000 tons of rice this year.

* * *

"The 'Why' of Our Involvement

"I have described the American role in the Vietnamese war -- the 'how' of our involvement. I would like to close by indicating something of the 'why.'

"You can think of Viet-Nam as a piece of strategic real estate. It is on the corner of mainland Asia, across the east-west trade routes, and in a position that would make it an excellent base for further Communist aggression against the rest of free Asia.

"You can think of our involvement in South Viet-Nam in terms of a moral commitment. The Vietnamese, on the frontier of the free world, are fighting not just for themselves but for all men who wish to remain free. I believe the 300-500 casualties they suffer each week is a precious contribution to the security of the whole free world.

"You can think of the American role in South Viet-Nam in terms of our SEATO [Southeast Asia Treaty Organization] commitment. You can regard it as a fulfillment of the implied obligation which we as a nation undertook when we said at the Geneva Conference in 1954 that we would regard any renewal of aggression in violation of the Geneva Agreements with grave concern and as seriously threatening international peace and security.

"You can think of South Viet-Nam as a test case; there is good reason to believe that this is the view of the Communist bloc. In Viet-Nam we are determining whether or not the free world can help a nation defend itself against the subversion and guerrilla warfare which make up the 'war of national liberation' tactics. I think it is fair to say that we have largely stopped the Communist thrust all around the world in conventional and nuclear terms. We are now confronted by a new kind of threat, and we have to a degree invented a new kind of response to meet it. All of the underdeveloped nations of the world are watching the event. If South Viet-Nam falls, their will to resist this kind of aggression will be weakened and the whole fabric of free-world strength and determination damaged thereby.

"Perhaps, in more human terms, you may want to think of our support to Viet-Nam as American help to the nearly 1 million Vietnamese refugees who fled North Viet-Nam in 1954 and 1955 to avoid living under a Communist regime."

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37. President Kennedy's TV Interview, September 2, 1963, Department of State Bulletin, September 30, 1963, p. 499:

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"Mr. Cronkite: Hasn't every indication from Saigon been that President Diem has no intention of changing his pattern?

"President Kennedy: If he does not change it, of course, that is his decision. He has been there 10 years, and, as I say, he has carried this burden when he has been counted out on a number of occasions.

"Our best judgment is that he can't be successful on this basis. We hope that he comes to see that; but in the final analysis it is the people and the Government itself who have to win or lose this struggle. All we can do is help, and we are making it very clear. But I don't agree

with those who say we should withdraw. That would be a great mistake. That would be a great mistake. I know people don't like Americans to be engaged in this kind of an effort. Forty-seven Americans have been killed in combat with the enemy, but this is a very important struggle even though it is far away.

"We took all this -- made this effort to defend Europe. Now Europe is quite secure. We also have to participate -- we may not like it -- in the defense of Asia."

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38. President Kennedy's NBC Interview, September 9, 1963, Department of State Bulletin, September 30, 1963, p. 499:

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"Mr. Huntley: Mr. President, in respect to our difficulties in South Viet-Nam, could it be that our Government tends occasionally to get locked into a policy or an attitude and then finds it difficult to alter or shift that policy?

"The President: Yes, that is true. I think in the case of South Viet-Nam we have been dealing with a Government which is in control, has been in control for 10 years. In addition, we have felt for the last 2 years that the struggle against the Communists was going better. Since June, however -- the difficulties with the Buddhists -- we have been concerned about a deterioration, particularly in the Saigon area, which hasn't been felt greatly in the outlying areas but may spread. So we are faced with the problem of wanting to protect the area against the Communists. On the other hand, we have to deal with the Government there. That produces a kind of ambivalence in our efforts which exposes us to some criticism. We are using our influence to persuade the Government there to take those steps which will win back support. That takes some time, and we must be patient, we must persist.

"Mr. Huntley: Are we likely to reduce our aid to South Viet-Nam now?

"The President: I don't think we think that would be helpful at this time. If you reduce your aid, it is possible you could have some effect upon the government structure there. On the other hand, you might have a situation which could bring about a collapse. Strongly in our mind is what happened in the case of China at the end of World War II, where China was lost -- a weak government became increasingly unable to control events. We don't want that.

"Mr. Brinkley: Mr. President, have you had any reason to doubt this so-called 'domino theory,' that if South Viet-Nam falls, the rest of Southeast Asia will go behind it?

"The President: No, I believe it. I believe it. I think that the struggle is close enough. China is so large, looms so high just beyond the frontiers, that if South Viet-Nam went, it would not only give them an improved geographic position for a guerrilla assault on Malaya but would also give the impression that the wave of the future in Southeast Asia was China and the Communists. So I believe it."

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39. President Kennedy's News Conference, September 12, 1963, Public Papers of the Presidents, Kennedy, 1963, p. 673:

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"Q. Mr. President, in view of the prevailing confusion, is it possible to state today just what this Government's policy is toward the current government of South Viet-Nam?

"THE PRESIDENT. I think I have stated what my view is and we are for those things and those policies which help win the war there. That is why some 25,000 Americans have traveled 10,000 miles to participate in that struggle. What helps to win the war, we support; what interferes with the war effort, we oppose. I have already made it clear that any action by either government which may handicap the winning of the war is inconsistent with our policy or our objectives. This is the test which I think every agency and official of the United States Government must apply to all of our actions, and we shall be applying that test in various ways in the coming months, although I do not think it desirable to state all of our views at this time. I think they will be made more clear as time goes on.

"But we have a very simple policy in that area, I think. In some ways I think the Vietnamese people and ourselves agree; we want the war to be won, the Communists to be contained, and the Americans to go home. That is our policy. I am sure it is the policy of the people of Viet-Nam. But we are not there to see a war lost, and we will follow the policy which I have indicated today of advancing those causes and issues which help win the war."

* * *

40. President Kennedy's Remarks at the Yellowstone County Fairgrounds, Billings, Montana, September 25, 1963, Public Papers of the Presidents, Kennedy, 1963, p. 724:

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"... Countries which we had never heard of before, Viet-Nam, Laos, the Congo, and the others, countries which were distant names in our geographies, have now become matters of the greatest concern, where the interests of the United States are vitally involved, and where we have, for example, in Viet-Nam, over 25,000 of your sons and brothers bearing arms.

"So this is a difficult and complex world. I am sure a citizen in this community and in this country must wonder what we are doing. I think what we are trying to do is comparatively simple, and that is, with our own power and might -- and the only country which has that power and might -- and, I believe, the long-range determination and perseverance, we are trying to assist the hundred-odd countries which are now independent to maintain their independence. We do that not only because we wish them to be free, but because it serves our own national interest. As long as there are all of these countries separate, free, and independent, and not part of one great monolithic bloc which threatens us, so long we are free and independent.

"When it appeared at the end of the fifties that there would be over a billion people organized in the Communist movement, Russia and China and Eastern Europe working closely together, that represented a danger to us which could turn the balance of power against us. As there has been a division within the bloc, as there has been a fragmentation behind the Iron Curtain, as the long-range interests of geography and nationalism play a part even behind the Iron Curtain, as it does on this side of the Iron Curtain, we have made progress, not toward an easier existence, but, I think, toward a chance for a more secure existence.

"In 1961 the United States and the Soviet Union came face to face over Berlin. The United States called up more than 150,000 troops. At the meeting in Vienna, of 1961, Mr. Khrushchev informed me that he was going to sign a peace treaty in Berlin by the end of the year, and if the United States continued to supply its forces in Berlin it would be regarded as a possible act of war. In 1962 we came face to face with the same great challenge in Cuba, in October. So we have lived, even in the short space of the last 3 years, on two occasions when we were threatened with a direct military confrontation. We wish to lessen that prospect. We know that the struggle between the Communist system and ourselves will go on. We know it will go on in economics, in productivity, in ideology, in Latin America and Africa, in the Middle East and Asia."

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41. President Kennedy's Remarks at the High School Memorial Stadium, Great Falls, Montana, September 26, 1963, Public Papers of the Presidents, Kennedy, 1963, p. 727:

"I know that there are many of you who sit here and wonder what it is that causes the United States to go so far away, that causes you to wonder why so many of your sons should be stationed so far away from our own territory, who wonder why it is since 1945 that the United States has assisted so many countries. You must wonder when it is all going to end and when we can come back home. Well, it isn't going to end, and this generation of Americans has to make up its mind for our security and for

our peace, because what happens in Europe or Latin America or Africa or Asia directly affects the security of the people who live in this city, and particularly those who are coming after.

"I make no apologies for the effort that we make to assist these other countries to maintain their freedom, because I know full well that every time a country, regardless of how far away it may be from our own borders -- every time that country passes behind the Iron Curtain the security of the United States is thereby endangered. So all those who suggest we withdraw, all those who suggest we should no longer ship our surplus food abroad or assist other countries, I could not disagree with them more. This country is stronger now than it has ever been. Our chances for peace are stronger than they have been in years. The nuclear test ban which was strongly led in the Senate of the United States by Mike Mansfield and Lee Metcalf is, I believe, a step toward peace and a step toward security, and gives us an additional chance that all of the weapons of Montana will never be fired. That is the object of our policy.

"So we need your support. These are complicated problems which face a citizenry. Most of us grew up in a relative period of isolation, and neutrality, and unalignment which was our policy from the time of George Washington to the Second World War, and suddenly, in an act almost unknown in the history of the world, we were shoved onto the center of the stage. We are the keystone in the arch of freedom. If the United States were to falter, the whole world, in my opinion, would inevitably begin to move toward the Communist bloc.

"It is the United States, this country, your country, which in 15 to 18 years has almost singlehandedly protected the freedom of dozens of countries who, in turn, by being free, protect our freedom. So when you ask why are we in Laos, or Viet-Nam, or the Congo, or why do we support the Alliance for Progress in Latin America, we do so because we believe that our freedom is tied up with theirs, and if we can develop a world in which all the countries are free, then the threat to the security of the United States is lessened. So we have to stay at it. We must not be fatigued."

* * *

42. U.S. Policy on Viet-Nam: White House Statement, October 2, 1963, Department of State Bulletin, October 21, 1963, p. 623:

"1. The security of South Viet-Nam is a major interest of the United States as other free nations. We will adhere to our policy of working with the people and Government of South Viet-Nam to deny this country to communism and to suppress the externally stimulated and supported insurgency of the Viet Cong as promptly as possible. Effective performance in this undertaking is the central objective of our policy in South Viet-Nam."

* * *

"5. It remains the policy of the United States in South Viet-Nam as in other parts of the world, to support the efforts of the people of that country to defeat aggression and to build a peaceful and free society."

* * *

43. President Kennedy's Remarks Prepared for Delivery at the Trade Mart in Dallas, November 22, 1963, Public Papers of the Presidents, Kennedy, 1963, p. 890:

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"I want to discuss with you today the status of our strength and our security because this question clearly calls for the most responsible qualities of leadership and the most enlightened products of scholarship. For this Nation's strength and security are not easily or cheaply obtained, nor are they quickly and simply explained. There are many kinds of strength and no one kind will suffice. Overwhelming nuclear strength cannot stop a guerrilla war. Formal pacts of alliance cannot stop internal subversion. Displays of material wealth cannot stop the disillusionment of diplomats subjected to discrimination.

"Above all, words alone are not enough. The United States is a peaceful nation. And where our strength and determination are clear, our words need merely to convey conviction, not belligerence. If we are strong, our strength will speak for itself. If we are weak, words will be of no help.

"I realize that this Nation often tends to identify turning-points in world affairs with the major addresses which preceded them. But it was not the Monroe Doctrine that kept all Europe away from this hemisphere -- it was the strength of the British fleet and the width of the Atlantic Ocean. It was not General Marshall's speech at Harvard which kept communism out of Western Europe -- it was the strength and stability made possible by our military and economic assistance.

"In this administration also it has been necessary at times to issue specific warnings -- warnings that we could not stand by and watch the Communists conquer Laos by force, or intervene in the Congo, or swallow West Berlin, or maintain offensive missiles on Cuba. But while our goals were at least temporarily obtained in these and other instances, our successful defense of freedom was due not to the words we used, but to the strength we stood ready to use on behalf of the principles we stand ready to defend."

* * *

"But American military might should not and need not stand alone against the ambitions of international communism. Our security and strength, in the last analysis, directly depend on the security and

strength of others, and that is why our military and economic assistance plays such a key role in enabling those who live on the periphery of the Communist world to maintain their independence of choice. Our assistance to these nations can be painful, risky and costly, as is true in Southeast Asia today. But we dare not weary of the task. For our assistance makes possible the stationing of 3-5 million allied troops along the Communist frontier at one-tenth the cost of maintaining a comparable number of American soldiers. A successful Communist breakthrough in these areas, necessitating direct United States intervention, would cost us several times as much as our entire foreign aid program, and might cost us heavily in American lives as well."

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V. A. - Vol II

V. JUSTIFICATION OF THE WAR - PUBLIC STATEMENTS

D. Johnson Administration

PART V.

JUSTIFICATION OF THE WAR -- PUBLIC STATEMENTS

Foreword

This portion of the study consists of an examination of the public statements justifying U.S. involvement in Vietnam. Only official statements contained in either the U.S. Department of State Bulletins or the Public Papers of the Presidents were reviewed. Although conclusions are based primarily on the statements of the President, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense, the statements of other high-ranking government officials were also studied in ascertaining the policy context of the quoted material. This report includes analyses of the Johnson period. The statements are organized chronologically and are summarized for each year.

1. 1964
2. 1965
3. 1966
4. 1967

JOHNSON ADMINISTRATION - 1964

SUMMARY

President Johnson succeeded to the Presidency upon the assassination of President Kennedy in November 1963 only three weeks after the coup d'etat which saw the Ngo Dinh Diem regime crushed and Diem himself murdered. Confronted with a crisis, the U.S. renewed its pledge to support the military junta and the free government of Vietnam. The U.S. increased its support even as the GVN wavered through a series of government changes each reflecting the control retained by the military. U.S. involvement deepened with the increased advisory strength and the introduction of combat troops in 1964. The Tonkin Gulf crisis and the subsequent resolution became benchmarks for the U.S. commitment. The new Administration emphasized the following points:

a. Organized aggression from the North obligated the United States to fulfill its commitments under the SEATO treaty.

b. The strategic importance of Southeast Asia to the security of the United States and the test of "wars of liberation" there as important to the future peace and freedom of South Vietnam.

c. The Gulf of Tonkin action showed that "aggression by terror" had been joined by "open aggression on the high seas" against the United States and the resolution which followed justified measures to "repel any armed attack."

d. The communist "appetite for aggression" through "wars of liberation" threatened not only other Asian countries, but also the United States if left unchecked. The U.S. seeks no wider war.

e. Four basic themes govern U.S. policy, essentially unchanged since 1954: America keeps her word; the future of Southeast Asia is the issue; "our purpose is peace; and, this war is a "struggle for freedom."

V. D. JUSTIFICATION OF THE WAR -- PUBLIC STATEMENTS

JOHNSON ADMINISTRATION

1964

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D. Johnson Administration

1. Secretary Rusk Interviewed on Voice of America, 15 February 1964, Department of State Bulletin, 2 March 1964, p. 333:

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"MR. O'NEILL: Well, Hanoi has just publicly now identified itself as supporting the guerrillas in South Vietnam and also threatening that Red China would intervene in any action against North Vietnam. Do you see any connection between that and the French recognition, or do you think this is an isolated development?

"SECRETARY RUSK: I haven't seen anything that would lead me to say there was an organic connection between what Hanoi has just said and what Paris has done. It is true that Hanoi has made no secret of this policy since 1959. They have publicly declared that they are out to take over South Vietnam, and in this same statement to which you are referring they made it very clear that North Vietnam is not going to be neutralized and that their interest in South Vietnam is not so much neutrality as taking it over. So I think the issues have been drawn very clearly out there.

"MR. O'NEILL: While we are on that area, how is the fighting in South Vietnam? Are we going to be able to win out, and do you have any idea as to how soon that might be?

"SECRETARY RUSK: Well, I think we will have to wait a bit before we can speak with complete confidence about it in the short run. In the long run, I have no doubt that the resources, the will, the material are present in South Vietnam to enable the South Vietnamese to do this job. We are determined that Southeast Asia is not going to be taken over by the communists. We must insist that these basic accords be adhered to. And so we are in this to the point where the South Vietnamese are going to be independent and secure."

* * *

"MR. WARD: Mr. Secretary, I wish you'd say something about this word 'neutralization' -- not whether Southeast Asia or some parts thereof should be neutralized, but what the word itself means. It seems to me there is a great deal of misunderstanding that flows from varied uses of the word.

"SECRETARY RUSK: Well, the word gets confused because it has meant so many different things to different people. I suppose in the strictest sense a neutral is, in time of peace, a so-called 'unalined' country, that it is not committed to one of the two major power blocs in the world, the NATO bloc or the communist bloc.

"Well, now, we don't object to neutrals or policies of neutrality or neutralization in that sense. There are a great many countries who are unalined with whom we have very close and friendly relations. We are not looking for allies. We are not looking for military bases out in Southeast Asia. We are not even looking for a military presence in that part of the world.

"Our troops are there assisting the South Vietnamese because people in the north have been putting pressures on Southeast Asia. If those pressures did not exist, those troops wouldn't be there. But when one talks about neutralizing South Vietnam in the present context, this means, really, getting the Americans out. That is all that that means.

"Now, North Vietnam is not going to be neutralized. It's going to remain a member of the communist camp. And from the time that it was established, North Vietnam has broken agreements and has applied pressure on its neighbors, particularly Laos and South Vietnam. So that if anyone has in mind that South Vietnam should be neutralized, meaning that Americans should simply go home and leave it exposed to takeover from the north, then this isn't going to happen.

"Now, if South Vietnam were independent and secure, it would be perfectly free to pursue its own policy. It can be unalined, as far as we are concerned."

* * *

2. TV Interview with President Johnson, 15 March 1964, Public Papers of The Presidents, Johnson, 1963-64, p. 370:

"MR. SEVAREID: Mr. Kennedy said, on the subject of Vietnam, I think, that he did believe in the 'falling domino' theory, that if Vietnam were lost, that other countries in the area would soon be lost.

"THE PRESIDENT: I think it would be a very dangerous thing, and I share President Kennedy's view, and I think the whole of Southeast Asia would be involved and that would involve hundreds of millions of people, and I think it's -- it cannot be ignored, we must do everything that we can, we must be responsible, we must stay there and help them, and that is what we are going to do."

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3. "United States Policy in Vietnam," by Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of Defense, 26 March 1964, Department of State Bulletin, 13 April 1964, p. 562:

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"At the Third National Congress of the Lao Dong (Communist) Party in Hanoi, September 1960, North Vietnam's belligerency was made explicit. Ho Chi Minh stated, 'The North is becoming more and more consolidated and transformed into a firm base for the struggle for national reunification.' At the same congress it was announced that the party's new task was 'to liberate the South from the atrocious rule of the U.S. imperialists and their henchmen.' In brief, Hanoi was about to embark upon a program of wholesale violations of the Geneva agreements in order to wrest control of South Vietnam from its legitimate government.

"To the communists, 'liberation' meant sabotage, terror, and assassination: attacks on innocent hamlets and villages and the coldblooded murder of thousands of schoolteachers, health workers, and local officials who had the misfortune to oppose the communist version of 'liberation.' In 1960 and 1961 almost 3,000 South Vietnamese civilians in and out of government were assassinated and another 2,500 were kidnaped. The communists even assassinated the colonel who served as liaison officer to the International Control Commission.

"This aggression against South Vietnam was a major communist effort, meticulously planned and controlled, and relentlessly pursued by the government in Hanoi. In 1961 the Republic of Vietnam, unable to contain the menace by itself, appealed to the United States to honor its unilateral declaration of 1954. President Kennedy responded promptly and affirmatively by sending to that country additional American advisers, arms, and aid.

"U.S. Objectives:

"I turn now to a consideration of United States objectives in South Vietnam. The United States has no designs whatever on the resources or territory of the area. Our national interests do not require that South Vietnam serve as a Western base or as a member of a Western alliance. Our concern is threefold.

"First, and most important, is the simple fact that South Vietnam, a member of the free world family, is striving to preserve its independence from communist attack. The Vietnamese have asked our help. We have given it. We shall continue to give it.

"We do so in their interest; and we do so in our own clear self-interest. For basic to the principles of freedom and self-determination which have sustained our country for almost two centuries is the right of peoples everywhere to live and develop in peace. Our own security is strengthened by the determination of others to remain free, and by our commitment to assist them. We will not let this member of our family down, regardless of its distance from our shores.

"The ultimate goal of the United States in Southeast Asia, as in the rest of the world, is to help maintain free and independent nations which can develop politically, economically, and socially and which can be responsible members of the world community. In this region and elsewhere

many peoples share our sense of the value of such freedom and independence. They have taken the risks and made the sacrifices lined to the commitment to membership in the family of the free world. They have done this in the belief that we would back up our pledges to help defend them. It is not right or even expedient -- nor is it in our nature -- to abandon them when the going is difficult.

"Second, Southeast Asia has great strategic significance in the forward defense of the United States. Its location across east-west air and sea lanes flanks the Indian subcontinent on one side and Australia, New Zealand, and the Philippines on the other and dominates the gateway between the Pacific and Indian Oceans. In communist hands this area would pose a most serious threat to the security of the United States and to the family of free-world nations to which we belong. To defend Southeast Asia, we must meet the challenge in South Vietnam.

"And third, South Vietnam is a test case for the new communist strategy. Let me examine for a moment the nature of this strategy.

"Just as the Kennedy administration was coming into office in January 1961, Chairman Khrushchev made one of the most important speeches on communist strategy of recent decades. In his report on a party conference entitled 'For New Victories of the World Communist Movement,' Khrushchev stated: 'In modern conditions, the following categories of wars should be distinguished: world wars, local wars, liberation wars and popular uprising.' He ruled out what he called 'world wars' and 'local wars' as being too dangerous for profitable indulgence in a world of nuclear weapons. But with regard to what he called 'liberation wars,' he referred specifically to Vietnam. He said, 'It is a sacred war. We recognize such wars...'"

* * *

"President Kennedy and President Johnson have recognized, however, that our forces for the first two types of wars might not be applicable or effective against what the communists call 'wars of liberation,' or what is properly called covert aggression or insurgency. We have therefore undertaken and continue to press a variety of programs to develop skilled specialists, equipment, and techniques to enable us to help our allies counter the threat of insurgency.

"Communist interest in insurgency techniques did not begin with Khrushchev, nor for that matter with Stalin. Lenin's works are full of tactical instructions, which were adapted very successfully by Mao Tse-tung, whose many writings on guerrilla warfare have become classic references. Indeed, Mao claims to be the true heir of Lenin's original prescriptions for the worldwide victory of communism. The North Vietnamese have taken a leaf or two from Mao's book -- as well as Moscow's -- and added some of their own.

"Thus today in Vietnam we are not dealing with factional disputes or the remnants of a colonial struggle against the French but rather with a major test case of communism's new strategy. That strategy has so far been pursued in Cuba, may be beginning in Africa, and failed in Malaya and the Philippines only because of a long and arduous struggle by the people of these countries with assistance provided by the British and the United States.

"In Southeast Asia the communists have taken full advantage of geography -- the proximity to the communist base of operations and the rugged, remote, and heavily foliated character of the border regions. They have utilized the diverse ethnic, religious, and tribal groupings and exploited factionalism and legitimate aspirations wherever possible. And, as I said earlier, they have resorted to sabotage, terrorism, and assassination on an unprecedented scale.

"Who is the responsible party -- the prime aggressor? First and foremost, without doubt, the prime aggressor is North Vietnam, whose leadership has explicitly undertaken to destroy the independence of the South. To be sure, Hanoi is encouraged on its aggressive course by Communist China. But Peiping's interest is hardly the same as that of Hanoi.

"For Hanoi, the immediate objective is limited: conquest of the South and national unification, perhaps coupled with control of Laos. For Peiping, however, Hanoi's victory would be only a first step toward eventual Chinese hegemony over the two Vietnams and Southeast Asia and toward exploitation of the new strategy in other parts of the world.

"Communist China's interests are clear: It has publicly castigated Moscow for betraying the revolutionary cause whenever the Soviets have sounded a cautionary note. It has characterized the United States as a paper tiger and has insisted that the revolutionary struggle for 'liberation and unification' of Vietnam could be conducted without risks by, in effect, crawling under the nuclear and conventional defense of the free world. Peiping thus appears to feel that it has a large stake in demonstrating the new strategy, using Vietnam as a test case. Success in Vietnam would be regarded by Peiping as vindication for China's views in the worldwide ideological struggle.

"Taking into account the relationship of Vietnam to Indochina -- and of both to Southeast Asia, the Far East, and the free world as a whole -- five U.S. Presidents have acted to preserve free-world strategic interests in the area. President Roosevelt opposed Japanese penetration in Indochina; President Truman resisted communist aggression in Korea; President Eisenhower backed Diem's efforts to save South Vietnam and undertook to defend Taiwan; President Kennedy stepped up our counterinsurgency effort in Vietnam; and President Johnson, in addition to reaffirming last week that the United States will furnish assistance and support to South Vietnam for as long as it is required to bring communist aggression and terrorism under control, has approved the program that I shall describe in a few minutes.

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"The U.S. role in South Vietnam, then, is first, to answer the call of the South Vietnamese, a member nation of our free-world family, to help them save their country for themselves; second, to help prevent the strategic danger which would exist if communism absorbed Southeast Asia's people and resources; and third, to prove in the Vietnamese test case that the free-world can cope with communist 'wars of liberation' as we have coped successfully with communist aggression at other levels."

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4. "U.S. Calls for Frontier Patrol to Help Prevent Border Incidents Between Cambodia and Vietnam," Statement by Adlai Stevenson to Security Council, 21 May 1964, Department of State Bulletin, 8 June 1964, p. 908:

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"First, the United States had no, repeat no, national military objective anywhere in Southeast Asia. United States policy for Southeast Asia is very simple. It is the restoration of peace so that the peoples of that area can go about their own independent business in whatever associations they may freely choose for themselves without interference from the outside.

"I trust my words have been clear enough on this point.

"Second, the United States Government is currently involved in the affairs of the Republic of Vietnam for one reason and one reason only: because the Republic of Vietnam requested the help of the United States and of other governments to defend itself against armed attack fomented, equipped, and directed from the outside.

"This is not the first time that the United States Government has come to the aid of peoples prepared to fight for their freedom and independence against armed aggression sponsored from outside their borders. Nor will it be the last time unless the lesson is learned once and for all by all aggressors that armed aggression does not pay -- that it no longer works -- that it will not be tolerated.

"The record of the past two decades makes it clear that a nation with the will for self-preservation can outlast and defeat overt or clandestine aggression -- even when that internal aggression is heavily supported from the outside, and even after significant early successes by the aggressors. I would remind the members that in 1947, after the aggressors had gained control of most of the country, many people felt that the cause of the Government of Greece was hopelessly lost. But as long as the people of Greece were prepared to fight for the life of their own country, the United States was not prepared to stand by while Greece was overrun.

"This principle does not change with the geographical setting. Aggression is aggression; organized violence is organized violence. Only the scale and the scenery change; the point is the same in Vietnam today as it was in Greece

in 1947 and in Korea in 1950. The Indochinese Communist Party, the parent of the present Communist Party in North Vietnam, made it abundantly clear as early as 1951 that the aim of the Vietnamese Communist leadership is to take control of all of Indochina. This goal has not changed -- it is still clearly the objective of the Vietnamese Communist leadership in Hanoi.

"Hanoi seeks to accomplish this purpose in South Vietnam through subversive guerrilla warfare directed, controlled, and supplied by North Vietnam. The communist leadership in Hanoi has sought to pretend that the insurgency in South Vietnam is a civil war, but Hanoi's hand shows very clearly. Public statements by the Communist Party in North Vietnam and its leaders have repeatedly demonstrated Hanoi's direction of the struggle in South Vietnam. For example, Le Duan, First Secretary of the Party, stated on September 5, 1960, 'At present our Party is facing /a/ momentous task:... to strive to complete...revolution throughout the country...' He also said this: 'The North is the common revolutionary base of the whole country.' Three months after the Communist Party Congress in Hanoi in September 1960, the so-called 'National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam' was set up pursuant to plans outlined publicly at that Congress.

"The International Control Commission in Vietnam, established by the Geneva accords of 1954, stated in a special report which it issued in June 1962 that there is sufficient evidence to show that North Vietnam has violated various articles of the Geneva accords by its introduction of armed personnel, arms, munitions, and other supplies from North Vietnam into South Vietnam with the object of supporting, organizing, and carrying out hostile activities against the Government and armed forces of South Vietnam.

"Infiltration of military personnel and supplies from North Vietnam to South Vietnam has been carried out steadily over the past several years. The total number of military cadres sent into South Vietnam via infiltration routes runs into the thousands. Such infiltration is well documented on the basis of numerous defectors and prisoners taken by the armed forces of South Vietnam.

"Introduction of communist weapons into South Vietnam has also grown steadily. An increasing amount of weapons and ammunition captured from the Viet Cong has been proven to be of Chinese Communist manufacture or origin. For example, in December 1963 a large cache of Viet Cong equipment captured in one of the Mekong Delta provinces in South Vietnam included recoilless rifles, rocket launchers, carbines, and ammunition of Chinese Communist manufacture.

"The United States cannot stand by while Southeast Asia is overrun by armed aggressors. As long as the peoples of that area are determined to preserve their own independence and ask for our help in preserving it, we will extend it. This, of course, is the meaning of President Johnson's request a few days ago for additional funds for more economic as well as military assistance for Vietnam.

"And if anyone has the illusion that my Government will abandon the people of Vietnam -- or that we shall weary of the burden of support that we are rendering these people -- it can only be due to ignorance of the strength and the conviction of the American people.

* * *

5. "The Defense of the Free World," Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of Defense, before the National Ind Conf Bd, 21 May 1964, Department of State Bulletin, 8 June 1964, p. 895:

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"The 'Forward Defense' Nations:

"Our military assistance program today is oriented mainly toward those countries on the periphery of the major communist nations where the threats are greatest and in which the indigenous resources are least. In the fiscal year 1965 program now before the Congress, about two-thirds of the total amount is scheduled to go to the 11 nations on the southern and eastern perimeters of the Soviet and Red Chinese blocs. These sentinels of the free world, in a sense, are in double jeopardy from potential military aggression from without and from attempted subversion from within. These countries are under the Red shadow. They face the major threat, and they are the ones most affected by the modernization of communist forces. For this group we requested $745 million in military assistance. They best illustrate the points I want to make.

"Imagine a globe, if you will, and on that globe the Sino-Soviet bloc. The bloc is contained at the north by the Arctic. To the west are the revitalized nations of Western Europe. But across the south and to the east you find the 11 'forward defense' nations -- Greece, Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, India, Laos, Thailand, South Vietnam, the Philippines, and the Republics of China and Korea. These nations, together with stretches of the Pacific Ocean bearing the U.S. Fleet, describe an arc along which the free world draws its frontlines of defense.

"The frontlines are there in the interests of those 11 nations; the lines are there also in the interests of the United States and the rest of the free world. The areaswhich this 11-nation arc protects are of obvious strategic importance to the United States. More significant, however, is the importance of the arc to the principle that nations have a right to be independent -- a right to develop in peace, in freedom, and according to the principle of self-determination. United States support of these rights at the frontiers thickens the blood of the free-world family; it strengthens our security at home.

"We must recognize, however, that the United States does not have the resources to maintain a credible force by itself along all of this great arc of forward positions. Such a strategy would be unbearably costly to us in both money and human resources. The United States maintains major

combat units ashore in forward positions only in Europe and in parts of the Far East. Such deployments are costly and hurt our balance-of-payments position. We do not now contemplate additional semipermanent deployments of forces abroad."

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6. "Laos and Viet-Nam -- A Prescription for Peace," Address by Secretary Rusk before the American Law Institute, Washington, D.C., 22 May 1964, Department of State Bulletin, 8 June 1964, p. 890:

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"Four Alternatives in Vietnam:

"You are all aware of the four principal alternatives in South Vietnam which have been referred to in recent discussion. The first would be to withdraw and forget about Southeast Asia. That would mean not only grievous losses to the free world in Southeast and southern Asia but a drastic loss of confidence in the will and capacity of the free world to oppose aggression. It would also bring us much closer to a major conflagration. Surely we have learned, in the course of the last 35 years, that a course of aggression means war and that the place to stop it is at its beginning.

* * *

"At the meeting of the Council of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization in Manila last month, seven of the eight members joined in declaring the defeat of the aggression against South Vietnam to be 'essential not only to the security of the Republic of Vietnam, but to that of Southeast Asia.' And, they said, its defeat will also be convincing proof that communist expansion by such tactics will not be permitted."

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7. "President Outlines Basic Themes of U.S. Policy in Southeast Asia," Statement by President Johnson at his News Conference on June 2, 1964, Department of State Bulletin, 22 June 1964, p. 953:

"It may be helpful to outline four basic themes that govern our policy in Southeast Asia.

"First, America keeps her word.

"Second, the issue is the future of Southeast Asia as a whole.

"Third, our purpose is peace.

"Fourth, this is not just a jungle war, but a struggle for freedom on every front of human activity.

"On the point that America keeps her word, we are steadfast in a policy which has been followed for 10 years in three administrations."

* * *

8. "Address to The Nation by President Johnson," 4 August 1964, Department of State Bulletin, 24 August 1964, p. 259:

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"In the larger sense this new act of aggression, aimed directly at our own forces, again brings home to all of us in the United States the importance of the struggle for peace and security in Southeast Asia. Aggression by terror against the peaceful villagers of South Vietnam has now been joined by open aggression on the high seas against the United States of America."

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9. "Address by The President, Syracuse University, 5 August 1964," Department of State Bulletin, 24 August 1964, p. 260:

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"Aggression -- deliberate, willful, and systematic aggression -- has unmasked its face to the entire world. The world remembers -- the world must never forget -- that aggression unchallenged is aggression unleashed.

"We of the United States have not forgotten. That is why we have answered this aggression with action.

"America's course is not without long provocation.

"For 10 years, three American Presidents -- President Eisenhower, President Kennedy, and your present President -- and the American people have been actively concerned with threats to the peace and security of the peoples of Southeast Asia from the communist government of North Vietnam.

"President Eisenhower sought -- and President Kennedy sought -- the same objectives that I still seek:

-- That the governments of Southeast Asia honor the international agreements which apply in the area;

-- That those governments leave each other alone;

-- That they resolve their differences peacefully;

-- That they devote their talents to bettering the lives of their peoples by working against poverty and disease and ignorance.

"In 1954 we made our position clear toward Vietnam.

"In July of that year we stated we would view any renewal of the aggression in violation of the 1954 agreements 'with grave concern and as seriously threatening international peace and security.'

"In September of that year the United States signed the Manila Pact, on which our participation in SEATO is based. That pact recognized that aggression by means of armed attack on South Vietnam would endanger the peace and the safety of the nations signing that solemn agreement.

"In 1962 we made our position clear toward Laos. We signed the Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos. That accord provided for the withdrawal of all foreign forces and respect for the neutrality and independence of that little country.

"The agreements of 1954 and 1962 were also signed by the government of North Vietnam.

"In 1954 that government pledged that it would respect the territory under the military control of the other party and engage in no hostile act against the other party.

"In 1962 that government pledged that it would 'not introduce into the Kingdom of Laos foreign troops or military personnel.'

"That government also pledged that it would 'not use the territory of the Kingdom of Laos for interference in the internal affairs of other countries.'

"That government of North Vietnam is now willfully and systematically violating those agreements of both 1954 and 1962.

"To the south, it is engaged in aggression against the Republic of Vietnam.

"To the west, it is engaged in aggression against the Kingdom of Laos.

"To the east, it has now struck out on the high seas in an act of aggression against the United States of America.

"There can be and there must be no doubt about the policy and no doubt about the purpose.

"So there can be no doubt about the responsibilities of men and the responsibilities of nations that are devoted to peace.

"Peace cannot be assured merely by assuring the safety of the United States destroyer MADDOX or the safety of other vessels of other flags.

"Peace requires that the existing agreements in the area be honored.

"Peace requires that we and all our friends stand firm against the present aggressions of the government of North Vietnam.

"The government of North Vietnam is today flouting the will of the world for peace. The world is challenged to make its will against war known and to make it known clearly and to make it felt and to make it felt decisively.

"So, to our friends of the Atlantic alliance, let me say this this morning. The challenge that we face in Southeast Asia today is the same challenge that we have faced with courage and that we have met with strength in Greece and Turkey, in Berlin and Korea, in Lebanon and in Cuba, and to any who may be tempted to support or to widen the present aggression I say this: There is no threat to any peaceful power from the United States of America. But there can be no peace by aggression and no immunity from reply. That is what is meant by the actions that we took yesterday.

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10. "President's Message to Congress, 5 August 1964," Department of State Bulletin, 24 August 1964, p. 261:

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"These latest actions of the North Vietnamese regime have given a new and grave turn to the already serious situation in Southeast Asia. Our commitments in that area are well known to the Congress. They were first made in 1954 by President Eisenhower. They were further defined in the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty approved by the Senate in February 1955.

"This treaty with its accompanying protocol obligates the United States and other members to act in accordance with their constitutional processes to meet communist aggression against any of the parties or protocol states.

"Our policy in Southeast Asia has been consistent and unchanged since 1954. I summarized it on June 2 in four simple propositions:

"1. America keeps her word. Here as elsewhere, we must and shall honor our commitments.

"2. The issue is the future of Southeast Asia as a whole. A threat to any nation in that region is a threat to all, and a threat to us.

"3. Our purpose is peace. We have no military, political, or territorial ambitions in the area.

"4. This is not just a jungle war, but a struggle for freedom on every front of human activity. Our military and economic assistance to South Vietnam and Laos in particular has the purpose of helping these countries to repel aggression and strengthen their independence.

"The threat to the free nations of Southeast Asia has long been clear. The North Vietnamese regime has constantly sought to take over South Vietnam and Laos. This communist regime has violated the Geneva accords for Vietnam. It has systematically conducted a campaign of subversion, which includes the direction, training, and supply of personnel and arms for the conduct of guerrilla warfare in South Vietnamese territory. In Laos, the North Vietnamese regime has maintained military forces, used Laotian territory for infiltration into South Vietnam, and most recently carried out combat operations -- all in direct violation of the Geneva agreements of 1962.

"In recent months, the actions of the North Vietnamese regime have become steadily more threatening. In May, following new acts of communist aggression in Laos, the United States undertook reconnaissance flights over Laotian territory, at the request of the Government of Laos. These flights had the essential mission of determining the situation in territory where communist forces were preventing inspection by the International Control Commission. When the communists attacked these aircraft, I responded by furnishing escort fighters with instructions to fire when fired upon. Thus, these latest North Vietnamese attacks on our naval vessels are not the first direct attack on armed forces of the United States.

"As President of the United States I have concluded that I should now ask the Congress, on its part, to join in affirming the national determination that all such attacks will be met, and that the United States will continue in its basic policy of assisting the free nations of the area to defend their freedom.

"As I have repeatedly made clear, the United States intends no rashness, and seeks no wider war. We must make it clear to all that the United States is united in its determination to bring about the end of communist subversion and aggression in the area. We seek the full and effective restoration of the international agreements signed in Geneva in 1954, with respect to South Vietnam, and again in Geneva in 1962, with respect to Laos."

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11. "Secretary Rusk Discusses Asian Situation on NBC Program," 5 August 1964, Department of State Bulletin, 24 August 1964, p. 268:

"Following is the transcript of an interview of Secretary Rusk by NBC correspondent Elie Abel, broadcast over nationwide television on August 5.

"MR. ABEL: Mr. Secretary, are we going to get through this situation without touching off a bigger war?

"SECRETARY RUSK: Well, Mr. Abel, one can't be a reliable prophet when the other side helps to write the scenario. But I do want to insist upon one point, that the purpose of the United States in Southeast Asia for these past 10 years or more has been a part of a general policy of the United States since World War II, that is, to organize a decent world community in which nations will leave their neighbors alone and in which nations can have a chance to live at peace with each other and cooperate on a basis of their common interests.

"Now, in Southeast Asia we have been saying over and over again, in conferences such as the Geneva conference of 1962 and elsewhere, that there is only one problem with peace in Southeast Asia and that is these pressures from the north, that if the north would leave their neighbors to the south alone, these peoples of that area could have their peace and could have a chance to work out their own lives in their own way. That is the problem, and to come to the decision to leave their neighbors alone is a necessary decision which Hanoi and anyone supporting Hanoi must reach.

"Q. Why was it necessary, Mr. Secretary, for us to strike as swiftly and abruptly as we did without taking time even to notify our allies?

"A. Well, in the first place, we had some ships in the Gulf of Tonkin who were under attack, and they were dodging torpedoes. Here is a vast expanse of international waters in which we have a perfect right to be. We had to strike immediately because we didn't expect to ask those ships to run a continuing gauntlet of torpedoes on their way back to the Gulf of Tonkin when their mission was completed, nor were we prepared to have them denied international waters in the Gulf of Tonkin.

"Further than that, if under these attacks there had not been an immediate and appropriate response, then Hanoi and those who might be standing behind Hanoi in this might well have come to a very formidable mistaken judgment about what is possible in the Southeast Asian situation.

"Q. You mean their view that we are a paper tiger might have been confirmed?

"A. That's correct. They could have made a basic miscalculation about what the commitment of the United States means in a situation of this sort.

* * *

12. Text of Joint Resolution, August 7, Department of State Bulletin, 24 August 1964, p. 268:

"To promote the maintenance of international peace and security in Southeast Asia.

"Whereas naval units of the communist regime in Vietnam, in violation of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and of international

law, have deliberately and repeatedly attacked United States naval vessels lawfully present in international waters, and have thereby created a serious threat to international peace; and

"Whereas these attacks are part of a deliberate and systematic campaign of aggression that the communist regime in North Vietnam has been waging against its neighbors and the nations joined with them in the collective defense of their freedom; and

"Whereas the United States is assisting the peoples of Southeast Asia to protect their freedom and has no territorial, military or political ambitions in that area, but desires only that these peoples should be left in peace to work out their own destinies in their own way: Now, therefore, be it

"Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the Congress approves and supports the determination of the President, as Commander in Chief, to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression.

"Sec. 2. The United States regards as vital to its national interest and to world peace the maintenance of international peace and security in Southeast Asia. Consonant with the Constitution of the United States and the Charter of the United Nations and in accordance with its obligations under the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, the United States is, therefore, prepared, as the President determines, to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom.

"Sec. 3. This resolution shall expire when the President shall determine that the peace and security of the area is reasonably assured by international conditions created by action of the United Nations or otherwise, except that it may be terminated earlier by concurrent resolution of the Congress."

13. "Freedom in the Postwar World," by Secretary Rusk before American Veterans of WWII and Korea, Philadelphia, 29 August 1964, Department of State Bulletin, 14 September 1964, p. 365:

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"In Southeast Asia the free world suffered a setback in 1954 when, after the defeat at Dien Bien Phu, Vietnam was divided and a communist regime was consolidated in Hanoi. We helped South Vietnam to get on its feet and to build its military defenses. It made remarkable progress for a few years -- which is perhaps why Communist North Vietnam, with the backing of Communist China, renewed its aggression against South Vietnam in 1959. In 1961 President Kennedy reviewed the situation, concluded that the assault from

the north had been underestimated, and substantially increased our assistance to the Government and people of South Vietnam."

* * *

"Hanoi and Peiping have not yet learned that they must leave their neighbors alone. But this is a decision which they must reach. We and our SEATO allies have declared that the communist aggressions in Southeast Asia must be defeated. As you said, Commander Gulewicz, in your statement to the platform committees of the two major parties, '...we cannot afford to abandon the free people of Vietnam. The world watches because South Vietnam is a critical test-case for new communist strategy.'"

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14. "Progress and Problems in East Asia: An American Viewpoint," by William P. Bundy, Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs, Address made before the Research Institute of Japan at Tokyo, 29 September 1964, Department of State Bulletin, 19 October 1964, p. 537:

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"A word further about the situation in Southeast Asia, especially in South Vietnam. Here the aim of our policy is to assist the Government of South Vietnam in maintaining its independence and its control over the territory allotted to it by the Geneva accords of 1954. We do not aim at overthrowing the communist regime of North Vietnam but rather at inducing it to call off the war it directs and supports in South Vietnam.

"We believe it essential to the interests of the free world that South Vietnam not be permitted to fall under communist control. If it does, then the rest of Southeast Asia will be in grave danger of progressively disappearing behind the Bamboo Curtain and other Asian countries like India and even in time Australia and your own nation in turn will be threatened. If Hanoi and Peiping prevail in Vietnam in this key test of the new communist tactics of 'wars of national liberation,' then the communists will use this technique with growing frequency elsewhere in Asia, Africa, and Latin America."

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15. Secretary Rusk's News Conference of December 23, Press Release dated 23 December 1964, Department of State Bulletin, 11 January 1965, p. 37:

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"American Interest in Vietnamese Independence:

"Q. Mr. Secretary, it is sometimes stated that one of the reasons for American assistance to Vietnam is the fact that vital Western interests

are involved in the situation there. Now that we are once again confronted with what apparently is a critical situation, could you define for us the precise nature and extent of those vital Western interests, as you see them?

"A. Well, our interest in Southeast Asia has been developed and expressed throughout this postwar period. Before SEATO (Southeast Asia Treaty Organization) came into existence, we and Britain and France were in very close touch with that situation. SEATO underlined the importance we attached to the security of the countries of that area.

"But actually the American interest can be expressed in very simple terms. Where there is a country which is independent and secure and in a position to work out its own policy and be left alone by its neighbors, there is a country whose position is consistent with our understanding of our interests in the world. It's just as simple as that.

"If we have military personnel in Southeast Asia, it is because we feel that they are needed to assist South Vietnam at the present time to maintain its security and independence. If South Vietnam's neighbors would leave it alone, those military people could come home.

"We have no desire for any bases or permanent military presence in that area. We are interested in the independence of states. That is why we have more than 40 allies. That is why we are interested in the independence and security of the nonalined countries. Because, to us, the general system of states represented in the United Nations Charter is our view of a world that is consistent with American interests. So our own interest there is very simple.

"But it is very important, because we feel that we have learned in the last many decades that a persistent course of aggression left to go unchecked can only lead to a general war and therefore that the independence of particular countries is a matter of importance to the general peace.

"Peiping's Militant Doctrine:

"Q. Mr. Secretary, could I put that question slightly differently? In the last decade or so, over three or four administrations, this Government has taken the position that the Indochina peninsula had an importance to this country beyond the actualities of the countries involved; that is, that it had a relationship to the American problem with China, and out of this developed, over a long period of time, the so-called falling-domino theory. Could you tell us whether you subscribe to that theory and whether you look upon our interest in Vietnam and Laos -- or how you look upon our interest in Vietnam and Laos in relation to China?

"A. Well, I would not myself go to the trouble of trying to outline a 'domino' theory. The theory of the problem rests in Peiping. It rests in a militant approach to the spread of the world revolution as seen from the communist point of view. And we know, given their frequently and publicly

proclaimed ambitions in this respect and what they say not only about their neighbors in Asia but such continents as Africa -- Africa is ripe for revolution, meaning to them ripe for an attempt on their part to extend their domination into that continent -- there is a primitive, militant doctrine of world revolution that would attempt to destroy the structure of international life as written into the United Nations Charter.

"Now, these are appetites and ambitions that grow upon feeding. In 1954 Vietnam was divided. North Vietnam became communist. The next result was pressures against Laos, contrary to those agreements; pressures against South Vietnam, contrary to those agreements. In other words, until there is a determination in Peiping to leave their neighbors alone and not to press militantly their notions of world revolution, then we are going to have this problem.

"And it's the same problem we have had in another part of the world in an earlier period in this postwar period in such things as the Berlin blockade, the pressures against Greece. Those things had to be stopped. They were stopped in the main.

"Now the problem is out in the Pacific. And we have a large interest in the way these problems evolve in the Pacific, because we have allies and we have interests out there. Southeast Asia is at the present time the point at which this issue of militant aggression against one's neighbors for ideological reasons is posed."

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JOHNSON ADMINISTRATION - 1965

SUMMARY

The level of war was escalated by introduction of increased U.S. combat troop strength and the initiation of air strikes against targets in North Vietnam. The Administration justified the escalation on the basis of increased infiltration of North Vietnamese units into South Vietnam and, in general, justified U.S. involvement using much the same rationale as the Kennedy Administration. The "domino theory," however, was de-emphasized in light of communist proclamations and predictions for success. The role of Communist China was given more publicity. The Administration's public pronouncements stressed the following:

a. The U.S. had been committed ten years before and had pledged help to the people of South Vietnam. "Three Presidents have supported that pledge" and it would not be broken. The "integrity of the American commitment" is at the heart of the problem as a point of national honor.

b. The security of the U.S. was tied closely to the expansion of communism in Southeast Asia: if the American counterinsurgency efforts are defeated in Vietnam, they can be defeated anywhere in the world. Failure to halt aggression through "wars of national liberation" would see increasing communist pressure on neighboring states and subsequently greater aggression. "These are big stakes indeed."

c. The basic issue of the conflict was "letting the nations of the area develop as they see fit"; if South Vietnam fell to communist control it would be difficult to prevent the fall of neighboring states. The "domino theory" was not considered a suitable explanation for the SEA situation.

d. "The confused nature of this conflict cannot mask the fact that it is the new face of an old enemy. Over this war -- and all Asia -- is another reality: the deepening shadow of Communist China. The rulers in Hanoi are urged on by Peiping."

e. South Vietnam represented a major test of the communism's new strategy of "wars of liberation." Veiled aggression under this strategy had its source in North Vietnam -- previously a privileged sanctuary -- and free nations had to defend themselves. "The simple issue is that military personnel and arms have been sent across an international demarcation line contrary to international agreements and law..."

V. D. JUSTIFICATION OF THE WAR -- PUBLIC STATEMENTS

JOHNSON ADMINISTRATION

1965

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31. President Johnson states Communist China's "target is not merely SVN, it is Asia" and their objective in VN is "to erode and to discredit America's ability to help prevent Chinese domination over all of Asia."..... D-46

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35. President Johnson indicates America learned the lesson in three earlier wars that aggression must not be tolerated whether in the form of massive armies or guerrilla bands; American commitments given by four Presidents must be honored..... D-50

36. Secretary McNamara refers to 1954 Eisenhower statement as still valid in explaining U.S. interest; he further cites our strategic interests and the threat posed by "wars of liberation," supported in differing degrees by both Red China and Russia... D-51

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Secretary Rusk cites SEATO and other bilateral agreements as obligating U.S. involvement; he stresses the need to honor our commitments as a deterrent to a militant Peiping..... D-55

38. William Bundy admits U.S. interest in Vietnam as "no longer guided...by particular military or economic concern" but by a concern for the development of healthy national entities free from domination..... D-58

39. President Johnson states, "We are there because...we remain fixed on the pursuit of freedom as a deep and moral obligation that will not let us go."..... D-59

16. A Conversation with Dean Rusk, NBC News Program on January 3, 1965, Department of State Bulletin, January 18, 1965, p. 64.

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"Secretary Rusk: ....Now, when North Viet-Nam was organized as a Communist country, almost immediately its neighbor, Laos, and its neighbor, South Viet-Nam, came under direct pressure from North Viet-Nam. Now, this is the nature of the appetite proclaimed from Peiping. One doesn't require a 'domino' theory to get at this. Peiping has announced the doctrine. It is there in the primitive notion of a militant world revolution which has been promoted by these veterans of the long march who now control mainland China. So we believe that you simply postpone temporarily an even greater crisis if you allow an announced course of aggression to succeed a step at a time on the road to a major catastrophe.

* * *

"Now, there are some in other countries, for example, who seem to be relatively indifferent to problems of this sort in Southeast Asia, and yet they are the first ones to say that if we were to abandon Southeast Asia, this would cause them to wonder what our commitments under such arrangements as NATO would mean. Do you see?

"In other words, the issue here is the capability of halting a course of aggression at the beginning, rather than waiting for it to produce a great conflagration."

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17. The State of the Union Address of the President to the Congress, January 4, 1965, Public Papers of the Presidents, Johnson, 1965, p. 3.

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"We are there, first, because a friendly nation has asked us for help against the Communist aggression. Ten years ago our President pledged our help. Three Presidents have supported that pledge. We will not break it now.

"Second, our own security is tied to the peace of Asia. Twice in one generation we have had to fight against aggression in the Far East. To ignore aggression now would only increase the danger of a much larger war.

"Our goal is peace in Southeast Asia. That will come only when aggressors leave their neighbors in peace."

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18. American Policy in South Viet-Nam and Southeast Asia, William P. Bundy, Remarks Made Before the Washington (Mo.) Chamber of Commerce on January 23, 1965, Department of State Bulletin, February 8, 1965, p. 168.

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"In retrospect, our action in Korea reflected three elements:

--a recognition that aggression of any sort must be met early and head-on or it will have to be met later and in tougher circumstances. We had relearned the lessons of the 1930's--Manchuria, Ethiopia, the Rhineland, Czechoslovakia.

--a recognition that a defense line in Asia, stated in terms of an island perimeter, did not adequately define our vital interests, that those vital interests could be affected by action on the mainland of Asia.

--an understanding that, for the future, a power vacuum was an invitation to aggression, that there must be local political, economic, and military strength in being to make aggression unprofitable, but also that there must be a demonstrated willingness of major external power both to assist and to intervene if required."

* * *

"Such was the situation President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles faced in 1954. Two things were clear: that in the absence of external help communism was virtually certain to take over the successor states of Indochina and to move to the borders of Thailand and perhaps beyond, and that with France no longer ready to act, at least in South Viet-Nam, no power other than the United States could move in to help fill the vacuum. Their decision, expressed in a series of actions starting in late 1954, was to move in to help these countries. Besides South Viet-Nam and more modest efforts in Laos and Cambodia, substantial assistance was begun to Thailand.

"The appropriations for these actions were voted by successive Congresses, and in 1954 the Senate likewise ratified the Southeast Asia Treaty, to which Thailand and the Philippines adhered along with the United States, Britain, France, Australia, New Zealand, and Pakistan. Although not signers of the treaty, South Viet-Nam, Laos, and Cambodia could call on the SEATO members for help against aggression.

"So a commitment was made, with the support of both political parties, that has guided our policy in Southeast Asia for a decade now. It was not a commitment that envisaged a United States position of power in Southeast Asia or United States military bases there. We threatened no one. Nor was it a commitment that substituted United States responsibility

for the basic responsibility of the nations themselves for their own defense, political stability, and economic progress. It was a commitment to do what we could to help these nations attain and maintain the independence and security to which they were entitled--both for their own sake and because we recognized that, like South Korea, Southeast Asia was a key area of the mainland of Asia. If it fell to Communist control, this would enormously add to the momentum and power of the expansionist Communist regimes in Communist China and North Viet-Nam and thus to the threat to the whole free-world position in the Pacific."

* * *

"....In simple terms, a victory for the Communists in South Viet-Nam would inevitably make the neighboring states more susceptible to Communist pressure and more vulnerable to intensified subversion supported by military pressures. Aggression by 'wars of national liberation' would gain enhanced prestige and power of intimidation throughout the world, and many threatened nations might well become less hopeful, less resilient, and their will to resist undermined. These are big stakes indeed."

* * *

19. William Bundy Discusses Vietnam Situation, February 7, 1965, Department of State Bulletin, March 8, 1965, p. 292.

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"....Why are we there? What is our national interest? I think it was pretty well stated by Congress last August when it passed a resolution, following the Gulf of Tonkin affair, in which it stated that the United States 'regards as vital to its national interest and world peace the maintenance of international peace and security in southeast Asia.' And that's the basic reason right there--peace in the area, letting the nations of the area develop as they see fit and free from Communist external infiltration, subversion, and control.

"Secondly, it's obvious on the map that if South Viet-Nam were to fall under Communist control it would become very much more difficult--I'm not using what's sometimes called 'the domino theory,' that anything happens automatically or quickly--but it would become very much more difficult to maintain the independence and freedom of Thailand, Cambodia, of Malaysia, and so on. And the confidence of other nations in the whole perimeter of Southeast Asia would necessarily be affected, and the Communists would think they had a winning game going for them. So that's a very important, strategic reason in addition to the fact that we're helping a nation under aggression.

"And thirdly, this technique they're using--they call it 'wars of national liberation'--is a technique that will be used elsewhere in the world if they get away with this one, and they'll be encouraged to do that.

"So those are the three basic reasons why our national interest--and basically our national interest in peace in this whole wide Pacific area with which we have historically had great concern and for which we fought in World War II and in Korea--are deeply at stake in this conflict.

* * *

20. Secretary Rusk's News Conference of February 25, 1965, Department of State Bulletin, March 15, 1965, p. 367.

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"Q. Mr. Secretary, what kind of legal basis did the United States have to bomb the targets of North Viet-Nam?

"A. Self-defense of South Viet-Nam and the commitments of the United States with respect to the security and the self-defense of South Viet-Nam."

* * *

21. Statement Submitted By Adlai Stevenson to U.N. Summarizing a Significant Report Entitled, "Aggression From the North, the Record of North Vietnam's Campaign to Conquer South Vietnam." It was released as Department of State Publication 7839, February 27, 1965.

"EXCELLENCY: For the information of the Members of the Security Council, I am transmitting a special report entitled Aggression From the North, the Record of North Viet-Nam's Campaign To Conquer South Viet-Nam, which my Government is making public today. It presents evidence from which the following conclusions are inescapable:

"First, the subjugation by force of the Republic of Viet-Nam by the regime in northern Viet-Nam is the formal, official policy of that regime; this has been stated and confirmed publicly over the past five years.

"Second, the war in Viet-Nam is directed by the Central Committee of the Lao Dong Party (Communist) which controls the government in northern Viet-Nam.

"Third, the so-called People's Revolutionary Party in the Republic of Viet-Nam is an integral part of the Lao Dong Party in North Viet-Nam.

"Fourth, the so-called liberation front for South Viet-Nam is a subordinate unit of the Central Office for South Viet-Nam, an integral part of the governmental machinery in Hanoi.

"Fifth, the key leadership of the Viet-Cong--officers, specialists, technicians, intelligence agents, political organizers and propagandists--has been trained, equipped and supplied in the north and sent into the Republic of Viet-Nam under Hanoi's military orders.

"Sixth, most of the weapons, including new types recently introduced, and most of the ammunition and other supplies used by the Viet-Cong, have been sent from North to South Viet-Nam.

"Seventh, the scale of infiltration of men and arms, including regular units of the armed forces of North Viet-Nam, has increased appreciably in recent months.

"Eighth, this entire pattern of activity by the regime in Hanoi is in violation of general principles of international law and the Charter of the United Nations, and is in direct violation of the Geneva Accords of 1954. Such a pattern of violation of the treaty obligations undertaken at Geneva was confirmed by a special report of the International Control Commission in 1962 and it has been greatly intensified since then.

"These facts about the situation in Viet-Nam make it unmistakably clear that the character of that conflict is an aggressive war of conquest waged against a neighbor--and make nonsense of the cynical allegation that this is simply an indigenous insurrection.

"I request that you circulate copies of the Report, together with copies of this letter, to the Delegations of all Member States as a Security Council document.

"In making this information available to the Security Council, my Government wishes to say once more that peace can be restored quickly to Viet-Nam by a prompt and assured cessation of aggression by Hanoi against the Republic of Viet-Nam. In that event, my Government--as it has said many times before--would be happy to withdraw its military forces from the Republic of Viet-Nam and turn promptly to an international effort to assist the economic and social development of Southeast Asia.

"In the meantime, my Government awaits the first indication of any intent by the government in Hanoi to return to the ways of peace and peaceful resolution of this international conflict.

"Accept, Excellency, the assurance of my highest consideration.

"ADLAI E. STEVENSON."

22. "Some Fundamentals of American Policy," Address by Secretary Rusk Before the U.S. Council of the International Chamber of Commerce at New York, March 4, 1965, Department of State Bulletin, March 22, 1965, p. 401.

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"The defeat of these aggressions is not only essential if Laos and South Viet-Nam are to remain independent; it is important to the security of Southeast Asia as a whole. You will recall that Thailand has already been proclaimed as the next target by Peiping. This is not something up in the clouds called the domino theory. You don't need that. Listen to the proclamation of militant, world revolution by Peiping, proclaimed with a harshness which has caused deep division within the Communist world itself, quite apart from the issues posed for the free world.

"The U.S. Stake in Viet-Nam

"So what is our stake? What is our commitment in that situation? Can those of us in this room forget the lesson that we had in this issue of war and peace when it was only 10 years from the seizure of Manchuria to Pearl Harbor; about 2 years from the seizure of Czechoslovakia to the outbreak of World War II in Western Europe? Don't you remember the hopes expressed in those days: that perhaps the aggressor will be satisfied by this next bite, and perhaps he will be quiet? Remember that? You remember that we thought that we could put our Military Establishment on short rations and somehow we needn't concern ourselves with peace in the rest of the world. But we found that ambition and appetite fed upon success and the next bite generated the appetite for the following bite. And we learned that, by postponing the issue, we made the result more terrible, the holocaust more dreadful. We cannot forget that experience.

"We have a course of aggression proclaimed in Peiping, very clear for all to see, and proclaimed with a militancy which says that their type of revolution must be supported by force and that much of the world is ripe for that kind of revolution. We have very specific commitments--the Manila Pact, ratified by the Senate by a vote of 82 to 1, a pact to which South Viet-Nam is a protocol state. We have the decision of President Eisenhower in 1954 to extend aid...."

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23. "Viet-Nam Action Called 'Collective Defense Against Armed Aggression'," /Department Statement read to news correspondents on March 4, 1965 by Robert J. McCloskey, Director, Office of News/, Department of State Bulletin, March 22, 1965, p. 403.

"The fact that military hostilities have been taking place in Southeast Asia does not bring about the existence of a state of war, which is

a legal characterization of a situation rather than a factual description. What we have in Viet-Nam is armed aggression from the North against the Republic of Viet-Nam. Pursuant to a South Vietnamese request and consultations between our two Governments, South Viet-Nam and the United States are engaged in collective defense against that armed aggression. The inherent right of individual and collective self-defense is recognized in article 51 of the United Nations Charter.

"If the question is intended to raise the issue of legal authority to conduct the actions which have been taken, there can be no doubt that these actions fall within the constitutional powers of the President and within the congressional resolution of August 1964."

24. "Pattern for Peace in Southeast Asia," Address by President Johnson at John Hopkins University, Baltimore, Maryland on April 7, 1965, Department of State Bulletin, April 26, 1965, p. 607.

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"The confused nature of this conflict cannot mask the fact that it is the new face of an old enemy.

"Over this war--and all Asia--is another reality: the deepening shadow of Communist China. The rulers in Hanoi are urged on by Peiping. This is a regime which has destroyed freedom in Tibet, which has attacked India, and has been condemned by the United Nations for aggression in Korea. It is a nation which is helping the forces of violence in almost every continent. The contest in Viet-Nam is part of a wider pattern of aggressive purposes.

"Why Are We in South Viet-Nam?

"Why are these realities our concern? Why are we in South Viet-Nam?

"We are there because we have a promise to keep. Since 1954 every American President has offered support to the people of South Viet-Nam. We have helped to build, and we have helped to defend. Thus, over many years, we have made a national pledge to help South Viet-Nam defend its independence.

"And I intend to keep that promise.

"To dishonor that pledge, to abandon this small and brave nation to its enemies, and to the terror that must follow, would be an unforgivable wrong.

"We are also there to strengthen world order. Around the globe, from Berlin to Thailand, are people whose well-being rests in part on

the belief that they can count on us if they are attacked. To leave Viet-Nam to its fate would shake the confidence of all these people in the value of an American commitment and in the value of America's word. The result would be increased unrest and instability, and even wider war.

"We are also there because there are great stakes in the balance. Let no one think for a moment that retreat from Viet-Nam would bring an end to conflict. The battle would be renewed in one country and then another. The central lesson of our time is that the appetite of aggression is never satisfied. To withdraw from one battlefield means only to prepare for the next. We must say in Southeast Asia--as we did in Europe--in the words of the Bible: 'Hitherto shalt thou come, but no further.'

"There are those who say that all our effort there will be futile--that China's power is such that it is bound to dominate all Southeast Asia. But there is no end to that argument until all of the nations of Asia are swallowed up.

"There are those who wonder why we have a responsibility there. Well, we have it there for the same reason that we have a responsibility for the defense of Europe. World War II was fought in both Europe and Asia, and when it ended we found ourselves with continued responsibility for the defense of freedom.

"Our objective is the independence of South Viet-Nam and its freedom from attack. We want nothing for ourselves--only that the people of South Viet-Nam be allowed to guide their own country in their own way. We will do everything necessary to reach that objective, and we will do only what is absolutely necessary.

"In recent months attacks on South Viet-Nam were stepped up. Thus it became necessary for us to increase our response and to make attacks by air. This is not a change of purpose. It is a change in what we believe that purpose requires.

"We do this in order to slow down aggression.

"We do this to increase the confidence of the brave people of South Viet-Nam who have bravely borne this brutal battle for so many years with so many casualties."

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25. Address by Leonard Unger, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs, Before the Detroit Economic Club, "Present Objectives and Future Possibilities in Southeast Asia," April 19, 1965, Department of State Bulletin, May 10, 1965, p. 712.

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"These objectives are not just pious generalities, nor is Southeast Asia just a configuration on a map. Distant though it may seem from Detroit, that area has great strategic significance to the United States and the free world. Its location across east-west air and sea lanes flanks the Indian subcontinent on one side and Australia, New Zealand, and the Philippines on the other, and dominates the gateway between the Pacific and Indian Oceans.

"In Communist hands this area would pose a most serious threat to the security of the United States and to the family of free-world nations to which we belong. To defend Southeast Asia, we must meet the challenge in South Viet-Nam.

"Communist 'Wars of Liberation'

"Equally important, South Viet-Nam represents a major test of communism's new strategy of 'wars of liberation.'"

* * *

"After the Communists' open aggression failed in Korea, they had to look for a more effective strategy of conquest. They chose to concentrate on 'wars of national liberation' -- the label they use to describe aggression directed and supplied from outside a nation but cloaked in nationalist guise so that it could be made to appear an indigenous insurrection.

"That strategy was tried on a relatively primitive scale, but was defeated in Malaya and the Philippines only because of a long and arduous struggle by the people of those countries, with assistance provided by the British and the United States. In Africa and Latin America such 'wars of liberation' are already being threatened. But by far the most highly refined and ambitious attempt at such aggression by the Communists is taking place today in Viet-Nam...."

* * *

"In order to cope with this veiled aggression, free nations must determine the real source of the aggression and take steps to defend themselves from this source. In Viet-Nam this has meant ending privileged sanctuary heretofore afforded North Viet-Nam--the true source of the Viet Cong movement.

"The 'wars of national liberation' approach has been adopted as an essential element of Communist China's expansionist policy. If this technique adopted by Hanoi should be allowed to succeed in Viet-Nam, we would be confirming Peiping's contention that militant revolutionary struggle is a more productive Communist path than Moscow's doctrine of peaceful coexistence.. We could expect 'wars of national liberation' to spread. Thailand has already been identified by Communist China as being the next target for a so-called 'liberation struggle.' Peiping's Foreign Minister Chen Yi has promised it for this year. Laos, Malaysia, Burma--one Asian nation after another--could expect increasing Communist pressures. Other weakly defended nations on other continents would experience this new threat of aggression by proxy.

"Even the Asian Communists have acknowledged that Viet-Nam represents an important test situation for indirect aggression. North Viet-Nam's Premier Pham Van Dong recently commented that:

'The experience of our compatriots in South Viet-Nam attracts the attention of the world, especially the peoples of South America.'

"General /Vo Nguyen/ Giap, the much-touted leader of North Viet-Nam's army, was even more explicit. In another recent statement, he said that,

'South Viet-Nam is the model of the national liberation movement of our time....If the special warfare that the U.S. imperialists are testing in South Viet-Nam is overcome, then it can be defeated everywhere in the world.'

"Our strong posture in Viet-Nam then seeks peace and security in three dimensions: for South Viet-Nam, for the sake of Southeast Asia's independence and security generally, and for the other small nations that would face the same kind of subversive threat from without if the Communists were to succeed in Viet-Nam...."

* * *

"All this, of course, is contrary to the 1954 Geneva accords on Viet-Nam and the 1962 agreement on Laos. I mention the latter because it is an established fact that Hanoi has been both threatening Laos and using Laos as a corridor for supplying personnel and arms to the Viet Cong.

"Our State Department has documented the character and intensity of North Viet-Nam's aggressive efforts since 1959 in the recent white paper, and in the similar report issued in 1961. The 1962 report of the International Control Commission for Viet-Nam also spelled out North Viet-Nam's aggressive actions in flagrant violation of the 1954 and 1962 agreements."

* * *

"The Communists are fond of saying that whether the Viet Cong are born in the North or South, they are still Vietnamese and therefore an indigenous revolt must be taking place. Certainly, they are Vietnamese, and the North Koreans who swept across their boundary in 1950 to attack South Korea were also Koreans. However, this did not make the Korean war an indigenous revolt from the point of view of either world security or in terms of acceptable standards of conduct.

"By the same token, if West Germany were to take similar action against East Germany; it is doubtful that the East Germans, the Soviet Union, and the rest of the Communist bloc would stand aside on the grounds that it was nothing more than an indigenous affair.

"The simple issue is that military personnel and arms have been sent across an international demarcation line (just as valid a border as Korea or Germany) contrary to international agreements and law to destroy the freedom of a neighboring people."

* * *

"....It is for that reason, and because Hanoi has stepped up its aggression, that the Government of South Viet-Nam and the United States have been forced to increase our response and strike through the air at the true source of the aggression--North Viet-Nam. This does not represent a change of purpose on our part but a change in the means we believe are necessary to stem aggression.

"And there can be no doubt that our actions are fully justified as an exercise of the right of individual and collective self-defense recognized by article 51 of the United Nations Charter and under the accepted standards of international law."

* * *

26. Address by Secretary Rusk, Made Before the American Society of International Law on April 23, 1965, "The Control of Force in International Relations, Department of State Bulletin, May 10, 1965, p. 697.

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"What Is a 'War of National Liberation'?

"What is a 'war of national liberation'? It is, in essence, any war which furthers the Communist world revolution--what, in broader terms, the Communists have long referred to as a 'just' war. The term 'war of national liberation' is used not only to denote armed insurrection by people still under colonial rule--there are not many of those left outside the Communist world. It is used to denote any effort led by Communists to overthrow by force any non-Communist government.

"Thus the war in South Viet-Nam is called a 'war of national liberation.' And those who would overthrow various other non-Communist governments in Asia, Africa, and Latin America are called the 'forces of national liberation.'

"Nobody in his right mind would deny that Venezuela is not only a truly independent nation but that it has a government chosen in a free election. But the leaders of the Communist insurgency in Venezuela are described as leaders of a fight for 'national liberation'--not only by themselves and by Castro and the Chinese Communists but by the Soviet Communists.

"A recent editorial in Pravda spoke of the 'peoples of Latin America ...marching firmly along the path of struggle for their national independence' and said, '...the upsurge of the national liberation movement in Latin American countries has been to a great extent a result of the activities of Communist parties.' It added:

'The Soviet people have regarded and still regard it as their sacred duty to give support to the peoples fighting for their independence. True to their international duty the Soviet people have been and will remain on the side of the Latin American patriots.'

"In Communist doctrine and practice, a non-Communist government may be labeled and denounced as 'colonialist,' 'reactionary,' or a 'puppet,' and any state so labeled by the Communists automatically becomes fair game--while Communist intervention by force in non-Communist states is justified as 'self-defense' or part of the 'struggle against colonial domination.' 'Self-determination' seems to mean that any Communist nation can determine by itself that any non-Communist state is a victim of colonialist domination and therefore a justifiable target for a 'war of liberation.'

"As the risks of overt aggression, whether nuclear or with conventional forces, have become increasingly evident, the Communists have put increasing stress on the 'war of national liberation.' The Chinese Communists have been more militant in language and behavior than the Soviet Communists. But the Soviet Communist leadership also has consistently proclaimed its commitment in principle to support wars of national liberation. This commitment was reaffirmed as recently as Monday of this week by Mr. Kosygin [Aleksai N. Kosygin, Chairman of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers].

"International law does not restrict internal revolution within a state or revolution against colonial authority. But international law does restrict what third powers may lawfully do in support of insurrection. It is these restrictions which are challenged by the doctrine, and violated by the practice, of 'wars of liberation.'

"It is plain that acceptance of the doctrine of 'wars of liberation' would amount to scuttling the modern international law of peace which the charter prescribes. And acceptance of the practice of 'wars of liberation,'

as defined by the Communists, would mean the breakdown of peace itself.

"South Viet-Nam's Right of Self-Defense

"Viet-Nam presents a clear current case of the lawful versus the unlawful use of force. I would agree with General Giap /Vo Nguyen Giap, North Vietnamese Commander in Chief/ and other Communists that it is a test case for 'wars of national liberation.' We intend to meet that test

"Were the insurgency in South Viet-Nam truly indigenous and self-sustained, international law would not be involved. But the fact is that it receives vital external support--in organization and direction, in training, in men, in weapons and other supplies. That external support is unlawful for a double reason. First, it contravenes general international law, which the United Nations Charter here expresses. Second, it contravenes particular international law: the 1954 Geneva accords on Viet-Nam and the 1962 Geneva agreements on Laos.

"In resisting the aggression against it, the Republic of Viet-Nam is exercising its right of self-defense. It called upon us and other states for assistance. And in the exercise of the right of collective self-defense under the United Nations Charter, we and other nations are providing such assistance.

"The American policy of assisting South Viet-Nam to maintain its freedom was inaugurated under President Eisenhower and continued under Presidents Kennedy and Johnson. Our assistance has been increased because the aggression from the North has been augmented. Our assistance now encompasses the bombing of North Viet-Nam. The bombing is designed to interdict, as far as possible, and to inhibit, as far as may be necessary, continued aggression against the Republic of Viet-Nam.

"When that aggression ceases, collective measures in defense against it will cease. As President Johnson has declared:

'...if that aggression is stopped, the people and Government of South Viet-Nam will be free to settle their own future, and the need for supporting American military action there will end.'

"The fact that the demarcation line between North and South Viet-Nam was intended to be temporary does not make the assault on South Viet-Nam any less of an aggression. The demarcation lines between North and South Korea and between East and West Germany are temporary. But that did not make the North Korean invasion of South Korea a permissible use of force.

"Let's not forget the salient features of the 1962 agreements on Laos. Laos was to be independent and neutral. All foreign troops, regular or irregular, and other military personnel were to be withdrawn within 75 days, except a limited number of French instructors as requested by

the Lao Government. No arms were to be introduced into Laos except at the request of that Government. The signatories agreed to refrain 'from all direct or indirect interference in the internal affairs' of Laos. They promised also not to use Lao territory to intervene in the internal affairs of other countries--a stipulation that plainly prohibited the passage of arms and men from North Viet-Nam to South Viet-Nam by way of Laos. An International Control Commission of three was to assure compliance with the agreements.

"What happened? The non-Communist elements complied. The Communists did not. At no time since that agreement was signed have either the Pathet Lao or the North Viet-Nam authorities complied with it. The North Vietnamese left several thousand troops there--the backbone of almost every Pathet Lao battalion. Use of the corridor through Laos to South Viet-Nam continued. And the Communists barred the areas under their control both to the Government of Laos and the International Control Commission.

"Nature of Struggle in Viet-Nam

"To revert to Viet-Nam: I continue to hear and see nonsense about the nature of the struggle there. I sometimes wonder if the gullibility of educated men and the stubborn disregard of plain facts by men who are supposed to be helping our young to learn--especially to learn how to think.

"Hanoi has never made a secret of its designs. It publicly proclaimed in 1960 a renewal of the assault on South Viet-Nam. Quite obviously its hopes of taking over South Viet-Nam from within had withered to close to zero--and the remarkable economic and social progress of South Viet-Nam contrasted, most disagreeably for the North Vietnamese Communists, with their own miserable economic performance.

"The facts about the external involvement have been documented in white papers and other publications of the Department of State. The International Control Commission has held that there is evidence 'beyond reasonable doubt' of North Vietnamese intervention.

"There is no evidence that the Viet Cong has any significant popular following in South Viet-Nam. It relies heavily on terror. Most of its reinforcements in recent months have been North Vietnamese from the North Vietnamese Army.

"Let us be clear about what is involved today in Southeast Asia. We are not involved with empty phrases or conceptions which ride upon the clouds. We are talking about the vital national interests of the United States in the peace of the Pacific. We are talking about the appetite for aggression--an appetite which grows upon feeding and which is proclaimed to be insatiable. We are talking about the safety of nations with whom we are allied--and the integrity of the American commitment to join in meeting attack.

"It is true that we also believe that every small state has a right to be unmolested by its neighbors even though it is within reach of a great power. It is true that we are committed to general principles of law and procedure which reject the idea that men and arms can be sent freely across frontiers to absorb a neighbor. But underlying the general principles is the harsh reality that our own security is threatened by those who would embark upon a course of aggression whose announced ultimate purpose is our own destruction.

"Once again we hear expressed the views which cost the men of my generation a terrible price in World War II. We are told that Southeast Asia is far away--but so were Manchuria and Ethiopia. We are told that, if we insist that someone stop shooting, that is asking them for unconditional surrender. We are told that perhaps the aggressor will be content with just one more bite. We are told that, if we prove faithless on one commitment, perhaps others would believe us about other commitments in other places. We are told that, if we stop resisting, perhaps the other side will have a change of heart. We are asked to stop hitting bridges and radar sites and ammunition depots without requiring that the other side stop its slaughter of thousands of civilians and its bombings of schools and hotels and hospitals and railways and buses.

"Surely we have learned over the past three decades that the acceptance of aggression leads only to a sure catastrophe. Surely we have learned that the aggressor must face the consequences of his action and be saved from the frightful miscalculation that brings all to ruin. It is the purpose of law to guide men away from such events, to establish rules of conduct which are deeply rooted in the reality of experience."

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27. Statement by President Johnson at a News Conference at the White House on April 27, 1965 and Transcript of Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara's New Conference of April 26, 1965 on the Situation in Viet-Nam, Department of State Bulletin, May 17, 1965, p. 748.

"Statement by President Johnson

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"Independent South Viet-Nam has been attacked by North Viet-Nam. The object of that attack is conquest.

"Defeat in South Viet-Nam would be to deliver a friendly nation to terror and repression. It would encourage and spur on those who seek

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to conquer all free nations within their reach. Our own welfare and our own freedom would be in danger.

"This is the clearest lesson of our time. From Munich until today we have learned that to yield to aggression brings only greater threats--and more destructive war. To stand firm is the only guarantee of lasting peace."

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"Viet Cong Weapons From External Sources

"The latest step has been the covert infiltration of a regular combat unit of the North Vietnamese Army into South Viet-Nam. Evidence accumulated within the last month now confirms the presence in northwest Kontum Province--that is in the central highland area of South Viet-Nam, around Pleiku and north of Pleiku--recent evidence which we have received confirms the presence in that northwest Kontum Province of the 2d Battalion of the 325th Division of the regular North Vietnamese Army. It is important to recognize, I think, that the great bulk of the weapons which the Viet Cong are using and with which they are supplied come from external sources."

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/Secretary McNamara/

"Communist Strategy

"Q. Mr. Secretary, a personal question. As the fighting has increased in Viet-Nam, more and more of the U.S. critics of the administration's policy have been referring to this as 'McNamara's war.' What is your reaction? Does this annoy you?

"A. It does not annoy me because I think it is a war that is being fought to preserve the freedom of a very brave people, an independent nation. It is a war which is being fought to counter the strategy of the Communists, a strategy which Premier Khrushchev laid out very clearly in the very famous speech which he made on January 6, 1961.

"You may recall that at that time he divided all wars into three categories. He spoke of world wars, meaning nuclear wars; he spoke of local wars, by which he meant large-scale conventional wars; and then he spoke of what he called 'wars of liberation.'

"He ruled out world wars as being too dangerous to the existence of the Communist states. He ruled out local wars because he said they could very easily escalate into nuclear wars which would lead to the ultimate destruction of the Communist states. But he strongly endorsed 'wars of

liberation' and made it perfectly clear that it would be through application of that strategy that the Communists would seek to subvert independent nations throughout the world, seek to extend their domination, their political domination, of other nations.

"It is very clear that that is the Communist Chinese strategy in Southeast Asia. It is a strategy I feel we should oppose, and, while it is not my war, I don't object to my name being associated with it."

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28. Statement by Secretary Ball on May 3, 1965 at the Opening Session of the SEATO Council Ministers' 10th Meeting at London, Department of State Bulletin, June 7, 1965, p. 922.

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"We have, however, come to realize from the experience of the past years that aggression must be dealt with wherever it occurs and no matter what mask it may wear. Neither we nor other nations of the free world were always alert to this. In the 1930's Manchuria seemed a long way away, but it was only 10 years from Manchuria to Pearl Harbor. Ethiopia seemed a long way away. The rearmament of the Rhineland was regarded as regrettable but not worth a shooting war. Yet after that came Austria. And after Austria, Czechoslovakia. Then Poland. Then the Second World War.

"The central issue we face in South Viet-Nam should, I think, be clear for all to see. It is whether a small state on the periphery of Communist power should be permitted to maintain its freedom. And that is an issue of vital importance to small states everywhere.

"Moreover, it is an issue that affects the security of the whole free world. Never has that point been more succinctly stated than by one of the greatest of all Englishmen, Sir Winston Churchill. 'The belief,' he said, 'that security can be obtained by throwing a small state to the wolves is a fatal illusion.' And let us not forget that General /Vo Nguyen/ Giap, the head of the North Vietnamese armed forces, has said quite explicitly that if the so-called 'war of liberation' technique succeeds in Viet-Nam, it can succeed 'everywhere in the world.'"

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29. Remarks by President Johnson at White House Before House and Senate Committees on May 4, 1965, "Congress Approves Supplemental Appropriation for Vietnam," Department of State Bulletin, May 24, 1965, p. 817.

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"This is not the same kind of aggression which the world has long been used to. Instead of the sweep of invading armies there is the steady and the deadly attack in the night by guerrilla bands that come without warning, that kill people while they sleep.

"In Viet-Nam we pursue that same principle which has infused American action in the Far East for a quarter of a century. There are those who ask why this responsibility should be ours. The answer, I think, is simple. There is no one else who can do the job. Our power alone, in the final test, can stand between expanding communism and independent Asian nations.

"Thus, when India was attacked, it looked to us for help, and we gave it immediately. We believe that Asia should be directed by Asians. But that means that each Asian people must have the right to find its own way, not that one group or one nation should overrun all the others.

"Now make no mistake about it, the aim in Viet-Nam is not simply the conquest of the South, tragic as that would be. It is to show that American commitment is worthless, and they would like very much to do that, and once they succeed in doing that, the gates are down and the road is open to expansion and to endless conquest. Moreover, we are directly committed to the defense of South Viet-Nam beyond any question.

"In 1954 we signed the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty and that treaty committed us to act to meet aggression against South Viet-Nam...."

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30. Address by William P. Bundy Before Dallas Council on World Affairs on May 13, 1965, "Reality and Myth Concerning South Vietnam," Department of State Bulletin, June 7, 1965, p. 893.

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"Myths on the South Viet-Nam Story

"This is the simple basic story of what has happened in South Viet-Nam since 1954. Let me now turn to certain myths that have arisen concerning that story.

"First, there is the question of the attitude of the South Vietnamese Government and ourselves toward the reunification of Viet-Nam through free elections. The 1954 Geneva accords had provided for free elections by secret ballot in 1956, and it has been alleged that the failure to proceed with these elections in some way justified Hanoi's

action in resorting to military measures, first slowly and then by the stepped-up infiltration beginning in 1959 and 1960.

"The facts are quite otherwise. The Eisenhower administration had fully supported the principle of free elections under international supervision, in Viet-Nam as in other situations where a country was divided, Korea and Germany.

"A similar position was taken by President Diem of South Viet-Nam. For example, in January 1955 Diem made it clear to an American correspondent that:

'The clauses providing for the 1956 elections are extremely vague. But at one point they are clear--in stipulating that the elections are to be free. Everything will now depend on how free elections are defined. The President said he would wait to see whether the conditions of freedom would exist in North Viet-Nam at the time scheduled for the elections. He asked what would be the good of an impartial counting of votes if the voting had been preceded in North Viet-Nam by the ruthless propaganda and terrorism on the part of a police state.'

"I do not think any of us would dissent from this description of what is required for free elections. And the simple fact is that, when the issue arose concretely in 1956, the regime in Hanoi--while it kept calling for elections in its propaganda--made no effort to respond to the call of the Soviet Union and Great Britain, as cochairmen of the 1954 Geneva conference, for the setting up of the appropriate machinery for free elections.

"The reason is not far to seek. For North Viet-Nam in 1956--and indeed today--is a Communist state and in 1956 North Viet-Nam was in deep trouble. Its own leaders admitted as much in their party congress in the fall of 1956 in a statement by General /Vo Nguyen/ Giap referring to widespread terror, failure to respect the principles of faith and worship in the so-called land reform program, the use of torture as a normal practice, and a whole list of excesses which even the Communists had come to realize went too far.

"So the answer is, I repeat, simple. There was no chance of free elections in North Viet-Nam in 1956. We shall wait to see whether there will ever be such a chance in the future.

"Second, there is the myth that the Viet Cong movement has any significant relationship to the political oppcsition to President Diem. I have referred already to the unfortunate trends that developed after 1959 in President Diem's rule. There was unquestionably opposition to him within South Viet-Nam, and that opposition included many distinguished South Vietnamese, some of whom went into exile as a result. Others stayed in Saigon, and some were imprisoned.

"But the point is this. The men who led the opposition to Diem are not today in the Viet Cong. On the contrary, the present Prime Minister, Dr. /Phan Huy/ Quat, and his group of so-called Caravellistes, all of whom opposed Diem, are today the leaders of the Government. These men, and their followers, are nationalists and strongly anti-Communist; not one of them, of any significance, went over to the Viet Cong.

"This brings me to the question of the so-called National Liberation Front, which is the political facade, made in Hanoi, for the Viet Cong movement. I doubt if any of you can name a single leader of the National Liberation Front. But these are faceless men installed by Hanoi to give the appearance of bourgeois and truly South Vietnamese support for the operation.

"Lest you think I exaggerate, I refer you to the excellent recent account by Georges Chaffard, a French correspondent for L'Express in Paris, who recently visited the Viet Cong and interviewed some of its "leaders." Chaffard describes vividly what these men are, including their strong desire to find a replacement for the obscure lawyer named Tho who is the titular head of the front and who apparently is the only figure Hanoi can find who was even in Saigon or participating in South Vietnamese political life during the latter Diem period. Chaffard's conclusion, which I quote, is that:

'The Front for National Liberation structure is the classic structure of a 'National Front' before the taking over of power by the Communists.'

"So there should be no doubt of the true nature of the Viet Cong and its Liberation Front, or that they are a completely different movement from the political opposition to Diem. As to the latter, and its present emergence into a truly nationalistic amalgam of forces--regional, religious, military, and civilian--I can perhaps best refer you to the excellent lead article by Mr. George Carver, an American with long experience in Saigon, in the April issue of Foreign Affairs. Mr. Carver tells a fascinating story of the emergence of these new nationalistic forces in South Viet-Nam, with all their difficulties and weaknesses, but with the fundamental and overriding fact that they are the true new voice of South Viet-Nam and that they have never had anything to do with the Viet Cong."

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"The Korean War also had an important message for the Communists--and as a result we may have seen the last of the old classical war of open invasions. Korea proved to the Communists that they had to find a more effective strategy of conquest. They chose to refine a technique that they had used on a primitive scale and to their ultimate defeat in Greece, Malaya, and the Philippines. I am referring to the so-called 'war of national liberation.' This is the label Khrushchev employed in

1961 to describe Communist strategy for the future--aggression directed and supplied from outside a nation, but disguised in nationalist trappings so that it might pass as an indigenous insurrection.

* * *

"The Communists have expanded upon their 'wars of liberation' technique. Africa and Latin America are already feeling the threat of such thrusts. But by far the most highly sophisticated and ambitious attempt at such aggression by the Communists is taking place today in Viet-Nam.

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"The 'wars of liberation' strategy is at this time an essential element of the expansionist policy of Communist China and her Asian ally, North Viet-Nam. If we allow it to succeed in Viet-Nam, we would be confirming Peiping's assertion that armed struggle is a more productive Communist course than Moscow's doctrine of peaceful coexistence. 'Wars of national liberation' would most certainly spread. Red China has already identified Thailand as the next target for a so-called 'liberation struggle,' and its Foreign Minister Chen Yi has promised that it will be launched before the end of this year.

"The major test to date of this new Communist strategy is taking place today in Viet-Nam. Even the Asian Communists have acknowledged the larger implications of this confrontation. Not long ago General Giap, the well-known leader of North Viet-Nam's army, declared that,

'South Viet-Nam is the model of the national liberation movement of our time....If the special warfare that the U.S. imperialists are testing in South Viet-Nam is overcome, then it can be defeated everywhere in the world.'

"In another recent comment, North Viet-Nam's Premier Pham Van Dong said that:

'The experience of our compatriots in South Viet-Nam attracts the attention of the world, especially the peoples of South America.'

"The People's Daily, Peiping's official newspaper, echoed those statements in an editorial on May Day this year. It said:

'The Vietnamese people's struggle against U.S. imperialism has become the focal point of the international class struggle at this moment. This is an acid test for all political forces in the world.'

"Our firm posture in Viet-Nam, then, seeks peace and security in three related dimensions: for South Viet-Nam, for the sake of Southeast

Asia's independence and security generally, and for the other small nations everywhere that would face the same kind of subversive threat from without if the Communists were to succeed in Vietnam...."

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31. Address by President Johnson Before the Association of American Editorial Cartoonists at the White House on May 13, 1965, "Viet-Nam: The Third Face of the War," Department of State Bulletin, May 31, 1965, p. 838.

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"....Communist China apparently desires the war to continue whatever the cost to their allies. Their target is not merely South Viet-Nam; it is Asia. Their objective is not the fulfillment of Vietnamese nationalism; it is to erode and to discredit America's ability to help prevent Chinese domination over all of Asia."

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32. Address by William P. Bundy, Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs, Before the Faculty Forum of the University of California at Berkeley on May 27, 1965, "A Perspective on U.S. Policy in Viet-Nam," Department of State Bulletin, June 21, 1965, p. 1001.

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"For the underlying fact is that there cannot be a balance of power in Asia without us. Under the control of a Communist regime still at the peak of its ideological fervor, a unified mainland China today does threaten the outnumbered newly independent nations of Asia, not merely in the sense of influence but in the sense of domination and the denial of national self-determination and independence--not necessarily drastically or at once, for the Chinese Communist leaders are patient; not necessarily, or even in their eyes preferably, by conventional armed attack, but surely and inexorably, as they see it, through the technique of spurious national movements deriving their real impetus and support from external and Communist sources.

"And in this central Communist effort, the other Communist nations of Asia, North Viet-Nam and North Korea, are willing partners. They have their national character, they are not true satellites--indeed, deep down, they too fear Chinese domination. Yet, so long as the spoils are fairly divided, they are working together with Communist China toward a goal the opposite of the one we seek, subjugation of the true national independence of smaller countries, an Asia of spheres of domination."

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"For South Viet-Nam is the outcome of a very particular slice of recent Asian history. Only in Viet-Nam was a genuine nationalist movement taken over by Communist leaders and transmuted into the Communist state of North Viet-Nam. And so the French, instead of yielding gradually or with the fullest possible preparation for self-government, as the British wisely did in India, Pakistan, and Malaysia, were effectively driven out in 1954 and Viet-Nam was divided."

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"By 1956, to paraphrase the same eminent scholar, Communist China and North Viet-Nam, all propaganda to the contrary notwithstanding, simply were not willing to risk the loss of South Viet-Nam in elections, and, perhaps most crucial, the conditions for free elections did not prevail in either North or South Viet-Nam. So the date passed, and the dividing line between the two Viet-Nams became a political division as in Germany and Korea, with reunification left to the future. And in the course of time another 30-odd nations recognized South Viet-Nam, and recognize it today.

"(By the way, the eminent scholar I have just been citing was Professor Hans J. Morgenthau, writing in a pamphlet entitled 'America's Stake in Viet-Nam,' published in 1956. One of the other participants in that conference was the then junior Senator from Massachusetts. He was a bit more downright than the professor, saying that 'neither the United States nor Free Viet-Nam is ever going to be a party to an election obviously stacked and subverted in advance.')

"Since 1956 two different strands have dominated developments in South Viet-Nam. One is a genuine nationalist internal political ferment, in which the South Vietnamese themselves are seeking a lasting political base for their country--in the face of the same problems other new nations have faced, but compounded by the colonial heritage of lack of training and divide-and-rule tactics. That ferment should not surprise us; almost every new nation has gone through it--for example, Korea and Pakistan. Under Diem it drove many distinguished South Vietnamese to exile or prison, from 1962 until early this year it seriously weakened the defense of the nation, and it now has brought into power a regime led by men who were the real opponents of Diem and are something close to the true voice of South Vietnamese nationalism--men, too, who are already widening the base of support and holding local elections.

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"The other, and entirely different, strand has been Hanoi's effort to take over the South by subversive aggression. On this the facts are plain and have been fully set out, though still in summary form, in the white papers published in December of 1961 and February 1965. If these

do not convince you, read Hanoi's own pronouncements over the years, the eyewitness accounts of the tons of weapons found just in recent months, the personal interrogation of a typical infiltrated Viet Cong by Seymour Topping in Sunday's New York Times, or the recent accounts by the Frenchman, George Chaffard, who concluded that the so-called National Liberation Front was a classic example of the type of Communist organization used to take over another country.

"In short, North Viet-Nam has been from the start, quite proudly and unashamedly, what President Johnson has called the heartbeat of the Viet Cong. As in Greece, the Viet Cong have won control of major areas of the country, playing in part on propaganda and the undoubted weaknesses of Diem and his successors, but relying basically on massive intimidation of civilians. Over the years, the rate of civilian casualties--deliberate action casualties, killed, wounded and kidnaped--has been about 40 a day in South Viet-Nam; civilian officials have been particular targets, with the obvious aim of crippling the government structure."

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"I come now to the choice of methods. Till 1961 President Eisenhower and President Kennedy limited our help to a massive economic effort and to the supply of military equipment under the terms of the Geneva accords. When, after 2 years of intensified effort from the North, the situation had become serious in late 1961, President Kennedy made the decision to send thousands of our military men for advisory and other roles short of the commitment of combat units. President Johnson intensified this effort in every possible way and only in February of this year took the further decision, urged by the South Vietnamese themselves, to do what would have been justified all along--and had never been excluded--engage in highly selective and measured military bombing of the North itself, still coupled with every possible effort to assist in the South in the struggle which only the South Vietnamese can win there."

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33. Address by President Johnson in Chicago, Illinois on June 3, 1965, "The Peace of Mankind," Department of State Bulletin, June 21, 1965, p. 987.

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"In the 1930's we made our fate not by what we did but what we Americans failed to do. We propelled ourselves and all mankind toward tragedy, not by decisiveness but by vacillation, not by determination and resolution but by hesitancy and irresolution, not by action but by inaction.

"The failure of free men in the 1930's was not of the sword but of the soul. And there just must be no such failure in the 1960's."

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34. Secretary Rusk's Interview re Vietnam on "Issues and Answers," American Broadcasting Company Radio and Television on July 11, 1965, With ABC Correspondents William H. Lawrence and John Scali, Department of State Bulletin, August 2, 1965, p. 188.

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"U.S. Obligation to Allies

"Mr. Scali: Mr. Secretary, you have mentioned repeatedly, in explaining why we are fighting, that the credibility of American pledges is at stake here and that if the Communists succeed in overrunning South Viet-Nam we will have trouble elsewhere in the world. What, specifically, could you foresee in the unlikely event we did lose this?

"Secretary Rusk: Well, suppose that our 41 other allies--or 42 allies--should find themselves questioning the validity of the assurance of the United States with respect to their security? What would be the effect of that? If our commitment to South Viet-Nam did not mean anything, what would you think if you were a Thai and considered what our commitments meant to Thailand? What would you think if you were West Berliners and you found that our assurance on these matters did not amount to very much?

"Now, this is utterly fundamental in maintaining the peace of the world, utterly fundamental. South Viet-Nam is important in itself, but Hanoi moved tens of thousands of people in there in the face of an American commitment of 10 years' standing. Now, this is something that we cannot ignore because this begins to roll things up all over the world if we are not careful here.

"Mr. Scali: Is the converse not also true--if we stop the Communists in South Viet-Nam that it will make it considerably easier to achieve an enduring peace elsewhere?

"Secretary Rusk: Well, I think that one can say with reasonable confidence that both sides recognize that a nuclear exchange is not a rational instrument of policy and that mass divisions moving across national frontiers is far too dangerous to use as an easy instrument of policy, but now we have this problem of 'wars of liberation' and we must find a complete answer to that, and the other side must realize that the use of militancy, of men and arms across frontiers in pursuit of what they call 'wars of liberation,' also is too dangerous.

"Now, there has been a big argument between Moscow and Peiping on

this subject over the years, but Peiping must also begin to work its way back toward the idea of mutual coexistence. Otherwise there is going to be very great trouble ahead."

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35. Statement by President Johnson at White House News Conference on July 28, 1965, "We Will Stand in Viet-Nam," Department of State Bulletin, August 16, 1965, p. 262.

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"....Three times in my lifetime, in two world wars and in Korea, Americans have gone to far lands to fight for freedom. We have learned at a terrible and brutal cost that retreat does not bring safety and weakness does not bring peace.

"It is this lesson that has brought us to Viet-Nam. This is a different kind of war. There are no marching armies or solemn declarations. Some citizens of South Viet-Nam, at times with understandable grievances, have joined in the attack on their own government.

"But we must not let this mask the central fact that this is really war. It is guided by North Viet-Nam, and it is spurred by Communist China. Its goal is to conquer the South, to defeat American power, and to extend the Asiatic dominion of communism.

"There are great stakes in the balance.

"Most of the non-Communist nations of Asia cannot, by themselves and alone, resist growing might and the grasping ambition of Asian communism.

"Our power, therefore, is a very vital shield. If we are driven from the field in Viet-Nam, then no nation can ever again have the same confidence in American promise or in American protection.

"In each land the forces of independence would be considerably weakened and an Asia so threatened by Communist domination would certainly imperil the security of the United States itself.

"We did not choose to be the guardians at the gate, but there is no one else.

"Nor would surrender in Viet-Nam bring peace, because we learned from Hitler at Munich that success only feeds the appetite of aggression. The battle would be renewed in one country and then another country, bringing with it perhaps even larger and crueler conflict, as we have learned from the lessons of history.

"Moreover, we are in Viet-Nam to fulfill one of the most solemn pledges of the American nation. Three Presidents--President Eisenhower, President Kennedy, and your present President--over 11 years have committed themselves and have promised to help defend this small and valiant nation.

"Strengthened by that promise, the people of South Viet-Nam have fought for many long years. Thousands of them have died. Thousands more have been crippled and scarred by war. We just cannot now dishonor our word, or abandon our commitment, or leave those who believed us and who trusted us to the terror and repression and murder that would follow.

"This, then, my fellow Americans, is why we are in Viet-Nam."

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36. Statement by Secretary of Defense, Robert S. McNamara, Before the Subcommittee on Department of Defense Appropriations of the Senate Committee on Appropriations on August 4, 1965, "Buildup of U.S. Forces in Viet-Nam," Department of State Bulletin, August 30, 1965, p. 369.

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"The issue in Viet-Nam is essentially the same as it was in 1954 when President Eisenhower said:

'I think it is no longer necessary to enter into a long argument or exposition to show the importance to the United States of Indochina and of the struggle going on there. No matter how the struggle may have started, it has long since become one of the testing places between a free form of government and dictatorship. Its outcome is going to have the greatest significance for us, and possibly for a long time into the future.

'We have here a sort of cork in the bottle, the bottle being the great area that includes Indonesia, Burma, Thailand, all of the surrounding areas of Asia with its hundreds of millions of people....'

"What is at stake there is the ability of the free world to block Communist armed aggression and prevent the loss of all of Southeast Asia, a loss which in its ultimate consequences could drastically alter the strategic situation in Asia and the Pacific to the grave detriment of our own security and that of our allies....

"The struggle there has enormous implications for the security of the United States and the free world and, for that matter, the Soviet

Union as well. The North Vietnamese and the Chinese Communists have chosen to make South Viet-Nam the test case for their particular version of the so-called 'wars of national liberation.' The extent to which violence should be used in overthrowing non-Communist governments has been one of the most bitterly contested issues between the Chinese and the Soviet Communists. Although the former Chairman, Mr. Khrushchev, fully endorsed 'wars of national liberation' as the preferred means of extending the sway of communism, he cautioned that 'this does not necessarily mean that the transition to Socialism will everywhere and in all cases be linked with armed uprising and civil war....Revolution by peaceful means accords with the interests of the working class and the masses.'

"The Chinese Communists, however, insist that:

'Peaceful co-existence cannot replace the revolutionary struggles of the people. The transition from capitalism to socialism in any country can only be brought about through proletarian revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat in that country....The vanguard of the proletariat will remain unconquerable in all circumstances only if it masters all forms of struggle--peaceful and armed, open and secret, legal and illegal, parliamentary struggle and mass struggle, and so forth. (Letter to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, June 14, 1963.)'

"Their preference for violence was even more emphatically expressed in an article in the Peiping People's Daily of March 31, 1964:

'It is advantageous from the point of view of tactics to refer to the desire for peaceful transition, but it would be inappropriate to emphasize the possibility of peaceful transition....the proletarian party must never substitute parliamentary struggle for proletarian revolution or entertain the illusion that the transition to socialism can be achieved through the parliamentary road....Violent revolution is a universal law of proletarian revolution. To realize the transition to socialism, the proletariat must wage armed struggle, smash the old state machine and establish the dictatorship of the proletariat.'

"'Political power,' the article quotes Mao Tse-tung as saying, 'grows out of the barrel of a gun.'

"Throughout the world we see the fruits of these policies and in Viet-Nam, particularly, we see the effects of the Chinese Communists' more militant stance and their hatred of the free world. They make no secret of the fact that Viet-Nam is the test case, and neither does the regime in Hanoi. General Giap, head of the North Vietnamese army, recently said that 'South Viet-Nam is the model of the national liberation movement of our time....If the special warfare that the U.S. imperialists are testing in South Viet-Nam is overcome, then it can be defeated everywhere in the world.' And Pham Van Dong, Premier of North Viet-Nam, pointed out that 'The experience of our compatriots in South Viet-Nam attracts the attention of the world, especially the peoples of South America.'

"It is clear, therefore, that a Communist success in South Viet-Nam would be taken as positive proof that the Chinese Communists' position is correct and they will have made a giant step forward in their efforts to seize control of the world Communist movement. Furthermore, such a success would greatly increase the prestige of Communist China among the nonalined nations and strengthen the position of their followers everywhere. In that event we would then have to be prepared to cope with the same kind of aggression in other parts of the world wherever the existing governments are weak and the social structures fragmented. If Communist armed aggression is not stopped in Viet-Nam as it was in Korea, the confidence of small nations in America's pledge of support will be weakened, and many of them, in widely separated areas of the world, will feel unsafe.

"Thus the stakes in South Viet-Nam are far greater than the loss of one small country to communism. Its loss would be a most serious setback to the cause of freedom and would greatly complicate the task of preventing the further spread of militant Asian communism. And, if that spread is not halted, our strategic position in the world will be weakened and our national security directly endangered.

"It was in recognition of this fundamental issue that the United States, under three Presidents, firmly committed itself to help the people of South Viet-Nam defend their freedom. That is why President Eisenhower warned at the time of the Geneva conference in July 1954 that 'any renewal of Communist aggression would be viewed by us as a matter of grave concern.' That is why President Johnson in his statement last Wednesday made it clear to all the world that we are determined to stand by our commitment and provide whatever help is required to fulfill it."

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"....We have also identified at least three battalions of the regular North Vietnamese army, and there are probably considerably more. At the same time the Government of South Viet-Nam has found it increasingly difficult to make a commensurate increase in the size of its own forces, which now stand at about 545,000 men, including the regional and local defense forces but excluding the national police."

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37. Interview with Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara on a Columbia Broadcasting System television program by Peter Kalischer, Alexander Kendrick, and Harry Reasoner, on August 9, 1965, "Political and Military Aspects of U.S. Policy in Viet-Nam," Department of State Bulletin, August 30, 1965, p. 342.

"Mr. Reasoner:

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"I would like to begin by asking both Secretaries two basic questions: First, how is our honor involved in Viet-Nam? And second, how is our security involved in those rice paddies and remote villages? And since sometimes in international relations security comes before honor, I will ask Mr. McNamara to answer first.

"Why U.S. National Security is Involved

"Secretary McNamara: First, let me make clear, Mr. Reasoner, that this is not primarily a military problem. Above all else, I want to emphasize that. It is a battle for the hearts and the minds of the people of South Viet-Nam, and it will only be won if we make clear to those people that their longrun security depends on the development of a stable political institution and an expanding economy. That is our objective.

"As a prerequisite to that, we must be able to guarantee their physical security. How does our physical security, our national interest, become involved in this? That is your question. Secretary Rusk will elaborate on it, but let me say to start with that it is apparent that underlying the terror, the harassment, of the South Vietnamese by the Viet Cong is the purpose and the objective of North Viet-Nam, backed by Communist China, to expand Communist control over the peoples of the independent nations of Southeast Asia and to use this as a test of their method of expanding control over independent peoples throughout the world in the undeveloped areas of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The leaders of those two nations have on numerous instances stated this as their purpose. For example, General /Vo Nguyen/ Giap, who is the head of the North Vietnamese military forces, said not long ago that South Viet-Nam is the model of the national liberation movement of our time. If the special warfare that the United States is testing in South Viet-Nam is overcome, then it can be defeated anywhere in the world.

"And perhaps more pertinently in relation to Latin America is the comment of Pham Van Dong, who is the Prime Minister of North Viet-Nam, who said recently: 'The experience of our compatriots in South Viet-Nam attracts the attention of the world, especially the peoples of Latin America,' and the interests of the Chinese Communists in advancing Asian communism by force are well known.

"But I want to call your attention to two important statements emphasizing that. The Peiping People's Daily said about 12 months ago from Peiping, China: 'It is advantageous from the point of view of tactics to refer to the desire for peaceful transition from capitalism to communism, but it would be inappropriate to emphasize that possibility. The Communist Party must never entertain the illusion that the transition to communism can be achieved through the parliamentary road....Violent revolution is a universal law of proletarian revolution. To realize the transition to communism the proletariat must wage armed struggle....' And, put even more succinctly, Mao Tse-tung said recently, 'Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun.'

"That is why our national security is involved in South Viet-Nam.

"Integrity of American Commitment

"Mr. Reasoner: And the honor, Secretary Rusk?

"Secretary Rusk: . Mr. Reasoner, the answer to this question is extremely simple and need not be complicated.

"When President Johnson talks about our national honor, he is not using some empty phrase of 18th-century diplomacy. He is talking about the life and death of the Nation. Now, the essential fact from which we start is that North Viet-Nam has sent tens of thousands of men and large quantities of arms into South Viet-Nam to take over that country by force. We have a very simple commitment to South Viet-Nam. It derives out of the Southeast Asia Treaty, out of the bilateral arrangements that President Eisenhower made with the Government of South Viet-Nam, out of regular authorizations and appropriations of the Congress in giving aid to South Viet-Nam, out of the resolution of the Congress of last August, out of the most formal declarations of three Presidents of both political parties.

"Now, there is no need to parse these commitments in great detail. The fact is that we know we have a commitment. The South Vietnamese know we have a commitment. The Communist world knows we have a commitment. The rest of the world knows it.

"Now, this means that the integrity of the American commitment is at the heart of this problem. I believe that the integrity of the American commitment is the principal structure of peace throughout the world. We have 42 allies. Those alliances were approved by overwhelming votes of our Senate. We didn't go into those alliances through some sense of amiability or through some philanthropic attitude toward other nations. We went into them because we consider these alliances utterly essential for the security of our own nation.

"Now, if our allies or, more particularly, if our adversaries should discover that the American commitment is not worth anything, then the world would face dangers of which we have not yet dreamed. And so it is important for us to make good on that American commitment to South Viet-Nam.

"Mr. Kendrick: But, sir, don't you have to reckon honor at its cost? I mean, it is not an abstract thing. It has to be evalued and weighed according to what it costs you. And what about dishonor? What about the world image that we now present? We are burning villages, we are killing civilians. Now, don't you weigh one against the other?

"Secretary Rusk: Well, let me say that you also weigh the costs of dishonor, that is, the failure of an American commitment. And I would hope that our own American news media would go to some effort to present

a balanced picture of what is going on in South Viet-Nam: the thousands of local officials who have been kidnaped, the tens of thousands of South Vietnamese civilians who have been killed or wounded by North Vietnamese mortars and by the constant depredations of these acts of violence against the civilian population.

"No, there are costs involved in meeting your commitments of honor. There always have been, there always will be. But I would suggest, if we look at the history of the last 30 or 40 years, that the costs of not meeting your obligations are far greater than those of meeting your obligations.

"Political and Military Situation in Viet-Nam

"Mr. Reasoner: Gentlemen, having set the stage, more or less, with your opening statements, I would like to start off first in the area of what we hope to achieve there this year and how we are doing militarily and politically. Peter?

"Mr. Kalischer: Well, I would like to bring up the subject of who we are committed to. You mentioned the fact, Mr. Secretary, that we have had a commitment to the Vietnamese Government. That government has changed some seven or eight times in the last 18 to 20 months, and when we say we have this commitment to this government, are we reasonably assured that this government represents the people of South Viet-Nam or even a large number of the people in South Viet-Nam?

"Secretary Rusk: Well, we recognize, of course, that there are difficulties in the top leadership in South Viet-Nam and have been over the months, but that does not mean that our commitment to the nation and to the people of South Viet-Nam is changed any more than the fact that we have had three changes of government in our own Government during the period of this commitment.

"Mr. Kalischer: In a slightly different form.

"Secretary Rusk: The impression we have is that among the 14 million people in South Viet-Nam we do not find any significant group outside of the Viet Cong itself, relatively limited in numbers, that seems to be looking to Hanoi for the answer. The Buddhists are not, the Catholics are not, the other sects are not, the montagnards are not, the million Cambodians living in South Viet-Nam are not. In other words, we, I think, would know very quickly, because we have lots of Americans living throughout the countryside--we would know very quickly if these people of South Viet-Nam wanted the program of the Liberation Front or wanted domination from Hanoi. That we do not find."

* * *

"Mr. Kendrick:

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"....I wonder, now, if we are still fighting the same war with Communist China that we were fighting in Korea; is that really the enemy?

"Secretary Rusk: Well, the present enemy on the ground is North Viet-Nam and infiltration from North Viet-Nam, as far as we are concerned. This appeal by the Liberation Front to Hanoi and Hanoi's response to it simply repeats the factual situation. Hanoi has been sending tens of thousands of men and large quantities of arms into South Viet-Nam. This is not new.

"Now, in terms of the more general problem, as you know, there have been very important disputes within the Communist world, and specifically between Moscow and Peiping, on the question of strategy and tactics in promoting the world revolution. Moscow has been more prudent, more cautious in this respect. Peiping has announced a doctrine of militancy which has caused great problems even within the Communist world. Now, if Peiping should discover that a doctrine of militancy is a successful policy through what happens to Southeast Asia, then the dangers throughout the rest of the world mount very quickly and very substantially."

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"U.S. Commitment Fundamental to Peace

"Mr. Reasoner: Secretary Rusk, I think Americans sometimes have--while they support this policy--have trouble understanding just what we mean when we speak in the pattern of having to defend it here or we will have to fight in some less suitable place. To be hypothetical, what would happen if Secretary McNamara announced that we had done all we could and we were now withdrawing because we needed the boys at home and we left? What do you think would ensue?

"Secretary Rusk: I think that it would not be for me to answer that one directly. But imagine yourself to be a Thai, and ask what the American commitment to Thailand would mean to you under those circumstances. Think of your self as a West Berliner, and ask yourself what the American commitment to you would mean under those circumstances.

"At the very heart, gentlemen, of the maintenance of peace in the world is the integrity of the American commitment under our alliances.

"Mr. Kendrick: Is it possible that it is an overcommitment?

"Secretary Rusk: Well, that can be argued. But it should have been argued at the time, at the various stages. I personally do not think so, because we have made 42 allies, as you know, in this postwar period, and at the time it seemed to be in the vital interest of the United States that these alliances be formed."

* * *

"So we do not have a worldwide commitment as the gendarme of the universe, but we do have 42 allies, and South Viet-Nam is a protocol state of the Southeast Asia Treaty and it does have a commitment from us. Therefore, the nature of that commitment is fundamental here if we are to maintain peace in the years ahead.

"Mr. Reasoner: Are we overcommitted from your standpoint, Mr. Secretary? Can you handle everything you foresee?

"Secretary McNamara: I believe so. The military forces of this country have been built up in strength, as you know. We do have 45 percent more combat-ready divisions today than we did 3 or 4 years ago. We do have nearly 50 percent more tactical fighter squadrons today than we did then. We have been building up our inventories in men and equipment.

"I think the question is really more fundamental than are we overcommitted. The question is, what kind of a world would we and our children live in if we failed to carry out the commitments we have or sought to reduce them?"

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38. Address by William P. Bundy, Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs, Before the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, on November 5, 1965, "A Perspective on U.S. Policy in Viet-Nam," Department of State Bulletin, December 6, 1965, p. 890.

"Our own objectives in relation to the Far East are simple. There, as throughout the world, we wish to see independent nations developing as they see fit and in accordance with their own traditions. We may hope that the development will be in the direction of governments based on consensus and increasingly on democratic processes, with economic systems that enlist the initiatives of the individual. But we have long since outgrown any notion that we have a blueprint for government and economic organization that can be applied in any pat sense to other nations, particularly in the less developed state.

"Moreover, our national interest is no longer guided in the Far East by particular economic or military concern with individual areas, as was to a considerable extent the case before the war. We have a deep concern for expanded trade and cultural ties--which alone can in the end bind the world together--and we have military base rights and needs related to our role in assisting in the security of the area. But neither of these is an end in itself: The first will, we believe, flourish if the nations of the area are able to develop in freedom; the second must now be maintained but will over time, we hope, become susceptible of reduction and indeed, wherever possible, of elimination.

"Rather, we care about the total picture partly because a nation with our traditions and our present power could hardly do otherwise, but partly because we know in our hearts that it makes a great deal of difference to our most concrete national interests that the vast potential and talent of the Far East should be developed in healthy national entities and that the Far East should not go through a second stage--as Europe had to do--of waves of domination that must in the end be met at the cost of vast human misery."

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39. President Johnson's Telephone Remarks to the AFL-CIO Convention Meeting at San Francisco on December 9, 1965, "Why We Are in Viet-Nam," Department of State Bulletin, December 27, 1965, p. 1014.

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"We are there because for all our shortcomings, for all our failings as a nation and a people, we remain fixed on the pursuit of freedom as a deep and moral obligation that will not let us go.

"To defend that freedom--to permit its roots to deepen and grow without fear of external suppression--is our purpose in South Viet-Nam. Unchecked aggression against free and helpless people would be a grave threat to our own freedom--and an offensive to our own conscience."

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JOHNSON ADMINISTRATION - 1966

SUMMARY

The Johnson Administration continued to employ the rationale of previous administrations throughout 1966 in justifying U.S. involvement in Vietnam. The Administration attempted continually to explain why the U.S. was involved. Significantly, the U.S. also sought to publicize the legal basis for the commitment as well as establishing firmly that the commitment under SEATO would be fulfilled. The themes initially stressed reassurance of the U.S. intent to remain in the struggle, later building on the legality of commitment, and finally, stressing American aims and objectives in Vietnam. Points emphasized were:

a. The U.S. pledged to stay in Vietnam until aggression had stopped and to honor commitments. "Our stand must be as firm as ever."

b. The question -- why are we in Vietnam? -- was repeatedly answered: to help promote Vietnamese freedom and world security, to fulfill the SEATO obligation, to stop aggression and wars of liberation, to make Communist expansion unprofitable, and to prove that guerrilla wars cannot succeed.

c. Legally, the U.S. involvement was traced from the Geneva Accords and the Eisenhower commitment in 1954 ("to assist the Government of Vietnam in developing and maintain a strong, viable state, capable of resisting attempted subversion or aggression through military means."), through SEATO ("collective self-defense against armed attack") to the Kennedy commitments of 1961.

d. Asian communism was recognized repeatedly as a clear and present danger -- "aggression feeds on aggression" -- as well as the fact that the security of Southeast Asia was extremely important to the security interests of the U.S.

e. The fulfillment of the U.S. commitment had necessarily changed with the nature of the aggression requiring combat troops only because of the "escalation of aggression by the other side."

f. The U.S. aims in Vietnam were limited to the desire for a political solution, to assure self-determination for the people of South Vietnam, and reunification of Vietnam decided by free choice.

V. D. JUSTIFICATION OF THE WAR -- PUBLIC STATEMENTS

JOHNSON ADMINISTRATION

1966

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40. The State of the Union Address of President Johnson to the Congress (Excerpts), January 12, 1966; Department of State Bulletin, January 31, 1966, p. 153.

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"And we will stay until aggression has stopped.

"We will stay because a just nation cannot leave to the cruelties of its enemies a people who have staked their lives and independence on America's solemn pledge--a pledge which has grown through the commitments of three American Presidents.

"We will stay because in Asia--and around the world--are countries whose independence rests, in large measure, on confidence in America's word and in America's protection. To yield to force in Viet-Nam would weaken that confidence, would undermine the independence of many lands, and would whet the appetite of aggression. We would have to fight in one land, and then we would have to fight in another--or abandon much of Asia to the domination of Communists."

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41. Statement by President Johnson, U.S. and South Vietnamese Leaders Meet at Honolulu, February 6, 1966; Department of State Bulletin, February 28, 1966, p. 303.

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"....We cannot accept their logic that tyranny 10,000 miles away is not tyranny to concern us, or that subjugation by an armed minority in Asia is different from subjugation by an armed minority in Europe. Were we to follow their course, how many nations might fall before the aggressor? Where would our treaties be respected, our word honored, and our commitment believed?

"In the forties and fifties we took our stand in Europe to protect the freedom of those threatened by aggression. If we had not then acted, what kind of Europe might there be today? Now the center of attention has shifted to another part of the world where aggression is on the march and enslavement of free men is its goal.

"Our stand must be as firm as ever. If we allow the Communists to win in Viet-Nam, it will become easier and more appetizing for them to take over other countries in other parts of the world. We will have to fight again someplace else--at what cost no one knows. That is why it is vitally important to every American that we stop the Communists in South Viet-Nam."

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42. Statement by Secretary Rusk Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, February 18, 1966, "The U.S. Commitment in Viet-Nam: Fundamental Issues" (Broadcast Live on Nationwide Television Networks); Department of State Bulletin, March 7, 1966, p. 346.

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"Why are we in Viet-Nam? Certainly we are not there merely because we have power and like to use it. We do not regard ourselves as the policeman of the universe. We do not go around the world looking for quarrels in which we can intervene. Quite the contrary. We have recognized that, just as we are not gendarmes of the universe, neither are we the magistrate of the universe. If other governments, other institutions, or other regional organizations can find solutions to the quarrels which disturb the present scene, we are anxious to have this occur. But we are in Viet-Nam because the issues posed there are deeply intertwined with our own security and because the outcome of the struggle can profoundly affect the nature of the world in which we and our children will live."

* * *

"What are our world security interests involved in the struggle in Viet-Nam?

"They cannot be seen clearly in terms of Southeast Asia only or merely in terms of the events of the past few months. We must view the problem in perspective. We must recognize that what we are seeking to achieve in South Viet-Nam is part of a process that has continued for a long time--a process of preventing the expansion and extension of Communist domination by the use of force against the weaker nations on the perimeter of Communist power.

"This is the problem as it looks to us. Nor do the Communists themselves see the problem in isolation. They see the struggle in South Viet-Nam as part of a larger design for the steady extension of Communist power through force and threat."

* * *

"But the Communist world has returned to its demand for what it calls a 'world revolution,' a world of coercion in direct contradiction to the Charter of the United Nations. There may be differences within the Communist world about methods, and techniques, and leadership within the Communist world itself, but they share a common attachment to their 'world revolution' and to its support through what they call 'wars of liberation.'

"So what we face in Viet-Nam is what we have faced on many occasions before--the need to check the extension of Communist power in order to maintain a reasonable stability in a precarious world...."

* * *

"Under Secretary Smith's statement was only a unilateral declaration, but in joining SEATO the United States took a solemn treaty engagement of far-reaching effect. Article IV, paragraph 1, provides that 'each Party recognizes that aggression by means of armed attack... would endanger its own peace and safety, and agrees that it will in that event act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.'

"It is this fundamental SEATO obligation that has from the outset guided our actions in South Viet-Nam.

"The language of this treaty is worth careful attention. The obligation it imposes is not only joint but several. The finding that an armed attack has occurred does not have to be made by a collective determination before the obligation of each member becomes operative. Nor does the treaty require a collective decision on actions to be taken to meet the common danger. If the United States determines that an armed attack has occurred against any nation to whom the protection of the treaty applies, then it is obligated to 'act to meet the common danger' without regard to the views or actions of any other treaty member."

* * *

"Our multilateral engagement under the SEATO treaty has been reinforced and amplified by a series of bilateral commitments and assurances directly to the Government of South Viet-Nam. On October 1, 1954, President Eisenhower wrote to President Diem offering 'to assist the Government of Viet-Nam in developing and maintaining a strong, viable state, capable of resisting attempted subversion or aggression through military means.' In 1957 President Eisenhower and President Diem issued a joint statement which called attention to 'the large build-up of Vietnamese Communist military forces in North Viet-Nam' and stated:

'Noting that the Republic of Viet-Nam is covered by Article IV of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, President Eisenhower and President Ngo Dinh Diem agreed that aggression or subversion threatening the political independence of the Republic of Viet-Nam would be considered as endangering peace and stability.'

"On August 2, 1961, President Kennedy declared that 'the United States is determined that the Republic of Viet-Nam shall not be lost to the Communists for lack of any support which the United States can render.'

"On December 14, 1961, President Kennedy wrote to President Diem, recalling the United States declaration made at the end of the Geneva conference in 1954. The President once again stated that the United States was 'prepared to help the Republic of Viet-Nam to protect its people and to preserve its independence.' This commitment has been reaffirmed many times since.

"These, then, are the commitments we have taken to protect South Viet-Nam as a part of protecting our own 'peace and security.' We have sent American forces to fight in the jungles of that beleaguered country because South Viet-Nam has, under the language of the SEATO treaty, been the victim of 'aggression by means of armed attack.'"

* * *

"Up to this point I have tried to describe the nature of our commitments in South Viet-Nam and why we have made them. I have sought to put those commitments within the framework of our larger effort to prevent the Communists from upsetting the arrangements which have been the basis for our security. These policies have sometimes been attacked as static and sterile. It has been argued that they do not take account of the vast changes which have occurred in the world and are still in train.

"These contentions seem to me to miss the point. The line of policy we are following involves far more than a defense of the status quo. It seeks rather to insure that degree of security which is necessary if change and progress are to take place through consent and not through coercion. Certainly, as has been frequently pointed out, the world of the mid-20th century is not standing still. Movement is occurring on both sides of the Iron Curtain. Communism today is no longer monolithic; it no longer wears one face but many, and the deep schism between the two great power centers of the Communist world--Moscow and Peking--is clearly one of the major political facts of our time.

"There has been substantial change and movement within the Soviet Union as well--and perhaps even more among the countries of Eastern Europe. These changes have not been inhibited because of our efforts to maintain our postwar arrangements by organizing the Western alliance. They have taken place because of internal developments as well as because the Communist regime in Moscow has recognized that the Western alliance cannot permit it to extend its dominion by force.

"Over time the same processes hopefully will work in the Far East. Peking--and the Communist states living under its shadow--must learn that they cannot redraw the boundaries of the world by force.

"What we are pursuing, therefore, is not a static concept. For, unlike the Communists, we really believe in social revolution and not

merely in power cloaked as revolution."

* * *

"Our purpose is equally clear and easily defined. In his Baltimore speech of April 7, 1965, President Johnson did so in the following terms:

'Our objective is the independence of South Viet-Nam and its freedom from attack. We want nothing for ourselves--only that the people of South Viet-Nam be allowed to guide their own country in their own way.'

"This has been our basic objective since 1954. It has been pursued by three successive administrations and remains our basic objective today.

"Like the Communists, we have secondary objectives derived from the basic one. We intend to show that the 'war of liberation,' far from being cheap, safe, and disavowable, is costly, dangerous, and doomed to failure. We must destroy the myth of its invincibility in order to protect the independence of many weak nations which are vulnerable targets for subversive aggression--to use the proper term for the 'war of liberation.' We cannot leave while force and violence threaten them.

"The question has been raised as to whether this clash of interests is really important to us. An easy and incomplete answer would be that it must be important to us since it is considered so important by the other side. Their leadership has made it quite clear that they regard South Viet-Nam as the testing ground for the 'war of liberation' and that, after its anticipated success there, it will be used widely about the world. Kosygin told Mr. Reston in his interview of last December:

'We believe that national liberation wars are just wars and they will continue as long as there is national oppression by imperialist powers.'

"Before him, Khrushchev, in January 1961, had the following to say:

'Now a word about national liberation wars. The armed struggle by the Vietnamese people or the war of the Algerian people serve as the latest example of such wars. These are revolutionary wars. Such wars are not only admissible but inevitable. Can such wars flare up in the future? They can. The Communists fully support such just wars and march in the front rank of peoples waging liberation struggles.'

"General Giap, the Commander in Chief of the North Vietnamese forces, has made the following comment:

'South Viet-Nam is the model of the national liberation movement of our time. If the special warfare that the United States imperialists are testing in South Viet-Nam is overcome, then it can be defeated anywhere in the world.'

"The Minister of Defense of Communist China, Marshal Lin Piao, in a long statement of policy in September 1965, described in detail how Mao Tse-tung expects to utilize the 'war of liberation' to expand communism in Latin America, Africa, and Asia.

"These testimonials show that, apart from the goal of imposing communism on 15 million South Vietnamese, the success of the 'war of liberation' is in itself an important objective of the Communist leadership. On our side, we can understand the grave consequences of such a success for us. President Eisenhower in 1959 stressed the military importance of defending Southeast Asia in the following terms. He said:

'Strategically, South Viet-Nam's capture by the Communists would bring their power several hundred miles into a hitherto free region. The remaining countries of Southeast Asia would be menaced by a great flanking movement....The loss of South Viet-Nam would set in motion a crumbling process that could, as it progressed, have grave consequences for us and for freedom.'

"This view has often been referred to as the 'domino theory.' I personally do not believe in such a theory if it means belief in a law of nature which requires the collapse of each neighboring state in an inevitable sequence, following a Communist victory in South Viet-Nam. However, I am deeply impressed with the probable effects worldwide, not necessarily in areas contiguous to South Viet-Nam, if the 'war of liberation' scores a significant victory there. President Kennedy commented on this danger with moving eloquence: 'The great battleground for the defense and expansion of freedom today is the southern half of the globe--Asia, Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East--the lands of the people who harbor the greatest hopes. The enemies of freedom think they can destroy the hopes of the newer nations and they aim to do it before the end of this decade. This is a struggle of will and determination as much as one of force and violence. It is a battle for the conquest of the minds and souls as much as for the conquest of lives and territory. In such a struggle, we cannot fail to take sides.'

"Gentlemen, I think a simple answer to the question, what are we doing in South Viet-Nam, is to say that for more than a decade we have been taking sides in a cause in which we have a vital stake."

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43. Address by President Johnson at a Freedom House Dinner at New York, February 23, 1966, "Viet-Nam: The Struggle to Be Free," Department of State Bulletin, March 14, 1966, p. 390.

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"Our purpose in Viet-Nam is to prevent the success of aggression. It is not conquest; it is not empire; it is not foreign bases; it is not domination. It is, simply put, just to prevent the forceful conquest

of South Viet-Nam by North Viet-Nam."

* * *

"The contest in Viet-Nam is confused and hard, and many of its forms are new. Yet our American purpose and policy are unchanged. Our men in Viet-Nam are there. They are there, as Secretary Dillon /former Secretary of the Treasury Douglas Dillon/ told you, to keep a promise that was made 12 years ago. The Southeast Asia Treaty promised, as Secretary John Foster Dulles said for the United States, that 'an attack upon the treaty area would occasion a reaction so united, so strong, and so well placed that the aggressor would lose more than it could hope to gain.'

"...But we keep more than a specific treaty promise in Viet-Nam tonight. We keep the faith for freedom.

"Four Presidents have pledged to keep that faith."

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44. Legal Memorandum Prepared by Leonard C. Meeker, State Department Legal Adviser, for Submission to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, March 4, 1966, "The Legality of United States Participation in the Defense of Viet-Nam"; Department of State Bulletin, March 28, 1966, pp. 15-16.

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"V. CONCLUSION

"South Viet-Nam is being subjected to armed attack by Communist North Viet-Nam, through the infiltration of armed personnel, military equipment, and regular combat units. International law recognizes the right of individual and collective self-defense against armed attack. South Viet-Nam, and the United States upon the request of South Viet-Nam, are engaged in such collective defense of the South. Their actions are in conformity with international law and with the Charter of the United Nations. The fact that South Viet-Nam has been precluded by Soviet veto from becoming a member of the United Nations and the fact that South Viet-Nam is a zone of a temporarily divided state in no way diminish the right of collective defense of South Viet-Nam.

"The United States has commitments to assist South Viet-Nam in defending itself against Communist aggression from the North. The United States gave undertakings to this effect at the conclusion of the Geneva conference in 1954. Later that year the United States undertook an international obligation in the SEATO treaty to defend South Viet-Nam against Communist armed aggression. And during the past decade the United States has given additional assurances to the South Vietnamese Government.

"The Geneva accords of 1954 provided for a cease-fire and regroupment of contending forces, a division of Viet-Nam into two zones, and

a prohibition on the use of either zone for the resumption of hostilities or to 'further an aggressive policy.' From the beginning, North Viet-Nam violated the Geneva accords through a systematic effort to gain control of South Viet-Nam by force. In the light of these progressive North Vietnamese violations, the introduction into South Viet-Nam beginning in late 1961 of substantial United States military equipment and personnel, to assist in the defense of the South, was fully justified; substantial breach of an international agreement by one side permits the other side to suspend performance of corresponding obligations under the agreement. South Viet-Nam was justified in refusing to implement the provisions of the Geneva accords calling for reunification through free elections throughout Viet-Nam since the Communist regime in North Viet-Nam created conditions in the North that made free elections entirely impossible.

"The President of the United States has full authority to commit United States forces in the collective defense of South Viet-Nam. This authority stems from the constitutional powers of the President. However, it is not necessary to rely on the Constitution alone as the source of the President's authority, since the SEATO treaty--advised and consented to by the Senate and forming part of the law of the land--sets forth a United States commitment to defend South Viet-Nam against armed attack, and since the Congress--in the joint resolution of August 10, 1964, and in authorization and appropriations acts for support of the U.S. military effort in Viet-Nam--has given its approval and support to the President's actions. United States actions in Viet-Nam, taken by the President and approved by the Congress, do not require any declaration of war, as shown by a long line of precedents for the use of United States armed forces abroad in the absence of any congressional declaration of war."

45. Address by Ambassador Arthur J. Goldberg, U.S. Representative to the United Nations, Before the Pilgrim Society at London, England on March 4, 1966, "America and Britain: Unity of Purpose"; Department of State Bulletin, April 4, 1966, p. 539.

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"The most unspoken and unuttered--almost concealed--thought of some in the fight against the American involvement in Southeast Asia is: First, America cannot win the war in South Viet-Nam; second, while South Viet-Nam or, indeed, Southeast Asia may be important to American interests, these areas are not crucial to those interests. Therefore, since we cannot win in a war theater where the territory is peripheral to American interests, let us retreat, let us withdraw with no further nonsense.

"In my view, the complete answer is that there would be no greater danger to world peace than to start segregating mankind and the countries

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they live in as either peripheral or crucial. Perhaps in those halcyon days when the Congress of Vienna was the supreme example of intelligent diplomacy, such distinctions had meaning. The introduction of Marxism-Leninism into world society and the visible determination by its militant exponents to implement that doctrine through 'wars of national liberation' has today obliterated such distinctions. So has the expansion of technology, which has made this a shrinking world of interdependent nations."

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"ATTITUDE OF COMMUNIST CHINA

"But President Johnson has spoken to ears which hear only the echo of their own doctrine. It is not Dennis Healey nor Robert McNamara but the Red Chinese Minister, Marshal Lin Piao, who wrote 6 months ago, and I quote:

'We know that war brings destruction, sacrifice, and suffering on the people. (But) the sacrifice of a small number of people in revolutionary wars is repaid by security for whole nations....war can temper the people and push history forward. In this sense, war is a great school....In diametrical opposition to the Khrushchev revisionists, the (Chinese) Marxist-Leninists...never take a gloomy view of war.'

"Marshal Lin Piao's statement didn't come out of thin air. In his book Problems of War and Strategy Mao Tse-tung wrote, and this was before 1949:

'The seizure of power by armed forces, the settlement of an issue by war, is the central task and the highest form of revolution.'

"When Mao wrote these words, he lacked nuclear capability. Today the story is different, and the implications of his words and those of Marshal Lin are more dreadful."

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46. Vice President Humphrey Reports to President on Asian Trip, White House Press Release of March 6, 1966; Department of State Bulletin, March 28, 1966, p. 490.

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"3. The significance of the struggle in Vietnam is not simply the defense of a small nation against powerful neighbors. Vietnam is, in a larger sense, the focus of a broad effort to restrain the attempt by Asian Communists to expand by force--as we assisted our European allies in resisting Communist expansion in Europe after World War II.

"4. The Honolulu Declaration emphasizing the defeat of aggression and the achievement of a social revolution could represent a historic turning point in American relationships with Asia. The goals agreed upon by President Johnson and the Chief of State and Prime Minister of the Republic of Vietnam at Honolulu are taken very seriously:

"to defeat aggression,

"to defeat social misery,

"to build a stable democratic government,

"to reach an honorable, just peace.

"5. Most Asian leaders are concerned about the belligerence and militancy of Communist China's attitudes. None wishes to permit his country to fall under Communist domination in any form. All are dedicated nationalists.

"6. Among the leaders with whom I spoke, there was repeatedly expressed a concern as to whether our American purpose, tenacity and will were strong enough to persevere in Southeast Asia. I emphasized not only the firmness of our resolve but also our dedication to the rights of free discussion and dissent."

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47. Address by Vice President Humphrey at the National Press Club, Washington, D.C., March 11, 1966, "United States Tasks and Responsibilities in Asia"; Department of State Bulletin, April 4, 1966, p. 523.

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"Why are we in South Viet-Nam?

"We are in South Viet-Nam to repel and prevent the success of aggression against the Government and the people of that country.

"We are there to help assure the South Vietnamese people the basic right to decide their own futures, freely and without intimidation.

"We are there to help those people achieve a better standard of living for themselves and their children.

"We are there to help establish the principle that, in this nuclear age, aggression cannot be an acceptable means either of settling international disputes or of realizing national objectives. If aggression is permitted to go unchecked, we cannot in good faith hold out much hope for the future of small nations or of world peace."

* * *

"ASIAN COMMUNISM, A CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER

"At the beginning today, I said the conflict in Viet-Nam was the focus of a wider struggle taking place in Asia.

"During my recent mission I was struck by the depth of feeling, among almost all Asian leaders, that Asian communism had direct design on their national integrity and independence. Almost all cited examples of subversion and in many cases direct military involvement by Communist troops within their countries. And none--without any exception--questioned our involvement in Viet-Nam. There were questions about aspects of our policy there but none concerning the fact of our presence there and our resistance to aggression.

"Among the leaders with whom I spoke, there was repeatedly expressed a deep concern as to whether our American purpose, tenacity, and will were strong enough to persevere in Southeast Asia. Public debate in America was sometimes interpreted as a weakening of purpose. I emphasized not only the firmness of our resolve but also our dedication to the rights of free discussion and dissent.

"For we know that John Stuart Mill's advice remains valid: 'We can never be sure that the opinion we are endeavoring to stifle is a false opinion; and if we were sure, stifling it would be an evil still.'

"Asian communism may be a subject for discussion here. In Asia, it is a clear and present danger. No single, independent nation in Asia has the strength to stand alone against that danger.

"I believe that the time may come when Asian communism may lose its fervor, when it may lose some of its neuroses, when it may realize that its objectives cannot be gained by aggression. But until that time I believe we have no choice but to help the nations of Southeast Asia strengthen themselves for the long road ahead.

"I also said, at the beginning today, that some very basic principles of international conduct were under test in Viet-Nam. Some people think not.

"Of them, I ask this: Were we to withdraw from Viet-Nam under any conditions short of peace, security, and the right of self-determination for the South Vietnamese people, what conclusions would be drawn in the independent nations of Asia? In Western Europe? In the young, struggling countries of Africa? In the nations of Latin America beset by subversion and unrest? What conclusions would be drawn in Hanoi and Peking?"

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48. Address by Secretary Rusk at the Founder's Day Banquet of the Boston University School of Public Communications at Boston, Massachusetts on March 14, 1966, "Keeping Our Commitment to Peace"; Department of State Bulletin, April 4, 1966, p. 514.

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"....The lesson of World War II was that it was necessary to organize and defend a peace--not merely to wish for it--and to 'unite our strength to maintain international peace and security.'

"Article 1 of the United Nations Charter is utterly fundamental and, although some may think it old-fashioned to speak of it, I should like to remind you of what it says:

'To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace;...'

"Unhappily and tragically, the ink was not dry on the United Nations Charter before it became fully apparent that Joseph Stalin had turned to world revolution and a policy of aggressive militancy. The first major issue before the Security Council was his attempt to keep Russian forces in Iran. Then came guerrilla operations against Greece, pressure on Turkey, the Berlin blockade, and the Korean aggression. These moves led to defensive action by the free world and a number of mutual defense treaties--the Rio Pact, NATO, the ANZUS treaty with Australia and New Zealand, and bilateral treaties with the Philippines and Japan.

"Under President Eisenhower we concluded the Southeast Asia treaty, which, by a protocol, committed us to help the three non-Communist states of former French Indochina--South Viet-Nam, Laos, and Cambodia--to repel armed attacks, if they asked for help. Under Eisenhower we also entered mutual defense pacts with the Republic of Korea and the Republic of China on Formosa.

"All of those commitments to oppose aggression--through the United Nations and through our various defensive alliances--were approved by the Senate by overwhelming majorities of both parties. And these and related obligations have been sustained over the years by authorizations, appropriations, and other supporting measures enacted by bipartisan votes in both Houses of Congress.

"THE BACKBONE OF WORLD PEACE

"I have read that I have drawn 'no distinction between powerful

industrial democratic states in Europe and weak and undemocratic states in Asia.' The answer is that, for the Secretary of State, our treaty commitments are a part of the supreme law of the land, and I do not believe that we can be honorable in Europe and dishonorable in Asia.

"I do believe that the United States must keep its pledged word. That is not only a matter of national honor but an essential to the preservation of peace. For the backbone of world peace is the integrity of the commitment of the United States."

* * *

"The fact is that I have always treated the SEATO treaty--which the Senate approved with only one dissenting vote--as an important part of our commitment to defend South Viet-Nam."

* * *

"I do not regard our policy in Viet-Nam as based only on past commitments. I believe that it is now just as much in our interest--and that of the free world--to repel Communist aggression there as it was when we made those earlier commitments."

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49. Article by Leonard Unger, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, "The United States and the Far East: Problems and Policies"; Department of State Bulletin, March 21, 1966, p. 452.

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"Our national interest--I speak as an American--is no longer explicitly guided in the Far East, by particular economic or military concerns with individual areas, as was indeed to a considerable extent the case not only with ourselves but also with the British and others before World War II. We have a deep concern for expanded trade and cultural ties--which alone can in the end bind the world together--and we have military base rights and needs related to our role in assisting in the security in the area. But neither of these is an end in itself. The first will, we believe, flourish if the nations in the area are able to develop in freedom; the second, the security role, must now be maintained but will over time, we hope, become susceptible of reduction and indeed, wherever possible, of elimination."

* * *

"....In the fall of 1961 President Kennedy made the decision that the United States would have to go beyond the limits of the Geneva accords. That decision was a fully justified response to the wholesale

violation of the accords by the other side. We raised our military personnel from the levels provided in the Geneva accords to 10,000 men in 1962 and to roughly 25,000 men at the end of 1964. These men acted as advisers and assisted the Government of South Viet-Nam in its logistics. They did not operate as combat ground units."

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"There is in addition the strategic stake, for, without accepting the pat simplicities of 'domino' theories, none of us could doubt that the preservation of the independence of Thailand, of Malaysia, of Singapore, of Burma, and beyond them in the long run of India, the Philippines, and Australia would become infinitely more difficult if this Communist venture were to succeed in South Viet-Nam. It is a Hanoi venture, but its success would feed the fires of the clearly expansionist thrust of Communist Chinese policy. That expansion must be contained so that over time there may emerge the latent moderate and constructive elements within Communist China.

"There is the world stake in defeating efforts to change the international framework by force, whether the attempt be, as in this case, by a Communist nation across a line that separates it from a non-Communist country or across a line that divides countries where communism is not a part of the issue. These are the stakes as we see them. We shall continue to do what is necessary to insure that South Viet-Nam will be able to stand on its own feet and determine its own future."

50. Address by Ambassador Arthur J. Goldberg, U.S. Representative to the United Nations, at the University of California, Berkeley, California on March 25, 1966, "The Quest for Peace"; Department of State Bulletin, April 18, 1966, p. 608.

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"Such principles are all very well. But between the idea and the reality falls the shadow--the shadow of Viet-Nam. Can this war be fitted into any wider concept of the search for better methods of peacekeeping? I think it can. No thinking American would support it if it could not. Let me begin by saying what this war is not.

"It is not emphatically a war to establish an American 'imperialism' or an American 'sphere of influence' in Asia. What exclusive interests have we there? Investment? trade? settlement? None.

"It is not a war to threaten or frustrate the legitimate interests of the Chinese people--though it seeks to discourage violence and aggression and play some part in persuading them that the imperialist world, once known to the Central Kingdom, is dead and will not be resurrected.

"It is in part, if you like, to persuade them that the fact that large parts of Asia--including all Southeast Asia and the hill states of the Himalayas--once, supposedly, paid the emperors tribute is no reason why they should revert to the status of vassal states in the 20th century.

"Again, this war is not a holy war against communism as an ideology. It does not seek unconditional surrender--from North Viet-Nam or anyone else. It does not seek to deny any segment of South Vietnamese opinion its part in peacefully establishing a stable regime.

"It does, however, preclude retreat before two things--first, the program of the Viet Cong, strongly controlled by the North, to impose its will by violence; and second, its claim to be the 'sole genuine representative' of a people, the vast majority of whom have rejected this claim.

"This, I believe, is the background against which to consider in positive terms what this war is about. It is, I suggest, another step in a limited operation of a policing type--an operation designed to check violence as a means to settle international disputes.

"The violence is no less total because it has been largely organized as a guerrilla operation...."

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51. Statement by Secretary Rusk Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on May 9, 1966, "Background of U.S. Policy in Southeast Asia"; Department of State Bulletin, May 30, 1966, p. 830.

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"I was myself in Government during the Truman administration and well recall the discussions which were held at the highest levels of Government in the National Security Council as well as the strategic problems considered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

"If the committee will search its own and the public records on this matter during that period and since, they could surely have no doubt that it was the judgment that the security of Southeast Asia was extremely important to the security interests of the United States. This was because of the more than 200 million people in Southeast Asia, the geography of that area, the important natural resources of the countries involved, the relationship of Southeast Asia to the total world situation, and the effect upon the prospects of a durable peace.

"I emphasize the last point because the overriding security interest of the United States is in organizing a stable peace. The sacrifices of World War II and the almost unimaginable losses of a world war III underline this central objective of American policy.

"There was also involved the problem of the phenomenon of aggression. We had found ourselves in the catastrophe of World War II because aggressions in Asia, in Africa, and in Europe had demonstrated that the aggressor would not stop until compelled to do so. It was the determination of the United States to learn the lessons of that experience by moving in the U.N. and otherwise to try to build an enduring international peace."

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"LEGALITY OF U.S. EFFORTS IN SOUTH VIET-NAM

"Very briefly, on the second question, Mr. Chairman, the matter was raised with respect to the legal issues surrounding our efforts in South Viet-Nam. We have made available to the committee an extensive legal memorandum on these matters, and the law officers of the Government are available to discuss this in whatever detail the committee may wish.

"In this brief statement today I shall merely outline the essence of our view.

"Military actions of the United States in support of South Viet-Nam, including air attacks on military targets in North Viet-Nam, are authorized under international law by the well-established right of collective self-defense against armed attack.

"South Viet-Nam is the victim of armed attack from the North through the infiltration of armed personnel, military equipment, and regular combat units. This armed attack preceded our strikes at military targets in North Viet-Nam.

"The fact that South Viet-Nam is not a member of the United Nations, because of the Soviet Union's veto, does not affect the lawfulness of collective self-defense of South Viet-Nam. The United Nations Charter was not designed to, and does not, limit the right of self-defense to United Nations members.

"Nor does South Viet-Nam's status under the Geneva accords of 1954, as one zone of a temporarily divided state, impair the lawfulness of the defense against attack from the other zone.

"As in Germany and Korea, the demarcation line is established by an international agreement, and international law requires that it be respected by each zone. Moreover, South Viet-Nam has been recognized as an independent entity by more than 60 governments around the world and admitted to membership in a number of the specialized agencies of the U.N.

"Nothing in the U.N. Charter purports to restrict the exercise of the right of collective self-defense to regional organizations such as the OAS [Organization of American States].

"As required by the U.N. Charter, the United States has reported to the Security Council the actions it has taken in exercising the right of collective self-defense in Viet-Nam. It has indeed requested the Council to seek a peaceful settlement on the basis of the Geneva accords, but the Council has not been able to act.

"There is no requirement in international law for a declaration of war before the right of individual or collective self-defense can be exercised.

"South Viet-Nam did not violate the Geneva accords of 1954 by refusing to engage in consultations with the North Vietnamese in 1955 with a view to holding general elections in 1956, as provided for in those accords. Even assuming that the election provisions were binding on South Viet-Nam, which did not agree to them, conditions in the North clearly made impossible the free expression of the national will contemplated by the accords. In these circumstances, at least, South Viet-Nam was justified in declining to participate in planning for a nationwide election.

"The introduction of U.S. military personnel and equipment in South Viet-Nam is not a violation of the accords. Until late 1961 U.S. military personnel and equipment in South Viet-Nam were restricted to replacements for French military personnel and equipment in 1954. Such replacement was expressly permitted by the accords.

"North Viet-Nam, however, had from the beginning violated the accords by leaving forces and supplies in the South and using its zone for aggression against the South. In response to mounting armed infiltration from the North, the United States, beginning in late 1961, substantially increased its contribution to the South's defense. This was fully justified by the established principle of international law that a material breach of an agreement by one party entitles another party at least to withhold compliance with a related provision.

"The United States has commitments to assist South Viet-Nam in defending itself against Communist aggression: In the SEATO treaty--which I have already mentioned and which is similar in form to our defense commitments to South Korea, Japan, the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, and the Republic of China--and even earlier in the Geneva conference we had declared that we would regard a renewal of Communist aggression in Viet-Nam with 'grave concern.'

"Since 1954 three Presidents have reaffirmed our commitments to the defense of South Viet-Nam.

"Finally, the President of the United States has full authority to commit U.S. forces in the collective defense of South Viet-Nam. This

authority stems from the constitutional powers of the President as Commander in Chief and Chief Executive, with responsibilities as well for the conduct of foreign relations. However, it is not necessary to rely upon the Constitution alone as the source of the President's authority. The SEATO treaty, which forms part of the law of the land, sets forth a United States commitment to defend South Viet-Nam against armed attack, and the Congress, in a joint resolution of August 1964 and in authorization and appropriation acts in support of the military effort in Viet-Nam, has given its approval and support to the President's action.

"The Constitution does not require a declaration of war for U.S. actions in Viet-Nam taken by the President and approved by the Congress. A long line of precedents, beginning with the undeclared war with France in 1798-1800 and including actions in Korea and Lebanon, supports the use of U.S. armed forces abroad in the absence of a congressional declaration of war."

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52. Address by Secretary Rusk Before the Council on Foreign Relations at New York, New York on May 24, 1966, "Organizing the Peace for Man's Survival"; Department of State Bulletin, June 13, 1966, p. 926.

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"And significant changes have occurred within the Communist world. It has ceased to be monolithic, and evolutionary influences are visible in most of the Communist states. But the leaders of both the principal Communist nations are committed to the promotion of the Communist world revolution, even while they disagree--perhaps bitterly--on questions of tactics.

"If mankind is to achieve a peaceful world order safe for free institutions, it is of course essential that aggression be eliminated--if possible by deterring it or, if it occurs, by repelling it. The clearest lesson of the 1930's and --40's is that aggression feeds on aggression. I'm aware that Mao and Ho Chi Minh are not Hitler and Mussolini, but we should not forget what we have learned about the anatomy and physiology of aggression. We ought to know better than to ignore the aggressor's openly proclaimed intentions or to fall victim to the notion that he will stop if you let him have just one more bite or speak to him a little more gently."

* * *

"....But what the Communists, in their familiar upside down language, call 'wars of liberation' are advocated and supported by Moscow as well as by Peiping. And the assault on the Republic of Viet-Nam is a critical test of that technique of aggression.

"It is as important to deter this type of aggression in Southeast Asia now as it was to defeat it in Greece 19 years ago. The aggression against Greece produced the Truman Doctrine, a declaration of a general policy of assisting other free nations who were defending themselves against external attacks or threats....

"THE 'WHY' OF OUR COMMITMENT

"In the discussion of our commitment in Southeast Asia, three different aspects are sometimes confused--why we made it, how we made it, and the means of fulfilling it.

"The 'why' was a determination that the peace and security of that area are extremely important to the security of the United States. That determination was made first before the Korean war by President Truman on the basis of protracted analysis in the highest councils of the Government. The problem was reexamined at least twice during his administration and at intervals thereafter. And the main conclusion was always the same. It was based on the natural resources and the strategic importance of the area, on the number of nations and peoples involved, more than 200 million, as well as on the relationship of Southeast Asia to the world situation as a whole and to the prospects for a durable peace....

"THE 'HOW' OF OUR COMMITMENT

"The 'how' of the commitment consists of various acts and utterances by successive Presidents and Congresses, of which the most solemn is the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, signed in 1954 and approved by the Senate in early 1955 with only one dissenting vote. I do not find it easy to understand how anyone could have voted for that treaty--or even read it--without realizing that it was a genuine collective defense treaty.

"It says in article IV that each party recognizes that 'aggression by means of armed attack in the treaty area'--which by protocol included the nations which came out of French Indochina--'would endanger its own peace and safety, and agrees that it will in that event act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.' And, in his testimony before the Foreign Relations Committee, Secretary of State Dulles said specifically that this clause covered an armed attack 'by the regime of Ho Chi Minh.' There was never any doubt about it when this treaty was signed. Article IV binds each party individually; it does not require a formal collective finding. And that too was made plain when the treaty was under consideration and has been reiterated on various occasions since then.

"Now the assertion that we have only recently discovered the SEATO Treaty is just untrue. I have referred to it frequently myself, beginning with a public statement in Bangkok in March 1961 that the United States would live up to its obligations under that treaty and would

'continue to assist free nations of this area who are struggling for their survival against armed minorities directed, supplied, and supported from without,' just as we would assist those under attack by naked aggression. President Kennedy referred to our obligations under SEATO on a number of occasions, including his last public utterance, and President Johnson has done so frequently.

"In April 1964 the SEATO Council of Ministers declared that the attack on the Republic of Viet-Nam was an aggression 'directed, supplied and supported by the Communist regime in North Vietnam, in flagrant violation of the Geneva accords of 1954 and 1962.' They declared also that the defeat of that 'Communist campaign is essential' and that the members of SEATO should remain prepared to take further steps in fulfillment of their obligations under the treaty. Only France did not join in these declarations.

"A few days later, in this city, President Johnson said that:

'The statement of the SEATO allies that Communist defeat is 'essential' is a reality. To fail to respond...would reflect on our honor as a nation, would undermine worldwide confidence in our courage, would convince every nation in South Asia that it must now bow to Communist terms to survive....So let no one doubt (he said) that we are in this battle as long as South Viet-Nam wants our support and needs our assistance to protect its freedom.'

"The resolution of August 1964, which the House of Representatives adopted unanimously and the Senate with only two negative votes, said that 'the United States regards as vital to its national interest and to world peace the maintenance of international peace and security in Southeast Asia.' It also said that 'the United States is, therefore; prepared, as the President determines, to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom.'

"FULFILLING OUR COMMITMENT

"Now the third aspect is the means of fulfilling our commitment. These have changed with the nature of the problem and as the dimensions of the aggression have grown. The decision to commit American forces into combat was made by the President with understandable sobriety and reluctance and only because it became necessary to cope with the escalation of the aggression by the other side.

"I have no doubt that a large majority of the governments of the free world are sympathetic to our efforts in Southeast Asia and would be deeply concerned were they to fail...."

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53. Address by Vice President Humphrey at Commencement Exercises at the United States Military Academy, West Point, New York on June 8, 1966, "Perspective on Asia"; Department of State Bulletin, July 4, 1966, p. 2.

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"World peace and security will be threatened by propaganda, subversion, and agitation, by economic warfare, by assassination of honest and able leaders, as well as by the naked use of armed force.

"World peace and security will be threatened, above all, by the very existence, for two-thirds of mankind, of conditions of hunger, disease, and ignorance.

"We must learn that the simple solutions of times past will not meet the present day challenges and new forms of aggression we face.

"Our 'doves' must learn that there are times when power must be used. They must learn that there is no substitute for force in the face of a determined enemy who resorts to terror, subversion, and aggression, whether concealed or open.

"Our 'hawks' must learn that military power is not enough. They must learn, indeed, that it can be wholly unavailing if not accompanied by political effort and by the credible promise to ordinary people of a better life.

"And all of us must learn to adapt our military planning and actions to the new conditions of subversive warfare, the so-called 'wars of national liberation.'"

* * *

"America's role in Asia today is a direct product of the century that preceded World War II and of the war itself. For with the end of that war, the responsibilities of victory imposed on us a stabilizing role in Japan and Korea. And with the beginning of the cold war, the Communist victory in China, and the outbreak of the Korean war, American power was the only shield available to fragile and newly independent nations in non-Communist Asia."

* * *

"But what of the states of former French Indochina? There, of course, is the present focal point of war and revolution in Asia. And there we are tested as never before. We face a situation of external aggression and subversion against a postcolonial nation that has never had the breathing space to develop its politics or its economy.

"In South Viet-Nam both defense and development--the war against the aggressor and the war against despair--are fused as never before. Viet-Nam challenges our courage, our ingenuity, and our ability to persevere. If we can succeed there--if we can help sustain an independent South Viet-Nam, free to determine its own future--then our prospects, and the prospects for free men throughout Asia, will be bright indeed.

"We know this. Our friends and allies know it. And our adversaries know it. That is why one small country looms so large today on everyone's map of Asia."

* * *

"War is always cruel. But the war in Viet-Nam should not obscure for us the fact that behind the smoke and uproar is the testing of an issue vital to all of Asia and indeed the world. Can independent, non-Communist states not only survive but grow and flourish in face of Communist pressure?"

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54. Address by President Johnson at Omaha Municipal Dock on June 30, 1966, "Two Threats to Peace: Hunger and Aggression"; Department of State Bulletin, July 25, 1966, p. 115.

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"Now I want to point out to you that the conflict there is important for many reasons, but I have time to mention only a few. I am going to mention three specifically.

"The first reason: We believe that the rights of other people are just as important as our own. We believe that we are obligated to help those whose rights are being threatened by brute force."

* * *

"The North Vietnamese at this hour are trying to deny the people of South Viet-Nam the right to build their own nation, the right to choose their own system of government, the right to go and vote in a free election and select their own people, the right to live and work in peace.

"South Viet-Nam has asked us for help. Only if we abandon our respect for the rights of other people could we turn down their plea.

"VIET-NAM AND THE SECURITY OF ASIA

"Second, South Viet-Nam is important to the security of the rest of all of Asia.

"A few years ago the nations of free Asia lay under the shadow of Communist China. They faced a common threat, but not in unity. They were still caught up in their old disputes and dangerous confrontations. They were ripe for aggression.

"Now that picture is changing. Shielded by the courage of the South Vietnamese, the peoples of free Asia today are driving toward economic and social development in a new spirit of regional cooperation.

"All you have to do is look at that map and you will see independence growing, thriving, blossoming, and blooming.

"They are convinced that the Vietnamese people and their allies are going to stand firm against the conqueror, or against aggression.

"Our fighting in Viet-Nam, therefore, is buying time not only for South Viet-Nam, but it is buying time for a new and a vital, growing Asia to emerge and develop additional strength.

"If South Viet-Nam were to collapse under Communist pressure from the North, the progress in the rest of Asia would be greatly endangered. And don't you forget that!

"The third reason is: What happens in South Viet-Nam will determine--yes, it will determine--whether ambitious and aggressive nations can use guerrilla warfare to conquer their weaker neighbors.

"It will determine whether might makes right.

"Now I do not know of a single more important reason for our presence than this.

"We are fighting in South Viet-Nam a different kind of war than we have ever known in the past."

* * *

"If by such methods the agents of one nation can go out and hold and seize power where turbulent change is occurring in another nation, our hope for peace and order will suffer a crushing blow all over the world. It will be an invitation to the would-be conqueror to keep on marching. That is why the problem of guerrilla warfare--the problem of Viet-Nam--is a critical threat to peace not just in South Viet-Nam, but in all of this world in which we live."

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55. Address by President Johnson on Nationwide Radio and Television to the American Alumni Council on July 12, 1966, "Four Essentials for Peace in Asia"; Department of State Bulletin, August 1, 1966, p. 158.

* * *

"Americans entered this century believing that our own security had no foundation outside our own continent. Twice we mistook our sheltered position for safety. Twice we were dead wrong.

"If we are wise now, we will not repeat our mistakes of the past. We will not retreat from the obligations of freedom and security in Asia.

"MAKING AGGRESSION A 'LOSING GAME'

"The second essential for peace in Asia is this: to prove to aggressive nations that the use of force to conquer others is a losing game."

* * *

"We are there because we are trying to make the Communists of North Viet-Nam stop shooting at their neighbors;

-- because we are trying to make this Communist aggression unprofitable;

--because we are trying to demonstrate that guerrilla warfare, inspired by one nation against another nation, can never succeed. Once that lesson is learned, a shadow that hangs over all of Asia tonight will begin, I think, to recede."

* * *

56. Address by President Johnson at the White House, 15 August 1966, "The Enemy We Face in Viet-Nam"; Department of State Bulletin, August 15, 1966, p. 227.

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"They may not look like we do. They don't speak the same language that we do. They may not even think like we do. But they are human beings. We promised them, by treaty, to help protect their independence, and America doesn't break its promises. We are going to stay there."

* * *

"Second, a victory for the Communists in South Viet-Nam will be followed by new ambitions in Asia.

"The Communists have taught us that aggression is like hunger: It obeys no law but its own appetite. For this reason they have gambled heavily on success in the South.

"The leaders of free Asian nations know this better than anyone. If South Viet-Nam falls, then they are the next targets. North Viet-Nam's effort to impose its own system on South Viet-Nam is a new form of colonialism. The free nations of Asia want it stopped now. Many of them are standing there by our side, helping us stop them now.

"Third, a Communist victory in South Viet-Nam would inspire new aggression in the rest of the world.

"Listen to me while I repeat the words of North Viet-Nam's top military commander. I want you to hear what he says:

'The war has become (in his words) the model of the national liberation movement of our time. If the special warfare that the United States imperialists are testing in South Viet-Nam is overcome, then it can be defeated anywhere in the world.'

"Let me repeat to you those last words: '...it can be defeated anywhere in the world.'

"Now what he really means is this: If guerrilla warfare succeeds in Asia, it can succeed in Africa. It can succeed in Latin America. It can succeed anywhere in the world."

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57. Address by President Johnson before the Navy League at Manchester, N.H., August 20, 1966, "Our Objective in Vietnam"; Department of State Bulletin, September 12, 1966, p. 368.

* * *

"...But I think most Americans want to know why Viet-Nam is important.

"I think they know that communism must be halted in Viet-Nam, as it was halted in Western Europe and in Greece and Turkey and Korea and the Caribbean, if it is determined to swallow up free peoples and spread its influence in that area trying to take freedom away from people who do want to select their own leaders for themselves.

"I think that our people know that if aggression succeeds there, when it has failed in other places in the world, a harsh blow would be

dealt to the security of other free nations in Asia and perhaps a blow to the peace in the entire world."

* * *

"To give them time to build is one reason that we are all there. For there are times when the strong must provide a shield for those on whom the Communists prey. We have provided that shield in other countries. We are providing it there. And this is such a time.

"We are there for another reason, too, and that is because the United States must stand behind its word, even when conditions have added to the cost of honoring a pledge that was given a decade ago.

"I do not have to remind you that our pledge was in fact given by treaty to uphold the security of Southeast Asia. Now that security is in jeopardy because people are trying to use force to take over South Viet-Nam. When adversity comes is no time to back down on our commitment, if we expect our friends around the world to have faith in our word."

* * *

58. Address by President Johnson before the American Legion National Convention in Washington, D.C. on August 30, 1966, "The True Meaning of Patriotism"; Department of State Bulletin, September 19, 1966, p. 425.

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"Make no mistake about the character of this war. Our adversaries have done us at least one great service: They have described this war for what it is--in unmistakable terms. It is meant to be the opening salvo in a series of bombardments, or, as they are called in Peking, 'wars of liberation.'

"And if it succeeds in South Viet-Nam, then, as Marshal Lin Piao says, 'The people in other parts of the world will see...that what the Vietnamese people can do, they can do, too.'"

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59. Statement by Arthur J. Goldberg before the U.N. General Assembly on September 22, 1966, "Initiative for Peace"; Department of State Bulletin, October 10, 1966, p. 518.

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"OUR AFFIRMATIVE AIMS IN VIET-NAM

"It is because of the attempt to upset by violence the situation in Viet-Nam, and its far-reaching implications elsewhere, that the United States and other countries have responded to appeals from South Viet-Nam for military assistance.

"Our aims in giving this assistance are strictly limited.

"We are not engaged in a 'holy war' against communism.

"We do not seek to establish an American empire or a sphere of influence in Asia.

"We seek no permanent military bases, no permanent establishment of troops, no permanent alliances, no permanent American presence of any kind in South Viet-Nam.

"We do not seek to impose a policy of alinement on South Viet-Nam.

"We do not seek to overthrow the Government of North Viet-Nam.

"We do not seek to do any injury to mainland China nor to threaten any of its legitimate interests.

"We do not ask of North Viet-Nam an unconditional surrender or indeed the surrender of anything that belongs to it.

"Nor do we seek to exclude any segment of the South Vietnamese people from peaceful participation in their country's future.

"Let me state affirmatively and succinctly what our aims are.

"We want a political solution, not a military solution, to this conflict. By the same token, we reject the idea that North Viet-Nam has the right to impose a military solution.

"We seek to assure for the people of South Viet-Nam the same right of self-determination--to decide its own political destiny, free of force--that the United Nations Charter affirms for all.

"And we believe that reunification of Viet-Nam should be decided upon through a free choice by the peoples of both the North and the South without outside interference, the results of which choice we are fully prepared to support."

* * *

60. Address by Secretary Rusk before the George C. Marshall Memorial Dinner of the Association of the United States Army at Washington, D.C. on October 12, 1966, "Requirements for Organizing the Peace"; Department of State Bulletin, October 31, 1966, p. 658.

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"And early in 1950, after extended consultations with his principal foreign policy and military advisers, President Truman determined that we had an important national security interest in keeping Southeast Asia, including Viet-Nam, within the free world. That finding was repeatedly reviewed--by him, and then by Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson--always with the same conclusion.

"I have heard it said or implied that President Kennedy did not regard the security of Southeast Asia generally, and of South Viet-Nam in particular, as important to the free world and the United States. If he ever had such views--or even any doubts about the importance of our stake in that area--he never revealed them to his Secretary of State.

"In his news conference of September 12, 1963, President Kennedy summed up our objective in Viet-Nam in these words:

'...we want the war to be won, the Communists to be contained, and the Americans to go home....But we are not there to see a war lost, and we will follow the policy which I have indicated today of advancing those causes and issues which help win the war.'

"The great decisions of President Truman in both Europe and Asia remind us that the community of nations must have the courage to resist aggression no matter what form it takes."

* * *

"There is an indigenous element in the war in South Viet-Nam, but relatively it is even smaller than was the indigenous element in the case of Greece. We consider it well within the capacity of the South Vietnamese to handle. We and others are there because of aggression from the North--an aggression which the other side has repeatedly escalated and now includes many regiments of the regular army of North Viet-Nam. And we shall leave when these invaders and arms from the North go home."

* * *

"And, let me emphasize, we had better not forget the ghastly mistakes which led to the Second World War. For, there won't be any opportunity to apply any lessons after a third world war. We had better remember what we know and see to it that a third world war does not occur."

"....Prudence dictates that we use enough force to achieve the essential purpose of deterring or repelling aggression. That has been the practice of all four of our postwar Presidents. That is the road which offers the best hope of reaching a reliable peace.

"For we can never forget that our objective is a secure peace. We want nothing else from anybody, anywhere in the world."

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61. Address by Secretary Rusk before the Annual Meeting of the Association of State Colleges and National Association of State Universities and Land-Grant Colleges at Washington, D.C., November 15, 1966, "The Future of the Pacific Community"; Department of State Bulletin, December 5, 1966, p. 838.

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"AGGRESSION IN SOUTH VIET-NAM

"But indirect aggression by infiltration of men and arms across frontiers is still with us. It was tried in Greece, in Malaya, in the Philippines, and now in South Viet-Nam. The label 'civil war' or 'war of national liberation' does not make it any less an aggression. The purpose is to impose on others an unwanted regime. It substitutes terror for persuasion, force for free choice. And especially if it succeeds, it contains the inherent threat of further aggression--and eventually a great war."

* * *

"The militant Asian Communists have themselves proclaimed the attack on South Viet-Nam to be a critical test of this technique. And beyond South Viet-Nam and Laos they have openly designated Thailand as the next target."

* * *

"Now, as a generation ago, some people are saying that if you let an aggressor take just one more bite, he will be satisfied. But one of the plainest lessons of our times is that one aggression leads to another--but the initial aggressor and perhaps by others who decide there would be profit in emulating him.

"Some assert that we have no national security interest in South Viet-Nam and Southeast Asia. But that is not the judgment of those who have borne the high responsibilities for the safety of the United States. Beginning with President Truman, four successive Presidents, after extended consultation with their principal advisers, have decided that we have a very important interest in the security of that area.

"There is a further and more specific reason why we are assisting South Viet-Nam: Out of the strategic conclusions of four successive Presidents came commitments, including the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty. The Senate approved it with only one negative vote.

"Our commitments are the backbone of world peace. It is essential that neither our adversaries nor our friends ever doubt that we will do what we say we will do. Otherwise, the result is very likely to be a great catastrophe.

"In his last public utterance President Kennedy reviewed what the United States had done to preserve freedom and peace since the Second World War, and our defensive commitments, including our support of South Viet-Nam. He said: 'We are still the keystone in the arch of freedom, and I think we will continue to do as we have done in the past, our duty....'"

* * *

JOHNSON ADMINISTRATION - 1967

SUMMARY

In general, the justification of U.S. involvement in Vietnam in 1967 centered on the determination of America to honor the commitment under SEATO. The continuation of the build-up of U.S. military strength was justified as necessary to fight the "limited war in Vietnam in an attempt to prevent a larger war...." -- to stop what Secretary Rusk called the "phenomenon of aggression." The national interests of the U.S. were enunciated to establish the "credibility" of U.S. diplomacy. Justification for U.S. policy considered the following:

a. The United States was in Vietnam because of the SEATO commitment to the collective self-defense against armed aggression. This commitment was necessary to eliminate aggression and build a durable peace. The ultimate aims are to protect the security of the U.S. and to resist aggression.

b. The "domino theory" was not needed to explain the future of Southeast Asia -- the world revolution of militant communism proclaimed by Peking was the theory, that is, the "phenomenon of aggression."

c. The U.S. commitment has bolstered our allies, promoted a confidence factor in Vietnam, and provided the crucial test for "wars of national liberation" as a tool of communist revolution.

d. U.S. policy has been guided by two basic propositions: that extension of hostile control by Asian communism was a threat to U.S. interests, and that a free and independent East Asian and Pacific region is essential to world peace.

e. The U.S. involvement has followed a legal course from the Eisenhower commitments and "domino theory" of the 1950's through the escalation of the 1960's. Senate approvals of SEATO, various authorizations and appropriations, and the joint resolution of August, 1964, have supported Presidential action.

f. "Aggressive conduct if allowed to go unchecked and unchallenged, ultimately leads to war." The appetite of aggression feeds on aggression -- the U.S. seeks to prevent a wider war by challenging communist expansion now in Southeast Asia -- as opposed to appeasement diplomacy of the 1930's.

V. D. JUSTIFICATION OF THE WAR -- PUBLIC STATEMENTS

JOHNSON ADMINISTRATION

1967

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80. President Johnson responds to question of U.S. aims in Vietnam thusly, "We think the security of the U.S. is definitely tied in with the security of Southeast Asia," and "When we are a party to a treaty..., then we carry it out."..... D-134

62. Letter from Secretary Rusk to 100 Student Leaders, January 4, 1967; "Secretary Rusk Redefines United States Policy on Viet-Nam for Student Leaders," Department of State Bulletin, January 23, 1967, p. 133.

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"There is no shadow of doubt in my mind that our vital interests are deeply involved in Viet-Nam and in Southeast Asia.

"We are involved because the nation's word has been given that we would be involved. On February 1, 1955, by a vote of 82 to 1 the United States Senate passed the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty. That Treaty stated that aggression by means of armed attack in the treaty area would endanger our own peace and safety and, in that event, 'we would act to meet the common danger.' There is no question that an expanding armed attack by North Viet-Nam on South Viet-Nam has been under way in recent years; and six nations, with vital interests in the peace and security of the region, have joined South Viet-Nam in defense against that armed attack.

"Behind the words and the commitment of the Treaty lies the lesson learned in the tragic half century since the First World War. After that war our country withdrew from effective world responsibility. When aggressors challenged the peace in Manchuria, Ethiopia, and then Central Europe during the 1930's, the world community did not act to prevent their success. The result was a Second World War--which could have been prevented."

* * *

"In short, we are involved in Viet-Nam because we know from painful experience that the minimum condition for order on our planet is that aggression must not be permitted to succeed. For when it does succeed, the consequence is not peace, it is the further expansion of aggression.

"And those who have borne responsibility in our country since 1945 have not for one moment forgotten that a third world war would be a nuclear war."

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63. The State of the Union Address of President Johnson to the Congress (Excerpts), January 10, 1967; Department of State Bulletin, January 30, 1967, p. 158.

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"We are in Viet-Nam because the United States of America and our allies are committed by the SEATO Treaty to 'act to meet the common danger' of aggression in Southeast Asia.

"We are in Viet-Nam because an international agreement signed by the United States, North Viet-Nam, and others in 1962 is being systematically violated by the Communists. That violation threatens the independence of all the small nations in Southeast Asia and threatens the peace of the entire region and perhaps the world.

"We are there because the people of South Viet-Nam have as much right to remain non-Communist--if that is what they choose--as North Viet-Nam has to remain Communist.

"We are there because the Congress has pledged by solemn vote to take all necessary measures to prevent further aggression.

"No better words could describe our present course than those once spoken by the great Thomas Jefferson: 'It is the melancholy law of human societies to be compelled sometimes to choose a great evil in order to ward off a greater.'

"We have chosen to fight a limited war in Viet-Nam in an attempt to prevent a larger war--a war almost certain to follow, I believe, if the Communists succeed in overrunning and taking over South Viet-Nam by aggression and by force. I believe, and I am supported by some authority, that if they are not checked now the world can expect to pay a greater price to check them later."

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64. Secretary Rusk Interview on 'Today' Program, January 12, 1967, With Hugh Downs from New York and Joseph C. Harsch in Washington; Department of State Bulletin, January 30, 1967, p. 168.

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"AGGRESSION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

"Mr. Harsch: Thank you, Hugh. I'm glad I am here.

"Mr. Secretary, I'd like to start it out by going back to the news conference that Secretary-General U Thant of the United Nations did 2 days ago. In that there appeared to be considerable differences with American policy. For example, he said, 'I do not subscribe to the generally held view that if South Viet-Nam falls, then country X, then country Y, then country Z will follow. I do not agree with this so-called domino theory.' Is this a matter of difference with our policy?

"Secretary Rusk: Well, I myself have never subscribed to something called the domino theory, because that suggests that we're merely playing games with little wooden blocks with dots on them. Actually, the problem is the old problem of the phenomenon of aggression.

"Country X, if you like, is South Viet-Nam. North Viet-Nam is trying to seize South Viet-Nam by force.

"Country Y is, perhaps, Laos. We had an agreement on Laos in 1962 under which there would be no North Vietnamese forces in Laos. And Laos would not be used as a route of infiltration into South Viet-Nam. That has not been performed. And the government that we agreed on in Geneva in 1962 has not been permitted to exercise authority throughout Laos. And the International Control Commission has not been permitted to exercise its functions in the Communist-held areas of Laos. So, undoubtedly, there are appetites with respect to Laos.

"Country Z is, perhaps, already Thailand. The other side has announced that they are going after Thailand. There are subversive guerrilla elements in northeast Thailand trained outside. There's a Thai training camp now in North Viet-Nam preparing additional guerrillas to go into Thailand.

"So, there's no need for something called the domino theory.

"The theory is that proclaimed in Peking repeatedly, that the world revolution of communism must be advanced by militant means. Now, if they can be brought toward an attitude of peaceful coexistence, if the second generation in China can show some of the prudence that the second generation in the Soviet Union has shown, then, maybe, we can begin to build a durable peace there.

"Mr. Harsch: Mr. Secretary, the Secretary-General of the U.N. also in that same news conference said, 'I do not subscribe to the view that South Viet-Nam is strategically vital to Western interests and Western security.' What are our vital strategic interests in the area? Do you regard Viet-Nam as vital?

"Secretary Rusk: Well, there are important geographical features, natural resources, large numbers of people in Southeast Asia.

"I think the heart of the matter is, again, the phenomenon of aggression. And if the momentum of aggression should begin to roll in that part of the world, stimulated or supported or engaged in by those who are committed to the spread of the world revolution by violence, then that seems to put us back on the trail that led us into World War II.

"What is important is that all nations, large and small, have a chance to live unmolested by their neighbors, as provided in the United Nations Charter.

"Article 1 of the charter deals with acts of aggression, breaches of the peace, the necessity for peaceful settlement of disputes. Article 2 of the charter is about the self-determination of people. These are

very important lessons derived from the events which led us into World War II. We feel that we've got to hang on to those lessons, because if they lead us into world war III, there won't be much left from which we can draw lessons and start over again.

"THREAT TO DURABLE PEACE

"Mr. Harsch: Mr. Secretary, is it not the question so much of our vital interests, as of the threat to our vital interests?

"Now, you said yesterday that four Presidents have identified this area as being strategically important to us. At the time that process started--we're talking about President Truman now and then President Eisenhower's time--there certainly did seem to be a major threat to our interests in that area.

"What has happened to the nature of that threat? During the last year I had in mind the breach between Moscow and Peking. Is there not a diminution in the threat to our interests in that area because Moscow and Peking are no longer close together?

"Secretary Rusk: Well, Peking has the capability of maintaining a major threat there, depending upon both its policy and its action.

"You see, we have a very strong interest in the organization of peace in the Pacific, just as we have in the Atlantic. We have alliances with Korea and Japan and the Republic of China and the Philippines, Thailand, Australia, New Zealand. So, we are very much interested in the stability of the peace in the Pacific Ocean area and in East Asia.

"Now, if these aggressive pressures from Hanoi, with the support of Peking, should move into Southeast Asia, not only are hundreds of millions of people involved and vital resources involved, but the prospects for a durable peace dissolve.

"And so we have a tremendous interest in establishing in that area of the world, as we have done in the NATO area, the notion that the nations must be left alone and be allowed to live in peace, as the Charter of the United Nations provides."

* * *

65. Address by William P. Bundy, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, before the Commonwealth Club of California, at San Francisco, California, January 20, 1967; "East Asia Today," Department of State Bulletin, February 27, 1967, p. 323.

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"THE CONFIDENCE FACTOR

"Now, in this broad picture I have already referred to our stand in Viet-Nam as having made a major contribution to the confidence factor. I will not review here the current situation in Viet-Nam, because I think the interpretive reporting you get is on the whole good.

"I come back to the central point: that what we have done in Viet-Nam did have a major part in developing the confidence factor, the sense that progress is possible, the sense that security can be maintained in the nations of free Asia. To virtually all the non-Communist governments of the area--and they often say this as bluntly as President Marcos did in his opening address at the Manila Conference--that security requires a continued United States ability to act, not necessarily an American presence, although that, too, may be required in individual cases, but an ability to act for a long time. And that we must--and, I think, shall--provide, and we shall keep on in Viet-Nam, as the President has made completely clear. Without what we have done in Viet-Nam, without the regeneration of the spirit of cooperation among the Western nations, ourselves included, and the nations of Asia, I doubt very much if the favorable developments I have described could have taken place on anything like the scale that has in fact been happening. And I think that is the very strongly felt judgment of responsible people, in government and out, throughout East Asia.

"If that vast area with its talents and its capacity were to fall under domination by a hostile power or group of powers, or if it were to fall into chaos and instability, the result would be vast human misery and possibly a wider war. However, today, I think, more than at any time in the 15 years that I have personally been associated with the area, East Asia offers the hope of becoming a region of stable nations, developing in their own way, each according to its own strong national and cultural heritage. And that is our hope and our fundamental national interest, both in Asia and throughout the rest of the world."

66. Address by Secretary Rusk before a Joint Session of the Legislature of Texas at Austin, Texas, January 26, 1967; "Building a Durable Peace," Department of State Bulletin, p. 269.

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"Obviously, the first essential in building a durable peace is to eliminate aggression--by preventing it, if possible, and by repelling it when it occurs or is threatened....

"The United Nations has helped to make and keep peace in many situations. We continue to support it and to seek ways of strengthening it. But because it has been unable to function in some of the most dangerous situations, the main job of preventing and repelling aggression has been accomplished by the defensive alliances of the free world--defensive

alliances organized and conducted in complete harmony with the U.N. Charter, which expressly recognizes the right of individual and collective self-defense and also provides for regional organizations or agencies to maintain international peace and security.

"Under those alliances, the United States is specifically pledged to assist in the defense of more than 40 nations. Those commitments, and the power that lies behind them, are the backbone of world peace.

"....But the principal Communist states remain publicly committed to what they call 'wars of liberation'--the infiltration of arms and trained men. That is the type of aggression by which Communist North Viet-Nam set out to conquer South Viet-Nam. It is an aggression which has become less and less indirect since the closing months of 1964, when North Viet-Nam began to move an entire division of its regular army into South Viet-Nam.

"Four successive Presidents of the United States, after extended study in consultation with their chief advisers on defense and foreign policy, have concluded that the security of Southeast Asia, and of South Viet-Nam in particular, is very important to the security of the United States. Those who take a different view are at odds with the men who have borne the highest responsibility for the defense of the United States and the free world since the Second World War.

"U.S. COMMITMENTS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

"In accordance with our national interest in the security of South Viet-Nam, the Government of the United States made commitments, of which the most solemn was the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty. That treaty was approved by the United States Senate in 1955 with only one dissenting vote. It bound us to take action in the event of an armed attack on South Viet-Nam, among other nations. And Secretary of State Dulles told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that that commitment included the case of an attack by 'the regime of Ho Chi Minh in North Viet-Nam.'

"The United States cannot run away from its commitments. If either our adversaries or our friends should begin to doubt that the United States will honor its alliances, the result could be catastrophe.

"We are fighting in Viet-Nam because also we have not forgotten the lesson of the tragic 1930's, the lesson that was foremost in the minds of the authors of the U.N. Charter: the lesson that one aggression leads to another...."

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67. Secretary Rusk Interview, Videotaped in Washington on January 31, 1967 and Broadcast by the British Independent Television Network on February 1, 1967; "Secretary Rusk Discusses Viet-Nam in Interview for British Television," Department of State Bulletin, February 20, 1967, p. 274.

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"PEKING AND SOUTHEAST ASIA

"Q. Mr. Rusk, could we look at the objects of this war? There appears to us in Britain to be a certain confusion in your war aims. Is this a war for the containment of China, or is it simply a war for the independence of South Viet-Nam? Could you tell us precisely what your war aims are?

"A. I don't know that there is a choice between those two objectives. My guess is that if the authorities in Peking were to throw their weight behind peace in Southeast Asia, there would be peace in Southeast Asia.

"But, nevertheless, the immediate events which brought our Armed Forces into South Viet-Nam were the movement of substantial numbers of North Vietnamese men in arms, including some now 20 regiments of their North Vietnamese regular army, into South Viet-Nam for the purpose of imposing a political settlement on the South by force. Now, this cuts right across our commitments under the SEATO Treaty. Under article IV of that treaty, each signatory determines what steps it will take to meet the common danger in the event of an aggression by means of armed attack; and it was specifically understood at the time that that would apply to an aggression by Ho Chi Minh, as well as to others.

"Now, the Chinese are not actively involved in this situation in South Viet-Nam. We do know that they are trying to stir up problems for the Thais in the northeast section of Thailand. China has publicly announced that Thailand is next on the list; but the key point is that if these countries would live at peace, we would be the first to give that our full support--leave these countries alone ourselves, get out of there."

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68. Sir Montague Burton Lecture by W. W. Rostow, The University of Leeds, Leeds, England, 23 February 1967, "The Great Transition: Tasks of the First and Second Postwar Generations"; White House Press Release, 23 February 1967.

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"The postwar Communist offensive had a certain shape and rhythm.

There was Stalin's thrust of 1946-51, in association with Mao, from 1949; Khrushchev's of 1958-62; finally, the offensive conducted over the past four years by Mao and those who accepted his activist doctrines and policies with respect to so-called 'wars of national liberation.'

* * *

"At one point after another this Chinese Communist offensive in the developing world fell apart, leaving the war in Viet Nam perhaps the last major stand of Mao's doctrine of guerrilla warfare.

"There is a certain historical legitimacy in this outcome.

"For the better part of a decade, an important aspect of the struggle within the Communist movement between the Soviet Union and Communist China had focused on the appropriate method for Communist parties to seize power. The Soviet Union had argued that the transit of frontiers with arms and men should be kept to a minimum and the effort to seize power should be primarily internal. They argued that it was the essence of 'wars of national liberation' to expand Communist power without causing major confrontation with the United States and other major powers. The Chinese Communists defended a higher risk policy; but they were militarily cautious themselves. Nevertheless, they urged others to accept the risks of confrontation with United States and Western strength against which the Soviet Union warned.

"Although Hanoi's effort to take over Laos and South Viet Nam proceeded from impulses which were substantially independent of Communist China, its technique constituted an important test of whether Mao's method would work even under the optimum circumstances provided by the history of the area. As General Giap has made clear, Hanoi is conscious of this link: 'South Viet Nam is the model of the national liberation movement in our time...if the special warfare that the United States imperialists are testing in South Viet Nam is overcome, this means that it can be defeated everywhere in the world.'"

* * *

"Similarly, a failure of the Vietnamese and their allies to see through the engagement to an honorable peace could destroy the emerging foundation for confidence and regional cooperation in Asia, with further adverse consequences on every continent."

* * *

"On the other hand, we are confident that what we are seeking to accomplish in Viet Nam is right and essential if we are to move successfully through the great transition.

"We are honoring a treaty which committed us to 'act to meet the common danger' in the face of 'aggression by means of armed attack' in the treaty area. And this commitment is also being honored by Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, and Thailand--as well as by the remarkable action of South Korea, which was not bound by treaty in this manner.

"We are also dealing with the gross and systematic violation of an agreement, signed in 1962, which committed all parties, including Hanoi, to withdraw their military forces from Laos; to refrain from reintroducing such forces; and to refrain from using the territory of Laos for interference in the internal affairs of other countries.

"We are also encouraged by the efforts of the people of South Viet Nam to make a transition to orderly constitutional government of the kind which the people of South Korea have accomplished with such notable success since 1961.

"And we are answering, as we have had to answer on other occasions, the question: Are the word and commitment of the United States reliable? For the United States cannot be faithful to its alliances in the Atlantic and unfaithful to its alliances in the Pacific."

* * *

"But in the perspective I have presented tonight, what is old-fashioned about Viet Nam is the effort by the leaders in Hanoi to make their lifelong dream of achieving control over Southeast Asia come to reality by the use of force.

"It is their concept of 'wars of national liberation' that is old-fashioned. It is being overtaken not merely by the resistance of the seven nations fighting there, but also by history and by increasingly pervasive attitudes of pragmatism and moderation.

"History, I deeply believe, will show in Southeast Asia, as it has displayed in many other parts of the world, that the international status quo cannot be altered by use of external force. That demonstration is costing the lives of many South Vietnamese, Americans, Koreans, Australians, and others who understand the danger to them of permitting a change in the territorial or political status quo by external violence -- who cherish the right of self-determination for themselves and for others.

"If the argument I have laid before you is correct -- and if we have the common will to hold together and get on with the job -- the struggle in Viet Nam might be the last great confrontation of the post-war era."

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69. Address by President Johnson before a Joint Session of the Tennessee State Legislature at Nashville, Tennessee on March 15, 1967; "The Defense of Viet-Nam: Key to the Future of Free Asia," Department of State Bulletin, April 3, 1967, p. 534.

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"As our commitment in Viet-Nam required more men and more equipment, some voices were raised in opposition. The administration was urged to disengage, to find an excuse to abandon the effort.

"These cries came despite growing evidence that the defense of Viet-Nam held the key to the political and economic future of free Asia. The stakes of the struggle grew correspondingly.

"It became clear that if we were prepared to stay the course in Viet-Nam, we could help to lay the cornerstone for a diverse and independent Asia, full of promise and resolute in the cause of peaceful economic development for her long-suffering peoples.

"But if we faltered, the forces of chaos would scent victory and decades of strife and aggression would stretch endlessly before us."

* * *

"The first answer is that Viet-Nam is aggression in a new guise, as far removed from trench warfare as the rifle from the longbow. This is a war of infiltration, of subversion, of ambush. Pitched battles are very rare, and even more rarely are they decisive."

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70. Address by William P. Bundy, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, before the National Executive Committee of the American Legion at Indianapolis, Indiana on May 3, 1967; "Seventeen Years in East Asia," Department of State Bulletin, May 22, 1967, p. 790.

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"This group hardly needs to be told why we are acting as we are in South Viet-Nam. We are acting to preserve South Viet-Nam's right to work out its own future without external interference, including its right to make a free choice on unification with the North. We are acting to fulfill a commitment that evolved through the actions of Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson and that was originally stated in the SEATO treaty, overwhelmingly ratified by the Senate in 1954. And we are acting to demonstrate to the world that the Communist technique of 'people's wars' or 'wars of national liberation'--in essence,

imported subversion, armed terror, guerrilla action, and ultimately conventional military action--can be defeated even in a situation where the Communist side had the greatest possible advantages through an unfortunate colonial heritage, political difficulty, and the inherent weaknesses to which so many of the new nations of the world are subject."

* * *

"Our policies have been guided essentially by two propositions rooted deeply in our own national interest:

"First, that the extension of hostile control over other nations or wide areas of Asia, specifically by Communist China, North Korea, and North Viet-Nam, would in a very short time create a situation that would menace all the countries of the area and present a direct and major threat to the most concrete national interests of this country.

"Second, and directly related to the first proposition, is the belief that an East Asian and Pacific region comprised of free and independent states working effectively for the welfare of their people is in the long run essential to preventing the extension of hostile power and also essential to the regional and world peace in which the United States as we know it can survive and prosper."

* * *

"But, of course, the situation in Viet-Nam in 1965 stood, alongside the trend in Indonesia, as the major dark spot in the area. And in early 1965 it became clear that unless the United States and other nations introduced major combat forces and took military action against the North, South Viet-Nam would be taken over by Communist force. If that had happened, there can be no doubt whatever that, by the sheer dynamics of aggression, Communist Chinese and North Vietnamese subversive efforts against the rest of Southeast Asia would have been increased and encouraged, and the will and capacity of the remaining nations of Southeast Asia to resist these pressures would have been drastically and probably fatally reduced.

"So our actions in Viet-Nam were not only important in themselves or in fulfillment of our commitment but were vital in the wider context of the fate of the free nations of Asia. The leaders of free Asia are fully aware of the relationship between our stand in Viet-Nam and the continued independence of their nations. The Prime Minister of Malaysia has emphasized that if South Viet-Nam were to fall before the Communists, his nation could not survive. The Prime Minister of Singapore has stated that our presence in Viet-Nam has bought time for the rest of the area. The Japanese Government has made known its conviction that we are contributing to the security of the area.

"Korea, New Zealand, the Philippines, Australia, and Thailand have

shown their convictions by sending military units to assist the South Vietnamese. Their efforts, joined with ours and with the South Vietnamese, have ended the threat of a Communist military takeover."

* * *

"In the broad picture what is the role of Viet-Nam? Behind the great and emerging changes I have sketched lies an atmosphere of growing confidence, a sensing by the peoples of free Asia that progress is possible and that security can be maintained. Our action in Viet-Nam has been vital in helping to bring about that confidence. For, as virtually all non-Communist governments in the area realize, their security requires a continuing United States ability to act, not necessarily an American presence, although that, too, may be required in individual cases, but an ability to act for a long time. And that we must--and, I think, shall--provide.

"That increasing confidence also depends deeply on the belief that essential economic assistance will continue to be provided. Without what we have done in Viet-Nam and the assistance we have provided throughout the region, I doubt very much if a considerable number of the favorable developments I have spoken of would have occurred, and certainly they would not have come so rapidly. I think that responsible people in East Asia would agree strongly with this judgment.

"I cannot too strongly stress this 'confidence factor.' It is an intangible, the significance of which is difficult to perceive unless one has visited the countries of Asia recently or, better still, periodically over an interval.

"Today, the increase in confidence among the non-Communist nations of Asia is palpable. Communist Chinese past failures and present difficulties play a part, but our own role in Viet-Nam is a major element even as the war goes on."

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71. Secretary Rusk Interview by Paul Niven, Televised from the Department of State to 75 Affiliated Stations of National Educational Television on May 5, 1967; "A Conversation with Dean Rusk," Department of State Bulletin, May 22, 1967, p. 774.

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"Secretary Rusk: ....They have no business being there. They have no right to try to seize South Viet-Nam by force. We are entitled under the SEATO treaty as well as under the individual and collective security-self-defense arrangements of the U.N. Charter, to come to the assistance of South Viet-Nam upon their request when they are subjected to this kind of aggression."

* * *

"In Southeast Asia we have treaty commitments that obligate us to take action to meet the common danger if there is an aggression by means of armed attack. That aggression is under way.

"If these questions can be decided by people in free elections, perhaps we could all relax. I don't know anyone who through free elections, any great nation--we have a particular State in India--that brought Communists to power with free elections. They are not monolithic--they are not monolithic.

"But all branches of the Communist Party that I know of are committed to what they call the world revolution. And their picture of that world revolution is quite contrary to the kind of world organization sketched out in the Charter of the United Nations.

"Now, they have important differences among themselves about how you best get on with that world revolution. And there is a contest within the Communist world between those who think that peaceful coexistence and peaceful competition is the better way to do it and the militants, primarily in Peking, who believe that you back this world revolution by force.

"But I think the Communist commitment to world revolution is pretty general throughout the Communist movement.

"Now, if they want to compete peacefully, all right, let's do that. But when they start moving by force to impose this upon other people by force, then you have a very serious question about where it leads and how you organize a world peace on that basis."

* * *

"Mr. Niven: But some of our former diplomats and some of the critics are forever contending that the Viet-Nam war places strings upon our alliances, it complicates and exacerbates other problems.

"Secretary Rusk: I think that is nonsense--because if you want to put some strain on our other alliances, just let it become apparent that our commitment under an alliance is not worth very much. Then you will see some strain on our alliances.

"Mr. Niven: You are suggesting if we don't uphold this commitment other people will lose faith in our commitments all over the world.

"Secretary Rusk: And more importantly, our adversaries or prospective adversaries may make some gross miscalculations about what we would do with respect to those commitments."

* * *

"Secretary Rusk:

* * *

"But I think that the end of the aggression in Viet-Nam would put us a very long step forward toward this organization of a durable peace. I think there is a general recognition in the world that a nuclear exchange does not make sense, that sending massed divisions across national frontiers is pretty reckless today. If we get this problem of these 'wars of national liberation' under reasonable control, then maybe we can look forward to a period of relative peace, although there will continue to be quarrels and neighborhood disputes and plenty of business for the Security Council of the United Nations."

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72. Address by Secretary Rusk before the National Conference of the U.S. Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service at Washington, D.C., May 18, 1967; "Our Foreign Policy Commitments To Assure a Peaceful Future," Department of State Bulletin, June 12, 1967, p. 874.

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"Secondly, I hear it said that Viet-Nam is just a civil war, therefore we should forget about it, that it is only a family affair among Vietnamese. Well, it's quite true that among the Viet Cong and the National Liberation Front there is a large component of authentic Southerners who are in rebellion against the several authorities who have been organized in Saigon.

"But those are not the people who explain the presence of American combat forces in South Viet-Nam. Because beginning in 1960 the authorities in the North activated the Communist cadres which had been left behind at the time of the division of the country. Then from 1960 onward they sent in substantial numbers of Southerners who had gone North, were trained in the North, and were sent back as cadres and armed elements to join in seizing the country. And by 1964 they had run out of authentic Southerners and were sending Northerners in increasing numbers, and late that year they began to send regular units of the North Vietnamese Regular Army. Today there are more than 20 regiments of the North Vietnamese Regular Forces in South Viet-Nam and substantial forces in and just north of the demilitarized zone in direct contact with our Marines.

"It was what the North is doing to the South that caused us to send combat forces there, because we felt we had an obligation to do so under the SEATO treaty, a treaty which calls upon us to take steps to meet the common danger. And if the North would decide to hold its hand and not persist in its effort to seize South Viet-Nam by force, this situation could be resolved peacefully, literally in a matter of hours."

* * *

"The commitment of the United States to its 40 or more allies is a very important element in the building of a durable peace. And if those who would be our adversaries should ever suppose that our commitments are not worth anything, then we shall see dangers we have not yet dreamed of."

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73. Address by William P. Bundy, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, before the 20th Annual Congress of the National Student Association at College Park, Maryland, August 15, 1967; "The Path to Viet-Nam: A Lesson in Involvement," Department of State Publication 8295, East Asian and Pacific Series 166, September 1967.

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"The fifth set of American decisions came in this setting and indeed overlapped the period of the Geneva Conference. The first aspect of these decisions was our leading role in the formation of the SEATO treaty, signed at Manila in September of 1954 and ratified by our Senate in February 1955 by a vote of 82 to 1. In the SEATO treaty South Viet-Nam and its territory were specifically included as a 'protocol state'; and the signatories specifically accepted the obligation, if asked by the Government of South Viet-Nam, to take action in response to armed attack against South Viet-Nam and to consult on appropriate measures if South Viet-Nam were subjected to subversive actions. The Geneva accords had, of course, already expressly forbidden aggressive acts from either half of Viet-Nam against the other half, but there had been no obligation for action by the Geneva participating nations. SEATO created a new and serious obligation extending to South Viet-Nam and aimed more widely at the security of the Southeast Asian signatories and the successor states of Indochina.

"The second aspect of our decisions at this period was an evolving one. In late 1954 President Eisenhower committed us to furnish economic support for the new regime, in which Diem was already showing himself tougher and more able than anyone had supposed possible. And in early 1955, without any formal statement, we began to take over the job of military assistance to South Viet-Nam, acting within the numerical and equipment limitations stated in the Geneva accords for foreign military aid.

"In short, in the 1954-55 period we moved into a major supporting role and undertook a major treaty commitment involving South Viet-Nam.

"These decisions, I repeat, are not mine to defend. In the mood of the period, still deeply affected by a not unjustified view of monolithic communism, they were accepted with very wide support in the United States, as the vote and the debate in the Senate abundantly proved. And the

Senate documents prove conclusively that there was full understanding of the grave implications of the SEATO obligations, particularly as they related to aggression by means of armed attack.

"The important point about these decisions--and a point fervently debated within the administration at the time, according to many participants--is that they reflected a policy not merely toward Viet-Nam but toward the whole of Southeast Asia. In essence, the underlying basic issue was felt, and I think rightly, to be whether the United States should involve itself much more directly in the security of Southeast Asia and the preservation of the largely new nations that had come into being there since World War II.

"There could not be the kind of clear-cut policy for Southeast Asia that had by then evolved in Northeast Asia, where we had entered into mutual security treaties individually with Japan, Korea, and the Republic of China. Some of the Southeast Asian countries wished no association with an outside power; others--Malaya, Singapore, and the northern areas of Borneo, which were not then independent--continued to rely on the British and the Commonwealth. So the directly affected area in which policy could operate comprised only Thailand, the Philippines, and the non-Communist successor states of Indochina--South Viet-Nam, Laos, and Cambodia.

"Yet it was felt at the time that unless the United States participated in a major way in preserving the independence and security of these nations, they would be subject to progressive pressures by the parallel efforts of North Viet-Nam and Communist China.

"The judgment that this threat of aggression was real and valid was the first basis of the policy adopted. Two other judgments that lay behind the policy were:

"(a) That a successful takeover by North Viet-Nam or Communist China of any of the directly affected nations would not only be serious in itself but would drastically weaken and in a short time destroy the capacity of the other nations of Southeast Asia, whatever their international postures, to maintain their own independence.

"(b) That while we ourselves had no wish for a special position in Southeast Asia, the transfer of the area, or large parts of it, to Communist control achieved by subversion and aggression would mean a major addition to the power status of hostile and aggressive Communist Chinese and North Vietnamese regimes. It was believed that such a situation would not only doom the peoples of the area to conditions of domination and virtual servitude over an indefinite period but would create the very kind of aggressive domination of much of Asia that we had already fought the militarist leaders of Japan to prevent. It was widely and deeply believed that such a situation was profoundly contrary to our national interests.

"But there was still a third supporting judgment that, like the others, ran through the calculations of the period. This was that the largely new nations of Southeast Asia were in fact valid national entities and that while their progress might be halting and imperfect both politically and economically, this progress was worth backing. To put it another way, there was a constructive vision of the kind of Southeast Asia that could evolve and a sense that this constructive purpose was worth pursuing as a matter of our own ideals, as a matter of our national interest, and as a realistic hope of the possibilities of progress if external aggression and subversion could be held at bay.

"These I believe to have been the bedrock reasons for the position we took in Viet-Nam and Southeast Asia at this time. They were overlaid by what may appear to have been emotional factors in our attitude toward communism in China and Asia. But the degree of support that this major policy undertaking received at the time went far beyond those who held these emotions. And this is why I for one believe that the bedrock reasons I have given were the true and decisive ones."

* * *

"....Despite all that romantics like [Jean] Lacouture may say, what happened was that Hanoi moved in, from at least 1959 onward (Bernard Fall would say from 1957), and provided a cutting edge of direction, trained men from the North, and supplies that transformed internal discontent into a massive subversive effort guided and supported from the outside in crucial ways."

* * *

"....But those who believe that serious mistakes were made, or even that the basic policy was wrong, cannot escape the fact that by 1961 we were, as a practical matter, deeply engaged in Southeast Asia and specifically in the preservation of the independence of South Viet-Nam.

"President Kennedy came to office with a subversive effort against South Viet-Nam well underway and with the situation in Laos deteriorating rapidly. And for a time the decisions on Laos overshadowed Viet-Nam, although of course the two were always intimately related.

"In Laos, President Kennedy in the spring of 1961 rejected the idea of strong military action in favor of seeking a settlement that would install a neutralist government under Souvanna Phouma, a solution uniquely appropriate to Laos. Under Governor [W. Averell] Harriman's astute handling, the negotiations finally led to the Geneva accords of 1962 for Laos; and the process--a point not adequately noticed--led the United States to a much more explicit and affirmative endorsement of the Geneva accords of 1954, a position we have since consistently maintained as the best basis for peace in Viet-Nam.

"In Viet-Nam, the situation at first appeared less critical, and the initial actions of the Kennedy administration were confined to an increase in our military aid and a small increase of a few hundred men in our military training personnel, a breach--it may be argued--to this extent of the limits of the Geneva accords but fully justified in response to the scale of North Vietnamese violation of the basic non-interference provisions.

"Although the details somewhat obscured the broad pattern, I think any fair historian of the future must conclude that as early as the spring of 1961 President Kennedy had in effect taken a seventh United States policy decision: that we would continue to be deeply engaged in Southeast Asia, in South Viet-Nam and under new ground rules, in Laos as well."

* * *

"No, neither President Kennedy nor any senior policymaker, then or later, believed the Soviet Union was still united with Communist China and North Viet-Nam in a single sweeping Communist threat to the world. But President Kennedy did believe two other things that had, and still have, a vital bearing on our policy.

"First, he believed that a weakening in our basic resolve to help in Southeast Asia would tend to encourage separate Soviet pressures in other areas.

"James Reston has stated, on the basis of contemporary conversations with the President, that this concern specifically related to Khrushchev's aggressive designs on Berlin, which were pushed hard all through 1961 and not laid to rest till after the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. At any rate, President Kennedy clearly did believe that failure to keep the high degree of commitment we had in Viet-Nam and Southeast Asia had a bearing on the validity of our commitments elsewhere. As Theodore Sorensen has summarized it...: '...this nation's commitment (in South Viet-Nam) in January, 1961...was not one that President Kennedy felt he could abandon without undesirable consequences throughout Asia and the world.'

"Secondly, President Kennedy believed that the Communist Chinese were a major threat to dominate Southeast Asia and specifically that a United States 'withdrawal in the case of Viet-Nam and in the case of Thailand might mean a collapse in the entire area.' Indeed, President Kennedy in one statement expressly supported the 'domino theory.'

"My own view, based on participation and subsequent discussion with others, is that the underlying view of the relation between Viet-Nam and the threat to Southeast Asia was clear and strongly believed throughout the top levels of the Kennedy administration. We knew, as we have always known, that the action against South Viet-Nam reflected deeply held ambitions by Hanoi to unify Viet-Nam under Communist control and that

Hanoi needed and wanted only Chinese aid to this end and wished to be its own master. And we knew, as again we always have, that North Viet-Nam would resist any Communist Chinese trespassing on areas it controlled. But these two propositions were not then, as they are not now, inconsistent with the belief that the aggressive ambitions of Communist China and North Viet-Nam--largely North Vietnamese in old Indochina, overlapping in Thailand, Chinese in the rest of Southeast Asia--would surely feed on each other. In the eyes of the rest of Southeast Asia, certainly, they were part of a common and parallel threat.

"So, in effect, the policy of 1954-61 was reaffirmed in the early months of 1961 by the Kennedy administration. Let me say right here I do not mean to make this a personal analysis of President Kennedy nor to imply any view whatever as to what he might or might not have done had he lived beyond November of 1963. But some untrue things have been said about the 1961 period, and I believe the record totally supports the account of policy, and the reasons for it, that I have given.

"STEMMING THE NORTH VIETNAMESE THREAT

"We then come to the eighth period of decision--the fall of 1961. By then, the 'guerrilla aggression' (Hilsman's phrase) had assumed truly serious proportions, and morale in South Viet-Nam had been shaken. It seemed highly doubtful that without major additional United States actions the North Vietnamese threat could be stemmed.

"President Kennedy took the decision to raise the ante, through a system of advisers, pilots, and supporting military personnel that rose gradually to the level of 25,000 in the next 3 years.

"I do not think it is appropriate for me to go into the detail of the discussions that accompanied this decision. Fairly full, but still incomplete, accounts have been given in various of the books on the period. What can be seen, without going into such detail, is that the course of action that was chosen considered and rejected, at least for the time being, the direct introduction of ground combat troops or the bombing of North Viet-Nam, although there was no doubt even then--as Hilsman again makes clear--that the bombing of North Viet-Nam could have been sustained under any reasonable legal view in the face of what North Viet-Nam was doing. Rather, the course of action which was adopted rightly stressed that the South Vietnamese role must remain crucial and primary.

"In effect, it was decided that the United States would take those additional actions that appeared clearly required to meet the situation, not knowing for sure whether these actions would in fact prove to be adequate, trying--despite the obvious and always recognized effect of momentum and inertia--not to cross the bridge of still further action, and hoping strongly that what was being undertaken would prove sufficient.

"POLITICAL CHANGE IN SOUTH VIET-NAM

"This was the policy followed from early 1962 right up to February of 1965. Within this period, however, political deterioration in South Viet-Nam compelled, in the fall of 1963, decisions that I think must be counted as the ninth critical point of United States policymaking. It was decided at that time that while the United States would do everything necessary to support the war, it would no longer adhere to its posture of all-out support of the Diem regime unless that regime made sweeping changes in its method of operation. The record of this period has been described by Robert Shaplen and now by Hilsman. Undoubtedly, our new posture contributed to the overthrow of Diem in November 1963."

* * *

"In early 1964 President Johnson expressly reaffirmed all the essential elements of the Kennedy administration policies publicly through every action and through firm internal directives. It is simply not true to say that there was any change in policy in this period toward greater military emphasis, much less major new military actions. Further actions were not excluded--as they had not been in 1954 or 1961--but President Johnson's firm object right up to February 1965 was to make the policy adopted in late 1961 work if it could possibly be done, including the fullest possible emphasis on pacification and the whole political and civilian aspect.

"The summer of 1964 did bring a new phase, though not a change in policy. The situation was continuing to decline, and North Viet-Nam may have been emboldened by the trend. Certainly, infiltration was rising steadily and, as we now know more clearly, began to include substantial numbers of native North Vietnamese. But, more dramatically, American naval ships on patrol in the Gulf of Tonkin were attacked, and there were two responding United States attacks on North Vietnamese naval bases.

"This led President Johnson to seek, and the Congress to approve overwhelmingly on August 7, 1964, a resolution--drafted in collaboration with congressional leaders--that not only approved such retaliatory attacks but added that:

'The United States regards as vital to its national interest and to world peace the maintenance of international peace and security in southeast Asia. Consonant with the Constitution of the United States and the Charter of the United Nations and in accordance with its obligations under the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, the United States is, therefore, prepared, as the President determines, to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom.'"

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"From late November onward, these choices were intensively examined, even as the military threat grew, the political confusion in Saigon deepened, and all the indicators recorded increasingly shaky morale and confidence not only in South Viet-Nam but throughout the deeply concerned countries of Southeast Asia. By late January, it was the clear judgment of all those concerned with policy and familiar with the situation that the first choice was rapidly becoming no choice at all--and not, to use the phrase of one commentator, a 'constructive alternative.' To 'muddle through' (that commentator's phrase) was almost certainly to muddle out and to accept that South Viet-Nam would be turned over the Communist control achieved through externally backed subversion and aggression.

"This was a straight practical judgment. It ran against the grain of every desire of the President and his advisers. But I myself am sure it was right judgment--accepted at the time by most sophisticated observers and, in the light of reflective examination, now accepted, I believe, by virtually everyone who knows the situation at all at first hand.

"There were, in short, only two choices: to move toward withdrawal or to do a lot more, both for its military impact and, at the outset, to prevent a collapse of South Vietnamese morale and will to continue.

"And as the deliberations continued within the administration, the matter was brought to a head by a series of sharp attacks on American installations in particular. These attacks were serious in themselves, but above all, they confirmed the overall analysis that North Viet-Nam was supremely confident and was moving for the kill. And as they thus moved, it seemed clear that they would in fact succeed and perhaps in a matter of months.

"Let me pause here to clear up another current historical inaccuracy. The basis for the successive decisions--in February to start bombing; in March to introduce small numbers of combat forces; and in July to move to major United States combat forces--was as I have stated it. It depended on an overall view of the situation and on an overall view that what had been going on for years was for all practical purposes aggression--and indeed this term dates from late 1961 or early 1962 in the statements of senior administration spokesmen."

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"But this historical point is less important than the fundamental elements of the situation as it stood at the time. On the one hand, all of what I have earlier described as the bedrock elements still remained: a strong Chinese Communist and North Vietnamese threat to Southeast Asia, a crucial link between the defense of South Viet-Nam and the realization of that threat, and the validity of non-Communist nationalism, whatever its imperfections, in South Viet-Nam and in the other nations of Southeast Asia.

"Moreover, the wider implications for our commitments elsewhere appeared no less valid than they had ever been. Viet-Nam still constituted a major, perhaps even a decisive, test case of whether the Communist strategy of 'wars of national liberation' or 'people's wars' could be met and countered even in the extraordinarily difficult circumstances of South Viet-Nam. Then as now, it has been, I think, rightly judged that a success for Hanoi in South Viet-Nam could only encourage the use of this technique by Hanoi, and over time by the Communist Chinese, and might well have the effect of drawing the Soviets into competition with Peking and Hanoi and away from the otherwise promising trends that have developed in Soviet policy in the past 10 years.

"Finally, it was judged from the outset that stronger action by us in Viet-Nam would not operate to bring the Soviet Union and Communist China closer together and that the possibility of major Chinese Communist intervention could be kept to a minimum so long as we made it clear at all times, both by word and deed, that our objective was confined solely to freeing South Viet-Nam from external interference and that we did not threaten Communist China but rather looked to the ultimate hope of what the Manila Declaration, of last fall, called 'reconciliation and peace throughout Asia.'"

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"INDEPENDENCE OF SOUTHEAST ASIA

"Other factors enter in, as I have tried to summarize, and despite their variations from time to time remain of major general importance. But it is primarily from the standpoint of Southeast Asia that I would like to close my remarks today. How do the bets I have described look today?

"Southeast Asia surely matters more than ever. A region which may have held as few as 30 million inhabitants in 1800--and which is carried under the heading of 'peripheral areas' in some textbooks on East Asia--now holds more than 250 million people, more than Latin America and almost as much as the population of Western Europe. The resources of this area are large, and its people, while not yet capable of the kind of dramatic progress we have seen in the northern parts of Asia, have great talent, intelligence, and industry. Its geographical location, while it should not be in the path of great-power collisions, is crucial for trade routes and in other respects.

"From the standpoint of our own security and the kind of world in which we wish to live, I believe we must continue to be deeply concerned to do what we can to keep Southeast Asia from falling under external domination and aggression that would contribute to such domination....

"The second part of our bet is that the independence of South Viet-Nam critically affects Southeast Asia. South Viet-Nam and its 15 million

people are important in themselves, but they assume an additional importance if the judgment is accepted that a success for aggression there would drastically weaken the situation in Southeast Asia and indeed beyond. That judgment cannot be defended solely by reference to the dynamics of major aggressive powers and their prospective victims in the past. I myself believe that those parallels have validity, but the question is always what Justice Holmes called 'concrete cases.' In this concrete case I think the underlying judgment has been valid and remains valid today.

"None of us can say categorically that the Communist Chinese would in due course move--if opportunity offered--to dominate wide areas of Southeast Asia through pressure and subversion. But that is what the Chinese and their maps say, and their Communist doctrine appears to add vital additional emphasis. It is what they are doing in Thailand today and, through local Communist allies, in Burma, Cambodia, Malaysia, and Singapore. And it is what they would like to do in Indonesia again."

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74. Remarks by President Johnson to the National Legislative Conference at San Antonio, Texas on September 29, 1967; "Answering Aggression In Viet-Nam," Department of State Publication 8305, East Asian and Pacific Series 167, Released October 1967.

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"Viet-Nam is also the scene of a powerful aggression that is spurred by an appetite for conquest.

"It is the arena where Communist expansionism is most aggressively at work in the world today--where it is crossing international frontiers in violation of international agreements; where it is killing and kidnaping; where it is ruthlessly attempting to bend free people to its will.

"Into this mixture of subversion and war, of terror and hope, America has entered--with its material power and with its moral commitment.

"Why?

"Why should three Presidents and the elected representatives of our people have chosen to defend this Asian nation more than 10,000 miles from American shores?

"We cherish freedom--yes. We cherish self-determination for all people--yes. We abhor the political murder of any state by another and the bodily murder of any people by gangsters of whatever ideology. And for 27 years--since the days of lend-lease--we have sought to strengthen free people against domination by aggressive foreign powers.

"But the key to all we have done is really our own security. At times of crisis, before asking Americans to fight and die to resist aggression in a foreign land, every American President has finally had to answer this question:

"Is the aggression a threat not only to the immediate victim but to the United States of America and to the peace and security of the entire world of which we in America are a very vital part?

"That is the question which Dwight Eisenhower and John Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson had to answer in facing the issue in Viet-Nam.

"That is the question that the Senate of the United States answered by a vote of 82 to 1 when it ratified and approved the SEATO treaty in 1955, and to which the members of the United States Congress responded in a resolution that it passed in 1964 by a vote of 504 to 2:

'...the United States is, therefore, prepared, as the President determines, to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom.'

"Those who tell us now that we should abandon our commitment, that securing South Viet-Nam from armed domination is not worth the price we are paying, must also answer this question. And the test they must meet is this: What would be the consequence of letting armed aggression against South Viet-Nam succeed? What would follow in the time ahead? What kind of world are they prepared to live in 5 months or 5 years from tonight?

"THREAT TO SOUTHEAST ASIA

"For those who have borne the responsibility for decision during these past 10 years, the stakes to us have seemed clear--and have seemed high.

"President Dwight Eisenhower said in 1959:

'Strategically South Viet-Nam's capture by the Communists would bring their power several hundred miles into a hitherto free region. The remaining countries in Southeast Asia would be menaced by a great flanking movement. The freedom of 12 million people would be lost immediately and that of 150 million in adjacent lands would be seriously endangered. The loss of South Viet-Nam would set in motion a crumbling process that could, as it progressed, have grave consequences for us and for freedom.'

"And President John F. Kennedy said in 1962:

'...withdrawal in the case of Viet-Nam and in the case of Thailand might mean a collapse of the entire area.'

"A year later, he reaffirmed that:

'We are not going to withdraw from that effort. In my opinion, for us to withdraw from that effort would mean a collapse not only of South Viet-Nam, but Southeast Asia. So we are going to stay there.'

"This is not simply an American viewpoint, I would have you legislative leaders know. I am going to call the roll now of those who live in that part of the world--in the great arc of Asian and Pacific nations--and who bear the responsibility for leading their people and the responsibility for the fate of their people.

"The President of the Philippines had this to say:

'Viet-Nam is the focus of attention now....It may happen to Thailand or the Philippines, or anywhere, wherever there is misery, disease, ignorance....For you to renounce your position of leadership in Asia is to allow the Red Chinese to gobble up all of Asia.'

"The Foreign Minister of Thailand said:

'/The American/ decision will go down in history as the move that prevented the world from having to face another major conflagration.'

"The Prime Minister of Australia said:

'We are there because while Communist aggression persists the whole of Southeast Asia is threatened.'

"President Park of Korea said:

'For the first time in our history, we decided to dispatch our combat troops overseas...because in our belief any aggression against the Republic of Viet-Nam represented a direct and grave menace against the security and peace of free Asia, and therefore directly jeopardized the very security and freedom of our own people.'

"The Prime Minister of Malaysia warned his people that if the United States pulled out of South Viet-Nam, it would go to the Communists, and after that, it would only be a matter of time until they moved against neighboring states.

"The Prime Minister of New Zealand said:

'We can thank God that America at least regards aggression in Asia with the same concern as it regards aggression in Europe--and is prepared to back up its concern with action.'

"The Prime Minister of Singapore said:

'I feel the fate of Asia--South and Southeast Asia--will be decided in the next few years by what happens out in Viet-Nam.'

"I cannot tell you tonight as your President--with certainty--that a Communist conquest of South Viet-Nam would be followed by a Communist conquest of Southeast Asia. But I do know there are North Vietnamese troops in Laos. I do know that there are North Vietnamese-trained guerrillas tonight in northeast Thailand. I do know that there are Communist-supported guerrilla forces operating in Burma. And a Communist coup was barely averted in Indonesia, the fifth largest nation in the world.

"So your American President cannot tell you--with certainty--that a Southeast Asia dominated by Communist power would bring a third world war much closer to terrible reality. One could hope that this would not be so.

"But all that we have learned in this tragic century strongly suggests to me that it would be so. As President of the United States, I am not prepared to gamble on the chance that it is not so. I am not prepared to risk the security--indeed, the survival--of this American Nation on mere hope and wishful thinking. I am convinced that by seeing this struggle through now we are greatly reducing the chances of a much larger war--perhaps a nuclear war. I would rather stand in Viet-Nam in our time, and by meeting this danger now and facing up to it, thereby reduce the danger for our children and for our grandchildren."

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75. Secretary Rusk's News Conference of October 12, 1967; Department of State Press Release No. 227, October 12, 1967.

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"Our commitment is clear and our national interest is real. The SEATO Treaty, approved with only one dissenting vote by our Senate, declares that 'Each party recognizes that aggression by means of armed attack in the treaty area...would endanger its own peace and safety, and agrees that it will in that event act to meet the common danger....' The Treaty says 'each party' will act. The fidelity of the United States is not subject to the veto of some other signatory -- and five signatories have engaged their forces alongside Korean and South Vietnamese troops. Indeed, the proportion of non-U.S. forces in South Viet-Nam is greater than non-U.S. forces in Korea.

"In August 1964 the Congress by joint resolution declared, with only two dissenting votes, that 'The United States regards as vital to its national interest and to world peace the maintenance of international

peace and security in Southeast Asia.' This was not a new idea in 1964. It was the basis for the SEATO Treaty a decade earlier. It is no less valid in 1967. Our several alliances in the Pacific reflect our profound interest in peace in the Pacific, and in Asia where two-thirds of the world's people live, no less vital to us as a nation than is peace in our own hemisphere or in the NATO area.

"I have heard the word 'credibility' injected into our domestic debate. Let me say, as solemnly as I can, that those who would place in question the credibility of the pledged word of the United States under our mutual security treaties would subject this nation to mortal danger. If any who would be our adversary should suppose that our treaties are a bluff, or will be abandoned if the going gets tough, the result could be catastrophe for all mankind."

* * *

"....I have never subscribed to the domino theory; it's much too esoteric. There are North Vietnamese regiments today fighting in South Viet-Nam. There are North Vietnamese armed forces in Laos being opposed by Laotian forces. There are North Vietnamese-trained guerrillas operating in Northeast Thailand. There are Communist dissident elements in Burma who are being aided, encouraged, and helped from outside Burma across the Chinese frontier.

"There was a major Communist effort in 1965 to pull off a coup d'etat against Indonesia. You don't need the domino theory. Look at their proclaimed doctrine and look at what they're doing about it."

* * *

"Q. Mr. Secretary, one of the questions -- basic questions -- that seems to be emerging in this Senate debate is whether our national security is really at stake in Viet-Nam, and whether Viet-Nam represents an integral part of our defense perimeter in the Pacific.

"Your earlier statement indicates that you think our security is at stake in Viet-Nam. I think it would help in this debate if you would perhaps elaborate and explain why you think our security is at stake in Viet-Nam.

"A. Within the next decade or two, there will be a billion Chinese on the Mainland, armed with nuclear weapons, with no certainty about what their attitude toward the rest of Asia will be.

"Now the free nations of Asia will make up at least a billion people. They don't want China to overrun them on the basis of a doctrine of the world revolution. The militancy of China has isolated China, even within the Communist World, but they have not drawn back from it. They have

reaffirmed it, as recently as their reception of their great and good friend, Albania, two days ago.

"Now we believe that the free nations of Asia must brace themselves, get themselves set; with secure, progressive, stable institutions of their own, with co-operation among the free nations of Asia -- stretching from Korea and Japan right around to the subcontinent -- if there is to be peace in Asia over the next 10 or 20 years. We would hope that in China there would emerge a generation of leadership that would think seriously about what is called 'peaceful co-existence,' that would recognize the pragmatic necessity for human beings to live together in peace, rather than on a basis of continuing warfare.

"Now from a strategic point of view, it is not very attractive to think of the world cut in two by Asian Communism, reaching out through Southeast Asia and Indonesia, which we know has been their objective; and that these hundreds of millions of people in the free nations of Asia should be under the deadly and constant pressure of the authorities in Peking, so that their future is circumscribed by fear.

"Now these are vitally important matters to us, who are both a Pacific and an Atlantic power. After all, World War II hit us from the Pacific, and Asia is where two-thirds of the world's people live. So we have a tremendous stake in the ability of the Free Nations of Asia to live in peace; and to turn the interests of people in Mainland China to the pragmatic requirements of their own people, and away from a doctrinaire and ideological adventurism abroad.

"Q. Could I ask just one follow-up question on that, sir:

"Do you think you can fulfill this very large commitment of containment and still meet the commitment of the Manila Conference -- to withdraw within six months after a peace agreement has been reached?

"A. Oh, yes, I think so.

"That does not mean that we ourselves have nominated ourselves to be the policemen for all of Asia. We have, for good reasons, formed alliances with Korea and Japan, the Philippines, the Republic of China, Thailand, Australia, and New Zealand; and South Viet-Nam is covered by the Southeast Asia Treaty.

"That doesn't mean that we are the general policemen. Today, the Laotian forces are carrying the burden in Laos on the ground. The Thais are carrying the burden in Thailand; the Burmese are carrying the burden in Burma; the Indians are carrying the burden upon their northeastern frontier -- the Sikkim border -- and whatever other threat there might be in that direction.

"But we have our part; we have accepted a share, and we have accepted that share as a part of the vital national interest of the United States."

"Q. Mr. Secretary, would you describe the net objective here then as the containment of Chinese Communist militancy?

"A. No. The central objective is an organized and reliable peace.

"Now if China pushes out against those with whom we have alliances, then we have a problem, but so does China. If China pushes out against the Soviet Union, both China and the Soviet Union have a problem.

"We are not picking out ourselves -- we are not picking out Peking as some sort of special enemy. Peking has nominated itself by proclaiming a militant doctrine of the world revolution, and doing something about it. This is not a theoretical debate; they are doing something about it.

"Now we can live at peace -- we have not had a war with the Soviet Union, in 50 years of co-existence, since their revolution. We are not ourselves embarked upon an ideological campaign to destroy anybody who calls themselves Communist...."

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76. Interview with Secretary Rusk, Videotaped at USIA Studios in Washington, D.C. on October 16, 1967 and Later Broadcast Abroad; "Secretary Rusk Discusses Viet-Nam in Interview for Foreign Television," Department of State Bulletin, November 6, 1967, p. 595.

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"Secretary Rusk:

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"But in my press conference I pointed the finger at what I called Asian communism because the doctrine of communism as announced and declared in Peking has a special quality of militancy, a militancy which has largely isolated Peking within the Communist world, quite apart from the problem it has created with many other countries....

"Mr. Barnett: Mr. Secretary, since your last press conference, some of your critics have accused you of using the threat of 'yellow peril' to justify the allied forces' presence in South Viet-Nam. And, related to that also is the fact that many people have seen what they consider a shade different emphasis in your approach to this, that at one time American forces were there to justify the self-determination of South Viet-Nam, and now you're talking more in terms of giving strength to the non-Communist nations in Asia as a defense against Peking. Could you clarify this?

"Secretary Rusk: Yes. In the first place, I put out a statement [on October 16] in which I rejected categorically any effort to put into

my mouth the concept of 'the yellow peril,' which was a racial concept of 60 or 70 years ago fostered by extreme journalism of those days. This is not in my mind.

"I pointed out that other Asian nations, ranging from Korea and Japan on the one side around to the subcontinent of India on the other, are concerned about their own safety over against the things which are being said and done in Peking and by Peking. These free nations of Asia also are of Asian races. So that to me, this has nothing whatever to do with the sense of 'yellow peril' that was built upon a racial fear and hostility 60 or 70 years ago in which the hordes of Asia were going to overrun the white race as a racial matter.

"Now, as far as the difference in emphasis is concerned, one of our problems is that people tend to listen to what we say on only one point at a time. We have spoken about our treaty commitments to Viet-Nam. We've talked about our interest in organizing a peace in the Pacific, because of our other alliances in the Pacific as with Korea, Japan, the Republic of China, the Philippines, the SEATO Treaty, and our ANZUS Treaty with Australia and New Zealand.

"So we have a great stake in the integrity of the alliances which we have in the Pacific Ocean area.

"Now, we have also talked about our own national interest, our own security interests in Southeast Asia, and in these alliances. Now, we haven't shifted from one to the other; we speak about all of these things and have for 6 or 7 years. At times people seem to think we emphasize one, some the other. I think this is more based upon the way people listen, rather than the way in which we state these underlying elements in our policy."

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"Mr. De Segonzac: But by injecting the Chinese question in the whole affair of Vict-Nam as you have in your last press conference, aren't you making it more difficult to come to some form of solution, because you're giving the impression now that the whole question of Viet-Nam is not so much to help a small power, as was explained previously, to come to its self-decisions, but now you're putting it as a problem of China and the dangers of China in the Far East?

"Secretary Rusk: Well, this is not something that is an opinion solely of my own. There are many countries in Asia who are concerned about Peking and their attitude. I have no doubt that if Peking were strongly to support the reconvening of a Geneva conference that there might well be a Geneva conference, for example. At the present time, they bitterly oppose such a conference.

"This is a question that affects many countries. There are more than

20 regiments of North Vietnamese in South Viet-Nam. There are North Vietnamese regiments in Laos, opposed there by Laotian forces. There are North Vietnamese-trained guerrillas now operating in the northeast of Thailand. We hear reports of Chinese assistance going to the guerrillas in Burma. The Indonesians charge that the Chinese were deeply involved in that attempted coup d'etat in 1965. We know the shooting that occurred recently along the Sikkim border between Indian and Chinese forces.

"So that these are--and we also have heard from Prince Sihanouk in the last 2 or 3 weeks that he himself is not very happy about what he thinks the Chinese are doing in Cambodia. The Chinese are even quarreling with Switzerland. They reach out to places like Kenya and Ceylon and other places.

"It's not just their difficulties with the Soviet Union, India, the United States, United Kingdom. They find it difficult to get along with almost anyone, except their great and good friend Albania.

"So I don't think that we can pretend that the policies of China and some of the actions being taken by China are a contribution toward peace in Asia. At least our Asian friends don't think so."

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"Mr. Ruge: Mr. Secretary, if the aim of U.S. policy is now mainly containment of China, how do you envision the future of Asia? Do you expect to have all the other Asian countries armed to the point where they're strong enough to resist China, or is that a permanent role for the United States in the Pacific as the gendarmes for a couple of billions?

"Secretary Rusk: Well, I myself have not used that term 'containment of China.' It is true that at the present time we have an alliance with Korea, Japan, the Republic of China on Taiwan, the Philippines, Thailand, Australia, and New Zealand. Now, does that system of alliances add up to containment? That is something one can judge.

"Would the determination of India not to permit Chinese intrusions across its long frontier be containment? That is to judge. My guess is that none of the countries of free Asia want to see themselves overrun by mainland China, and in the case of some of those countries we have an alliance. Now, we have not ourselves undertaken to be the world's policeman, for all purposes, all around the globe. But we do have some alliances and those alliances are very serious to us and unless we take them seriously, my guess is that some very serious dangers will erupt not only in Asia but in other places."

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"Secretary Rusk: Back in 1964, in August 1964, our Congress with only two dissenting votes, declared that it was in the vital interest of

the United States and of world peace that there be peace in Southeast Asia. Ten years earlier the Senate had approved our SEATO Treaty with only one dissenting vote in the Senate.

"Now, the basis for these alliances that we made in the Pacific was that the security of those areas was vital to the security of the United States. We did not go into these alliances as a matter of altruism, to do someone else a favor. We went into them because we felt that the security of Australia and the United States, New Zealand and the United States, was so interlinked that we and they ought to have an alliance with each other, and similarly with the other alliances we have in the Pacific, as with the alliance in NATO. So that these alliances themselves rest upon a sense of the national security interests of the United States and not just on a fellow feeling for friends in some other part of the world."

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77. Address by Under Secretary of State Katzenbach before the Fairfield University Progress Dinner at Fairfield, Connecticut, October 17, 1967; "The Complex and Difficult Problems in Viet-Nam," Department of State Bulletin, November 6, 1967, p. 602.

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"These commitments--both legal and moral--are so solidly founded that I cannot see how anyone can rightly argue that we should renege on them.

"They are rooted in the Geneva Accords of 1954, at the conclusion of which the United States formally stated that we 'would view any renewal of the aggression...with grave concern and as seriously threatening international peace and security'; rooted in the SEATO treaty, which applies to South Viet-Nam through a protocol annexed to it; and rooted in numerous other assurances, including President Kennedy's statement of August 2, 1961, that 'the United States is determined that the Republic of Viet-Nam shall not be lost to the Communists for lack of any support which the United States Government can render.'

"Our commitments to South Viet-Nam are far better grounded than were those to South Korea at the time of the aggression there. For this reason, I am puzzled as to why so many liberals who supported President Truman in a policy of limited war in Korea now oppose a parallel policy in Viet-Nam. The objectives of such a policy have seldom been as clearly and precisely stated as they were by Richard Rovere and Arthur Schlesinger ('The General and the President,' Farrar, Straus & Young) in 1951. They said:

'The objective is not to destroy communism everywhere, a goal which would involve an unlimited ideological crusade, or even to destroy

the Soviet Union, a goal which could not be briefly attained without an atomic holocaust, the objective is to punish aggression by lowering the boom on individual experiments in aggression, while at the same time refusing to generalize from the individual case to the total war. Korea had to remain a limited war: limited in its investment of American forces, limited in its goal.'

"What Rovere and Schlesinger wrote about Korea in 1951, it seems to me, is no less valid for Viet-Nam today...."

* * *

"One such irrelevancy--one of the sillier ones--has been the assertion made in the press in the last few days that the administration was evoking 'the yellow peril.' In discussing our interests in Southeast Asia at his press conference last week, Secretary Rusk pointed out that the free nations of the area fully share our determination to prevent aggression. He said what everyone knows, that these nations--which are also oriental--are deeply concerned about their long-term security in the face of a militant, hostile, and rigidly ideological Communist China."

* * *

"Now is our starting point. Now is from where we must go on. But while our current action is delimited by responsibilities and decisions carried over from the past, it also gains by past experience. Significant to that experience, the experience of all of us who lived through the period between World Wars I and II, is the finding that armed aggression cannot be met simply by appeals to reason and virtue. Armed aggression is not deterred by rhetoric or wishful thinking."

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78. Address by Eugene V. Rostow, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, before the Regional Foreign Policy Conference at the University of Kansas, Lawrence, Kansas, October 17, 1967; "Another Round in the Great Debate: American Security in an Unstable World," Department of State Bulletin, November 6, 1967, p. 605.

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"VIETNAM AND THE U.S. NATIONAL INTEREST

"Let me take up first the more specific arguments about Viet-Nam before returning to the broader problem.

"In the view of our Government, the war in Viet-Nam is like the attack on South Korea and earlier threats to Greece, Iran, and Berlin.

It constitutes a clear aggression by a Communist regime supported both by China and the Soviet Union--attempting to take over another country by force. Whatever view one takes of the origins of the war--whether it is considered an insurrection against the authority of the South Vietnamese state aided by North Viet-Nam or, as we believe, an infiltration and invasion from North Viet-Nam--the issue in international law and politics is the same. In either view, North Viet-Nam is waging war against South Viet-Nam. And South Viet-Nam has the right to ask for the help of the international community in resisting an attack mounted from beyond its borders.

"Neither South Viet-Nam nor the United States wants to conquer North Viet-Nam or to overturn its Communist regime. The central issue of the war is whether North Viet-Nam will be allowed to conquer South Viet-Nam.

"What is America's national interest in South Viet-Nam? Why are we there?

"There are several answers.

"We are in Viet-Nam because we are obliged to be there specifically by the SEATO treaty and generally by the U.N. Charter itself.

"The obligations of the United Nations Charter are not suspended when permanent members of the Security Council disagree or the Assembly cannot act. The principles of the charter condemn the attack of North Viet-Nam on South Viet-Nam and authorize the members of the organization to offer South Viet-Nam assistance in its efforts of self-defense.

"Honoring these commitments is dictated by the most hardheaded assessment of our national interest. Three Presidents have concluded that the fate of Southeast Asia as a whole is directly related to the preservation of South Viet-Nam's independence. And Congress has repeatedly affirmed their judgment. If South Viet-Nam were to be taken over, the expansionist forces of Communist China and North Viet-Nam would be encouraged, and resistance to them and to aggression generally throughout the world would be seriously weakened.

"The United States is no less a Pacific than an Atlantic power. Our security demands an equilibrium of power in the Far East as much as it does in Europe and in the Middle East. That equilibrium depends on Viet-Nam and the system of alliances it symbolizes.

"Responsible opinion throughout Southeast Asia believes that the outcome in Viet-Nam will determine the future alinement of the whole region. Present events in Laos, Thailand, and Burma confirm this widespread judgment.

"Viet-Nam is the test for a new technique of revolution. As nuclear warfare is unthinkable and massed frontal attacks of the Korean type are too dangerous to be tried, Communist leaders are drawn to 'wars of national liberation.' Indeed, they have developed an elaborate doctrine explaining the place of these ventures in their overall strategy. On their present scale, the hostilities in Viet-Nam could hardly continue for any length of time without large-scale aid from China and the Soviet Union. Deescalation of the fighting should follow logically if that aid were to be reduced.

"But the Soviet Union has not so far responded to proposals of this kind. Indeed, the Soviet Union still declines to join with the United Kingdom in reconvening the Control Commissions either for Laos or for Viet-Nam.

"In summary, we are bound to Viet-Nam by specific and general commitments and by our own national interest.

"Above all, at this stage, whether one believes we were right or wrong in getting into Viet-Nam in the first place, the hostilities in Viet-Nam have been made the test of America's resolve to maintain that network of security arrangements upon which the equilibrium of world power has come to depend. There would be little security to protect our interests anywhere in the world if America's promise faltered or failed when the going got rough. As President Kennedy once said:

'The 1930's taught us a clear lesson: Aggressive conduct, if allowed to go unchecked and unchallenged, ultimately leads to war. This nation is opposed to war. We are also true to our word.'"

* * *

"What principle of ethics makes it immoral to protect the safety of the nation through methods which have the sanction of international law and the United Nations Charter? In what way do we lessen our capacity to seek social justice at home by defending the cause of peace, stability, and social progress abroad?"

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79. Address by Secretary Rusk (Excerpt) made at Columbus, Indiana, October 30, 1967; "Firmness and Restraint in Viet-Nam," Department of State Bulletin, November 27, 1967, p. 703.

"We're in Viet-Nam today for several reasons. These reasons cannot be summarized in a single phrase or catchword. They are not reasons which shift from time to time but are always present.

"The first is that the peace and security of Southeast Asia are, as the Congress has put it, 'vital' to our own national interest.

"That conclusion was first reached by President Truman before the attack on Korea, after thorough analysis in the highest councils of the Government. The question was reexamined after the Korean war began and again in the early months of President Eisenhower's administration. The conclusion was always essentially the same: that we had a vital national interest in the peace and security of Southeast Asia. That conclusion was based on such factors as the population of the area--more than 200 million--its natural resources, and its strategic location athwart the gateway between the Pacific and Indian Oceans, with the Indian subcontinent on one flank and Australia and New Zealand on the other. The loss of Southeast Asia to a hostile power or powers would be a weighty shift of the balance of power to the disadvantage of the free world and would affect adversely the world situation as a whole.

"That fundamental conclusion led the United States to join with others in signing the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, which the United States Senate approved with only one dissenting vote. Article IV of that treaty says that 'Each party recognizes that aggression by means of armed attack in the treaty area...would endanger its own peace and safety' and, in that event, would 'act to meet the common danger.' By a protocol signed and approved with the treaty, the protection was extended to the non-Communist states of former French Indochina:

"So we are fighting in Viet-Nam:

--because the peace and security of Southeast Asia are vital to our national interest;

--because we made a solemn commitment 'to act to meet the common danger' if South Viet-Nam were subjected to 'aggression by means of armed attack';

--because if those who would be our enemies should come to think that the defensive commitments of the United States--to more than 40 allies--are just bluffs, we would be on the slippery slope to general war;

--because Asian Communist leaders have proclaimed the struggle in Viet-Nam to be a critical test of a special technique for achieving Communist domination of the world: through whay they, in their upside-down language, call 'wars of national liberation.'

"We are in Viet-Nam because we believe that the people of South Viet-Nam should have a chance to determine their own government and their own future by their own choice and not through force imposed by Hanoi. The idea of self-determination is fundamental to a nation which was founded

upon the notion that governments derive 'their just powers from the consent of the governed.' This does not mean that we are the world's policemen, but it does mean that we take this factor into full account when we make treaties and undertake commitments beyond our borders.

"And we are fighting in Viet-Nam because we are resolved not to repeat the blunders which led to the Second World War."

* * *

80. President Johnson's News Conference, November 17, 1967; Department of State Bulletin, December 11, 1967, p. 779.

* * *

"Q. Mr. President, is your aim in Viet-Nam to win the war or to seek a compromised, negotiated solution?

"The President: I think our aims in Viet-Nam have been very clear from the beginning. They are consistent with the SEATO treaty, with the Atlantic Charter, and with the many statements that we have made to the Congress in connection with the Tonkin Gulf resolution. The Secretary of State has made this clear dozens and dozens of times--and I made it enough that I thought even all the preachers in the country had heard about it.

"That is, namely, to protect the security of the United States. We think the security of the United States is definitely tied in with the security of Southeast Asia.

"Secondly, to resist aggression. When we are a party to a treaty that says we will do it, then we carry it out."

* * *

UNITED STATES - VIETNAM RELATIONS

1945 - 1967

V.B.1.

JUSTIFICATION OF THE WAR
- INTERNAL COMMITMENTS -

The Roosevelt Administration, 1940-1945

67-244 O—71—vol. 7——16

JUSTIFICATION OF THE WAR -- INTERNAL COMMITMENTS

THE ROOSEVELT ADMINISTRATION, 1940 - 1945

Foreword

This portion of the study consists of a collection of U.S. Government documents which set forth the rationale of U.S. policy toward Vietnam. The collection represents the internal commitment of the U.S. as expressed in classified documents circulated at the highest levels in the government. The documents are organized chronologically within each Presidential administration. This volume covers the Roosevelt years, 1940-1945.

JUSTIFICATION OF THE WAR -- INTERNAL COMMITMENTS

The Roosevelt Administration, 1940 - 1945

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751G.94/81

THE ADVISER ON POLITICAL RELATIONS (DUNN) TO THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE (WELLES)[1]

Washington, August 6, 1940.

Acting upon your instructions, I called on the French Ambassador this morning and gave him the oral reply which you have formulated to the Ambassador's aide-mémoire of August 6th, on the subject of the demands made by the Japanese Government upon the French Government with regard to authorization to send troops across Indochina, to use the local air fields in Indochina, to station forces at the air fields for the purpose of assuring their security, and to send planes, munitions, and all necessary material through Indochina destined to the Japanese Army.

I told the French Ambassador that we have been doing and are doing everything possible within the framework of our established policies to keep the situation in the Far East stabilized; that we have been progressively taking various steps, the effect of which has been to exert economic pressure on Japan; that our Fleet is now based on Hawaii, and that the course which we have been following, as indicated above, gives a clear indication of our intentions and activities for the future. I also raised with the French Ambassador the question whether it would be practicable for the French to delay discussions with the Japanese with respect to Indochina for a period. I furthermore told the Ambassador that the British Ambassador had been informed of this matter by you in a most strictly confidential manner and that if the British had any observations or comments to make we would transmit them immediately to the French Ambassador.

Count de Saint-Quentin stated that he felt that this reply to the French request for assistance and support in her negotiations with Japan would very

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[1]Taken from MSS for Foreign Relations of the United States, 1940; not yet cleared for publication.

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probably not be considered by his Government as sufficient prospect for support to enable them to withstand the pressing demands made by the Japanese Government for the establishment of certain rights in Indochina in addition to the economic demands accompanying the former. He said that he did not think it would be practicable for the French Government to delay the negotiations because the Japanese had themselves stated at the time of making the demands that if the French Government did not acquiesce in the granting of these rights, the Japanese Government had every intention of taking the necessary action to acquire them. He went on to say that in his opinion the phrase "within the framework of our established policies", when associated with the apparent reluctance of the American Government to consider the use of military force in the Far East at this particular time, to mean that the United States would not use military or naval force in support of any position which might be taken to resist the Japanese attempted aggression on Indochina. The Ambassador asked me to convey to you thus his construction of your oral reply conveyed to him through me this morning and his fear that the French Government would, under the indicated pressure of the Japanese Government, be forced to accede to the demands set forth in his aide-memoire.

JAMES CLEMENT DUNN

751G.94/14a: Telegram

THE ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE TO THE AMBASSADOR IN JAPAN (GREW)[1]

[Paraphrase]

Washington, August 6, 1940
1 p.m.

293. News agencies have carried reports that Japan has made secret demands on France regarding French Indo-china. As reported, these demands include right on part of Japan to move armed forces of Japan through that French possession, the right of armed forces of Japan to use air bases at certain points there, etc.

The statements given by the Secretary of State to the press on April 17 and May 11, 1940, set forth this Government's belief that (1) intervention in the domestic affairs of the Netherlands East Indies, or (2) any alteration, by other than peaceful processes, in their status quo would be prejudicial to the cause of security, stability, and peace in the entire Pacific area, not just in the region in question. Also, there was set forth the observation of the Government of the United States that the belief restated in the preceding sentence was based on a doctrine of universal application and that it is a doctrine unequivocally supported by this Government. The same belief and the same observation naturally apply to French Indochina likewise. This Government is seriously perturbed, therefore, over the démarche which it is reported that the Government of Japan has made to the French authorities.

If no objection is perceived, it is my desire that at your early convenience you call upon the Minister for Foreign Affairs and that you express to him, as under instruction from your Government and along the lines above indicated, the concern felt by the Government of the United States regarding the reported developments.

WELLES

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[1] As printed in Foreign Relations of the United States: Japan, 1931-1941, vol. II, pp. 289-290.

In a telephone conversation this afternoon with the First Secretary of the Chinese Embassy on a routine matter, Mr. Tsui repeated substantially the same question asked by Mr. Liu. My reply was the same as given to Mr. Liu. After some hesitation and speaking in Chinese, Mr. Tsui said that the Embassy was very much concerned over these reports. He said that the Central Government felt that . . . Lung Yun (Chairman of Yunnan Province) . . . might be expected to be subjected to great Japanese pressure. . . .

The foregoing situation would seem to be an additional reason for the taking of strong action in the event of the Japanese occupation of the French colony.

740.0011 P. W./420

Memorandum by Mr. Cecil W. Gray, Assistant to the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] July 24, 1941.

In a telephone conversation with Acting Secretary Welles at 12:30 p. m. on July 23, there was considerable discussion about the Far Eastern situation. The Secretary spoke of the latest venture of Japan toward acquiring bases in Indochina in the face of the fact that Japan was not threatened by any nation on the globe. This southward movement, he said, stemmed from a policy of force and conquest. He referred to the friendship of Darlan [51] and Hitler and of the elements in the French Government who were in favor of turning all France over to Hitler.

The Secretary said that, of course, our own Government would do its utmost to carry out any understanding that might be arrived at with Japan, and that Japan was not in danger in the South Sea area. Hence that country must be bent on conquest, in which case some future Japanese Government would take the final steps toward domination of that entire region.

There followed an exchange of views as to what Mr. Welles should say to the Japanese Ambassador later in the afternoon when he kept an appointment with Mr. Welles.[52]

The Secretary's general idea was that if the Japanese Ambassador attempted to explain away the Indochina move by saying that it had been brought about by peaceful means, then such "peaceful means" were completely contrary to the spirit of the discussions between the United States and Japanese Governments looking toward a friendly

[51] Adm. François Darlan, French Minister for Foreign Affairs and Vice President of the Council of Ministers (Vice Premier).

[52] See memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State, July 23, 1941, *Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941*, vol. II, p. 522.

settlement in the Pacific. The United States Government, Mr. Hull said, could only be driven to the conclusion that our discussions for a friendly settlement had been wiped out by the Indochina development. The Secretary said that if we waited until he came home to tell Ambassador Nomura the foregoing, then it would come too late as a warning to Japan. We must let them see the seriousness of the step they have taken and let them know that such constitutes an unfriendly act because it helps Hitler to conquer Britain. The Secretary said that if we did not tell the Ambassador all this, he would not sit down with Admiral Nomura when he came back to Washington. It would be a farce to do so.

There followed quite a bit of discussion about counter measures on the part of the United States, with Mr. Welles explaining what the British proposed to do, what our Army and Navy boards favored, what the President favored, et cetera, and, as I understood it, the Secretary left the decision on these questions to the judgment of those on the ground.

Secretary Hull then came back to the subject of Mr. Welles' forthcoming talk with Admiral Nomura, and he said that Mr. Welles might begin the conversation by speaking to Admiral Nomura concerning a readjustment of the United States position vis-à-vis Japan somewhat as follows: There is a profound belief everywhere, in view of many reports from many sources, that the Japanese movement into Indochina has two probable purposes, or at least two possibilities this Government cannot ignore: (1) if this Government is to be safe, it is bound to assume that this act constitutes definite notice of the launching of a policy of force and conquest on the part of the Japanese Government; (2) this Government, in the interest of its own safety and in the light of all Japanese utterances and acts, must assume that by its actions and preparations Japan may be taking one more vital and next to the final step in occupying all the South Sea area. Such a statement to the Ambassador would lay the basis for our own future acts and would let the Japanese understand fully our position.

It was agreed between the Secretary and Mr. Welles that there was no use to pursue our discussions for a friendly settlement with the Japanese unless the Japanese policies are to coincide with their professions. We could get any kind of an agreement from the British and other governments looking to the safeguarding of Japanese legitimate interests so that there is no real basis for Japanese claims of being threatened or in danger.

It was agreed between the Secretary and Mr. Welles that something must be said to the press along the lines of the foregoing para-

graphs.[64] This would be for the purpose of making a record about the real significance of the Japanese movement and likewise to acquaint the public with the fact that we knew what was going on. Mr. Welles then read to the Secretary a draft of a statement prepared by the Far Eastern Division. The Secretary made specific comment as follows: make clear the fact that the occupation of Indochina by Japan possibly means one further important step to seizing control of the South Sea area, including trade routes of supreme importance to the United States controlling such products as rubber, tin and other commodities. This was of vital concern to the United States. The Secretary said that if we did not bring out this point our people will not understand the significance of this movement into Indochina. The Secretary mentioned another point to be stressed: there is no theory on which Indochina could be flooded with armed forces, aircraft, et cetera, for the defense of Japan. The only alternative is that this venture into Indochina has a close relation to the South Sea area and its value for offense against that area.

The Secretary closed by suggesting that Mr. Welles make clear to Admiral Nomura that we are ready and desirous of going forward with our discussions should circumstances permit, and that if an agreement were reached between our two countries, it would safeguard Japan far more securely than taking over Indochina. He said for Mr. Welles to ask the Ambassador to send this to his Government.

C. W. GRAY

740.0011 P. W./421

Memorandum by Mr. Cecil W. Gray, Assistant to the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON, July 25, 1941.]

EXCERPTS FROM SECRETARY HULL'S REMARKS IN TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH ACTING SECRETARY WELLES ON JULY 25, 1941

We have had conversations for several months with the Ambassador and his associates covering this matter completely and we couldn't have offered more assurance to Japan for her entire satisfaction from every standpoint than we did in those discussions. I told him (the Ambassador) repeatedly that if this matter progressed I expected to get a similar agreement with the British, the Dutch, et cetera. We have followed that up as the Indochina phase developed. You will remember we first considered sending a cable of inquiry to Japan about the Indochina matter. Then we sent Hamilton to see the Am-

[64] For press release issued by the Department of State on July 24, 1941, see *Foreign Relations*, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. II, p. 315.

bassador when I didn't see him here to go over the whole situation. Then we sent Hamilton again to see his two associates for the purpose of keeping alive the whole situation that we had under discussion. Then finally, before they got to a face-saving stage, after it was apparent that they were preparing the Indochina move, this was followed up by a final step of summing up for the record the pros and cons and making a final appeal to the Japs before it was too late. That is the record we made. I think it ought all to be kept in mind. It is a fact that, in justice to the Administration, the Government and the State Department, as the Chinese-Japanese difficulties developed, we not only expressed opposition and condemnation at appropriate times, but we gradually took steps of retaliation. I need not mention all the steps. When the question of oil became most seriously considered for the first time, there was not a long period between that point and the point when Japan and the Netherlands proceeded with their trade negotiations, which involved oil and raised the whole oil question. Now, in those circumstances, not with the idea of appeasing Japan ourselves, but merely to deal practically with an international situation that had become acute, so far as oil was concerned, in connection with those negotiations, and which was clearly to remain acute until those negotiations were concluded, we rested our position before those negotiations had ended. The Japanese Government through its Ambassador came to us with a proposal for a peaceful settlement covering the entire Pacific area, including the question of oil and everything else, and I have had, as you know, seventeen conferences with him. There is a strong so-called peace group in Japan back of him (the Ambassador). Naturally, it would have been utterly impractical for us to have followed a purely appeasement policy when every consideration would prevent us from putting on embargoes and penalties and retaliation during these negotiations. My judgment is that the State Department and the Government should not say too much on this Japanese question. The first thing we know we will run into a storm. It is so delicate and there are so many angles to it. I am sure Japan is going on unless something happens to stop her. This is a world movement. The Japanese are seeking to dominate militarily practically one-half the world and apply the barbarous methods that they are applying to China and that Hitler is applying in Europe, and if they have their way, they will carry out what they are saying of their right to be supreme in that half of the world, by which they mean military supremacy with methods of arbitrary, selfish domination and the Hitler method of piracy and naval control of the seas and commerce. At any rate, I just want you to keep that in mind.

C[ECIL] W. G[RAY]

711.94/2177

MEMORANDUM BY THE ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE[1]

[WASHINGTON,] July 24, 1941.

At the request of the Japanese Ambassador, the President received the Ambassador for an off-the-record conference in the Oval Room at the White House at five o'clock this afternoon. At the President's request, Admiral Stark and I were present.

. . . . . .

The President then went on to say that this new move by Japan in Indochina created an exceedingly serious problem for the United States. He said that, as I had stated to the Ambassador yesterday, insofar as assuring itself that it could obtain foodstuffs and raw materials from Indochina, Japan, of course, had it reached an agreement with the United States along the terms of the discussions between Secretary Hull and the Ambassador, would have been afforded far greater assurances of obtaining such supplies than any other nation. More than that, the President said, the cost of any military occupation is tremendous and the occupation itself is not conductive to the production by civilians in occupied countries of food supplies and raw materials of the character required by Japan. Had Japan undertaken to obtain the supplies she required from Indochina in a peaceful way, she not only would have obtained larger quantities of such supplies, but would have obtained them with complete security and without the draining expense of a military occupation. Furthermore, from the military standpoint, the President said, surely the Japanese Government could not have in reality the slightest belief that China, Great Britain, the Netherlands or the United States had any territorial designs on Indochina nor were in the slightest degree providing any real threats of aggression against Japan. This Government, consequently, could only assume that the occupation of Indochina was being undertaken by Japan for the purpose of further offense and this created a situation which necessarily must give the United States the most serious disquite.

The President said that he had been following in complete detail the conversations which had been progressing between Secretary Hull and the Ambassador and that he was confident that the Ambassador would agree that the policies not undertaken in Indochina by the Japanese Government were completely opposed to the principles and the letter of the proposed agreement which had been under discussion.

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[1]As printed in Foreign Relations of the United States: Japan, 1931-1941, vol. II, pp. 527-530.

At this point the Ambassador took out of his pocket two sheets of notes which he had prepared and asked the President's permission to refer to them in order to make a statement of his Government's position.

In this exposition the Ambassador covered exactly the same ground which he had covered in his conversation with me last night.

The only points of difference were that at the outset of the conversation, the Ambassador very clearly and emphatically stated that the move by Japan into Indochina was something which he personally deplored and with which he personally was not in agreement.

. . . . . .

The President then said that he had a proposal to make to the Ambassador which had occurred to him just before the Ambassador had come in and which he had not had time to talk over with me before making his proposal to the Ambassador.

The President said that it might be too late for him to make this proposal but he felt that no matter how late the hour might be, he still wished to seize every possible opportunity of preventing the creation of a situation between Japan and the United States which could only give rise to serious misunderstandings between the two peoples. The President stated that if the Japanese Government would refrain from occupying Indochina with its military and naval forces, or, had such steps actually been commenced, if the Japanese Government would withdraw such forces, the President could assure the Japanese Government that he would do everything within his power to obtain from the Governments of China, Great Britain, the Netherlands, and of course the United States itself a binding and solemn declaration, provided Japan would undertake the same commitment, to regard Indochina as a neutralized country in the same way in which Switzerland had up to now been regarded by the powers as a neutralized country. He stated that this would imply that none of the powers concerned would undertake any military act of aggression against Indochina and would remain in control of the territory and would not be confronted with attempts to dislodge them on the part of de Gaullist or Free French agents or forces.

If these steps were taken, the President said, Japan would be given solemn and binding proof that no other power had any hostile designs upon Indochina and that Japan would be afforded the fullest and freest opportunity of assuring herself of the source of food supplies and other raw materials in Indochina which she was seeking to secure.

The Ambassador then reiterated concisely and quite clearly what the President had suggested. He then made some statement which was not quite clear to the effect that such a step would be very difficult at this time on account of the face-saving element involved on the part of Japan and that only a very great statesman would reverse a policy at this time.

. . . . . .

The Ambassador said that he would immediately report his conversation to his Government in Tokyo. He seemed to be very much impressed with what the President had said but I did not gather from his reactions that he was in any sense optimistic as to the result.[1]

S/umner/ W/elles/

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[1]A formal document setting forth the President's proposal was presented to the Japanese Ambassador on August 8.

PRESS RELEASE ISSUED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE ON AUGUST 2, 1941[1]

The Acting Secretary of State, Mr. Sumner Welles, issued the following statement on August 2 in reply to inquiries from the press concerning the agreement entered into between the French and Japanese Governments regarding French Indochina:

"The French Government at Vichy has given repeated assurances to the Government of the United States that it would not cooperate with the Axis powers beyond the obligations imposed on it by the armistice, and that it would defend the territory under its control against any aggressive action on the part of third powers.

"This Government has now received information of the terms of the agreement between the French and Japanese Governments covering the so-called 'common defense' of French Indochina. In effect, this agreement virtually turns over to Japan an important part of the French Empire.

"Effort has been made to justify this agreement on the ground that Japanese 'assistance' is needed because of some menace to the territorial integrity of French Indochina by other powers. The Government of the United States is unable to accept this explanation. As I stated on July 24, there is no question of any threat to French Indochina, unless it lies in the expansionist aims of the Japanese Government.

"The turning over of bases for military operations and of territorial rights under pretext of 'common defense' to a power whose territorial aspirations are apparent, here presents a situation which has a direct bearing upon the vital problem of American security. For reasons which are beyond the scope of any known agreement, France has now decided to permit foreign troops to enter an integral part of its Empire, to occupy bases therein, and to prepare operations within French territory which may be directed against other peoples friendly to the people of France.

"The French

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[1] As printeddin Foreign Relations of the United States: Japan 1931-1941, vol. II, pp. 320-321. For earlier statements on this subject, see Department's Press Releases of Sept. 4 and 23, 1940, and tel. 440 to Vichy of Sept 9, 1940. (Not included here).

"The French Government at Vichy has repeatedly declared its determination to resist all encroachments upon the sovereignty of its territories. However, the German and Italian forces availed themselves of certain facilities in Syria to carry on operations directed against the British, the French Government, although this was a plain encroachment on territory under French control, did not resist. But when the British undertook defense operations in the territory of Syria, the French Government did resist.

"Under these circumstances, this Government is impelled to question whether the French Government at Vichy in fact proposes to maintain its declared policy to preserve for the French people the territories both at home and abroad which have long been under French sovereignty.

"This Government, mindful of its traditional friendship for France, has deeply sympathized with the desire of the French people to maintain their territories and to preserve them intact. In its relations with the French Government at Vichy and with the local French authorities in French territories, the United States will be governed by the manifest effectiveness with which those authorities endeavor to protect these territories from domination and control by those powers which are seeking to extend their rule by force and conquest, or by the threat thereof."

711.94/2504

DOCUMENT HANDED BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO THE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR (NOMURA) ON NOVEMBER 26, 1941[1]

Tentative and Without Commitment.

WASHINGTON, November 26, 1941.

Outline of Proposed Basis For Agreement Between The United States And Japan

. . . . . .

SECTION II

STEPS TO BE TAKEN BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES AND BY THE GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN.

The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan propose to take steps as follows:

1. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will endeavor to conclude a multilateral non-aggression pact among the British Empire, China, Japan, the Netherlands, the Soviet Union, Thailand and the United States.

2. Both Governments will endeavor to conclude among the American, British, Chinese, Japanese, the Netherland and Thai Governments an agreement whereunder each of the Governments would pledge itself to respect the territorial integrity of French Indochina and, in the event that there should develop a threat to the territorial integrity of Indochina, to enter into immediate consultation with a view to taking such measures as may be deemed necessary and advisable to meet the threat in question. Such agreement would provide also that each of the Governments party to the agreement would not seek or accept preferential treatment in its trade or economic relations with Indochina and would use its influence to obtain for each of the signatories equality of treatment in trade and commerce with French Indochina.

3. The Government of Japan will withdraw all military, naval, air and police forces from China and from Indochina.

. . . . . .

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[1] As printed in Foreign Relations of the United States: Japan, 1931-1941, vol. II, pp. 768-770.

740.0011 Pacific War/856

PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT TO EMPEROR HIROHITO OF JAPAN[1]

/WASHINGTON/ December 6, 1941.

. . . . . .

More than a year ago Your Majesty's Government concluded an agreement with the Vichy Government by which five or six thousand Japanese troops were permitted to enter into Northern French Indo-China for the protection of Japanese troops which were operating against China further north. And this Spring and Summer the Vichy Government permitted further Japanese military forces to enter into Southern French Indo-China for the common defense of French Indo-China. I think I am correct in saying that no attack has been made upon Indo-China, nor that any has been contemplated.

During the past few weeks it has become clear to the world that Japanese military, naval and air forces have been sent to Southern Indo-China in such large numbers as to create a reasonable doubt on the part of other nations that this continuing concertration in Indo-China is not defensive in its character.

Because these continuing concentrations in Indo-China have reached such large proportions and because they extend now to the southeast and the southwest corners of that Peninsula, it is only reasonable that the people of the Philippines, of the hundreds of Islands of the East Indies, of Malaya and of Thailand itself are asking themselves whether these forces of Japan are preparing or intending to make attack in one or more of these many directions.

I am sure that Your Majesty will understand that the fear of all these peoples is a legitimate fear in as much as it involves their peace and their national existence. I am sure that Your Majesty will understand why the people of the United States in such large numbers look askance at the establishment of military, naval and air bases manned and equipped so greatly as to constitute armed forces capable of measures of offense.

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[1] As printed in Foreign Relations of the United States: Japan, 1931-1941, vol. II. pp. 784-786.

It is clear that a continuance of such a situation is unthinkable.

None of the peoples whom I have spoken of above can sit either indefinitely or permanently on a keg of dynamite.

There is absoluteely no thought on the part of the United States of invading Indo-China if every Japanese soldier or sailor were to be withdrawn therefrom.

I think that we can obtain the same assurance from the Governments of the East Indies, the Governments of Malaya and the Government of Thailand. I would even undertake to ask for the same assurance on the part of the Government of China. Thus a withdrawal of the Japanese forces from Indo-China would result in the assurance of peace throughout the whole of the South Pacific area.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

740.0011 European War 1939/29461

Extract from Letter of Robert D. Murphy

to General Henri Giraud

November 2, 1942

The General:

Referring to the declaration made on several occasions by President Roosevelt, and the obligations already undertaken by the American Government as well as by the British Government, I am able to assure you that the restoration of France to full independence, in all the greatness and vastness which it possessed before the war in Europe as well as overseas, is one of the war aims of the United Nations.

It is thoroughly understood that French sovereignty will be re-established as soon as possible throughout all the territory, metropolitan and colonial, over which flew the French flag in 1939.

The Government of the United States considers the French nation as an ally and will treat it as such.

May I add further that in case of military operations in French territory (whether in Metropolitan France or in the Colonies) in all instances where French collaboration may be found, the American authorities will not intervene in any way in those affairs which are solely within the province of the national administration or which have to do with the exercise of French sovereignty.

CONSIDERATION OF PROPOSED ENTRY OF CHINESE TROOPS INTO INDOCHINA TO COMBAT JAPANESE FORCES IN THAT COLONY[1]

740.0011 Pacific War/3531

The Washington Delegation of the French Committee of National Liberation to the Department of State[2]

[Translation]

WASHINGTON, October 20, 1943.

MEMORANDUM

According to certain information which has come to the knowledge of the Committee of National Liberation, Allied plans of operation in the Far East would, in the near future, include the start of operations against the frontiers of Indo-China, operations entrusted to Chinese troops.

The Washington Delegation of the Committee has already had occasion to call the Department of State's attention to the absolute importance to the Allied cause of associating the competent French authorities with the detailing of Allied war plans in the Far East, especially when their execution involves French Indo-China. The aforementioned authorities possess, in this field, documentation and experience which can be of the greatest use to the Allied High Command. The role which France has traditionally played in the Far East, the important interests which she has there, the dispositions already taken by the Algiers Committee to participate when the time comes in the struggle for the liberation of Indo-China, are all, as many more, reasons for an effective French participation in Inter-Allied Councils where the general strategy of the United Nations in the Far East is determined.

As concerns the project of a Chinese offensive against Indo-China, the Algiers Committee—if the information which has reached it on this subject is correct—must very seriously draw the attention of the American Government to the great danger which its realization would present.

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[1] Continued from *Foreign Relations*, 1942, China, pp. 743–760.

[2] Handed on October 21 to the Assistant Secretary of State (Berle) by Henri Hoppenot, Delegate of the French Committee of National Liberation.

A Chinese attack against Tonkin would have the immediate effect of causing the whole Indo-Chinese population to rise against the Allies.

For the Annamites, the Chinese, who have so frequently in the past invaded and ravaged their frontier regions, represent the hereditary enemy. Far from greeting them as liberators, the local population would impede their advance by every means in their power. Moreover, the population and the French troops, who would take the side of the Allies if it were French, American and British forces which were coming to their help, might very well react against an attack by the Chinese, whose true intentions could easily be confused by enemy propaganda. The position which a Chinese attack apparently will cause civilian and military French Indo-Chinese to take will in the future be difficult to modify and the consequences of such a mistake run the risk of weighing heavily upon the development of the campaign.

The French Committee of National Liberation believes, therefore, that it is of the highest importance to set aside a project which, far from serving Allied interests, runs the risk of causing the greatest harm. The Committee, likewise, equally believes that, as concerns military operations whose theatre would be French territory, it is imperative to ask the Allies that no decision should be taken without our previous agreement.

740.0011 Pacific War/3531

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State (Berle)

[Washington,] October 21, 1943.

M. Hoppenot came in to see me at his request. He handed me the attached memorandum,[1] which states that the French National Committee understands that Chinese operations will presently open against the Japanese within the frontiers of Indochina. This gave great concern to the Committee of National Liberation. If Chinese troops attacked there, plainly there would not be any support from the French, since the Chinese had always claimed interest there, and it was not unlikely that the French troops would defend against a Chinese attack.

I asked whether this matter had already been brought to the attention of the Chiefs of Staff. M. Hoppenot said it had, through General

[1] *Supra.*

Bethouart. I thanked him for the information and said that the matter presented was primarily for military consideration.

A[DOLF] A. B[ERLE], JR.

NOTE: But it is not only for military consideration. This brings us squarely up to the problem of whether, in the Far East, we are re-establishing the western colonial empires or whether we are letting the East liberate itself if it can do so. I feel that the matter should be discussed on a high level with the President for his decision. I do not know that we need to settle matters with the French Committee in Algiers. If the Chinese can do anything against the Japanese in French Indochina to the general advantage of the war, I have difficulty in seeing why we should stop them.

A[DOLF] A. B[ERLE], JR.

740.0011 Pacific War/3531

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State (Berle) to the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius)

[WASHINGTON,] October 22, 1943.

Mr. STETTINIUS: In connection with the application of the French Committee of National Liberation for membership on the Pacific War Council, it is of interest that the representative of the Committee yesterday presented us with a request that we do not permit the Chinese to take part in operations against the Japanese troops which are presently occupying Indo-China. The Committee observed that if British and American troops accomplished the reconquest this would be quite all right; but the French, and particularly those in Indo-China, considered the Chinese as their hereditary enemies (*erbfeinde*); if they took part in the liberation of Indo-China, probably they would claim new territory.

The French would push this view in the Pacific War Council. This would probably be supported by the British and the Dutch. This would present us, for all practical purposes, with the task of reconquering Indo-China almost single-handed (since the British interest stops with Burma) for the sole purpose of returning Indo-China to France. France is unlikely to be able to maintain herself in control of, or protect, that province for a good while; so that we should have the added job of policing and protecting it against the Chinese as well as the Japanese in the interest of the French Colonial Empire.

It strikes me that this fact should be called to the attention of the President and also of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.[4] I think we should

[4] On October 29 Mr. Stettinius replied to Mr. Berle: "I agree with you that the matter of French representation on the Pacific War Council and also their

answer the French Committee that their representation will receive consideration, but that military factors must predominate in the decision.

Frankly, I doubt if we could defend before the Congress a very considerable expenditure of American lives for the sole purpose of keeping Indo-China in French, as against Chinese or Indo-Chinese, hands. . . .

A[DOLF] A. B[ERLE], JR.

740.0011 Pacific War/3531

Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Vincent) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Berle)[5]

[WASHINGTON,] November 2, 1943.

MR. BERLE: We have read with keen interest your memorandum of conversation with Mr. Hoppenot and his *aide-mémoire*, and concur in the opinion expressed in your note.

There is at the bottom of page 1 of the *aide-mémoire* the following statement which we feel should not pass without comment: "Pour l'Annamite, les Chinois, qui ont si frequemment dans le passé envahi et ravagé leurs régions frontières, représentent l'ennemi héréditaire." This statement is grossly misleading, if not actually false. In 1879 the Annamites sought military aid from China to drive out the French. It was China's weakness, not Annamite dislike or fear of China, that permitted the French to remain. Recurrent waves of Annamite nationalism have looked to Chinese nationalism for inspiration and guidance, particularly since 1920. Today there is understood to be in southern China a group of Annamites which advocates independence for Indochina and seeks Chinese support. It is our belief that the Annamites, by and large, have for the Chinese a feeling of friendliness and cultural affinity.

The Chinese Government's attitude regarding the post-war status of Indochina has been cautious. Officials of the Government have disclaimed territorial ambitions but they have at times intimated that China would desire an arrangement which assured access to the sea from Yunnan Province through Tonkin to Haiphong. Independence for Indochina is included in the Chinese Government's general advocacy of self-government for eastern peoples.

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request that the Chinese be asked not to conduct military operations within Indo-China should be referred both to the President and to the Joint Chiefs of Staff."

[5] Initialed by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Ballantine).

The post-war status of French Indochina is a matter of speculation: return to France; international control; and even British control. It is our belief that the Annamites are fundamentally capable of self-government and that it should be the objective of any post-war administration to train Annamites to resume the responsibilities of self-government. This objective might be achieved by a continuation of French administration for a definitely limited period or by international administration. There would seem to be no reasonable basis for British administration. In any event, the Chinese Government should be consulted and its views given full consideration in regard to plans for the future of Indochina.

740.0011 Pacific War/3531

Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State to President Roosevelt

WASHINGTON, November 8, 1943.

M. Henri Hoppenot, the Delegate of the French Committee of National Liberation, has left with the State Department a communication, a copy of which in translation is attached hereto,[1] giving the reasons why, in the opinion of the Committee, it would be a mistake to entrust to Chinese troops the launching of military operations against Indo-China. The main reason advanced is that the Chinese are the hereditary enemies of the Annamites and that an attack by the Chinese would therefore be resisted by the local population as well as by French troops. It is our belief that this presentation of the case involves allegations not in accord with the facts, and that the Annamites, by and large, have for the Chinese a feeling of friendliness and cultural affinity.

The problem to which these representations relates seems primarily to be a military problem for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. We understand that it has already been brought to the attention of that body by General Bethouart, Chief of the French Military Mission.

EDWARD R. STETTINIUS, JR.

740.0011 Pacific War/3567

Memorandum by President Roosevelt to the Acting Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, November 9, 1943.

In regard to the use of Chinese troops against Annam, I agree with the State Department that the French presentation of the case is not sufficiently valid to take any action.

[1] *Ante*, p. 882.

The whole matter should be left to the discretion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and to the Commanding Officers in the area. This is essentially a military problem.

F[RANKLIN] D. R[OOSEVELT]

740.0011 Pacific War/3630

The Delegate of the French Committee of National Liberation (Hoppenot) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Berle)

[Translation]

No. 759 WASHINGTON, December 13, 1943.

DEAR MR. BERLE: I have already had occasion to speak to you of the interest which the French Committee of National Liberation would attach to being associated in the inter-Allied deliberations concerning the conduct of the war in the Far East, particularly when it is a matter of operations which may involve Indochina. I refer particularly to the *aide-mémoire* which I transmitted to you on this subject October 21, and which contemplated on the one hand the entrance of a representative of the Committee into the Pacific Council, and on the other hand the apprehensions caused at Algiers by a proposed Chinese offensive against the frontier of Indochina.

M. Massigli has just requested me to recall this question again to your high attention.

The cooperation of the French staff with the Allied staffs in the Far East has as a matter of fact entered into a new phase following the sending to Delhi, with the accord of the British War Office, of a French military mission commanded by General Blaizot. This new fact seems to make it more desirable that a parallel collaboration should be established at Washington, by the association of a French representative in the deliberations of the Pacific Council of which delegates of all the Powers participating in the war effort against Japan are members.

We have learned, moreover, that the proposed Chinese operations on the frontier of Indochina have not been abandoned and that irregular Chinese troops, staffed by American officers, are said to be trained at the present time for this purpose near the said frontier. The Chinese elements in question are precisely the ones whose incursions and pillaging have frequently created, in the course of recent decades, a state of insecurity and trouble in that region, and their reappearance on Indochinese territory, even with the corrective of a staff of American officers, would aggravate further the repercussions of any Chinese action on those frontiers. Knowing personally the mentality both of the French of Indochina and of the native populations of the Union,

I am convinced that nothing could more seriously hinder their cooperation with the Allies than for the liberation of Indochina to appear to be entrusted, even provisionally, to Chinese formations which, in the present case, would appear to them not only as the advance guard of the hereditary enemy of Annam and Tonkin, but as the direct descendants of the bands of pirates and Jolly Rogers who have so long caused the threat of their exactions to weigh upon those regions. Just as American or English troops would be welcomed as allies and liberators, so we run the risk of seeing French and natives react strongly against the use of these Chinese elements. I do not believe that a more serious political and psychological fault could be committed and I take the liberty to beg you to call this point again to the very serious attention of the competent authorities.[3]

Please accept [etc.] HENRI HOPPENOT

[3] On January 5, 1944, Mr. Berle wrote M. Hoppenot that the contents of his letter had been transmitted to appropriate authorities of the Government.

TEHRAN CONFERENCE

Extract from Memorandum of Conversation between President Roosevelt and Marshal Stalin, November 28, 1943, 3 p.m.[1]

MARSHAL STALIN expatiated at length on the French ruling classes and he said, in his opinion, they should not be entitled to share in any of the benefits of the peace, in view of their past record of collaboration with Germany.

THE PRESIDENT said that Mr. Churchill was of the opinion that France would be very quickly reconstructed as a strong nation, but he did not personally share this view since he felt that many years of honest labor would be necessary before France would be re-established. He said the first necessity for the French, not only for the Government but the people as well, was to become honest citizens.

MARSHAL STALIN agreed and went on to say that he did not propose to have the Allies shed blood to restore Indo-China, for example, to the old French colonial rule. He said that the recent events in the Lebanon made public service the first step toward the independence of people who had formerly been colonial subjects. He said that in the war against Japan, in his opinion, that in addition to military missions, it was necessary to fight the Japanese in the political sphere as well, particularly in view of the fact that the Japanese had granted the least nominal independence to certain colonial areas. He repeated that France should not get back Indo-China and that the French must pay for their criminal collaboration with Germany.

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[1] Handbook of Far Eastern Conference Discussions (Historical Division Research Project No. 62, November 1949), pp. D16-D17, Top Secret.

THE PRESIDENT said he was 100% in agreement with Marshal Stalin and remarked that after 100 years of French rule in Indo-China, the inhabitants were worse off than they had been before. He said that Chiang Kai Shek had told him China had no designs on Indo-China but the people of Indo-China were not yet ready for independence, to which he had replied that when the United States acquired the Philippines, the inhabitants were not ready for independence which would be granted without qualification upon the end of the war against Japan. He added that he had discussed with Chiang Kai Shek the possibility of a system of trusteeship for Indo-China which would have the task of preparing the people for independence within a definite period of time, perhaps 20 to 30 years.

MARSHAL STALIN completely agreed with this view.

DISCUSSIONS REGARDING THE FUTURE STATUS OF FRENCH INDO-CHINA AND FRENCH PARTICIPATION IN ITS LIBERATION FROM JAPANESE OCCUPATION

Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Roosevelt[20]

WASHINGTON, January 14, 1944.

Last week in a conversation[21] which I had with the British Ambassador he stated that, according to information from his Foreign Office, you had spoken rather definitely during your recent trip of your views concerning the future of French Indo-China. According to Lord Halifax' information you had expressed the opinion that Indo-China should be taken away from the French and administered by an international trusteeship.[22] He wondered whether this represented your final conclusions and attached importance to the matter in view of the fact that reports of your alleged conversations would undoubtedly get back to the French. I informed the Ambassador that I did not know whether you had come to any final conclusions on the subject and added that, in my judgment, you and Mr. Churchill would find it desirable to talk this matter over fully, deliberately, and perhaps finally at some future stage.

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[20] Copy of memorandum obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.

[21] For extract of memorandum of this conversation, dated January 3, 1944, see *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943, p. 864.

[22] A memorandum of July 21, 1943, obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library at Hyde Park, N.Y., records a statement by President Roosevelt in the thirty-third meeting of the Pacific War Council that Indochina should be placed under a trusteeship until it was ready for independence.

As of possible interest to you I am enclosing two brief memoranda citing the more important public statements or commitments by ourselves and the British with regard to the future of French territory after the war.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

[Enclosure 1]

JANUARY 7, 1944.

UNITED STATES POSITION WITH RESPECT TO FRENCH TERRITORY AFTER THE WAR

During the past three years there have been a number of public pronouncements, as well as unpublished statements, by the President, the Secretary of State, and other high ranking officials of this Government regarding the future of French territory after the war. The most important of these pronouncements and statements are set forth below.

1. In a statement issued on August 2, 1941, concerning the agreement entered into between the French and Japanese Governments regarding French Indochina, the Secretary of State said:[23]

"This Government, mindful of its traditional friendship for France, has deeply sympathized with the desire of the French people to maintain their territories and to preserve them intact. In its relations with the French Government at Vichy and with the local French authorities in French territories, the United States will be governed by the manifest effectiveness with which those authorities endeavor to protect these territories from domination and control by those powers which are seeking to extend their rule by force and conquest, or by the threat thereof." (Department of State Press Release No. 374)

2. In a letter to Marshal Pétain in December, 1941,[24] President Roosevelt stated that so long as "French sovereign control remains in reality purely French" the American Government has no desire to see existing French sovereignty over French North Africa or any of the French colonies "pass to the control of any other nation".

3. A State Department press release of March 2, 1942[25] (No. 85) relative to the situation in New Caledonia, included the following words:

"The policy of the Government of the United States as regards France and French territory has been based upon the maintenance of

[23] For complete text of statement, see Department of State *Bulletin*, August 2, 1941, p. 87.

[24] For text of letter of December 27, 1941, see *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. II, p. 205.

[25] Department of State *Bulletin*, March 7, 1942, p. 208.

the integrity of France and of the French empire and of the eventual restoration of the complete independence of all French territories."

The above statement was qualified by the following words:

"In its relations with the local French authorities in French territories the United States has been and will continue to be governed by the manifest effectiveness with which those authorities endeavor to protect their territories from domination and control by the common enemy."

4. In a note of April 13, 1942,[26] to the French Ambassador at Washington, relative to the establishing of an American consular establishment at Brazzaville, the Acting Secretary of State said:

"The Government of the United States recognizes the sovereign jurisdiction of the people of France over the territory of France and over French possessions overseas. The Government of the United States fervently hopes that it may see the reestablishment of the independence of France and of the integrity of French territory."

5. At his press conference on May 21, 1942, in reply to an inquiry as to whether the United States considered itself bound to the restoration of the whole French Empire after the war, the Secretary of State said that this question had not arisen.

6. In an unpublished letter of November 2, 1942, to General Giraud, the President's Personal Representative, Mr. Murphy, wrote:

"It is thoroughly understood that French sovereignty will be reestablished as soon as possible throughout all the territory, metropolitan and colonial, over which flew the French flag in 1939."

7. The landing of American forces in North Africa on November 8, 1942,[27] was the occasion for a number of assurances to the French people regarding American motives. Among them were the following:

In his message to Marshal Pétain[28] the President said:

"I need not tell you that the ultimate and greater aim is the liberation of France and its empire from the Axis yoke."

The President's message[29] to Admiral Esteva, Resident General at Tunis, concluded with these words:

"I know that I may count on your understanding of American friendship for France and American determination to liberate the French empire from the domination of its oppressors."

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[26] *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. II, p. 361.
[27] For correspondence concerning the landings of November 8, 1942, see *ibid.*, pp. 420–432.
[28] Department of State *Bulletin*, November 14, 1942, pp. 904, 905.
[29] *Ibid.*, p. 908.

In his broadcast to the French people on November 8 [30] the President said:

"We assure you that once the menace of Germany and Italy is removed from you, we shall quit your territory at once."

8. The preamble of the unpublished Clark–Darlan Agreement of November 22, 1942,[31] contains the following words:

"It has been agreed by all French elements concerned and United States military authorities that French forces will aid and support the forces of the United States and their allies to expel from the soil of Africa the common enemy, to liberate France and restore integrally the French Empire."

[Enclosure 2]

JANUARY 7, 1944.

BRITISH POSITION WITH RESPECT TO FRENCH TERRITORY AFTER THE WAR

Prime Minister Churchill has more than once expressed the desire to see France, including Alsace-Lorraine, restored, and both Mr. Churchill and Mr. Eden [32] have repeatedly denied any territorial ambitions on the part of Great Britain with respect to the French Empire.

1. On June 10, 1941, the Prime Minister assured the House of Commons [33] that

"We have no territorial designs in Syria or anywhere else in French territory";

and subsequently, on November 10, 1942, he said: [34]

"For ourselves we have no wish but to see France free and strong, with her empire gathered round her and with Alsace-Lorraine restored. We covet no French territory. We have no acquisitive designs or ambitions in North Africa or any other part of the world."

These commitments, however, are not interpreted by the British Government as including any guarantee of particular frontiers or of the integrity of the French Empire. The British Foreign Secretary, in a letter to the American Ambassador on November 16, 1942,[35] stated:

"You will see that we have taken care to avoid guaranteeing the integrity of the French Empire and have concentrated upon asserting our intention to restore 'the independence and greatness of France' and denying any desire to annex French territory".

[30] Department of State *Bulletin*, November 14, 1942, p. 892.
[31] *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. II, p. 453.
[32] Anthony Eden, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
[33] *Parliamentary Debates*, House of Commons, 5th series, vol. 372, col. 157.
[34] For entire text of speech, see the London *Times*, November 11, 1942, p. 8.
[35] Not printed.

Much earlier, in connection with his note of August 7, 1940, to General de Gaulle, Mr. Churchill, in an unpublished letter of the same date, had said:

"I think it necessary to put on record that the expression 'full restoration of the independence and greatness of France' has no precise relation to territorial frontiers. We have not been able to guarantee such frontiers in respect of any nation now acting with us, but, of course, we shall do our best."

2. Like the United States, the British Government has made a number of commitments relative to the maintenance of French sovereignty in North Africa, and on March 17, 1943, the Lord Privy Seal stated in the House of Lords [36] that

"North Africa is French territory";

and

"The relationship of the British and United States Commanders is not that of an occupying power toward the local authority of an occupied region".

Memorandum by President Roosevelt to the Secretary of State [37]

[WASHINGTON,] January 24, 1944.

I saw Halifax last week and told him quite frankly that it was perfectly true that I had, for over a year, expressed the opinion that Indo-China should not go back to France but that it should be administered by an international trusteeship. France has had the country—thirty million inhabitants for nearly one hundred years, and the people are worse off than they were at the beginning.

As a matter of interest, I am wholeheartedly supported in this view by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek [38] and by Marshal Stalin.[39] I see no reason to play in with the British Foreign Office in this matter. The only reason they seem to oppose it is that they fear the effect it would have on their own possessions and those of the Dutch. They have never liked the idea of trusteeship because it is, in some instances, aimed at future independence. This is true in the case of Indo-China.

Each case must, of course, stand on its own feet, but the case of Indo-China is perfectly clear. France has milked it for one hundred years. The people of Indo-China are entitled to something better than that.

F[RANKLIN] D. R[OOSEVELT]

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[36] See *Parliamentary Debates*, House of Lords, 5th series, vol. 126, col. 737.
[37] Copy obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.
[38] President of the National Government of China and Supreme Allied Commander of the China Theater.
[39] Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Soviet Union.

851G.01/46

Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius) to President Roosevelt

[WASHINGTON,] February 17, 1944.

The Civil Affairs Division of the War Department has indicated its desire to proceed at once with civil affairs planning for Indo-China and before doing so has requested political guidance from the State Department.

A number of important decisions depend upon whether French troops are to be used in the military operations to regain control of Indo-China, and whether French nationals are to be used in civil administration and planning. There is ample evidence that the French hope to be consulted and to play a part in driving the Japanese from that area.

Subject to your approval, the State Department will proceed on the assumption that French armed forces will be employed to at least some extent in the military operations, and that in the administration of Indo-China it will be desirable to employ French nationals who have an intimate knowledge of the country and its problems. We would assume further that the use of French forces or civilians would be without prejudice to the question of the ultimate status of French Indo-China and would be related solely to problems directly connected with and flowing from possible military operations.

EDWARD R. STETTINIUS, JR.

851G.01/7-1044

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

July 10, 1944

FE
Mr. Grew

Subject: Views of the President with Respect to Indochina

On March 27, 1943 President Roosevelt, Secretary of State Hull, the Right Honorable Anthony Eden, British Ambassador Lord Halifax, Mr. Strang of the British Foreign Office, Ambassador Winant, Under Secretary Welles, and Mr. Harry Hopkins held a general conference at the White House. In the course of the discussion the President suggested that trusteeship be set up for Indochina. Mr. Eden indicated that he was favorably impressed with this proposal.

On January 3, 1944 Secretary of State Hull and the British Ambassador Lord Halifax held a conversation at the Department in which the British Ambassador remarked that information had come to him from his Foreign Office that in a conversation with the Turks, Egyptians and perhaps others during his recent trip to the Near East, the President spoke rather definitely about what purported to be his views to the effect that Indochina should be taken away from the French and put under an international trusteeship, etc. The Ambassador said that of course he had heard the President make remarks like this during the past year or more but that the question of whether the President's utterances represent final conclusions

becomes

becomes important in view of the fact that it would soon get back to the French, etc. Mr. Hull said that he knew no more about the matter than the Ambassador and had only heard the President make these remarks occasionally just about as the Ambassador had heard him make them. He added that in his judgment, "the President and Mr. Churchill would find it desirable to talk this matter over fully, deliberately and perhaps finally at some future stage."

In a memorandum for the President of January 14 Mr. Hull reported his conversation with the British Ambassador and asked if the President's opinion, previously expressed, that Indochina should be taken away from the French and administered by an international trusteeship, represented his final conclusions on the matter. The Secretary stated that he had informed the British Ambassador that he did not know whether the President had come to any final conclusion on the subject.

On February 17, 1944, in a memorandum for the President from the Under Secretary, on the subject of Civil Affairs problems in Indochina, the statement was made that "Subject to your approval, the State Department will proceed on the assumption that French armed forces will be employed to at least some extent in the military operations, and that in the administration of Indochina it will be desirable to employ French nationals who have an intimate knowledge of the country and its problems." Across the face of the document the President, in reaffirmation of his previously expressed opinion, wrote: "No French help in Indochina ___ country on trusteeship."

On February 25, 1944, in a memorandum to Mr. Dunn, the Under Secretary mentioned the President's reception of the memorandum of February 17 above referred to and stated that the "President expressed the view that no French troops whatever should be used in operations there [Indochina]. He feels the operations should be Anglo-American with international trusteeship following."

[Drafted by K. P. Landon; initialed by J. W. B.]

67-244 O—71—vol. 7——18

851G.00/8-2644

Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Roosevelt

[WASHINGTON,] August 26, 1944.

There is attached herewith a copy of an *aide-mémoire*[40] left with the Department of State this morning by Lord Halifax in which the latter raises certain questions with regard to the French role in military operations in the Far East, with particular reference to French Indo-China.

The Ambassador stated that the question is of considerable urgency owing to Mr. Eden's desire to give an answer on two definite points before the latter leaves London on Tuesday, August 29. The two specific questions on which Mr. Eden desires to give an affirmative answer are:

(1) The attachment to the South East Asia Command Headquarters of a French Military Mission under General Blaizot, and

[40] Not printed, but for substance, see Secretary Hull's memorandum of October 10, p. 775.

(2) The establishment in India of a "Corps Léger d'Intervention" which apparently has already been established at Algiers.

Although these suggestions are ostensibly military in character, they have wide political implications and for this reason they are being referred to you for decision. If more time is needed for decision we can so inform Lord Halifax.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

851G.014/8–2844

Memorandum by President Roosevelt to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, August 28, 1944.

In regard to your memorandum of August 26th on the subject of questions raised by Lord Halifax in reference to French Indo-China, I suggest this matter be deferred until after my meeting with the Prime Minister in Quebec.[41]

The same thing applies to the *Aide-Mémoire* covering the French Committee's proposals.[42] It should be remembered that in relation to (IV) participation in the planning of political warfare in the Far East involves one of the principal partners i.e. China.

F[RANKLIN] D. R[OOSEVELT]

851G.00/8–2644

Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Roosevelt

[WASHINGTON,] October 10, 1944.

FRENCH PARTICIPATION IN LIBERATION OF INDOCHINA

On August 26, 1944 I sent you a memorandum with a copy of a British *aide-mémoire* dated August 25 stating that the French had requested British approval of:

(*a*) Sending a French Military Mission under General Blaizot to be attached to SEAC[43] headquarters;
(*b*) Sending to India a light intervention force for later use in Indochina;
(*c*) Sending, later on, a French expeditionary force to participate in the liberation of Indochina;
(*d*) Participation by the French in planning the war against Japan;
(*e*) Participation by the French in planning political warfare in the Far East.

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[41] Documentation on the Second Quebec Conference, September 11–16, 1944, is scheduled for publication in a subsequent volume of *Foreign Relations*.
[42] For substance of French proposals, see Secretary Hull's memorandum of October 10, *infra*.
[43] South East Asia Command.

The British requested American concurrence on the first two points by August 29. You informed me orally that you planned to discuss the French proposals with the British Prime Minister at Quebec; accordingly no reply has been made to the British *aide-mémoire*.

The Consul at Colombo has reported that on October 4 it was learned from an unimpeachable source that the British plan to bring a French Mission under General Blaizot to SEAC headquarters in the immediate future; that full collaboration is to be given the French Mission which will participate officially in activities of the SEAC; that as American agreement has not been obtained, the Mission will be ostensibly unofficial and will be housed at first in a hotel; that as soon as the concurrence of the Allies is forthcoming it is planned to move the Mission into permanent quarters; and that French parachutists are continuing to be trained by the British in groups of four or five for clandestine activities in Indochina.

As you will recall, the British proposed in their *aide-mémoire* that all details of French political warfare relating to Indochina should be a matter for arrangement between SEAC and the French Military Mission, although, according to the latest information in the Department, Indochina is in the China theater and not in the SEAC theater.

Will you inform me whether the reported sending of this Mission is in accordance with any understanding which may have been reached with Mr. Churchill on the French requests together with an indication of whether you desire the Department to take any action?

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

851G.48/10–1044

Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Roosevelt

[WASHINGTON,] October 13, 1944.

A letter has been received from General Donovan, Director of the Office of Strategic Services, asking the views of the State Department on the following contemplated operations:

"The staff of the Theater Commander for the CBI [44] theater has under consideration operational plans involving the furnishing of supplies and equipment to resistance groups. It is contemplated that these operations will be under American command although there will be collaboration with the French."

In amplification of the foregoing, it was explained orally that the proposed assistance would be to resistance groups within Indochina; that the proposed collaboration would be with the French Military Mission at Chungking; that such collaboration would not prevent

[44] China, Burma, India.

assistance to all resistance groups whether French or native, but that without such collaboration, it would not be possible effectively to assist resistance groups among the French military forces in Indochina, and that this would result in retarding resistance efforts.

Subject to your approval, the Department will reply to General Donovan that it has no objection to furnishing supplies and equipment to resistance groups, both French and native, actually within Indochina, nor to American collaboration with the French Military Mission at Chungking or other French officers or officials in furtherance of the contemplated operations or any other military operations in Indochina for the defeat of Japan.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

851G.00/10–1644

Memorandum by President Roosevelt to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, October 16, 1944.

In regard to this Indochina matter, it is my judgment on this date that we should do nothing in regard to resistance groups or in any other way in relation to Indochina. You might bring it up to me a little later when things are a little clearer.

F[RANKLIN] D. R[OOSEVELT]

851G.01/11–244

Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Office of European Affairs (Matthews)[45]

[WASHINGTON,] November 2, 1944.

According to Ambassador Winant's[46] recollection, Indochina was dealt with only briefly at the White House conversation on March 27, 1943 and in other conversations with Mr. Eden.[47] In the March 27 conversation the question of trusteeship was discussed at some length, Mr. Eden advocating the advantages of national rather than international administration. There was considerable inconclusive discussion as to the degree to which governments other than the one having sovereignty or administrative responsibility for a particular area might properly intervene in matters involving the administration of the area or its relations with other areas. Mr. Eden emphasized

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[45] Addressed to the Deputy Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Ballantine) and to the Chief of the Division of Southwest Pacific Affairs (Moffat).

[46] American Ambassador in the United Kingdom.

[47] For correspondence regarding the visit of Mr. Eden to Washington, March 12–30, 1943, see *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. III, pp. 1 ff.

554–183—65——50

the belief that the goal for small colonial areas should be economic, social, and political advancement and an autonomous status rather than independence, which would subject them to both economic and military dangers.

The Ambassador does not recall that the question of restoring Indochina in full sovereignty in France was discussed at the time but expressed the opinion that the French will be highly sensitive about the restoration of all parts of their colonial empire to the *status quo ante* and that the British Government will firmly support the French position in view of its desire for the closest possible relations with France.

H. FREEMAN MATTHEWS

740.0011 P.W./11–244

Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius) to President Roosevelt

[WASHINGTON,] November 2, 1944.

INDOCHINA

In order that you may be kept fully informed on developments in relation to Indochina, there has been prepared the memorandum attached hereto.

EDWARD R. STETTINIUS, JR.

[Annex]

[WASHINGTON,] November 2, 1944.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN RELATION TO INDOCHINA

The following are recent developments in relation to Indochina: Colombo [43] has reported that:

The British staff at headquarters of SEAC has protested to the British Chiefs of Staff in London against the inclusion of Indochina in the theatre under the new United States Army Commanding General in China, urging that Indochina be included in the SEAC theatre.

The French Military Mission, which is large, has arrived in Ceylon and has received American approval and is now recognized openly and officially. Apparently, General Blaizot has not yet arrived. Baron de Langlade who parachuted into Indochina some weeks ago with a letter of introduction from de Gaulle is also in Ceylon. He spent twenty-four hours with French Army officers in Indochina, and stated, upon his return that a basis for a French resistance movement exists

[43] Seat of the American Consulate in Ceylon.

there, but reportedly declined to say more until Blaizot's arrival. Blaizot, a Lieutenant General, was formerly Chief of Staff in Indochina. He is a "colonial" general.

Although SEAC was advised specifically that only military, and not political, questions might be discussed with the French Mission, political questions are in fact under discussion.

The British SOE [49] which is actively engaged in undercover operations in Indochina has recently received orders from the Foreign Office that they should have nothing to do with any Annamite or other native organizations in Indochina, but are to devote their efforts to the French.

The OWI [50] representative at New Delhi has received indication that the British wish OWI activities directed at the native populations in Thailand and Indochina be eliminated so as not to stir up native resistance to the Japanese and so incite the Japanese to send more troops into those areas. Colombo states that it is apparent SOE desires severely to restrict OSS [51] operations in the SEAC theatre and to give SOE preeminence or, failing that, to establish combined SOE–OSS operations.

British propaganda agencies are emphasizing the recent appeal by the French War Ministry for recruits to participate in the campaign for liberation of Indochina on the ground that news of any French military efforts to recover Indochina would encourage the French in Indochina. OWI has so far refrained from mentioning the French appeal or other phases of French preparations for military participation fearing the adverse effect on the native populations in Indochina and elsewhere in the Far East on the restoration of the *status quo ante* which such preparations would appear to imply. OWI has specifically requested State Department guidance on United States policy in this regard, and have been advised to be silent on the subject despite the anticipated British broadcasts.

General Donovan has submitted to the Secretary of State a report from the OSS representative in SEAC reading in part:

"There can be little doubt that the British and Dutch have arrived at an agreement with regard to the future of Southeast Asia, and now it would appear that the French are being brought into the picture. . . ." [52] It would appear that the strategy of the British, Dutch and French is to win back and control Southeast Asia, making the fullest use possible of American resources, but foreclosing the Americans from any voice in policy matters."

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[49] Secret Operations Executive.
[50] Office of War Information.
[51] Office of Strategic Services.
[52] Omission indicated in the original memorandum.

740.0011 P.W./11–344

Memorandum by President Roosevelt to the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius)

WASHINGTON, November 3, 1944.

I have yours of November second, enclosing memorandum on recent developments in relation to Indo-China. I wish you would make it clear that:

1. We must not give American approval to any French military mission, as it appears we have done in the first sentence of the first paragraph.

2. Referring to the third paragraph, it must be made clear to all our people in the Far East that they can make no decisions on political questions with the French mission or anyone else.

3. We have made no final decisions on the future of Indo-China. This should be made clear.

4. In the final paragraph it is stated the British and Dutch have arrived at an agreement in regard to the future of Southeast Asia and are about to bring the French into the picture. It should be made clear to all our people that the United States expects to be consulted with regard to any future of Southeast Asia. I have no objection to this being made clear to the British, the Dutch or the French.

F[RANKLIN] D. R[OOSEVELT]

851G.01/11–444 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State

PARIS, November 4, 1944—1 p. m.
[Received 2:37 p. m.]

316. ReEmbs 279, November 1, 4 [8] p. m.[53] Chauvel[54] remarked yesterday that France is most desirous of participating to the greatest possible extent its capacity permits in the recovery of Indochina (he recalled that little less than a division has been training at two points in North Africa for service in the Pacific). He added that there is a token detachment of a couple of thousand men already in India. Moreover, he said recruiting has been active and training has already commenced in metropolitan France for a French expeditionary force to the Pacific. It is hoped that these forces may eventually amount to two normal divisions. Personnel is to be drawn from the regular army and the FFI;[55] the whole force is to be under the command of General Blaizot (Corps d'Armée) who recently arrived in India.

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[53] Not printed.
[54] Jean Chauvel, of the French Foreign Office.
[55] Forces Françaises de l'Intérieur.

General Blaizot has been instructed to report to Lord Louis Mountbatten.[55]

Adverting to France's primary interest in Indochina, Chauvel made the point that the French Government is interested not only in a French force in India but also would be interested in French units to be included in forces which might strike from the Philippines toward Indochina if such plans were on foot.

CAFFERY

740.0011 P.W./11-2344

The British Ambassador (Halifax) to the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius)

WASHINGTON, November 23, 1944.

MY DEAR ED: I send you herewith an *Aide-Mémoire* concerning proposals for the use of the French in pre-operational activities in Indo-China.

This is a matter which Mountbatten and all of us have very much at heart. Until we have the all-clear from your side he cannot effectively carry out sabotage etc. activities which he is satisfied should contribute very considerably to his task.

You will see that the matter is urgent and I would be grateful if you could let us have a very early reply.

V. sin[cerely,] HALIFAX

[Annex]

The British Embassy to the Department of State

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

1. In August last His Majesty's Government invited the concurrence of the United States Government in the following proposals:

(1) The establishment of a French military mission with the South East Asia Command. This would facilitate the work of the Secret Operations Executive and of the Office of Strategic Services and would serve as the nucleus of the operational headquarters which may be required later. The function of the mission would be primarily to deal with matters concerning French Indo China and it would not participate in questions of general strategy. It would, therefore, be much on the same basis as the Dutch and Chinese missions attached to the South East Asia Command.

(2) The establishment in India of a "Corps Léger d'Intervention" composed at the start of 500 men and designed to operate exclusively in Indo China on Japanese lines of communication. The activities of

[55] Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia Command.

this body would correspond to those of the American and British Secret Operational organizations and its establishment could be without prejudice to the wider question of from what sources French forces participating in the Far East should be equipped.

(3) French participation in the planning of political warfare in the Far East. This would be a matter for arrangement between the South East Asia Command and the French Military Mission.

2. The United States Chiefs of Staff, from a military point of view concurred with these proposals except that they believe that French participation in the planning of political warfare should be restricted to the area of the South East Asia Command. No further action could be taken by them in this matter as it was understood that the President had expressed the desire first to discuss the question of French Indo China orally with the Prime Minister.

3. The United States Chiefs of Staff took occasion to point out that in their view, French Indo China was part, not of South East Asia Command, but of the China Theatre and was an American sphere of strategic responsibility. They recognised that an oral understanding had been come to between Admiral Mountbatten and the Generalissimo by which both Commanders would be free to attack Thailand and French Indo China, and boundaries between the two Theatres would be decided at an appropriate time in the light of progress made by the two forces.

4. This agreement was recognised by the Generalissimo after SEXTANT[57] as applying to preoperational activities. It has however never been formally confirmed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

5. No further steps could be taken in obtaining the necessary approval by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the proposals outlined in paragraph 1 of this *aide-mémoire* until the President and the Prime Minister had had an opportunity to discuss them. It was anticipated that this discussion would take place at the Quebec Conference, but in fact the subject was never raised. Consequently no further progress has been made in this matter which is becoming increasingly urgent.

6. Admiral Mountbatten is strongly of the opinion that useful and important work on irregular lines could immediately be done in French Indo China. The French Army and Civil Service are unquestionably anxious to take part in the liberation of the country from the Japanese and constitute virtually a well-organised and ready-made Maquis.[58] The secret organisations operating from South East Asia Command have made contact with these elements

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[57] Code word for the Cairo Conference of December, 1943; for correspondence on this Conference, see *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943.

[58] French underground force.

and are now in regular communication with them. All that is necessary to exploit the situation is the presence in South East Asia Command of the necessary French personnel from whom alone the French in French Indo China will take the direction necessary to produce the action required.

7. Admiral Mountbatten has pointed out that French Indo China constitutes an area of vital importance to the operation of his Command since it lies on the Japanese land and air reinforcement route to Burma and Malaya. Irregular activities therefore on the lines envisaged in the proposals which are the subject of this *aide-mémoire* are for him a matter of urgency.

8. His Majesty's Government, therefore, earnestly hope that the United States Government will concur as to the desirability and urgency of pushing on with the irregular operations outlined above and will take such action as will make possible the issue of a directive by the Combined Chiefs of Staff (*a*) confirming the oral understanding already existing between the Generalissimo and Admiral Mountbatten, and (*b*) approving the program set out in the opening paragraph of this *aide-mémoire*. Such action would in no way prejudice the question of the ultimate settlement of the boundary between the China Theatre and the South East Asia Command, which, by the agreement between Admiral Mountbatten and the Generalissimo, is at present left open, nor the wider question of the participation of regular French armed forces in the Far Eastern War.

WASHINGTON, 22 November, 1944.

851G.01/12-2744

Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Roosevelt

[WASHINGTON,] December 27, 1944.

With reference to the British *aide-mémoire* of November 22, requesting approval of the French Military Mission to the Southeast Asia Command and French military participation in the liberation of Indochina, a proposed reply to which was sent to you with a memorandum on December 11,[59] the British are obviously perturbed about the situation.

On December 8 Lord Halifax called at his request and stressed to me the importance of a prompt reply.[60]

Ambassador Winant has now reported that Mr. Bennett, head of the Far Eastern Department in the British Foreign Office, has expressed his concern that the United States apparently has not yet de-

[59] Memorandum not printed; proposed reply not found in Department files.
[60] Memorandum by the Secretary of State of this conversation not printed.

termined upon its policy towards Indochina. Mr. Bennett stated that it would be difficult to deny French participation in the liberation of Indochina in light of the increasing strength of the French Government in world affairs, and that unless a policy to be followed toward Indochina is mutually agreed between our two Governments, circumstances may arise at any moment which will place our two Governments in a very awkward situation. Although Mr. Bennett was expressing his personal views only, Mr. Winant stated his belief that the Foreign Office generally shares these views.

In a conversation yesterday Lord Halifax again referred to the importance which his Government attaches to a prompt decision on the questions raised in his *aide-mémoire*.

EDWARD R. STETTINIUS, JR.

EXTRACT FROM STETTINIUS DIARY [1]

Regarding the French saboteurs for Indo-China, to serve under Mountbatten, the President replied to Secretary Stettinius on January 1 (1945):

> I still do not want to get mixed up in any Indo-China decision. It is a matter for postwar.— ... I do not want to get mixed up in any military effort toward the liberation of Indo-China from the Japanese.— You can tell Halifax that I made this very clear to Mr. Churchill. From both the military and civil point of view, action at this time is premature.

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[1] Copy in HD.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: January 2, 1945

JAN 2 2 1945

SUBJECT: French Indo-China

JAN 3 1945

PARTICIPANTS: The Secretary
Lord Halifax

OFFICE OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
DIRECTOR
JAN 5 1945
MR. CUNN
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

COPIES TO: A-D U [illegible] SE & SP

DIRECTOR
JAN 8 1945
MR. [illegible]

Lord Halifax called upon me today at his request. He inquired if I had anything to tell him relative to the request for French agents to be sent to Indo-China, which Lord Mountbatten had requested. I replied that I had just received a note from the President saying that he could not agree to this step at the present time. The Ambassador expressed his disappointment and said he would report this decision to London immediately.

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FILED
JAN 22 1945

A-D-Dunn

#5905

WAR DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON, D.C.

DIVISION OF SOUTHEAST PACIFIC AFFAIRS
JAN 13 1945
OFFICE OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

JAN 9 1945
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
JAN 9 1945
DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

JAN 2 1945

OFFICE OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JAN 17 1945
Department of State

File

The Honorable,

The Secretary of State.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

Reference is made to your letter of December 22, 1944, in which you suggest that I may wish to consider whether American participation in certain actions regarding a French Expeditionary Force to participate in the liberation of Indochina and a light intervention force for clandestine operations in Indochina is consistent with the instructions from the President.

note 851G.01

The French have communicated their plans to form two divisions for Far Eastern service to the Combined Chiefs of Staff who are now considering the matter. The U.S. Chiefs of Staff are aware of the President's instructions.

With regard to the report that weekly conversations are being held between representatives of SHAEF's Intelligence Section and representatives of the French General Staff, British SOE and OSS, to discuss Far Eastern affairs, General Eisenhower has been furnished the President's instructions for his guidance in the matter of American participation.

Sincerely yours,

Henry L. Stimson

Secretary of War.

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740.0011 P.W./2-645 : Telegram

The Ambassador in China (Hurley) to the Secretary of State

CHUNGKING, February 6, 1945—2 p. m.
[Received 2:25 p. m.]

177. ReEmbs 116, January 26, 3 p. m.[1] (1) Following is substance of interview of February 2 between French Military Attaché and General Wedemeyer[2] which latter has authorized me to report to State Department: Japanese are now assuming a more exacting and arrogant role in Indochina where they are concentrating stronger forces. Should they demand that French troops disarm and disband, those who can will disperse into hills where they will continue to conduct underground and guerilla activities, but some units may be compelled to retire to Yunnan. In such event, they would urgently require medical and communications equipment. He expressed special concern over the attitude of the Chinese toward those troops who might be forced over the frontier into China and suggested that a competent member of the French mission now with General Olatratten be despatched to Chungking as liaison officer at American headquarters here.

(2) Consonant with standing instructions from War and State Departments, General Wedemeyer reports he has maintained noncommittal policy vis-à-vis Indochina. In this particular instance he states he informed French Military Attaché that situation latter described was probably well known to leaders of French and American Governments and that it would have to be dealt with by competent higher authorities. This Embassy has consistently advised the French here that policy on Indochina must originate in Washington and Paris, not in Chungking. Wedemeyer states that French are voluntarily furnishing valuable information to his headquarters and 14th Air Force and would like this to be continued.

HURLEY

[1] Not printed.

[2] Lt. Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer, Commanding General of United States Forces, China Theater.

YALTA CONFERENCE

Extract from Memorandum of Conversation between President Roosevelt and Marshal Stalin, Livadia Palace, February 8, 1945, 3:45 p.m.[1]

THE PRESIDENT then said he also had in mind a trusteeship for Indochina. He added that the British did not approve of this idea as they wished to give it back to the French since they feared the implications of a trusteeship as it might affect Burma.

MARSHAL STALIN remarked that the British had lost Burma once through reliance on Indochina, and it was not his opinion that Britain was a sure country to protect this area. He added that he thought Indochina was a very important area.

THE PRESIDENT said that the Indochinese were people of small stature, like the Javanese and Burmese, and were not warlike. He added that France had done nothing to improve the natives since she had the colony. He said that General de Gaulle had asked for ships to transport French forces to Indochina.

MARSHAL STALIN inquired where de Gaulle was going to get the troops.

THE PRESIDENT replied that de Gaulle said he was going to find the troops when the President could find the ships, but the President added that up to the present he had been unable to find the ships.

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[1]"Handbook of Far Eastern Conference Discussions" (Historical Division Research Project No. 62, November 1949), pp. E24-E25, top secret.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

February 14, 1945

Mr. Culbertson
Mr. Hickerson
Mr. Dunn

MR. HICKERSON
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

With reference to the attached despatch from Chungking, I fear that there is a lump in the General's mashed potatoes. I gather that he speaks his mind to the representatives of the "imperialistic powers" and then announces that he is not responsible for our policy. All in all it strikes me as a rather extraordinary performance.

The attached note from the French is also an extraordinary document for one Embassy to deliver to another.

A-D
MAR 9 1945
MR. DUNN
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AFFAIRS
FEB 28 1945
OFFICE OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

WE:JCHBonbright:BS

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Chungking, China
January 31, 1945

DIVISION OF CHINESE AFFAIRS
FEB 28 1945
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

No. 111

Subject: Position of French Provisional Government in regard to Indochina.

RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
FEB 5

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

Sir:

Mr. Achilles Clarac, Counselor of the French Embassy, called on Counselor Atcheson on January 26, 1945 and handed him the enclosed "note" in French with English translation which he requested be forwarded to the American Government. The note appears to be self-explanatory. Mr. Atcheson made no comment to Mr. Clarac in regard to its contents.

I am forwarding the note without taking any other action pending instructions from the Department in regard to policy toward Indochina. So far as I am personally concerned, I have let the diplomatic representatives of the so-called imperialistic governments with interests in southeast Asia know that I am personally opposed to imperialism but that I am not making the policy of the United States on that subject. I have remarked to them that the United States is committed to the proposition that governments should derive their just powers from the consent of the governed. I have said that I personally adhere to the principles of the Atlantic Charter which provides that we shall "respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live". I have commented that French imperialism and French monopolies in Indochina seem to me to be in conflict with those principles. However, I have emphasized, as indicated above, that I am personally not making the policy of my Government. I have accordingly suggested to the French that they should look to Washington and Paris and not to us here for clarification of America's policy in regard to Indochina.

In connection with my opinion on this subject I refer also to the speeches made early in the war by Prime Minister Churchill, Secretary Hull and President Roosevelt which indicate clearly the principles of liberty for which we are fighting. These principles are also set out definitely in the Atlantic Charter.

AIR MAIL

One aspect of the maneuvers in China of the imperialistic powers which has struck me since the beginning of my sojourn here is the assistance rendered to them (especially to the British) by American lend lease. The British intelligence and other agencies in China are supplied by air in lend lease planes. General A. Carton de Wiart, Personal Representative of Mr. Churchill and head of most of the widespread British intelligence system in China, has a personal American lend lease plane. It has been my observation that British agents here are opposed--some of them frankly so--to our policy of working for a strong, united and democratic China. China is not, of course, the only part of the world in which American lend lease has been used, is being used and will be used for the purpose of defeating the principles for which we profess to be fighting this war. I do not blame the British or other lend lease beneficiary governments for employing lend lease or other aid to attain their ends. I feel that it is at least in part our fault that they are able so to do. From my observations in China I am of the opinion that responsibility for this situation rests in considerable measure upon ourselves for failure to implement concretely the policy to which we are committed. The apparent continuing lack of affirmative American policy on the question of the future status of Indochina will eventually result in a vitiation of what I understand to be among the fundamentals of our war aims insofar as that country is concerned.

Respectfully yours,

Patrick J. Hurley

Enclosure:
As stated. att.

Ozalid original to the Department

PJH:rcb

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(Enclosure to Despatch No. 111, dated January 31, 1945, from the American Embassy, Chungking, China.)

GOUVERNEMENT PROVISOIRE DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANCAISE
AMBASSADE DE FRANCE EN CHINE

No. ..... Tchongking, le 20th January 1945

N O T E

The political position taken by the Provisional Government of the French Republic regarding Indochina is plain. A few sentences will be sufficient to make it clear.

First, France cannot admit any discussion about the principle of her establishment in Indochina. Her presence founded on agreements consistent with international law and established on the immense task carried out by her for the sake of the Indochinese population has never been disputed by any Power. The occupation of Indochina by the Japanese has not changed anything in that state of things. This occupation is nothing but a war incident similar to the invasion by the Japanese forces of Malaya, of the Netherlands East Indies and Burma. The activity of the underground movement, the formation of the expeditionary forces that we are ready to send to the Far East, are a clear proof of the energy with which France intends to take part in the liberation of those of her territories that have been momentarily torn away from her by the enemy.

This being clear, the French Government are prepared to consider with its allies all the measures that may be taken to insure security and peace for the future in the Pacific area; it expects that its participation in those measures will be the one it is entitled to get owing to the importance of French interests in the Far East.

Furthermore, the French Government has already fixed at the Brazzaville conference the principles of the policy it means to follow in its overseas possessions. Accordingly it will set up together with the populations concerned the status of Indochina on a basis that will secure for the Union a satisfactory autonomy within the frame of the French Empire. Besides, Indochina will be granted an economic regime that will enable her to profit widely by the advantages of international competition. Such decisions, having no international character, come within the competence of the French Government only. Thoroughly aware of the importance of the principles at stake in the present war, France will not shrink from her responsibilities.

For the time being, however, France's concern in the Far East is mainly military. As early as June 1943, the French Committee of National Liberation made it known to its allies that it considered that zone as one where it would be extremely desirable for all the interested parties to set up a thorough military collaboration. On the 4th of October 1943, it decided to form an Expeditionary Force that would take part in western Pacific operations and in the liberation of Indochina. In the meanwhile the French Government has established in Indochina itself a network of connections with the French and Indochinese underground. By this action, the efficacity of which has been proved by the French Forces of the Interior in France, it will support the assault of the forces attacking from without and help them in their task in a way that can be decisive.

The French Government has informed Washington and London of all the measures it has taken in that respect. It asked several times that the Expeditionary Forces should be sent on the spot and used to the best; but the answer was that the decision belonged to President Roosevelt and the Combined Chiefs of Staff. This agreement has not yet been given. Yet, the French Government is prepared to have its expeditionary forces used on the American as well as on the British theatre of operations. Considering therefore the part France is entitled to ask and ready to take in the military operations in the Pacific, it would be advisable that she should be admitted to the Pacific War Council and particularly to the Sub-Committee responsible for the operations involving French Indochina./.

740.0011 PW/3–1345 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State

PARIS, March 13, 1945—7 p. m.
[Received March 14—1 : 23 p. m.]

1196. General de Gaulle [12] asked me to come to see him at 6. He spoke in very quiet, affable, friendly fashion, but this is what he said: "We have received word that our troops still fighting in Indochina have appealed for aid to your military authorities in China and the British military authorities in Burma. We have received word that they replied that under instructions no aid could be sent.["] They were given to understand that the British simply followed our lead.

He said also that several expeditionary forces for Indochina had been prepared: Some troops were in North Africa, some in southern France and some in Madagascar, and the British had promised to transport them but at the last minute they were given to understand that owing to American insistence they could not transport them. He observed: "This worries me a great deal for obvious reasons and it comes at a particularly inopportune time. As I told Mr. Hopkins [13] when he was here, we do not understand your policy. What are you driving at? Do you want us to become, for example, one of the federated states under the Russian aegis? The Russians are advancing apace as you well know. When Germany falls they will be upon us. If the public here comes to realize that you are against us in Indochina there will be terrific disappointment and nobody knows to what that will lead. We do not want to become Communist; we do not want to fall into the Russian orbit, but I hope that you do not push us into it."

He then went on to say that difficulties were being created too in regard to the promised armament—difficulties he could not understand unless that were part of our policy too. I told him I had been given to understand that the armament was arriving here as promised.

In any event, I said, I would telegraph at once to Washington all that he had said.

CAFFERY

[12] Gen. Charles de Gaulle, Head of the Provisional French Government.

[13] Harry L. Hopkins, Special Assistant to President Roosevelt.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington

March 16, 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Indo-China.

Communications have been received from the Provisional Government of the French Republic asking for:

(1) Assistance for the resistance groups now fighting the Japanese in Indo-China.

(2) Conclusion of a civil affairs agreement covering possible future operations in Indo-China.

These memoranda have been referred to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in order to obtain their views concerning the military aspects of the problems, and I shall communicate with you further on the subject upon receipt of the Joint Chiefs' reply.

Attached herewith is the text of a recent telegram from Ambassador Caffery describing his conversation with General de Gaulle on the subject of Indo-China. From this telegram and de Gaulle's speech of March 14, it appears that this Government may be made to appear responsible for the weakness of the resistance to Japan in Indo-China. The British may likewise be expected to encourage this view. It seems to me that without prejudicing in any way our position regarding the future of Indo-China we can combat this trend by making public our desire to render such assistance as may be warranted by the circumstances and by the plans to which we are already committed in the Pacific area. To this end I attach a draft of a suggested statement for publication, subject to your approval, by the State Department.

/s/ E. R. Stettinius, Jr.

Enclosures:
1. Proposed Statement.
2. Copy of telegram from Ambassador Caffery, [not included here].

PROPOSED STATEMENT

The action of the Japanese Government in tearing away the veil with which it for so long attempted to cloak its domination of Indo-China is a direct consequence of the ever-mounting pressure which our arms are applying to the Japanese Empire. It is a link in the chain of events which began so disastrously in the summer of 1941 with the Franco-Japanese agreement for the "common defense" of Indo-China. It is clear that this latest step in the Japanese program will in the long run prove to be of no avail.

The Provisional Government of the French Republic has requested armed assistance for those who are resisting the Japanese forces in Indo-China. In accordance with its constant desire to aid all those who are willing to take up arms against our common enemies, this Government will do all it can to be of assistance in the present situation, consistent with plans to which it is already committed and with the operations now taking place in the Pacific. It goes without saying that all this country's available resources are being devoted to the defeat of our enemies and they will continue to be employed in the manner best calculated to hasten their downfall.

851G.00/3-1745

THE WHITE HOUSE
Washington

March 17, 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR

The Secretary of State

By direction of the President, there is returned herewith Secretary of State Memorandum of 16 March, subject Indo-China, which includes a proposed statement on the Japanese action in Indo-China.

The President is of the opinion that it is inadvisable at the present time to issue the proposed statement.

/s/ William D. Leahy

740.0011 P.W./3–1945

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State (Dunn)

[WASHINGTON.] March 19, 1945.

Yesterday afternoon (Sunday) about six o'clock the French Ambassador called me by telephone and asked whether he could come to see me. I immediately offered to go to the Embassy, which he accepted. When I arrived there he informed me that under instructions from his Government, Admiral Fenard was taking up with Admiral Leahy [16] the following matter.

[16] Adm. William D. Leahy, Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy.

He said the Fourteenth Air Force of the United States forces in China had planes loaded and all ready to transport supplies and munitions to units of the French forces in Indo-China which were resisting the imposition of total control over Indo-China by the Japanese, this imposition having been recently inaugurated by the Japanese forces in Indo-China. He said the French Government had direct reports from the resistance forces in Indo-China to the effect that if they were granted assistance they would be able to make a very good showing against the Japanese effort to take over the whole country. He said that his Government requested that authorization be given by the United States Chiefs of Staff to send these supplies forward to the French; that Admiral Fenard was making this request of Admiral Leahy and he asked the State Department to make a similar request of the President for authorization for United States assistance to these resistance forces.

Mr. McCloy, Assistant Secretary of War, telephoned me this morning to say that Admiral Fenard had made the above request to Admiral Leahy and that Admiral Leahy had authorized the War Department to send a message to General Wedemeyer giving him authority to send whatever assistance could be spared without interfering with the war effort of the American and Chinese forces. Mr. McCloy said he would send me a copy of the authorization which was being sent to General Wedemeyer, for our information. I am asking Mr. Bohlen [17] to discuss this matter a little further with Admiral Leahy as it has occurred to me that it might be well for this Department to be in a position to inform the French Ambassador here of the action which has been taken in response to his request and also to inform Ambassador Caffery in Paris in order that he may know the latest developments in this situation.

[17] Charles E. Bohlen, Assistant to the Secretary of State.

JAMES CLEMENT DUNN

SWNCC

THE STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE
WASHINGTON, D. C.

WE
Wm Bonbright

March 20, 1945

ASSISTANT SECRETARY
A-D
MAR 20 1945
MR. DUNN
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Document Must Be Returned to

A-D
Mr. Dunn,

The attached memorandum and enclosure, dated March 19, regarding Indo-China is transmitted for your information.

R.E.C.

851G.00/3-2045

DDR
Ans. 4
Rev.
Cat.

cc: Mr. Dooman
Mr. Bonbright

FILED
JUN 29 19

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851G.00/3-2045

By Authority of A.C. of S. CPD
3/19/45 (RRS)

PARAPHRASE MESSAGE TO CHENNAULT FROM WEDEMEYER
(19 March 1945)

Fourteenth Air Force is reported by Admiral Fenard to be ready to aid French resistance, but must first receive permission from Washington. The U. S. Government's present attitude, according to informal statement, is to aid French, providing such assistance does not interfere with operations now planned. Further details will follow, but for the present, within the limitations imposed by above policy, operations against the Japanese in Indo-China to aid the French may be undertaken by the Fourteenth Air Force.

Cleared by Col. McCormack (WDS)

740.00:1 PW/3-1245

The Secretary of State to the French Ambassador (Bonnet)

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to His Excellency the Ambassador of the French Republic and acknowledges the receipt of the Embassy's note No. 303 of March 12, 1945 on the matter of the Japanese occupation of French Indo-China.

The Government of the United States has given most careful and sympathetic consideration to the subject matter of the communication of the Provisional Government of the French Republic. It has also given consideration to all available information in regard to recent events in Indo-China. The deep concern of the Provisional Government in regard to the situation is fully appreciated.

With regard to the request that the Government of the United States intervene with the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the end that Allied Forces in the Far East will furnish immediate assistance to the French resistance in Indo-China, it is noted that this subject is already before the Combined Chiefs of Staff in the form of a letter from General de St. Didier and there accordingly appears to be no reason for further presentation of the matter to the Combined Chiefs of Staff by the Government of the United States at this time.

With regard to the suggestion that the American Air Forces and troops based in China intervene in favor of the French Forces in Indo-China, the Secretary of State is glad to confirm the information given the Ambassador orally some days ago that the American Air Forces in China have already assisted the French Forces in Indo-China and have been authorized for the present, in aid of the French, to undertake operations against the Japanese in Indo-China, provided such action does not interfere with operations planned elsewhere. The resources of the Allied Forces in the Far East in men, munitions, and transportation must be concentrated on and employed in attaining our main objectives, and the Ambassador will therefore readily appreciate that no commitment can be given with regard to the amount or character of any assistance which may be provided. However, in appreciation of the importance and urgency which the French Provisional Government attaches to this question, immediate steps are being taken to ascertain whether any further assistance can be given from the China Theater to the resistance groups in Indo-China without jeopardizing the over-all war effort in other areas. The Secretary of State will be happy to keep the Ambassador informed of any further developments in that regard.

WASHINGTON, April 4, 1945.