


AIR LAND SEA BULLETIN



Issue No. 2013-1

Air Land Sea Application (ALSA) Center

January 2013



**SOF
and
Conventional
Force
Interoperability**

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Purpose: The ALSA Center publishes the ALSB three times a year. ALSA is a multi-Service DOD field agency sponsored by the US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC), Navy Warfare Development Command (NWDC), and Curtis E. LeMay Center for Doctrine Development and Education (LeMay Center). This periodical is governed by Army Regulation 25-30, Chapter 10. The ALSB is a vehicle to “spread the word” on recent developments in warfighting concepts, issues, and Service interoperability. The intent is to provide a cross-Service flow of information among readers around the globe.

Disclaimer: Since the ALSB is an open forum, the articles, letters, and opinions expressed or implied herein should not be construed as the official position of TRADOC, MCCDC, NWDC, LeMay Center, or ALSA Center.

Submissions: We solicit articles and reader’s comments. Contributions of 1,500 words or less are ideal. Submit contributions, double-spaced in MS Word. Include the author’s name, title, complete unit address, telephone number, and email address. Graphics can appear in an article, but a **separate computer file for each graphic and photograph (photos must be 300 dpi) must be provided.** Send email submissions to alsadirector@langley.af.mil. The ALSA Center reserves the right to edit content to meet space limitations and conform to the ALSB style and format.

Next issue: May 2013; Submission DEADLINE: COB 1 February 2013. The theme of this issue is “Joint Close Air Support (JCAS) and Joint Application of Firepower (JFIRE).”

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Soldiers with Special Operations Task Force–South prepare to load an all-terrain vehicle on to a CH-47 Chinook helicopter in preparation for a rapid offload during operations in the Maruf District, Kandahar Province, Afghanistan on 1 October 2010. (Photo by SPC Jesse LaMorte, US Army)

DIRECTOR'S COMMENTS

Air Land Sea Application (ALSA) Center personnel are currently working on 25 of our 35 multi-Service tactics, techniques, and procedures (MTTP) publications. Also, we are working to expand the use of information technology to reach more people in more innovative and efficient ways. These efforts support our goal to make ALSA MTTP more timely, relevant and compelling, to meet the immediate needs of the warfighter.

One of our new initiatives is an email hosting service. We are leveraging this resource to expand our outreach and improve our ability to communicate with the warfighter and doctrine communities. Our first attempts at using this service to contact the thousands of subscribers in the ALSA database have shown positive results. Through the hosting service, we have increased our readership by more than a 150 subscribers in the last month. If you have not subscribed and want to receive notification of release dates for MTTP revisions or other publications, visit the ALSA website, <http://www.alsa.mil>. Alternately, you can also click through the subscription link on page 25 of this publication. Also, we encourage our readers to invite friends and colleagues, who may be interested in ALSA products, to subscribe.

Since publishing the last ALSB in September, ALSA has revised several MTTP. These are Brevity; Survival, Evasion, and Recovery; Airborne Target Coordination and Attack Radar Systems (ATCARS); and Joint Application of Fire Power (JFIRE). They are available on the ALSA and Joint Doctrine Education and Training Information System (JDEIS) websites.

Our last ALSB was titled Attack the Network (AtN). We received a number of positive responses about the articles and thank the authors and organizations who contributed them.

The intent of this ALSB is to explore the interoperability of conventional forces (CF) and special operations forces (SOF) in current and future operations. The Army Chief

of Staff, GEN Raymond T. Odierno, emphasized this need in a New York Times article dated May 2012. He said, "the Army will need to preserve and enhance its relationship with joint special operations forces. The evolution of this partnership over the past decade has been extraordinary, and the ties can become even stronger as we continue to develop new operational concepts, enhance our training and invest in new capabilities."

The articles in this bulletin explore challenges and lessons learned from CF/SOF experiences by warfighters from Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. The first article, written by Maj Rob Burrell, US Marine Corps, examines "Joint Doctrine for Unconventional Warfare." The second article, "Articulating the Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational Biometrics Operating Model ...", written by the US Africa Command Identity Resolution Team, focuses on interoperability throughout multiple layers of bureaucracy.

"Integrating Conventional Aviation with SOF ...," was written by LTC Charles Bowery of the United States (US) Army Aviation Center of Excellence. It addresses predeployment preparation and integration of conventional aviation assets in support of SOF. The fourth article, written by LtCol Adam Tharp, US Marine Corps, "Integrating Village Stability Operations into a Conventional Force Battlespace" provides lessons learned integrating CF and SOF.

In the final article, MAJ Greg Stroud, US Army, explores, "Unity of Command – Should Guide SOF and GPF Integration."

Our next ALSB will be published May 2013. The topic is Joint Close Air Support and Joint Application of Firepower. To submit articles for consideration, email alsaA@langley.af.mil no later than 1 February 2013. As always, we value your feedback; so, let us know how we are doing!



BRUCE V. SONES, Colonel, USA

Director

JOINT DOCTRINE FOR UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE



United States Army Soldiers and Afghan commandos patrol a community in Afghanistan, 3 March 2009. In this environment, non-lethal weapons can play a critical role in unconventional warfare, where distinguishing between adversaries and innocent civilians is sometimes nearly impossible. (Photo by Petty Officer 2nd Class James Wagner, US Navy)

By Maj. Robert S. Burrell, USMC

Warfare in the 21st Century has changed, and the use of large conventional military forces to achieve the United States' (US') objectives, as in Iraq and Afghanistan, has proven a costly and dangerous option for addressing today's security challenges. Irregular threats – derived from terrorist organizations, intrastate competition, weak and failing states, transnational crime, and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction – have superseded the danger of state versus state confrontation with traditional military weapons and battlefield tactics.¹

The US appears unprepared to successfully influence rapidly evolving aspects of regional instability. In January 2011, social media (e.g., blogs, social-network sites, video sharing, and Twitter) played a significant role in or-

ganizing and sustaining mass protest in Egypt, a major US ally.² In a mere eighteen days, a change in Egyptian government transpired, significantly influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood.³ In February 2011, a rapid Libyan rebellion caught the US off guard, creating more opportunities for non-state actors like the Muslim Brotherhood and Al Qaeda to influence the political landscape. In 2011 and 2012, the US appeared unable to successfully influence a Syrian revolutionary movement toward one consistent with democracy and human rights, as opposed to the intolerance and radicalism of the Muslim Brotherhood and Al Qaeda.⁴ Even more disconcerting, the growing collaboration of transnational criminal organizations with terrorist organizations in ungoverned spaces (e.g., Northwestern Africa) poses a serious threat to international security.

...the growing collaboration of transnational criminal organizations with terrorist organizations in ungoverned spaces ... poses a serious threat to international security.

Irregular threats are not confined to the Middle East and Northern Africa. After six years of repulsive violence in Mexico, an estimated 47,000 people have died as a result of conflict with transnational criminal organizations. US objectives to end government corruption and provide stability in its nearest neighbor have proven unsuccessful, and the potential of a failed state remains.⁵ In order to effectively counter emerging irregular threats, the US should develop joint doctrine for unconventional warfare (UW).

UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE

UW is an increasingly viable US strategic option. UW supports US policy with few resources, low casualty risk, and negates anti-access capabilities of hostile states. The joint definition for UW is: "Activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, and guerilla force in a denied area."⁶

UW supports opposition groups to a state government or occupying power. US objectives range from the coercion of a hostile state, disruption of that state's activities, or complete overthrow of its government. In UW, the US uses a surrogate to pursue its objectives, which is an indirect approach versus the direct application of US military power. Additionally, UW is conducted in a denied area, which is an area unsuitable for a conventional US campaign due to geographic, military, economic, or political factors.

The five pillars of irregular warfare (IW) consist of: UW, foreign internal defense (FID), stability operations (STABOPS), counterterrorism (CT), and counterinsurgency (COIN).⁷ Irregular threats associated with IW activities normally occur simultaneously within the same region. Consequently, a UW campaign must also consider the relationships and activities of allied, neutral, and hostile countries while pro-

viding regional stability and addressing irregular threats within nation states.

THE DOCTRINAL VOID

While UW has a long history in US military operations, its recent attention in joint doctrine is predicated upon the evolution of the other four IW activities. After nearly a decade of confronting irregular threats in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere, the joint staff released Joint Publication (JP) 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, in 2009; JP 3-26, *Counterterrorism*, in 2009; JP 3-22, *Foreign Internal Defense*, in 2010; and JP 3-07, *Stability Operations*, in 2011. With the exception of UW, today's doctrine provides comprehensive guidance on IW activities (i.e., FID, STABOPS, CT, and COIN) across the range of military operations (see figure 1).⁸ In its 2010 memorandum, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) fully recognized the UW doctrinal gap and specifically tasked US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) with leading revision.⁹ The UW joint doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities change recommendation best describes the requirement.

*"UW is not fully discussed in joint doctrine. When referenced, it is only in the context of a capability for SOF [special operations forces]. This lack of sufficient joint doctrine limits understanding of UW, inhibits operational design for planning, and limits integration of other SOF elements in the conduct and support of UW. It also limits the ability of the services to man, train, and equip the GPF [conventional force] to support SOF conducting UW operations. Joint doctrine would establish authoritative guidance for operational behavior of the entire joint force in executing and supporting UW, and, when operationally feasible, would facilitate the ability of joint force commanders to incorporate UW in their operations planning."*¹⁰

As generally outlined in JROC Memorandum 098-11, Joint UW doctrine should expand on: (1) the author-

... lack of sufficient joint doctrine limits understanding of UW, inhibits operational design for planning, and limits integration of other SOF elements in the conduct and support of UW.




Figure 1. Joint Doctrine Relationships Among the Five IW Activities

ities required to conduct operations; (2) the interdependence of SOF and conventional forces; (3) campaign design; (4) coordination with unified action partners; and (5) the use of cyberspace and the importance of human terrain.¹¹

AUTHORITIES TO CONDUCT UW

While the US maintains overt political, economic, and military actions towards a hostile state, UW directed against that same state includes highly sensitive covert and clandestine operations conducted in a hostile environment over an extended period of time. The recently signed USSOCOM directive on UW provides detailed guidance on execution authorities and funding sources available. However, doctrine should describe how the joint force commander should successfully navigate these complex authorities while planning and conducting a UW campaign.¹²

THE INTERDEPENDENCE OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND CONVENTIONAL FORCES

The interdependence of special operations and conventional forces while conducting UW campaigns is a

critical requirement throughout all levels of war (i.e., tactical, operational, and strategic). UW is executed as a campaign. As such, a lone service component like US Army Special Operations Command cannot conduct UW without joint force assistance. While US Army doctrine provides the most significant guidance on UW, joint doctrine is required to meet campaign requirements.¹³ Special operations forces are capable of independent operations within a denied area, and conducting numerous shaping activities over an extended period of time. The joint force commander may designate a joint special operations component in the denied area to coordinate such efforts. Meanwhile, conventional forces can be expected to execute enabling UW support operations from land, sea, air, space, and cyberspace throughout the region and denied area.

The doctrinal void is twofold. First, USSOCOM needs to develop specifically tailored doctrine for theater special operations commands which integrates Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps special operations forces in a UW campaign;¹⁴ and second, joint doctrine needs to address the interde-

... doctrine should describe how the joint force commander should successfully navigate these complex authorities while planning and conducting a UW campaign.

pendence of conventional and special operations forces conducting a UW campaign in the joint operations area. Joint doctrinal considerations include: the coordination required between the geographic combatant command and other joint commands, particularly US Strategic Command and US Cyber Command; and special operations and conventional force interdependence in the maritime environment (based on the strategic importance of sea lines of communication in relation to US seapower).

JOINT FORCE CAMPAIGN DESIGN

UW requires synchronization of national resources in support of national objectives and resistance or insurgency while recognizing the desired end state may be limited to coercion or disruption rather than complete overthrow of the hostile regime. The majority of resources in support of UW derive from outside the denied area, originating from unified action partners, including the Department of Defense, the Department of State, and the intelligence community.¹⁵ Despite great US capacity for diplomatic, informational, military, and economic power, the joint force commander must judiciously apply these assets in support of a resistance movement, recognizing that a self-sustaining insurgency has a greater chance of success than one dependent on external support, which weakens its legitimacy.

Campaign design must resolve the framework (lines of effort) and objectives (decisive points) utilized to achieve US strategy. In the case of an insurgency gaining complete control of a state, the US might enable the resistance through the following lines of effort. Information operations support each of these at all times.

- Resistance gains international and national legitimacy.
- Resistance achieves popular support abroad and in the contested area.

- Resistance delegitimizes the hostile state through subversion and sabotage.

- Resistance develops financial and logistical capacity for self-sustainment.

- Resistance is prepared for transition to the role of the state.

- Guerrilla force operates with impunity against COIN forces.

Figure 2 illustrates an example of lines of effort for US support to an insurgency. Notice US military objectives correlate to resistance goals. Additionally, of the six illustrated, the traditional concept of special forces training guerrillas is only one line of effort. While the UW campaign design follows the joint operational planning process, planners must understand the conceptual framework and operational art particular to UW.

COORDINATION WITH UNIFIED ACTION PARTNERS

The joint force's approach to interorganizational coordination in UW must be fundamentally different than that taken in other campaigns. In the other IW activities (i.e., FID, STABOPS, CT and COIN), the joint force works with the host nation to counter irregular threats. In UW, the joint force coordinates with an underground, auxiliary, or guerrilla force in a hostile state. Collaboration with a resistance movement can be far more complex than with the apparatus of a nation state. For example, in the Arab Spring movements of Egypt, Libya, and Syria, it proved far simpler to communicate with the incumbent government than to locate a singular, authoritative body for each opposition movement. Simultaneously, a number of other governments and organizations have interests in the outcome of the changes brought about by resistance. Unified action partners can include the military forces of partner nations, international organizations, other US Government departments and agencies, nongovernmental

Collaboration with a resistance movement can be far more complex than with the apparatus of a nation state.




Figure 2. An Example of Unconventional Warfare Lines of Effort Coordination with Unified Action Partner-ordination with Unified Action Partners

organizations, and corporations. The ratio and extent of covert and clandestine operations in a UW campaign add more complexity to coordination with unified action partners than in other campaigns.

CYBERSPACE AND HUMAN TERRAIN

UW doctrine needs to integrate the domain of cyberspace and recognize the importance of human terrain. Cyberspace offers access, placement, and influence within the population of a denied area without boots on the ground. Cyberspace offers persistent engagement without the need for sustainment or nonconventional assisted recovery. The joint force recently accepted cyberspace as a warfighting domain (along with land, sea, air, and space), but has yet to fully recognize its importance within UW. Despite the cyber domain's obvious potential, the final coordination draft of JP 3-12, *Cyberspace* (currently awaiting signature at the joint staff) fails to mention UW.

While cyberspace remains critical to UW in the 21st Century, its exploitation requires an understanding of the human dynamics within the operational area. UW requires an appreciation for the environment in which the population lives, but it also requires awareness of the specific individuals driving an insurgency. Mapping the human terrain provides an appreciation of the physical, cultural, and social environmental factors influencing the population within the denied area, while social network analysis identifies key leaders of a resistance despite the typical lack of hierarchical organization. The intelligence gathering activities required for human terrain analysis and social network mapping may require varying degrees of US presence in the denied area; yet, these products can drive cyberspace operations. With these tools, the commander can influence human behavior of populations in favor of resistance goals from a physical distance.

Cyberspace offers access, placement, and influence within the population of a denied area without boots on the ground.

THE WAY AHEAD

As specified by the JROC, the joint force requires expanded doctrine on unconventional warfare. While US Army Special Forces may comprise the friendly main effort in a UW campaign plan, all special operations forces (Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force) perform UW activities. More importantly, the joint force must understand UW, be able to design a UW campaign, and provide conventional force enablers for successful prosecution. Inclusion of the conventional forces, as well as other departments and agencies in future UW exercises and experimentation would go a long way toward establishing habitual roles, responsibilities, and relationships. Simultaneously, an urgent need exists for UW as a national strategic option to address 21st Century challenges. The joint force may require a bridging vehicle between concepts and doctrine to outline the fundamental principles by which the Department of Defense will conduct UW. Whether through a joint doctrinal test publication or some other medium, the time to revolutionize joint doctrine on UW is now.

Major Robert S. Burrell is a graduate of the US Army Special Operations Command Unconventional Warfare Operational Design Course. He is an award-winning US Marine Corps (USMC) historian (*Ghosts of Iwo Jima*, 2006) and currently serves as a doctrine developer at USSOCOM. Opinions stated in this article are his and are not necessarily those of USSOCOM, USMC, or Department of Defense.

ENDNOTES

¹ *Irregular Warfare: Countering Irregular Threats Joint Operating Concept*, Department of Defense, 17 May 2010, 11.

² Lieutenant Colonel Brian Petit, "Social Media and Unconventional Warfare," *Special Warfare*, Spring 2012. Also see Brian Reed, "A Social Network Approach to Understanding an Insurgency," *Parameters*, Summer 2007.

³ Ferry de Kerckhove, "Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood and the Arab Spring," *Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute*, May 2012.

⁴ For more information on US international objectives, see *National Security Strategy*, May 2010.

⁵ Eric L. Olson, "Considering New Strategies for Confronting Organized Crime in Mexico," *Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars*, March 2012.

⁶ Joint Publication 1-02, *Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, Department of Defense, 1 Oct 2012.

⁷ Department of Defense Directive 3000.07, *Irregular Warfare*, Department of Defense, 1 December 2008. Also see *Irregular Warfare: Countering Irregular Threats Joint Operating Concept*, version 2.0 (Department of Defense), 17 May 2010.

⁸ For more information on the relationship of UW with IW activities, see Colonel David S. Maxwell, "Why Does Special Forces Train and Educate for Unconventional Warfare?" *Small Wars Journal*, April 2010.

⁹ (S/NF) Joint Requirements Oversight Council Memorandum 098-11, *UW Joint Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Leadership and Education, Personnel, and Facilities Change Recommendation* (U), 5 July 2011.

¹⁰ (S/NF) U.S. Special Operations Command, *Joint Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Leadership and Education, Personnel, and Facilities Change Recommendation for Unconventional Warfare* (U), 18 August 2010.

¹¹ Also see U.S. Special Operations Command *Unconventional Warfare Doctrine Joint/Interagency Working Group*, 16 May 2012.

¹² (S/NF) U.S. Special Operations Command Directive 525-89, *Unconventional Warfare* (U), 31 May 2012.

¹³ See Army Techniques Publication 3-05.1, *Unconventional Warfare*, (Final Draft), 10 September 2012.

¹⁴ A description of the UW roles and responsibilities between the service components of special operations forces has been recently articulated in (S/NF) U.S. Special Operations Command Directive 525-89, *Unconventional Warfare* (U), 31 May 2012.

¹⁵ Unified action partners are those military forces, governmental and nongovernmental organizations, and elements of the private sector with whom US forces plan, coordinate, synchronize, and integrate during the conduct of operations. For more information see Army Doctrinal Publication (ADP) 3-0 *Unified Land Operations*, 10 October 2011; and Army Doctrinal Reference Publication (ADRP) 3-0 *Unified Land Operations*, 16 May 2012.

... the joint force must understand UW, be able to design a UW campaign, and provide conventional force enablers for successful prosecution.

ARTICULATING THE JOINT, INTERAGENCY, INTER- GOVERNMENTAL, AND MULTINATIONAL BIOMET- RICS OPERATING MODEL IN THE UNITED STATES (US) AFRICA COMMAND AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY



An Afghan man has his retina scanned using a handheld interagency identity detection equipment (HIIDE) system by an unidentified United States Army Soldier 8 June 2012. The HIIDE system scans an individual's biometric information and matches it against an internal database. (Photo by SSGT Frank Inman, US Army)

Biometric capabilities may achieve enabling effects such as the ability to separate, identify, track, and exploit persons of interest

By the USAFRICOM Identity Resolution Team

BIOMETRICS IN BORDER SECURITY, LAW ENFORCEMENT (LE) AND MILITARY OPERATIONS

Biometric capabilities and its integration into various activities including border security, LE and military operations have become extremely useful over the last decade in preventing illegal entry, capturing criminals, protecting American troops, and supporting national security. Biometric data is collected across several modalities (identifiers) because there is no single biometric modality that is best for all implementations, or a single device that collects all modalities. The primary biometric modalities collected include: face, fingerprint, iris, DNA, and palm print.

Biometric capabilities may achieve enabling effects such as the ability to separate, identify, track, and exploit persons of interest (POIs) (i.e., threats, “bad actors”, criminals, known and suspected terrorists (KSTs), special interest aliens (SIAs)) from the populace; promote security and governance; deny threats to freedom of movement; enhance force protection; increase security at access points (areas and facilities); and support identifying and targeting networks.

THE BIOMETRICS PROCESS AND ROLES WITHIN DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (DOD) OPERATIONS

The biometrics process involves collecting, matching, storing, analyzing, and sharing an individual's biometric identifiers and associated infor-

mation. With coordination beforehand and the proper sharing agreements in place, “match/no match” reports may be available to various organizations and vetted users. To initiate the process within DOD, biometric data collection is conducted by both conventional and special operations forces (SOF). Both use the same biometric enrollment equipment and send the data to the same location. POIs, SIAs, or worse, KSTs, will often hide within the general populace. The conventional forces are in a position to gather large amounts of data by enrolling several groups of people at the same time. SOF are in a position to gather highly specific data that, when used with the data collected by conventional forces, may lead to better force protection while enabling various missions.

Leaders play an integral part in planning the use and directing the employment of biometrics to achieve operational success. To ensure biometric capabilities are leveraged to the fullest extent possible to defeat the threat

and enhance protection, it is imperative leaders and collectors understand biometric data may be used globally across all components of the Federal Government and in cooperation with international partners. In situations where leaders are able to co-opt multinational partners by providing them proper biometric training and approved equipment, the desired effect is a reciprocal, surrogate collection capability providing a greater geographic reach.

With our own forces, leaders also must ensure biometric operations are not treated as a “check-the-block” activity. Quality biometric collections will not only lead to a greater degree of force protection for the unit, but will also enhance security across the operational environment. High quality collections result in an efficient and credible database that requires less effort from database managers to correct discrepancies and increases the likelihood of successful matches for all users.

SOF are in a position to gather highly specific data that, when used with the data collected by conventional forces, may lead to better force protection while enabling various missions.



SGT Michael Towey, a soldier with 1st Platoon, Bravo Company, 1st Battalion 23rd Infantry Regiment, takes a picture of a local villager with the HIIDE system in the Naib Kalay area of Afghanistan, 23 June 2012. (Photo by SGT Matt Young, US Army)

MIGRATION IN EAST AFRICA: A COMPLEX SITUATION AND INCREASING THREAT

Migration in East Africa is due to poverty, malnutrition, drought, ethnic strife, and ineffective governance, among other concerns. It enables unchecked movement and anonymity of “bad actors” that intermingle with the migrating population. These actors may include illegal traffickers, transnational criminals, SIAs, KSTs, and violent extremists and their affiliates (e.g., al Qaida affiliated al-Shabaab terrorists, or pirates) who may act to influence and/or recruit other migrants. The affected nations are Kenya, Tanzania, Sudan, South Sudan, Uganda, Ethiopia, and Somalia. The officials in these countries are unable to determine and/or verify identities, since most of the migrating populations have no credible documentation. Many actors remain within these countries as anonymous, undocumented persons who carry out criminal activities or perpetrate terrorist acts (2011 into 2012 saw an increase in improvised explosive device attacks in Kenya, Somalia and Nigeria). Others continue to other parts of Africa, Europe, and North America, usually passing through the US southwestern border.

EMPLOYMENT OF BIOMETRICS: A COLLABORATIVE OPPORTUNITY IN THE MIDST OF COMPLEXITY

The situation in the US Africa Command (AFRICOM) area of responsibility (AOR) has high interest from several organizations across the joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational (JIIM) environment with various levels of commitment of resources. These organizations include the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the International Criminal Police Organization, affected partner nations, and US Government (USG) departments. USG departments include the US Agency for International Development (Department of State), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) (Department of Justice), US Im-

migration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and Customs and Border Patrol (Department of Homeland Security (DHS)), and AFRICOM, US Special Operations Command, and the Biometrics Identity Management Agency (DOD).

To address employing biometrics, AFRICOM and ICE Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) collaborated to produce an initial concept of operations partnering both organizations. Because of the partnership, AFRICOM conducted training on and temporarily loaned biometric collection devices to HSI agents to conduct the Biometric Identification Transnational Migration Alert Program (BITMAP). They also had a bilateral agreement to conduct BITMAP with the Republic of Kenya.

First conducted in US Southern Command’s AOR, BITMAP is an effort to identify and combat extraterritorial criminal organizations that may pose a threat to the national security of the US and foreign partners. It also supports increasing the ability of the USG to identify the movements of SIAs who may be members of or sympathizers with extremist or terrorist groups attempting to gain entry into the US. BITMAP uses a portable biometric collection device (Secure Electronic Enrollment Kit II (SEEK II)) to obtain forensic-quality fingerprints, latent fingerprints, iris images, photos, and other biometric data.



Figure 1. SEEK II

Many actors remain within these countries as anonymous, undocumented persons who carry out criminal activities or perpetrate terrorist acts



Pictured are the hands of an unidentified Afghan National Army soldier, left, and a United States Army Soldier, right, recording an elder's fingerprint Shah Karez, Afghanistan, 9 March 2012. The American Soldier is with the 5th Battalion, 20th Infantry Regiment. (Photo by SPC Kristina Truluck, US Army)

The SEEK II device collects biological and biographical contextual data of POIs and matches fingerprints and iris images against an internal biometrics enrollment database. The device is lightweight (3 lbs., 6 oz.), is capable of multimodal collection and matching, compatible with the DOD's Automated Biometric Identification System, compliant with current software standards, and fully operational in direct sunlight. Figure 1 is a picture of SEEK II.

DEVELOPING A BIOMETRICS OPERATING MODEL FOR AFRICOM

In mid-August 2012, personnel from AFRICOM headquarters in Stuttgart, Germany, supported the DHS ICE Regional Field Office in Pretoria, South Africa, by providing equipment to the Field Office and conducting a train-the-trainer course on SEEK II devices for the HSI agents. The newly trained HSI agents executed a mission in September 2012. The field office conducted the initial BITMAP operation in Kenya and plans to manage future BITMAP efforts south of the Sahel (an area south of the Sahara Desert that encompasses about

ten countries). With agreement and support from the Kenyan Ministry of Internal Security, the newly trained ICE HSI special agents trained select Kenyan LE personnel who later deployed along migration routes to conduct biometric collections. A milestone for BITMAP in Africa was reached when Kenyan LE submitted data successfully through DOD, DHS, and FBI national databases, and thus effectively established a new JIIM biometrics operating model for AFRICOM.

THE "SO WHAT?" OF BIOMETRICS IN AFRICOM

By providing support to our International partners in Africa through the integration of biometric capabilities, the US is enabling to separate, identify, track, and exploit the threat (i.e., KSTs, SIAs, and criminals). Also, this will help prevent threat elements from harming our African partners or those in other parts of the world; or worse attacking America and American interests. The security and stability of our partner nations in Africa, and across the global community, help secure and defend our homeland.

... will help prevent threat elements from harming our African partners or those in other parts of the world ...

INTEGRATING CONVENTIONAL AVIATION WITH SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES (SOF) IS LIKE RUNNING A MARATHON AT A SPRINT PACE



An AH-64D Longbow from Task Force Dragon, 1-4 Aviation Regiment departs a refueling point in Helmand Province, Afghanistan during a SOF mission in March 2011. (Photo by SGT Richard Carreon, US Army).

By LTC Charles R. Bowery, Jr., USA

When 1st Battalion, 4th Aviation Regiment (attack helicopter battalion) received an order in January 2010 to deploy to Afghanistan in support of special operations forces (SOF), few, if any of the members of the battalion had SOF experience. Seven months later, the unit began a year of combat operations, primarily in a direct support (DS) role of SOF. This fact alone does not make the unit unique in any way. The battalion did, however, learn some valuable lessons worth sharing with other units embarking on a similar mission. In Afghanistan today, a significant percentage of rotary-wing sorties support SOF in some way. These include rotary wing fires (either close combat attack

or close air support (CAS)); air assault or air movement of SOF elements; non-traditional intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; and combat service support through aerial resupply and passenger movements.

All conventional aviation formations can benefit from the best practices learned as a result of 1st Battalion, 4th Aviation Regiment's Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) 10-11 deployment.

TRAINING AND PREDEPLOYMENT PREPARATION

Because the battalion deployed to OEF on a SOF Request for Forces, the battalion had the benefit of some dedicated predeployment training in the form of mobile training teams and detailed integration meetings and ex-

In Afghanistan today, a significant percentage of rotary-wing sorties support SOF in some way.

ercises. If deploying units don't receive these, they can easily develop their own training opportunities to get their team ready for SOF missions. At a minimum, they should arrange with SOF points of contact to provide classified program orientations prior to arrival in theater. Get an early start on security clearances for your selected liaison, intelligence, and operations officers.

Think, speak, and train joint. While supporting SOF, conventional aircrews are expected to be conversant with joint doctrine and terms. This was particularly true for attack weapons teams (AWTs) operating as a fires asset or utility and cargo Helicopter Assault Forces. Use of joint application of firepower terminology and CAS tactics, techniques, and procedures is the standard, so reach out to the Joint Tactical Air Controllers (JTAC) on your installation for training. With some coordination, units can design team-level scenarios that will help you certify crews, flight leads, and air mission commanders (AMC). Incorporation of these tactical situations requiring AMC decisions into gunnery tables and collective training is highly recommended. Sending unit key leaders to joint training exercises, such as Jaded Thunder, a joint fires exercise, will also make a unit more knowledgeable of other Service air elements.

Establish contacts with the "customer." During the process of predeployment training, the battalions command and staff met several of the operators they were supporting in Afghanistan. Even if a unit does not train with the operators, this initial contact is critical to a unit's ultimate success. Any qualified and current aircrew can accomplish an appropriately briefed and planned mission to a baseline standard, but in the SOF community, expectations rise and missions are of a higher complexity. SOF elements operate on a personalized basis driven by their small numbers, specialized training, high operating tempo (OPTEMPO), and associated risk. They form close, habitual relationships over time. While a conventional aviation

unit "plugged in" to a SOF formation will never achieve this level of familiarity, the battalion's ability to form solid relationships with their supported task forces, combined with repeated demonstrations of the battalion's skill and understanding of their operations, gave the battalion a level of interoperability they would not have achieved otherwise.

IN COMBAT

Train with the supported task force during reception, staging, onward movement, and the integration window. At a minimum, conducting a capabilities brief will go a long way toward an effective working relationship. The relief in place period between task forces is also an ideal time to conduct static load training or, in the case of AWTs or scout weapons teams, a live fire exercise in a designated training area. 1st Battalion, 4th Aviation Regiment's task force was able to execute iterations of live fire training with the JTACs at their forward operating base (FOB), and the AMCs conducted face-to-face briefings, using static displays, with the assault forces at outlying FOBs. A conventional aviation unit arrives for this mission with no habitual relationships in place and has to prove its capability to the operators. Units can expect to operate every night in the "stack" with other joint air assets. Conventional aviation units need to learn the other joint air assets capabilities and how they can offset their limitations.

Build capable crews and teams over time. Some crews will be able to meet SOF standards from day one of the deployment; these form your nucleus for further development and improvement. The very best personnel will have to understand a great deal will be expected of them in the initial phases of a mission. For example, 1st Battalion, 4th Aviation Regiment utilized its strongest first fully mission qualified (FMQ) AWT for its first mission with the SOF and in the course of the mission participated in a full-up joint air attack team scenario that killed multiple insurgents and dealt a serious

A conventional aviation unit arrives for this mission with no habitual relationships in place and has to prove its capability to the operators.

... they must develop their bench by improving skills across the entire unit.

blow to the Taliban network in its area. This very successful operation established the battalion as one that had a reputation for skill and aggressiveness (within the rules of engagement) which the task force passed on to every successive unit the battalion supported. Units will need every single member of their team to contribute over time, so they must develop their bench by improving skills across the entire unit. Some aviators must possess the maturity to understand they will eventually get into the fight, but not right away.

Just as not all of a unit's crews will work at the FMQ level initially, not all of a unit's pilot in command (PC) will be trustworthy AMCs. Mature, level-headed, aggressive AMCs are the center of gravity for a unit's nightly operations. They must possess the confidence and skill to work as trusted partners with the assault forces, and this maturity must extend to telling the assault force commander, "I can't do that for these reasons, but this is how we can accomplish your mission." Battalion Commanders should strive to make their company commanders and platoon leaders PCs, so they can benefit from this priceless leadership experience.

This process must begin at home station, using center-of-excellence-driven scenarios and a dedicated AMC training program. The AMC program can use aircraft and simulation devices. Over the course of a nine-month or longer deployment, qualified AMCs will frequently be a unit's limiting factor in generating combat power, so a unit must continue identifying, training, and certifying them while deployed.

Develop effective command and support relationships. For a conventional aviation force supporting SOF, these are separate but mutually supporting relationships. The aviation task force, or smaller unit, will normally be assigned to or put under the operational control (OPCON) of the combat aviation brigade (CAB) with a SOF preference for direct support (DS) to a particular element or assault force. "Such relationships allow the supporting commander the flexibility to determine the methods and tactics ... Support allows a flexible relationship for dynamic operations," according to Field Manual 6-03.05, CF/SOF Integration and Interoperability (p.24).

It is important for a unit to work well with both masters. They belong to the CAB for standardization, risk ap-



Airmen and soldiers load a U.S. Army AH-64 Apache attack helicopter aboard a U.S. Air Force C-5B Galaxy at Bagram Air Field, Afghanistan, on August 31, 2012. (Photo by Capt Raymond Geoffroy, US Air Force)

proval, and life support; but take tactical direction from the supported task force. A battalion commander's personal example will make this relationship work, and the unit's staff must understand it. The standards and daily procedures of the CAB, and the conventional Army, should dictate the unit's standards and discipline.

Understand the friction between differing deployment cycles. SOF units execute frequent, high-intensity, short duration deployments. Conventional units execute less frequent, but longer duration deployments with varying levels of intensity. This difference creates friction that manifests itself in a unit's nightly OPTEMPO. As 1st Battalion, 4th Aviation Regiment trained for the mission, a joint special operations command staff member explained that the battalion's year would be "a marathon at a sprint pace" due to the high demands of the battalion's supported task forces. A unit and its Soldiers must understand what will be expected, and prepare physically and mentally for it. This is most critical for two groups: aircrews and maintenance personnel. Standard warfighter management tools may not capture individual fatigue in this environment where AMCs and PCs, in particular, must operate for long periods with a great degree of precision. The battalion's typical mission set was a completely reversed cycle, operating during hours of darkness and lasting for five to seven hours, forcing crews to operate at the outer limit of established flying hour limitations for months on end. Maintenance personnel dealt with these stresses as well, supporting operations with no-fail launch times and very few aircraft spares, night after night. Individuals have differing levels of endurance, and commander's must understand those thresholds when selecting crews and designating AMCs. Strict enforcement of a sustainable battle rhythm, close management of flying hours, and intensive management of aviation maintenance will allow a unit to meet these missions over the nine month or year period.

Develop a mission rotation plan. Units will likely conduct a mix of conventional and SOF missions during their deployment. The supported SOF task force will push for familiarity and habitual relationships where they see and work with the same crews night after night. While this is good and provides the extra margin of effectiveness commanders seek, there is also great benefit to exposing a unit's crews to the full range of missions while in theater. Conducting conventional missions, without the benefit of extensive enablers and support structure, keeps air-ground integration skills sharp and provides support to conventional ground forces that do not always have the benefit of extensive aviation coverage. This rotation plan will also allow a unit to remain properly integrated with their assigned/OPCON CAB.

CONCLUSION

Operating in support of SOF is an intensely rewarding, satisfying, and challenging experience. Every single night brings different situations, and it is never boring. 1st Battalion, 4th Aviation Regiment provided strategic effects and was able to see and experience a unique dimension of the military. Working with SOF was both a professional and personal developing for the battalion and the members of the battalion exceed their perceived limits and expanded their skills over the course of their year in Afghanistan. The battalion achieved what they did because of extensive pre-deployment training programs, and because they approached the "customer" task forces with respect and an earnest desire to be a combat multiplier.

LTC Charles R. Bowery Jr. is a career Aviation officer with three deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan. He commanded 1st Battalion, 4th Aviation Regiment from 2009 to 2011 and deployed with the battalion to Afghanistan from June 2010 to June 2011.

... the battalion's year would be "a marathon at a sprint pace" due to the high demands of our supported task forces.

INTEGRATING VILLAGE STABILITY OPERATIONS INTO A CONVENTIONAL FORCE BATTLESPACE



Afghan National Army soldier, known only as Hussain, listens for instructions while halted on a partnered security patrol with United States Marines from 3rd Platoon, India Company, 3rd Battalion, 3rd Marine Regiment in Helman Province, Afghanistan, 30 December 2011. (Photo by CPL Reece Lodder, US Army)

By LtCol Adam Tharp, USMC

We received word special operations forces (SOF) would be executing a “new” program, village stability operations (VSO) into a problematic village adjacent to our main effort in Sangin, Afghanistan during Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. Though not in our regimental battlespace, the village would certainly be within small arms range. We, Regimental Combat Team-Two, welcomed friendly support on our unguarded flank, but recognized we needed to coordinate with our new neighbors.

With ten month’s experience running Northern Helmand, we had developed a solid working relationship with SOF units working in and adjacent to our battlespace. We routinely coordinated fires and medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) support with independent teams executing civil affair operations along the southwestern

badlands. Our relationship with direct action SOF units evolved from not only clearing the battlespace to coordinating and designing our conventional missions to “smoke out” priority SOF targets with clean battle handover procedures. In the former case, we were separated by space; in the latter, the short duration required relatively little “close” coordination. In neither case did we have to “live” with SOF right next to us.

But VSO were different. They were built on the concept of inserting a small reinforced team sized element “at the village level which allows the locals to defend themselves and re-establish traditional forms of government and provide the backstop that tribal leaders need to push back against the Taliban. VSO is an effort to establish governance and rule of law at the local level and then link it back up to Kabul.”¹

...developed a solid working relationship with SOF units working in and adjacent to our battlespace.

VSO focused on developing the Afghan Local Police in order to establish local security and provide a strategic link between Kabul and the villages.

SOF WAS COMING IN TO STAY.

“The idea is fairly straight forward. Get in, build rapport, stabilize the village and establish local governance then tie them back to Kabul through district and provincial mechanisms.”² A number of recent journal articles highlight the VSO’s shape, clear, hold, build model and linkage to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) counterinsurgency strategy, but none addressed the integration challenges and successes between conventional forces (CF) and SOF.

Since the early days of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, the joint community identified a doctrinal gap in CF/SOF integration on the battlefield. At first, the time-space separation obscured this gap, but it quickly came to light during “phase IV” operations in Iraq. SOF units executing strategic missions within conventional force battlespace

routinely led to unnecessary confusion; failed missions; and, at worst, fratricide.

By 2006, SOF and conventional communities produced several handbooks identifying CF/SOF integration tactics, techniques, and procedures. In March 2010, these were codified by the Air Land Sea Application Center in “Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Conventional Forces and Special Operations Forces Integration and Interoperability” (CF/SOF MTTP). Though we did not directly reference the CF/SOF MTTP at the time, in hindsight our regiment’s integration with the VSO was a testament to its applicability.

The literature and doctrine repeatedly point to command and control (C2) as the key requirement in CF/SOF integration. The CF/SOF MTTP points out, “effective C2 is a force multiplier that allows commanders to employ their forces toward a common effort.”³ By late 2010, the ISAF C2 architecture in theater designated SOF a supporting effort to the supported-battlespace

Get in, build rapport, stabilize the village and establish local governance ...



Pictured, second from right, is United States Marine Corps SSGT Alejandro Santiago, an assistant team leader with the Police Advisor Team, Delta Company, 1st Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion, who follows an Afghan Uniformed Police-led patrol in Wali Jan, Afghanistan, 24 March 2012. (Photo by SGT Michael Cifuentes, US Army)



US Navy Petty Officer 3rd Nicholas Spear, left, a corpsman serving with the Police Advisor Team, Delta Company, 1st Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion, speaks to Afghan Uniformed Police patrolman Mohammad Nasim during a patrol in Helmand Province, Afghanistan, 24 March 2012. (Photo by SGT Michael Cifuentes, US Army)

owner. This was especially important for the VSO as these units were designed to establish a somewhat permanent presence in the village; in our case, within 3,000 meters of our battalion's area of operation.

At the operational level, with this formalized C2 arrangement, SOF liaison elements came to the Regional Command headquarters. To say these liaison officers (LNOs) were invaluable would be an understatement. They were particularly important in clearly articulating the SOF mission, scheme of maneuver, and requirements. Though the C2 relationship on paper was "supporting-supported," the CF/SOF tactical relationship in practice was really "mutual support." We benefited from the VSO tackling one of our areas of interest, and the VSO benefited from access to our resources and capabilities. The fiduciary relationship between the CF and SOF in VSO is best illustrated through the lens of the joint functions (i.e., C2, movement and maneuver, fires, intelligence, logistics, and protection).

The real C2 driver was battlespace design. Past SOF operations required their own battlespace, to include the air above; whether it is a short duration restricted operations zone or a longer term joint special operations area. In this case, there was simply not enough airspace to support two distinct maneuver forces executing the range of aviation operations from reconnaissance to close air support, resupply and MEDEVAC. The solution was fairly simple; the VSO used the neighboring CF's direct link into the regional air C2 system to effect air support requirements. Having a single airspace manager not only simplified the C2 arrangement, it reduced additional manning requirements for the VSO.

Likewise, operating in less than 4 square kilometers, the VSO relied on the adjacent CF battalion for fire support coordination services for the fire support requirements above their organic capability. These services ranged from organic CF battalion 81-mm and 120-mm mortars to division 155-mm Howitzer and long-range, High Mobility Artillery Rocket System.

... there was simply not enough airspace to support two distinct maneuver forces ...

Effecting this coordination required the CF battalion to provide an LNO to the VSO. Given their limited size, the VSO could not spare manpower to provide a reciprocal LNO. But even this shortfall was mitigated through daily and weekly coordination either in person or virtually. Communication was not an issue, as both the VSO and CF forces employed theater standard communications (through chat, line-of-sight, satellite, and voice over internet protocol) and common operating picture platforms (i.e., Command Post of the Future and Blue Force Tracker).

From the maneuver perspective, close coordination and shared situational awareness enabled both the VSO and CF battalion to mass effects by planning mutual supporting operations. When the CF battalion executed deliberate clearing operations abutting the VSO battlespace, the VSO planned concurrent operations to net fleeing insurgents. Likewise, the CF battalion shaped its efforts to complement VSO deliberate operations.

With civic action programs, one cornerstone of gaining local population support, the VSO unit initially had problems encouraging the locals to participate in medical civic action program (MEDCAP). Recognizing the female population held the key to a successful MEDCAP, the VSO requested and received female engagement team (FET) support from the CF battalion. Though FETs were in short supply, the CF battalion commander understood supporting the VSO efforts was important to his mission.

Close coordination created efficiencies in logistics support and force protection. With a major CF forward operating base only 5 kilometers away, the SOF embedded their recurring sustainment in the CF combat logistics patrols which in turn minimized the number of vehicles and patrols along the main supply route. The VSO preserved the “golden hour” capability and maintained operational tempo, even when MEDEVAC was grounded for weather, by leveraging the CF Role-2 medical facility via surface evacuation.

Intelligence sharing supported both operations and improved force protection by providing cross-boundary indications and warnings of impending attacks and observed enemy tactics. The CF made the battalion quick reaction force available to the VSO unit which not only assured the team on the ground, but also provided relief to theater SOF quick reaction force requirements.

Overall, we had a positive experience working the VSO program into our conventional force operations. It was not difficult to make happen, but it required clear C2 arrangements agreed to at the strategic level which, in turn, filtered to tactical employment. Without this arrangement, success would have depended purely on the personalities of the commanders involved, and certainly would have been less assured.

Relative proximity was also significant factor for the CF and SOF; each was in the other’s area of interest and each could easily create unintended effects for the other. In the end, without realizing it, we followed the recommendations in the CF/SOF MTTP and they worked.

LtCol Tharp currently serves as doctrine development officer for the Navy Warfare Development Command, Norfolk, Virginia. He served as Future Operations Officer, Regimental Combat Team-Two in support of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM from February 2010 to February 2011.

... close coordination and shared situational awareness enabled both the VSO and CF battalion to mass effects ...

END NOTES

¹ Mayfield, Tyrell, “*Village Stability-Operations: VSO A-Primer*”, July 10, 2012 available at <http://www.thekabulcable.com/village-stability-operations-vso-a-primer>, accessed 25 Oct 2010

² Ibid

³ Air Land Sea Application Center, *Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (MTTP) for Conventional Forces and Special Operations Forces Integration and Interoperability (CF/SOF NTTP 3-05.19)*, Mar 2010

UNITY OF COMMAND SHOULD GUIDE SOF AND GPF INTEGRATION



Members of the 8th Commando Kandak and coalition special operations forces (SOF) discuss troop movement during a firefight near Nawa Garay village, Kajran District, Daykundi Province, Afghanistan, 3 April 2012. The commandos partner with coalition SOF to conduct operations throughout Daykundi, Uruzgan, and Zabul Provinces. (Photo by Petty Officer 2nd Class Jacob Dillon, US Navy)

by MAJ Greg Stroud, USA

In the past decade, the United States military placed special operations forces (SOF) at the forefront of what former President George W. Bush called the Global War on Terror (GWOT). During this time, SOF have undergone changes in task organization, employment, and capabilities to meet the diverse challenges the GWOT mission presents. These changes raised the question, how do we best integrate SOF and general purpose forces (GPF) (i.e., conventional forces) capabilities? This question has been continuously explored in both organizations. Generally, SOF commander's concerns center on a perceived inability of GPF commanders to properly employ SOF with regard to tasks, capabilities, and risks.

SOF have undergone changes in task organization, employment, and capabilities to meet the diverse challenges the GWOT mission presents.

The GPF commander's concerns center on a desire to control all forces in his/her area. Both sides have valid apprehensions; however, these concerns can be alleviated by a concerted effort on the part of leaders in both organizations.

During a recent nine-month experience in eastern Afghanistan, it appeared necessary for SOF to have operational independence from the battle space owner (BSO). The BSO seemed to grasp the metric of growing the Afghanistan local police (ALP) numbers, but did not appear to understand that ALP growth was one factor among many contributing to the success of village stability operations (VSO). This led to the BSO placing an emphasis on increasing ALP numbers

through his own efforts without necessarily understanding how ALP growth is nested within the larger concept of VSO. On the other hand, there were many missed opportunities to leverage complementary capabilities in BSO operations because higher SOF headquarters (HQ) judged other missions as higher priorities, or because of poor situational awareness and coordination between the SOF and GPF.

Each organization seemed content to let the other execute operations in whatever manner desired, as long as it did not create friction for the other. This approach minimized conflicts between the two organizations, but it did not effectively integrate capabilities in a coherent, synchronized plan or campaign. The time has come to energize a conversation about unity of command.¹

Unity of command is an important principle because it aligns everyone's efforts to accomplish the com-

mander's intent and end state. This article does not seek to provide the answer, but rather, presents two potential ways of structuring command and control relationships and task organization to better integrate both forces' capabilities in pursuit of operational and strategic objectives and attempts to provide a basis to start a professional discussion.

One way to integrate SOF capabilities is to place an element similar to a Special Operations Command and Control Element (SOCCE) in a supporting role or other command relationship to the Brigade Task Force.² The SOCCE-like element would have tactical control (TACON) or operational control (OPCON) of SOF assigned to work in the brigade's area of operations. This places the SOF elements in a more direct supporting role, answering directly to the brigade.

... The time has come to energize a conversation about unity of command.



A US Army soldier, from Special Operations Task Force - East, assists an injured Afghan commando, from 2nd Commando Kandak, to a casualty evacuation helicopter while US special operations forces unload supplies for joint forces remaining behind to conduct the remainder of a cordon and search operation in Ghazni province, 7 November 2012. (Photo by SGT Justin Morelli, US Army)

In Afghanistan's current task organization, a special operations task force controls a special forces advance operations base (AOB). This AOB coordinates its actions with the BSO, which often reduces the friction described. Instead of merely coordinating with the BSO, the SOCCE-like element would be a part of the brigade tactical operations center or HQ. This course of action places a more responsive SOF element in direct support of the BSO's plan. This arrangement also provides the requisite experience to advise the GPF commander in the employment of SOF capabilities. Additionally, it prevents the problem of SOF elements trying to please two bosses, one who owns the unit and the other who owns the battle space in which the SOF unit operates.

This closer relationship also could have a synergistic effect for operations, intelligence fusion, logistics simplification, and other assets usage (such as airborne platforms). Further, with prior planning, security augmentation for SOF (such as infantry squads) could be prearranged, instead of requiring infantry battalions not organic to the BSO to assign their squads to support SOF elements. A partnership could be identified early to facilitate premission training events between the SOF and GPF. As a counter to toxic leadership or improper SOF employment, the Special Operations Joint Task Force (SOJTF) or the Combined Joint Special Operation Task Force (CJSOTF) could retain the authority to assign forces and simply reassign SOF elements to other areas if these assets are needed for other missions.

Another method to achieve unity of command and integrate capabilities is to place GPF in a TACON or OPCON role to a SOF HQ. This option makes more sense in environments where the emphasis or main effort is outside

conventional capabilities or training, such as VSO. As the GPF reduces its numbers in Afghanistan beginning in 2013, this method to achieve unity of command may become more practical as the SOJTF begins to take the operational lead. This would allow SOF to maintain appropriate security postures, logistics, and enabler platforms they do not inherently possess by requesting these assets to be placed in an OPCON, TACON or a direct support role.³ However, this option has a flaw that many consider unacceptable. Most planners structure command and control relationships so every commander works for someone at least one rank higher. In this course of action, there is potential for a commander to work for another commander of equal rank, which could create an awkward and uncomfortable unit dynamic if they are not able to work together.⁴

In summary, unity of command should not be disregarded in today's operational environment. Doctrine states unity of command is preferable to unity of effort. Unity of effort works well when everyone agrees on the priorities and how assets should be used. Unity of effort briefs well as a concept, but it does not work well in practice because individuals rarely agree on a plan, unless someone enforces agreement. The options described here are not the only solutions and are described only at a conceptual level. This is where the discussion needs to start in order to prepare for future operations and conflicts. Doctrine can, and should, provide guidance to incorporate principles that are time-tested and contributed to the success of previous operations, campaigns, and wars. This article hopes to provoke thought and energize a discussion on how to possibly better organize for the contemporary environment⁵ which requires both SOF and GPF capabilities integration to forge success.

Doctrine can, and should, provide guidance to incorporate principles that are time-tested and contributed to the success of previous operations, campaigns, and wars

MAJ Greg Stroud is currently a Special Forces Company Commander in 1st Special Forces Group (A) stationed in Japan.

END NOTES

¹ Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations (2006, change 2), writes that unity of command “means that all forces operate under a single commander with the requisite authority to direct all forces employed in pursuit of a common purpose.”

² Joint Publication 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations (2003), states that the SOCCE “is the focal point for the synchronization of SOF activities with conventional force operations,” and can perform liaison as well as command and control functions. Army Doctrine Reference Publication 3-05, Special Operations, states that “a Joint Special Operations Task Force commander may elect to employ SOCCEs to coordinate unilateral special operations with conventional ground force HQ or, if a supporting commander, facilitate his supporting commander’s responsibilities.” For further reading and definitions of command relationships, see Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations (2006, change 2).

³ For further reading and definitions of command relationships, see Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations (2006, change 2).

⁴ For instance, 2nd Infantry Division provided an infantry battalion to SOTF-East in Afghanistan to augment SOF elements with infantry squads for increased security posture at the detachment level. This left the battalion’s HQ element without a proper tasking, so the CJSOTF created a task force in order to avoid the awkward position of having a lieutenant colonel work for another lieutenant colonel or having a battalion headquarters without any responsibility. This arrangement might necessitate a Modified Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE) promotion in rank for SF battalion commanders to colonel and SF group commanders to brigadier general in order to avoid future predicaments. SF detachment commanders and SF company commanders are already one rank higher than the equivalent GPF unit commander. This would bring the rest of the SF command structure in line with this concept and relieve a significant amount of friction in making this a reality. This idea should be explored because SOF commanders have a significantly different education and experience base than most GPF commanders, which theoretically should give them an advantage in combating irregular and insurgent threats in addition to working in politically sensitive areas.

⁵ The contemporary operational environment is the overall operational environment that exists today and in the near future (out to the year 2020). <http://www.strategypage.com/articles/operationenduringfreedom/chap1.asp>

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DYNAMIC TARGETING <i>Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Dynamic Targeting</i> Distribution Restricted	7 MAY 2012	FM 3-60.1 MCRP 3-16D NTTP 3-60.1 AFTTP 3-2.3	Description: Provides the JFC, the operational staff, and components MTTP to coordinate, de-conflict, synchronize, and prosecute DTs within any AOR. Includes lessons learned, multinational and other government agency considerations. Status: Current
IADS <i>Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for an Integrated Air Defense System</i> Distribution Restricted	1 MAY 09	FM 3-01.15 MCRP 3-25E NTTP 3-01.8 AFTTP 3-2.31	Description: Provides joint planners with a consolidated reference on Service air defense systems, processes, and structures to include integration procedures. Status: Revision
JFIRE <i>Multi-Service Procedures for the Joint Application of Firepower</i> Distribution Restricted	30 Nov 12	ATP 3-09.32 MCRP 3-16.6A NTTP 3-09.2 AFTTP 3-2.6	Description: Pocket size guide of procedures for calls for fire, CAS, and naval gunfire. Provides tactics for joint operations between attack helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft performing integrated battlefield operations. Status: Current
JSEAD / ARM-J <i>Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses in a Joint Environment</i> Classified SECRET	28 MAY 04	FM 3-01.4 MCRP 3-22.2A NTTP 3-01.42 AFTTP 3-2.28	Description: Contributes to Service interoperability by providing the JTF and subordinate commanders, their staffs, and SEAD operators a single, consolidated reference. Status: Revision
KILL BOX <i>Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Kill Box Employment</i> Distribution Restricted	4 AUG 09	FM 3-09.34 MCRP 3-25H NTTP 3-09.2.1 AFTTP 3-2.59	Description: Assists the Services and JFCs in developing, establishing, and executing Kill Box procedures to allow rapid target engagement. Describes timely, effective multi-Service solutions to FSCMs, ACMs, and maneuver control measures with respect to Kill Box operations. Status: Revision
SCAR <i>Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Strike Coordination and Reconnaissance</i> Distribution Restricted	26 NOV 08	FM 3-60.2 MCRP 3-23C NTTP 3-03.4.3 AFTTP 3-2.72	Description: This publication provides strike coordination and reconnaissance (SCAR) MTTP to the military Services for the conduct of air interdiction against targets of opportunity. Status: Revision
SURVIVAL, EVASION, AND RECOVERY <i>Multi-Service Procedures for Survival, Evasion, and Recovery</i> Distribution Restricted	11 Sep 12	ATP 3-50.3 MCRP 3-02H NTTP 3-50.3 AFTTP 3-2.26	Description: Provides a weather-proof, pocket-sized, quick reference guide of basic survival information to assist Service members in a survival situation regardless of geographic location. Status: Current
TAGS <i>Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Theater Air-Ground System</i> Distribution Restricted/ REL ABCA	10 APR 07	FM 3-52.2 NTTP 3-56.2 AFTTP 3-2.17	Description: Promotes Service awareness regarding the role of airpower in support of the JFC's campaign plan, increases understanding of the air-ground system, and provides planning considerations for the conduct of air-ground ops. Status: Revision
UAS <i>Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Tactical Employment of Unmanned Aircraft Systems</i> Distribution Restricted	21 Sep 11	FM 3-04.15 MCRP 3-42.1A NTTP 3-55.14 AFTTP 3-2.64	Description: Establishes MTTP for UAS addressing tactical and operational considerations, system capabilities, payloads, mission planning, logistics, and most importantly, multi-Service execution. Status: Current

LAND AND SEA BRANCH – POC alsab@langley.af.mil

TITLE	DATE	PUB #	DESCRIPTION/STATUS
ADVISING <i>Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Advising Foreign Forces</i> Distribution Restricted	10 SEP 09	FM 3-07.10 MCRP 3-33.8A NTPP 3-07.5 AFTTP 3-2.76	Description: This publication serves as a reference to ensure coordinated multi-Service operations for planners and operators preparing for, and conducting, advisor team missions. It is intended to provide units and personnel that are scheduled to advise foreign forces with viable TTP so that they can successfully plan, train for, and carry out their mission. Status: Revision
AIRFIELD OPENING <i>Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Airfield Opening</i> Distribution Restricted	15 MAY 07	FM 3-17.2 NTPP 3-02.18 AFTTP 3-2.68	Description: A quick-reference guide to opening an airfield in accordance with MTTP. Contains planning considerations, airfield layout, and logistical requirements for opening an airfield. Status: Revision
CF/SOF <i>Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Conventional Forces and Special Operations Forces Integration and Interoperability</i> Distribution Restricted	17 MAR 10	FM 6-03.05 MCWP 3-36.1 NTPP 3-05.19 AFTTP 3-2.73 USSOCOM Pub 3-33V.3	Description: This publication assists in planning and executing operations where conventional forces and special operations forces (CF/SOF) occupy the same operational environment. Status: Revision
CORDON AND SEARCH <i>Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Cordon and Search Operations</i> Distribution Restricted	25 APR 06	FM 3-06.20 MCRP 3-31.4B NTPP 3-05.8 AFTTP 3-2.62	Description: Consolidates the Services' best TTP used in cordon and search operations. Provides MTTP for the planning and execution of cordon and search operations at the tactical level of war. Status: Revision
EOD <i>Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Explosive Ordnance Disposal in a Joint Environment</i> Approved for Public Release	27 OCT 05	FM 4-30.16 MCRP 3-17.2C NTPP 3-02.5 AFTTP 3-2.32	Description: Provides guidance and procedures for the employment of a joint EOD force. It assists commanders and planners in understanding the EOD capabilities of each Service. Status: Current
Military Diving Operations (MDO) <i>Multi-Service Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Military Diving Operations</i> Distribution Restricted	12 Jan 11	ATTP 3-34.84 MCRP 3-35.9A NTPP 3-07.7 AFTTP 3-2.80 CG COMDTINST 3-07.7	Description: This MTTP publication describes US Military dive mission areas (DMA) as well as the force structure, equipment, and primary missions that each Service could provide to a JTF Commander. Status: Assessment
MILITARY DECEPTION <i>Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Military Deception</i> Classified SECRET	12 APR 07	MCRP 3-40.4A NTPP 3-58.1 AFTTP 3-2.66	Description: Facilitate the integration, synchronization, planning, and execution of MILDEC operations. Serve as a "one stop" reference for service MILDEC planners to plan and execute multi-service MILDEC operations. Status: Revision
NLW <i>Multi-Service Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Tactical Employment of Nonlethal Weapons</i> Approved for Public Release	24 OCT 07	FM 3-22.40 MCWP 3-15.8 NTPP 3-07.3.2 AFTTP 3-2.45	Description: This publication provides a single-source, consolidated reference on the tactical employment of NLWs and offers commanders and their staff guidance for NLW employment and planning. Commanders and staffs can use this publication to aid in the tactical employment of NLW during exercises and contingencies. Status: Revision
PEACE OPS <i>Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Conducting Peace Operations</i> Approved for Public Release	20 OCT 03 Change 1 incorporated 14 APR 09	FM 3-07.31 MCWP 3-33.8 AFTTP 3-2.40	Description: Provides tactical-level guidance to the warfighter for conducting peace operations. Status: Revision
TACTICAL CONVOY OPERATIONS <i>Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Tactical Convoy Operations</i> Distribution Restricted	13 JAN 09	FM 4-01.45 MCRP 4-11.3H NTPP 4-01.3 AFTTP 3-2.58	Description: Consolidates the Services' best TTP used in convoy operations into a single multi-Service TTP. Provides a quick reference guide for convoy commanders and subordinates on how to plan, train, and conduct tactical convoy operations in the contemporary operating environment. Status: Revision
TECHINT <i>Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Technical Intelligence Operations</i> Approved for Public Release	9 JUN 06	FM 2-22.401 NTPP 2-01.4 AFTTP 3-2.63	Description: Provides a common set of MTTP for technical intelligence operations. Serves as a reference for Service technical intelligence planners and operators. Status: Revision
UXO <i>Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Unexploded Explosive Ordnance Operations</i> Distribution Restricted	20 Sep 11	FM 3-100.38 MCRP 3-17.2B NTPP 3-02.4.1 AFTTP 3-2.12	Description: Describes hazards of UXO submunitions to land operations, addresses UXO planning considerations, and describes the architecture for reporting and tracking UXO during combat and post conflict. Status: Current

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TITLE	DATE	PUB #	DESCRIPTION/STATUS
AOMSW <i>Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Air Operations in Maritime Surface Warfare</i> Distribution Restricted	17 NOV 08	NTTP 3-20.8 AFTTP 3-2.74	Description: This publication consolidates Service doctrine, TTP, and lessons-learned from current operations and exercises to maximize the effectiveness of "air attacks on enemy surface vessels". Status: Revision
BREVITY <i>Multi-Service Brevity Codes</i> Distribution Restricted	20 Sep 12	ATP 1-02.1 MCRP 3-25B NTTP 6-02.1 AFTTP 3-2.5	Description: Defines multi-Service brevity which standardizes air-to-air, air-to-surface, surface-to-air, and surface-to-surface brevity code words in multi-Service operations. Status: Current
CIVIL SUPPORT (DSCA) <i>Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Civil Support Operations</i> Distribution Restricted	3 DEC 07	FM 3-28.1 NTTP 3-57.2 AFTTP 3-2.67	Description: Fills the Civil Support Operations MTTP void and assists JTF commanders in organizing and employing Multi-Service Task Force support to civil authorities in response to domestic crisis. Status: Revision
COMCAM <i>Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Combat Camera Operations</i> Approved for Public Release	24 May 07	FM 3-55.12 MCRP 3-33.7A NTTP 3-13.12 AFTTP 3-2.41	Description: Fills the void that exists regarding combat camera doctrine and assists JTF commanders in structuring and employing combat camera assets as an effective operational planning tool. Status: Revision
HAVE QUICK <i>Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for HAVE QUICK Radios</i> Distribution Restricted	7 MAY 04	FM 6-02.771 MCRP 3-40.3F NTTP 6-02.7 AFTTP 3-2.49	Description: Simplifies planning and coordination of HAVE QUICK radio procedures. Provides operators information on multi-Service HAVE QUICK communication systems while conducting home station training or in preparation for interoperability training. Status: Revision
HF-ALE <i>Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the High Frequency-Automatic Link Establishment (HF-ALE) Radios</i> Distribution Restricted	20 NOV 07	FM 6-02.74 MCRP 3-40.3E NTTP 6-02.6 AFTTP 3-2.48	Description: Standardizes high power and low power HF-ALE operations across the Services and enables joint forces to use HF radio as a supplement / alternative to overburdened SATCOM systems for over-the-horizon communications. Status: Revision
JATC <i>Multi-Service Procedures for Joint Air Traffic Control</i> Distribution Restricted	23 JUL 09	FM 3-52.3 MCRP 3-25A NTTP 3-56.3 AFTTP 3-2.23	Description: Provides guidance on ATC responsibilities, procedures, and employment in a joint environment. Discusses JATC employment and Service relationships for initial, transition, and sustained ATC operations across the spectrum of joint operations within the theater or AOR. Status: Revision
EW REPROGRAMMING <i>Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Reprogramming of Electronic Warfare and Target Sensing Systems</i> Distribution Restricted	01 FEB 11	FM 3-13.10 (FM 3-51.1) NTTP 3-51.2 AFTTP 3-2.7	Description: Supports the JTF staff in planning, coordinating, and executing reprogramming of electronic warfare and target sensing systems as part of joint force command and control warfare operations. Status: Assessment
TACTICAL CHAT <i>Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Internet Tactical Chat in Support of Operations</i> Distribution Restricted	07 JUL 09	FM 6-02.73 MCRP 3-40.2B NTTP 6-02.8 AFTTP 3-2.77	Description: This publication provides MTTP to standardize and describe the use of internet tactical chat (TC) in support of operations. It provides commanders and their units with guidelines to facilitate coordination and integration of TC when conducting multi-Service and joint force operations. Status: Revision
TACTICAL RADIOS <i>Multi-Service Communications Procedures for Tactical Radios in a Joint Environment</i> Approved for Public Release	14 JUN 02	FM 6-02.72 MCRP 3-40.3A NTTP 6-02.2 AFTTP 3-2.18	Description: Standardizes joint operational procedures for SINCGARS and provides an overview of the multi-Service applications of EPLRS. Status: Revision
UHF TACSAT/DAMA <i>Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures Package for Ultra High Frequency Tactical Satellite and Demand Assigned Multiple Access Operations</i> Approved for Public Release	31 AUG 04	FM 6-02.90 MCRP 3-40.3G NTTP 6-02.9 AFTTP 3-2.53	Description: Documents TTP that will improve efficiency at the planner and user levels. (Recent operations at JTF level have demonstrated difficulties in managing limited number of UHF TACSAT frequencies.) Status: Revision

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The Air Land Sea Application (ALSA) Center develops multi-Service tactics, techniques, and procedures (MTTPs) with the goal of meeting the needs of the warfighter. In addition to developing MTTPs, ALSA provides the ALSB forum to facilitate tactical and operationally relevant information exchanges among warfighters of all Services.

There is no better resource for information than the people doing the jobs. Personal experiences, studies and individual research lead to inspirational and educational articles. Therefore, we invite our readers to share their experiences and possibly have them published in an upcoming ALSB.

The topic for the May 2013 ALSB is "Joint Close Air Support (JCAS) and Joint Application of Firepower (JFIRE)."

We want to take your lessons learned from recent operations or any other multi-Service or multi-nation missions in which you have been involved, and spread that knowledge to others. Get published by sharing your experiences and expertise.

With the focus on JCAS and JFIRE, your article could concentrate on JCAS coordination and planning procedures; communications architecture; training; or the significance of fires integration. Also, the Army's Close Combat Attack procedures are possible considerations. There is a vast number of topics to be explored. Challenge yourself and submit an article.

Please keep submissions unclassified and in accordance with the instructions in the box on this page.

Joint Close Air Support and Joint Application of Firepower

Submissions must:

- Be 1,500 words or less
- Be releasable to the public
- Be double spaced
- Be in MS Word format
- Include the author's name, unit address, telephone numbers, and email address
- Include current, high-resolution (300 dpi minimum), original photographs and graphics

Article submissions and photos are due no later than 1 February 2013 for publication in the May 2013 issue.


Early submissions are highly encouraged.

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