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THESIS

**ENGAGING MILITARY IN POST-WAR
RECONCILIATION: A CASE STUDY OF IMPLICATIONS
FOR THE CONSOLIDATION OF DEMOCRACY IN
SRI LANKA**

by

Chaminda Wickramaratne

March 2013

Thesis Advisor:

Thomas C. Bruneau

Thesis Co- Advisor:

Florina Cristiana Matei

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OF IMPLICATIONS FOR THE CONSOLIDATION OF DEMOCRACY IN
SRI LANKA**

Chaminda Wickramaratne
Wing Commander, Sri Lanka Air Force RWP,
MDS., University of Kelaniya, 2010, psc

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March 2013**

Author: Chaminda Wickramaratne

Approved by: Thomas C. Bruneau
Thesis Advisor

Florina Cristiana Matei
Thesis Co-Advisor

Harold Trinkunas
Chair, Department of National Security Affairs

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ABSTRACT

“Engaging military in post war reconciliation: A case study of implications for the consolidation of democracy in Sri Lanka” was prompted by post-war developments in Sri Lanka related to Civil-Military relations. The longest fought civil war in South East Asia, came to an end when the Sri Lankan Armed Forces successfully defeated the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) militarily in May 2009.

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Some critiques argue that Sri Lanka has undergone an excessive militarization, which is hindering post-war democratic consolidation. In this context, this research will look at Civil-Military relations adopted by the Sri Lankan government after the civil-war period from the perspective of the military prerogatives highlighted by Alfred Stepan and will further seek to identify the impact of CMR on the consolidation of democracy in the dilemma of militarization. It will start with a discussion of relevant theories of democratic transition and consolidation of CMR, followed by a discussion of democratic transition and consolidation in Sri Lanka, CMR during and after the civil war, and how CMR impacted democratic consolidation. The thesis finishes with an examination of lessons learned and best/worst practices of CMR.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	INTRODUCTION.....	1
A.	MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION.....	1
B.	IMPORTANCE.....	5
C.	PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES	5
D.	LITERATURE REVIEW	6
E.	METHODS AND SOURCES.....	15
F.	THESIS OVERVIEW	16
II.	THEORETICAL BACKGROUND-INSIGHTS ON DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION AND CONSOLIDATION, CIVIL MILITARY RELATIONS, AND MILITARY PREROGATIVES.....	19
A.	WHAT IS DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION?.....	19
B.	WHAT IS DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION?	22
C.	CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS AND DEMOCRACY	26
D.	MILITARY PREROGATIVES, CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS AND DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION	27
III.	SRI LANKA	29
A.	BACKGROUND ON THE TRANSITION AND CONSOLIDATION OF DEMOCRACY IN SRI LANKA.....	29
1.	Historical Background Prior to Transition	29
2.	Transition to Democracy and Democratic Consolidation.....	29
3.	Deterioration of Democracy	31
B.	CHALLENGES TO CONSOLIDATION OF DEMOCRACY-THE CIVIL WAR IN SRI LANKA.....	34
1.	EELAM WAR-1.....	35
2.	EELAM WAR II.....	38
3.	EELAM WAR III	40
4.	EELAM WAR IV.....	43
C.	CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS DURING THE WAR, AND HOW IT GUIDED MILITARY TO WIN THE WAR (EFFECTIVE CIVILIAN CONTROL).....	47
1.	Revamping the Ministry of Defense (MOD).....	47
2.	Affecting Structural Changes	50
3.	Professionalizing the Military.....	53
4.	Taking Over the Ministry of Finance to Support the War Effort	54
5.	Establishing Guidelines on the Role of Media and Utilization of Media to Rally Public Support	55
6.	Revamping Diplomatic Prowess to Support the War.....	57
D.	POST-WAR ROLES AND MISSIONS OF THE SRI LANKA ARMED FORCES	59
E.	POST-WAR CIVIL MILITARY RELATIONS IN THE COUNTRY	66

IV. ANALYSIS	71
V. CONCLUSION	87
LIST OF REFERENCES	91
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST	103

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1.	Prerogatives of Military as an Institution in the Democratic Regime in Sri Lanka (After Alfred Stepan, <i>Rethinking Military Politics</i> , 94–127) 78
Table 2.	Requirements for Achieving Democratic Civilian Control and Effectiveness (After Bruneau and Matei, <i>The Routledge Handbook</i> , 2013, 345) 81
Table 3.	Statistics of Freedom in Sri Lanka (After Freedom in the World 2013, Freedom House).....85

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

MOD :	Ministry of Defense
LTTE :	Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
SLA :	Sri Lanka Army
SLAF :	Sri Lanka Air Force
SLN :	Sri Lanka Navy
GoSL :	Government of Sri Lanka
Sec Def:	Secretary of Defense
MCNS:	Media Centre for National Security
ILPA :	Indo-Lanka Peace Accord
IDP :	Internally Displaced Personnel
NFZ :	No Fire Zone
CMR :	Civil-Military Relations
GDP :	Gross Domestic Production

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION

The selection of the topic “Engaging military in post war reconciliation: A case study of implications for the consolidation of democracy in Sri Lanka” was prompted by post-war developments in Sri Lanka related to civil-military¹ relations, based on many debates engaged in by various interested parties locally and internationally. Sri Lanka was considered a vibrant and upcoming democracy² among the developing nations in Southeast Asia a few decades ago.

The conflict between the Tamil separatist terrorists³ and the Sri Lankan government, which developed in the 1980s, however, later turned into a full-fledged civil war in 1983. The war ravaged the country for almost three decades, transforming the

¹ Peter D. Fever in a an article published in “Annual Review on Political Science,” describes civil-military relations as one of the truly interdisciplinary fields of study in social science, and as a broad subject that encompasses the entire range of relationship between the military and the civilian society. The field largely focuses on control or direction of the military by the civilian supremacy in nation states. Thomas C. Bruneau highlights in his book *Who Guards the Guardians and How* that the importance of civil-military relations came in to be recognized with the so- called third wave of democratization in the Portuguese upheaval, began in 1974. In addition, Bruneau and Matei expound the field of CMR in their paper ‘Towards a New Conceptualization of Democratization and Civil-Military Relations’ to include more than civilian control of the armed forces. They consider CMR a trinity of democratic civilian control, effectiveness, and efficiency of the security forces.

² David Dunham and Sisira Jayasooriya claims that Sri Lanka was seen to be a stable, even vibrant parliamentary democracy and “An oasis of peace and stability” in an otherwise turbulent region. David Dunham and Sisira Jayasooriya, “Equity, Growth and Insurrection: Liberalization and the Welfare Debate in Contemporary Sri Lanka,” *Oxford Development Studies* Vol 28, No-I, 2000. accessed on July 22, 2012, <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/713688305>.

³ The United States Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has categorized the Tamil Tigers as one of the most deadly extremist terrorist organizations in the world. As per the FBI, for more than three decades the group has launched a campaign of violence and bloodshed in Sri Lanka. It has launched suicide attacks, assassinated politicians (including two heads of state), and committed all of kinds of crimes to finance its operations. The resulting civil war has taken the lives of nearly 100,000 Sri Lankans on both sides of the conflict since 1983 alone. The ruthless tactics of the Tamil Tigers have inspired terrorist networks worldwide, including Al-Qaeda. “Taming the Tamil Tigers: From Here in the U.S.” *FBI Report*, accessed July 19, 2012, http://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2008/january/tamil_tigers011008/.

democratic republic into nearly a failed state⁴ by 2008. The armed conflict, which was the longest fought civil war in Southeast Asia, came to an end when the Sri Lankan Armed Forces successfully defeated the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) militarily in May 2009. The successive governments in Sri Lanka since the 1980s had taken various measures such as military action and negotiation to suppress the LTTE, which had gained control of a considerable area of the north and the east of the island (the Districts of Jaffna, Killinochchi, Mannar, Mulathivu, Trincomalee, Baticaloa and Amparai). All previous governments since the 1980s had failed, however, and the present government (2006 to date) adopted a different approach in civil-military relations that enhanced professionalization of the military. This different approach, in turn, succeeded in defeating the LTTE comprehensively and winning the war.

The huge success achieved by the Sri Lankan military vis-à-vis the Tamil Tigers has made the government rely on the country's military even after the defeat of the LTTE and adopt a militaristic approach in post-war reconciliation activities in the country. With that background, the government has encouraged military presence in all possible areas of the driving mechanism of the country. Specifically, the government has engaged the military in many activities of national development and reconciliation, such as reconstruction of housing and amenities, reactivation of farm lands, restoration of roads and irrigation projects, reconstruction of railway lines, restoration of civil administration, tourism promotion, and the like.

⁴ Weakness is endemic in many developing nations—the halfway house between strength and failure. Some weak states, such as Chad and Kyrgyzstan (and even once-mighty Russia), exhibit several of the defining characteristics of failed states and yet do not fail. Others, such as Zimbabwe, may slide rapidly from comparative strength to the very edge of failure. A few, such as Sri Lanka and Colombia, may suffer from vicious, enduring civil wars without ever failing, while remaining weak and susceptible to failure. Robert I. Rotberg, “Failed State in a World of Terror,” *Council of Foreign Relations* Vol 81, No.4 (Jul-Aug 2002) 127–140. Accessed August 20, 2012, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/20033245.pdf>.

Within this scenario, there are many questions raised against the government of Sri Lanka and the military: Is this excessive⁵ military involvement in civilian work leading to enhanced military prerogatives⁶ for Sri Lanka's Armed Forces? Will the prerogatives in turn jeopardize civilian supremacy over the armed forces? Is involvement of the military in activities of national development and reconciliation endangering or boosting democratic consolidation in Sri Lanka?

⁵ Commander of the Sri Lankan Army General J. Jayasooriya says, "Like any other army we were engaged in post—conflict action to help the government machinery to restore everything back to normal. We are glad to say we have done that in three years. Reconstruction work we do is beyond civilian capacity. We do it faster and I am sure people appreciate it." (The Sri Lanka Army is heavily involved in post—war reconstruction, rehabilitation and resettlement efforts in the North and East where thousands of civilians were displaced due to heavy fighting between government forces and the Tamil Tigers). J. Jayasooriya, "Sri Lanka Army role in North is Minimal: Army Chief," IRIB World Service Radio, accessed on September 12, 2012, <http://english.irib.ir/subcontinent/news/regional/item/83780-sri-lanka-army-role-in-north-is-minimal-army-chief>.

⁶ Alfred Stepan describes military prerogatives as an assumption of the military that they have an acquired right or privilege, formal or informal, to exercise control over its internal governance, to play a role within extra—military areas within the state apparatus, or even to structure relationships between the political or civil society. Further, Stepan views that militaries in most new democracies have such tendencies that might threaten democratic regimes. Stepan lists 11 prerogatives, and the Sri Lankan Military remains in the lower range of this influence in comparison to the criteria laid down. Peripheral studies indicate that only three of the listed prerogatives (coordination of the defense sector, role of senior career civil servants or civilian political appointees, role in state enterprise) have some effect on civilian control in Sri Lanka. In addition Thomas C. Bruneau, Tyrell Mayfield, Kelvin Maccaskey, Florina Cristiana Matei and Jason Weece in their analytical paper written on the role of the military in the contemporary politics of Egypt, Pakistan, and Turkey, use a slightly modified version of Stepan's 11 prerogatives. While dropping three of them, they introduce a new prerogative called 'role in domestic security' and adopt a nine prerogative model to analyze the dynamic evolution of main features of control in CMR in those countries. See Alfred Stepan, *Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Sothern Cone* (United Kingdom: Princeton Press, 1988), 93–127; Thomas C. Bruneau et al., *Civil-Military Relations in Democratic Transitions: The Cases of Egypt, Pakistan, and Turkey*, (Unpublished manuscript.)

Some critiques argue that Sri Lanka has undergone an excessive militarization, which is hindering post-war democratic consolidation.⁷ In this context, this thesis will look at civil-military relations adopted by the Sri Lankan government after the civil-war period from the perspective of the military prerogatives highlighted by Alfred Stepan and will seek further to identify the impact of CMR on the consolidation of democracy in the dilemma of militarization. As per Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, consolidation of a democracy requires at least five interacting conditions to exist. Those conditions are: development of a free and lively civil society, a relatively valued political society, and availability of a state bureaucracy.⁸ Against this backdrop, the thesis will start with a discussion of relevant theories of democratic transition, consolidation, and CMR. These will be followed by a discussion of democratic consolidation in Sri Lanka, CMR during and after the civil war, and impact of CMR on democratic consolidation in Sri Lanka. The thesis will conclude with an examination of lessons learned and best and worst practices of CMR in the Sri Lankan context.

In terms of the preceding discussion, this paper attempts to answer the following research question: Does the heavy presence of the Sri Lanka military in post-war reconciliation activities have any impact (negative or positive) on civil-military relations and the consolidation of democracy in Sri Lanka?

⁷ According to Tisaranee Gunasekara, militarization of post-war Sri Lanka has continued unabated. Post-war, the armed forces are everywhere, doing everything. Plans are afoot to institutionalize and intensify this militarization of civilian spaces by garrisoning every district and inducting the armed forces into development work. This rapid encroachment on civilian spaces by the military is symbolized in the recasting of the Defense Ministry as the Defense and Urban Development Ministry. As per Rahul Bedi, Sri Lanka is South Asia's most militarized country with 8000 defense personnel for every one million citizens. After defeating the Tamil Tiger guerrillas in May 2009, the country opted to involve its bloated military in a range of commercial activities. Instead of downsizing its 300,000—strong defense forces after the bitter civil war ended, President Mahinda Rajapaksa's administration encouraged their involvement in various commercial and other activities. Disturbingly, the island's Education Ministry plans on sending fresh graduates to military camps for three-week leadership courses where they will be given instruction in English, leadership skills and social etiquette. The analysts and NGO's warn that it is a move fraught with 'militarizing the seat of Sri Lanka's higher education.' See "Militarization and Law Lessness," Colombo: Sri Lanka Guardian, accessed on May 06, 2012, <http://www.srilankaguardian.org/2012/05/militarization-and-law-lessness.html>; "Armed, Dangerous and Building their Own Empires." UK Tamilnet, accessed on July 02, 2012, http://www.nzherald.co.nz/business/news/article.cfm?c_id=3&objectid=10746321.

⁸ Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transitions and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe* (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 7.

B. IMPORTANCE

There are at least three reasons why this study is relevant. First, it will provide some lessons learned, as well as best/worst practices of civil-military relations for other countries undergoing conflict, while striving to become democratic, can follow. Even though the government of Sri Lanka has successfully met the challenge of overcoming a ruthless terrorist outfit, in the post-war scenario leaving an opportunity for the military to enhance its prerogatives may erode democratic consolidation. In that context, the study will highlight the potential dangers involved in the Sri Lankan issue that the government should be concerned about.

Second, this study will complement the emerging, yet scarce literature of CMR in developing democracies. Although there are many scholarly works on CMR in developed democracies—and even some literature on CMR in new democracies in Latin America and Central and Eastern Europe—there is much less literature on CMR in Asia. Furthermore, the case of Sri Lanka complements the literature on CMR related to a democracy consolidating after a civil war, rather than in a country transforming from dictatorship to a democracy. This study would provide an alternate experience.

Third, this research can assist policy makers and representatives of security institutions in developed democracies, especially for those who are interested in learning what challenges to democratic consolidation and civil-military relations emerging democracies have to overcome. For example, this study may be useful to civilian and military elites in the United States, due to the growing interest in strengthening security and stability of friendly nations in the Indian Ocean region.

C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES

Hypothesis I – The exaggerated role played by the Armed Forces of Sri Lanka in reconciliation activities, inspired by their military victory over the LTTE, may influence democratic governance, erode civil-military relations, leading to the militarization of the country, and affecting the consolidation of democracy in post-war Sri Lanka.

Hypothesis II – Having won the battle against the LTTE, may motivate and inspire the Armed Forces of Sri Lanka to be more patriotic and committed to the rule of law, strengthening the relationship between the

military and the government. It may further ensure civilian supremacy⁹ over the armed forces more than ever before, as the armed forces become the driving factor ensuring Sri Lanka's post-war reconciliation.

D. LITERATURE REVIEW

There is abundant scholarly work on democracies and civil–military relations. First, there is literature on democratic transition, consolidation, and military intervention. For example, scholars such as Adam Przeworski, Guillermo O'Donnell, Juan J. Linz, and Alfred Stepan argue that the fall of dictatorship, or the end of authoritarian regimes can lead to democratic transition and consolidation. However, the validity of this argument may not be appropriate in the present context as many countries have transitioned and become consolidating or consolidated democracies even though they were not authoritarian regimes. For example, countries like Sri Lanka, used to be a British colony but transformed to a democracy with the declaration of independence in 1948. Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan define consolidation of democracy as a political situation in which the democracy has become the only game in town.¹⁰ Giuseppe di Palma relates democracy to a game, and views consolidation of democracy as the establishment of rules of the game that can prevent important players from proscribing the game.¹¹ Guillermo O'Donnell suggests dividing the transition to democracy into two phases. The first phase is the process from the authoritarian regime up to the establishment of a democracy, and the second phase is the process from that democratic government to the consolidation of a democracy (COD).¹² Nevertheless, although the above-mentioned luminaries in the field of democratic transition and consolidation have made valuable attempts to introduce well-founded definitions for transition and consolidation of democracy, they do not

⁹ Samuel E. Finer claims that, for the military to intervene, the military must also absorb the principle of supremacy of civil power. In this context, the most convenient definition is, both formally and effectively, that the major politics and programs of the government ... should be decided by the nation's politically responsible civilian leaders. Samuel E. Finer, *The Man on the Horseback: Role of the Military in Politics* (New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers, 2006), 28.

¹⁰ Linz and Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transitions and Consolidation*, 5.

¹¹ Giuseppe di Palma believes consolidation to be the establishing of rules of the competition able to prevent the key players from boycotting the game. Narcis Serra, *The Military Transition: Democratic Reform of the Armed Forces* (UK: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 12.

¹² Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, Laurence Whitehead, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for Democracy* (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 251.

incorporate the military as an important determinant factor. However, the idea and model presented by the aforesaid scholars may be useful in initiating the study on Sri Lanka, a country that is presently undergoing a period of post war reconciliation that may have profound effects of the military on consolidation of democracy.

Phillippe C. Schmitter has a different perception on democratic consolidation. He argues that democracies are never supposed to be consolidated. Different regimes should have the potential to adopt continuous changes that may require self-transformation to effect changes to their structures and rules.¹³ He further maintains that consolidation is not simply a continuation of transition from authoritarian regime—it is a combination of processes such as new actors, new processes, new values and resources—and he discusses the relevance of the military in consolidation of democracy under “Negotiation of a Military Pact” and “Submission of Military to Civilian Control”¹⁴ (refer to figures I and III). These are valuable insights that can be utilized for analysis of the situation in Sri Lanka too.¹⁵ Alfred Stepan links military prerogatives to democratic civilian control, and democratic consolidation to crises that may occur at any time, even in a consolidated democracy, due to civil-military contestation.¹⁶ It is Narcis Serra who clearly advocates that, in order to consolidate a democracy, it is necessary to include the armed forces as an important variable.¹⁷ Specifically, Serra believes that the military can undermine the process of transition and the consolidation of democracy of a country, especially in a

¹³ Phillippe C. Schmitter describes that democracy is never supposed to be consolidated. Geoffrey Pridham, *Transitions to Democracy: Comparative Perspectives from Southern Europe, Latin America and Eastern Europe* (Dartmouth: University of Bristol- Centre For Mediterranean Studies, 1995), 536–537.

¹⁴ Ibid., 541–564.

¹⁵ Thomas C. Bruneau and Scott D. Tollefson, ed., *Who Guards the Guardians and How: Democratic Civil Military Relations* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2006), 2.

¹⁶ Alfred Stepan introduces the Military–contestation—Military–prerogatives model to explain the interplay between the two aspects which results in civilian control in varying degrees and which ultimately decides establishment and consolidation of democracy. He further adds that no democracy in the world is theoretically or empirically immune to a crisis that might eventually upset a once-consolidated model of civilian control. Stepan, *Rethinking Military Politics*, 98–101.

¹⁷ Serra, *The Military Transition: Democratic Reform of the Armed Forces*, 13.

situation where the military assumes that they are the guarantors of the nation.¹⁸ In Sri Lanka too, the military with the popularity they have gained, may assume themselves as guarantors of the nation and act similarly. However, the latest scholarly work of Thomas C. Bruneau and Scott D. Tollefson asserts that different countries may have their unique ways of political transition but, once such a phase is achieved, the ongoing democratic consolidation is similar of the most part.¹⁹ All of these arguments provide an ideal stand point from that to analyze the Sri Lankan context, a country in the process of establishing democratic consolidation after a civil war.

Though many scholars have succeeded in introducing democratic consolidation in broad terms, they have taken a lesser interest in describing the important conditions that should exist for democratic consolidation of a country. In this context, Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan have made substantial contribution in their latest literature, and they describe five arenas of democratic consolidation that would be useful in analyzing the Sri Lankan issue. Further, they believe that for a country to be democratically consolidated, first it should become a state. In that sense Sri Lanka can proceed further without any hesitation. As per Linz and Stepan, the five conditions described need to be interconnected and mutually reinforced to ensure the democratic consolidation. The five arenas they describe are: a free and lively civil society, a relatively autonomous and valued political society, rule of law to ensure legal guarantees for citizens' freedom, a state bureaucracy that is usable by the democratic government, and an institutionalized economic society.²⁰ However, high military influence of a country will automatically suppress the above conditions. In a similar scenario, the Sri Lankan military has already

¹⁸ The element most likely to undermine the process of consolidation is the military when it asserts itself as a tutelary power or creates its own autonomous space and takes areas of political decision making away from the government. The armed forces assert themselves as tutelary powers when they consider themselves guarantors of the nation. Serra, *The Military Transition*, 16.

¹⁹ The literature findings on democratic transitions tend to differ to the degree that each country's political transition is unique but this does not appear to be the case in democratic consolidation. Once that certain phase is reached, then general findings on political parties, electoral systems, bureaucracies, and the other institutions of democracy become relevant. Bruneau and Tollefson, ed., *Who Guards the Guardians*, 3.

²⁰ Linz and Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transitions and Consolidation*, 7–15.

engaged in performing exaggerated roles in post war reconciliation activities, and this may also affect the consolidation of democracy.

The scholarly work of S.E. Finer provides some excellent thoughts on military intervention. According to Finer, modern armies are a microcosm of the state and capable of self-sustaining.²¹ Therefore, in primitive economies they may be technically ahead of the civil sector, get involved in economic developments and dominate the society. However, when societies get advanced and complicated the military might lag behind and be less influential. However, the situation in Sri Lanka may be different as the military is as advanced as the civil sector, so it can dominate the civil society at any time. Finer further describes how, when public attachment to civilian institutions is strong the risk of military intervention is less. In post-war Sri Lanka the public's attachment to the military may be higher than its attachment to public institutions, and that may create an opportunity for the military to intervene.²²

Secondly, there is rich literature, pertaining to civil-military relations in developed democracies, which reflects the coherent approaches focused on constant upheaval of democratic values. Even though such approaches were developed later in a much advanced civil-military environment, the primary literature on the subject is based on pioneering work of Samuel P. Huntington and Morris Janowitz on American civil-military relations.²³ Thomas C. Bruneau and Florina Cristiana Matei argue that focus of those scholars is limited to developed democracies, especially to the United States where the main concerns are controlling the military and subordination of the military to ensure civilian supremacy. On the other hand the theories of Huntington and Janowitz mostly related to the consequences of trade-offs between security and liberty. Bruneau and Matei maintain that such approaches are problematic, as the literature focuses only on the

²¹ Finer, *The Man on Horseback*, 12–18.

²² Ibid.

²³ Thomas C. Bruneau quotes Peter D. Fever who says that Huntington's theory outlined in the *Soldier and the State*, remains the dominant theoretical paradigm in civil-military relations, especially in American Civil-Military relations.... and his model is widely acclaimed to be the most elegant, ambitious, and important on civil-military relations theory to date, Thomas C. Bruneau, *Patriots for Profit: Contractors and the Military in U.S. National Security* (California: Stanford University Press, 2011), 15.

domestic U.S. environment whose relevance is questionable elsewhere in the world.²⁴ Although earlier scholars had resorted to defining relations between civilians and the military narrowly as an interaction between the higher political elites and the top brass of the military, Hans Born, Marina Caparini, Karl Haltiner and Jurgen Kuhulmann view that CMR should be comprehended in a broader context beyond the usual civil component (civilian political elites). They stress that it should be an all-inclusive approach that promotes military relations with the whole society, based on the terms of democratic values encompassing such norms as openness, transparency, accountability, legitimacy, and pluralism.²⁵

The scholarly work of Bernard Boene highlights that, during the last decade or so, the French armed services have undergone many changes in their strategic environment, organizational goals, and relationship between the state and society. He observes that the most striking factors related to such changes are the steep decline of resources in the armed services, both human and budgetary, and the increased confidence of the general public in the armed forces. The aforesaid reasons later became factors that fuelled the destabilization of civil-military relations in France. Affiliation with the European Union introduced new EU disciplines, such as budgetary restrictions, that brought about poor funding for the armed forces—a worrisome factor for the military. French political elites took advantage of military ethics that kept the military silent and accommodated the frequently made demands by the civilian sector. Political elites ignored the military's professional viewpoint, which further widened the gap between the military and civilian authorities. The armed forces felt that they had been sidelined by political elites, while they maintained a long-standing top position as the most respected public institution of

²⁴ Thomas C. Bruneau and Florina Cristiana Matei, "Toward a New Conceptualization of Democratization and Civil-Military Relations," *Democratization*, 909–929 Vol.15, No.5, December 2008, accessed on 10 July 2012, http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/22327/Bruneau_final_file.pdf.

²⁵ Hans Born, Marina Caparini, Karl Haltiner and Jurgen Kuhulmann, argue that past academics have tended to define civil-military relations narrowly in terms of interactions between the top military and political elites. The broadening of the 'civil' component of the term is especially important given our interest in democratic civil-military relations, which argues for an inclusive approach that does not privilege civil political elites but views military relations with society in the broad terms suggested by democratic norms such as openness, transparency, accountability, legitimacy and pluralism. Hans Born, Marina Caparini, Karl W. Haltiner and Jurgen Kuhlmann, ed., *Civil Military Relations in Europe: Learning Crisis and Institutional Change*, (London and New York: Routledge, 2006), 5.

the country.²⁶ Having neglected the military for almost three decades and having learned from the mistakes of promoting an all-volunteer force and Gendarmes,²⁷ politicians realized the importance of the forgotten loyalty of the military and later on heeded professional military advice more attentively.

Addressing the restricted budgets and reasserting the uniqueness of the military, the French politicians re-established cohesive civil-military relations in later years, which highlighted the importance of reaffirming the military identity of the country.²⁸ In contrast, the Sri Lankan military cannot grumble as the government has been providing appropriate funds despite much difficulty in sustaining the military mechanism during the war. With the end of the war, however, the government has enforced certain budgetary restrictions, and the military may become agitated on such grounds in the future.

Thirdly, there is literature on civil-military relations in emerging democracies. As Hans Born, Marina Caparini, Karl Haltiner and Jurgen Kuhulmann point out, interest in scholars researching civil-military relations of developed democracies is fading as transitioning democracies offer more contrasting studies due to potential influence of the military. In that context, the literature on Poland's road to civilian control explores some valuable insights in civil-military relations. Janusz Onyszkiewicz's study on the former Communist regime of Poland confirms that the military is an extremely autocratic institution that demands complete and unconditional loyalty and commitment. Further, it is an organization that can muster a great force at any time the state may demand. The impact created by such institutions is amply described by Samuel Finer, Zoltan Brany,

²⁶ Ibid., 177–183.

²⁷ Ibid., 184.

²⁸ Bernard Boene describes that the role of the service members is to safeguard the nation's higher interests by military means. The military profession is not a public service like others notwithstanding a few provisions to the contrary. As a consequence, members of the armed forces are citizens with a difference. Their identity is fashioned by the requirements of their profession and governed by a set of sacred principles which form the basis of its uniqueness. These principles, for service members are discipline, loyalty, unrestricted availability for duty, commitment that includes the possibility of sacrifice; for the state they are guaranteed protection of their interests and the legitimacy of their action on its behalf. Born, Caparini, Haltiner and Kuhlmann, ed., *Civil Military Relations in Europe*, 187.

and Thomas C. Bruneau.²⁹ Thomas C. Bruneau argues that any armed force strong enough to defend a country is also strong enough to take over and run that country.³⁰ During the Communist regimes, the military in Poland was of the view that the armed forces were the custodians of national values and, therefore, understood the interests of the country more than the politicians. Furthermore, they believed that they had a moral obligation and duty to intervene in national politics when necessary. Samuel E. Finer views the popularity or the prestige of the military as a critical factor in military to intervention in governance.³¹ In a Communist environment, the idea of placing the military under civilian control was not a reality, and that situation prevailed not only in Poland but in many other countries in Central and the Eastern Europe. In such a setting, with overwhelming popular support, the democratic institutions of Poland endowed the military with even dictatorial powers. Further, the Polish military did not accept the concept of civilian control of the military, as they had a well embedded philosophy that civilians do not have any expertise in handling military matters. As a result, the military was utilized to fill Polish MOD positions with active military personnel, departing from the standard procedure as is followed by other countries. Janusz Onyszkiewicz states that Poland has now realized the need to establish civilian supremacy over the military; the importance of inculcating a defense culture in the minds of national political leaders, administrators, and local government officials, and most importantly, the fundamental formalization of civil-military relations through the constitution. While the case of Poland provides insights into Communist influence on civil-military relations, the negative impact that could arise from the military's overwhelming popularity and its impression of sole expertise in the defense field could be related to the Sri Lankan context in the proposed study.

²⁹ Janusz Onyszkiewicz quotes Samuel Finer's observations that, instead of asking why the military engages in politics, we ought surely to ask why they ever do otherwise. For at first sight the political advantages of the military vis-à-vis other civilian groupings are overwhelming. The military possesses vastly superior organization. And it possesses arms. Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, *Civil-Military Relations and Democracy*, (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 99.

³⁰ Bruneau, *Patriotic for Profit*, 35.

³¹ Finer, *The Man on Horseback*, 35.

By contrast, the literature on civil-military relations in Asian and African countries is comparatively limited. In such scarcity, the scholarly work of Jakkie Cilliers on Southern Africa provides limited knowledge on civil-military relations in this turbulent region. The region has suffered from major armed conflicts and, since decolonization, indigenous, highly politicized military cadres have existed, except for a few countries with some kind of matured military that accepts the supremacy of civilian control. Most of the militaries have either practiced European or Soviet doctrines, and by 1980 two thirds of the countries south of the Sahara were ruled by soldiers. Some countries have been able to enter the transformation process peacefully to become democracies, although their prospects seem to be blurred. With this background one cannot expect rich literature to be generated from the said region on CMR.³²

Aurel Croissant, David Kuehn and Philip Lorenz's theoretical and comparative research on democratization and civil-military relations of Asia expands to many countries transitioned from authoritarian regimes to democracies like Bangladesh, Indonesia, Philippine, Pakistan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand. It proposes a conceptual scheme that allows a different comparative assessment on complex patterns of direct and indirect military influence that shapes civil-military relations. They view Asia as the best region with great diversity for drawing inferences on civil-military relations and democratization. As they highlight, most countries in the region have some form of experience of democratization, and in that, majority of the countries remain under authoritarian rule. As per their study, they categorize those countries as military rule (Burma/Myanmar), closed authoritarian rule under communist one party rule (China, Laos, Vietnam), and traditional monarchies and multiparty authoritarian regimes like Malaysia. Further, they maintain that demand for political liberalization has led the regimes transition into democracies along with third wave of democratization. During the process of transition, countries like South Korea and Taiwan has led to institutionalization and consolidation of liberal democracies, while countries like Pakistan and Thailand has failed to consolidate leading to breakdown of democracy. However, they highlight that the said democratic transitions have contributed reasonably to decline

³² Diamond and Plattner, *Civil-Military Relations and Democracy*, 81–95.

military's political power reducing the number of coups occur in the region significantly. Further, the new democratic environment has made those countries compelled to introduce new reforms to the civil-military relations contributing to demilitarizing of state, society, and the economy. However, in their study they have categorized Sri Lanka as a personalistic regime similar to Bhutan, Brunei and North Korea and excluded from the main study. This background on Asia and the regional trend is helpful for the study of civil-military relations in Sri Lanka.³³

Given the size and the diversity of the region, Carolina G. Hernandez believes that civil-military relations, especially in Southeast Asia, have colonial influences and are facing different challenges peculiar to the region.³⁴ Carolina maintains that lack of experience in democratic governance by the political leaders in the post-colonial governments, instability created by strong ethnic and religious rivalries, lack of political institutions, and the judiciary may have allowed the military to intervene. The end of the Cold War diminished the Communist threat in the region, and such fundamental changes compelled governments to redefine the role of the military with force restructuring and budget cuts, which raised the concerns of the military. Carolina G. Hernandez argues that the prolonged internal and external conflicts of countries in the region have a profound impact on civil-military relations. Perhaps pertinent examples are the Kashmir conflict between India and Pakistan and the internal conflict that lasted in Sri Lanka for three decades between the government of Sri Lanka and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). In such scenarios, the countries have entrusted their militaries with major domestic responsibilities.³⁵ Carolina stresses that the military's domestic responsibilities should be limited only to a quick response, such as disaster relief on the basis of quick withdrawal after accomplishment of the task, and not extended to the deployment of the military in long-term assignments such as nation building. Indonesian armed forces, who

33 Aurel Croissant, David Kuehn and Philip Lorenz, *Breaking with the Past? Civil-Military Relations in the Emerging Democracies of East Asia* (Hawaii: East-West Centre, 2012), 1–11.

34 Diamond and Plattner, *Civil-Military Relations and Democracy*, 66–67.

35 Carolina G. Hernandez observes that with the comprehensive and multidimensional concept of security prevalent in East Asia, the role of the military is not limited to defending the country against potential external threats. Rather, in countries such as Indonesia, the armed forces have been given major domestic responsibilities, Diamond and Plattner, *Civil-Military Relations and Democracy*, 69.

engaged in nation building and are adopting the “dual function” (socio and economic) doctrine³⁶ is an example. The argument of Carolina G. Hernandez directly opposes the role of the Sri Lankan armed forces who took part in reconciliation and nation-building, in the country that is the subject of this thesis.

Extensive review of available literature relevant to the subject confirms that there is sufficient material pertaining to developed countries (with established democracies) and transitioning democracies (located mostly in Central and Eastern Europe, and Latin America, and Asia). In contrast, the literature available on Africa is more meager, and it is even difficult to find literature on countries in the Asian region that are in transition or consolidating as democracies, especially after conflicts. While utilizing the existing literature as a base for study, this thesis attempts to remedy the scarcity of literature available on Asia and provide some utility for scholars focusing on the South Asian region.

E. METHODS AND SOURCES

This research is an empirical study and intended to be carried out in the form of qualitative research utilizing secondary data gathered from various journals, reports submitted by governments, publications, newspaper articles, books and other literature from Dudley Knox Library and other books and journals available through inter-loan facilities from other libraries. The research will focus on civil-military practices adopted by the government of Sri Lanka and their effect on consolidation of democracy in the country. It will follow the system of a case study analysis supplemented by my own experiences as an officer with a twenty-three-year military career, twenty-years of them in the bitter civil war.

³⁶ The Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia (ABRI) are heavily involved in social-political affairs under the philosophy of dwifungsi. Dwifungsi says, basically that in addition to its role as a defense force, ABRI also has an active role to play in the creation and maintenance of social and political stability. Under this doctrine, ABRI officers are employed in an array of non-military roles, including provincial governors, ambassadors, senior civil servants and chiefs of state enterprises, Arief Budiman, “*Military Dual Function Under Spot Light*,” *The Australian*, August 10, 1996, <http://peace.home.xs4all.nl/pubeng/pdm/OP271AB.html>.

F. THESIS OVERVIEW

This thesis will be divided into five chapters. The first chapter will be dedicated to introducing the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, and the latest developments in civil-military relations in the country recovering after thirty years of civil war. Furthermore, the chapter will be enriched by the comprehensively reviewed literature on the subject, which covers significant thoughts and original insights of the various scholars involved in the field. Moreover, it will convene the diversified experiences of civil-military relations in different parts of the world to begin the discussion.

Chapter II will incorporate the necessary theoretical background of the study by focusing on democratic transition, consolidation, and importance of civil-military relations. Likewise, this chapter will outline how civil-military relations play a decisive role in re-instituting democracy in a country and the resultant outcome. Within this theoretical context the chapter will introduce the important explanations of military prerogatives on which the central argument of the thesis depends.

The issues specific to Sri Lanka will be taken up in Chapter III. The first of the four subsections will look at the aspects related to transition and consolidation of democracy in the country, and subsection two is intended to discuss the background of the civil war and highlight, civil-military relations maintained during the civil war period that paved the way to defeat the Liberation Tigers Tamil Eelam. The next subsection will analyze the exaggerated roles and missions of the Sri Lankan Armed Forces, which have become the focus of the critiques. The last subsection will explore the post-war civil-military relations prevailing in the country since the end of the civil war, which has aroused numerous questions, and which necessarily relates to the military prerogatives.

Chapter IV will analyze the impact of the post-civil war civil-military relations on democratic consolidation of Sri Lanka. Chapter V is the closing chapter of the study, will draw conclusions and provide answers to the complex questions raised on excessive military involvement, enhanced prerogatives of the military, civilian supremacy over the armed forces, and democratic consolidation. In conclusion the study will highlight the

invaluable lessons learned and best/worst practices, which would strengthen the civil-military relations mechanism to ensure a consolidated democracy that is the most preferred governance of the world.

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II. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND-INSIGHTS ON DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION AND CONSOLIDATION, CIVIL MILITARY RELATIONS, AND MILITARY PREROGATIVES

Laying the theoretical background is a necessity prior to proceeding with the specific case study of Sri Lanka. The chapter briefly discusses the relevant and important theoretical terms and explanations that will be useful to comprehending the study.

A. WHAT IS DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION?

In the simplest form, “transition” can be defined as an interval between one political regime and another. Democratic transition (or transition to democracy) can be described as the process in which authoritarian regimes transform to democracies. Transitions are delimited on one side by the launching of the process to terminate an authoritarian regime and on the other by establishing some degree of democracy, returning to some form of authoritarian rule, or allowing the emergence of a rebellious alternative.³⁷

In most situations, transitions and resultant democratizations involve the crucial component of mobilization and organization of a large number of individuals. Scholars like O'Donnell and Schmitter relate transition to a cycle of mobilization. In the early phases of a transition, oppositions tend to remain inactive considering the massive cost of opposing an authoritarian rule. When transition is underway and liberalization comes into play, the opposition is automatically mobilized and a resurrection of civil society takes place. Finally, when an acceptable transition is achieved, demobilization of cohesive opposition elements and democratization may occur.³⁸ This might not be a general pattern applicable to all countries, and may differ from country to country.

³⁷ Scott Mainwaring, “Transition to Democracy and Democratic Consolidation: Theoretical and Comparative Issues,” Working Paper- Helen Kellogg Institute for International Studies, November, 1989. accessed on December 26, 2012.
http://www.undp.org.eg/portals/0/int%20forum/democratic%20consolidation_mainwaring.pdf.

³⁸ Linz and Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transitions and Consolidation*, 66–68.

In the path to democracy, Adam Przeworski has identified two types of transitions: the bottom up transition and top down transition. The bottom up transition takes place when people rise up and overthrow an authoritarian regime through a popular revolution. In most instances well before a popular mobilization divisions within an authoritarian regime becomes visible. Cracks in the regime occur between the hardliners and the liberalizers who survive within an authoritarian regime. The liberalizers within an authoritarian environment see the possibility and tend to make alliances with the civilian society and that leads to crack of the regimes. Therefore, liberalization occurs as result of interaction between the civil society and the splits of the authoritarian regime. The popular mobilizations indicates potential liberalizers the possibility of making alliances with civil society. The civil society identifies availability of political space for them to function autonomously when they observe visible splits within an authoritarian power bloc. In that manner in liberalization process, splits of a regime and popular mobilizations interact feeding each other. The resultant liberalization—transition may last for days to years.³⁹

In the top down approach the authoritarian rulers introduces liberalizing reforms that finally leading to democratic transition. It is a controlled form of opening of political spaces for civil society. The signs of imminent popular unrest and signs of probable split within an authoritarian regime may prompt the authoritarian rulers to allow some space for the autonomous organizations of the civil society to function. Through this initiative the authoritarian regimes try to relax the social tension and incorporate new social groups while expanding their social base. However, in this form of liberalization the transition takes place per the interests and values of authoritarian rulers.⁴⁰

Transition to democracy of a country depends on the institutional character of the state elite who are involved in the day-to-day activities of a state. In Linz and Stepan's view, there are four distinctive types of state elites who can be influential in democratic transfer and consolidation: hierarchical military, nonhierarchical military, civilian elites

³⁹ Adam Przeworski, *Democracy and the Market* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 56–59.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

and sultanistic elites. The officers' corps in a hierarchical military regime is an important element favorable for transitions as it has enduring interests about the state rather than short-term interests in an undemocratic rule. Further, officers prefer the existence of a stable state and the availability of a government that would fulfill their long-term interests. As an extrication strategy, hierarchical military regimes prefer to hold democratic elections. The military in most countries has uncontended power and access to opportunities, and any democratic government that assumes power following a transition needs to deal with the military. However, when weaker coalitions force the ruling military to leave office, the military may negotiate terms to retain nondemocratic prerogatives and create conditions difficult for a smooth transition.⁴¹ The nonhierarchical military regime, which is led by officers of the level of colonels and majors, poses comparatively less of a threat to democratic transition and consolidation as its officers prefer to adopt extrication strategies and establish formal hierarchies that would be helpful for transitions.⁴²

In sultanistic regimes, the ruler personalizes the government through penetration of the state, political society and the civil society by pervasive means. Further, it is difficult to identify whether these regimes are led by the military or by civilians. Moreover, since these regimes are governed by one ruler or governed only by close family members of the ruler, they are susceptible to sudden and severe movements of the civil society, and assassination of the leader or the overthrow of his person by an armed rebellion may lead to transition of the state.⁴³

In contrast, regimes led by civilians (even post totalitarian civilian regimes with communist parties) have more robust institutional, symbolic, and absorptive capacities than military or sultanistic regimes, so they can direct and manage transitions more efficiently. Because civilian regimes have more access to civilian society, they are more capable of negotiating complex reform packages than military or the sultanistic regimes. Further, civilians view themselves as prospective winners and rulers of the democratic

⁴¹ Linz and Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transitions and Consolidation*, 66–68.

⁴² Ibid., 68.

⁴³ Ibid., 70.

regimes to be established. India and Sri Lanka are two examples for countries that have transitioned to democracies led by civilian regimes.

In the context of colonized countries, most of them won independence through populist revolutions and some through peaceful negotiations. These countries subsequently transitioned to their own rule, however, most processes were shadowed by imperial legacies. After decolonization, the countries who won independence have established different types of governments—military and civilian. While some countries have benefited from imperial experiences, in other, colonizers have ruined the traditional state structures derailing subsequent democratic transition and consolidation processes.

As per Linz and Stepan democratic transition can only be completed when agreements are made and procedures are established to elect a government by popular vote through free and fair elections, and elected government has power to formulate policies. Further, the three main pillars of democracy: executive, legislative and the judiciary are made independent and full functional without sharing power with any other authority.⁴⁴

B. WHAT IS DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION?

Philippe C. Schmitter's definition of consolidation of democracy first refers to the regime consolidation. To describe, "it consists in transforming the accidental arrangements, prudential norms and contingent solutions that emerged in relation to the above issues during uncertain struggles of transition into structures."⁴⁵ Consolidation of democracy, which occurs next, is transforming the said ad hoc patterns in to stable structures confirming to a specific standard.⁴⁶

Later in the same chapter, Schmitter concludes that consolidation of democracy can be conceived, measured and ultimately evaluated as a process of linking emergent political institutions to economic and social groups whose support is crucial to their long-

⁴⁴ Ibid., 3.

⁴⁵ Philippe C. Schmitter's defines regime consolidation and consolidation of democracy...Pridham, *Transitions to Democracy: Comparative Perspectives*, 539.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

run survival. He further emphasize on linkages formed between various types of private constituencies and public authorities, and guaranties and privileges extended to capital, religious authorities, aristocracies, armed forces, police, ethnic minorities, local communities, secret societies, or the civil service to sustain their commitment to the democratic bargain.⁴⁷

In Linz and Stepan view, for consolidation of democracy first a state should exist. When the basic fulfillment the existence of a state—is achieved, a functioning state should accomplish five other inter-connected, mutually reinforcing conditions in order for the democracy to be consolidated. They are: conditions supporting development of a free and lively civil society, availability of a relatively autonomous and valued political society, assurance of rule of law and legal guarantees of the citizens, availability of a state bureaucracy that can function for a democratic government, and the availability of an institutionalized economic society.⁴⁸

A free and lively civil society is a necessity for democratic consolidation, and it encompasses a wide variety of social groups, such as self-organized groups, movements and individuals who try to voice their interests. Further, the civil society can include diverse social movements like women's associations, neighborhood associations, religious groupings, intellectual organizations and civil associations like trade unions. Lately, civil society includes social media (Twitter, Facebook to name a few). These organizations, which represent a wide spectrum of the social strata, are capable of organizing a great force through large mobilizations not only by their memberships but also by including other civilians who form a crucial part of the huge force demanding a change of regimes. The latest examples in this context are Egypt and Tunisia where

⁴⁷ Ibid., 551.

⁴⁸ Linz and Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transitions and Consolidation*, 7.

people of the two countries changed the autocratic regimes of Hosni Mubarak and Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali, respectively, through popular uprising.⁴⁹

In a democratic environment, the politicians assume democratic rights to control a state, and it is in the political society that they contests for it. Although, a civil society can help to end a non-democratic regime, proper transition and consolidation can only be achieved through active participation of a political society. Further, the political society demonstrates control over public power and the state apparatus. The political society is a combination of core institutions, such as political parties, elections, electoral rules, political leadership, interparty alliances and legislatures through, which they construct democracies. There is a tendency, however, of neglecting civil society over the other, or vis-à-vis, that might affect consolidation of democracy in a state. This happens when democratic leaders of the political society try to demobilize the very same civil society that has brought them to democratic politics. Therefore, in a democratic consolidation process, both civil and political societies are required to be treated with equal importance while assuring they function freely.⁵⁰

For democratic consolidation of a state, in addition to the autonomy of civil and political society, both should be further supported by legal guarantees and rule of law. Constitutions can provide enough guidelines in this behalf, and it is democratic governments that should ensure fair rule while maintaining law and order toward every citizen. Governments should uphold the spirit of the constitution that provides greater consensus over the constitutional framework, which enables the legal guarantees of the people. The inculcating of a strong legal culture in the society and independence of the judiciary are other important factors that most countries fail to establish in the democratization process.⁵¹

⁴⁹ Hamze Abbas Jamoul, "The Arab Spring: The Root Causes," *Al-Manar*. December 11, 2012. Accessed on December 11, 2012, <http://www.almanar.com.lb/english/adetails.php?fromval=1&cid=31&frid=31&eid=45439>; Christopher Walker and Vanessa Tucker, "Tunisia: The Arab Spring's Pivotal Democratic Example," *Freedom House*, accessed on January 22, 2013, <http://www.freedomhouse.org/article/tunisia-arab-springs-pivotal-democratic-example>.

⁵⁰ Linz and Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transitions and Consolidation*, 9.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 10.

In a democratic environment, ensuring that the rights of the citizens are guaranteed and protected should have the monopoly of the legitimate use of force over a state's territory. To ensure security, a democratic country needs to maintain legitimate security forces (armed forces, police, intelligence etc.). In addition, there are numerous other services that governments provide, like judicial services, education, health and transport, all of which need large infrastructure and colossal amounts of money and, therefore, collection of taxes from the citizens of a country. To maintain such complicated services, new democracies need strong bureaucracies. Moreover, these are considered a prerequisite for democratic consolidation.⁵²

The fifth and the last supportive condition important for consolidation of democracy is the availability of a sufficiently institutionalized economic society. Economic theorists claim that democratic consolidation cannot exist in either command economies or pure-market economies. In that context, consolidating democracies require an economic society that incorporates socio-politically accepted norms, organizations, and procedures that can arbitrate between the government and the market. This can facilitate greater market autonomy and ownership diversity in an economy, which can necessarily create a lively civil society supporting the consolidation of democracy.⁵³

Furthermore, for transitions to take place the availability of dominant actors in democratic politics is not always important, and in the same way actors who are important for transitions are not essentially required for democratic politics. As an example, parties and elections, which are important to ensure democratic governance, may not be important for the transition phase of a country.

In summary, the consolidation of democracy is a composite outcome of the interrelated functions of, at least, the five facets described. Further, it highlights that none of the arenas described can function individually without the support of the others and that democracy is an interactive system different from the previously prevailing historical regimes.

⁵² Linz and Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transitions and Consolidation*, 11.

⁵³ Ibid.

C. CIVIL–MILITARY RELATIONS AND DEMOCRACY

Since the third wave of democratization, many countries in the third world have transitioned to democracies, including former military dictatorships. In some of the new democracies, depending on the role during non-democratic regime, and role they played during transition, the military may present a potential threat to democratic civilian rule. For example, the armed forces were the chief props of the authoritarian regimes in Portugal and Spain, and actively took part in the transition to democracy. In other countries, like Chile, the armed forces were the authoritarian regime and continued to have high authority even after the transition. On a different note, in Romania, while armed forces were not supporting the communist regime of Nicolae Ceausescu, the army played a prominent role in the transition process of converting the dictatorship of Ceausescu into a democracy.

For these reasons, civil-military relations have become a key concern in both the literature and the political agenda, and most analysts discuss civil-military relations as an important determinant of democracy.⁵⁴ The importance of civil-military relations for democratic consolidation was highlighted by Juan J. Linz, Alfred Stepan, Schmitter, O'Donnell, Diamond, Przeworski, Plattner, Bruneau and Cristiana Matei who draw attention to the military variable of COD, in particular civilian control. Studies on democratic control of armed forces have also highlighted relevance of civilian control in the overall democratization process. Within the same context of democratic civilian control, Stepan looks at the prerogatives, and how they impact COD (which will be addressed in the next subsection).

In this context, one could argue that democracies have preferred controlling the armed forces and subordinating the military to civilian control.⁵⁵ With the evolution of democracies, new security challenges like terrorism have emerged, and countries have been compelled to maintain a sizable strength of armed forces to meet such contemporary

⁵⁴ See Diamond and Plattner, *Civil-Military Relations and Democracy*, ix ; Thomas C, Bruneau and Florina Cristiana Matei, ed., *The Routledge Handbook of Civil-Military Relations* (New York: Routledge, 2013) ; Linz and Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transitions and Consolidation*.

⁵⁵ Bruneau and Matei, "Toward a New Conceptualization," 912.

security challenges. Especially in the twenty-first century, armed forces the world over have been assigned to perform additional roles beyond their traditional tasks. This has allowed them to be involved in civil-related tasks, too. In this background, the recent studies on civil-military relations have expanded their scope beyond the concern for controlling the armed forces toward a trinity of civil-military relations: democratic civilian control, effectiveness, and efficiency supporting the consolidation of democracy.⁵⁶

D. MILITARY PREROGATIVES, CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS AND DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION

The military in any country is identified as an important unit in the state apparatus, and it may be empowered through the constitution to safeguard national interests. The aforementioned empowerment sometimes is misinterpreted by the military as a prerogative making it an exclusive and privileged entity that can interfere in the democratic governance of a country. Military involvement beyond its assigned responsibilities in a country is a democratically unaccepted norm and can be detrimental to civil-military relations and the consolidation of democracy in any country, irrespective of developed or consolidating democracies.

Alfred Stepan describes eleven types of prerogatives that can affect democratic governance by creating different levels of instability in various sectors—creating high, moderate, and low effects. Stepan's first prerogative is the constitutionally sanctioned independent role played by the military in the political system. His second prerogative is the relationship of the military with the chief executive of the country. The next prerogative is the involvement of the military in the coordination of the defense apparatus of the state. The fourth prerogative is representation in the cabinet by active duty military members. The fifth prerogative is military involvement in the country's legislature. The sixth prerogative is military presence in the senior career level of civilian appointments. The seventh prerogative is military involvement in the state intelligence apparatus. The

⁵⁶ See Bruneau and Matei, "Toward a New Conceptualization ..." However, they reworked this framework and dropped efficiency in a more recent publication. See Bruneau and Matei, ed., *The Routledge Handbook of Civil-Military Relations*, 26. I use this framework in this thesis.

eighth prerogative is the role played by the police. The ninth prerogative is the role played by the military in awarding promotions. The tenth prerogative is the military role in state enterprises, and the last prerogative is the role played in the legal system.⁵⁷ In most circumstances, when the military acts within the aforesaid prerogatives, a civilian government will run into a conflict. When countries manage with fewer military prerogatives, there is less contestation and this can be referred to as an ideal situation that will support consolidation. All other situations created through the effects of military prerogatives cause conflict, and do not create a suitable environment to enhance civil-military relations. Finally, they do not enforce stable democratic governance in a country.⁵⁸

The chapter describes about democratic transition, democratic consolidation, civil-military relations, and the connection of military prerogatives to civil-military relations and democratic consolidation. The transitions are basically intervals between the political regimes, and depend much on the institutional character of four types of state elites. They are hierarchical military, nonhierarchical military, civilian elites and sultanistic elites, and the transitions of colonized countries have occurred through populist revolutions or peaceful negotiations. The transitions become complete only when important components of democracy: executive, legislative and the judiciary are established. However, for both aspects, transition to democracy and democratic consolidation, civil-military relations will be an important determinant. Therefore, in any country the military becomes a decisive factor determining transitions and consolidation of democracy. These being the core concepts of the study, the chapter leads to a detailed account of Sri Lanka, which analyses wide variety of issues pertaining to democratic transition, democratic consolidation and civil-military relations specific to the country.

⁵⁷ Stepan, *Rethinking Military Politics*, 94–97.

⁵⁸ Ibid., 98–102.

III. SRI LANKA

A. BACKGROUND ON THE TRANSITION AND CONSOLIDATION OF DEMOCRACY IN SRI LANKA

1. Historical Background Prior to Transition

The transition of Sri Lanka into a democracy commenced in the year 1948 with the obtaining of independence from British colonial rule. Sri Lanka had been under the imperial rule of the Portuguese, Dutch and the British for over approximately four hundred and fifty years. The British, as the last colonizers, ruled the country for nearly one hundred and fifty years; during which time they introduced many changes to our culture, to our traditions, and to state structure. By the time of transformation from British rule to an independent democratic state, the required bureaucracy, police and defense forces, public education system, and judicial system had been already developed in Sri Lanka.⁵⁹ In addition, private establishments had emerged and were slowly gaining legitimacy. The British colonial rulers granted universal franchise to the Sri Lankans in 1938. Since then, a broader political organizing took place in the country, which established an anti-colonial and nationalistic movement led by the local elites who convinced the British rulers of their desire for independence.⁶⁰

2. Transition to Democracy and Democratic Consolidation

The transition of Sri Lanka into a democracy commenced in the year 1948 with the obtaining of independence from British colonial rule. Unlike in most British colonies and especially that of neighboring India, the transformation from colonial rule to an independent state in Sri Lanka took place in a relatively peaceful manner. The British granted independence to Sri Lanka on February 04, 1948, and transformed the country initially into a dominion status of the British to function under a Governor-General. On

⁵⁹ Neil De Votta, "Control Democracy, Institutional Decay, and the Quest for Eelam: Explaining Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka," *Pacific Affairs*. Vol.73, No1, 2000. 55–56. accessed on December 19, 2012, <http://www.jstor.org.libproxy.nps.edu/stable/pdfplus/2672284.pdf?acceptTC=true>.

⁶⁰ Siri Gamage, "Democracy in Sri Lanka: Past, Present and Future," *Asian Studies Review*. Vol 17. Issue I. 1993. 107–116. accessed on December 19, 2012, <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/03147539308712906>.

May 22, 1972, Sri Lanka turned into a republic when full autonomy was granted with establishment of the new constitution parallel to the third wave of democratization⁶¹ expanding in Asia and Latin America.

The situation in Sri Lanka in 1948 was, in contrast, stable, peaceful and in order.⁶² As the transfer of power took place in a smooth and peaceful manner, the British created a new capital class in Sri Lanka, constituted of the elites, and little was seen of the divisions and bitterness tearing at the recently obtained independence of the new nations of South Asia. By the time of independence, in addition to a social structure different from the traditional, the British have established important components of a democracy—the executive, legislature and the judiciary. These institutions of the country developed rapidly, however, in all areas of concern the British influence was prevalent. Further, governors of the country retained the British Ceylon armed forces formed during the imperial rule, which completed the important requisites of a newly independent nation. In addition, critical determinants of liberalization like formation of political parties,⁶³ holding of elections⁶⁴ and amendment of the constitution took place in the contemporary period, which strengthened the progressive democracy of Sri Lanka.

Britain's divide-and-rule policy during their colonial rule, however, had boldly favored the minority community at the expense of the majority community of Sinhalese in its religion, language and culture. In this context, the majority Sinhalese viewed

⁶¹ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*, (University of Oklahoma Press, 1992), 21.

⁶² KM De Silva, *History of Sri Lanka*, (India: Penguin Books, 2005), 489–491.

⁶³ The growth and institutionalization of a stable political party system over the brief span of less than five decades is significant, and an impressive political achievement of Sri Lanka in the post-independence era. The foundation for a party system was laid in the country by introduction of universal adult suffrage in 1931. It was the colonial influence and adoption of a British-style parliamentary system of government that prompted the formation of political parties in Sri Lanka that have played major roles in the nation's politics since independence in 1948. Robert N. Kearney "The Political Party System in Sri Lanka," *Political Science Quarterly* Vol. 98, No. 1, 1983, 17–3. accessed on January 26, 2013. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2150202.pdf?acceptTC=true>.

⁶⁴ The Department of Elections in Sri Lanka was created on October 01, 1955, amalgamating the then existing two Departments of Parliamentary Elections and Local Body Elections. The Vision of the Department is to protect democracy in the country; it is achieved by conducting free and fair elections and referenda. The department functioned as an independent government department not coming under any Minister. The Commissioner is answerable only to the Parliament." Department of Elections," accessed on January 26, 2013. <http://www.slections.gov.lk/>.

independence and transfer of power as a mechanism that would restore the rightful place of the Sinhala language, Buddhism and the intertwined culture. In the elections held in 1947, D. S. Senanayake from the majority Sinhala community was elected as the Prime Minister.⁶⁵

3. Deterioration of Democracy

Within a few months after gaining independence, one of the most pressing issues since the British colonial times—the Tamil problem—was settled when Tamil politicians like G.G Ponnambalam joined the government. Prime Minister D.S. Senanayake steered the government toward a settlement of the Tamil issue with moderate political opinion and sensitivity toward minority interests. This development of affairs was seen by the minorities as a genuine democratic effort made by the majority Sinhalese government.⁶⁶ Senanayake understood that a multi-cultural society in a country like Sri Lanka, which was in the last phase of the transfer of power, should give due consideration of its minority if the country was going to be democratically consolidated. In that sense, the government ensured there was no discrimination against the minorities and a moderate opinion in politics—the political party representing the majority community at the same time was acceptable to the minority—and to abandon the concept of secular state and ensure neutrality toward all religions.⁶⁷

The stability achieved in 1948 in the democratization process had eroded by 1956 when SWRD Bandaranayke became the Prime Minister and introduced a “Sinhala Only” official Language Act. It was seen as an abandonment of the multi-racial policy and agitated the Tamil minority. That led to the creation of a separate historical past for the Tamils, for their linguistic unity and distinctiveness.⁶⁸ Soon, the combustible nature of a linguistic nationalism in a multi-cultural society became obvious when nationwide riots erupted. Although the “Sinhala Only” language policy did not come into effect in its

⁶⁵ Votta, “Control Democracy,” 57–58.

⁶⁶ De Silva, *History of Sri Lanka*, 490–491.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ Ibid., 512–513.

original form, the damage was done and it affected the consolidation of democracy in the country, emphasizing the role of language as a determinant of nationhood. Further, this laid the seed for a demand for autonomy for the Northern and Eastern Provinces where a majority of the Tamils lived—a claim later altered by the LTTE in the separatist war.

During the next decade or so, an independent Sri Lanka progressed as a liberal democracy although with ups and downs. It took the form of a classic parliamentary system with organized political parties contesting local and national elections. The two main power blocs replaced each other after almost every election, and the public participation in elections was among the highest recorded in the world.⁶⁹ Various apparatus of the government—administrative, legislative, judicial and accounting—enjoyed some level of autonomy. State-society relations were maintained at an acceptable level, which supported the progress of the liberal democracy. In addition, the associational life was vigorous, and as a whole the overall situation in the country was supportive of a liberal democracy. In this scenario, the country enjoyed a less violent period, and accordingly no state effort was taken to strengthen the armed forces. Therefore, the armed forces remained insignificant by any criterion—budget, equipment, training, experience, power or status.⁷⁰

A period of turmoil erupted in 1971 when an island-wide, Sinhalese youth uprising took place and the government was compelled to use comparatively weak, ill-equipped military to curb the rebellion. The constitutional changes adopted in 1972 provided more state patronage to Sinhalese nationalists and Buddhism, which pushed the country toward an ethnocracy. The Sinhalese community learnt electoral politics and they utilized it to demand and dictate state policies, and sometimes the outcomes were discriminating the minority. However, the Sinhalese could not dictate terms on population based representation and selection criteria adopted for state sector jobs and education as per the constitution. This system was advantageous for the minority Tamils spread all over the country even though in small numbers. When the minority Tamils

⁶⁹ Mick Moore, "Retreat from Democracy in Sri Lanka," *The Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics*. Vol 30, Issue 1, 1992. 64–65. accessed on December 21, 2012. <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/14662049208447625>.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

gained disproportionate representation in the universities and in the civil service, the majority Sinhalese were marginalized. The government through a new constitution devised a weightage system blocking the overrepresentation and additional opportunities enjoyed by the Tamils—that later led to discriminating them. This incident sighted a new approach to controlling democracy in Sri Lanka.⁷¹ Stemming from irregularities and lack of opportunities in bureaucratic, commercial, and educational spheres, mobilization of the Tamil youth slowly took place, transforming into a freedom struggle by the latter part of the 1970s.⁷² The continuous galvanizing of the Tamil youth under the banner of Eelam expanded the LTTE movement, which allowed it to stage feared attacks on the democracy of Sri Lanka in the next four decades.

The constitutional reforms in 1978 transformed the system of governance of Sri Lanka from a British-imported, Westminster-style parliamentary system to an executive presidential system, and since then political processes have changed radically from the previous ethos. Concentrating on an economic agenda and open economic policies, the Sri Lankan government during the said era ignored political values and civil principles for economic and political expediency.⁷³ This had far reaching effects on democratic consolidation in the country.

Since the eruption of the Eelam Wars in 1983, the country has been pushed into a war footing and remained under emergency regulations for more than three decades. The new bill on Prevention of Terrorists Acts (PTA) was also detrimental to the consolidation of democracy, while LTTE terrorists grossly violated basic human rights. Their inhuman attacks eroded democracy of the country. The prolonged violence and resultant institutional breakdowns did not give any hope for reestablishment of democracy in Sri Lanka. The only hope was ending the civil war first, which had diluted the democracy under the tenacity of the LTTE terrorism and the absence of moderate political maneuvering of the government of Sri Lanka. However, it was an illusion as the Eelam Wars continued until the LTTE was militarily defeated in May 2009.

⁷¹ Votta, “Control Democracy,” 60–61.

⁷² Ibid., 62–63.

⁷³ Gamage, “Democracy in Sri Lanka: Past, Present and Future,” 110.

The termination of the civil war has brought new hope for an era of democratic consistency, but repairing damage caused to the democracy during the civil war will be a challenging task for the national leadership and the whole society of Sri Lanka.⁷⁴

B. CHALLENGES TO CONSOLIDATION OF DEMOCRACY-THE CIVIL WAR IN SRI LANKA

The inception of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) was similar to other militant groups in the world. The LTTE, which started in the form of a common insurgent uprising, gradually developed into a full-fledged separatist terrorist organization similar to Hizbollah⁷⁵ in the Middle-East, demanding an independent state called Tamil Eelam, which encompassed virtually the entire North and East of the Island. During three decades of armed conflict, approximately 100,000 lives were lost and billions of dollars' worth of infrastructure was destroyed in the North and East, which almost paralyzed the economy of the whole country.

The history of the civil war in Sri Lanka falls into four distinct phases covering nearly three decades of violent conflict.⁷⁶ Punctuated by both long and short term cease-fires observed by the parties to the conflict—the government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE—Eelam Wars I, II, III, and IV were fought mainly in the northern and eastern provinces of the country, although the war affected the security and stability of the entire country.

Tensions between the Tamil extremist groups and the government over ethnic, linguistic issues had been brewing predominantly in northern Sri Lanka largely since 1970s in the context of poor political response by ruling governments. However, these events did not turn into a distinctive armed struggle until the 1980s. Although the LTTE grew in strength and organization day by day undercover, they did not pose an apparent threat to the armed forces deployed in the Jaffna peninsula—the heartland of the LTTE.

⁷⁴ Robert Oberst, "Countries at the Crossroads-Sri Lanka," *Freedom House*. accessed on December 24, 2012, <http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/countries-crossroads/2012/sri-lanka>.

⁷⁵ Ahmad Nizar Hamzeh, *In the Path of Hizbollah* (New York: Syracuse University Press, 2004), 1–5.

⁷⁶ Hans Born and Albrecht Schnabel, ed., *Security Sector Reform in Challenging Environments* (Geneva: Geneva Centre For the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2009), 191.

The first attack on the military took place in October 1981, when the LTTE attacked and murdered a soldier on duty at Stanley Road in Jaffna. Then skirmishes took place on and off until July, 23, 1983, when 13 soldiers of the Sri Lankan Army were ambushed and murdered by the LTTE at Thirunelveli, in Jaffna. This single incident created a new dimension in the civil war in Sri Lanka and also marked the commencement of Eelam War I. Against that backdrop, the following paragraphs elaborate different phases of the civil war highlighting how the armed forces of Sri Lanka engaged in the bitter war under different conditions and constraints, fulfilling directives of the governments in power during those different eras.

1. EELAM WAR-1

The onset of the civil war in Sri Lanka is generally ascribed to “Black July,”⁷⁷ the incident that occurred in 1983. The massacre of 13 soldiers by the LTTE in an ambush in the Jaffna Peninsula created anger amongst the majority in the South and triggered riots throughout the country. Although riots were controlled by the police and the armed forces within a few days the fighting in the North and East was intensified by the LTTE, targeting government officials, civilians, and armed forces positioned in the North and East. By that time the Sri Lankan military—which consisted of all three armed forces the Army, the Navy and the Air Force—had already departed from its ceremonial posture and was exposed to the increasing threat of the Tamil Tigers as an operationally oriented force. The only previous instance of the Sri Lankan Military becoming operationally deployed was the armed youths uprising in 1971.⁷⁸ Since then the armed forces of Sri Lanka had barely maneuvered in the country except during natural calamities. In the

⁷⁷Arijit Mazumdar, South Asia in Transition: India-Sri Lanka Relations in the Twenty-First Century, (Minneapolis: Minnesota International Relations Colloquium, 2012), 8. accessed on November 28, 2012. http://scholar.google.com/scholar?start=80&q=1983+black+july+riots+in+sri+lanka&hl=en&as_sdt=0,5.

⁷⁸Ganganath Obesekara, “Some Comments on the Social Backgrounds of the April 1971 Insurgency in Sri Lanka,” *Journal of Asian Studies* Vol xxxiii, No 3. May, 1974, accessed on November 28, 2012, <http://search.proquest.com/docview/218122219/pageviewPDF?accountid=12702>.

subsequent period, the LTTE grew rapidly, increasing their cadres⁷⁹—training them locally and internationally in neighboring countries.⁸⁰

The LTTE claimed the North and East of Sri Lanka as their exclusive homeland and started ethnic cleansing by massacring poor Sinhalese civilians in the farming villages of Kent and Dollar Farms in Mullthivu in the North in 1984. In 1985, the LTTE carried out a series of attacks in the sacred city of Anuradhapura, targeting pilgrims, worshipers, Buddhist monks, and nuns inside the sacred Sri Mahabodhi⁸¹ premises, gunning down more than 146 personnel and injuring hundreds of civilians.

The scattered incidents occurred in different parts of the island could not be prevented by any of the authorities responsible for national security. Both the military and the police suffered from insufficient strength and logistical shortcomings to undertake tasks of such intensity in the South. The primary attention of the military was focused on battling the LTTE in the North, while the Sri Lankan Police could manage nothing beyond primitive community policing that was insufficient to counter the increased activities of the LTTE.

⁷⁹ No source has been able to determine exact strength of the LTTE, and in what numbers they grew with expansion of the movement. However, the South Asia Terrorism Portal based on their research claims that LTTE organization possessed at least 17000–20000 cadres comprising ground, air and sea fighters. “Institute for Conflict Management- South Asia Terrorism Portal.” accessed on January 24, 2013. <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/shrilanka/terroristoutfits/LTTE.HTM>.

⁸⁰ Marshall R. Singer, “Sri Lanka’s Tamil-Sinhalese Ethnic Conflict: Alternative Solutions,” *Asian Survey* Vol. 32, No 8 (1992). accessed on November 28, 2012, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2645364.pdf>.

⁸¹ The Sacred Jaya Siri Maha Bodhi in Anuradhapura is reckoned as the oldest surviving historical tree in the world. It was brought to Sri Lanka by the Their Sangamitta, daughter of Emperor Asoka and was planted in the Mahameghavana Park in Anuradhapura in 249 BC by King Devanampiyatissa. It is said to be the southern branch of the Jaya Siri Maha Bodhi at Buddha Gaya in India under which Lord Buddha attained enlightenment. The Mahavamsa or the Great Chronicle of the Sinhalese provides an elaborate account of the establishment of the Jaya Siri Maha Bodhi in the island. Bodhi means wisdom that understands the four Noble Truths. Thus, the tree which assisted Lord Buddha to achieve wisdom or enlightenment is called Bodhi. “Srimahabodhi,” accessed on November 11, 2012. <http://srimahabodhi.org/>.

In 1985, to find a solution for the conflict, the government of Sri Lanka negotiated peace talks with the LTTE in Thimphu, Bhutan,⁸² for the first time in the history of the civil war. The negotiations, however, failed over the extreme LTTE demands for an independent state for the Tamils.

In 1987, two years after the failed negotiations, the armed forces of Sri Lanka launched “*Operation Wadamarachchi*,” concentrating on a single front, the first ever conventional military operation since Independence. It tested the newly acquired counter-terrorist capability of an operational outfit converted from a ceremonial setting. The aim of the operation was to liberate the Jaffna peninsula, and the offensive proved successful. During the bloody clashes, the LTTE carried out their first-ever ferocious, suicide, black tiger-attack killing more than 40 soldiers. It later became the iconic deterrence of the LTTE in the Eelam War. The Sri Lanka military operation was a landmark event of the entire Eelam War as it was about to crush the LTTE in the Jaffna peninsula and end the conflict.

Reacting to the pressure of the majority Tamil community of the southern state of Tamil Nadu, the central government of India forced the government of Sri Lanka to terminate the military onslaught against the LTTE. India blatantly violating the sovereignty of Sri Lanka and forcefully airdropped food and other relief items to the rebel held areas.⁸³ The government of Sri Lanka succumbed to the pressure of the powerful neighbor and ordered the military to step back. This single incident demoralized the military and fostered displeasure toward the government. The Indo-Lanka Peace Accord

⁸² P. Venkateshwar Rao, “Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka: India’s Role and Perception,” *Asian Survey* Vol. 28, No. 4. April (1988): 427–428. accessed on November 28, 2012, <http://www.jstor.org.libproxy.nps.edu/stable/pdfplus/2644736.pdf?acceptTC=true>.

⁸³ Ibid., 433. In a drastic move, on June 4, 1987 five Indian Air Force planes escorted by Mirage 2000 fighter jets entered Sri Lanka’s airspace and dropped relief supplies around Jaffna. Sri Lanka condemned Indian “Operation Eagle” as a “naked violation of independence,” and an “unwarranted assault on sovereignty and territorial integrity.”

(ILPA) was signed on July 29, 1987, and a massive Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF)⁸⁴ arrived in Sri Lanka to disarm the LTTE and establish peace in the North and East, per the treaty. The discontented Sri Lankan armed forces were ordered to retire to the barracks while the IPKF took over the controls, marking the end of Eelam War 1 from Sri Lanka's stand point and commencement of an unsuccessful mission for the huge Indian military. The signing of the ILPA demoralized the Sri Lankan military, and a considerable discontent circulated among all ranks about the political leadership.

2. EELAM WAR II

The second phase of the Eelam War was a period of bloodshed, which dismantled the life of the people of the entire country. Re-establishment of peace and security in the North and East was vested with the IPKF, while a portion of the Sri Lanka military was deployed to the South to curb an armed insurrection led by the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP),⁸⁵ a Marxist group that used violence to demand the expulsion of the Indian army from Sri Lankan soil and to eliminate social injustice. Under the devolution of power introduced through the Indo-Sri Lanka Peace Accord, the North and East provincial councils were headed by a puppet leader of the LTTE. He carried out the necessary ground work toward the establishment of an independent state within the state of Sri Lanka (Tamil Eelam)⁸⁶ to fulfill thirst of the LTTE. Realizing the impending threat of the LTTE's unilateral declaration of independence in the North and East, president of

⁸⁴ The India-Sri Lanka Accord was signed by then Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and President Junius Jayawardene to end the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka peacefully. India willy-nilly became the guarantor for the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF), disarming the LTTE in lieu of Sri Lanka devolving power to the minority Tamils. Invited by Sri Lanka, IPKF became the instrument for implementing ISLA. Two and a half years after the accord, with 1200 soldiers lost and nearly 2500 wounded, the IPKF was unceremoniously withdrawn with the ISLA in tatters as a mission not achieved. Ashok Mehta, "25 Years on, IPKF Awaits a Fitting Tribute Back Home," *Times of India*, July 29, 2012, http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2012-07-29/all-that-matters/32923128_1_india-sri-lanka-accord-president-jayawardene-ltte.

⁸⁵ Jayadeva Uyangoda, "The Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna Split," *Economic and Political Weekly* Vol. 43, No. 18, May 9, 2008, 8–10, accessed on November 28, 2012, <http://www.jstor.org.libproxy.nps.edu/stable/pdfplus/40277655.pdf?acceptTC=true>.

⁸⁶ Kristian Stokke, "Building the Tamil Eelam State: Emerging State Institutions and Forms of Governance in LTTE-Controlled Areas in Sri Lanka," *Third World Quarterly* Vol. 27, No. 6, 2006, 1022–1024, accessed on November 24, 2012, <http://web.ebscohost.com.libproxy.nps.edu/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid=16cfe170-dcb2-459b-93bf-45d1b2b4655c%40sessionmgr111&vid=2&hid=122>.

Sri Lanka Ranasinghe Premadasa dissolved the problematic provincial council. He further pressured the Indian government to withdraw the IPKF as a measure to settle an uproar led by the JVP. By then the IPKF's role in Sri Lanka had become India's Vietnam,⁸⁷ and the huge IPKF force was unceremoniously withdrawn on March 24, 1990, having lost more than 1200 soldiers and with thousands more wounded in the face of the fierce LTTE, making the ILPA a total failure.

The limited strength of the Sri Lanka military deployed in the South, imposed by the JVP insurrection, posed a challenge, so the government expanded the Special Task Force (STF)⁸⁸—a paramilitary group under the Police. The departure of the IPKF marked the redeployment of the Sri Lankan military in the North and the East. Under such circumstances, President Premadasa once again attempted negotiations with the LTTE during the period of 1987–1990, but once again the LTTE outsmarted the government of Sri Lanka, and the peace attempt was shattered.

In the subsequent years of the war, the Sri Lankan military had to face much more brutal resistance from the LTTE, which had reorganized and trained during the IPKF presence. During this period the Sri Lankan military had not relaxed or followed any training. It was out on streets in the South performing counter-insurgency maneuvers against the extremist JVP. The period from 1989–1990 is still recalled as the years of extreme terror in Sri Lanka, as the military attempted to suppress revolts on two fronts—one in the North and the other in the South.⁸⁹

The Sri Lankan military with its limited strength was finding it hard to ensure the security of civilians in the entire North and East in addition to their commitments in other

⁸⁷ K T Rajasingham, "Sri Lanka: The Untold Story," *Asia Times Online*. June 8, 2002. accessed on November 29, 2012, <http://www.atimes.com/ind-pak/DF08Df01.html>.

⁸⁸ STF is an elite special unit of the Sri Lanka Police Service specialized in Counter-Terrorist and Counter-Insurgency operations. It was formed in 1983 not as a military force but rather as a highly specialized police unit. The STF conducts counter-terrorist missions and is considered as the highest trained para-military organization in Sri Lanka. The "Kini Mini Service" (K.M.S.) comprising of British ex-SAS officers, provided training to STF officers at the very beginning. "Special Task Force," accessed on November 12, 2012. <http://www.police.lk/index.php/special-task-force->.

⁸⁹ "Sri Lanka: The Failure of the Peace Process" *International Crisis Group-Asia Report N* 124. November 28, 2006, accessed on November 29, 2012, http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/asia/south-asia/sri-lanka/124_sri_lanka___the_failure_of_the_peace_process.pdf.

parts of the island, including the capital city of Colombo. The biggest setback for the government forces occurred in the year 2000, when the strategic army garrison at Elephant Pass—the gateway to the Jaffna peninsula—was overrun by an unexpected 5000 LTTE cadres who claimed the lives of more than 2000 soldiers.⁹⁰

Another crucial incident that affected the military was the land mine explosion in Araly in Jaffna on August 8, 1992, which killed most of the military top brass who led the battle against the LTTE. The LTTE's highest achievement was the assassination of President Ranasinghe Premadasa by a suicide black tiger cadre at a May Day rally in Colombo in 1993.⁹¹ In a series of major setbacks, LTTE attacks on strategic Poonaryn Army and Navy camps situated at the tip of the mainland linking the Jaffna peninsula were also critical as the government forces lost approximately 1000 soldiers and a few pieces of heavy artillery, armor and other defense logistics. These attacks demonstrated the lack of strategic planning and complete disarray of the government's approach in confronting war and an unconventional enemy.⁹²

3. EELAM WAR III

Amidst a fragile security situation, the elections held in 1994 brought in new hope for peace as Chandrika Bandaranayake Kumaranathunge came to power on a peace platform as the President of Sri Lanka with a sweeping percentage of 62% votes. However, the situation in the country became even bloodier in next few years. The brief ceasefire which left room for peace talks with the new government failed when the LTTE

⁹⁰ Chris Smith, "Tiger Trouble," *The World Today* July, 2000, accessed on 29 November 2012, <http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/The%20World%20Today/2000/wt000724.pdf>.

⁹¹ Edward A. Gargan, "Suicide Bomber Kills President of Sri Lanka," *The New York Times* May 02, 1993. accessed on November 29, 2012, <http://www.nytimes.com/1993/05/02/world/suicide-bomber-kills-president-of-sri-lanka.html>.

⁹² Gamini Keerawella and Rohan Samarajiva, "Sri Lanka in 1993: Eruptions and Flow," *Asian Survey* Vol. 34, No. 2. Feb, 1994, accessed on November 29, 2012, <http://www.jstor.org.libproxy.nps.edu/stable/pdfplus/2645118pdf?acceptTC=true>.

launched an attack and blew up two navy vessels on April 19, 1995, in Trincomalee in eastern Sri Lanka.⁹³ The incident gave a sound start for Eelam War III which ravaged the country for another seven years.

During Eelam War III the LTTE gave the biggest setback for the Sri Lanka Air Force as they introduced the “Stinger” missile on April 19, 1995, bringing down two HS-748 Avro military transport aircraft in the Jaffna peninsula.⁹⁴ In the subsequent period, they brought down as many as 29 SLAF aircraft through their deadly stinger missiles which demoralized the entire Air Force. The government fell into a difficult situation as it could not provide a suitable self-protection system for their military aircraft.

Leaving aside the setback, and armed with a new defense minister the new government entrusted the military to recapture the entire Jaffna peninsula. In a joint environment, they were able to accomplish the task despite tough encounters. Approximately 2500 soldiers and rebels were killed, and more than 7000 personnel injured during these confrontations. The Tamil Tigers who lost their bastion in Jaffna were furious and they responded equally when they overran the isolated Mullathivu Army Camp—a former LTTE strong hold.⁹⁵ The reinforcement operations launched were also terminated as the Special Forces suffered unprecedented casualties, when they could not negotiate the situation at Mullathivu due to lack of air and the naval support.⁹⁶ In fact, the depleted fleets of the Air Force and the Navy were barely sufficient to meet such demanding situations. The incident once again highlighted the lack of coordination of the three forces and inability of the defense policy to reorganize the forces in such debacles.

While the Sri Lankan Police were incapable of ensuring public security, the military continuously failed to maintain security in the country and most of the military maneuvers were conducted with the purpose of gaining ground with some kind of

⁹³ Iqbal Athas, “Navy on High Alert for Possible Attacks,” *Sunday Times* April, 1995, accessed on November 29, 2012, <http://www.sundaytimes.lk/050410/columns/sitrep.html>.

⁹⁴ Shamindra Ferdinando, “LTTE Move to Wipe Out SLAF Revealed,” *The Island Online*, accessed on November 29, 2012, <http://www.island.lk/2006/08/26/features2.html>.

⁹⁵ Shamindra Ferdinando, “LTTE Change Vanni Landscape: War on Terror Revisited,” *The Island Online*, Oct 04, 2012, accessed on November 29, 2012, http://www.island.lk/index.php?page_cat=article-details&page=article-details&code_title=63004.

⁹⁶ Ibid.

underlying political interest. In the same era, in a pre-election rally held in Colombo, a LTTE woman cadre carried out a suicide attack on President Chandrika Bandaranayake Kumaranathunge. She miraculously escaped but lost her right-eye to the explosion.⁹⁷

By the year 2000, due to exhaustion and depleted strength, the military was in a state of frustration. In mid-2000, the government started fresh negotiations for peace brokered by the Norwegians, along with a cease fire. Violating the ceasefire, the LTTE carried out a massive attack on the strategic Elephant Pass Camp, once again, and advanced further North, posing a serious threat to the entire military deployed in the Jaffna peninsula. However, they were driven back with greatest the difficulty by the military.

In 2001, the Air Force suffered a severe blow when LTTE Black Tigers attacked the strategic Katunayake Air Base and the adjoining Bandaranayake International Airport, which resulted in the destruction of billions of dollars' worth of military aircraft and civilian jet airliners (all the latest Airbus aircraft), leading to a severe economic down turn in the country.⁹⁸

To avoid a no confidence motion against the government and citing failures in conducting the war and resultant economic downfalls, President Bandaranayake dissolved the parliament, and fresh elections were held on December 5, 2001, which resulted in a change of the government.⁹⁹ As had been usual with all previous governments, the newly elected United National Party government also pledged negotiations with the LTTE for peace. As a result, a Norwegian brokered peace process got underway, and a new

⁹⁷ KM De Silva, "Flawed Presidential Election, Harbinger of More Trouble Ahead," *Economic and Political Weekly* Vol. 35, No. 4. January 22, 2000, accessed on December 2, 2012, <http://www.jstor.org.libproxy.nps.edu/stable/pdfplus/4408841.pdf?acceptTC=true>.

⁹⁸ Ravinatha Aryasinha, "Terrorism, the LTTE and the Conflict in Sri Lanka," *Conflict, Security & Development*. July 17, 2006, accessed on December 02, 2012, <http://www.tandfonline.com.libproxy.nps.edu/doi/pdf/10.1080/14678800100590607>.

⁹⁹ Rajath Ganguly, "Sri Lanka's Ethnic Conflict: At a Crossroad between Peace and War," *Third World Quarterly* Vol. 25, No. 5, 2004, accessed on December 02, 2012, <http://web.ebscohost.com.libproxy.nps.edu/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid=46288536-7c43-47e5-9857-d530a9d5ff%40sessionmgr104&vid=28&hid=122>.

ceasefire agreement (CFA) was announced on February 22, 2002,¹⁰⁰ which became the longest observed ceasefire in the history of the Eelam War story. This marked the end of the Eelam War III.

Developments that occurred afterwards were not so favorable for the already exhausted armed forces. While the military was strictly restricted to the barracks, the political leadership never appreciated the sacrifice made by the armed forces for many years in the battlefield. Instead, inspired by the ceasefire, the government neglected the military and even introduced budget cuts to reduce expenditures.¹⁰¹ In this context, the new government was not interested in professionalizing the military through training, and it significantly cut down on new recruitments and concentrated solely on the ceasefire. The initiatives of the new government created discomfort among the military, but it absorbed these silently, being subordinate to the government.

4. EELAM WAR IV

Eelam War IV was a period of determination, unsurpassed patriotism, joint endeavor, outstanding military leadership and the display of battle-hardened soldiership of the armed forces of Sri Lanka. The election of President Mahinda Rajapakse to the highest seat of the country as president of Sri Lanka on November 19, 2005, turned the fortune of the ruthless LTTE upside down when he directed the armed forces to eliminate the LTTE and unite the country through great character and perseverance. Eelam War IV was not negotiated effortlessly without bloodshed, but it proved to be of value for the blood that soldiers shed in the battle field at all fronts. For the LTTE, Eelam IV was a period of ruthlessness, martyrdom and display of the highest caliber of conventional

¹⁰⁰John Stephen Moolakkattu, "Peace Facilitation by Small States Norway in Sri Lanka," *Cooperation and Conflict*. Nov 11, 2005, accessed on December 02, 2012, <http://cac.sagepub.com.libproxy.nps.edu/content/40/4/385.full.pdf+html>.

¹⁰¹ Austin Fernando a former Secretary of Defence describes, "The military chiefs were not consulted in the drafting of the Cease Fire Agreement. Of course, a casual opportunity was given to them to discuss the draft with the ministers of Defence and Constitutional Affairs. This was not considered adequate by the commanders, as they did not get an opportunity to discuss the CFA with their senior officers..." Shamindra Ferdinando, "CFA, Security Issues and Eelam War IV," *The Island* September 16, 2010, http://www.island.lk/index.php?page_cat=article-details&page=article-details&code_title=6833.

ability of ground, air and sea warfare as the insurgent force was finally reduced to ashes in the face of a superior battleship guided by superior force and leadership.¹⁰²

In first few months of the Rajapakse government, the LTTE played the same game that they had played with previous governments—negotiation and peace talks. The president did not want to waste time. While negotiating peace talks wholeheartedly he hurriedly revamped the military mechanism of the country for his next option, transforming the exhausted military into a patriotic force to function effectively under democratic civilian control as never before. For the transformation process, the measures that the government adopted may not be similar to other countries, and sometimes the initiatives were controversial and unique. (These initiatives will be discussed in a later chapter of the study.)

From the beginning of 2006, while escalating their demands at the negotiation table, the LTTE stepped up claymore mine attacks and attacks on public transport all over the country with their widespread suicide network, killing hundreds of innocent civilians. This intensified matters for the government. The LTTE officially pulled out from peace talks indefinitely, creating deep skepticism, and they carried out a suicide attack on the Commander of the Army, killing 08 soldiers of the commander's security squad. The army commander narrowly escaped fatal injuries.¹⁰³ The government remained patient, but the closing of Mavil Aru sluice gates¹⁰⁴—a major irrigation canal situated in the East—compelled it to proceed with the military option, which marked the commencement of the Eelam War IV.¹⁰⁵

¹⁰² Don Wijewardana, *How LTTE Lost the Eelam War: Defeat of the Tamil Tiger Terrorists Who Ravaged Sri Lanka for Over Thirty Years* (Pannipitiya: Stamford Lake Pvt. Ltd, 2010), 1–15.

¹⁰³ V.S. Sambandan, "Sri Lankan Army Chief Injured in Attack," *The Hindu* April 26, 2006, accessed on December 02, 2012, <http://www.hindu.com/2006/04/26/stories/2006042616960100.htm>.

¹⁰⁴ Mavil Aru sluice gate is located in eastern Sri Lanka in a major irrigational canal supplying water for more than 15000 families and 302,000 acres of paddy lands. Remote villages like Kallar, Dehiwaththa, Thoppur, Seruvila, Serunuwara, Neelapola, Medagama, Sirimangalapura, Pallikudirippu, Kiliweddi, Kanguweli, Maingama, Thanganagar and Bharathipuram depend on Mavil Aru as their main source for water for drinking and irrigation. "Denial of Water to Civilians," *Daily News*, July 6, 2006. accessed on February 5, 2013.

¹⁰⁵ Wijewardana, *How LTTE Lost the Eelam War*, 3–6.

Having carefully selected the theaters of battle, the Ministry of Defense focused the military specifically on the East, covering a vast area of Mavil Aru, Sampur, and Thoppigala. This was effective and drove out the LTTE from the East by July 11, 2007. Liberating the East was historical because it was under the control of the LTTE for many years. This proved the commitment of the national leadership, correct strategic planning, timely directives, and coordination of military forces, on the ground, all of which had rarely been displayed during the past several years.¹⁰⁶

Military success in the East and the new government's genuine commitment toward curbing LTTE terrorism in the country drove a considerable amount of youth to join the armed forces enabling expansion of the armed forces. Following a new multi-front strategy, the ground, air and naval forces started operations in the Wanni region (northern Sri Lanka) subsequent to liberation of the East. In spite of stiff resistance of the LTTE, the Sri Lankan military advanced toward the North closely backed by the state defense leadership, capturing LTTE strong holds one by one and pushing the LTTE toward the Mullativu jungles and the northeastern coast of the island.¹⁰⁷ The confrontations in the Wanni battle fronts were heavy. Realizing the intensity, the Air Force engaged to the highest magnitude with recently upgraded platforms and weapon delivery systems, and above all, was operated by a more dedicated aircrew utilizing new tactics acquired through training.¹⁰⁸

In this stage of the war, the military had to face the challenge of taking care of internally displaced personnel (IDP) due to the offensive operations, and the Ministry of Defense took pains to minimize civilian casualties by introducing no-fire zones and limiting the use of heavy artillery and air attacks.¹⁰⁹ Eelam War IV also displayed the

¹⁰⁶ "The Battle of Baron's Cap," Ministry of Defense and Urban Development. December 30, 2010, accessed on December 02, 2012, http://www.defence.lk/new.asp?fname=20070712_06.

¹⁰⁷ Shamindra Ferdinando, "Tigers Retreat on All Fronts," *The Island* November 27, 2012, accessed on December 02, 2012, <http://slwaronterror.blogspot.com/2012/11/tigers-retreat-on-all-fronts.html>.

¹⁰⁸ Shamindra Ferdinando, "Cohesive Use of Air Power in an Internal Conflict," *The Island* September 16, 2012, accessed on December 02, 2012, <http://slwaronterror.blogspot.com/2012/09/cohesive-use-of-air-power-in-internal.html>.

¹⁰⁹ "Sri Lanka Declares New 'No Fire Zone' for Civilians," *Hindustan Times* February 9, 2012, accessed on December 02, 2012, <http://www.hindustantimes.com/world-news/SriLanka/SriLanka/Article1-378003.aspx>.

LTTE's conventional air and sea force abilities. While it challenged the professional Sri Lankan Navy at sea with its suicide, sea-tiger attacks, the LTTE's rudimentary air force conducted ten air attacks on Sri Lanka Air Force (SLAF) bases, army facilities and economic centers of gravity, creating a huge impact on the economy. On February 20, 2009, while the army was inching toward making a final attack, the LTTE carried out two suicide air missions, one reaching the capital city of Colombo and the other to SLAF base at Katunayake where most of the fleet of fighter jets was housed.¹¹⁰ Both missions missed the intended targets due to the activation of the air defense system.

The final battle of the Eelam War was fought in May 2009 by the Sri Lankan military against stiff resistance of the LTTE, concentrating at a narrow strip of land in the Nandikadal area on the east coast. The final battle was emotionally difficult for the military as the LTTE used civilians as human shields.¹¹¹ At this stage of the war, there was intense international pressure on the government to terminate the war. However, the government very firmly upheld its decision to continue with the war. While the military was closely guided on the final mission, special forces were utilized to penetrate the LTTE fortification where civilians were held.¹¹² The Special Forces succeeded with few casualties and rescued more than 200,000 civilian hostages of the ruthless LTTE. The final battle came to an end on May 18, 2009 when all the fronts from different axis reached Nandikaddal victoriously. This culminated the three decades of sweat and blood by the military to save the country. The president on May 19, 2009, officially announced the victory of the civil war and the death of Velupillai Prabhakaran, the leader of the LTTE, who was instrumental in ravaging the country for three decades—while extending his gratitude and the gratitude of the whole nation to the armed forces of Sri Lanka for ending terrorism.

¹¹⁰ "The Last-Night-Flight: Security Forces Nail LTTE's Rudimentary Air Wing," Ministry of Defense-Sri Lanka, accessed on November 23, 2012, http://www.defence.lk/new.asp?fname=20090221_09.

¹¹¹ Michael Roberts, "Blackmail During the Endgame in Eelam War IV," *Colombo Telegraph* April 11, 2012, accessed on December 02, 2012, <http://www.colombotelegraph.com/index.php/blackmail-during-the-endgame-in-eelam-war-iv/>.

¹¹² VK Shashikuma, "Lessons from the War in Sri Lanka," *Indian Defense Review*, 2009. Vol. 24.3 Jul-Sep. accessed on December 02, 2012. <http://www.indiandefencereview.com/spotlights/lessons-from-the-war-in-sri-lanka/>.

In contemporary history, no developing country like Sri Lanka has ever built up a large armed force, maintained democratic control, not faced a coup, and fought against terrorism successfully. Against that background, the next chapter examines the methods and measures adopted by the government of Sri Lanka toward establishing democratic control of civil-military relations during Eelam War IV.

C. CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS DURING THE WAR, AND HOW IT GUIDED MILITARY TO WIN THE WAR (EFFECTIVE CIVILIAN CONTROL)

1. Revamping the Ministry of Defense (MOD)

Unlike previous national leaders of Sri Lanka, President Mahinda Rajapakse's concept and approach toward waging war as the national leader was radical and pragmatic.¹¹³ His significant political experience¹¹⁴ and broad thinking enabled him to understand the necessity of introducing a major revamp in the entire military mechanism to wage war against the LTTE. For that matter, the introduction of a new institutional process effective for Sri Lanka is most uncommon compared to other countries.

Having identified the importance of a strong institutionalism¹¹⁵ for streamlining CMR and wage war against LTTE effectively, President Rajapakse decided first to solidify military planning. Immediately after coming to power, the president himself swore in as Minister of Defense, taking the strategic MOD under his control—empowering the MOD to become more decisive. The new appointment reduced a tier in

¹¹³ J. F. Ranjith Perera, *Winning and Unwinnable War: Tribute to War Heroes* (Nugegoda: Sarasavi Publishers, 2011), 80.

¹¹⁴ President, Mahinda Rajapaksa is a professional politician who has more than 40 years of political experience. He comes from a family of politicians from the Southern heartland of Sri Lanka in the Hambantota District, and in 1970 at the age of 24 became the youngest Sri Lankan to be elected to parliament. A lawyer by profession he was an active campaigner for human, labour and trade union rights. Before being elected as the president he served as the 13th prime-minister of Sri Lanka in the 7th parliament of Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka. "Mahinda Rajapaksa: He is the President who Presided Over the Crushing Defeat of the Tamil Tigers," *Aljazeera* November 19, 2010, accessed on January 14, 2012, <http://www.aljazeera.com/focus/2010/01/20101281759855487.html>.

¹¹⁵ Institutionalism is creating bureaucracies by humans at particular times for specific purposes with determined goals. It is often referred in the bureaucratic setups of ministries of defense especially in democracies. In a bureaucratic setup no two MOD possess same structures, processes, and practices. In such background in the contemporary world institutionalism has become a mostly followed initiative by democracies to streamline MOD and the civil-military relations functions. Bruneau and Tollefson, *Who Guards the Guardians.*, 71–72.

the decision making process and ensured swift and firm decision making. As the national leader, the president stood firm with decisions he made pertaining to the war against terrorism. To establish proper coordination between the political leadership and the military, he appointed his own brother, Gotabaya Rajapakse, a talented retired military officer as the Secretary of Defense.¹¹⁶ President had faith and confidence on Gotabaya and his decision to appoint him to the top administrative post played a pivotal role in guiding the war according to a calculated time plan. As Secretary of Defense, Gotabaya Rajapakse was the critical interface between the armed forces and the President but he never involved himself in party politics.¹¹⁷ His role as a senior most administrative officer in the MOD eliminated unnecessary delays in addressing critical and strategically important decision-making moments throughout the war such as deciding on air interdictions and counter attacks.

Since the MOD was under close supervision by his close confidant, the president rested assured that his decisions were implemented adequately without flaw. The classic coordination established through the revised structure positively influenced the flow in the decision making process of the national leadership, which in turn enhanced timely, military, operational planning. That made a positive impact on tactical-level activities in the fierce battle ground.

In principle, the MOD in Sri Lanka is a civilian dominated organization, adequately coordinated by senior military staff headed by the Secretary Defense. Even during the restructuring processes the said balance has not been disturbed, and no military influence has overpassed the civilian hierarchy. The MOD in Sri Lanka is structured into seven divisions for handling different areas of responsibility of security, and all these divisions are headed by civilians. Further, the said senior administrators are empowered to draft policy and strategy in relevant areas of their responsibility. This can be related to

¹¹⁶ Gotabaya retired as a colonel in the Sri Lanka Army after a brilliant career of 20 years during which he excelled as a valiant soldier in the battle. C. A.Chanraprema, *Gota's War: The Crushing of Tamil Tiger Terrorism in Sri Lanka* (Colombo: Piyasiri Printing Systems: 2012), 290.

¹¹⁷ Wijewardana, *How LTTE Lost the Eelam War*, 61.

the function of the Spanish MOD, which operates with three major blocks.¹¹⁸ The civilians employed in the MOD of Sri Lanka are appointed by the Sri Lanka Administrative Services, and they enjoy career opportunities similar to other government administrative service servants working in different departments. However, limited numbers of staff appointments at the MOD (not more than 15% of the staff positions) including the Secretary Defense are held by retired senior military/police officers—that has not been detrimental to the political control. The selection criteria of these officers for appointments at the MOD are based on merit and prominence that they have achieved during their careers, and are only hand-picked. Although, their tenures of duty have not been restricted by any specific criteria, the present situation indicates termination of appointments within a period of five years. However, these appointments are open for any person who is qualified, and the government has increased opportunities by opening more training institutions encouraging civilians to master the field. (This will be discussed in a later paragraph.) Further, by observance it is understood that presently serving civilians whom have been recruited with security background have maintained a balanced approach toward the assigned tasks without being biased to military branches that they have represented.

The national leadership of Sri Lanka believed a solid hierarchy was a fundamental requirement for the military to be effective in the war. This had not been the case in the last twenty years of the Eelam War during which the government of Sri Lanka failed repeatedly. In that sense, President Rajapakse's foremost initiative was to appoint the right people for the right job in the military on the basis of performance and bravery in battle, rather than depending on formal seniority structures or political affiliations. In that way, he established an efficiency and effectiveness that had been lacking for years.¹¹⁹ The best example in this context is the appointment of a senior Air Force officer as the Chief of the Defense Staff (CDS) to lead the war effort at a strategic/policy level in an army heavy military environment already in place. As the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, the president appointed warriors to command the three forces and never

¹¹⁸ Bruneau and Matei, *The Routledge Handbook*, 185.

¹¹⁹ Chanraprema, *Gota's War*, 291.

interfered with their battle plans.¹²⁰ He did, however, constantly review and encourage them with necessary guidance to lead the battle as per timely targets selected by the military, not by the political hierarchy. Non-interference by the political hierarchy permitted military commanders to contribute innovative thinking for battle planning. With guidance of the CDS it was in this period Sri Lanka utilized air force for the battle effectively, that brought quick results, and was a direct outcome of innovative thinking. The non-interference in military planning was a prized quality in the Commander in Chief and it enhanced confidence and subordination of the military commanders and importantly the combat effectiveness. Further, it led to better control of the military and improved civil-military relations in the country. In the history of the civil war in Sri Lanka, political motives had disturbed solid military plans in many instances.

2. Affecting Structural Changes

Learning from prior setbacks,¹²¹ the government realized the importance of effecting structural changes in the military as a necessity to face the ever-increasing threat of the LTTE. Therefore, it authorized a two-fold increase of manpower of the military from its previous strength, and the launch of a massive recruitment drive.¹²² The intention of the government was to concentrate and deliver maximum possible thrust within a short period and eradicate terrorism as soon as possible. Inspired by the President's patriotic speeches the new recruitment drive was fruitful as many patriotic youth joined the armed forces to serve the nation. The new recruitments enhanced the military with an additional 85,000 personnel within a span of two years (from 2006 to 2008).¹²³ This overwhelming turnout helped a military depleted in battle strengths for

¹²⁰ Wijewardana, *How LTTE Lost the Eelam War*, 119–120.

¹²¹ Overrunning of Elephant Pass, Mullathivu, and Poonaryn military bases by LTTE and debacle in Wanni which compelled the Sri Lanka military to fallback leaving important battle ground with high number of casualties were significant drawbacks in the history of civil war in Sri Lanka. Shamindra Ferdinando, "Sri Lanka-War on Terror Revisited," *The Island Online*, accessed on January 14, 2013, http://slwaronterror.blogspot.com/2012_10_01_archive.html.

¹²² Perera, *Winning an Unwinnable War*, 81.

¹²³ *Ibid.*, 62.

many years. It not only ensured major structural changes in the organization of the military but created new task forces and reorganized depleted battle fronts¹²⁴ all of which boosted the morale of the forces.

While the aforesaid reforms were underway, the MOD introduced another structural change in the armed forces that allowed the establishment of larger forces for ground operations within the Sri Lanka Air Force. This became known as the air force regiment.¹²⁵

Although the regiment concept was similar to that of the Royal Air Force¹²⁶, its role and task was not limited to airfield defense. Its role was similar to that of infantry in the regular army. Similarly, in the Sri Lanka Navy a ground defense element was formed, Naval Patrolmen Branch,¹²⁷ to perform infantry tasks. In addition, special forces units were also formed as branches in both the Air Force and the Navy. In the air force, the special force element was known as the air force regiment special forces. In the navy, the special force element was known as the special boat squadron. Later, in the battle against the LTTE, all said forces were effectively maneuvered by the Joint Operations Headquarters for various tasks on the ground and at sea in addition to formal army operations, which strengthened the overall war effort. These initiatives improved combat effectiveness of the military in the battlefield from many folds. The battle successes of each armed force were well appreciated by the government and it boosted morale of the armed forces and dedication to the job assigned further. The armed forces with boosted morale never step back or ignore government directions during challenging situations and

¹²⁴ Ranil Wijayapala, "Victory Achieved through Sacrifice," *Daily News* June 03, 2009, accessed on November 27, 2012, <http://www.dailynews.lk/2009/06/03/supstory.asp?id=s02>.

¹²⁵ Shamindra Ferdinando, "SLAF Regiment's Role in Defeating Terrorism," *The Island Online*, accessed on November 27, 2012, <http://www.island.lk/2009/06/24/news28.html>.

¹²⁶ Royal Air Force Regiment is the ground fighting force of the Royal Air Force. It is a diverse organization that provides first-rate worldwide force protection to UK air assets. Its officers and gunners have been deployed on operational service since the establishment of the formation in 1942 and have a proud history. "The RAF Regiment," accessed on Nov 27, 2012, <http://www.raf.mod.uk/rafregiment/>.

¹²⁷ "Sri Lanka Navy - Amphibious Operations," *Global Security.Org*, accessed on November 27, 2012, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/sri-lanka/navy-amphibious.htm>.

the loyalty generated kept them intact throughout the war without any defection. The said initiatives enhanced civil-military relations, and stand unique to Sri Lanka compared to other countries.

Meeting the manpower demand operating multiple fronts in the battle field and, simultaneously, securing border villages adjoining the front lines was an impossible task for the military itself. The LTTE had already infiltrated each and every vulnerable point in the island. There was no way that the military could cope with such a deep-rooted network. To address the situation, the government introduced another change in the defense sector that allowed utilization of police personnel in extended roles other than routine policing. This necessitated that the police department be brought under the purview of the MOD.¹²⁸ Under new regulations, the police were deployed in limited anti-terrorist operations. This proved useful in securing non-conflict areas.

In addition, to strengthening the police force, an effective force of voluntary civilians, mostly recruited from the border villages was established. The new force was created under a special provision of the MOD called the Civil Defense Force¹²⁹ (CDF), and it was entrusted with maintaining the security of threatened border villages. The CDF was trained in military training centers per the directives of the MOD, and was issued with automatic weapons commensurate to the threat encountered. The CDF later played a significant role in the war, securing the border villages with the police. These newly introduced institutional changes were home grown and redrew the routine structural framework and functions of the MOD. As a whole, the new initiatives helped to strengthen the defense mechanism in Sri Lanka in a different format compared to other countries—and the enhanced civil-military relations helped immensely to fight the war effectively.

¹²⁸ “Departments and Statutory Institutions- Ministry of Defense Law and Order,” accessed on November 27, 2012, http://www.priu.gov.lk/Ministries_2007/Min_Defence_Public_security_Law_Order.html#Departments and Statutory Institutions.

¹²⁹ Chaminda Perera, “Civil Defense Force to Assist with the Military Successes,” *Daily News* June 09, 2009, accessed on November 27, 2012. <http://www.dailynews.lk/2009/06/03/supstory.asp?id=s04>.

3. Professionalizing the Military

The president, as an experienced politician who had seen and lived through the war for many years, was well aware in what manner the LTTE behaved. To face this enemy under the newly appointed military leadership, his government believed in professionalizing¹³⁰ the military. As the first step to make the military expertise, geared all the military training centers to carry out mission-oriented training programs on counterrevolutionary tactics. Most of the training centers were reorganized to conduct cross-service training, allowing the critical elements of the three forces' personnel to undergo training on multiple combat skills at the training centers of each service to improve joint operational capability. While other counter parts fought the war in actual battle grounds, the training centers in rear areas met the training demands required to expertise the troops to counter changing tactics of the LTTE.

The MOD ensured senior officers and others of the level of mission commanders were provided with exposure in democratic friendly foreign countries like USA and India to gain specialist knowledge on civil-military relations. The syllabuses of the local staff colleges of the armed forces were revised to impart knowledge on civil-military relations. This was materialized through posting of officers who have undergone training on civil-military relations in foreign countries and tasking them to design and incorporate knowledge on democratic civilian control of military as a subject in to the syllabus. Before the said revision military has not considered civil-military relations as an important subject under military training. Further, MOD has allowed civilian officers of senior administrative level to join the Defense Services Command and Staff College and obtain degrees in defense studies. This has extended the field of civil-military relations to different intellectuals of the country. The latest move toward professionalizing the personnel involved in national security has been the upgrading of Kothalawala Defence

¹³⁰ The primary task of the military is management of violence, and it is a unique skill that distinguishes the military different from other civilian professions. In a democratic environment the military is expected to utilize force and violence only in a legitimate manner for a public purpose only with the consent of the public. To perform the said task the military should be expertise, accept responsibility and possess corporateness. In that background making this unique skill to meet legitimate needs of a democracy is professionalizing the military. Bruneau and Tollefson, *Who Guards the Guardians.*, 17–18.

Academy¹³¹ to the status of a university allowing the civilians to become professionals in the field of national security administration.

Creating a sense of responsibility, which is also an important element of professionalizing among the armed forces, has been a relatively easy task for the government of Sri Lanka. Since the inception of the armed forces in the country, it has behaved loyal and responsible to any government in power, and hence no major adjustment was required in that area. However, through the MOD government made clear their intentions and the responsibility of the armed forces—to win the war and defeat terrorism. Similarly government made no significant attempt to improve the important determinant—corporateness needed for professionalizing military as they viewed Sri Lanka armed forces has displayed adequate level of corporateness during its engagement in the prolonged war for many years without any defection. These were encouraging factors for the government in its effort of professionalizing the military. As a whole, all of such initiatives improved professionalism of the military and related civilian counterparts at an accelerated pace thanks to the timely directives of the government. In the decisive war, these elements became effective contributory factors that enhanced civil-military relations in the country.

4. Taking Over the Ministry of Finance to Support the War Effort

Another significant initiative in the institutionalization process particular to Sri Lankan civil-military relations was the takeover of the Ministry of Finance by the president himself in addition to his portfolio as the Minister of Defense.¹³² President Mahinda Rajapakse at a very early stage identified the need of providing necessary budgetary support for the military as a critical element for the successful conduct of the

¹³¹ General Sir John Kotelawala Defence University (KDU) is the only university offering graduate courses in defense studies in the South Asian region. As a member of the Association of Commonwealth Universities (United Kingdom), the university maintains world class standards for educating and grooming Officer Cadets to successfully meet the challenges of modern defense management. “General Sir John Kothalawala Defence University,” accessed on January 13, 2013, <http://www.kdu.ac.lk/#>.

¹³² As per the constitution of the country President of Sri Lanka can serve multiple terms in the office of presidency and hold different ministries as per his discretion for the betterment of the country. *The Constitution of Sri Lanka- Chapter VII (The Central Executive,)* accessed on January 24, 2013. http://confinder.richmond.edu/admin/docs/srilanka_constitution.pdf.

war. As a developing nation with a high budget deficit, Sri Lanka continuously funding a war was considered an overwhelming waste of national income by many critics. Sri Lanka spent 3.7% of its GDP on the military, which was the highest percentage reported in the region.¹³³ Despite criticism by Western governments and agencies like World Bank¹³⁴ the national leadership decided to fund an all-out war against the LTTE, and to that effect the president's leadership as the Minister of Finance and Planning was crucial. Providing adequate finances at a critical juncture of the war allowed the sophisticated military inventories to run smoothly, and it undoubtedly energized the military.¹³⁵ This is a marked difference compared to other militaries in the world, which suffer from budgetary restrictions that curtail some sound plans, and it can be considered as a noteworthy initiative that Sri Lanka has adopted to strengthen civil-military relations in the country.

5. Establishing Guidelines on the Role of Media and Utilization of Media to Rally Public Support

During the thirty-year history of the civil war in Sri Lanka, the military had experienced numerous situations where it had been compelled to abandon promising war plans due to various domestic and foreign political pressures.¹³⁶ Most of these pressures forced through the media. In this regard, President Rajapakse had a simple message to the armed forces—their job was only to fight and win the war. He promised to look after any political fallout from the engagement, both domestic and international.¹³⁷

¹³³ "Military Expenditure by Country as Percentage of Gross Domestic Product, 1988–2010," *Stockholm International Peace Research Institute*, accessed on January 13, 2013. <http://milexdata.sipri.org/files/?file=SIPRI+milex+data+1988–2011.xls>.

¹³⁴ Wijewardana, *How LTTE Lost the Eelam War*, 292–293.

¹³⁵ Udeshi Amarasinghe, "Unstoppable Sri Lanka," *Business Today* November, 2009, accessed on November 27, 2012, http://www.businesstoday.lk/cover_page.php?article=1947.

¹³⁶ On June 4, 1987 Indian Air Force planes violating Sri Lanka's airspace entered Sri Lanka and dropped relief supplies around Jaffna and demanded Sri Lanka to stop an operation against LTTE which was on progress. Sri Lanka condemned the intrusion as a "naked violation of independence," however, was compelled to abandon the operation due to foreign pressure. Rao, "Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka," 433.

¹³⁷ Wijewardana, *How LTTE Lost the Eelam War*, 123.

The national leadership understood importance of media for uninterrupted conduct of the war and, therefore, established a special institution called the Media Centre for National Security (MCNS)¹³⁸ to direct media conduct related to the war. Vested with adequate powers to direct the media, MCNS managed the flow of news, providing accurate accounts of the war and establishing required firewalls against foreign and local media agencies biased toward the LTTE. This institutionalization effort was an important endeavor by the national leadership, which successfully controlled spread of false propaganda against the country and the war effort.

During battle, local and foreign media and pressure groups raised numerous allegations against Sri Lankan armed forces to demoralize them and divert their attention. However, the national leadership, with the newly established MCNS, confidently countered all such allegations, enabling the military to stay focused on its objective.¹³⁹ While previous governments succumbed before international pressures and changed their military strategies at crucial junctures, the present government in decisive situations stood firm ordering the military to fight the battle per the military plan uninterruptedly, and this posture of the government improved military confidence and the civil-military relations, in particular.

Another classic role played by the MCNS was the giant media campaign launched under the theme of “Api Wenuwen Api Wemu”¹⁴⁰ (Be Together for All), which created public awareness of the dedicated service of the armed forces. It stressed the responsibility of the entire nation to stand by the forces and respect and appreciate their meritorious service to the nation. Further, President Rajapakse foresaw the importance of rallying public support in order to continue the war uninterruptedly. Toward that end, the

¹³⁸ The Media Centre for National Security (MCNS) was established for the specific purpose of disseminating all national security and defense-related information and data to the media and the public from one co-coordinating center. It is the sole state authority to distribute national security and defense-related media releases, data, statistics, visuals and other information to the public and releasing of special dossiers, audio-video clips and documentaries. “*Media Centre for National Security*,” accessed on November 27, 2012. <http://www.nationalsecurity.lk/MCNS/defence-security/aboutUs.php>.

¹³⁹ Wijewardana, *How LTTE Lost the Eelam War*, 118.

¹⁴⁰ The aim of the programme was to encourage all Sri Lankans to support service personnel who dedicated their lives to bringing peace to Sri Lanka. “Api Wenuwen Api Wemu,” accessed on November 27, 2012. <http://www.apiwenuwenapi.com/index.htm>.

president used his convincing speeches and directed the MCNS to launch an effective media campaign to uplift the morale of the masses and regenerate an important “lost national will” of the country. While he generated the national will of the public, the MCNS portrayed the unified commitment of the country to the outside world to explain and gain international support to wage the war.¹⁴¹ With effective utilization of the MCNS, the government was able to build faith of the entire nation in the military, which stood extend improved civil-military relations in the country.

6. Revamping Diplomatic Prowess to Support the War

The next concern of the national leadership was revamping diplomatic prowess to fight against Tamil diaspora and other international elements impeding the war effort. Sri Lanka’s Foreign Service was in a dilapidated condition, which hardly supported the war effort over many years of conflict. Although diplomacy may not be obviously seen as linked to civil-military relations, its indirect effect had great influence on the conduct of the war in Sri Lanka. Realizing the importance of diplomatic missions abroad, the president appointed capable officials replacing dormant diplomats, and revamped the diplomatic service of the country. Through this refurbished mechanism with more effective channels, the government was able to answer countless issues raised by pro-LTTE Western countries that made various allegations against the Sri Lankan Military.¹⁴² The revamped diplomatic prowess played an impressive role throughout the war under the guidance of the president in overcoming militarily targeted external pressures mounted on the government of Sri Lanka. These pressures included immediate termination of war during crucial junctures of the war. In many instances in the history of

¹⁴¹ Nitin Gokhale, “Sri Lanka: Winning the War on Two Fronts,” *Live Mint and the Wall Street Journal*. June 30, 2009, accessed on November 27, 2012, <http://www.livemint.com/Opinion/eQeG5xEPZNfkJ5syAJFf6I/Sri-Lanka-winning-the-war-on-two-fronts.html>.

¹⁴² Wijewardana, *How LTTE Lost the Eelam War*, 124.

Eelam War, pressures mounted by powerful countries terminated military offensives by the government—creating displeasure among the military.¹⁴³ It created adverse effect on civil-military relations of the country.

While diplomatic negotiations with Western countries were important, maintaining a cordial relationship with the closest neighbor, India, was also crucial for the war effort. India had already intervened in several instances in Sri Lanka's civil war due to the interests of the Tamil community living in India's state of Tamil Nadu. With this background, the government of Sri Lanka utilized its diplomatic mechanism extensively to convince India to wage war against the LTTE.¹⁴⁴ Unlike other national leaders, President Rajapakse did not agitate India for any reason. He always tried to accommodate and yield to India's interests while being firm on the Sri Lankan position in conflicting issues. As a whole, the restyled diplomatic missions were able to handle all the international pressures India included, smoothly. Diplomatic missions provided plausible intelligence to intercept major LTTE arms shipments successfully at sea during the war.¹⁴⁵

Later in the war, the revamped diplomatic mechanism closely coordinated the tracking down of top LTTE cadres hiding in safe heavens in international territories, too. The firm stand on international pressure by the national leadership, made possible through the revamped diplomatic mechanism, made the task of the military easy. It allowed the military to stay focused on predetermined military objectives free from political interference diverting or terminating the mission, unlike in the past. This effort by the political hierarchy was highly appreciated by the military—allowing it to achieve

¹⁴³ 'Operation Liberation' was launched by the Sri Lanka Military in 1987, and it was about to finish successfully crushing the LTTE strong hold in Vadamarachchi in Jaffna Peninsula. Following the launch, India warned Sri Lanka to stop the offensive and, with no response India intervened by dropping supplies to the LTTE-held areas, claiming that it was humanitarian aid. Referring to the incident General Cyril Ranathunge states that he as the GOC received instructions from President Jayawardana to halt the offensive immediately. He had visited the troops on the battlefield to break the news and, for the first time, he had seen the disappointment in their faces. Further, he states that some found it difficult to accept and even questioned their company commanders about how India could intervene. Finally, Operation Liberation was called off. "Operation Liberation One," *The Sunday Times*. June 28, 2012, accessed on November 28, 2012, http://sundaytimes.lk/090628/Plus/sundaytimesplus_08.html.

¹⁴⁴ Wijewardana, *How LTTE Lost the Eelam War*, 128.

¹⁴⁵ Perera, *Winning an Unwinnable War*, 88.

decisive gains on the battleground, which increased faith of the military toward the government day by day and led to better civil-military relations.

D. POST-WAR ROLES AND MISSIONS OF THE SRI LANKA ARMED FORCES

The victorious termination of the civil war in 2009 and establishment of peace in the country has obviously shifted the roles and missions of the armed forces in Sri Lanka. Since the establishment of the army in Sri Lanka in 1949, along with independence of the country the mission of the armed forces has been defense and safeguarding the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the country. Although, not been amended constitutionally, at present the roles of the military have been substantially shifted by the government to accomplish post-war challenges of reconciliation. The country's concerns of incorporating regional security aspects for derivation of future mission of the armed forces have come to the limelight. The ever-increasing importance of security of the Indian Ocean region¹⁴⁶ and the expansion of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) has become the contributory factors influencing the incorporation of regional security to reformulate the mission of the armed forces of Sri Lanka. Therefore, in the current context, the mission of the Sri Lanka armed forces will remain central to the idea of defense and safeguarding the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the country with the added interest of security of the Indian Ocean region.

Since the inception of the armed forces of Sri Lanka, their macro role has remained under the dominant context of “defender of the nation” in a relatively peaceful environment, unthreatened by external enemies as an island nation located in the Indian Ocean. Therefore, the role of the Sri Lankan Military has been mostly ceremonial with limited strength and resources. Except for its mobilization to clamp down on internal riots in 1971, the armed forces have hardly been called upon to perform in any instance in history until they were called for duty under emergency regulations in response to the

¹⁴⁶ Sri Lanka was known, and its history was shaped over the years, through sea trade. In this context, Sri Lanka, like all the other nations which depend on the stability of the Indian Ocean, is extremely concerned and mindful of the safety and security of vital ocean space. The lack of a coordinated international effort to uphold maritime security not only affects ocean going vessels but also the national security of coastal nations. Gotabaya Rajapakse, “Galle Dialog Maritime Conference - 2012,” accessed on November 16, 2012, <http://www.galledialogue.com/>.

LTTE uprising. Since the engagement in insurgency warfare in the 1980s, the military has transformed itself from ceremonial status to the role of “defender of the nation,” and has performed the dedicated role of safeguarding the country untiringly for almost three decades.

After winning the war and uniting the country under one flag, the government was conscious of not leaving the purposefully expanded 400,000 troops idle. As Paul Shemella says¹⁴⁷ a government with wisdom should do, the government of Sri Lanka has refocused its armed forces onto fresh roles without retiring its soldiers to barracks or demobilizing them. Instead, they have been actively engaged in duties other than their formal role to accomplish post-war challenges of reconciliation. While maintaining a sizable balance of forces ready for deployment in national emergencies, the armed forces have been entrusted with a wide array of tasks connected to national development. It has gradually shifted the stance of the armed forces from the macro role¹⁴⁸ of nation defender to the role of nation builder, participating in multiple micro roles¹⁴⁹ of national interest in a broader concept.

It is observed that, in recent years, countries less disturbed by external or internal threats and with relative stability make significant adjustments to the macro roles of their militaries, creating conditions to utilize the armed forces in more effective ways. As an example, Argentina having participated in the Persian Gulf War as an ally with the U.S., switched the macro role of war fighters to peace keeping, and later became a leading nation involved in peace keeping in the world.¹⁵⁰

In this context, the approach of Sri Lanka has been somewhat different. Although the government of Sri Lanka has stated its continuous support to provide troops to United

¹⁴⁷ “Only the wisdom of governments and their societies can ensure that armed forces remain focused on properly developed roles and missions. Adherence to these precepts can help governments maintain armed forces that contribute to solving problems at home and abroad rather than causing them.” Thomas C. Bruneau and Scott D. Tollefson, ed., *Who Guards the Guardians and How*, 140.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid., 125.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid., 85.

Nations Peace Keeping Missions around the world,¹⁵¹ it has not made any positive attempt to increase its troop contributions, especially after the end of the civil war. Although providing troops for peace keeping is prestigious, and monetary-wise a lucrative engagement for developing country like Sri Lanka, the government has restricted its contribution to a contingent of 1200 soldiers who are presently deployed in the Republic of Haiti and Lebanon.¹⁵² Therefore, even after the war, Sri Lanka has not made any positive move toward becoming a peace keeping nation a move that might have changed the macro role of the military to peace keeping. This indicates the government of Sri Lanka's interest in retaining a large force within the country for its contingencies rather than deploying soldiers overseas in UN missions for economic gain or prestige.¹⁵³

By the end of the Eelam War IV, the government of Sri Lanka came across another humanitarian issue of paramount importance—the issue of IDPs produced as a result of confrontations that reached the total of 300,000. The government without hesitation tasked the military to lead the gigantic task of providing facilities of food, accommodation and, welfare for the displaced, and for that matter, constructing two welfare villages in Menik Farm west of Vavuniya believed to be the largest IDP camp functioned in the world.¹⁵⁴ While the military put its heart and soul into fulfilling this task, it provided the required manpower and expertise to build the infrastructure and

¹⁵¹ “Sri Lanka Pledges Enhanced Support for UN Peacekeeping Missions.” *UN News Centre* accessed on Nov 17, 2012, <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?Cr=sri+lanka&Cr1=&NewsID=36093#.UKgsHodTySo>.

¹⁵² Dinouk Colombage, “Sri Lanka Earns in Excess of Rs.18.4 Billion from Peace Keeping,” *The Sunday Leader*, November 17, 2012, accessed on December 24, 2012, <http://www.thesundayleader.lk/2012/07/08/sri-lanka-earns-in-excess-of-rs-18-4-billion-from-peace-keeping/>.

¹⁵³ Sri Lankan battalions serving the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) have been commended by all past and present MINUSTAH Force Commanders because of the exemplary nature of the team and troop proficiency. Further, the commendations received from the heads of UN missions in the countries where Sri Lankan soldiers and officers work has boosted the image of the military and the country as a whole. Pradeep Seneviratne, “Sri Lanka Army Making a Difference as UN Peacekeepers,” *Khabar South Asia* July 16, 2012, accessed on December 2, 2012, http://khabarsouthasia.com/en_GB/articles/apwi/articles/features/2012/07/16/feature-6?change_locale=true.

¹⁵⁴ “Sri Lanka – A Complex Emergency,” U.S. AID (Fact Sheet #1, Fiscal Year 2012,) accessed on November 17, 2012, http://transition.usaid.gov/our_work/humanitarian_assistance/disaster_assistance/countries/sri_lanka/template/fs_sr/fy2012/srilanka_ce_fs01_09-30-2012.pdf.

establish the village in the shortest time span and later administer it to the highest standards with the participation of civilian authorities.¹⁵⁵

Another micro role that the Sri Lankan military has been vitally assigned by the MOD is humanitarian demining. During thirty years of brutal war, the LTTE utilized an unprecedented amount of anti-tank mines, anti-personnel mines, and different kinds of improvised explosive devices to confront armed forces. Large quantities of unexploded explosive devices are believed to be in every area of former, LTTE occupation in the north and east conflict zones.

In this scenario, ensuring safety and providing a mine-free environment for resettlers in their original home places was a complex issue. Ensuring a mine-free environment prior to resettlement was given highest priority by the government, and realizing the gravity and complexity of the task, the government engaged the military along with some foreign action groups to undertake this vital task. In this engagement, the military's macro role as humanitarian de-miners has been highly successful, which has made the resettlement program of IDP's in Sri Lanka a reality. Further, the demining program has been carried out in stages and, so far, the de-miners have been able to complete the priority stages of towns, villages, and agricultural areas. Their next task is to concentrate on forest areas, a project that may run in-to a few more years.¹⁵⁶

Rehabilitation and reintegrating of ex-LTTE cadres into the society was another micro role performed by the military in the post war reconciliation process in Sri Lanka. During the last stages of the war, over 12000 LTTE cadres—including 594 child soldiers—have been apprehended or have surrendered to the military, and these cadres with different levels of involvement in terrorism needed careful screening, grading,

¹⁵⁵ Gotabaya Rajapakse, "The Role of the Military in the Post Conflict Era," *The Colombo Telegraph*, August 23, 2012. accessed on December 23, 2012, <http://www.colombotelegraph.com/index.php/the-role-of-the-military-in-the-post-conflict-era/>.

¹⁵⁶ Gotabaya Rajapakse, "The Role of the Military in Today's Context," *Sunday Observer*, August 26, 2012, accessed on Dec 3, 2012, <http://www.sundayobserver.lk/2012/08/26/fea02.asp>.

identifying, and directing through a proper rehabilitation process.¹⁵⁷ Due to severe indoctrination, the rehabilitation needed expertise and close supervision, so the military, utilizing its inherent training capabilities along with the Ministry of Rehabilitation and assistance of various organizations including the UN, has undertaken the grueling task since mid-2009. By 2012, the military had successfully accomplished this sensitive task and has been able to reintegrate close to 10,900 rehabilitees back to civil society, having duly transformed as productive citizens with added competence in a profession of their interest to make their living. The government's attainment of these targets in rehabilitating indoctrinated cadres in a short period is a result of direct utilization of the military along with the Ministry of Rehabilitation.¹⁵⁸

In the list of priorities of the reconciliation process, the government found that rebuilding infrastructure in the war-ravaged north and east was important in uplifting social life. For that matter, the same necessity prevailed in other areas too in the country. To effect developments at an accelerated phase, the government utilized the battle-proven military for the micro-role of civil construction. The military, sufficiently armed with expertise, organization, machinery, and target-oriented culture, has proven itself in that particular sector, too, by building more than 7000 housing units and renovating over 6000 houses damaged during the war, all of this earlier than expected. They have undertaken such major tasks as reconstructing bridges and roads, re-laying the northern and Mannar railroads, and developing war-affected remote towns, allowing civilian agencies to follow them to accomplish major tasks at an accelerated phase.¹⁵⁹ In addition, the contribution of the military to infrastructure development in the capital city of

¹⁵⁷ Shenali Waduge, "Sri Lanka's National Armed Forces is the Envy of Foreign Private Contractors," *Asian Tribune*, September 03, 2012, accessed on December 20, 2012, <http://www.asiantribune.com/news/2012/09/02/sri-lanka%E2%80%99s-national-armed-forces-envy-foreign-private-contractors>.

¹⁵⁸ Rajapakse, "The Role of the Military in the Post Conflict Era," *The Colombo Telegraph*.

¹⁵⁹ A W J C de Silva, "Sri Lanka Army's Contribution Towards Peace and Stability through Sustained Assistance to National Re-Integration Programme," Ministry of Defense and Urban Development, Sri Lanka. August 11, 2012, accessed on November 18, 2012, http://www.defence.lk/new.asp?fname=full_text_maj_gen_de_silva.

Colombo has been incredible. The present city of Colombo is cleaner, landscaped and has been beautified as a direct result of the engagement of the military by the government in the role of civil construction.¹⁶⁰

To promote economic activities in former war-affected areas, the military has been employed in economic activities such as managing major farm yards and cattle farms, turning much unused infertile land into income-generating ventures.¹⁶¹ Many rehabilitated, ex-LTTE cadres have been enrolled in the Civil Defense Force (CDF),¹⁶² and some of them contribute labor to the management of farm lands in reviving the north and east after the war—which has provided a comprehensive source of income for the rehabilitated, ex-LTTE cadres and an added strength to the gross food production of the country.¹⁶³

The military's micro-role in economic ventures has been further extended to multimillion dollar projects to support the re-blooming tourism sector, which had been one of the key income generating industries in the country prior to the civil war. The army has been allowed to build and operate three, star class tourist resorts under the brand name of "LAYA," which also employ civilians from the highest class in the hospitality trade. This has generated considerable number of direct and indirect job opportunities and revenue to strengthen the national economy.¹⁶⁴ In addition, the Sri Lankan Army has moved to the lucrative air-travel trade by establishing its own travel agency—Air Travel Services (Pvt) Limited—to support the tourism industry and to cater to the growing numbers of local pilgrims who visit India and Mecca after the civil war.¹⁶⁵

¹⁶⁰ "Old Dutch Hospital in Colombo: Now Open to the Public," *Ground Views* December 10, 2011, accessed on November 18, 2012, <http://groundviews.org/2011/12/10/old-dutch-hospital-in-colombo-now-open-to-the-public/>.

¹⁶¹ "Sri Lanka Army Converts Former IDP Camp into an Orchard," *Colombo Page*, November 17, 2012, accessed on November 19, 2012, http://www.colombopage.com/archive_12B/Nov17_1353139302CH.php.

¹⁶² Perera, "Civil Defense Force to Assist with the Military Successes."

¹⁶³ Rajapakse, "The Role of the Military in Today's Context."

¹⁶⁴ "Sri Lanka Military Opens More Hotels, Creates Resort Brand," *Lanka Business Online* November 09, 2012, accessed on November 19, 2012, <http://www.lankabusinessonline.com/fullstory.php?nid=369700485>.

¹⁶⁵ "Sri Lanka Army Launches Air Travel Services," *Business Today* November 19, 2012, accessed on December 3, 2012, <http://www.businesstoday.lk/article.php?article=3337>.

The Sri Lankan Air Force, too, contributes to the economic micro-role of the military through multiple ventures. The SLAF has established “Heli-tours,”¹⁶⁶ their commercial flying arm under the companies act, and provides safe air transport to any destination in the country utilizing a dedicated fleet of fixed wing and rotor-wing aircraft. This promotes tourism in Sri Lanka. In the east coast capital of Trincomalee, the SLAF manages a state-of-the-art Holiday Resort at Marble Beach, and a world-class golf links, which have also become profitable ventures.¹⁶⁷

Last, but not least, the Sri Lankan military has been assigned a role in the diplomatic service. Since completion of the civil war, the government has taken measures to strengthen the diplomatic machinery of the country and has appointed a considerable number of qualified senior military officers to various levels of diplomatic careers in foreign missions. The intention of the government is to establish a more active diplomatic service capable of countering the powerful propaganda activities of the still-active Tamil diaspora in other countries directed at damaging the image of the country.¹⁶⁸

Although it is only three years since the end of the civil war, this chapter describes the variations effected in the macro and the micro-roles of the armed forces by the government of Sri Lanka. The government has understood the gravity and potential liabilities of an idle force, which had been at one time fully mobilized. As a country that has been derailed due to prolong effects of terrorism, Sri Lanka’s rapid recovery in a post war scenario would be a difficult challenge unless supported by robust initiatives. The changes that have been effected in the roles and mission of the Sri Lankan armed forces are a direct result of that challenge. However, they might generate many positive and negative consequences in the long run.

¹⁶⁶ Helitours is a venture established by air force that nurtures the post war strategy of nation building and tourism promotion in Sri Lanka. “Helitours,” accessed on November 19, 2012, <http://www.helitours.lk/aboutus.aspx>.

¹⁶⁷ The Eagles’ Golf Links (EGL) is located on the east coast of Sri Lanka near the Trincomalee Harbour, one of the best natural harbours in the world. The course overlooks two scenic bays, Clappenberg Bay and Malay Cove. Part of the attraction of EGL is its proximity to Marble Beach, one of the best beaches in the island. “Eagles’ Golf Links,” accessed on November 19, 2012, <http://www.eaglesgolf.lk/>.

¹⁶⁸ Gotabaya Rajapakse, “The Role of the Military in the Post Conflict Era,” Defense Seminar: 2012-Sri Lanka, accessed on November 19, 2012, <http://www.defseminar.lk/index.php?id=3>.

E. POST-WAR CIVIL MILITARY RELATIONS IN THE COUNTRY

The post-civil war civil-military relations in Sri Lanka indicate a relatively stable and strengthened outlook in the medium term under the current political leadership. The GoSL has been able to maintain democratic civilian control over the military during the period of civil war while making it effective to defeat terrorism and unite the country. In the aftermath of the war, in a peaceful environment, the government has shifted the focus of the military from its previous status as defender of the nation to one of nation builder, focused on future challenges of the country.

To establish civil-military relations in a country the existence of a stable polity is a prerequisite and the present government in power since 2005 led by President Rajapakse has been able to maintain the required political stability. That has enabled the government to effect changes in the military mechanism as per the necessity with confidence, and guide it to win the war.

The political constancy of the Rajapakse Government was further emphasized during presidential elections held in 2010 subsequent to the civil war. The elections reflected his extraordinary popularity as he won 57.88% of the total votes—a significant improvement compared to the 2005 results, which accounted for 50.29% votes.¹⁶⁹ The increasing popularity and majority power in the parliament has enabled the present government to repair any political hitches easily and maintain a stable legislative and executive control in the country. The credibility of the present government has been well understood by the armed forces, and it has remained subordinated without challenging the people's power that has managed the country satisfactorily. To reciprocate, the government has not hesitated to praise and accolade the military for its yeomen service, which saved the nation from brutal terrorism after thirty years of costly war.¹⁷⁰ This climate has created conditions for further strengthening civil-military relations in the country. Against that background, the remaining paragraphs briefly discuss how GoSL has managed civil-military relations in the post-war context.

¹⁶⁹ “Presidential Election Results,” Department of Elections-Sri Lanka, accessed on 20 November, 2012, <http://www.slelections.gov.lk/presidential2010/AIVOT.html>.

¹⁷⁰ Udeshi Amarasinghe and Thilini Kahandawaarachchi, “Salute the War Heroes,” *Business Today* June, 2012, accessed on November 22, 2012, <http://www.defence.lk/pdf/DefSec-BusinesstodayJune.pdf>.

The post-war approach to management of the military in Sri Lanka spans an extension of war-time initiatives introduced by the government. Following the same lines of success, the MOD still play the role of lead agency that links the powerful military to the political sphere. Compared to the other ministries of the government in the aftermath of the war the MOD in Sri Lanka assumes a powerful position in the legislative sphere and secures a priority position over others, is still led by the President as the Minister of Defense. Military success has further strengthened the position of the Secretary of Defense, and he continues to function as representative of the military in politics. In the post-war context, the role and the task of the MOD has been expanded with annexation of the Ministry of Urban Development to facilitate the task of nation building, and this may be a unique situation in contrast to any other MOD functioning in the world.¹⁷¹ The added work scope has empowered the MOD to undertake development tasks in the north and the east, as well as in other areas, with direct employment of the armed forces in development tasks.

In the post-war scenario, few structural changes have been effected in the Sri Lankan army, navy and the air force. While discontinuing the task forces formed during the period of war, their strength has been absorbed into existing divisions and the newly formed Southern Division. By the end of the war, the army's many operational divisions experienced depleted strengths due to heavy casualties, and the new initiative replenished the troop shortages of those divisions. The navy established a new South East Command to ensure the security of the southeastern seas of the country.¹⁷² The Air Force has enhanced its presence in the north by establishing air field units in two captured air fields of the LTTE with the intension of expanding those deployments into large complexes in the future.¹⁷³ In the higher defense mechanism, the Joint Operational Headquarters has been renamed the Office of the Chief of Defense Staff, with added responsibility of the

¹⁷¹ Kamalika Jayathilaka, "Colombo Building A World Class City," *Business Today* July, 2012, accessed on November 22, 2012, <http://businesstoday.lk/article.php?article=7297>.

¹⁷² "Sri Lanka Navy Establishes South-Eastern Naval Command," *Colombo Page* September 22, 2012, accessed on November 22, 2012, http://www.colombopage.com/archive_12A/Sep22_1348294658CH.php.

¹⁷³ "SLAF Opens Iranamadu and Mulaitivu Camps," *News Lanka* August 22, 2009, accessed on November 22, 2012, <http://www.topix.com/forum/hobbies/flying/T069OT9N5FD6KD6CD>.

newly formed Coast Guard.¹⁷⁴ These minimal structural adjustments by the MOD have not created any drawbacks in the military command structure that may be detrimental for civil-military relations.

The Sri Lankan Police Department, responsible for public policing and maintenance of civil security in the island, functioned under the purview of the MOD during the period of war. Even three years after the termination of war, no change has been effected to the line ministry of the police, and it still function under the explicit control of the MOD. However, after the civil war, public policing activities have been fully reinstated, and with diminished responsibilities pertaining to national security police has been fully engaged for maintaining internal security. Compared to the Sri Lankan military, the police maintain a poor track record in the aspect of corruption, and need considerable improvement. While much procedural streamlining has been introduced, the MOD has enhanced professionalizing the police through training to transform it in to an effective public service. Although, the Police Department in Sri Lanka functions under the MOD, it has not created any detrimental effect to the neutrality of police functions or, vis-à-vis, to the civil-military relations of the country so far. However, many interested local and international parties have highlighted the need to effect structural independence of the police to improve transparency. This is a prerequisite of a democracy, and needs immediate attention of the government.¹⁷⁵

The defense budget in Sri Lanka indicates an upward trend, and a higher percentage of GDP (\$2.2 billion) allocated for 2013 compared to previous years indicates adequate spending on the military in post-war Sri Lanka.¹⁷⁶ In practical terms, although considerable restrictions have been introduced to reduce military spending at organization levels, the government has favored providing same benefits to the entire military payroll

¹⁷⁴ “New Name for JOH,” *The Sunday Times* September 27, 2012, accessed on November 22, 2012, http://www.sundaytimes.lk/090927/News/news_22.html.

¹⁷⁵ Kishali Pinto Jayawardane.ed., “Sri Lanka Policing from South Asian Perspective,” *Low and Society Trust Review*. Vol 20 Issue 272, June, 2010, accessed on November 22, 2012. http://www.nipsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2011/04/LST_Review_FINAL_June_2010.pdf.

¹⁷⁶ “Sri Lanka to Raise Defense Spending by More Than 25%,” *Jane’s Intelligence Weekly* October 10, 2012, accessed on November 23, 2012, <https://janes.ihs.com.libproxy.nps.edu/CustomPages/Janes/DisplayPage.aspx?DocType=News&ItemId=++1524420&Pubabbrev=JIWK>.

without restricting any of the incentives provided during the time of war. This initiative has kept the military in the same high spirits in the post-war period, too. Especially in the aftermath of the war the government has requested all other public and private institutions to provide the best possible and prioritized services to the war heroes whenever they seek their assistance. In a similar aspiration, the government has created awareness in drawing the respect of the general public of all spheres toward the military. It has glorified and elevated the esteem of the military encouraging military to remain loyal. Basically, the military is a prestige service in Sri Lanka.

Most of the soldiers in the military represent the poorer social strata of the general population, and realizing this fact the government has introduced various programs to uplift the social standards of the soldiers and their families. The government has established a special agency called the Ranaviru Seva Authority to coordinate all such activities, and so far it has introduced a number of initiatives covering a wide scope of activities, such as the construction of full-fledged housing schemes for the military, construction of houses for needy war heroes on their own plots of land, allocation of lands to construct their own houses, providing loans for livelihood improvement, and providing a special provision for school entrance for the children of war heroes.¹⁷⁷

Apart from that, the critical attention of the government has been focused on looking after lifelong dependent war heroes who have been injured during the war. There are many facilities that have been built to take care of this segment of war heroes, and the government has been able to obtain wide popular support for further improvement of said facilities.¹⁷⁸ The “Abimansala” and the “Mihindu Seth Medura” are such sanatorium-type, lifetime care centers built for disabled war heroes.¹⁷⁹ The government has indicated that caring of disabled war heroes is a duty of the government, as the whole nation owes them for their meritorious acts, which saved the country. Further, the government has

¹⁷⁷ Sandasen Marasinghe and Irangika Range, “Ranaviru Seva Authority Meets War Heroes’ Needs,” *Daily News* September 19, 2012, accessed on November 24, 2012, <http://www.dailynews.lk/2012/09/19/pol03.asp>.

¹⁷⁸ “Abimansala-2 Opens on Saturday,” *Sunday Observer* November 04, 2012, accessed on November 24, 2012, <http://www.sundayobserver.lk/2012/11/04/new23.asp>.

¹⁷⁹ Hemanthi Fernando, “Abimansala: A Place to Heal the Wounds of War,” *Sunday Times* August 21, 2011, accessed on November 24, 2012, http://www.sundaytimes.lk/110821/Plus/plus_01.html.

taken steps to honor the parents of war heroes who sacrificed their lives during the war through special schemes like “Ranaviru Ma-Piya Rekawarana,”¹⁸⁰ which indicate the unwavering commitment of the government toward the welfare of the military.

In summary, the GoSL has utilized moreover an incentive based approach for post-war management of civil-military relations. That has been successful so far, creating greater respect and adequate subordination of the military toward civilian control, minimizing any opportunity for friction between the civil supremacy and the military.

¹⁸⁰ The Ranaviru Mapiya Rekawarana programme provides a monthly payment of Rs 750 each is being paid to parents of war heroes past and present who served in the Army, Navy, Air Force, Navy and Police Department from 1–1–1983 to 19–5–2009. Dhanushka Godakumbura, “Unwavering Commitment to Security despite Terror Defeat,” *Daily News* October 19, 2012, accessed on November 24, 2012, <http://www.dailynews.lk/2012/10/19/news02.asp>.

IV. ANALYSIS

Ending the war and eradicating terrorism from a war-ravaged, island nation is a great achievement for Sri Lanka, and this study confirms that the said military accomplishment has distinctive linkage to civil-military relations. Winning the war has opened a new pathway for reestablishing democracy in the country, a pathway which had been severed for many decades. The Government of Sri Lanka has adopted some unique initiatives, different from other countries in the world, to guide the military to a winning strategy. Energized by the successful conclusion of the war, the government has largely depended on the military and utilized the military in post-war reconciliation activities, engaging it in an extended role. With this background and considering the arguments put forth in Chapters II and III, this chapter analyzes the post war scenario: whether continuing military presence in the civilian arena has enhanced military prerogatives detrimental to the consolidation of democracy, and if so, whether these prerogatives have jeopardized civilian supremacy and endangered democratic consolidation in Sri Lanka.

The analysis of Sri Lanka's post-war military involvement in extra-military roles will be based on a theoretical paradigm of Alfred Stepan's military prerogatives described in Chapter II. Further, at the outset it is pertinent to note that engaging the Sri Lanka military in extra military roles has been a government initiative and not an initiative taken by the military in its own interests.

Stepan's first prerogative examines the role played by the military in the political system. Although the Sri Lanka military has been engaged in diversified roles in the post-war reconciliation, the situations discussed in the study clearly indicate that the Sri Lanka military has not made any attempt to be involved in the country's political system. The military has maintained its distance, respecting the state bureaucracy managed by the political hierarchy and headed by the executive president as commander in chief of the armed forces. The political bureaucracy has carefully exercised its command and control over the armed forces, maintaining distance between the military and the civilian political arena through a comprehensively established and functioning MOD. All military dealings with the political hierarchy have been channeled through a well-established MOD, and

there is no indication of overstepping of boundaries. Further, the Sri Lanka constitution has not left any room for the military to interfere in strategic decision making of the country, and abiding by that norm the military has functioned in assigned roles satisfactorily without creating any threat to the civilian-led political regime during the war and in the post war scenario. The Sri Lanka military that had been fully engaged in internal security during the civil war was disengaged along with the removal of emergency regulations in the aftermath of the war. The space created in internal security responsibilities due to the removal of the military has been filled by the civil police. Further, during the short span of four years of post-war reconciliation, the military has not taken part in any internal security duties, either on their own or by order of the government. Therefore, there has been no opportunity for the military to involve itself in the political system as a prerogative. In that category and context the Sri Lanka military scores low.

The second prerogative described by Stepan highlights the military's relationship to the chief executive and refers to de facto control of the military by uniformed, active-duty, service commanders.¹⁸¹ The type of civil-military relations maintained in the country have prevented development of any environment conducive for the military to take over the appointment of the commander in chief in Sri Lanka either during the intense period of war or in the war's aftermath. By commencement of the Eelam War IV, the national leadership of Sri Lanka had established the necessary mechanism for effective management of the military through a clearly defined command structure exercised by the executive president through the secretary of defense. The appointment of Gotabaya Rajapakse to the highest seat of the MOD as the secretary of defense was a decisive and undeniably crucial decision taken by the president for the improvement of civil-military relations. Subsequent changes in military hierarchy by the MOD has gathered and formed a cohesive group of dedicated top military officers who have been subordinated to democratic civilian control throughout the period under review.

¹⁸¹ Stepan, *Rethinking Military Politics*, 93–127.

This becomes evident with the successful termination of the three-decade-long war in 2009 under the political leadership of Mahinda Rajapakse. In the post-war scenario, a similar kind of legitimate control has been exercised by the GoSL, and the study reveals that the MOD in Sri Lanka is a highly empowered institution utilized to regulate the military. In that setup, the secretary of defense has performed the role of intermediary between the powerful military and the country's commander-in-chief and president, who is popularly elected.

The opportunity gained by the military through employment in extra-military duties has not been detrimental to civilian control in Sri Lanka, and there is no evidence to the contrary—of any attempt made by the military to manipulate unwarranted influence over civilian control in order to override the supreme command. In the structured environment in which the war was conducted and in its aftermath, the president as the commander-in-chief has exercised *de jure* and *de facto*¹⁸² command over the military as stipulated in the constitution and has never been challenged by the military, though it has been powerful. This is an encouraging situation ideal for consolidation of democracy that hardly prevails in most countries. The most recent examples in this context are Pakistan and Egypt. Therefore, in this category, too, Sri Lanka military scores low on prerogatives.

The coordination of the defense sector in Sri Lanka may be viewed as an area that might generate a moderate prerogative for the military. In a democratic environment, coordination of the military is a *de jure* and *de facto* task of a cabinet-level civilian officer appointed by the executive. In ideal terms, he should manage the military with the participation of other professional civil servants.¹⁸³

However, in Sri Lanka this highest administrative position at the MOD, which is also the nerve center for military control, is held by a retired military officer. Further, few MOD positions (not exceeding 15% of the total staff positions) in Sri Lanka are managed by retired military and police officers. Hence, there is a strong possibility of creating

¹⁸² Ibid., 93–127.

¹⁸³ Ibid., 94.

organizational biases by these officers. Further, in an environment where the military is actively involved in tasks other than their primary duty, these officers may manipulate situations to their own benefit. Therefore, the presence of even a few numbers of military retirees' at strategic levels of decision making in the MOD might be detrimental to the democratic control of the armed forces in the long run.

Another significant weakness observed in the MOD is the criteria adopted for selection of staff officers. As the study reveals, Sri Lanka recruits retired military officers to the highest staff positions in the MOD by handpicking, and there is no specific standard maintained for recruiting. This is a poor procedure, as no transparency is maintained in the process. However, it is observed that a majority of the staff appointments are filled by civilian officials who are recruited through the Sri Lanka Administrative Service and who take competitive examinations. This is viewed as a better arrangement that can strengthen democratic control of the armed forces.

Further, the presence of a retired military officer in the highest civilian administrative position of the MOD, and who is a link to the political sphere, can be viewed as a deviation from standard procedure. The study reveals that the role of Gotabaya Rajapakse as the Secretary of Defense in Sri Lanka, however, has been highly instrumental in winning the war and successfully engaging the armed forces in post-war reconciliation and nation-building tasks. Although, this arrangement in Sri Lanka has been effective and has not created any threat to democratic control of the armed forces, it can only be described as a unique situation accomplished with dedication, a positive attitude and the special qualities of an individual. This may not be appropriate as a general concept to be applied in a different situation.

In the Sri Lankan scenario, neither during the civil war nor after the war, has the military actively participated in the cabinet. A study of the thirty-year-long war and the history before does not reveal any incident of the military taking over cabinet portfolios. The cabinet in Sri Lanka, composed of politicians has been under the civilian purview without any military influence throughout. Although the military has been engaged in extra-military activities in post-war Sri Lanka, no attempt has been made by it—nor have there been any opportunities made available for it by the political hierarchy—to intrude

in the performance of the cabinet. Therefore, in that sense the Sri Lanka military does not present any prerogative detrimental to democratic civilian control and, for that matter, is very unlikely to do so in the future.

Legislative control of the military in Sri Lanka has been established through their close supervision of the MOD. The policy issues affecting military budgets, force structure, and new weapon systems were favorably handled through a functioning MOD to support the war. In the aftermath, the MOD enhanced extra-military roles of reconciliation and reconstruction, roles that have been adequately monitored and debated in the parliament. Unlike other countries, Sri Lanka has made the leadership of the two critical, line ministries involved in the subject area the purview of one individual. The president's holding of the two line ministries—defense and finance—has always helped accommodate a priority position when allocating and debating budgets. This arrangement has been a government-initiated move rather than a military initiative. The high military expenditure (3.7 % of the GDP)¹⁸⁴ in post-war Sri Lanka is not an indication of a military prerogative. In the long term, however, military involvement in extra-military activities related to business ventures may create new problems of corruption and malpractice within the military if adequate transparency is not maintained during operations.

The sixth military prerogative highlighted by Stepan—military influence in the role of senior career civil servants or civilian appointees¹⁸⁵—becomes null and void in the context of Sri Lanka as no active-duty, military officials are present in top, defense-sector staff roles in the MOD. The very same organizational setup of the security sector was maintained during the war, as well as in its aftermath. Although the military has been engaged in extended roles of post-war reconciliation—such as demining, resettlement of IDP's, reconstruction of housing, reactivation of farm lands, restoration of roads and irrigation projects, reconstruction of railway lines, restoration of civil administration, tourism promotion, and the like—no special opportunity has been made available for active-duty military officers to influence the top defense management or the executive of

¹⁸⁴ "Military Expenditure by Country as Percentage of Gross Domestic Product, 1988–2010," *Stockholm International Peace Research Institute*, accessed on January 13, 2013, <http://milexdata.sipri.org/files/?file=SIPRI+milex+data+1988–2011.xls>.

¹⁸⁵ Stepan, *Rethinking Military Politics*, 93–127.

the country in Sri Lanka. In addition to the secretary of defense, no civilian or retired or active duty military officer has been appointed in the capacity of advisor or assistant to the executive, and the defense management of the country has been exclusively handled through the MOD. The strictly regulated MOD functions have maintained democratic, civilian control of the military, and the welfare-based policies adapted in post-war management of the military have resulted in disciplined reciprocation by the military rather than its demanding positions in the arena of defense management. This is a classic situation the GoSL has achieved which strengthens civil-military relations, leading to consolidation of democracy.

Although it was not discussed in the study, the Sri Lanka military assumed no role or influence over the intelligence services. The National Intelligence Bureau (NIB) is a purely civilian-led institution, and the military has no stake in the management setup of the said organization. The only role allocated to the military is feeding the NIB with information pertaining to national security. Therefore, the de jure and de facto control of the highest intelligence agency in Sri Lanka is handled through civilian chains of command and is free from military influence.

As the thesis highlights, a stark difference in the security organization in Sri Lanka is the function of police which fall under the purview of the MOD as in Colombia. This is a significant deviation from the commonly accepted practice of democracies. However, the MOD has granted adequate structural independence for the police to function independently under the Inspector General of Police. Although the Sri Lanka Police have been under the administrative control of the MOD, the study reveals that the police have been able to reinstate and maintain domestic security at an acceptable level, especially after the conclusion of the war. In this background, the military has no opportunity to command or intervene in the functions of the police, nor does it assume any prerogative reasoning that deters democracy in the country. The strategy adapted in Sri Lanka may be successful in the short term, but in the long term it may infringe on the free and fair function of the police due to influences that may be created by various militaristic approaches followed by a MOD.

Promotions within a military in a functioning democracy should take place in a highly regulated environment, and the military should not have the prerogative of manipulating the promotion process.¹⁸⁶ In Sri Lanka, too, a similar regulative arrangement has been laid down. The armed services adopt a standard and transparent procedure to effect military promotions. In the post-war scenario, although assigned extra roles of nation building, the military has adhered to the standard procedures. Recommendations for promotions are channeled through the MOD for approval of the executive. In that sense, the mechanism for military promotions in Sri Lanka is observed as free from influence, leaving no room to gain undue prerogatives. This may be one reason, why the Sri Lanka military has remained disciplined and subordinated. Especially after the conclusion of the war, maintaining discipline in a large force engaged in duties of a non-military nature possess a high probability of inducing coups, but the strongly established civil-military relations mechanism in Sri Lanka has prevented such a development, one that might endanger consolidation of democracy.

The military role in state enterprises in Sri Lanka indicates some degree of involvement that might enhance military prerogatives. In the Sri Lankan scenario, however, the government is following a relatively secure approach and has appointed retired military officers instead of reserve or active-duty military officers to high positions in the state enterprises. This became apparent in the revamping process of the diplomatic corps (discussed in Chapter III), during the periods of the civil-war and post-war Sri Lanka, as many senior, retired, military officers were appointed as ambassadors.

This level of military involvement can be identified as an area that might generate a moderate level of military prerogative. Further, the military's successful performance in extended roles of post-war reconciliation may influence the government to further increase the appointment of officers with military background in additional areas of nation building in the future. This might result in reduction and elimination of employment opportunities for the civil sector.

¹⁸⁶ Stepan, *Rethinking Military Politics*, 93–127.

The Sri Lanka military can be well excluded from the eleventh prerogative described by Stepan that specifies the role of the military in a state legal system. As per the constitution, the Sri Lanka military comes under the jurisdiction of two courts of law. While each armed service is administered under its respective military act (the Army Act, Navy Act and the Air Force Act), the services are also subject to the country's civil law. Under no circumstances in the history of Sri Lanka, or during the civil-war or in its aftermath, have civilians been brought under the scrutiny of military courts for any reason. Further, under no circumstances has the military either rejected or not participated in the jurisdiction of the civil courts, and the judiciary has remained free from any military influence.

The Table 1 presents in a summarized format the impact levels of the military prerogatives discussed above. For ease in understanding the possible impact levels, the prerogatives are listed in four categories based on effect—nil, low, medium and high. Overall, the impact of military prerogatives in Sri Lanka demonstrates minimal military implications. The impact range remains between nil to low, indicating a conducive environment for establishing stable, civil-military relations in the country.

Types of Prerogatives	Possible Effect			
	Nil	Low	Moderate	High
1. Constitutionally sanctioned independent role of the military in political system:	X			
2. Military relationship to the chief executive:	X			
3. Coordination of defense:		X		
4. Active-duty military participation in the Cabinet:	X			
5. Role of legislature:	X			
6. Role of senior career civil servants or civilian political appointees:		X		
7. Role in intelligence:	X			
8. Role in police:		X		
9. Role in military promotions:	X			
10. Role in state enterprises:		X		
11. Role in legal system:	X			

Table 1. Prerogatives of Military as an Institution in the Democratic Regime in Sri Lanka (After Alfred Stepan, *Rethinking Military Politics*, 94–127)

Fewer military prerogatives in a country denote less contestation between the civilians and the military—an ideal situation for democratic consolidation. The study proves that Sri Lanka has achieved such stability in civil-military relations through implementation of various measures of democratic control that have enhanced effectiveness of the military, guiding it to conclude a thirty-year-long war and eradicate terrorism from the country. Later, it guided the military in post-war reconciliation and nation building with positive results.

As per the study, it is found that most analyses of civil-military relations assume that an armed force strong enough to defend a country is also capable to taking it over. (This has been discussed in the review of literature.) Therefore, the fundamental concern of civil-military relations has been focused on control. However, a new conceptualization of civil-military relations by Bruneau and Matei, on which I base my arguments, focuses beyond the aspect of control and looks at effectiveness, considering contemporary challenges like terrorism, crime, humanitarian assistance, peace support operations, and civil conflicts.

As Bruneau and Matei suggest in their framework of civil-military relations, institutional control mechanisms, oversight, and inculcation of professional norms are key considerations in establishing civil-military relations. Institutional control mechanisms provide directions and guidelines for the security forces. These include organic laws, regulations that empower civilians, and civilian-led organizations with professional staff. In that context, the MOD (led by civilians), ministry of interior for national police are considered vital. Oversight is the other important factor which allows civilians to keep track of the security forces and their performance and to ensure guidelines are properly followed. In a democratic environment, the executive, legislative, and judiciary branches, as well as independent media and INGO's are the institutions that undertake this task. The professional norms among the security forces are institutionalized through recruitment, training, and promotions per the aspirations of democratically elected civilian leaders.

Bruneau and Matei describe effectiveness as the ability and preparedness of security forces to fulfill their assigned roles. For security forces to be effective they

should have plans, structures, processes, and resources. However, Bruneau and Matei believe that measuring effectiveness is a difficult task. The benchmark of effectiveness in conducting war, they say, can be considered as equal to winning it.

The comparison and contrast of measures adopted by Sri Lanka on democratic control of civil-military relations using new concepts of Bruneau and Matei highlight many similarities as well as some deviations. While following accepted concepts, Sri Lanka adopted many deviations in shaping its civil-military relations, deviations that proved effective during the war and its aftermath. As the ultimate benchmark of effectiveness in conducting the war, the Sri Lanka military has proven itself effective winning the civil war and eradicating terrorism. In the post-war scenario, the Sri Lanka military has been instrumental in accelerating the reconciliation process and achieving on time the development targets set by the political hierarchy.

Chapter III of the study provides an in depth discussion of strategies adopted in establishing institutional control mechanisms. Unlike other countries, Sri Lanka introduced substantial changes in the organization of the MOD, effected structural changes in the military with uncommon initiatives to coordinate the three forces. The present government of Sri Lanka made considerably more effort professionalizing the military than any other previous government, moved the ministry of finance to function under the purview of the minister of defense, established new guidelines for the role of the media, utilized the media to rally public support, and revamped and utilized diplomatic prowess to maintain international relations important for conducting military operations. These initiatives have proven to be successful in the case of Sri Lanka.

The oversight function of the military in Sri Lanka has brought about a certain degree of success. The MOD mechanisms have maintained strict oversight of functions among the services, and an independent body of government auditors was allowed to carry out auditing functions. While defense related bills are essentially debated in parliament, no significant judicial control is observable. The oversight by media was minimal during the time of the war, however, in the post-war period, the media has become highly active highlighting the slightest military incident.

In contrast to countries like the U.S. and Romania, Sri Lanka needs immediate improvement in the aspect of civilian oversight by media and NGOs as the Sri Lanka military has undertaken commercial activities that might lead to corruption. In the context of professional norms, the study observes the adequate commitment of the Sri Lanka military as it has followed democratic procedures in the areas of recruitment, promotions and training. Table 2 summarizes the achievement of democratic civilian control and effectiveness in Sri Lanka in two different scenarios—during the civil war and after the civil war. The table indicates almost similar status in both scenarios except for resources, which indicate a reduction, and for improvement of oversight, which is due to media activity in the post-war era. However, as has been highlighted earlier, Sri Lanka needs further improvement in the oversight mechanism due to current commitments of the military.

Civil-military relations	Requirements for civilian control			Requirements for effectiveness		
	Institutional control mechanisms	Oversight	Professional norms	Plan	Institutions / Structures	Resources
During the war	High	Low/ Medium	High	High	High	Medium/ High
Post-war	High	Medium	High	High	High	Medium

Table 2. Requirements for Achieving Democratic Civilian Control and Effectiveness (After Bruneau and Matei, *The Routledge Handbook*, 2013, 345)

In this context, Sri Lanka provides a proven case study for the new conceptualization of civil-military relations introduced by Bruneau and Matei, a modified idea of democratic control and effectiveness of the military in civil-military relations for countries affected with modern threats like terrorism and organized crime.¹⁸⁷

¹⁸⁷ Bruneau and Matei, *The Routledge Handbook*, 26.

Furthermore, in regard to the establishment of civil-military relations in such a country, this study recognizes the intense contribution the national leadership made in key areas of reorganizing the defense apparatus, in decision making under international pressure, in gaining public awareness to support the military effort, and in encouraging patriotic youth to join the armed forces. All these have contributed to a positive impact in civil-military relations during and after the war. Compared to the leaders of other countries, President Rajapakse as the Commander-in-Chief performed the roles of both Minister of Defense and the Minister of Finance, and this combination eliminated unnecessary bureaucratic delays in funding the military—conserving crucial logistic functions, maintaining the costly delivery platforms and, above all, increasing manpower and sustaining training cycles. It is to note that scholars have limited themselves only to drawing examples from aspects like national leadership, commitment, and patriotism of the highest level of the command relevant to the effectiveness of the military rather than discussing those in length. In that background, the Sri Lankan incident proves that, not only institutional changes ensure civil-military relations.

In the aftermath of war, the GoSL adopted similar strategies with a more incentive-based approach to guide the military. However, it has changed roles to an extra-military nature supporting post-war reconciliation and consolidation of democracy in the country. While arguments have been made about utilization of the military in extended roles by the GoSL, causing excessive militarization (as elaborated in chapter I), the study proves that the roles performed by the Sri Lanka military during the post-war period have not created any impact leading to excessive militarization. Analysis of the prerogatives of the Sri Lanka military, set beside Stepan's elaborations on military prerogatives, clears this doubt comprehensively.

Samuel E. Finer describes modern armies as a microcosm of the state,¹⁸⁸ capable of supporting primitive economies and even more developed economies and accelerating

¹⁸⁸ Finer, *The Man on Horseback*, 15.

their development. He provides examples such as Brazil and Argentina.¹⁸⁹ In that sense, engaging the Sri Lanka military in extra roles in the interest of reconciliation and reconstruction; resettlement of IDP's; rehabilitation and reintegration of former LTTE combatants into the society; humanitarian demining; infrastructure facilities rebuilding; agriculture farming; and hotel management can also be categorized as endeavors of national interests similar to that of Argentina and Brazil. These projects have been implemented for nation building and have not endangered democratic consolidation of the country.

Although the accomplishments of the government attained by guiding the military to win the war and by utilizing it for post-war reconciliation and nation building reflects an established civil-military mechanism in the country, the extended roles of the post-war military might raise serious questions of corruption in the long run. The military has always been an institution oriented towards engaging in war or other national-security related roles and missions,¹⁹⁰ not an organization geared to undertake business. In that context, the study of new strategies adopted in civil-military relations in Sri Lanka, whereby the military performs an extra role, may not grasp any apparatus introduced to minimize possible post-war corruption. This stands as a critical weakness in the post-war, civil-military relations mechanism in a country where the military is extensively engaged in commercial activities.

In the analysis of military prerogatives, new strategies of civil-military relations, extra roles of the military, and the weakness of CMR strategy in post-war scenario, it is important to ascertain the impacts of the Sri Lanka military on consolidation of democracy in the aftermath of the war. In using Linz and Stepan's five arenas of consolidation of democracy¹⁹¹ described in Chapter II, the military in Sri Lanka does not present any threat to post-war consolidation of democracy. Rather than posing a threat to the consolidation effort, the study identifies that the military has strengthened the

¹⁸⁹ In Brazil, the army has explored the interior, set up telegraph and wireless stations, developed agricultural colonies and engaged in educating the Indians. In Argentina, the military is involved in construction of roads, schools, and hospitals, and has some stake in the domestic oil industry, Ibid.

¹⁹⁰ Bruneau and Matei, *The Routledge Handbook*, 26–29.

¹⁹¹ Linz and Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transitions and Consolidation*, 7.

democratization process by maintaining minimum prerogatives. By winning the war, the military has reinstated the freedom of the society; hence, it has not intervened in any political process in the country or disturbed political parties from functioning freely.

As the study highlights, the government itself popularized the military in the country during the war and in the post-war period, and as a result, the respect and affection of the general public towards the military has gone up and stayed four years after the war has ended. Maybe due to this reason, no significant interest has been taken by the general society to criticize the military. Society has viewed the military as a credible organization compared to all other government institutions. In this situation, the study could not identify the existence of any oversight function exercised by the civil society. Further, as Andrew Cottey, Timothy Edmonds, and Anthony Forster identified in Bulgaria,¹⁹² in Sri Lanka it is not due to the ignorance of the population and society that there is no watchdog function. However, the lack of such a function in the post-war environment might be advantageous for the military allowing it to cover shortcomings that occur while engaging in commercial activities.

In Sri Lanka, under a powerful executive and legislature, the military has not expanded any prerogative detrimental to the rule of law of the country, and the study confirms that the military in Sri Lanka has respected the law of the country while remaining equally subordinate to military law. No conflict has occurred between the military and the civilian political leadership, especially in the post-war period, and it stands as a good testimony to the discipline of the Sri Lanka military. Although the military has engaged in post-war reconciliation tasks involving various civilian organizations, it has not created any threat to bureaucratic functions led by civilian leaders, and the composite outcome of the five arenas of consolidation of democracy described by Linz and Stepan.

Table 3 summarizes data extracted from three years of annual reports of the EIU, indicating how Sri Lanka has maintained democracy during the periods of civil war

¹⁹² Andrew Cottey, Timothy Edmonds, and Anthony Forster, "The Second Generation Problematic: Rethinking Democracy and Civil-Military Relations," *Armed Forces and the Society*, Vol 29, Fall 2002, accessed on February 07, 2013. <http://afs.sagepub.com/content/29/1/31.full.pdf+html>.

(2008) and in the aftermath of the war (2010 and 2011.) It indicates significant improvement in the area of functioning government. In other areas of concern, Sri Lanka has survived and maintained the same levels, and not deteriorated. Although, no indicator identifies military influence, the said indicators may represent direct effects of military initiatives. In that context, I utilize the said data to conclude that post-war engagement of the military in Sri Lanka has not endangered democratic consolidation. On the contrary, Freedom House in its 2013 annual report has categorized Sri Lanka as a “partly free country,” indicating a decline¹⁹³ of democracy. However, Freedom House utilizes only two types of data—political rights and civil liberty—in its surveys, so its conclusions need further clarification.

Year	Electoral process and pluralism	Functioning government	Political participation	Political culture	Civil liberties	Overall score	Rank
2008	7.42	4.64	5.56	7.5	7.94	6.61	57
2009	Data not available						
2010	7.00	6.07	5.0	6.88	8.24	6.64	55
2011	7.00	6.07	5.0	6.88	7.94	6.58	57
2012	Data not available						

Table 3. Statistics of Freedom in Sri Lanka (After Freedom in the World 2013, Freedom House)

Further, the analysis of the case of Sri Lanka draws attention to areas of importance which have not been examined by past scholars in their studies. One such factor is the impact of national leadership on civil-military relations. In Sri Lanka, the president, as the national leader and the commander in chief of the armed forces, has displayed exceptional patriotism in saving the country. Such exemplary attitude of the

¹⁹³ Sri Lanka received a downward trend due to evidence of increasing corruption and a politicized attempt to impeach the chief justice of the Supreme Court. “Freedom in the World,” Freedom House, accessed on February 7, 2013.
<http://www.freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/FIW%202013%20Booklet.pdf>.

national leader has generated patriotism among the armed forces in Sri Lanka. While most political leaders around the world fear popularizing and recognizing the military as defenders of a nation, President Rajapakse made a great effort to uplift the image of the military, to establish democratic control through proper institutionalism, and to guide the military in winning a war and uniting the country.

In the aftermath, in an established civil-military relations environment, utilization of the military in an extended role has resulted in rapid development, and it has become the driving factor of post-war reconciliation and nation building in Sri Lanka, supporting consolidation of democracy in the country. This proves hypothesis-II projected in the study.

V. CONCLUSION

This thesis looked at engaging the military in post-war reconciliation in Sri Lanka and its implications for consolidation of democracy in the country. In the beginning, it reviews the existing literature on the subject focusing on different regions of the world. Having reviewed the literature, the thesis next introduces the necessary theoretical background relevant to the study, then discusses the case of Sri Lanka—concentrating on the war and post-war scenario. Next, it analyzes the case of Sri Lanka in order to find implications for consolidation of democracy in the light of engaging the military in post-war reconciliation. In conclusion, the study finds that the state of democratic, civil-military relations maintained in the country has inspired the military to subordinate itself to civilian supremacy, perform new roles, and be the driving factor of post-war reconciliation of the country.

First, Sri Lanka faced one of the most ruthless terrorist organizations in the world. The civil war in Sri Lanka was the longest fought civil war in the South Asian Region. The conflict dragged on for almost three decades under many national leaders and, while the country was undergoing a period of turmoil, Mahinda Rajapakse assumed the presidency. As an agile leader, he was able to establish democratic civilian control, transform a demoralized military into a military with a winning strategy, and guide it to unite the country under one national flag, defeating the LTTE.

Second, President Rajapakse's approach towards finding a solution has been radical and pragmatic, and his solution to the long, drawn-out conflict was militaristic. To make war, he realized the necessity of building a strong military and controlling and guiding it towards the accomplishment of the goal. His government introduced radical changes in the management system of the country's military through major revamps in the MOD, the military structure, and other essential areas that supported the war. Further, the national leadership instilled patriotism among the military and created a national will among the general public, through which Rajapakse was able to coherently improve civil-military relations in the country. Finally, after establishing strong civil-military relations,

the GoSL was able to guide the military in winning the war against the LTTE, proving the valuable though debatable thought once made by scholar Edward N. Luttwack: “make war to make peace.”¹⁹⁴

Third, this thesis finds that in the aftermath of the war the GoSL tactfully managed civil-military relations in the country, realizing that the military is a cohesive entity of power. Instead of adopting a brutal fiscal approach—cutting budgets, reducing wartime concessions and downsizing the military—the GoSL has adopted a strategy of establishing controls and utilizing the enlarged military for post-war reconciliation and nation building. Further, instead of claiming credit for ending the war, the government gave full credit to the military for its patriotic dedication to the country. That increased the respect and loyalty of the armed forces towards the government multifold with no prerogative detrimental to democratic control.

Fourth, the thesis finds that, after concluding the war the GoSL did not hesitate to employ the military in changed roles to accomplish post-war reconciliation and nation building in a wide scope of tasks while ensuring democratic civilian control over the military. Instead of reducing military privileges in its incentive-based approach, the government granted more welfare to the military—especially to uplift the social standards of the poor foot soldier who played a key role in the battle. The government has also made a dedicated attempt to take care of thousands of disabled war heroes through various rehabilitation projects that have captured the attention and sincere appreciation of the military—enhancing military subordination to civilian control. In this context, the extended roles assigned it have been highly welcomed by the military without hesitation and, during the short spell of three years since the war ended, the military along with the government has been able to make a substantial contribution in many areas of critical importance, accelerating the post-war stabilization and consolidation of democracy in the country.

¹⁹⁴ Edward N. Luttwack, *Give War a Chance*, (Centre for International Strategic Studies: 1999), accessed on September 12, 2012. <http://www.scribd.com/doc/7258092/Luttwak-Give-War-a-Chance>.

Under these circumstances, the thesis finds that, in using Stepan's military prerogatives, the Sri Lanka military had created few or no prerogatives detrimental to civilian control or effectiveness while enhancing civil-military relations and democratic consolidation of the country. In this context, the heavy presence of the Sri Lanka military in post-war reconciliation and nation building has not created any negative impact on civil-military relations and the consolidation of democracy in Sri Lanka. This is illustrated in the democracy index-2011 published by the Economic Intelligence Unit (EIU) where Sri Lanka occupies the position 57¹⁹⁵ in world ranking, ahead of democratic countries like Romania and many other prominent nations.

The case of Sri Lanka is unique, as measures adapted to effect democratic civilian control of the military are different from the most common approaches based on controlling the military used by well-established countries. Although the initiatives of the government have been successful, they may be strictly dependent on current political leadership and prove to be fragile in changed circumstances. However, the experience in Sri Lanka proves the importance and effectiveness of civil-military relations in winning wars and dealing with post-war democratization challenges.

¹⁹⁵ "Democracy Index-2011," Economic Intelligence Unit, 4, accessed on February 6, 2013.
http://www.eiu.com/Handlers/WhitepaperHandler.ashx?fi=Democracy_Index_2011_Updated.pdf&mode=wp&campaignid=DemocracyIndex2011.

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