



**NAVAL
POSTGRADUATE
SCHOOL**

MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

**THE SEEDS OF MOBILIZATION: EMOTIONAL
FRAMES AND INFLUENCE**

by

Benjamin L. Tipton

March 2013

Thesis Advisor:
Second Reader:

Hy Rothstein
Doowan Lee

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

| REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE | | | Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 |
|---|--|--|----------------------------------|
| Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. | | | |
| 1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) | 2. REPORT DATE March 2013 | 3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED Master's Thesis | |
| 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE THE SEEDS OF MOBILIZATION: EMOTIONAL FRAMES AND INFLUENCE | | 5. FUNDING NUMBERS | |
| 6. AUTHOR(S) Benjamin L. Tipton | | 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER | |
| 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93943-5000 | | 10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER | |
| 9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) N/A | | 11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. IRB Protocol number NPS.2012.0066-IR-EP7-A. | |
| 12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited | | 12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE | |
| 13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) Why is the U.S. not highly effective at influencing the attitudes and opinions of foreign audiences? The constant and almost sole utilization of rational argumentative frames with almost no emotionally resonant appeal for fear of offending foreign sensibilities is the reason why. This study utilizes a survey research experiment to suggest that emotionally resonant messaging is more effective, and that its use should not only be acceptable but requisite to both policy makers and public of the U.S. to influence foreign populations to the benefit of the U.S. and our allies. | | | |
| 14. SUBJECT TERMS Psychological operations, influence, persuasion, coercion, mobilization, social movement theory, information, emotion, fear, hate. | | 15. NUMBER OF PAGES 93 | |
| | | 16. PRICE CODE | |
| 17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT Unclassified | 18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE Unclassified | 19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT Unclassified | 20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UU |

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited

THE SEEDS OF MOBILIZATION: EMOTIONAL FRAMES AND INFLUENCE

Benjamin L. Tipton
Major, United States Army
B.S., Longwood College, 1999

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF SCIENCE IN DEFENSE ANALYSIS

from the

**NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
March 2013**

Author: Benjamin L. Tipton

Approved by: Hy Rothstein
Thesis Advisor

Doowan Lee
Second Reader

John Arquilla
Chair, Department of Defense Analysis

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

ABSTRACT

Why is the U.S. not highly effective at influencing the attitudes and opinions of foreign audiences? The constant and almost sole utilization of rational argumentative frames with almost no emotionally resonant appeal for fear of offending foreign sensibilities is the reason why. This study utilizes a survey research experiment to suggest that emotionally resonant messaging is more effective, and that its use should not only be acceptable but requisite to both policy makers and public of the U.S. to influence foreign populations to the benefit of the U.S. and our allies.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

TABLE OF CONTENTS

| | | |
|-------------|---|-----------|
| I. | INTRODUCTION..... | 1 |
| | A. BACKGROUND | 1 |
| | B. PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVE | 3 |
| | C. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK | 4 |
| | 1. Types of Messages | 6 |
| | 2. Channels for Messaging | 7 |
| | D. METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH..... | 8 |
| | E. CHAPTER OUTLINE..... | 9 |
| II. | CONCEPTS FROM LITERATURE | 11 |
| | A. RESEARCH QUESTION AND SCOPE | 11 |
| | 1. Influence Operation’s Prevailing Paradigm..... | 11 |
| | 2. Influence and Strategic Framing | 11 |
| | 3. Emotion and Mobilization..... | 14 |
| | B. CONCLUSION | 15 |
| III. | THE SURVEY EXPERIMENT | 17 |
| | A. PURPOSE OF THE SURVEY EXPERIMENT | 17 |
| | 1. Survey Experiment Design..... | 17 |
| | 2. Survey Distribution..... | 21 |
| | B. RESEARCH CHALLENGES | 21 |
| IV. | THE SURVEY EXPERIMENT RESULTS | 23 |
| | A. INTRODUCTION..... | 23 |
| | B. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS..... | 23 |
| | 1. Opinion Changes..... | 23 |
| | <i>a. Rational Messaging.....</i> | <i>24</i> |
| | <i>b. Emotional Messaging</i> | <i>26</i> |
| | <i>c. Channels.....</i> | <i>29</i> |
| | <i>d. Conclusion to Descriptive Statistics</i> | <i>32</i> |
| | 2. Correlation..... | 33 |
| | C. REGRESSION ANALYSIS | 36 |
| | D. QUALITATIVE SURVEY RESPONSES | 40 |
| V. | CONCLUSION | 45 |
| | A. INTRODUCTION..... | 45 |
| | B. VALIDITY OF THE HYPOTHESES | 45 |
| | 1. First Hypothesis | 45 |
| | <i>a. Results of the First Hypothesis</i> | <i>46</i> |
| | 2. Second Hypothesis | 46 |
| | <i>a. Results of the Second Hypothesis</i> | <i>46</i> |
| | 3. Comments on the Hypotheses | 47 |
| | C. IMPLICATIONS FOR WAR | 47 |
| | D. ETHICS AND MORALITY OF COERCIVE MESSAGING | 48 |

| | | |
|----|---|----|
| E. | RECOMMENDATION FOR FUTURE RESEARCHERS | 48 |
| 1. | Large Initial Population | 48 |
| 2. | Investigate Other Emotions | 49 |
| 3. | Lengthen the Time of the Experiment | 49 |
| 4. | Larger Variety of Channels of Communication | 49 |
| F. | CONCLUDING COMMENTS..... | 49 |
| | APPENDIX A: INITIAL SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE | 51 |
| | APPENDIX B: FOLLOW-UP SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE..... | 57 |
| | APPENDIX C: RATIONAL AND EMOTIONAL MESSAGES | 61 |
| A. | ISSUE 1: SICKNESS FROM MOLD,, | 61 |
| 1. | Rational Messaging:..... | 61 |
| 2. | Emotional Messaging: Collective Blaming | 61 |
| 3. | Emotional Messaging: Targeted Vilification..... | 62 |
| B. | ISSUE 2: POOR CONSTRUCTION | 62 |
| 1. | Rational Messaging:..... | 62 |
| 2. | Emotional Messaging: Collective Blaming | 63 |
| 3. | Emotional Messaging: Targeted Vilification..... | 63 |
| C. | ISSUE 3: LACK OF PROPER INSPECTIONS, MAINTENANCE, AND REPAIRS” | 64 |
| 1. | Rational Messaging:..... | 64 |
| 2. | Emotional Messaging: Collective Blaming | 65 |
| 3. | Emotional Messaging: Targeted Vilification..... | 65 |
| D. | ISSUE 4: CONTRACTOR IGNORING OR COVERING-UP THE PROBLEMS” | 65 |
| 1. | Rational Messaging:..... | 65 |
| 2. | Emotional Messaging: Collective Blaming | 66 |
| 3. | Emotional Messaging: Targeted Vilification..... | 66 |
| E. | ISSUE 5: INFANT DEATHS AT FORT BRAGG’ ’ ’ | 67 |
| 1. | Rational Messaging:..... | 67 |
| 2. | Emotional Messaging: Collective Blaming | 67 |
| 3. | Emotional Messaging: Targeted Vilification..... | 68 |
| | APPENDIX D: UNIT APPROVALS | 69 |
| | LIST OF REFERENCES | 71 |
| | INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST | 73 |

LIST OF FIGURES

| | | |
|------------|---|----|
| Figure 1. | The warfare messaging scale | 5 |
| Figure 2. | The belief system graph | 14 |
| Figure 3. | The survey experiment construct | 18 |
| Figure 4. | Survey experiment initial survey messaging | 19 |
| Figure 5. | Survey experiment final survey messaging | 20 |
| Figure 6. | Initial survey questionnaire – Page 1 | 51 |
| Figure 7. | Initial survey questionnaire – Page 2 | 52 |
| Figure 8. | Initial survey questionnaire – Page 3 | 53 |
| Figure 9. | Initial survey questionnaire – Page 4 | 54 |
| Figure 10. | Initial survey questionnaire – Page 5 | 55 |
| Figure 11. | Initial survey questionnaire – Page 6 | 56 |
| Figure 12. | Follow-up survey questionnaire – Page 1 | 57 |
| Figure 13. | Follow-up survey – Page 2 | 58 |
| Figure 14. | Follow-up survey – Page 3 | 59 |
| Figure 15. | Follow-up survey – Page 4 | 60 |
| Figure 16. | Email sent to unit commanders and officers in charge requesting approval ... | 69 |
| Figure 17. | Approval from the commander of the Civil Affairs Training Battalion | 69 |
| Figure 18. | Approval from the commander of the Psychological Operations Training Battalion | 70 |
| Figure 19. | Approval from the NPS Defense Analysis Special Operations Forces Chair | 70 |
| Figure 20. | Approval from the commander of the 4TH MISOG (A) | 70 |

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

LIST OF TABLES

| | | |
|-----------|---|----|
| Table 1. | Survey distribution..... | 21 |
| Table 2. | Group and aggregate results of rational messaging | 25 |
| Table 3. | Aggregate results of emotional messaging | 26 |
| Table 4. | Group and aggregate results of collective blaming emotional messaging..... | 27 |
| Table 5. | Group and aggregate results of targeted vilification emotional messaging | 28 |
| Table 6. | Aggregate results of work, personal, and both email channels..... | 30 |
| Table 7. | Group and aggregate results of work email channel..... | 30 |
| Table 8. | Group and aggregate results of personal email channel | 31 |
| Table 9. | Group and aggregate results of two-channel messaging..... | 32 |
| Table 10. | Overall variable correlation matrix | 34 |
| Table 11. | Regression analysis of participant opinion of private management companies | 37 |
| Table 12. | The regression analysis of rational and emotional messaging..... | 38 |

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

CAQC – Civil Affairs Qualification Course

CEO – Chief Executive Officer

COIN – Counter Insurgency

ICOS – International Council on Security and Development

IW – Irregular Warfare

LMH – Lincoln Military Housing

MISOG (A) – Military Information Support Operations Group (Airborne)

MOE – measure(s) of effectiveness

NPS – Naval Postgraduate School

PMH – Picerne Military Housing

POQC – Psychological Operations Qualification Course

U.S. – United States

UW – Unconventional Warfare

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The United States (U.S.) finds itself needing to influence foreign populations and individuals in order to achieve its national goals. This influence comes in two distinct flavors: persuasion and coercion. The U.S. often prefers to use persuasive techniques over the coercive due to public sentiment, ethical considerations, and cost. Where does this leave the U.S.? Is it limited to handing out soccer balls and stickers with images of Iraq or Afghanistan imprinted on them? Is the U.S. limited to offering rewards for reporting terrorists or appealing to indigenous populations to take action against the odds because it is the right thing to do? Persuasion has its place, but does not encompass all that can and should be done. Fundamental to the notion of influence is how individuals and groups can be motivated by primary emotions to sufficiently mobilize a people toward supporting U.S. goals. Put differently, most groups and individuals have certain identifiable fears and hatreds which, when appropriately exploited, can serve as highly effective trigger points for causing actions favorable to U.S. interests. This is the concept of coercive persuasion put forth in this thesis. I contend that the proactive use of coercive persuasion is a much more effective tool for mobilization than the reactive nature of the current U.S. influence paradigm of rational persuasion.

The research question for this thesis was: Under what conditions can messaging achieve its intended influence of mobilization toward U.S. desired goals? The question was answered by conducting a survey experiment. The purpose of the survey experiment was to measure the efficacy of the emotionally resonating frames of fear and hate against the rational frame.

Two hypotheses were developed to be tested by the survey experiment. The first stated that if messaging incorporates emotional frames that resonate with the target population, then it is more likely to increase the mobilization of the target population. The second hypotheses stated that multiple interactive messaging channels are more effective than single interactive channels for inducing a greater mobilization.

To evaluate the validity of the hypotheses four analytic procedures were used. First, descriptive statistics such as the means and standard deviations of each construct were reviewed. Second, a correlation matrix was used to assess the internal relations among the variables. Third, the results were reviewed with regression analysis. Finally, the results were be qualitatively reviewed by analyzing individual survey comments. The first two methods of analysis did not provide significant insights. However, the regression and qualitative analyses did provide significant insights from the data collected.

The survey experiment suggests that messaging can be effective when leveraging a specific type of channel and framing focus. Second, the results showed that emotional narratives are more powerful than rational narratives. Third, the moderate effectiveness achieved by the rational narratives was due to reinforcing the message and using multiple delivery channels. Simply put, an emotionally resonant message can achieve its desired mobilization more easily. On the other hand, a rational message has to be channeled through more methods of dissemination to affect levels of mobilization.

The U.S. can benefit from adopting the model of using emotionally resonant messaging delivered over the proper massed channels. The practice of such techniques across warfare environments as well as in the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war can contribute to the U.S. obtaining its goals more efficiently and effectively.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

First, I would like to thank my wife and children for taking care of each other while I was so often occupied with the research and writing of this thesis. My advisory team of Hy Rothstein and Doowan Lee, to whom I owe deep gratitude, was instrumental in ensuring the thesis was a product worthy of the institution. Their insight, knowledge, and advice were of great importance. Lastly, I would like to thank my entire family and friends for the constant support you provided to me while I undertook this effort. I could not have completed this project without the professional and personal support from all of these individuals.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

I. INTRODUCTION

The U.S. finds itself needing to influence foreign populations and individuals in order to achieve its national goals. This influence comes in two distinct flavors: persuasion and coercion. The U.S. often prefers to use persuasive techniques over the coercive due to public sentiment, ethical considerations, and cost. Where does this leave the U.S.? Is it limited to handing out soccer balls and stickers with images of Iraq or Afghanistan imprinted on them? Is the U.S. limited to offering rewards for reporting terrorists or appealing to indigenous populations to take action against the odds because it is the right thing to do? Persuasion has its place, but does not encompass all that can and should be done. Fundamental to the notion of influence is how individuals and groups can be motivated by primary emotions to sufficiently mobilize a people toward supporting U.S. goals. Put differently, most groups and individuals have certain identifiable fears and hatreds which, when appropriately exploited, can serve as highly effective trigger points for causing actions favorable to U.S. interests. This is the concept of coercive persuasion put forth in this thesis. I contend that the proactive use of coercive persuasion is a much more effective tool for mobilization than the reactive nature of the current U.S. influence paradigm of rational persuasion.

A. BACKGROUND

Messaging in Afghanistan has been and continues to be ineffective. According to a survey of the Afghan people conducted by the International Council on Security and Development (ICOS) published in 2010, the majority of the people living in Afghanistan still do not know that the:¹

- U.S. was attacked by al Qaeda;
- Taliban government of Afghanistan hosted al Qaeda;
- Taliban refused to give up the al Qaeda leaders to face justice for their crimes;

¹ Robert Reilly, "Shaping Strategic Communication," in *Afghan Endgames: Strategy and Policy for America's Longest War*, eds. Hy Rothstein & John Arquilla (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2012), 172–173.

- U.S. toppled the Taliban government for protecting al Qaeda;
- U.S. has been pursuing al Qaeda leaders responsible for attacking the U.S.

After being informed of these basic facts, the majority of Afghans stated that the U.S. was within its rights to invade Afghanistan, install a new government, and track down those responsible for the initial attacks. When the population of Afghanistan is almost completely ignorant of why the U.S. is occupying Afghanistan, it is going to assume the U.S. is just the latest foreign power in the long line of foreign powers attempting to exploit them and their land. While the above narrative has the potential to be framed around culturally resonating emotional frames that can influence the target population, the majority of subsequent messaging has focused on promises alien to average Afghans. This does not foster a positive environment for establishing a robust influence program that can effectively aid war fighting in either a counterinsurgency or unconventional warfare environment. Put differently, the majority of U.S. messaging fails to invoke locally resonating norms. The promises of economic development, building of infrastructure, social progress, and democracy are often futile as they fall upon the deaf ears of people who either do not share this Western belief or are merely trying to survive for another day.

In contrast, the Taliban have been and continue to be very effective communicators in Afghanistan. The use of threatening Shabnamah (night letters) left in a village to be discovered by the people the next day detailing all that the people should and should not do coupled with threats and promises have been very effective.² What has made this work so well for the Taliban? Simply put Taliban follow through and commitment. The Taliban does not threaten to do what it cannot or will not do, nor does it promise what it cannot or will not provide. In other words, the Taliban leverage and invoke locally resonating frames—such as fear and honor—to induce compliance. Whatever the local villager’s opinion of or attitude toward the Taliban may be, he or she knows exactly where the Taliban stands in relation to him or her, and vice versa. The

² Thomas H. Johnson, “The Taliban Insurgency and Its Tribal Dynamics: An Analysis of Shabnamah (Night Letters),” in *Strategic Culture and Violent Non-State Actors: Weapons of Mass Destruction and Asymmetrical Operations Concepts and Cases*, INSS Occasional Paper 64, 45–94 (Colorado Springs, CO: USAF Academy, February 2008), 55.

above narrative shows exactly how the Taliban are able to emotionally frame issues in a culturally resonating manner. Most importantly, this influences the Afghan population through a focus on issues familiar to average Afghans.

As shown from the comparison, pragmatic and positive messaging by the Coalition Forces in Afghanistan has proven less effective than Taliban messaging. Core to this problem is how messaging is appealing to the indigenous population's sense of moral righteousness and indignation when they are suffering through the seemingly endless horrors and deprivations of war or oppression.

The continued failing of our influence mechanisms underscores the necessity to re-examine and even change its basic tenets. As stated at the very beginning of this thesis, while the persuasive influence techniques have their applicability, the U.S. is in need of another method of influencing foreign populations. Arguably, this necessity is even more pressing when applied to unconventional warfare campaigns where the goal is both perceptual and behavioral.

B. PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVE

The purpose of this thesis is to identify effective means and ways of operationalizing coercive persuasion by exploiting emotions, chiefly fear and hate. Specifically, I intend to examine general principles of effective influence to induce behavioral change and ultimately a robust mobilization of a specific target audience. I define this mobilization as a collective and increasing willingness to act in the manner specified by the messaging. The scope of this thesis will focus on how the content and dissemination of messages can be used to assist the U.S. government to mobilize target audiences in support of U.S. goals. It must be noted that messaging can have a wide range of effects, such as changing perceptions, passive support, and active participation. I will tentatively consider active participation in or mobilization of a mass social movement as the best indicator of the effectiveness of the coercive form of messaging.

C. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Humans are social creatures and, therefore, in need of a sense of belonging or group identity. Most people find this within the societies into which they are born while some do not. Others are excluded from or lose their group identity. These “free radicals,” or outliers, are likely candidates for influence and mobilization efforts. There are also many people residing within the social group that are candidates for influence and mobilization. Convincing those excluded from the group to join another group will not be as difficult as convincing those still within a group to leave and join another group. Why would a current member of a group leave to join another group or movement? Being in a certain group may not be enough. Perhaps within a group, one is marginalized, stifled, or otherwise harassed. An alternative may offer hope. This is where the focus of the friendly forces needs to be; providing a viable counter narrative to the enemy’s narrative.

Figure 1 is a representation of the theoretical framework depicting the overall effectiveness of messaging in various warfare environments. The support for friendly forces on the right side is represented by green, enemy forces on the left by red, and ambivalence in the center by yellow. The perceived effectiveness of messaging by the enemy and friendly forces in the environments of conventional warfare, counter-insurgency (COIN), and unconventional warfare (UW) is compared and contrasted.




Figure 1. The warfare messaging scale

Decreasing the number of people on left side of the scale (actively supporting the enemy) while increasing the number of people on the right side of the scale (actively supporting friendly forces) is the goal of influential messaging. Only highly effective influence activities will move someone from one end of the spectrum to another in a short time frame and most likely not be permanent. Permanently moving someone from any location along the continuum requires time, effort, repetition, and reinforcement of messages by actions. Therefore, the goal of any messaging in war should be threefold:

- to maintain attitudes and actions of people on the right side of the scale which are supportive of friendly forces
- to move the generally ambivalent people in the center of the scale to the right by showing that the friendly forces are supportive and protective of the population and that the enemy forces are not supportive and protective of the population

- to move as many of the enemy forces and its supporters on the left of the scale to the center or the right by convincing them of the futility of their efforts and eventual defeat

The overall effect of a successful coercive messaging campaign would see the chart display larger green and yellow sections and a smaller red section.

The enemy uses the powerfully coercive force of social influence where social circles (families, extended families, friends, tribes, governments) all possess and exercise control over the individual and groups to maintain the status quo in the power structure and societal norms. This is why an effective campaign of coercive messaging is a necessity in mobilization and influence efforts. The messaging campaign's goal in war is to counter this influence through sustained activity to aid in taking support away from the enemy and giving it to the group of our creation or choice. I call this mobilization in support of U.S. national security interests.

Based on the preceding examination and the relevant bodies of knowledge in the literature listed in Chapter II, I propose to examine and test the following hypotheses to identify more precise methods of using emotional frames as a tool of influence and mobilization.

1. Types of Messages

H1: If messaging incorporates emotional frames that resonate with the target population, then it is more likely to increase the mobilization of the target population.

Not all frames have the same degree of influence. However, one of the basic tenets of strategic framing is cultural resonance.³ In other words, the more the chosen frame is based on traditionally accepted norms, the more likely it can produce compliance which then leads to effective mobilization.

H1-1: Messaging that uses targeted vilification can increase the effectiveness of mobilization.

³ David A. Snow and Robert D. Benford, "Ideology, Frame Resonance, and Participant Mobilization," in *International Social Movement Research*, v. 1, *Supplement to Research in Social Movements, Conflicts and Change* (Greenwich, CT: JAI, 1988), 199–202.

Personal vilification can facilitate the isolation of the target regime from the population by creating a sense of moral indignation sufficient to induce active participation in resistance movements. Vilification has been a very useful tool in mobilizing a population against another population in many historical contexts.⁴ Hitler's propaganda influenced the Germans to blame their ills on the Jews, among others, but the Jews were held especially responsible. This gave the non-Jewish population of Germany a convenient and powerless minority to unite against.

H1-2: Historically relevant themes increase the effectiveness of messaging for mobilization as such cues render proposed solutions—such as insurrection and open rebellion (prognostic frames)—more credible.⁵

The use of history is a particularly useful activity for both the influence operator and the insurgency leader. History is replete with examples of groups that have fought against each other.⁶ Much of this animosity continues today. For example, the sworn enemy of Israel, Hamas (or as it is less well known Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya), has used jihad, militarily and politically, with Israel since its inception in the late 1980s and continues to do so presently.⁷

2. Channels for Messaging

H2: Multiple interactive messaging channels are more effective than single interactive channels for inducing a greater mobilization.

Recent events from the Arab Spring appear to have demonstrated the efficacy of interactive media on anti-regime mobilization. Central to the effectiveness of social media is the logic of empowerment through interactive channels of messaging.⁸ Another

⁴ Eric Hoffer, *The True Believer: Thoughts on the Nature of Mass Movements*, (New York: Harper-Perennial, 2010), 89–90.

⁵ Sidney G. Tarrow, *Power in Movement* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 109–111.

⁶ Hoffer, *The True Believer*, 89–99.

⁷ Michael Schaad, *More Effective Warfare: Warfare Waged Psychologically* (Master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, May 2012), 48–54, <http://hdl.handle.net/10945/7411>.

⁸ Jeroen Van Laer, "Activists Online and Offline: The Internet as an Information Channel for Protest Demonstrations," *Mobilization: An International Journal* 15, no. 3 (2010): 360–361.

reason that interactive channels are more effective at influencing is the role of brokerage in extending the scope of influence to outside groups.⁹ This means that it is easier for movement members to not only interact with people in their group but also with people involved in other movements that are likely to join and/or support a similar group. One used to have to travel to an area to learn its internal politics and social issues. The poor, disadvantaged, and marginalized segments of a society were unable to communicate outside their local area, let alone able to contact someone on the other side of the world before the advent of the Internet. The Internet's ability to connect distant and intermittent communities to the entire world gains these distant and intermittent communities the greatest proportional benefit.¹⁰

The Internet was key in the 1994 Zapatista uprising, the 1999 demonstrations in Seattle against the World Trade Organization, and the 2008 protest against the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia.¹¹ Laer found that online activists use the Internet to stay informed about upcoming events and to sustain and reinforce motivational elements such as “group-based anger.”¹² The ability to maintain contacts and establish contacts via the Internet enabling simultaneous participation, stronger mobilization, and greater reach of social movements has never existed before this point.¹³

D. METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH

The study is based on a voluntary survey experiment to determine military service members' satisfaction with privatized military housing. The surveys were developed by the author to gauge changes in opinion and likelihood for action before and after receiving messages intended to negatively influence opinion and positively influence the likelihood for action. The surveys provide both quantitative and qualitative information for analysis and study. The quantitative analysis is achieved through a regression analysis

⁹ Stefaan Walgrave et al., “Multiple Engagements and Network Bridging in Contentious Politics: Digital Media Use of Protest Participants,” *Mobilization: An International Journal* 16, no. 3 (2011): 344.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 327.

¹¹ Laer, “Activists Online and Offline,” 348.

¹² *Ibid.*, 361.

¹³ Walgrave, “Multiple Engagements,” 329.

of the numerical data. The qualitative portion is drawn from the free response section at the end of each survey where the participants were encouraged to write any additional comments they had about privatized military housing.

In brief, the experiment intends to show how a target audience's opinion can be changed using the emotionally charged framings of fear for the safety of one's family and the hatred of those who would endanger that safety. The issue chosen to demonstrate this effect is the housing provided to members of the military and their families by the government through privatized housing companies. In general, participants receive messaging (rational, collective blaming, or targeted vilification) about the substandard service and quality provided by these companies via email (work, personal, or both).

E. CHAPTER OUTLINE

This first chapter explained the overarching problem regarding the current state of U.S. influence messaging; the ineffective use of appeals to logic, rationality, and reason based upon our own Western cultural influences instead of the locally resonate cultural frames. The next chapter offers a logical and pragmatic solution to this problem; use emotionally and culturally resonating themes and messages in addition to local norms of logic, rationality, and reason. To validate the argument posed above, an experiment is constructed to show the efficacy of emotionally and culturally resonating framing. The experiment's methodology will be discussed in more detail in Chapter III. The results and the analysis of the experiment will be reviewed in Chapter IV. Finally, the argument for the U.S. to use emotional framing in its influence messaging will be tied to the experiment's results in Chapter V.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

II. CONCEPTS FROM LITERATURE

A. RESEARCH QUESTION AND SCOPE

Under what conditions can messaging achieve its intended influence of mobilization toward U.S. desired goals? Mobilization, in this thesis, is defined as a collective and increasing willingness to act in the manner specified by the messaging. This thesis is predicated upon three bodies of knowledge: influence operation's prevailing paradigm, influence & strategic framing, and emotion & mobilization.

1. Influence Operation's Prevailing Paradigm

As noted in the thesis of Lopacienski et al.,¹⁴ the United States tends to use a reactive and defensive model to influence as opposed to a proactive and offensive model. Doctrine does not prohibit the use of emotionally charged and sensitive messaging. However, the permissions currently required to execute this messaging are tightly controlled effectively eliminating the use of this effective technique. It is akin to attacking a defensive position with a bayonet charge when there is air support available to drop thousands of pounds of ordnance. This prevailing paradigm of influence operations has failed. On the other hand, insurgents have used a different paradigm with great success, especially in denied areas. For instance, the Taliban have used Shabnamah quite effectively as a tool of influence and mobilization. Thomas Johnson states that these night letters have been effective because they directly exploit the Pashtun honor code, making it impossible to not comply with the Taliban.¹⁵

2. Influence and Strategic Framing

The logic of coercion and motivation in denied areas is not entirely new to the literature of contentious politics. For instance, Snow and Benford identify the importance

¹⁴ Edward Lopacienski et al., *Influence Operations: Redefining the Indirect Approach* (Master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, June 2011), 8, <http://hdl.handle.net/10945/5611>.

¹⁵ Johnson, "Shabnamah (Night Letters)," 67.

of strategic framing in creating a permissive condition for coercive action.¹⁶ Hafez also identifies that radical frames can be used to influence and induce compliance.¹⁷ Central to the concept of strategic framing and influence is how mobilization is achieved and enhanced by synthesizing emotions with locally resonating norms such as indignation, vilification, and victimization. Put differently, emotional activation of norms lies in the nexus between messaging and mobilization.

From a strategic framing perspective, messaging designed to induce loyalty is more likely to achieve mobilization. And the connection of emotion to behavioral change is also supported by the psychology of influence. For instance, Cialdini states that people are societally engineered to react to six basic influence principles that can be exploited to motivate people to behave in ways and manners that they would not do without prompting. Through the use of reciprocation (give and take), commitment and consistency, social proof (seeing others like something), liking (do more for friends than strangers), authority, and scarcity (people want what they “can’t” have).¹⁸ In essence, it can be argued that leveraging emotional needs is a key aspect of influence and mobilization. In summation, an influential argument cannot lead to mobilization if it does not have the properties of a proper emotional framework. Without this emotional framework, the argument is nothing more than ineffective rhetoric that is ignored by the target audience no matter how correct or compelling the argument.

Essential to any mobilization of people for a cause is solid frame resonance. Frame resonance requires the identification and exploitation of the correct ideological factors for a given audience. According to Snow and Benford, an argument to motivate a movement must be appropriately framed within the constraints of the culture’s belief system.¹⁹

¹⁶ David A. Snow et al., “Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation,” *American Sociological Review* 51, no. 4 (1986): 469–470.

¹⁷ Mohammed M. Hafez, *Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach*, ed. Quintan Wiktorowicz (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2004), 38.

¹⁸ Robert Cialdini, *Influence: Science and Practice* (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 2001), 1–16, 21, 52, 98, 143, 178, 203.

¹⁹ Snow and Benford, “Ideology, Frame Resonance, and Participant Mobilization,” 199–202, 205–210.

There are three types of frames: diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational. In the diagnostic frame, the problem must be identified and a cause given for the problem.²⁰ The prognostic frame provides solutions, how to achieve them, and ways to measure progress.²¹ The motivational frame provides spirited arguments necessary to develop interest in people to redress some perceived injustice.²² Next, the framing needs to fit within the confines of the target's belief system. The three core components of this belief system are:²³

- the *centrality* or hierarchical salience of any particular idea creation element in relation to other such elements within the belief system;
- the *range* of the central idea creation elements or the domains of life they encompass;
- the degree of *interrelatedness* among the various ideational elements within the belief system.²⁴

Figure 2 is an interpretation of the relationship between the three core components of belief systems as identified by Snow and Benford and previously discussed. It is a general representation of a belief system showing a graphical depiction of the relation between the three core components. It enables understanding them separately and in combination. The graphic also serves to show how to craft resonating messages in any identified belief system.

²⁰ Ideology, 200.

²¹ Ibid., 201.

²² Ibid., 202.

²³ Ibid., 205.

²⁴ Ibid.




Figure 2. The belief system graph

Finally, we come to the first-person point of view constraints of empirical credibility, experiential commensurability, and narrative fidelity. This is how a frame is made to make sense and solve a problem. Empirical credibility asks how well the framing fits reality.²⁵ Experiential credibility asks if the proffered framing provides “answers and solutions to troublesome events...which harmonize with the ways in which these conditions have been or are currently experienced.”²⁶ Narrative fidelity describes the extent to which the framing offered culturally resonates with the people being mobilized.²⁷ A culturally resonate, experiential, and credible frame will succeed over a frame lacking one or more of the components.²⁸

3. Emotion and Mobilization

Evident from this literature is the saliency of emotional frames in conditioning compliance and mobilization, especially in denied areas. This is true in any warfare environment, and especially in the environment of counterinsurgency or unconventional warfare.

²⁵ Snow and Benford, “Ideology, Frame Resonance, and Participant Mobilization,” 208.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Ibid., 210.

²⁸ Ibid., 211.

According to Jasper, emotions play a significant and, historically, misunderstood part in the mobilization of social and resistance movements.²⁹ He discusses the parallels between emotion and thought as interacting processes of evaluation with the outer world. He analyzes the need for redefining emotions into a more workable construct. Specifically, his typologies of emotions are urges, reflex emotions, moods, affective loyalties or orientations, and moral emotions. He defines affective loyalties or orientation as “attachments or aversions: love, liking, respect, trust, admiration, and their negative counterparts.”³⁰ The focus of this thesis will be to understand the factors necessary for effectively influencing the loyalties or orientations of people in order to mobilize them to action.

Hoffer identifies what he terms “unifying agents” for motivating a movement: hatred; imitation; persuasion & coercion; leadership; action; and suspicion.³¹ The unifying agent of hatred is historically easily created and highly effective. Hate, according to Hoffer, is best manifested by creating an outside, evil character such as the foreign devil; an antagonist from elsewhere; those “not of us.”³² Fear is a natural component of hate which can be effectively used to further divide a group.

B. CONCLUSION

The U.S. needs to use emotionally resonant themes and frames to more effectively influence the foreign populations where it wages war. Our adversaries leverage the emotions of these populations to great effect against us, so why not turn the tables and do the same to them? This study pursues an understanding of the effectiveness of the use of exploiting foreign populations’ fears and hatreds as a way to more effectively fight and win our wars.

²⁹ James M. Jasper, *Emotions and Social Movements: Twenty Years of Theory and Research*, Unpublished paper, 1.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 3.

³¹ Hoffer, *The True Believer*, 91–126.

³² *Ibid.*, 92–93.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

III. THE SURVEY EXPERIMENT

The data for this study was collected using a survey administered to the students of the Defense Analysis Department of the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), the Psychological Operations (POQC) and the Civil Affairs Qualification Courses (CAQC), and members of the 4TH Military Information Support Group (Airborne) (MISOG[A]). Permission to conduct the survey was obtained from NPS and from each unit's commanding officer prior to initiating the experiment.³³

A. PURPOSE OF THE SURVEY EXPERIMENT

The purpose of the survey experiment was to measure the efficacy of the emotionally resonating frames of fear and hate against the rational frame. Customer satisfaction with privatized military housing was chosen as the subject of the experiment due to its relevance for everyone in the military. Also, anecdotally, there have been numerous issues with the quality and management practices with privatized military housing.

1. Survey Experiment Design

The survey experiment consisted of three parts: the initial twenty statement survey; the five week messaging period; and the final seventeen statement survey. The initial survey served to provide the baseline opinions of the participants toward privatized military housing. The messaging period provided a venue to deliver messages via email to the participants on five different aspects of privatized military housing. The final survey served to provide the new opinions of the participants regarding privatized military housing. The initial and final surveys can be found in Appendixes A and B.

The messages delivered to the survey experiment participants during the messaging period varied depending on which group the participant was randomly placed. Based upon which group the participants were in, they received either a rational or an

³³ See Appendix D for emails from unit commanders granting permission to conduct research with their personnel.

emotional message. The participants who received an emotional message were further broken down into either receiving an emotional message of collective blame or an emotional message of targeted vilification. The participants received a rational or emotional message each week for the entire five week period. Appendix C shows the rational and emotional messages that were sent to the participants. The key frames for the messages were:

- Issue 1: Sickness from mold
- Issue 2: Poor construction
- Issue 3: Lack of inspections, maintenance, and repairs
- Issue 4: Ignoring or covering up problems by the contractor
- Issue 5: Infant deaths at Fort Bragg

The participants were also divided by the manner in which they would receive the messaging. One-third of the participants received the messages via a work email account; one-third via a personal email account; and one-third via both a work and a personal email account. The messaging charts in figures 2, 3, and 4 provide greater detail.




Figure 3. The survey experiment construct

THE INITIAL MESSAGING CHART




Figure 4. Survey experiment initial survey messaging

THE FINAL MESSAGING CHART




Figure 5. Survey experiment final survey messaging

2. Survey Distribution

Over 600 military men and women, officers and enlisted, were contacted by email or in person to participate in the survey experiment. The members of the 4TH MISG, the CAQC, and the POQC were given a briefing and were asked to volunteer for the survey. The NPS Defense Analysis students were asked to participate via an email with a hyperlink to the survey. Of this number, 142 completed the initial survey, and 72 completed the final survey. The numbers further break down by unit as follows in Table 1.

| Initial | Unit | Final |
|---------|----------|-------|
| 54 | NPS | 36 |
| | 4TH | |
| 61 | MISOG(A) | 27 |
| 17 | CAQC | 1 |
| 10 | POQC | 8 |
| 142 | Total | 72 |

Table 1. Survey distribution

B. RESEARCH CHALLENGES

The most challenging aspect of this research was ensuring that a population of sufficient size completed the entire experiment. The initial population of approximately 600 translated into an approximately 24% initial response rate or 142 initially completing the survey. Furthermore, only 50% of the people who completed the initial survey completed the final survey. If the response rate would have been much lower the data acquired from the experiment could have been inconclusive.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

IV. THE SURVEY EXPERIMENT RESULTS

A. INTRODUCTION

This study's surveys were developed to determine the susceptibility of a target population to emotional messaging on a contentious topic. To evaluate the validity of the hypotheses, this section will employ four analytic procedures. First, the results will be reviewed by looking at the descriptive statistics such as the means and standard deviations of each construct. This will delineate the overall static distribution of the results. Second, the results will be reviewed by a correlation matrix in order to assess the internal relations among the variables. These two sets of descriptive statistics show limited support of the hypotheses. Third, the results will be reviewed in two separate regression analyses which reveal an interesting pattern leading to strong support of the hypotheses. Finally, the qualitative results will be reviewed by analyzing the responses obtained from the comments section of the survey. Those who chose to comment tended to support the hypotheses through negative and critical comments regarding military housing in general and privatized military housing in specific. While the descriptive analysis highlights opinion changes induced by different types of messaging, the regression analysis and qualitative analysis underscore the importance of messaging and channeling to increase the level of mobilization, rendering strong support for the hypotheses.

B. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

1. Opinion Changes

In general, the descriptive statistics show a discernible effect on the participants' opinions toward privatized military housing, but a limited impact on the level of mobilization. This dampening of efficacy was presumably due to the averaging of the results necessary to determine the delta of their means and standard deviations.

Statements 9/5 through 17/13³⁴ were hypothesized to result in a negative mean delta if the survey experiment participants were persuaded to lower their opinions about privatized military housing. Statements 18/14 through 20/16³⁵ were hypothesized to result in a positive mean delta if the survey experiment participants were persuaded to take action and vice versa.

a. Rational Messaging

The participants of the experiment who received only rational messages regarding privatized military housing belong to the control group, experiment group 1, and experiment group 2. The delta of their means and standard deviations between the initial and final surveys are shown below by group and en masse for review and

³⁴ Statements 9/5 through 17/13 were agreed or disagreed with on a seven point scale from completely disagree (1) to neutral (4) to completely agree (7) with the points in-between undefined and left open to participant interpretation. The statements were:

9/5. I plan on living in military housing.

10/6. I plan on remaining in military housing.

11/7. Private property management companies do a better job managing the housing than the government did in the past.

12/8. The military offers the best available housing.

13/9. Private property management companies manage military housing well.

14/10. The changes made by the private property management companies have improved military housing.

15/11. The private property management companies have maintained the military housing superbly.

16/12. The private property management companies constructed/reconstructed the military housing superbly.

17/13. The private property management companies take complaints from residents seriously.

³⁵ Statements 18/14 through 20/16 were agreed or disagreed with on a seven point scale from completely disagree (1) to neutral (4) to completely agree (7) with the points in-between undefined and left open to participant interpretation. The statements were:

18/14. I am interested in attending a meeting for a local volunteer group to advocate on them behalf of families in military housing maintained by private property management companies.

19/15. I am willing to volunteer 4 hours every weekend in order to organize a meeting for a local group to advocate on behalf of families in military housing maintained by private property management companies.

20/16. I am willing to donate \$100 to a local volunteer group to advocate on the behalf of families in military housing maintained by private property management companies?

comparison. Overall, this analysis did not show a significant change in opinion toward privatized housing or a willingness to take action to correct deficiencies in privatized military housing.

| Control Group | | | Exp. Group 1 | | Exp. Group 2 | | Rational Messaging | |
|----------------|---------------|--------------------|---------------|--------------------|---------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| State- ment | Delta Mean | Delta Std. Dev. | Delta Mean | Delta Std. Dev. | Delta Mean | Delta Std. Dev. | Delta Mean | Delta Std. Dev. |
| 5/4 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| 9/5 | -0.286 | -0.171 | -0.600 | -0.568 | 0.000 | 0.000 | -0.333 | -0.236 |
| 10/6 | 0.262 | -0.493 | -0.200 | -0.786 | -1.000 | -0.247 | -0.321 | -0.556 |
| 11/7 | 0.143 | 0.092 | 0.200 | 0.422 | 1.143 | -0.767 | 0.458 | 0.005 |
| 12/8 | 0.000 | -0.382 | 0.800 | -0.117 | 1.143 | 0.288 | 0.679 | -0.054 |
| 13/9 | 0.143 | 0.264 | 0.556 | 0.775 | 0.571 | 0.383 | 0.440 | 0.493 |
| 14/10 | 0.143 | -0.050 | 0.100 | 0.363 | 0.857 | -0.198 | 0.333 | 0.081 |
| 15/11 | 0.286 | -0.365 | 0.000 | 0.974 | 0.429 | 0.524 | 0.208 | 0.467 |
| 16/12 | 0.714 | -1.028 | 0.300 | 0.464 | -0.143 | 0.539 | 0.292 | 0.093 |
| 17/13 | 0.286 | 0.428 | 0.000 | 0.302 | 0.857 | 0.559 | 0.333 | 0.294 |
| 18/14 | 0.429 | 1.134 | 0.400 | -0.025 | 0.571 | 0.361 | 0.458 | 0.179 |
| 19/15 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.200 | -0.150 | -0.429 | -0.328 | -0.042 | -0.184 |
| 20/16 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.700 | 0.399 | -0.667 | 0.238 | 0.333 | 0.320 |

Table 2. Group and aggregate results of rational messaging

Interestingly, there are some small and contradictory results observed in the descriptive statistics in Table 2. All three groups showed a small drop in planning to move into or remain in military housing (statements 9/5 and 10/6). At the same time there was a larger increase in the overall opinion of how well the privatized military housing companies perform and the housing they provide (most notably statements 11/7, 12/8, and 14/10). There was also a slight overall increase in these groups to take some form of action against a poorly performing privatized military housing company. All three groups showed an increased willingness to attend a volunteer advocate meeting (statement 18/14). Experiment group 1 was also somewhat willing to donate both 4 hours each weekend and \$100 to advocate for better housing (statements 19/15 and 20/16). The control group maintained its position, and experiment group 2 lowered its support to donating both 4 hours and \$100.

b. Emotional Messaging

The emotional messaging portion of the survey experiment is twice the size of the rational messaging due to it having been further divided into collective blaming and targeted vilification. The collective blaming messages placed the responsibility for the problems associated with privatized military housing on the companies as a whole. The targeted vilification messages placed the responsibility on specific individuals within the companies.

| Collective Blaming | | | Targeted Vilification | | | Emotional Messaging | | |
|--------------------|---------------|--------------------|-----------------------|---------------|--------------------|---------------------|---------------|--------------------|
| State- ment | Delta Mean | Delta Std. Dev. | Stent- ment | Delta Mean | Delta Std. Dev. | State- ment | Delta Mean | Delta Std. Dev. |
| 5/4 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 5/4 | -0.036 | 0.012 | 5/4 | -0.021 | 0.006 |
| 9/5 | -0.050 | 0.369 | 9/5 | 0.571 | 0.030 | 9/5 | 0.313 | 0.104 |
| 10/6 | -0.150 | 0.054 | 10/6 | 0.071 | -0.238 | 10/6 | -0.021 | -0.120 |
| 11/7 | 0.400 | 0.806 | 11/7 | 0.571 | -0.011 | 11/7 | 0.500 | 0.253 |
| 12/8 | 0.200 | 0.263 | 12/8 | 0.571 | -0.052 | 12/8 | 0.417 | 0.033 |
| 13/9 | 0.350 | 0.300 | 13/9 | 0.286 | -0.092 | 13/9 | 0.313 | 0.060 |
| 14/10 | 0.200 | 0.321 | 14/10 | 0.122 | -0.096 | 14/10 | 0.150 | 0.078 |
| 15/11 | 0.450 | -0.175 | 15/11 | 0.341 | -0.178 | 15/11 | 0.393 | -0.156 |
| 16/12 | 0.250 | -0.330 | 16/12 | 0.357 | -0.287 | 16/12 | 0.313 | -0.306 |
| 17/13 | 0.400 | -0.165 | 17/13 | 0.500 | -0.330 | 17/13 | 0.458 | -0.267 |
| 18/14 | -0.150 | 0.145 | 18/14 | 0.237 | -0.423 | 18/14 | 0.078 | -0.198 |
| 19/15 | 0.150 | 0.308 | 19/15 | 0.250 | -0.059 | 19/15 | 0.208 | 0.086 |
| 20/16 | -0.150 | 0.448 | 20/16 | 0.000 | -0.199 | 20/16 | -0.063 | 0.058 |

Table 3. Aggregate results of emotional messaging

Table 3 shows a very statistically stable picture. Given that the two categories of collective blaming and targeted vilification are already the aggregate of three groups, the category of emotional messaging is a further watered-down and smoothed out average. There is nothing significant to note directly in regard to any of the statistics observed in this chart. However, it is interesting to note that, even though the mean deltas are small, the majority of the figures are the opposite of the survey experiment's desired outcome. In other words, most of the opinion statements are slightly positive while one-third of the mobilization statements slightly negative. However, it should be noted that these patterns tend to hide the full impact of the message types on

individual levels of mobilization. The impact on individual levels of mobilization will be discussed in the regression analysis section.

(1) Collective Blame. The participants of the experiment who received only collective blame messages regarding privatized military housing belong to experiment group 3, experiment group 4, and experiment group 5. The delta of their means and standard deviations are shown in Table 4 by group and en masse for review and comparison.

| Experiment Group 3 | | | Exp. Group 4 | | Exp. Group 5 | | Collective Blame | |
|--------------------|---------------|--------------------|---------------|--------------------|---------------|--------------------|------------------|--------------------|
| State- ment | Delta Mean | Delta Std. Dev. | Delta Mean | Delta Std. Dev. | Delta Mean | Delta Std. Dev. | Delta Mean | Delta Std. Dev. |
| 5/4 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0 | 0.000 |
| 9/5 | -0.125 | 0.654 | -0.400 | -0.765 | 0.286 | 0.995 | -0.05 | 0.369 |
| 10/6 | -0.375 | 0.250 | 0.000 | -0.801 | 0.000 | 0.488 | -0.15 | 0.054 |
| 11/7 | 0.875 | 1.132 | 0.200 | 0.347 | 0.000 | 0.610 | 0.4 | 0.806 |
| 12/8 | 0.000 | 0.578 | 0.600 | -0.208 | 0.143 | 0.320 | 0.2 | 0.263 |
| 13/9 | 0.750 | 0.109 | 0.600 | -0.140 | -0.286 | 0.161 | 0.35 | 0.300 |
| 14/10 | 0.750 | 0.477 | -0.200 | -0.693 | -0.143 | 0.321 | 0.2 | 0.321 |
| 15/11 | 0.750 | 0.170 | -0.200 | -0.969 | 0.571 | -0.106 | 0.45 | -0.175 |
| 16/12 | 0.000 | -0.682 | 0.000 | -0.622 | 0.714 | 0.261 | 0.25 | -0.330 |
| 17/13 | 0.500 | -0.296 | 0.200 | -0.680 | 0.429 | 0.255 | 0.4 | -0.165 |
| 18/14 | 0.625 | 0.313 | -1.200 | 0.213 | -0.286 | 0.467 | -0.15 | 0.145 |
| 19/15 | 0.750 | 0.562 | 0.000 | 0.857 | -0.429 | -0.102 | 0.15 | 0.308 |
| 20/16 | 0.125 | 0.135 | -0.600 | 0.038 | -0.143 | 1.060 | -0.15 | 0.448 |

Table 4. Group and aggregate results of collective blaming emotional messaging

In general, the results for the descriptive statistics of collective blaming follow the pattern established above in the overall emotional messaging analysis. However, there is some distinctiveness between the experiment groups' results. Overall, experiment group 3 experienced both a rise in opinion toward privatized military housing and toward mobilizing against privatized military housing. Experiment groups 4 and 5 showed a rise and fall in opinion toward privatized military housing but a reduced desire to mobilize against privatized military housing.

(2) Targeted Vilification. The participants of the experiment who received only targeted vilification messages regarding privatized military housing

belong to experiment group 6, experiment group 7, and experiment group 8. The delta of their means and standard deviations are shown in Table 5 by group and en masse for review and comparison.

| Experiment Group 6 | | | Exp. Group 7 | | Exp. Group 8 | | Targeted Vilification | |
|--------------------|---------------|--------------------|---------------|--------------------|---------------|--------------------|-----------------------|--------------------|
| State- ment | Delta Mean | Delta Std. Dev. | Delta Mean | Delta Std. Dev. | Delta Mean | Delta Std. Dev. | Delta Mean | Delta Std. Dev. |
| 5/4 | 0.000 | 0.000 | -0.125 | 0.017 | 0.000 | 0.000 | -0.036 | 0.012 |
| 9/5 | 1.000 | 0.357 | 0.250 | -0.291 | 0.400 | -0.254 | 0.571 | 0.030 |
| 10/6 | 0.400 | 0.033 | 0.000 | -0.676 | -0.200 | -0.632 | 0.071 | -0.238 |
| 11/7 | 0.700 | 0.168 | 0.625 | 0.111 | 0.400 | -0.400 | 0.571 | -0.011 |
| 12/8 | 0.400 | -0.211 | 0.125 | -0.888 | 1.100 | 0.753 | 0.571 | -0.052 |
| 13/9 | 0.300 | 0.180 | 0.125 | -0.320 | 0.400 | -0.455 | 0.286 | -0.092 |
| 14/10 | -0.033 | 0.376 | 0.125 | -0.573 | 0.300 | -0.379 | 0.122 | -0.096 |
| 15/11 | 0.600 | -0.225 | -0.250 | -0.418 | 0.500 | 0.028 | 0.341 | -0.178 |
| 16/12 | 0.600 | 0.107 | 0.000 | -0.620 | 0.400 | -0.479 | 0.357 | -0.287 |
| 17/13 | 0.300 | -0.174 | 0.500 | -0.327 | 0.700 | -0.842 | 0.500 | -0.330 |
| 18/14 | 0.833 | -0.841 | -0.250 | -0.285 | 0.100 | -0.500 | 0.237 | -0.423 |
| 19/15 | 0.700 | -0.122 | -0.250 | -0.065 | 0.200 | -0.215 | 0.250 | -0.059 |
| 20/16 | 0.100 | -0.379 | 0.500 | 0.934 | -0.500 | -0.681 | 0.000 | -0.199 |

Table 5. Group and aggregate results of targeted vilification emotional messaging

In general, these results provide some of the largest increases of both opinion of and mobilization against privatized military housing. In experiment group 6 there were four opinion statements with a positive delta of between 0.600 and 1.000 that showed an improvement in opinion of privatized military housing, but there were also significant increases in mobilization of 0.700 and 0.833, which showed an increased desire to mobilize against privatized military housing. Experiment group 7 showed some minor to moderate improvement in opinion of privatized military housing along with some minor reduction in mobilization. Experiment group 8 showed a moderate to high improvement of opinion but negligible change in the level of mobilization expressed. There is some evidence of targeted vilification leading to a small increase in mobilization with participants being 0.237 and 0.250 points more likely on average to attend a meeting or volunteer four hours every weekend. However, the overall

descriptive statistics results of targeted vilification are inconclusive when aggregated and averaged, and they are in need of further analysis.

c. Channels

The participants in the survey experiment had their rational or emotional messages regarding privatized military housing delivered to them in one of three ways. The control group, experiment group 3, and experiment group 6 received their messages through work email accounts. The experiment group 1, experiment group 4, and experiment group 7 received their messages through personal email accounts. The remaining participants in experiment group 2, experiment group 5, and experiment group 8 received their messages through both work and personal email accounts. In other words, these last three groups had twice the opportunity of exposure to the messages than the first six groups.

In Table 6, the aggregate statistics of the work email channel and both emails channel showed more effectiveness than the personal email channel did. While the work email channel and both email channel showed some effectiveness, this effectiveness was only moderate at best. The work email channel showed some increase in the opinion toward privatized military housing while it also showed some increase in the desire to mobilize against privatized military housing. At the same time, the both emails channel also showed some increase in opinion while displaying a mixed result in regard to mobilization. The aggregate results of the personal email channel were mixed in regard to both opinion and mobilization, and they did not show much positive or negative movement.

| Work E-mail Only | | | Personal E-mail Only | | | Both E-mails | | |
|------------------|---------------|--------------------|----------------------|---------------|--------------------|--------------|---------------|--------------------|
| State- ment | Delta Mean | Delta Std. Dev. | Q | Delta Mean | Delta Std. Dev. | Q | Delta Mean | Delta Std. Dev. |
| 5/4 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 5/4 | -0.043 | 0.008 | 5/4 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| 9/5 | 0.280 | 0.189 | 9/5 | -0.261 | -0.479 | 9/5 | 0.250 | 0.119 |
| 10/6 | 0.113 | -0.012 | 10/6 | -0.087 | -0.710 | 10/6 | -0.375 | -0.267 |
| 11/7 | 0.600 | 0.276 | 11/7 | 0.348 | 0.223 | 11/7 | 0.500 | -0.029 |
| 12/8 | 0.150 | -0.040 | 12/8 | 0.522 | -0.311 | 12/8 | 0.833 | 0.481 |
| 13/9 | 0.400 | 0.160 | 13/9 | 0.437 | 0.295 | 13/9 | 0.250 | 0.189 |
| 14/10 | 0.237 | 0.335 | 14/10 | 0.043 | -0.079 | 14/10 | 0.333 | 0.044 |
| 15/11 | 0.560 | -0.141 | 15/11 | -0.083 | 0.233 | 15/11 | 0.500 | 0.150 |
| 16/12 | 0.440 | -0.445 | 16/12 | 0.130 | -0.064 | 16/12 | 0.333 | 0.059 |
| 17/13 | 0.360 | -0.041 | 17/13 | 0.217 | -0.134 | 17/13 | 0.667 | -0.022 |
| 18/14 | 0.623 | -0.014 | 18/14 | -0.174 | -0.069 | 18/14 | 0.125 | -0.021 |
| 19/15 | 0.520 | 0.278 | 19/15 | 0.000 | 0.035 | 19/15 | -0.167 | -0.259 |
| 20/16 | 0.080 | -0.113 | 20/16 | 0.348 | 0.478 | 20/16 | -0.208 | 0.116 |

Table 6. Aggregate results of work, personal, and both email channels

(1) Work Emails. The following chart shows the results of both rational and emotional messaging received only through the work email channel.

| Control Group | | | Exp. Group 3 | | Exp. Group 6 | | Work E-mail | |
|----------------|---------------|--------------------|---------------|--------------------|---------------|--------------------|---------------|--------------------|
| State- ment | Delta Mean | Delta Std. Dev. | Delta Mean | Delta Std. Dev. | Delta Mean | Delta Std. Dev. | Delta Mean | Delta Std. Dev. |
| 5/4 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| 9/5 | -0.286 | -0.171 | -0.125 | 0.654 | 1.000 | 0.357 | 0.280 | 0.189 |
| 10/6 | 0.262 | -0.493 | -0.375 | 0.250 | 0.400 | 0.033 | 0.113 | -0.012 |
| 11/7 | 0.143 | 0.092 | 0.875 | 1.132 | 0.700 | 0.168 | 0.600 | 0.276 |
| 12/8 | 0.000 | -0.382 | 0.000 | 0.578 | 0.400 | -0.211 | 0.150 | -0.040 |
| 13/9 | 0.143 | 0.264 | 0.750 | 0.109 | 0.300 | 0.180 | 0.400 | 0.160 |
| 14/10 | 0.143 | -0.050 | 0.750 | 0.477 | -0.033 | 0.376 | 0.237 | 0.335 |
| 15/11 | 0.286 | -0.365 | 0.750 | 0.170 | 0.600 | -0.225 | 0.560 | -0.141 |
| 16/12 | 0.714 | -1.028 | 0.000 | -0.682 | 0.600 | 0.107 | 0.440 | -0.445 |
| 17/13 | 0.286 | 0.428 | 0.500 | -0.296 | 0.300 | -0.174 | 0.360 | -0.041 |
| 18/14 | 0.429 | 1.134 | 0.625 | 0.313 | 0.833 | -0.841 | 0.623 | -0.014 |
| 19/15 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.750 | 0.562 | 0.700 | -0.122 | 0.520 | 0.278 |
| 20/16 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.125 | 0.135 | 0.100 | -0.379 | 0.080 | -0.113 |

Table 7. Group and aggregate results of work email channel

The control group, as was expected, had the least overall amount of change in opinion and level of mobilization. While it showed a consistent improved opinion of privatized military housing, the overall change in opinion was small. Overall, experiment group 3 experienced both a rise in opinion toward privatized military housing and toward mobilizing against privatized military housing. In experiment group 6 there were four opinion statements with a positive delta of between 0.600 and 1.000 which showed an improvement in opinion of privatized military housing, but there were also significant increases in mobilization of 0.700 and 0.833 which showed an increased desire to mobilize against privatized military housing.

(2) Personal Emails. Table 8 shows the results of both rational and emotional messaging received only through the personal email channel.

| Experiment Group 1 | | | Exp. Group 4 | | Exp. Group 7 | | Personal E-mail | |
|--------------------|---------------|--------------------|---------------|--------------------|---------------|--------------------|-----------------|--------------------|
| State- ment | Delta Mean | Delta Std. Dev. | Delta Mean | Delta Std. Dev. | Delta Mean | Delta Std. Dev. | Delta Mean | Delta Std. Dev. |
| 5/4 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | -0.125 | 0.017 | -0.043 | 0.008 |
| 9/5 | -0.600 | -0.568 | -0.400 | -0.765 | 0.250 | -0.291 | -0.261 | -0.479 |
| 10/6 | -0.200 | -0.786 | 0.000 | -0.801 | 0.000 | -0.676 | -0.087 | -0.710 |
| 11/7 | 0.200 | 0.422 | 0.200 | 0.347 | 0.625 | 0.111 | 0.348 | 0.223 |
| 12/8 | 0.800 | -0.117 | 0.600 | -0.208 | 0.125 | -0.888 | 0.522 | -0.311 |
| 13/9 | 0.556 | 0.775 | 0.600 | -0.140 | 0.125 | -0.320 | 0.437 | 0.295 |
| 14/10 | 0.100 | 0.363 | -0.200 | -0.693 | 0.125 | -0.573 | 0.043 | -0.079 |
| 15/11 | 0.000 | 0.974 | -0.200 | -0.969 | -0.250 | -0.418 | -0.083 | 0.233 |
| 16/12 | 0.300 | 0.464 | 0.000 | -0.622 | 0.000 | -0.620 | 0.130 | -0.064 |
| 17/13 | 0.000 | 0.302 | 0.200 | -0.680 | 0.500 | -0.327 | 0.217 | -0.134 |
| 18/14 | 0.400 | -0.025 | -1.200 | 0.213 | -0.250 | -0.285 | -0.174 | -0.069 |
| 19/15 | 0.200 | -0.150 | 0.000 | 0.857 | -0.250 | -0.065 | 0.000 | 0.035 |
| 20/16 | 0.700 | 0.399 | -0.600 | 0.038 | 0.500 | 0.934 | 0.348 | 0.478 |

Table 8. Group and aggregate results of personal email channel

Table 8 summarized the aggregate results of the personal email channel. It should be noted that while some opinions have changed, they were too small to warrant any implications. Table 9 shows the results of both rational and emotional messaging received through both work and personal email channels.

| Experiment Group 2 | | | Exp. Group 5 | | Exp. Group 8 | | Both E-mails | |
|--------------------|---------------|--------------------|---------------|--------------------|---------------|--------------------|---------------|--------------------|
| State- ment | Delta Mean | Delta Std. Dev. | Delta Mean | Delta Std. Dev. | Delta Mean | Delta Std. Dev. | Delta Mean | Delta Std. Dev. |
| 5/4 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| 9/5 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.286 | 0.995 | 0.400 | -0.254 | 0.250 | 0.119 |
| 10/6 | -1.000 | -0.247 | 0.000 | 0.488 | -0.200 | -0.632 | -0.375 | -0.267 |
| 11/7 | 1.143 | -0.767 | 0.000 | 0.610 | 0.400 | -0.400 | 0.500 | -0.029 |
| 12/8 | 1.143 | 0.288 | 0.143 | 0.320 | 1.100 | 0.753 | 0.833 | 0.481 |
| 13/9 | 0.571 | 0.383 | -0.286 | 0.161 | 0.400 | -0.455 | 0.250 | 0.189 |
| 14/10 | 0.857 | -0.198 | -0.143 | 0.321 | 0.300 | -0.379 | 0.333 | 0.044 |
| 15/11 | 0.429 | 0.524 | 0.571 | -0.106 | 0.500 | 0.028 | 0.500 | 0.150 |
| 16/12 | -0.143 | 0.539 | 0.714 | 0.261 | 0.400 | -0.479 | 0.333 | 0.059 |
| 17/13 | 0.857 | 0.559 | 0.429 | 0.255 | 0.700 | -0.842 | 0.667 | -0.022 |
| 18/14 | 0.571 | 0.361 | -0.286 | 0.467 | 0.100 | -0.500 | 0.125 | -0.021 |
| 19/15 | -0.429 | -0.328 | -0.429 | -0.102 | 0.200 | -0.215 | -0.167 | -0.259 |
| 20/16 | -0.667 | 0.238 | -0.143 | 1.060 | -0.500 | -0.681 | -0.208 | 0.116 |

Table 9. Group and aggregate results of two-channel messaging

(3) Both Emails. While the both emails channel had the greatest effect on opinion of privatized military housing companies, especially in experiment group 2, the differences were too small to draw conclusions about the hypotheses. For instance, experiment group 5 showed a mixed change of opinion with a minor loss in desire to mobilize, and experiment group 8 showed an almost unanimous increase in opinion but had a mixed result in regard to mobilization.

d. Conclusion to Descriptive Statistics

The key take away from analyzing the descriptive statistics of this survey experiment is the realization that the numbers could be misleading when aggregated. While the numbers are representative of a particular group of people, they do not all share the same opinion. They did not share the same opinion starting point before the survey experiment, it did not become the same during the survey experiment, and it did not become the same at the end of the survey experiment. While some opinions went up a little some mobilization rose at a higher rate and vice versa. This is why quite often both the overall perceived opinion of private military housing companies would rise while at

the same time so would the overall level of perceived mobilization rise. Further analysis of the results is necessary and will be undertaken in the remainder of this chapter.

2. Correlation

The correlation matrix in Table 10 demonstrates how related each statement (the row across the top) is to itself and the other statements (the left column). The higher the number is at their intersection the more directly related the two statements are and vice versa. A correlation of 1.000 is perfect correlation, while a correlation of -1.000 is the exact opposite.

| | 9/5d | 10/6d | 11/7d | 12/8d | 13/9d | 14/10d | 15/11d | 16/12d | 17/13d | 18/14d | 19/15d | 20/16d |
|--------|-------------------------------|-------------------------------|-------------------------------|----------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------------------|---|--------------------------------|---------------------------------------|-----------------------|--|---------------------|
| | Plan to live in Military Home | Plan to stay in Military Home | Private Cos better than gov't | Military offers best homes | Private Cos do good job | Private Cos improved Military homes | Private Cos maintain Mil homes superbly | Private Cos build superb homes | Private Cos take complaints seriously | I will attend meeting | I will volunteer 4 hours every weekend | I will donate \$100 |
| 9/5d | 1.000 | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 10/6d | 0.691 | 1.000 | | | | | | | | | | |
| 11/7d | 0.252 | 0.297 | 1.000 | | | | | | | | | |
| 12/8d | 0.318 | 0.276 | -0.006 | 1.000 | | | | | | | | |
| 13/9d | 0.209 | 0.194 | 0.605 | 0.267 | 1.000 | | | | | | | |
| 14/10d | 0.219 | 0.231 | <u>0.742</u> | 0.084 | 0.647 | 1.000 | | | | | | |
| 15/11d | 0.267 | 0.280 | 0.645 | 0.148 | 0.632 | <u>0.733</u> | 1.000 | | | | | |
| 16/12d | 0.283 | 0.279 | 0.479 | 0.217 | 0.549 | 0.573 | 0.663 | 1.000 | | | | |
| 17/13d | 0.297 | 0.281 | 0.611 | 0.163 | 0.651 | <u>0.719</u> | <u>0.710</u> | 0.665 | 1.000 | | | |
| 18/14d | 0.243 | 0.150 | -0.106 | 0.238 | 0.113 | -0.076 | 0.100 | 0.156 | 0.006 | 1.000 | | |
| 19/15d | 0.100 | 0.135 | -0.019 | 0.173 | 0.155 | -0.025 | 0.124 | -0.014 | -0.088 | 0.650 | 1.000 | |
| 20/16d | 0.147 | 0.104 | -0.146 | 0.121 | -0.088 | -0.170 | -0.081 | -0.103 | -0.133 | 0.630 | 0.547 | 1.000 |

Table 10. Overall variable correlation matrix

There were four highly significant correlations observed in the survey experiment with values that ranged from 0.710 to 0.742 are bolded and double underlined. There are also another ten somewhat interesting correlations noted in Table 9 which are only bolded. These ten correlations are worthy of being noted in the table, but are not significant enough to require being individually reviewed here.

The most significant correlation was that the preference for private military housing (statement 11/7) was associated with private military housing companies' improvement of housing (statement 14/10) at a correlation of 0.742.

The second most significant correlation was that the impression that privatized military housing companies had improved military housing (statement 14/10) was associated with their having maintained the housing superbly (statement 15/11) at a correlation of 0.733.

The third highly significant correlation was between the impression that privatized military housing companies had improved military housing (statement 14/10) was associated with how responsive the participants felt the private military housing companies were to complaints from residents (statement 17/13) at a correlation of 0.719.

The fourth and final highly significant correlation was between the private military housing companies having maintained the housing superbly (statement 15/11) was associated with how responsive the participants felt the private military housing companies were to complaints from residents (statement 17/13) at a correlation of 0.710.

These four correlations showed a direct relationship between an opinion of privatized military housing companies and the likelihood of living or not living in privatized military housing. Conversely, it suggests that the level of mobilization could be affected by the perception of improving housing quality and maintenance. The correlation analysis also showed the potential for a large portion of the survey participant pool to be unsatisfied with the privatized military housing, which is evident in the qualitative analysis section. Broadly, these highly correlated opinions suggest that certain frames can be aligned to affect levels of mobilization. For instance, the participants were more likely to move their opinions together when opinions about complaints are aligned

with issues related to improving housing quality. In the next section, the regression analysis will analyze whether these opinions or the framing of these issues increases or decreases the level of mobilization.

C. REGRESSION ANALYSIS

The two previous attempts to analyze the survey experiment data have either not told an accurate or complete story about what actually happened to the participants from the beginning to the end of the survey experiment. A more robust method of analysis needs to be performed on the data collected. This analysis will be conducted by regression analysis. According to Chatterjee, Hadi, and Price,

regression analysis is a conceptually simple method for investigating functional relationships among variables. ...The relationship is expressed in the form of an equation or a model connecting the response or the dependent variable and one or more explanatory or predictor variables.³⁶

Furthermore, the results of the regression analysis will be displayed as a coefficient and a t-value. The coefficient will demonstrate the amount of change in opinion and mobilization. The t-value indicates the precision or spread of the coefficient among the participants. Conventionally, a t-value close to or above 2 demonstrates reliable coefficients.

Table 11 shows the regression analysis results with regard to the overall opinion of the survey experiment toward the private military housing companies' ability to manage, improve, maintain, build, and take complaints.

³⁶ Samprit Chatterjee, Ali S. Hadi, and Bertram Price, *Regression Analysis by Example*, 3rd ed. (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2000), 1.

| Opinion | Coefficients | t-value |
|---|---------------------|----------------|
| S13/9 Private companies manage military housing well. | 0.2259 | 1.21 |
| S14/10 Private company changes improved military housing. | -0.4657 | -1.99 |
| S15/11 Private companies maintain housing superbly. | 0.2451 | 1.07 |
| S16/12 Private companies build/rebuild military housing superbly. | 0.2592 | 1.33 |
| S17/13 Private companies take resident complaints seriously. | -0.1897 | -0.75 |

Table 11. Regression analysis of participant opinion of private management companies

The preceding regression analysis showed a differentiated result. Opinions about improving military housing had the strongest impact on the level of mobilization. While the first and second variables had some impact on the outcome variable, their coefficients were statistically insignificant. This analysis of the entire survey experiment population as a whole unit shows some rise in opinion and some fall of opinion. It provides few conclusive answers regarding who was influenced, how they were influence, and by how much were they influenced. In other words, it is hard to discern a consistent pattern between opinion changes and levels of mobilization.

Table 12 demonstrates the relative effectiveness of the rational and emotional messaging undertaken toward the experiment groups 1–8 compared to the rational messaging of the control group. The model for this analysis adds the impact of message types and channels to the previous model.

| Mobilization and Opinion vs. Control Group | Coefficients | t-value |
|--|---------------------|----------------|
| Exp. Grp. 1 (Rational – Personal) | 1.9772 | 2.14 |
| Exp. Grp. 2 (Rational – Personal and Work) | 1.8625 | 1.88 |
| Exp. Grp. 3 (Emotional – Collective Blame – Work) | 0.5638 | 0.59 |
| Exp. Grp. 4 (Emotional – Collective Blame – Personal) | 1.0058 | 0.91 |
| Exp. Grp. 5 (Emotional – Collective Blame – Personal and Work) | 1.6583 | 1.64 |
| Exp. Grp. 6 (Emotional – Targeted Vilification – Work) | 2.3891 | 2.6 |
| Exp. Grp. 7 (Emotional – Targeted Vilification – Personal) | 1.7693 | 1.71 |
| Exp. Grp. 8 (Emotional – Targeted Vilification – Personal and Work) | 1.507 | 1.66 |
| Statement 14/10 Private company changes improved military housing. | -0.2352 | -1.28 |
| Statement 15/11 Private companies maintain housing superbly. | 0.391 | 2 |
| Statement 16/12 Private companies build/rebuild military housing superbly. | -0.0409 | -0.25 |
| Statement 17/13 Private companies take resident complaints seriously. | -0.1581 | -0.77 |

Table 12. The regression analysis of rational and emotional messaging

With the primary causal variables integrated into the regression model, the effects of opinions almost completely disappear except for the opinion statement about privatized military housing companies’ ability to maintain the housing. It is worth noting that this opinion statement lost some of its initial impact to the primary causal variables. The fully specified model shows that the message and channel types produce highly discernible effects on the level of mobilization. This second regression analysis in Table 12 suggests that the messaging in the survey experiment was indeed effective to elevate levels of mobilization. The messaging was effective across all three channels as well as the rational and emotional messaging frames. The best mobilization result was obtained from emotional messaging where targeted vilification was combined with work email. The second and third most successful mobilizations were a result of rational messaging disseminated by personal or both personal and work email. It should be noted that just changing the channel of messaging had a profound impact on the level of achieved mobilization. The next three groups that show some mobilization were affected by emotional messages, but are statistically weak. Table 12 also shows that opinions about

privatized military housing companies' performance was impacted, but to a much lesser (almost negligible) extent than mobilization.

The best result from the experiment was that of experiment group 6. Compared to the control group, experiment group 6 had an impact of 2.3891 on the level of mobilization with a robust statistical significance (t-value of 2.6). For this survey experiment, the targeted vilification frame delivered via the work email channel proved to be the most effective.

The next two best results were from experiment groups 1 and 2. Compared to the control group, they had an impact of 1.9772 and 1.8625, respectively, on the level of mobilization with very high t-values of 2.14 and 1.88, respectively. For this survey experiment, the rational frame delivered by the personal email channel and the combined personal and work email channels were very effective influence tools.

Slightly less effective, but still highly influential on the mobilization level compared to the control group, were the experiment groups 5, 7, and 8. Experiment group 5 used the collective blame frame and both the personal and work email channels to impact the mobilization level by 1.6583. While it is not entirely reliable given its modest statistical significance (t-value of 1.64), it shows a substantial increase from the control group. Experiment groups 7 and 8 used the targeted vilification frame to impact mobilization by 1.7693 and 1.5070, respectively, and high t-values of 1.71 and 1.66. Experiment group 7 only utilized the personal email channel while experiment group 8 utilized both channels.

Overall, for this survey experiment, the emotional frames delivered by the personal email channel and the combined personal and work email channels were very effective influence tools.

These results support the hypothesis of emotionally resonating messaging being more effective than purely rational messaging. The results also show that rational messaging is not ineffective if it is disseminated through reinforcing channels. As noted in the thesis of Lopacienski et al., amassing multiple channels to convey the message can have great effect on the amount of influence (positive or negative) carried by the

message.³⁷ In other words, even rational messages can moderately affect the level of mobilization when they are channeled through more personal and individual methods. Both varieties of messaging should be conducted in conjunction with one another in a complementary fashion for greatest effect across a population where some are persuaded by logic and facts and others by instinct and emotions.

D. QUALITATIVE SURVEY RESPONSES

The survey experiment participants were offered the opportunity to provide written comments on anything pertaining to privatized military housing on both the initial and the follow-up surveys. Out of the seventy-two participants who completed both surveys, seventeen chose to comment on the initial survey and eleven chose to comment again on the follow-up survey. On the initial survey fifteen comments were negative in opinion toward privatized military housing, two were neutral, and there were no positive comments. On the follow-up survey nine comments were negative in opinion toward privatized military housing, one was both positive and negative, and one was positive.

The following anonymous comments from a participant in experiment group 5 are both extreme and representative of all the negative comments received during the survey experiment:

Initial Survey Response:

The money that is paid monthly for housing in La Mesa is quite sufficient for Pinnacle to provide much better quality housing. I am an O-4 and my BAH is somewhere above \$3,000 a month for the house I am provided with. In return for my rent that I pay, I have to go through this ridiculous process of requesting improvements and or items to be fixed. I will give you two examples. 1. Prior to moving in my wife and I met the occupants of the house before they moved out. The # 1 & # 2 complaints were the carpet and the dishwasher, respectively. We saw it and it was rather gross, large stains, smelly, etc... We requested to Pinnacle several times to have new carpet installed prior to our house hold goods being delivered. It never happened. After months of continuous requests, we finally were approved to get new carpet. The pitfall was that it was only installed to the top of the stairs. So none of the bedrooms, hallways, etc., have new carpet. I asked the carpet company that was here how much the job cost for

³⁷ Lopacienski et al., *Influence Operations*, 16.

installation and carpet and was told \$800 total. I was dumbfounded, as I would have paid out of pocket to get this done prior to moving in. 2. My second example is a simple and inexpensive fix that has resulted in almost stupidity on Pinnacle's part. Our microwave stopped working (it burned up) approximately 6-7 months after moving in. No big deal, we requested a new one. After a week of promises of a new microwave, a promise to wait after the weekend, for one we finally got one installed. The upset is that it is black and all the other appliances are white. It looks terrible to have it like this, we even told the maintenance guy that did it and there is nothing apparently that Pinnacle can do....Despite the expensive real estate in/around Monterey, I would recommend to future renters to think twice and to be more apt to looking off post first. If you have any questions you are more than welcome to contact me and/or take pictures of my carpet, microwave, or dishwasher as well as my LES that shows the amount of money I have paid monthly for an inadequate property. Thank you, [name and phone number redacted]

Follow-Up Survey Response:

When we signed our contract here in La Mesa Village, Monterey, the contract referred to a residential group to advocate on the behalf of families, but this group no longer exists. We still had to initial that we received information about this group and some other crap, despite of the fact that this group did not exist. We tried to cross this out, but were told we could not change anything in this contract - we could not add anything, cross anything out - only signatures, initials and dates in the designated spaces were allowed, no matter if the content of the contract was correct or not.

As can be seen from these responses, the participant came into the experiment with a well-formed opinion of privatized military housing. The collective blaming frame the participant received through both work and personal email accounts helped to maintain and strengthen this negative opinion. This participant is very unlikely to ever live in privatized military housing at any point in the future.

Other respondents were quite similar in their responses. Here are some additional anonymous survey responses:

Initial Survey Response from Experiment Group 6:

I grew up in military housing (government operated) from 1985-1989. I recall quick responsiveness from the government when (and if) we ever had problems with the house. Self-Help was an easy resource to use. Since

joining the Army, I've had many peers and subordinates that choose on-post housing...they are rather dissatisfied.

Follow-up survey response from experiment group 6:

I understand the Army's shift to civilian management of certain areas that used to be handled by the Army itself...constantly fluctuating budget and repeated fluctuations in size of the force. That notwithstanding, it is clear that civilian managed military housing is mismanaged...flat out. If this isn't an issue that has garnered response from the Command (on any base, or for any unit), then we have an even more serious problem. As an officer, I can say this directly falls in-line with taking care of Troops, i.e., the fighting force. If commanders at all levels haven't addressed this, advocacy groups won't do much better to help the situation. There needs to be a serious re-look at the method in which the government allows their Soldiers and Soldiers' Families to live.

This participant began the survey experiment with a less than positive opinion of privatized military housing that preferred the government managed military housing they had lived in as a child. By the end of the survey, not only did the participant have a very poor opinion of privatized military housing, but also of anyone with authority to correct the poor conditions of privatized military housing who did not. The targeted vilification frame the participant received through their work email account helped to maintain and strengthen this negative opinion.

Initial survey response from experiment group 7:

The satisfaction level of military housing is dependent upon the level of support from the property manager. In La Mesa the houses are barely maintained. The carpet in my house is disgusting. It is clearly the original builder's grade carpet installed in the house. The dishwasher is broken, stucco on the exterior walls is cracking, and the fixtures and appliances are cheap. The house was clearly built to maximize profit. Therein lays the conflict of interest as the property manager only cares about profit. They do not care about customer satisfaction and their management practices are biased and conflicted. DoD needs to implement oversight of the property management practices employed by the civilian property manager.

Follow-up survey response from experiment group 7:

There should be no need to volunteer time or money. The contract written, allowing civilian contracting oversight, should stipulate DoD quality

control. Quality control is not being implemented to ensure adequate housing standards are being met.

This survey respondent began the experiment with a negative opinion of privatized military housing, particularly that provided at the La Mesa housing area in Monterey, California. The targeted vilification frame the participant received through their personal email account helped to maintain and strengthen this negative opinion.

Eight of the eleven final survey respondents also responded on the initial survey qualitatively. All eight maintained a negative attitude throughout the survey experiment with some becoming more negative. The qualitative responses garnered by channel were almost identical, with a response rate figure of 4:3:4 (work email to personal email to both emails). The emotional frames garnered more responses than the rational frame by a figure of ten to one. Within the emotional frame, targeted vilification outpaced collective blame by a rate of seven to three.

These qualitative results complete the picture started by the second regression analysis above. The participants of the survey experiment are disappointed in the housing, the maintenance, and the service offered by privatized military housing. They are aware of what is available in the private market and how much it costs. Their opinions paint a bleak picture of the level of performance by the privatized military housing companies and the military commands under which they operate. Broadly, this analysis shows that negative influence frames can be used to reinforce and change opinions of a target audience toward another entity.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

V. CONCLUSION

A. INTRODUCTION

The following chapter will review the hypotheses put forth in the first chapter, and it will focus on the relative validity of the hypotheses assessed from the experiment results. It will be followed by a section on the experiment's implications to warfare in future conflicts. Third in line is a brief discussion on the ethical nature of using people's emotions to coerce action. The chapter ends with an overview of recommendations for further research and a few concluding remarks.

B. VALIDITY OF THE HYPOTHESES

First, the survey experiment suggests that messaging can be effective when leveraging a specific type of channel and framing focus. Second, the results showed that emotional narratives are more powerful than rational narratives. Third, the moderate effectiveness achieved by the rational narratives was due to reinforcing the message and using multiple delivery channels. Simply put, an emotionally resonant message can achieve its desired mobilization more easily. On the other hand, a rational message has to be channeled through more methods of dissemination to affect levels of mobilization.

1. First Hypothesis

If messaging incorporates emotional frames that resonate with the target population, then it is more likely to increase the mobilization of the target population.

- Messaging that uses targeted vilification can increase the effectiveness of mobilization.
- Historically relevant themes increase the effectiveness of messaging for mobilization as such cues render proposed solutions—such as insurrection and open rebellion (prognostic frames)—more credible.³⁸

³⁸ Tarrow, *Power in Movement*, 109–111.

a. Results of the First Hypothesis

As hypothesized, the emotional messaging (collective blame and targeted vilification) increased the level of mobilization against privatized military housing, with targeted vilification having been the most mobilizing frame in the experiment. The collective blaming and rational frames also experienced successful participant mobilization. Interestingly, the rational messaging was the second most effective frame while collective blame was the least effective frame to mobilize the participants.

The experiment did not support the second sub-hypothesis of historically relevant themes increasing the effectiveness of the messaging. This could have been due to poor construction of historically relevant themes in the messaging. The target audience may not have been concerned with historical housing issues. It is hard to ascertain the validity of this proposition as the experiment did not fully incorporate its key construct.

2. Second Hypothesis

Multiple interactive messaging channels are more effective than single interactive channels for inducing greater mobilization.

a. Results of the Second Hypothesis

As hypothesized, in total, the multiple interactive messaging channels of both work and personal emails were more effective at achieving mobilization. In other words, while single channel messaging can produce effective mobilization with the targeted vilification frame in the experiment, overall multiple channel messaging was responsible for greater mobilization among all three frames. This shows that message repetition with proper frame alignment has a potentially high impact on the level of mobilization. When the frame alignment is done correctly there is agreement between individual interests, values, beliefs, organizational activities, goals and ideology, thus providing the high potential for mobilization.³⁹

³⁹ “Frame Alignment Processes,” 464.

3. Comments on the Hypotheses

The suggestion captured in the regression analysis showed that emotionally resonate messaging is effective to change opinions and cause the mobilization of a target audience. These regression results are the measure of effectiveness (MOE) that is desired by influence professionals but not usually captured due to either a lack of planning or a desire to inappropriately measure effectiveness with measures of performance. The survey experiment suggested that the emotionally resonate frames of fear and hate not only influence opinions of the target audience but also motivates the target audiences to action. The experiment shows that the use of emotionally resonant frames and multiple channels enhance narratives for successful mobilization. The experiment suggests that it is necessary to measure messaging's effectiveness whenever possible.

The potential also exists for using other emotional frames to reinforce and change opinions and mobilize a target audience in a desired direction. The ability to use any emotional frame effectively comes down to knowing a target audience's preferred frames. Mirror imaging regarding motivation will likely lead to poor results. An influence professional must isolate what makes target audiences behave to achieve making them act in the desired manner.

C. IMPLICATIONS FOR WAR

Numerous implications to war can be drawn from the survey experiment. The most important is that the more the theme resonates with a target audience's central belief structures, the more advantageous it is to those attempting to mobilize the target audience to action through influence. The focus of messaging should be the same regardless of environment, i.e., conventional warfare, irregular warfare (IW), or unconventional warfare. The key difference would be how the emotionally resonant messaging is delivered. The more conventional the environment is the more overt the messaging; the more unconventional, the less overt the messaging.

D. ETHICS AND MORALITY OF COERCIVE MESSAGING

Is this type of influence an endeavor the U.S. should undertake? The U.S. should undertake a more emotionally resonant messaging campaign to coerce its enemies and their supporters to act in the interests of the U.S. Obtaining U.S. goals through this activity is arguably more ethically sound than the application of direct force against an enemy and its supporters. At the very least, the U.S. should routinely consider this course of action before executing more traditional military acts of violence that are arguably less ethical. This is not to say that the U.S. should not wage traditional war. However, the U.S. should be more judicious about when, where, why, and against who it uses force. Research suggests that governments which vilify their protagonists prior to taking action against them prevent or lessen the backfire effects from the populace.⁴⁰ In other words, it is beneficial to reduce the standing of the protagonist before taking any negative action against them. While it is necessary to coerce an enemy through force at certain points, it is more ethical and morally correct to coerce an enemy to act as the U.S. desires through non-lethal means first. Sun Tzu explains why it is better to win through coercion or intimidation than through direct warfare: “For to win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill.”⁴¹

E. RECOMMENDATION FOR FUTURE RESEARCHERS

1. Large Initial Population

Future researchers should use as large an initial survey population as possible to prevent developing inconclusive data. An initial population of 1,000 to 2,000 would be more likely to provide the final number of participants necessary to produce conclusive data.

⁴⁰ David Hess and Brian Martin, “Repression, Backfire, and the Theory of Transformative Events,” in *Mobilization: An International Journal* 11, no. 2, (2006): 251–2.

⁴¹ Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, translated Samuel B. Griffith (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), 77.

2. Investigate Other Emotions

The research was limited to only negative emotions of fear and hate. It is highly recommended that additional research include other emotions.

3. Lengthen the Time of the Experiment

The author did not have a sufficient amount of time in which to design, gain approval, conduct, analyze, and prepare this research. These factors provided only five weeks for the conduct of the survey experiment. A longer period of messaging may provide stronger results.

4. Larger Variety of Channels of Communication

The author was limited to using only email communication to attempt to influence the participants in the survey experiment. Further investigation should add other methods of communication (text messages, posters, radio, television, tweets, Facebook, speeches, lectures, etc.) in conjunction with email and measure the new results.

F. CONCLUDING COMMENTS

The survey experiment conducted on the subject of privatized military housing suggested that there is great efficacy to utilizing both emotional resonance and massed channels to mobilize a target audience to action. The new and developing channel of social media holds great potential for leveraging emotionally resonant messaging, especially in regard to targeted vilification. The U.S. can benefit from adopting the model of using emotionally resonant messaging delivered over the proper massed channels. The practice of such techniques across warfare environments as well as in the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war can contribute to the U.S. obtaining its goals more efficiently and effectively.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

APPENDIX A: INITIAL SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE

Military Housing Initial

***1. Naval Post Graduate School –Defense Analysis Program
Quality of Military Housing on U.S. Military Installations Surveys**

You are invited to participate in a voluntary interview about military housing satisfaction.

The following survey will ask you questions that will gauge your current level of satisfaction with the quality of the housing provided to service members by the government. The potential benefit is determining if the housing provided is of an adequate level of suitability. There is no direct benefit to you for participating.

The purpose of this research study is to evaluate the current level of satisfaction with the housing provided to members of the military. Your e-mail addresses are required to participate for two reasons: 1) to receive the two surveys, and 2) to receive a few updates on military housing. The survey will be conducted in three parts: 1) an initial survey, 2) a communication period, 3) a final survey.

Each survey should take around 5 minutes to complete. Whether at work or home, you may take this survey whenever you have free time. Each military housing update should take less than 5 minutes to review. Your participation is voluntary. If you participate, you are free to skip participating or stop participating at any time without penalty. The alternative to participating is not participating and there will be no negative repercussions. Your responses are anonymous. Any demographic information requested is only to gain a snapshot of the overall survey population to ensure proper distribution across ranks and experience levels. Results of the survey will be used responsibly and protected against release to unauthorized persons.

The survey is hosted on a separate Survey Monkey account that is password protected. Only the investigators will have access to the password. Individual surveys will not be available for publication or review in the thesis, only overall tabulated data. Once the survey results are tabulated, all data will be stored on a password protected computer. Only researchers will have access to the computer. Individual names will not be associated with the data. The potential risk of participating in the study is mismanagement of the information that you provide. This could result in any answers you provide being attributable to you. The assessed risk is minimal since the questions you will be asked and the answers you would provide are common subjects that you could potentially talk about during a normal business day. Approximately 200 - 400 participants are expected to take

Figure 6. Initial survey questionnaire—Page 1

Military Housing Initial

this survey.

If you have any questions or comments about the research, or you experience an injury or have questions about any discomforts that you experience while taking part in this study please contact the Principal Investigator, Doowan Lee, (831) 656-2097, dlee@nps.edu. Questions about your rights as a research subject or any other concerns may be addressed to the Navy Postgraduate School IRB Chair, CAPT John Schmidt, USN, 831-656-3864, jkschmid@nps.edu.

Please acknowledge terms of consent by checking the block below.

I have read the terms above and wish to participate in this survey.

Figure 7. Initial survey questionnaire—Page 2

Military Housing Initial

Please answer the following questions to the best of your ability:

***2. What is your preferred work e-mail address?**

***3. What is your preferred personal e-mail address?**

***4. What is your current rank?**

- E1 – E4
- E5 – E6
- E7 – E9
- O1/W1 – O3/CW3
- O4/CW4 – O6/CW6
- O7 – O10

Figure 8. Initial survey questionnaire—Page 3

Military Housing Initial

Please answer the following questions to the best of your ability:

***5. Do you currently live in military housing?**

- Yes
- No

***6. Which best describes the military housing you live in currently?**

- Barracks
- Duplex
- Single Family House
- NA
- Other (please specify)

***7. Have you ever lived in military housing?**

- Yes
- No

***8. If you lived in military housing, was it privately managed or government managed?**

- Private
- Government
- Both
- NA

Figure 9. Initial survey questionnaire—Page 4

APPENDIX B: FOLLOW-UP SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE

Military Housing Final

***1. Naval Post Graduate School –Defense Analysis Program
Quality of Military Housing on U.S. Military Installations Surveys**

This is the follow-up survey about military housing satisfaction.

The survey should take around 5 minutes to complete. Whether at work or home, you may take this survey whenever you have free time. Your participation is voluntary. If you participate, you are free to skip participating or stop participating at any time without penalty. The alternative to participating is not participating and there will be no negative repercussions. Your responses are anonymous. Any demographic information requested is only to gain a snapshot of the overall survey population to ensure proper distribution across ranks and experience levels. Results of the survey will be used responsibly and protected against release to unauthorized persons.

The survey is hosted on a separate Survey Monkey account that is password protected. Only the investigators will have access to the password. Individual surveys will not be available for publication or review in the thesis, only overall tabulated data. Once the survey results are tabulated, all data will be stored on a password protected computer. Only researchers will have access to the computer. Individual names will not be associated with the data. The potential risk of participating in the study is mismanagement of the information that you provide. This could result in any answers you provide being attributable to you. The assessed risk is minimal since the questions you will be asked and the answers you would provide are common subjects that you could potentially talk about during a normal business day. Approximately 200 - 400 participants are expected to take this survey.

If you have any questions or comments about the research, or you experience an injury or have questions about any discomforts that you experience while taking part in this study please contact the Principal Investigator, Doowan Lee, (831) 656-2097, dlee@nps.edu. Questions about your rights as a research subject or any other concerns may be addressed to the Navy Postgraduate School IRB Chair, CAPT John Schmidt, USN, 831-656-3864, jkschmid@nps.edu.

Please acknowledge terms of consent by checking the block below.

I have read the terms above and wish to participate in this survey.

Figure 12. Follow-up survey questionnaire—Page 1

Military Housing Final

Please answer the following questions to the best of your ability:

***2. What is your work e-mail address?**

***3. What is your personal e-mail address?**

***4. Do you currently live in military housing?**

Yes

No

Figure 13. Follow-up survey—Page 2

APPENDIX C: RATIONAL AND EMOTIONAL MESSAGES

A. ISSUE 1: SICKNESS FROM MOLD^{42,43,44}

1. Rational Messaging

Nationwide, thousands of military families residing in privatized military housing have, over the last five years, begun to complain about mysterious illnesses. In Norfolk alone, 860 families requested mold inspections. To date, 680 inspections have been performed, and 10% have required full remediation while most identified the need for minor to major repairs of the housing. These illnesses range from occasional headaches to severe nausea, temporary losses of vision and consciousness, and potentially death in a few cases. While the exact cause of these events has yet to be determined, the families affected are convinced that an overabundance of mold within their homes is to blame.

2. Emotional Messaging: Collective Blaming

Shelley, a spouse living in the Navy's Norfolk area privatized military housing began to experience unexplained chronic illnesses. She would have frequent and very painful headaches, blurred vision, severe nausea, and even lost all mobility on her left side. There was mold visibly growing on the walls of her home, to which the maintenance response was to paint over the mold patch. After complaining over a period of months to the property management company, Lincoln Military Housing (LMH), about the visible mold in her home the affected drywall was removed by maintenance personnel. This exposed wet insulation from leaking pipes, as well as additional mold spores into the home as the maintenance personnel from LMH carried the water-logged insulation through the house, causing the spouse to immediately have projectile vomiting

⁴² "Toxic Homefront; Faith and Fury; Battery Powered Brains," *CNN Presents*, <http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/1204/21/cp.01.html>.

⁴³ "Military Mold: Woman says her moldy furniture put her in the hospital," *News Channel 3*, May 7, 2012, <http://wtkr.com/2012/05/07/military-mold-woman-says-her-moldy-furniture-put-her-in-the-hospital/>.

⁴⁴ "Special Investigation: Military families say dangerous mold is taking over their homes," *News Channel 3*, November 21, 2011, <http://wtkr.com/2011/11/21/special-investigation-military-families-say-dangerous-mold-is-taking-over-their-homes/>.

and burning eyes. LMH claims that Shelley would be sick wherever she lived, and states there is no correlation between any maintenance issues, mold in the house, and the woman's sicknesses.

3. Emotional Messaging: Targeted Vilification

Shelley, a spouse living in the Navy's Norfolk area privatized military housing began to experience unexplained chronic illnesses. She would have frequent and very painful headaches, blurred vision, severe nausea, and even lost all mobility on her left side. There was mold visibly growing on the walls of her home, to which the maintenance response was to paint over the mold patch. After complaining over a period of months to the property management company, Lincoln Military Housing (LMH), about the visible mold in her home the affected drywall was removed by maintenance personnel. This exposed wet insulation from leaking pipes, as well as additional mold spores into the home as the maintenance personnel from LMH carried the water-logged insulation through the house, causing the spouse to immediately have projectile vomiting and burning eyes. Gerald Bliss, the CEO of LMH, claims that Shelley would be sick wherever she lived, and states there is no correlation between any maintenance issues, mold in the house, and the woman's sicknesses. Mr. Bliss is not a medical doctor, has no expertise on mold health issues, and it is in his best personal and financial interest to assert that there is no relation between Shelley's illness and the housing.

B. ISSUE 2: POOR CONSTRUCTION⁴⁵

1. Rational Messaging

Picerne Military Housing (PMH) at Fort Bragg was awarded contracts for revitalizing old housing and building new housing for military families. PMH built an entirely brand new neighborhood behind the Special Warfare Center's Aaron Bank Hall for mid-grade officers and non-commissioned officers. The houses were modern and beautiful by both commercial and military housing standards. The problems began after the military families occupied the neighborhood, as an entire section of these houses

⁴⁵ The facts of this event come from the thesis author's own remembrance of the events at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. There were no stories released by any media outlets regarding this matter.

began to fall down the slopes they were built upon. PMH and its subcontractors, in an effort to save money, had failed to properly fill and grade the lots. Over 50 military families were forced to either move into another PMH house or find housing off of Fort Bragg due to the houses being condemned, razed, and eventually rebuilt from the ground up.

2. Emotional Messaging: Collective Blaming

Picerne Military Housing (PMH) at Fort Bragg was awarded contracts for revitalizing old housing and building new housing for military families. PMH built an entirely brand new neighborhood behind the Special Warfare Center's Aaron Bank Hall for mid-grade officers and non-commissioned officers. The houses were modern and beautiful by both commercial and military housing standards. The problems began after the military families occupied the neighborhood, as an entire section of these houses began to fall down the slopes they were built upon. Darren and his wife had been living in their newly constructed PMH at Fort Bragg for about a year. While Darren was deployed in support of the Global War on Terror, his wife received a notice informing her that her house had been condemned. The notice also stated that she would have to either move into alternative PMH property on post or find a private home within thirty days. This poor construction and oversight caused much undue stress upon Darren, his wife, and many others affected by the neighborhood being condemned. PMH and its subcontractors, in an effort to save money, had failed to properly fill and grade the lots. Over 50 military families were forced to either move into another PMH house or find housing off of Fort Bragg due to the houses being condemned, razed, and eventually rebuilt from the ground up.

3. Emotional Messaging: Targeted Vilification

John Picerne, the president and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of Picerne Military Housing (PMH) at Fort Bragg was awarded contracts for revitalizing old housing and building new housing for military families. Mr. Picerne built an entirely brand new neighborhood behind the Special Warfare Center's Aaron Bank Hall for mid-grade officers and non-commissioned officers. The houses were modern and beautiful by

both commercial and military housing standards. The problems began after the military families occupied the neighborhood, as an entire section of these houses began to fall down the slopes they were built upon. Darren and his wife had been living in their newly constructed PMH at Fort Bragg for about a year. While Darren was deployed in support of the Global War on Terror, his wife received an indifferent notice informing her that her house had been condemned. The notice also stated that she would have to either move into alternative PMH property on post or find a private home within thirty days. This poor construction and oversight caused much undue stress upon Darren, his wife, and many others affected by the neighborhood being condemned. Mr. Picerne, in an effort to maximize his personal profit, had never provided managerial oversight to ensure that his company and subcontractors properly filled and graded the lots. Over 50 military families were forced to either move into another PMH house or find housing off of Fort Bragg due to the houses being condemned, razed, and eventually rebuilt from the ground up.

C. ISSUE 3: LACK OF PROPER INSPECTIONS, MAINTENANCE, AND REPAIRS^{46,47,48,49}

1. Rational Messaging

Some 860 families at Norfolk Naval Base's privatized military housing have stated that their concerns about needing mold inspections have been ignored. They also say that the maintenance personnel treat symptoms instead of fixing problems. It has taken the intervention of Senator Mark Warner on their behalf to begin resolving the issues identified with the privatized military housing.

⁴⁶ "Toxic Homefront," *CNN Presents*.

⁴⁷ "Managers of Lincoln Military Housing refuse to respond to questions about mold," *News Channel 3*, November 23, 2011, <http://wtkr.com/2011/11/23/managers-of-lincoln-military-housing-refuse-to-respond-to-questions-about-mold/>.

⁴⁸ "Resident to sue Lincoln Military Housing," *News Channel 3*, January 11, 2012, <http://wtkr.com/2012/01/11/resident-to-sue-lincoln-military-housing-17/>.

⁴⁹ "More military families complain about mold in homes," *News Channel 3*, November 22, 2011, <http://wtkr.com/2011/11/22/more-military-families-complain-about-mold-in-homes/>.

2. Emotional Messaging: Collective Blaming

According to a former employee of Lincoln Military Housing (LMH) who was fired for spending too much money on repairing privatized military housing, LMH systematically cuts corners on inspections, maintenance, and repair of their housing units. She states that LMH was concerned with two things: spending as little money as possible maintaining the housing, and keeping the occupancy rate as close to 100 percent as possible at all times. LMH exists to take in as much money from the government while providing the least possible in return to the service members living in the housing. Complaints by families were to be ignored for as long as possible.

3. Emotional Messaging: Targeted Vilification

According to a former employee of Lincoln Military Housing (LMH) who was fired for spending too much money on repairing privatized military housing, LMH systematically cuts corners on inspections, maintenance, and repair of their housing units. She states that the CEO of LMH, Gerald Bliss, was concerned with two things: spending as little money as possible maintaining the housing, and keeping the occupancy rate as close to 100 percent as possible at all times. Mr. Bliss is motivated by taking in as much money from the government while providing the least possible in return to the service members residing in his housing. Complaints by families were to be ignored for as long as possible.

D. ISSUE 4: CONTRACTOR IGNORING OR COVERING-UP THE PROBLEMS^{50,51,52}

1. Rational Messaging

Military personnel at numerous post's and base's privatized military housing have stated that their concerns have been ignored. In Norfolk, despite numerous complaints from over 40 families about mold in the housing at the naval base, the housing contractor

⁵⁰ "Managers...refuse to respond," *News Channel 3*.

⁵¹ "More military families complain," *News Channel 3*.

⁵² "Special Investigation," *News Channel 3*.

denied the existence of mold and refused to pay for testing. This situation and other problems, such as leaking pipes, moldy walls, unexplained foul odors, cracked walls, drafty doors and windows, and malfunctioning appliances and utilities, are treated either by ignoring the problem or correcting the symptoms rather than addressing the actual cause of the problem.

2. Emotional Messaging: Collective Blaming

Shelley Federico, a spouse living in Norfolk Naval Base's privatized housing, has stated that her and her neighbors' concerns have been and continue to be ignored by Lincoln Military Housing (LMH). Problems such as leaking pipes, moldy walls, unexplained foul odors, cracked walls, drafty doors and windows, and malfunctioning appliances and utilities are treated by correcting the symptom rather than addressing the actual cause of the problem. The military's privatized housing management companies are more profitable when they use a can of paint, a roll of tape, or a little bit of spackling instead of replacing or repairing the broken equipment. She is on the verge of personal bankruptcy due to medical expenses, mental suffering, and lost possessions due to mold infestation.

3. Emotional Messaging: Targeted Vilification

Military personnel at numerous post's and base's privatized military housing have stated that their concerns have been ignored. Problems such as leaking pipes, moldy walls, unexplained foul odors, cracked walls, drafty doors and windows, and malfunctioning appliances and utilities are treated by correcting the symptom rather than addressing the actual cause of the problem. The owners (John Picerne of Picerne Military Housing, Gerald Bliss of Lincoln Military Housing, etc.) of the military's privatized housing management companies have instructed the maintenance personnel to use a can of paint, a roll of tape, or a little bit of spackling instead of replacing or repairing the broken equipment. This provides the owners with more profit, and the management with higher bonuses by not spending the BAH received from the military on costly repairs.

E. ISSUE 5: INFANT DEATHS AT FORT BRAGG^{53,54,55,56}

1. Rational Messaging

Starting in 2007, there have been 12 unexplained infant deaths in the Fort Bragg privatized housing. Three of the deaths have occurred in the same house to three different families. The other nine infant deaths have occurred to other families occupying other houses on Fort Bragg. The Consumer Product Safety Commission has recently declared that the first 11 deaths were not caused by any environmental factors, i.e., fumes from faulty drywall, mold spores, etc., but also did not identify any cause.

2. Emotional Messaging: Collective Blaming

The 12 infant deaths at Fort Bragg between February 2007 and March 2011 are officially unexplained incidents. The first infant death and two others all occurred in the same house while occupied by three different families. According to David M. Abramson, a professor at Columbia University's Mailman School of Public Health and director of research for the National Center for Disaster Preparedness, "Common sense would dictate there's something common in the environmental exposure." Currently, no investigation ongoing at Fort Bragg has determined a cause for any of these infant deaths. Picerne Military Housing (PMH) denies any abnormalities with the repair and maintenance of the "Fort Bragg Death House" or any of the other privatized housing it manages for the Army. PMH continues to place families into this house in order to keep the profit margin as high as possible.

⁵³ "Army investigating child deaths on Fort Bragg," *WRAL Channel 5 News*, August 30, 2010, <http://www.wral.com/news/local/story/8203991/>.

⁵⁴ "Safety commission: Drywall not connected to Bragg baby deaths," *WRAL Channel 5 News*, February 10, 2011, <http://www.wral.com/news/local/story/9091327/>.

⁵⁵ "Army taking new look at Bragg baby deaths," *WRAL Channel 5 News*, March 31, 2011, <http://www.wral.com/news/local/story/9363652/>.

⁵⁶ Joaquin Sapien and Aaron Kessler, "Fort Bragg Infant Death Toll May Climb to Twelve," *Pro Publica*, March 9, 2011, <http://www.propublica.org/article/fort-bragg-infant-death-toll-may-climb-to-twelve>.

3. Emotional Messaging: Targeted Vilification

John Picerne is profiting off of providing the Soldiers at Fort Bragg with substandard housing that is proving to be uninhabitable. The 12 infant deaths at Fort Bragg between February 2007 and March 2011 are officially unexplained incidents. The first infant death and two others all occurred in the same house while occupied by three different families. According to David M. Abramson, a professor at Columbia University's Mailman School of Public Health and director of research for the National Center for Disaster Preparedness, "Common sense would dictate there's something common in the environmental exposure." John Picerne, Picerne Military Housing's president and CEO, denies any abnormalities with the repair and maintenance of the "Fort Bragg Death House" or any of the other privatized housing it manages for the Army. John Picerne continues to place families into this house in order to keep the profit margin as high as possible.

APPENDIX D: UNIT APPROVALS

Sir,
I've attached my thesis proposal for your perusal. It has been approved by my advisers (Dr. Hy Rothstein & Ph. D. candidate Doowan Lee), and now I need to move on to the real work!

The BLUF is that I'm seeking your approval to conduct a survey experiment utilizing your organization's students, the enlisted, non-commissioned officers, & officers. They would be expected to take a survey, receive updates on the survey subject for 2 to 3 months, and then take another survey. No personal information will be published, only aggregate data will be used in the thesis.

I appreciate your consideration of my request, and I am at your disposal to answer any questions you may have in regards to this endeavor of mine.

Cheers,
Ben

Respectfully,
Ben Tipton
MAJ, PO
NPS, Defense Analysis

Figure 16. Email sent to unit commanders and officers in charge requesting approval

From: Bartos Brent M LTC [brent.bartos@soc.mil]
Sent: Wednesday, April 11, 2012 5:33 AM
To: Tipton, Benjamin (Ben) (MAJ)
Cc: brinton.rosenberry@soc.mil; Guerrero Monique MAJ (USAJFKSWCS)
Subject: RE: Request for Thesis Assistance

MAJ Tipton,

I have no issues if want to survey CA students, however, by the tone of your thesis, is it the PO students you want to engage? If so, LTC Rosenberry and the XO cc'd above are your POCs. We are also available if want to sample both student populations.

v/r
LTC Brent M. Bartos
Commander, 3/1 SWTG (A)
United States John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School
(910) 432-3862 / DSN: 239-3862
brent.bartos@soc.mil

Figure 17. Approval from the commander of the Civil Affairs Training Battalion

From: [Rosenberry Brinton LTC \(USAJFKSWCS\)](#) [brinton.rosenberry@soc.mil]
Sent: Sunday, April 15, 2012 3:11 AM
To: Tipton, Benjamin (Ben) (MAJ)
Subject: RE: Request for Thesis Assistance

Ben,
I don't have any issues as long as you articulate the amount/type of participation, so all volunteer Instructors fully understand their responsibilities to provide you adequate data.

I'll be TDY for the next 4 weeks- plus, we're enduring a [TRADOC Accreditation](#) and running a [USASOC JM](#) course for the next 3 weeks. I can receive e-mail via my BB.

Take care,
[LTC Britt Rosenberry](#)
[CDR, 5th BN, 1st SWTG\(A\)](#)
ofc: (910)908-2503
cell: (910)257-8981
brinton.rosenberry@soc.mil
brinton.rosenberry@us.army.mil

Figure 18. Approval from the commander of the Psychological Operations Training Battalion

From: Wilson, Gregory (COL)
Sent: Friday, June 08, 2012 6:12 PM
To: Tipton, Benjamin (Ben) (MAJ)
Subject: RE: [FW](#): Request for Thesis Support

Ben - no problem....can you send me the survey?

Thanks

Sent from my Samsung smartphone on AT&T

Figure 19. Approval from the NPS Defense Analysis Special Operations Forces Chair

From: Bostick Reginald J COL (MISG) [reginald.bostick@soc.mil]
Sent: Thursday, June 21, 2012 6:17 PM
To: Tipton, Benjamin (Ben) (MAJ); Smith Jason E LTC (MISOC); Rubick Scott A MSG (MISOC)
Cc: Gore Yolanda D MAJ (MISOC); Carter Donald P CPT; Flach Jeffery E MAJ (MISOC)
Subject: RE: Request for Thesis Assistance

Team,

Assist MAJ Tipton with whatever he needs for research.

Best,
REGINALD "JYD" BOSTICK
COL, PO
Commanding
4th Military Information Support Group (Airborne)
COM: (910)432-7225
NIPR: reginald.bostick@ahqb.soc.mil
SIPR: reginald.bostick@usasoc.socom.smil.mil

Figure 20. Approval from the commander of the 4TH MISOG (A)

LIST OF REFERENCES

- Chatterjee, Samprit, Ali S. Hadi, and Bertram Price. *Regression Analysis by Example*, 3rd ed. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2000.
- Cialdini, Robert. *Influence: Science and Practice*. Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 2001.
- Hafez, Mohammed M. "One: From Marginalization to Massacres: A Political Process Explanation of GIA Violence in Algeria." In *Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach*, edited by Quintan Wiktorowicz, 37–60. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2004.
- Hess, David and Brian Martin, "Repression, Backfire, and the Theory of Transformative Events," In *Mobilization: An International Journal* 11, no. 2 (2006).
- Hoffer, Eric. *The True Believer: Thoughts on the Nature of Mass Movements*. New York: Harper-Perennial, 2010.
- Jasper, James M. *Emotions and Social Movements: Twenty Years of Theory and Research*. Unpublished paper, 1.
- Johnson, Thomas H. "The Taliban Insurgency and Its Tribal Dynamics: An Analysis of Shabnamah (Night Letters)." In *Strategic Culture and Violent Non-State Actors: Weapons of Mass Destruction and Asymmetrical Operations Concepts and Cases*. INSS Occasional Paper 64, 45–94. Colorado Springs, CO: USAF Academy, February 2008.
- Lopacienski, Edward, et al. *Influence Operations: Redefining the Indirect Approach* (Master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, June 2011). <http://hdl.handle.net/10945/5611>.
- Reilly, Robert. "Shaping Strategic Communication." In *Afghan Endgames: Strategy and Policy for America's Longest War*. Edited by Hy Rothstein & John Arquilla, 169–192. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2012.
- Schaad, Michael A. *More Effective Warfare: Warfare Waged Psychologically* (Master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, May 2012). <http://hdl.handle.net/10945/7411>.
- Snow, David A., and Robert D. Benford. "Ideology, Frame Resonance, and Participant Mobilization," In *International Social Movement Research*, Vol. 1, Supplement to *Research in Social Movements, Conflicts and Change*, edited by Bert Klandermans, 197–217, Greenwich, CT: JAI, 1988.
- Snow, David A., et al. "Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation." In *American Sociological Review* 51, no. 4 (1986).

Tarrow, Sidney G. *Power in Movement*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.

Tzu, Sun. *The Art of War*. translated Samuel B. Griffith. New York: Oxford University Press, 1963.

Van Laer, Jeroen. "Activists Online and Offline: The Internet as an Information Channel for Protest Demonstrations." In *Mobilization: An International Journal* 15, no. 3 (2010).

Walgrave, Stefaan, et al. "Multiple Engagements and Network Bridging in Contentious Politics: Digital Media Use of Protest Participants." In *Mobilization: An International Journal* 16, no. 3 (2011).

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

1. Defense Technical Information Center
Ft. Belvoir, Virginia
2. Dudley Knox Library
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California
3. Colonel Robert A. Warburg
Military Information Support Operations Command, Airborne, Provisional
(MISOC[A][P])
Fort Bragg, North Carolina
4. Colonel Reginald Bostick
4TH Military Information Support Operations Group, Airborne (4TH MISOG[A])
Fort Bragg, North Carolina
5. Colonel Brian Cavanaugh
8TH Military Information Support Operations Group, Airborne (8TH MISOG[A])
Fort Bragg, North Carolina
6. Colonel Bjorn Anderson
2ND Psychological Operations Group
Moffett Field, California
7. Colonel Jeffrey Scott
7TH Psychological Operations Group
Twinsburg, Ohio
8. Colonel Michael Ceroli
United States Army Special Warfare Center and School
Fort Bragg, North Carolina
9. Lieutenant Colonel Brian Howell
3RD Battalion, 1ST Special Warfare Training Group, Airborne (3/1ST SWTG[A])
Fort Bragg, North Carolina
10. Lieutenant Colonel Brinton Rosenberry
5TH Battalion, 1ST Special Warfare Training Group, Airborne (5/1ST SWTG[A])
Fort Bragg, North Carolina