

THE INTER-AMERICAN DEFENSE BOARD:
A STUDY IN "ALLIANCE" POLITICS

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

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Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
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A STUDY IN "ALLIANCE" POLITICS

To my dear parents,
who have all my life given
me immeasurable moral support
and confidence that I could achieve
any goals I set for myself.
With love
and gratitude,
Bill

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
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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

THE INTER-AMERICAN DEFENSE BOARD: A STUDY IN "ALLIANCE" POLITICS, by Major William C. Spracher, USA, 182 pages.

This study attempts to determine how well the IADB has performed its mission within the inter-American security system. The investigation relies on historical analysis of the Board's performance over the past four decades, application of alliance politics theory, and interpretation of a questionnaire administered to both military and non-military students from the United States and Latin America.

Investigation reveals that the hemispheric security environment and the nature of the threat have changed tremendously during the period since the founding of the oldest international military organization in the Free World. Consequently, the Board has had to adapt, seeking new roles and functions while some of its members question its basic mission of planning for an external threat to the Western Hemisphere. Attempts have been made by the IADB to establish a more formal institutional link with the Organization of American States, but these have so far proven futile due to insurmountable political and bureaucratic hurdles.

The Board has performed many useful tasks, but usually in obscurity, due in part to contradictory security visions among its member nations and also to political intransigence stemming from distrust of the Latin American military. Looming over the entire inter-American military system is the fact of traditional dominance by the United States. Elements of this imbalance have begun to dissipate in recent years, but the resulting divisive tendencies have made it more difficult to maintain a sense of solidarity.

The study concludes that the IADB should be retained, but revitalized to fit the security needs and the political tenor of the times. Specific recommendations are offered in the final chapter, to include: (1) A closer, more formal relationship between the IADB and the OAS, or at least a formal charter for the Board delimiting the complementary roles of the two organizations; (2) establishment of an Inter-American Security Council to replace the impotent OAS Advisory Defense Committee and supervise intra-hemispheric peace-keeping efforts, preferably built around the IADB as a core element of military expertise; (3) greater involvement by the Board in non-military activities related to security; and (4) consideration given to possible rotation of key leadership positions among the member states to signal U.S. desire to put a more multinational and credible face on this beneficial but poorly understood organization.

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Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

Overview

It is odd that such a mysterious and little known entity as the Inter-American Defense Board (IADB) could be the oldest international military organization in the Free World today, but in fact it has been in continuous existence since its establishment in 1942.¹ The Board was founded primarily as a response to the World War II enemy threat, and a series of conferences presaged its founding. Of course, the special relationship existing between the United States and Latin America as a result of the Monroe Doctrine a century before laid a framework for any sort of inter-American arrangement to follow.

This paper will evaluate the IADB in light of selected events occurring in the last four decades to determine if the organization still serves the purposes for which it was founded. Given the quantum leaps in technological change, the perceived shrinkage of the world reflected in new modes of communication and transportation and, most importantly, new ways of looking at political and military relationships, the fact that the IADB has survived for so long does not necessarily guarantee its vitality. On the other hand, the mere fact that it persists must at least indicate that it has been acceptable to the participants--if not overly useful at least not terribly harmful either. Casual references

to the IADB in most textbook sources, if made at all, tend to dismiss the organization as being rather unimportant to the sort of modern crises likely to impact on the Western Hemisphere in the foreseeable future. Observers see the Board as a relic of the past, providing a comfortable atmosphere for meddlesome right-wing officers to come together to tell war stories and plan in vain for some future threat to the hemisphere that likely will never come. With this "common wisdom" as a starting point, I shall investigate the body's worth from a number of different angles. My initial hypothesis is that the IADB is militarily ineffective, has outlived its usefulness, and therefore should be disbanded. Before proceeding further with our exploration, a brief historical perspective is in order.

Historical Background

The seed of inter-American multilateral defense consultation was sown at a Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Ministers in Havana in 1940, although previous similar meetings at Lima and Panama City had generated less concrete discussions of the problem of defense.² At Havana it was reaffirmed that the American states would consult in the event of an extra-hemispheric attack on any one of them and that an attack on one would be viewed as an attack on all.³ An Inter-American Peace Committee was also created, consisting of five nations which were authorized to mediate the peaceful settlement of disputes among two or more American states.

The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor served to fuel interest in a series of strategic plans which had been evolving into a hemispheric defense policy of the United States. These plans zeroed in on the importance to U.S. security of the Panama Canal and the "bulge" of Brazil.⁴ This focus was embodied in the so-called "quarter-sphere defense" concept, one of eight U.S. military-strategic concepts of Latin America discussed in a 1976 seminar at the U.S. Defense Intelligence School by Lieutenant Colonel John Child, then Secretary of the U.S. Delegation to the IADB. Since leaving the Board, he has taught at the Inter-American Defense College and at The American University's School of International Service.

The quarter-sphere vision, which was in vogue from 1939 until 1942, the year the IADB was founded, held that U.S. military concerns in Latin America should be aimed at establishing a limited but defensible perimeter against the external enemy. The perimeter included the northern half of the Western Hemisphere and the area contained within a line running from Alaska to the Galapagos Islands in the Pacific, across South America to the Brazilian bulge at Natal, then north to Newfoundland.⁵ The Galapagos were included because Japanese aircraft operating from that point could threaten the canal. The bulge was included because Natal is only 1500 miles from Dakar (now in Senegal) in Africa, at the time considered a potential Nazi base of attack against the soft underbelly of the U.S. Latin American nations within the perimeter were important only in that they contributed to the defense of the U.S. Nations outside the fence had no priority at all.

Before World War II the U.S. strategic view of Latin America had been predominantly the "American Lake" concept, in which only the Caribbean area was important, as witnesses to the former policies of Manifest Destiny, Big Stick, and Dollar Diplomacy could attest. The quarter-sphere approach was merely an expansion of the American Lake to "accommodate the technological and geopolitical realities of World War II."⁶ There was a hiatus of approximately six years between these two visions which coincided with the period during which President Roosevelt's Good Neighbor Policy was receiving public attention. Unilateral U.S. military activity in the area all but ceased, leaving a void characterized by ambivalent military policy. Critics of military interventionism no doubt assessed this period as one of "benign neglect," an overworked but appropriate cliché also used by Child. According to historian Edwin Lieuwen, the 1930's saw a gradual pullback of the U.S. from its traditional policy of intervention. "By 1941 all vestiges of U.S. supervision of the internal affairs of Latin American nations were removed."⁷

The attack on Pearl Harbor changed the aura of complacency, however. It was genuinely feared by U.S. officials that the Latin American nations might split into pro-Axis and anti-Axis blocs. Paranoia also grew over the potential enemy use of Latin America for submarine ports, communications bases, the cutting off of vital raw materials to the U.S., operational bases for saboteurs and spies, and a host of other perfidious schemes.⁸ Fortunately for the U.S.,

the Roosevelt Administration began to prepare the Latin American nations psychologically for joining in a hemisphere-wide defense program to meet the external threat. Lieuwen aptly labels these developments "pan-Americanizing the Monroe Doctrine" or, in other words, a gradual shift toward multilateral rather than unilateral action.⁹

Therefore, by 1942 the "hemisphere defense" concept had replaced the quarter-sphere and saw the defense of the hemisphere as a collective responsibility shared by all members of the Pan-American system. Although the U.S. was still expected to make a larger contribution than the others, all American countries would participate in the planning and execution of its defense. The popularity of this concept has persisted until the present, despite the fact there have been vociferous proponents of other concepts which have gained a temporary following.¹⁰

A major proponent of the hemispheric concept was Under-Secretary of State Sumner Welles, who headed the U.S. delegation to a meeting of American foreign ministers in Rio de Janeiro in January 1942. Out of this conference emerged a resolution recommending the rupture of diplomatic and other relations with the Axis powers, with which only Chile and Argentina delayed complying. The Emergency Advisory Committee for Political Defense, to be based in Montevideo, was created to study threats of espionage and subversion. The conference also established the IADB, consisting of military representatives from all the American republics, to

coordinate military policies and actions.¹¹ This measure was enacted with the encouragement of the U.S. State Department but over the strong objections of the Army and Navy, which instead favored bilateral agreements with individual Latin American nations.¹²

It is necessary to look past the actual founding of the IADB, however, to grasp the impact other measures have had on its roles and responsibilities. Up to this point, the only formal definition of regional military cooperation had been that posited by the Havana conference, with emphasis on consultation only. Early in 1945 there was convened in Mexico City an Inter-American Conference on the Problems of War and Peace, with the U.S. delegation headed by Secretary of State Edward Stettinius. Here the Act of Chapultepec was signed, which went beyond Havana's Declaration of Reciprocal Assistance by asserting that "an act or threat of aggression against one American state by any country, American or non-American (emphasis added), was an act or threat against all."¹³ Until the end of the war each nation would repel such acts by measures ranging from recall of ministers to use of military force. The Act further recommended that after the war the American nations negotiate a treaty establishing procedures to carry out this principle. Also at Mexico City it was recommended the IADB be continued as the instrumental "multinational military organization" within this framework.¹⁴

Shortly thereafter, at the conference held in San Francisco for the purpose of drawing up the United Nations (UN) Charter,

the Latin American representation under the leadership of then President of Colombia Alberto Lleras Camargo insisted upon the incorporation of regionalism in the Charter, in keeping with the Act of Chapultepec. This group of men also recommended the negotiation of a mutual security treaty and a "regional arrangement for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action in this Hemisphere."¹⁵ Consequently, the Charter drafters adopted Article 33, which reads as follows:

1. The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.

2. The Security Council shall, when it deems necessary, call upon the parties to settle their dispute by such means.

Similarly, the drafters also adopted Article 51, recognizing the right of individual and collective self-defense in case of armed attack until the UN Security Council could take necessary measures to restore peace and security.¹⁶

It is obvious that not only was the idea of hemispheric defense in vogue at this troubled time within the hemisphere, it also had a considerable international following. During the war, hemispheric defense was the military facet of the inter-American united front against the common and very real external threat of the Axis. Although the threat was perceived with varying intensity throughout the hemisphere, there was a remarkable degree of unanimity on the

issue of military cooperation.¹⁷ The concept of hemisphere defense played a vital role by giving the Latin nations the sense of military participation so essential to the creation of hemispheric psychological solidarity in World War II.¹⁸ In Child's viewpoint, the specific vehicle for developing this sense of military solidarity was the IADB, although many observed it as having more of a symbolic than a direct role in the war.

With peace achieved the next task was to negotiate the treaty that had been promised in Mexico City to implement the principles of the Act of Chapultepec. This did not occur until 1947 at the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Continental Peace and Security held at Rio de Janeiro. Backed up by the UN Charter and a high-level U.S. delegation led by Secretary of State George Marshall, the conference produced the first regional arrangement for collective self-defense, the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, known more commonly as simply "the Rio Treaty."¹⁹ This treaty was the first of several regional pacts entered into by the U.S. to bind together defensively most of the Free World as part of a global Cold War strategy, that is, containment of Communism. While the treaty's main thrust was toward joint measures in the event of armed attack, provision was made for consultation in the event a participating country "should be affected by an aggression which is not an armed attack," thus leaving open a legal door for multilateral action against Communist subversion.²⁰ This ambiguity should be kept in mind as we later discuss several instances in which the external nature of "aggression" was somewhat dubious.

Although military solidarity had been achieved through the Rio Treaty, political and social solidarity was addressed soon afterward, with the Ninth International Conference of American States held at Bogotá in 1948 formally creating the Organization of American States (OAS). In addition to producing the OAS Charter, this conference also drafted the American Treaty of Pacific Settlement, or the Pact of Bogotá.²¹ Therefore, as we have seen, in less than a decade a wide-ranging inter-American security infrastructure had been built or, at the very least, a series of strongly worded declarations legitimizing the anticipated future performance of formal security institutions. The question that must be asked, however, is for whose security had the effort been expended. Until the 1950's, when events occurred within Latin America itself to test regional cooperation, it was obvious the system was geared toward protecting U.S. interests almost exclusively.

Former Chilean Foreign Minister Gabriel Valdes aptly explains why the Latin American members were so eager to cooperate:

At the end of the Second World War, the U.S. managed to place Latin America within its own scheme of ideology and military security, defined in function of the cold war. On their part, the constant pressure of the Latin Americans was aimed at obtaining from the U.S. political and legal acceptance and support for the principles of non-intervention in their international affairs, while at the same time seeking U.S. financial, economic, industrial, and technological cooperation for their development.²²

In contrast, a Latin America scholar from the U.S. presents a more paternalistic view:

At the end of World War II, the dominant international interest of the Latin American countries was a continuation and intensification of relations with the U.S. That was seen as the best means of promoting Latin American interests. But, with the onset of the cold war, 'the U.S. began to use the inter-American system as a means of ensuring the diplomatic conformity of the governments of Latin America,' something that did little to advance the objectives of the Latin American countries. This use of the inter-American system by the U.S. was a development that the Latin American countries had not anticipated and 'most Latin American statesmen were slow in grasping the fact that the global scheme of priorities of the U.S. in the cold war was determined by hard considerations of diplomatic and military strategy.' The hard, cold, but seemingly accurate case is that those Latin Americans responsible for foreign policy and the conduct of international relations in the immediate postwar years either had a poor and unrealistic grasp of international political realities or were simply naive.²³

These observations of Latin American affairs are not meant to be pejorative, but the tendency of inter-American arrangements to be U.S.-centered is a critical point and will no doubt cast a giant shadow over the rest of this thesis.

Mission and Functions

According to the IADB its mission is "to act as the organ of preparation and recommendation for the collective self-defense of the American continent against aggression and to carry out, in addition to the advisory functions within its competence, any similar functions ascribed to it by the Advisory Defense Committee (to be discussed later), established in Article 64 of the Charter of the Organization of American States."²⁴ The Charter sets forth provisions for the pacific settlement of disputes and for collective security in accordance with the provisions of the 1947 Rio Treaty.²⁵

The full text of the portion of the OAS Charter dealing with the functions of the Advisory Defense Committee and the new status of the IADB can be found at Appendix 1.

The twenty member nations of the Board include the United States, Mexico, Guatemala, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Honduras, Panama, Bolivia, Chile, Peru, Argentina, Uruguay, Brazil, Paraguay, Ecuador, Colombia, Venezuela, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic (see map). Although the states involved are nearly the same as those belonging to the OAS, the two bodies are technically independent, related functionally only in that, through their Secretariats, the OAS provides the channel by which IADB funding is accomplished.²⁶ The major components of the IADB include the Council of Delegates, the International Staff, the Secretariat, and the Inter-American Defense College (IADC). Both the Board itself and the College are located in Washington, D.C. Currently about 4.38% of the OAS budget goes to the IADB, of which 48% is used to administer the IADC.²⁷

The IADB functions continually with bi-weekly Council meetings, utilizing the principle of one-nation/one-vote and with no members having veto powers. Decisions which affect the defense of the hemisphere at large require an affirmative vote of a two-thirds majority. Most of the operational functions related to defense are handled by the International Staff, a multinational, multi-service body which develops and updates military contingency plans, prepares special studies, and carries out other assignments from the Council of Delegates. The Secretariat's functions are, of course, largely administrative in nature.

Other references do not define the IADB's mission quite as loftily as does the Board itself, which might be expected if one believes the tenets of bureaucratic politics. It is the nature of virtually all bureaucracies to place more importance on themselves than others place on them. For instance, Norman Padelford, George Lincoln, and Donne Olvey devote one entire sentence to the body in their textbook on international relations: "Cooperation in security matters is coordinated through an Inter-American Defense Board, located in Washington."²⁸ As cited earlier, John Finan merely notes that the IADB was established to coordinate military policies and actions.²⁹ Most other texts are no more laudatory than these and provide little, if any, elaboration.

The obvious question now facing us must be, "Is the IADB living up to its purpose, whatever we agree that purpose to be?" Unfortunately, verbatim deliberations of military planning bodies are rarely made available to the general public, except for their usually glib resolutions pronounced for public consumption. Thus, we shall have to glean considerable inference of the Board's performance by investigating some of the hemispheric crises of the last three decades or so and determining if, and to what extent, the IADB was involved in their settlement.

Methodology

The principal research approach utilized in this study of the IADB is the historical method. A combination of government documents, secondary source evaluations, and personal opinions

solicited from government and non-government individuals having knowledge of Latin American affairs should provide a fairly objective critique of the performance of the Board at various stages of its existence. Conclusions relating to the aforementioned hypothesis will be inductive in nature, with subjectivity kept to a minimum through careful analysis of the best evidence available. Still, the human factor cannot be totally discounted; in the end a judgment will be made whose irrefutability might be debated by some other interested observer. The author enters into his task with no conscious biases or debilitating preconceptions, only the "hunch" set out in the initial hypothesis based on limited previous knowledge.

Research on the topic consists of a review of various materials available in the Fort Leavenworth Combined Arms Research Library (CARL) and the University of Kansas Library (mostly secondary sources), IADB documents, government assessments, political science/international relations texts, and the results of a questionnaire administered to selected students at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC). Obtaining the views of the Latin American students in the CGSC regular course, plus those of the only Latin American liaison officer assigned to the school, has been enlightening. They may or may not have had any military experience with the IADB, but their differing national perspectives on the issue help counterbalance the predominantly U.S.-centered literature most readily available.

Purely scientific interviewing techniques are not deemed necessary to achieve this goal. The aim is merely to broaden the perspective from which hemispheric security is assessed in an informal manner.

The questionnaire itself is found at Appendix 2, with an evaluation of its use in Chapter 4. It was administered to three groups of CGSC students: All Latin American officers, U.S. officers with Foreign Area Officer (FAO)-related assignment experience in Latin America, and a random sample of U.S. officers with no Latin American background. Despite the non-sophistication of this instrument, at least the latter group of respondees represents a pseudo-control group reflecting the general level of awareness of the U.S. officer corps on regional collective security issues. In addition, the questionnaire was administered to a group of civilian college students representing another control group. The questionnaire is in the English language, with responses also solicited in English. The author has only limited Spanish expertise (and none whatsoever in Portuguese), which has been utilized to the maximum extent feasible in translating available Spanish-language materials on the IADB.

A benchmark to be utilized in a later chapter in measuring the IADB's effectiveness is some of the richer literature extant on military alliances and security coalition-building. Since most of these theoretical constructs were specifically devised to study the European alliance systems--especially the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and, in counterpoint, the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) or Warsaw Pact--they are not prime determinants

in reaching conclusions about the IADB. Nevertheless, their more applicable elements should prove to be useful in providing a different way of looking at the problem. In other words, I shall not be weighing the worth of the Board against a particular model per se. Likewise, I shall not evaluate the organization purely in light of U.S. security objectives or those of any other member nation. However, I will be grading the overall performance of the Board based upon my own personal opinion as an informed social scientist with some training in international relations and comparative politics. This training has perhaps subconsciously and no doubt indelibly been influenced by studying such theoretical paradigms in U.S. educational institutions. In particular, some of the excellent ideas set forth by Karl Deutsch in Political Community and the North Atlantic Area and by Richard Neustadt in his seminal book Alliance Politics will be applied to the Board. Another commendable piece on the theory of international organizations in general is The Anatomy of Influence by Robert Cox and Harold Jacobson. This thesis is not designed to be overly theoretical in its approach or tone, but where theory helps to make the discussion more lucid I have not hesitated to take advantage of it.

Before proceeding into a chronological evaluation of the IADB's performance, it is necessary to limit the scope somewhat. The entire realm of hemispheric security planning can be considered to include three critical areas--countering a threat external to the hemisphere, dealing with international disputes internal to the hemisphere, and handling intranational conflict within a

single member nation. Depending on how one might interpret the wording of the various treaties previously mentioned and the operative portions of the OAS Charter itself, a compelling argument could be made that the IADB is legally sanctioned to become involved in all of these areas.

Nevertheless, for the purposes of this paper, the latter case will be avoided unless external influences are clearly present. Meddling by any outside agency in such prickly arenas as wars of national liberation, civil wars, people's rebellions, or whatever other euphemistic rubric can be given to this type of activity is simply too problematic to deal with in an effort of this size. Apparently, the Board itself is wary of jumping into such messy areas, for it has rarely capitalized on its questionable authority in this realm unless some sort of international Communist subversion with obvious spillover potential was strongly evident. The second area--international disputes within Latin America--will receive more attention, since such conflicts have been fairly common and the Board's authority in these cases is less debatable. The remainder of the discussion will stress the external threat contingency which, after all, was the organization's raison d'être in the first place. Few question the relevance of the Board's role in dealing with external threat scenarios; however, many doubt that the external threat is as great as it once was.

To limit the focus even further, it is imperative to declare clearly at the outset what this thesis is not. It is not an area assessment of Latin America, in which the IADB would be scrutinized

utilizing an interdisciplinary approach with detailed study of the "enemy, weather, and terrain," to use a military cliché. In other words, no attempt is made here to analyze the Board's "turf," as we might say. That task will be left to the Latin American FAO's and area studies programs at civilian colleges. Nor is the thesis a military net assessment, in which such factors as the member nations' intentions and capabilities to achieve the objectives set out by the IADB would be measured. The Board is primarily an advisory and planning body; I am more interested in its ability to perform such roles than I am in whether the military muscle is actually present to implement its ideas once conflict erupts. This task can be left to the think tanks and the DIA/CIA defense analysts. In short, I intend to evaluate the Board only in terms of whether it can achieve what it says it can do, and that appears to be more an exercise of political-military analysis than anything else.

Consequently, this investigation will focus principally on the external threat, whether it is real or imagined, direct or indirect, how it has manifested itself over four decades of radical change in the region, and how (or if) the IADB has coped with this threat. Chapter 2 will look at the performance of the Board up until about 1960, or roughly the beginning of the Fidel Castro era when Soviet influence in Latin America became a genuine concern. Chapter 3 will discuss the post-1960 era, with emphasis on the last five years. For this period, primary information solicited

from personal sources has been relied upon to fill the gap left by the books on the IADB and the OAS available in local libraries, most of which are rather dated. Chapter 4 will include the aforementioned application of international relations theory and an evaluation of the questionnaire results. Conclusions about the IADB's past performance and effectiveness will be provided in Chapter 5, along with recommendations concerning its future status.

NOTES

1. LTG John W. McSherry, "A Message from the Chairman," The Inter-American Defense Board (cited hereafter as IADB Pamphlet) (Washington: Inter-American Defense Board, undated), p. 3. This is a public relations-type brochure providing a brief, unclassified introduction to the IADB. I have three editions of the brochure, one from the 1950's (undated but stamped 1957 by the CARL), one from the 1970's (dated 1976), and one from the 1980's (undated, but the one currently issued by the IADB and cited above). They contain virtually the same material, with periodic updating and new artwork.
2. Harold Eugene Davis, John J. Finan, and F. Taylor Peck, Latin American Diplomatic History (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1977), p. 222.
3. Throughout this paper, the term "American" will refer generically to all nations of Latin America and the United States. Specific references to the latter will be denoted "U.S."
4. Davis, et. al., Diplomatic History, p. 222.
5. LTC John Child, "Latin America: Military-Strategic Concepts," Air University Review, September-October 1976, reprinted in Strategic Intelligence Assessments: Readings on Terrorism and the Third World (Washington: U.S. Defense Intelligence School, 1977), p. IV-3.
6. Child, "Latin America," p. IV-3.
7. Edwin Lieuwen, U.S. Policy in Latin America: A Short History (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965), pp. 62-67.
8. Gaddis Smith, American Diplomacy during the Second World War, 1941-1945 (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1965), p. 27.
9. Lieuwen, U.S. Policy in Latin America, p. 72.
10. Child, "Latin America," pp. IV-5--IV-14. Child cites at least four such concepts: (1) "Special bilateral relationships"--This concept views the region primarily in terms of substantive bilateral relationships with only a few key Latin American nations capable of making a direct, positive contribution to rather narrowly defined U.S. strategic interests. Multilateral military relations exist but are purely tokenistic. (2) "Secondary space"--This concept, popular only during the height of the Cold War, saw Latin America as belonging in a secondary and thus low-priority geographic area.

10. (continued) Planners divided the world into a "power belt" or "primary space" Northern Hemisphere and a Third World "secondary space." The latter's role was to supply strategic raw materials and to stay locked into the spheres of influence of the First and Second Worlds. See also John E. Kieffer, "Defending the Western Hemisphere," Américas, August 1955, p. 4. (3) The "Atlantic triangle"--This concept sees Latin America as one of three apexes of a security partnership comprising the U.S., Western Europe, and Latin America based on common bonds and the common threat of Soviet expansionism. The idea was proposed by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles in 1955, who no doubt assumed that the Rio Treaty could become a tight collective security arrangement like NATO, which it of course is not, and that perhaps NATO and the Rio Treaty could be merged into a triangular alliance relationship. The proposal was quietly forgotten upon recognition that a majority of the Latin American nations would not support what they perceived as a militarization of the inter-American system. See also Joseph W. Reidy, "Latin America and the Atlantic Triangle," Orbis, Spring 1964, p. 63. (4) The "antifoco"--This concept was developed around 1960 to counter the Castro-Debray-Guevara "foco" strategy used in the attempt to export revolution to other areas of Latin America. Whereas "foco" proponents argued that multiple insurgencies in the hemisphere would provoke U.S. intervention and hence overextend U.S. military resources, the "antifoco" view saw application of counterinsurgency, civic action, and nation-building processes as the appropriate countermeasures. Although still observed by some strategists as an operational concept, its importance peaked during the revolutionary turmoil of the 1960's.

11. Davis, et. al., Diplomatic History, p. 224.

12. John L. Mecham, The United States and Inter-American Security, 1889-1960 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1961), p. 222. Military officials tended to support the "special bilateral relationships" concept outlined in note #10 above, and several today continue to prefer this simpler mode of dealing with the military of another nation.

13. Richard W. Leopold, The Growth of American Foreign Policy (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1962), p. 702.

14. IADB Pamphlet, p. 4.

15. Davis, et. al., Diplomatic History, p. 243.

16. John C. Dreier, The Organization of American States and the Hemisphere Crisis (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), p. 26. See also Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice (New York: UN Office of Public Information, undated), p. 19.

17. Child, "Latin America," p. IV-7.
18. Hanson W. Baldwin, United We Stand: Defense of the Western Hemisphere (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1941), p. 92.
19. Leopold, American Foreign Policy, p. 702.
20. Davis, et. al., Diplomatic History, p. 244.
21. Dreier, The Organization of American States, p. 30.
22. Gabriel Valdes S., "The Americas in a Changing World as a Response to the Consensus of Viña del Mar," Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, May 1975, p. 208. This is a review essay of Americas in a Changing World: Report by the Commission on United States-Latin American Relations, Chairman, Sol M. Linowitz (New York: Center for Inter-American Relations, 1974).
23. James D. Cochrane, "Some Perspectives on Latin American International Relations," Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, May 1975, p. 228. This is a review essay of Latin America, the Cold War and the World Powers 1945-1973: A Study in Diplomatic History, by F. Parkinson (Beverly Hills, Cal.: Sage Publications, 1974). Internal quotes are from Parkinson, pp. 12-14.
24. Untitled and undated fact sheet from the Inter-American Defense Board (cited hereafter as IADB Fact Sheet).
25. Charles G. Fenwick, "The Organization of American States," Encyclopedia Britannica, 1958, Vol. 16, p. 801.
26. IADB Pamphlet, p. 6. As indicated on the map at the beginning of the paper, currently there are four OAS members not also belonging to the IADB--Barbados, Trinidad and Tobago, Jamaica, and Cuba. Nicaragua is still a member of both organizations; only time will tell how long the conservative Latin American states will tolerate its continued membership before attempting to vote it out of either or both bodies.
27. IADB Fact Sheet.
28. Norman J. Padelford, George A. Lincoln, and Lee D. Olvey, The Dynamics of International Politics, 3rd ed. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1976), p. 477. The late BG George Lincoln was thoroughly knowledgeable of the military's role in international relations, having headed the Social Sciences Department at the U.S. Military Academy and later served as a statutory member of President Nixon's National Security Council in his role as Director of the Office of Emergency Preparedness.
29. Davis, et. al., Diplomatic History, p. 224.

Chapter 2

PERFORMANCE (Pre-1960)

Overview

Although the IADB was formally established in 1942, the primary focus of this chapter will be the decade and a half following 1945. There is little doubt that the Board performed a valuable service to the American republics during the Second World War, when the external threat was tangible and clearly perceived. Most references to the IADB in fact dwell on the war period when the organization was young, vital, and more visible than it has been at any time since. To go into intricate detail about the military role of Latin America in World War II is beyond the scope of this thesis.¹

Suffice it to say that the Board performed many routine functions necessary in the arena of coalition warfare. Within only two months of its formal establishment in March 1942, the Board was ready with a recommendation for eliminating clandestine telecommunication stations. Furthermore, it urged continuous intergovernmental exchange of information concerning aviation and called for simplification of legal procedures to facilitate the transit of military aircraft.² These proposals and seven other resolutions devoted to the immediate problems posed by the war were prepared before the end of the year and forwarded to

the member governments. By December 1945, the Board had outlined the broad bases for inter-American military cooperation in resolutions dealing with security against sabotage; production of strategic materials; naval and air bases; anti-submarine defense; standardization of materiel, training, and organization; utilization of manpower; and teaching of the various hemispheric languages in military schools to eliminate the language barrier. Throughout the war, full cooperation and reciprocal assistance among the American states were emphasized.³

In contrast to the flurry of activity during the war, the postwar years offered new and less public challenges which demanded adaptation in roles and flexibility in outlook if the Board were to survive and remain germane to what was occurring in the hemisphere. Some observers have rated the IADB's adaptability as quite high. For example, in a doctoral dissertation written in the mid-1960's, Paul Hanley asserts that "since its creation in 1942, there have been several significant changes in the Board's composition and functions. In each case, the change has added to the Board's activities as well as its usefulness to its member nations." The two principal changes of this nature cited by Hanley were the addition of a permanent professional staff in 1949 and the establishment of the IADC in 1962. Almost as important, he claims, when its long-range effects are weighed, was a decision to add civilians to the College's faculty and student body in 1964.⁴ However, I see such changes as more administrative than operational in nature, more procedural than substantive. Consequently, it

should be more instructive to survey the years since the war chronologically, recall the crises, and evaluate the Board's role in them.

Politically, according to noted Latin America scholar Abraham Lowenthal, "the two decades immediately following World War II marked the zenith of U.S. power in the Americas."⁵ Not only was the Rio Treaty enacted in 1947 to formalize close political and security relations in the hemisphere and the OAS established in 1948 to authorize collective sanctions and act as a forum to deal with intra-hemispheric disputes, but much progress in related fields was made. A network of inter-American military institutions, including schools, training programs, and defense councils, offered a means of insuring continued U.S. influence through devices ranging from standardized weapons and procedures to personal influence. In addition to strictly military influence, a plethora of both bilateral and multilateral modes of providing foreign aid channeled U.S. technical, educational, and economic advice. The culmination of the latter was the founding of the Inter-American Development Bank⁶ in 1959 to channel resources to Latin America from the U.S. and other Western nations, with Washington of course retaining the predominant lever over the use of its funds and in effect a veto over its loans.⁷

Probably the single most monumental development of the late 1940's was the creation of the United Nations. Here again, the countries of Latin America looked to the U.S. for leadership in cementing their relations with the rest of the world. It is

Lowenthal's feeling that, whether for their own motives or because of Washington's pressures (and usually for both reasons), the American nations almost uniformly supported U.S. major foreign policy initiatives--establishing the UN and its associated international institutions, opposing Soviet expansionist aims, backing Israel's creation, supporting the Marshall Plan for Europe's reconstruction, and "uniting for peace" in opposition to North Korea's invasion in 1950.⁸

In fact, Latin Americans were very instrumental in the early efforts of the UN and managed to achieve a remarkable degree of solidarity that often evaded them in the frustrating years of the League of Nations. Much of this can be attributed to the tireless work of Eduardo Zuleta Ángel of Colombia. This statesman was named by the president of the Colombian delegation, Alberto Lleras Camargo (twice President of Colombia and the first OAS Secretary General from 1948 to 1954⁹), to represent his nation in the Preparatory Commission for the UN. Zuleta was subsequently elected president of the Commission and, thereby, provisional president of the UN's First General Assembly held in London in 1946.¹⁰ The unity of the Latin American nations in helping get the incipient organization off the ground no doubt was invaluable in the early success of the UN and was key to the U.S. assuming a dominant role in the first decade or so of the organization's existence.

Such inter-American cooperation in international and regional bodies was a hallmark of the 1945-1960 period, and especially

through the early 1950's. Just as evident as the solidarity and perhaps more significant, however, was the fact that the U.S. was the dominant partner in the hemisphere. One critical assessment notes that after World War II U.S. concern for Latin America declined, and American policy in that area was "halting and inept," due to attention being focused on threats from Communist powers toward Europe, Asia, and the Middle East.¹¹ It is fortunate that Latin interests during this period in general converged with U.S. interests, for if they had not there is little doubt which nation's policy positions would have held sway. Latin America supported U.S. military, political, and economic policies not just because it was in its interests to do so; it really had no choice. The U.S. alone dictated hemispheric policies almost exclusively. This fact of life has not survived the more recent history of inter-American relations, as we shall see later.

That the U.S. enjoyed general hemispheric support in major international forums for its global policies in the late 1940's did not necessarily guarantee that regional organizations would be just as vital and cooperative or that regional policies were clearcut. The previously mentioned dominance of the U.S. position and benign neglect of Latin America in general tended to relegate the IADB to a less dynamic role in hemispheric military affairs. Child asserts that "the IADB had a tendency to languish as a result of the low priority Latin America had in the U.S.'s global strategic concerns and the pessimism regarding multilateral approaches."¹²

Nevertheless, the Board was more active than should have been expected given the circumstances. Child attributes this in part to good leadership, with back-to-back Board Chairmen being Lieutenant Generals Matthew Ridgway (1946-48) and Willis Crittenger (1948-52). Despite the excellent qualifications of these two men and their considerable prior experience in Latin American affairs, however, they were somewhat hamstrung by their other duties on the UN Military Staff Committee, which obliged them to live in New York and spend only about 20% of their time on IADB matters.¹³

The major activity of the Board during this period was the drafting by the newly created International Staff (whose functions were described in Chapter 1) of its first war plan, known as the "Common Defense Scheme for the Western Hemisphere." According to Child, this was a radical departure for the Board since its mission at the time (circa 1949) was only to revise and recommend, and in fact it was not given a formal planning mission until the Fourth Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Ministers in 1951.¹⁴ The scheme was the result of a U.S. Defense Department initiative instructing the U.S. Delegation to the IADB to obtain such a plan. Laid out in the documents "NSC 56" and "JCS 1976/5," these instructions made it clear that any IADB planning would be subordinate to global U.S. strategic interests, hardly surprising given the U.S. dominance of Board activities. The tie to the ever-growing ring of anti-Communist containment alliances was specified in the Secretary of Defense's cover letter: "The U.S. Delegation to the IADB is the U.S. link for completing the Western segment of the chain of countries outside the Iron Curtain."¹⁵

The Delegation's instructions contained the following conditions:

- The multilateral (i.e., IADB) plan would be broad.
- Operational commitments would come from subsequent bilateral agreements.
- The plan would be predicated on U.S. strategic objectives.
- No U.S. strategic concepts would be disclosed to the Latins.
- The U.S. Delegation was specifically cautioned not to acquiesce in:

- a. Any military plan which might jeopardize or even unduly influence global strategy in favor of either direct military assistance or distribution of equipment solely for the achievement of political objectives.
- b. Any arrangement for the Inter-American Defense Board's command participation in Western Hemisphere strategy.¹⁶

It is clear that U.S. policy-makers' view of the Board at this time did not reflect a feeling of mutual trust and confidence. Worse, the instructions smack of paternalism or even insouciance. Child assesses the situation this way:

These instructions reveal that the U.S. military's approach to a multilateral IAMS (Inter-American Military System) was strongly conditioned by a continuing faith in bilateralism for operational matters; by concern over being inhibited by multilateral commitments; by caution over security leaks in multilateral bodies; and by a growing realization that the IADB as a multilateral organ provided a useful "cover" or complement to the preferred bilateral approach.¹⁷

Obviously, the Board was not totally languishing; it was performing planning, which is what we would expect it to do in a crisis-prone world. It is less clear whether the planning was genuinely a multilateral effort of benefit to all in the region or merely a token activity to make the Latins feel important and not totally subverted by U.S. goals and objectives. With this general background in mind, let us now look at some specifics.

The 1940's

In the remaining months of 1945 following Japan's surrender, the IADB agreed on three resolutions dealing with organization and training, two dealing with resources, and one concerning standardization. The relatively large number of resolutions passed in this brief period, according to Hanley, and the close attention paid to organization and training reflected a strong desire to improve the structural framework for military cooperation in the immediate postwar period. The general climate of international relations at this time was marked by relaxed tensions and a high level of confidence, especially among the Western Hemisphere nations. "The spirit of the Chapultepec Conference and the recently adopted charter of the United Nations extended to the deliberations of the IADB."¹⁸ Surely this level of successful activity was due in part to the energy pitch built up during the war itself, which carried over into the immediate postwar period.

Nevertheless the postwar euphoria was neither total nor long-lasting, partly on account of the resentment I mentioned earlier. The case of Argentina stands out in particular. Relations between Argentina and the U.S. had been strained anyway due to the former's reluctance to break off diplomatic relations with the Axis powers during the war (finally accomplished in January 1944). Argentina was not represented at the Chapultepec Conference in February-March

1945 since it still had not declared war on any of those powers. It did join the UN as a belligerent against the Axis, but only on the eve of the San Francisco Conference at which the Charter was formulated.¹⁹ During preliminary discussions on establishing some hemispheric organ for defense planning, Argentina had favored a number of regional groupings within the hemisphere. The government had hoped to play a sub-regional leadership role, rather than the role of merely "one among equals" reflected by the makeup of the IADB. Following the end of hostilities, there was an apparent rapprochement between Argentina and the U.S., suggests Hanley. However, at the same time there was increasing rivalry between Argentina and Brazil, which at times was so pronounced that it interfered with the routine work of the IADB. On some occasions the fact that one of these members supported a given resolution or proposal served as a signal for opposition by the other. A portion of Argentina's sentiment can be attributed to the ambitious and nationalistic regime of Juan Perón. All this in part explains why only five resolutions were approved by the Board between 1946 and 1950.²⁰

In December 1948 the Costa Rican ambassador in Washington requested a meeting of the Organ of Consultation of the OAS under the provisions of the Rio Treaty. Costa Rica alleged that a Nicaraguan force had violated its territorial integrity, thus threatening its independence and sovereignty. Hanley summarizes the response this way:

The OAS Council promptly constituted itself provisionally as Organ of Consultation. On December 14 it resolved to appoint a committee to conduct an on-the-spot investigation. The committee was composed of four ambassadors, from Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, and the United States. Three of these ambassadors took military advisers with them to assist in the investigation; and two of the three military advisers were IADB delegates. Significantly, the OAS Council did not request formal cooperation nor collaboration from the IADB, though in retrospect it would seem the logical step to have taken. At this point in the history of the OAS, the Council appears to have been sensitive as to the autonomous position of the IADB; and the Defense Board, in turn, limited its attention to threats to the peace from outside the hemisphere. Had the IADB Staff been in operation, the OAS Council might have asked for assistance or advice from the Board. As it was, a precedent was established of solution of such problems without aid from the IADB.²¹

At any rate, the dispute was settled amicably in 1949.²²

There were to be a rash of such regional conflicts in the 1950's, such as a second one between Costa Rica and Nicaragua in 1955 and one between Honduras and Nicaragua in 1957. Since without fail the responses followed the same pattern as the 1948 dispute, I shall dispose of them quickly here. In all cases the OAS successfully handled the disputes in accordance with the Rio Treaty, usually sending in investigating committees, but I can find no evidence at all of IADB involvement.²³ Hanley finds the significance of all these actions by the OAS Council lies in its repeated preference for military advice or assistance from sources other than the Board. The reasons for this policy are not that clear but, as he opines, perhaps there was apprehension that the IADB would insist on a voice in the ultimate political decisions after the conclusion of the military phases. Another possibility is that the Council might have opposed any military "foot in the door" which might

lead the military to demand progressively greater responsibility and authority in each new dispute that arose.²⁴

I previously alluded to the 1949 establishment of the General Staff, which in Hanley's mind, was "by far the most significant step in the history of the Board to that date: It meant that the divisive force of each delegation seeking to enhance the aims of its government would henceforth be offset by an integrating and reconciling force of the staff, which was animated by loyalty to the interests of the Inter-American community as a whole."²⁵ This view is a common one; it is often applied to the Secretariat of the UN by those who see the worth of the so-called "international civil servant" unblinded by nationalist loyalties. I am not as sanguine about how totally any bureaucrat can cast off the biases of his country of origin. The IADB itself tends not to overrate the organizational change. It merely says in its promotional materials that "to enhance its planning capability, the International Staff was formed in 1949 to carry out the working functions of the Board."²⁶ In another source the IADB states: "In 1949 the Board was reorganized, approving new governing regulations. The Council of Delegates, which is the deliberative and governing body, was augmented by a technical working body, the International Staff. The functions of the Secretariat were expanded in keeping with the additions made to the Board."²⁷ Such less than enthusiastic self-assessments prompted my earlier conclusion that the change was more an administrative improvement than anything else.

The 1950's

Reflecting back to the linkage between regional cooperation and the UN, its first real test came with the Korean War in 1950. In the spring of 1951 U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson convened a Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Ministers in Washington, in much the same way as did Costa Rica in 1948. This body is an OAS organ which is supposed to work hand-in-hand with the IADB during times of crisis in the following manner: In the event the Meeting of Consultation were to activate the Advisory Defense Committee (ADC), the IADB Council of Delegates would be a consultative organ to the ADC and the IADB Secretariat would serve as the Secretariat of the ADC.²⁸ Of course, the Meeting of Consultation can choose not to activate the ADC and, as a corollary, the IADB might not become involved. In fact, the ADC has never met, primarily because Latin American members have always avoided militarizing the OAS.²⁹

As an historical note which sheds more light on the impotence of the ADC, the draft OAS Charter contemplated an Inter-American Defense Council as a fourth technical organ of the OAS Council. But there was opposition from several delegations at the Bogotá Conference, limiting this proposal to the creation of the ADC and again the retention of the IADB.³⁰ Another observer adds that the fact some delegates rejected the fourth technical organ proposal was "an attitude similar to the OAS rejection of NATO's request of 1957 for a closer military link between the two organizations."³¹

This tactic is not surprising considering the seeming incongruity between the two I pointed out earlier. At any rate, the Meeting of Consultation is the decisive authority here, having the obligation of serving as the organ of consultation in the event of an armed attack within the territory of an American republic, bringing into effect the provisions of the Rio Treaty.³²

Previously on June 28, 1950, the OAS Council had declared its support of UN action against North Korea. By August 1950 seventeen Latin American nations had pledged token contributions to the UN Command. Nevertheless, with a Soviet attack in the Western Hemisphere seemingly remote, the diplomats were not disposed to transform the 1947 Rio pact into another NATO. "The platitudinous resolutions they adopted were more useful as a show of continental unity than as a means of strengthening the defense of the free world."³³ In fact, unity was hardly total on the Korean issue. After the outbreak of hostilities, Guatemala took the leadership in the UN General Assembly in insisting that providing troops for UN forces in Korea be optional. Similarly, when OAS foreign ministers met in Washington at the end of March 1951 to consider military support for UN forces in Korea, Guatemala along with Argentina maintained that each member should decide for itself whether to send troops. Soon thereafter the foreign minister announced that Guatemala would not send any troops to Korea and would focus all its efforts on its own development.³⁴ In the final analysis, Colombia was the only Latin American state to send an actual force to Asia, to include one thousand troops and a corvette.³⁵

Despite the fact that the Korean War could scarcely be considered a threat against the Western Hemisphere, the IADB remained busy during this period. The many proposals made by the Board to member governments were usually formulated rapidly and with little delay due to the sense of urgency associated with Korea. In this respect, Hanley observes, they received similar treatment to resolutions proposed in the early days of World War II. During both conflicts, the pronouncements dealt with the essential problems of military cooperation, reflecting such topics as an Estimate of the Situation; Outline Plan of Defense; Defense of Maritime Routes; Protection against Sabotage, Espionage, or Subversion; a General Continental Defense Plan; and a System of Exchange of Military Information. The only difference was that the Korean War proposals considered these subjects in a more complex and sophisticated context than those in World War II, no doubt partly attributable to having a permanent staff for formulating them.³⁶

Earlier in this chapter I discussed the evolution of the planning role of the IADB. Disregarding the normative controversy over whether the Board should have got into that sort of planning or whether the impetus should have been U.S. interests rather than regional interests, here I shall merely reiterate that the change was the most significant event of 1951. That year, at the Fourth Meeting of Consultation in Washington, new and stronger emphasis was placed on hemispheric defense. The conference formally enlarged the scope of the Board's work by establishing a new mission

for it--the "military planning of the common defense."³⁷ Thus began a new role which continues today, one of planning as well as functioning as an advisory agency, but still with no authority for seeing that its members execute its plans. In reality, there was some planning going on before 1951; the Meeting of Consultation actually only legitimized an activity that was naturally evolving.

Up to this point, Latin Americans had never been given cause to test their security system against an internal threat. Indeed, most of the verbiage that had emerged as the various multilateral declarations since 1940 were couched in terms of the more worrisome external threat and were mostly oriented toward U.S. national security, more often than not actually pushed through the system by U.S. diplomats. James Cochrane succinctly describes the scenario:

Inter-American relations in the late 1940's and early 1950's was a stimulus-and-response situation with the stimulus coming from Washington and the response from the Latin American countries. The situation was less the result of United States' desire to dominate the countries and more the result of a lack of ability on the part of the Latin American countries to do more than respond.³⁸

The crisis in Guatemala in 1954 changed this situation. For the first time Latin America was faced with an actual attempt at Communist subversion within its own region, not a threat against the U.S. but a threat against itself. In the end, however, it was U.S. action and not any sort of consolidated hemispheric defense effort which resolved the crisis. About all the OAS could muster was another grandiose resolution parsimoniously entitled the Declaration of Solidarity for the Preservation of the Political Integrity of the

American States Against the Intervention of International Communism.³⁹

The IADB was not even consulted, probably because its ambiguous role in internal problems had never been worked out. The OAS did send an investigating committee, but before it arrived in Guatemala the revolutionary forces were in control of the nation and the request for the investigation was withdrawn. The IADB was not involved at all in the OAS action during this crisis, as was the case with virtually all the intra-regional disputes of the decade.⁴⁰

Let us look at a couple of different viewpoints on how the Guatemalan situation was handled, first from an American:

The main lesson learnt by the governments of Latin America from the Guatemala crisis was that in the face of a major international crisis they were inexperienced and without articulate policies. It had also begun to be realized that coordination of policies among at least the major Latin American powers was essential if the course of events was to be affected in any way.⁴¹

A wrap-up from the perspective of a Latin American scholar contradicts this view:

The consolidation of Latin America's full alignment in the global security system of the U.S. was achieved at the Tenth Conference of American States held in Caracas in March 1954. The U.S. Secretary of State, Mr. John Foster Dulles, secured the approval of a resolution which laid down the principle that the establishment of a Communist regime anywhere in the continent represented a threat to all countries in the hemisphere and, accordingly, could create a situation for collective action, through the machinery envisaged in the Mutual Defense Treaty of Rio. The immediate objective sought was the legitimization of the intervention undertaken against the then-ruling government in Guatemala and, more basically, the aim of preventing direct influence by the Soviet Union in this area.⁴²

However, this benevolent point of view implies three fallacies:

(1) Although the resolution authorized collective action, it was too late to implement it in this case; (2) the Latin Americans were faced with a fait accompli and could only legitimize U.S. intervention after the fact, a patently distasteful sanction of an activity that most Latin Americans had traditionally abhorred; and (3) here again the U.S. held sway, acting unilaterally to resolve the crisis, and here again it was a U.S. official who secured the resolution.

Nevertheless, the Guatemalan experience portended better performance by the Latin Americans the next time such a situation might arise. The ouster of the Arbenz regime by covert U.S. action was considered a turning point in Latin America's relationship to its international environment. From then on, foreign relations began to be more diversified and sophisticated. In certain cases some Latin American countries even began to act independently of the U.S.⁴³ Of course, Washington took a "critical view of the dependency analysis and the independent foreign policies it has prompted. Because the U.S. has enjoyed a dominant position in the hemisphere during the twentieth century it has with varying degrees of success cajoled, bullied, and at times forced the Latin American countries to do as it wanted. Whatever the morality of the situation, the facts of international life have been that powerful countries dominate weaker neighbors."⁴⁴

The mid-1950's witnessed a tremendous slowdown in IADB public activities, but it continued to perform quietly its planning role. The Staff began a methodical review of the General Military Plan

for the Defense of the American Continent in 1956 by analyzing international strategic and political developments since the original plan was approved in late 1951. These factors were evaluated along with the Estimate of the Situation, updated by the Intelligence Committee on the basis of current intelligence. The revised plan was received by the Council of Delegates in February 1957 and forwarded to member governments in July as IADB Resolution XXXII. This was the first resolution approved by the Board since November 1951.⁴⁵

The remainder of the decade witnessed a return to the normal flow of resolutions emanating from the IADB. Included were such topics as the strategic importance of Trinidad; language training; military exercises; control of shipping; standardized security procedures for safeguarding classified information; and standardized procedures dealing with communications, logistics, and some aspects of operations. This group of resolutions did not deal with earth-shaking matters vital to the defense of the hemisphere, but it did serve to renew the normal flow of resolutions to member governments.⁴⁶

Beginning in 1957 the concept of an inter-American defense college was discussed and studied by the Board. Its purpose was to be the conduct of advanced studies and courses on the inter-American system and on political, social, economic, and military factors that constitute essential components of hemispheric defense.⁴⁷ The comments of the member governments were solicited rather than

outright approval sought, and several delegations expressed reservations. Some believed the IADB lacked power to establish such an institution, placing such a decision instead under the authority of an Inter-American Conference. Others accepted the concept of a college operating under the guidance of the Board but were adamant about a specific location. The resultant resolution reflected the lack of unanimity on the issue. Mexico disapproved, while Chile, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, and Venezuela approved with reservations. Sufficient approvals were received by the beginning of 1961, and the IADC was formally opened in October 1962. The College will be discussed in greater detail in later chapters.

I shall conclude at this point with the discussion of the IADB's performance up until 1960. Of course, a major event had occurred in 1959, the import of which was not immediately felt. Nevertheless, the emergence of the Castro regime in Cuba portended a monumental relook by the U.S. into its Latin American policy. Concomitantly, the entire inter-American structure was reassessed and, with it, the IADB was soon due for some changes in its perspective. How the Board adapted to the revolutionary 1960's is the subject of Chapter 3.

NOTES

1. For an excellent discussion of the war period see, for example, LTC Luiz G.S. Lessa, "The Security of the South Atlantic: Is It a Case for 'SATO'--South Atlantic Treaty Organization?" (unpublished Master of Military Art and Science (MMAS) thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1982), pp. 24-61. See also John Child, Unequal Alliance: The Inter-American Military System, 1938-1978 (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1980), pp. 27-69.

2. The Inter-American Defense Board: An Introduction to Mutual Security Planning by the American Republics (Washington: Inter-American Defense Board, undated), pp. 6-7. This is the oldest of the three versions of the IADB Pamphlet cited in note #1 of Chapter 1. To prevent confusion, this version will hereafter be cited as An Introduction to Mutual Security Planning.

3. An Introduction to Mutual Security Planning, p. 7. A less sanguine assessment is provided by Lieuwen, who asserts that because of the varying degrees of commitment to the war effort by the Latin American nations it was virtually impossible to implement an effective multilateral hemispheric defense policy. Consequently, he says, the U.S. found it expedient to operate on a bilateral basis for many of its military needs. For instance, joint U.S.-Mexican and U.S.-Brazilian defense boards were set up. In addition, bilateral lend-lease agreements were made with eighteen Latin American states (notable exceptions being Argentina and Paraguay). According to these deals, in exchange for performing specific hemispheric defense tasks, the Latin Americans were to receive a variety of military equipment, consisting of planes, tanks, ships, and guns. Still, Lieuwen feels "the actual military contribution made by Latin America to the Allied war effort was of little consequence." Only two nations sent forces abroad and these were token contributions (a Brazilian infantry division to Italy in 1944 and a Mexican air squadron to the Philippines in 1945). Latin America's greatest value was as a source of strategic raw materials. See Edwin Lieuwen, U.S. Policy in Latin America: A Short History (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965), pp. 79-80.

4. Paul T. Hanley, "The Inter-American Defense Board" (unpublished PhD dissertation, Stanford University, 1965), from its abstract printed in Dissertation Abstracts, Vol. XXVI, No. 7, January 1966, p. 4055.

5. Abraham F. Lowenthal, "The United States and Latin America: Ending the Hegemonic Presumption," Foreign Affairs, October 1976, p. 204.

6. The similarity in acronyms often causes confusion between the Bank (IDB) and the Board (IADB), the former tending to be more widely known than the latter.

7. Lowenthal, "The United States and Latin America," p. 204.

8. Lowenthal, "The United States and Latin America," p. 204. According to another Latin Americanist, there may have been an ulterior motive involved on at least one of these points. When the Marshall Plan was adopted in 1947, "the good neighbors to the south promptly set up a cry for a Marshall Plan for Latin America, invoking the old 'special relationship' of the Western Hemisphere idea; but the answer from Washington was no, and it was given with an air of pained surprise as if the special relationship, too, had been forgotten." This same individual notes that, as enthusiasm for American regionalism declined in the U.S. after the war, it rose in Latin America. The underlying reason, in his view, was that the Latins tried to employ the regional system as an agency in hastening the final ejection of Europe from America, i.e., to liquidate the vestiges of European colonialism in America. Whereas the U.S. asserted this was a problem for the UN, the Latin Americans insisted repeatedly on attacking it through the inter-American system. See Arthur P. Whitaker, The Western Hemisphere Idea: Its Rise and Decline (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1954), pp. 171-174. This was only one of many factors that were destined to demonstrate the increasingly divergent interests of the U.S. and Latin America since 1945.

9. One observer notes that the OAS was structured in a way making it much stronger and more representative than its predecessor, the Pan American Union. Moreover, the choice of Lleras Camargo as the first Director-General, as the position was then called, gave the reorganized body very able leadership. Hubert Herring, A History of Latin America, 2d ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1961), p. 812.

10. Eduardo Zuleta Ángel, "How Latin America Shaped the U.N.: The Memoirs of a Colombian Statesman," Américas, September-October 1982, pp. 9-11.

11. Herring, A History of Latin America, p. 813. Another reference, the most critical encountered, goes so far as to say that "the friendly relations and the co-operation which existed during the war years between the United States and Latin America tended to disappear after 1945. A feeling of bitter disappointment and resentment was expressed throughout those countries because of American financial and economic aid to Europe and other parts of the world to the exclusion of the nations of the Western Hemisphere."

11. (continued) The source goes on to cite ill feelings at the 1947 Bogotá Conference and during Vice President Nixon's goodwill visit to Latin America in 1958 when he was ridiculed by mobs in Peru and Venezuela. See A. Curtis Wilgus and Raul d'Eça, Latin American History, 5th ed. (New York: Barnes and Noble, Inc., 1963), p. 407. Hanley notes that the Soviet-led drive for international Communism and expansionism tended to bring the American republics closer together in their foreign policies. Indeed, the Rio Treaty and the OAS Charter provided convincing evidence of a sense of hemispheric unity and solidarity. Yet there were divisive forces within the regional system which worked against the spirit of harmony appearing in official pronouncements. Hanley suggests that the Latin American nations felt the U.S. should give its highest priority to hemispheric matters. Consequently, there was a degree of resentment over the attention focused on Europe and manifested by the Marshall Plan and the founding of NATO. Hanley, "The Inter-American Defense Board," pp. 93-94. The only way I can reconcile these contradictory assessments is to assume that the feelings of the diplomats and statesmen did not always jibe with those of the masses. Of course, one's perspective of how well the U.S. and the countries of Latin America were getting along is necessarily colored by one's feelings about the political domination of the hemisphere by a single superpower.

12. Child, Unequal Alliance, p. 112.

13. Child, Unequal Alliance, p. 112. LTG Ridgway, more famous as the 82d Airborne Division Commander during World War II and later as Commander of UN Forces in Korea, brought a welcome boon of prestige and energy to the Board. His influence served as a driving force during a most critical period and reflected the increased U.S. military interest in the body from 1946 to 1948. See Child, p. 87. Like his predecessor, LTG Crittenger was a highly respected World War II combat commander. He had come to the IADB from the U.S. Army Caribbean Command in the Panama Canal Zone, where he had been deeply involved in the problems of U.S.-Latin American military relations, to include the entire U.S. military mission system in Latin America. See Child, p. 112.

14. Child, Unequal Alliance, p. 112.

15. "NSC 56," U.S. National Security Council, Washington, D.C., p. 9, as quoted in Child, Unequal Alliance, p. 113.

16. "NSC 56," pp. 11-12, as quoted in Child, p. 113.

17. Child, Unequal Alliance, p. 113.

18. Hanley, "The Inter-American Defense Board," p. 59.

19. Hanley, "The Inter-American Defense Board," p. 94.

20. Hanley, "The Inter-American Defense Board," pp. 94-95.
21. Hanley, "The Inter-American Defense Board," p. 104.
22. Wilgus and d'Eça, Latin American History, p. 200.
23. John C. Dreier, The Organization of American States and the Hemisphere Crisis (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), pp. 60-67. See also Herring, A History of Latin America, p. 813, and Hanley, "The Inter-American Defense Board," pp. 138-139.
24. Hanley, "The Inter-American Defense Board," p. 140.
25. Hanley, "The Inter-American Defense Board," p. 99.
26. The Inter-American Defense Board (cited throughout as IADB Pamphlet) (Washington: Inter-American Defense Board, undated), p. 4.
27. Undated fact sheet from the IADB entitled "Historical Resume."
28. IADB Pamphlet, p. 6.
29. LTC John Child, in a lecture presented at the U.S. Defense Intelligence School, Washington, D.C., October 18, 1976.
30. William Manger, Pan America in Crisis (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1961), p. 32.
31. O. Carlos Stoetzer, The OAS (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965), p. 36.
32. Charles G. Fenwick, "The Organization of American States," Encyclopedia Britannica, 1958, Vol. 16, p. 801.
33. Richard W. Leopold, The Growth of American Foreign Policy (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1962), p. 704.
34. Cole Blasier, The Hovering Giant: U.S. Responses to Revolutionary Change in Latin America (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1976), p. 154.
35. Herring, A History of Latin America, p. 519. See also Lieuwen, U.S. Policy in Latin America, p. 82.
36. Hanley, "The Inter-American Defense Board," pp. 123-124.

37. "Historical Resume."
38. James D. Cochrane, "Some Perspectives on Latin American International Relations," Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, May 1975, p. 228.
39. Norman J. Padelford, George A. Lincoln, and Lee D. Olvey, The Dynamics of International Politics, 3rd ed. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1976), p. 477.
40. Hanley, "The Inter-American Defense Board," p. 127.
41. Cochrane, "Some Perspectives on Latin American International Relations," p. 228.
42. Gabriel Valdes S., "The Americas in a Changing World as a Response to the Consensus of Viña del Mar," Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, May 1975, p. 208.
43. Cochrane, "Some Perspectives on Latin American International Relations," p. 228.
44. Michael J. Francis, "United States Policy Toward Latin America: An Immoderate Proposal," Orbis, Winter 1977, p. 905. For a deeper understanding of the dependencia approach from a Latin American perspective see, for example, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, "The Consumption of Dependency Theory in the United States," Latin American Research Review, Vol. XII, No. 3, 1977, pp. 7-24.
45. Hanley, "The Inter-American Defense Board," p. 133.
46. Hanley, "The Inter-American Defense Board," pp. 134-136.
47. "Historical Resume."

Chapter 3

PERFORMANCE (Post-1960)

Overview

The tumultuous change in the Cuban government cast a gigantic shadow over the political climate of the rest of Latin America and was destined to produce fundamental shifts in perspectives on hemispheric security. The IADB, like all other inter-American organs, would not be immune to these changes. According to Hanley, the Board began to adjust to the rapidly changing conditions of the early 1960's. As an integral component of the overall inter-American system, the IADB devoted increasing attention to the promotion of economic and social progress in the member republics; it became one of several instruments in the new program of "internal defense and development" (IDAD), as Child and others have referred to it.¹

Resulting from the collective shock over the rapidity with which Castro was aligning Havana with the Soviet Bloc, the Board in 1961 took the drastic step of denying the Cuban delegate access to classified information. This action was followed in a January 1962 decision by the Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Ministers held in Uruguay (also known as the "Second Punta del Este Conference") to exclude Cuba from Board membership entirely until it might be readmitted by a vote of two-thirds of the American

states. Moreover, the IADB had already begun to react to the Cuban revolutionary movement by devoting more of its time to less vital subjects, many of which did not deal with classified military information.² Some of the Board's specific activities and resolutions will be examined in more detail later in this chapter.

At a higher level than merely the concrete actions taken against Cuba by the U.S. and the Latin American states was a fundamental shift in the overall framework of U.S.-Latin relations. Lieuwen notes that as the Cold War continued to heat up the U.S., taking Latin America's support for granted, more and more insisted that security against the Communist threat must be the major consideration in a cooperative hemispheric foreign policy. This trend, of course, started far in advance of the Cuban events of 1959-61, but Castro's takeover caught Washington somewhat off guard and served to solidify this single-track preoccupation with Communism more than ever before. On the other hand, the Latin American nations focused less on the single pernicious threat of Castroism. Instead, they tended to see a bigger problem in the economic conditions plaguing the region. Having become enmeshed in "revolutions of rising expectations," as Lieuwen observes, they were principally concerned with their internal socio-economic problems.³ Hence, a basic incompatibility of U.S. and Latin American nations began to be more apparent. Hints of a growing contradiction had surfaced as far back as the early 1950's, but in the 1960's the differences became obvious and affected the tenor of the entire inter-American system.

The speed with which the Castro regime became dominated by Communists and tilted more convincingly toward Moscow produced a feeling of shock and betrayal in Washington. The regime's subservience to Soviet-led international Communism became increasingly apparent during 1960, and by the end of 1961 there was no doubt whatsoever that Cuba represented the first true Soviet satellite in the Western Hemisphere. To the Eisenhower Administration, and subsequently to Kennedy's, the external threat to the hemisphere had become clearly manifested. However, most of Latin America, although concerned, did not feel the threat as acutely as the U.S. Most of the IADB member capitals were far from Havana, while Cuba was only ninety miles from Florida. The Latin governments had more pressing concerns than worrying about the Soviet Union utilizing Cuba as a takeoff point for the eventual subversion of the entire Western Hemisphere. These differing perceptions of the threat and the dissimilar priorities of objectives were destined to shape U.S.-Latin American relations in the years to come. Let us now look at how the IADB was affected by this working environment in greater detail.

The 1960's

The early part of the decade reflected the single-minded focus on Cuba and its ties with the Soviet Union. In April 1961 frustration over the turn of events in Cuba culminated in the fiasco of the Bay of Pigs invasion. Of course, the IADB did not have a

hand in this action at all. It was clearly a unilateral U.S. attempt to utilize Cuban exiles to retake the island, and no advance coordination with friendly Latin American states was effected. The U.S. was obviously guilty of indirect intervention in contravention of Article 15 of the OAS Charter. However, unlike seven years earlier in the Guatemalan affair, this time Washington wisely did not attempt to refute the charge of intervention.⁴

The same month of the invasion the Board formally approved a U.S. motion denying the Cuban Delegation access to classified documents and sessions.⁵ However, the Bay of Pigs was only the latest factor in the progressive isolation of Cuba. Already in December 1960 the IADB Council of Delegates had approved despite Cuban protest Resolution XLVIII, which forwarded to member governments its assessment of the problem of having the Cuban Delegation participate in formulating continental defense plans. Simultaneously the Board suspended work on classified projects.⁶ The major ramification of the Bay of Pigs failure was to reduce U.S. prestige temporarily, at least until later Castro pronouncements and actions began to solidify the Latin American states against his regime. The Cuban government has since been the cause of several applications of the Rio Treaty with subsequent action taken by the OAS. After a series of meetings of the Organ of Consultation, Cuba was excluded from active participation in the OAS and, as previously mentioned, the IADB also eliminated Cuba from its organization.⁷

It was at about this same time that the Alliance for Progress came into being as Kennedy's attempt to solidify U.S. relations with Latin America, to improve economic conditions in the region as a bulwark against the spread of Communism, and to bridge the gap between the diverging objectives previously discussed. Seeking a way to make its policy toward the Latin American military consistent with Alliance for Progress goals, the Kennedy Administration seized upon the civic action concept as a means of providing a progressive and positive U.S. military strategy. As noted by Child, the new emphasis was reflected in a shift in rationale in 1961-62 for the U.S. Military Assistance Program (MAP) from hemisphere defense to the new realities of counterinsurgency and civic action, with Castro no doubt serving as a major impetus. Equipment sales and grants stressed those items suitable for nation-building objectives, such as vehicles for engineering and transportation, rather than strictly military, purposes. U.S. training of Latin American military personnel began to focus on counterinsurgency tactics and civic action responsibilities. The limited quantities of purely military training and materiel provided were justified on the grounds of contributing to the stability required for orderly development under the Alliance for Progress.⁸

Meanwhile, IADB activities in the early part of the decade reflected this shift in concern from high-level macro-threats to low-level micro-concerns, from classified strategic planning to unclassified tactical planning, and from a purely military focus to a widening emphasis on non-military areas. Resolutions XLII,

XLV, and XLVI, all in July 1960, and XLIX in January 1961 dealt with such mundane topics as standardization of aircraft markings, the names of 68 stars, aeromedical evacuation, and the hemisphere flight plan. Resolution XLVII entitled "Contribution of the Armed Forces to the Economic-Social Development of the Countries" was passed in December 1960. This resolution urged consideration of projects later identified as Military Civic Action, i.e., the use of military resources in peacetime to help the advancement of the national well-being. It suggested such general types of projects as highway construction and improvement, education and skills useful to the civilian economy, etc. This resolution reflected the Board's desire to cooperate as much as possible with the Alliance for Progress.⁹

Following adoption of the December 1960 resolutions, emphasizing military civic action on the one hand and expressing concern over the political leanings of the Havana government on the other, the IADB went through a period of diminished activity. Due to the presence of a Cuban delegate loyal to the Castro regime, the Board was inhibited from discussing sensitive matters pertaining to defense planning until Cuba was expelled from membership. Routine activities continued, such as familiarization trips, conferences with distinguished visitors, and lecture series. In line with continuing attempts to achieve military conformity between member nations, in 1961 the Board was successful in standardizing some maps, technical dictionaries, landing signals for

air traffic control, and other such measures.¹⁰ However, the flow of resolutions and defense plans was virtually halted for six months after the first half of 1961.¹¹

Despite the general lethargy of 1961, 1962 was a big year for the IADB. As mentioned in a previous chapter, the Inter-American Defense College finally came to fruition after several years of planning and friendly persuasion among Board member governments. The IADC was formally opened on October 9, 1962, with its first class of 29 students representing fifteen of the American nations.¹² Located at Fort Leslie J. McNair in Washington in close proximity to the U.S. National War College and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces (both now part of the umbrella institution, the National Defense University), the IADC is a Senior Service College-level institution dedicated to the education and development of selected military officers and civilian officials in the political, military, social, and economic disciplines in order to prepare them for future leadership responsibilities.¹³ As currently configured, the College runs an annual 10-month course for 40-60 colonels and lieutenant colonels or equivalent from the various member nations of the IADB.¹⁴ Typical of the sort of U.S. officers attending the school are Latin American FAO's with attaché or military assistance and advisory group experience in the region. The IADC Director is normally a U.S. major general reporting directly to the IADB Chairman.

Of course, the next major event to test the inter-American system was the Cuban Missile Crisis later in the same month that the IADC was opened. Before a nationwide television audience on

October 22, President Kennedy declared a quarantine on offensive weapons bound for Cuba from the Soviet Union and proposed a blockade against all ships carrying them. The following morning, in an emergency session of the OAS, U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk cited the Rio Treaty and proposed a resolution authorizing the use of force, either collectively or individually, to enforce the blockade. Since this was a rather black-and-white, non-controversial case of a blatant external threat to the hemisphere, similar to the threats that prompted close cooperation during World War II, the Latin American members approved the resolution unanimously.

Although basically a unilateral U.S. military action backed up by political support from other sources, the blockade did receive some cooperative defense gestures from the Latin American nations. Argentina sent two destroyers to join the blockade. Peru and Honduras offered to send troops, and Colombia and Venezuela mobilized their armed forces. Moreover, the U.S. was offered the use of Caribbean bases by Venezuela, Panama, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic.¹⁵ Many of the inter-American components were exercised to a greater or lesser degree during the crisis--the OAS, the Rio Treaty, the multinational naval element, and even the IADB. However, Child feels that the participation of the latter was rather disappointing for those who saw in the crisis an opportunity to forge more tightly integrated links between the Board and the OAS. The Board offered its services but was rebuffed by the OAS, which once again showed its preference for employing short-term ad hoc military measures. The IADB action

consisted of the promulgation of Resolution LXII on October 30, which offered Board military expertise and services to the Organ of Consultation and urged member states to utilize the Board's assistance in their individual actions. Nevertheless, the OAS Council, acting as the provisional Organ of Consultation, took note of the offer, expressed appreciation, and then ignored it.¹⁶

Despite the setback for the IADB, the Cuban Missile Crisis did much to solidify attitudes toward the threat of Communism. If it did not succeed in completely convincing the Latin Americans of the direct threat posed by the Castro regime itself, at least it made evident the fact that Castro was indeed a Soviet ally and that an indirect Soviet threat through Cuba existed. Not only was solidarity demonstrated within the OAS, but the UN was also instrumental in providing a forum for airing this first great crisis of the OAS.¹⁷

The temporary harmony among the Latin American states induced by events in Cuba ushered in a relatively significant period for IADB activities. In November 1963 the Board provided military technical experts to assist in the identification of a large cache of Cuban weapons uncovered in Venezuela. After positive identification of the weapons and their origin, political sanctions were taken against Cuba.¹⁸ The incident came to light when the Betancourt government brought charges against Cuba before the OAS, claiming that Cuba had sent the arms clandestinely for use by Venezuelan terrorists and guerrillas. In December the IADB experts

attached to the OAS investigating committee clearly identified the origin of the weapons and determined Cuba's participation in the subversion.¹⁹ At the Ninth Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Ministers held in Washington in July 1964, by a 15-4 vote Cuba was declared guilty of aggression and intervention in Venezuelan affairs. The assembly recommended severing all diplomatic ties with Cuba and suspending trade and sea transportation. These relatively harsh collective political and economic sanctions were no doubt due to the positive identification of the weapons' origin and other factors indicating Cuba intended to export revolution to other Latin American nations.²⁰ By the end of 1964 all the Latin American states except Mexico, which resisted for legal and internal political reasons, had taken the steps recommended by the OAS and thus further isolated Cuba from the rest of the hemisphere.²¹

At this point it might be appropriate to back up to the beginning of the decade and take a quick look at some of the regional disputes. Again Venezuela was involved in the first event of significance. In July 1960 the Caracas government requested action by the OAS to consider acts of aggression by the Dominican Republic culminating in the attempted assassination of the Venezuelan chief of state.²² The incident was investigated by the OAS, with the result being the first ever imposition of Rio Treaty sanctions under Article 8. However, the sanctions were only of an economic and diplomatic nature, not the military type also authorized under this article.²³

This is an important point to consider, according to Child. He claims that, as a defensive alliance or a collective security system, the Rio Treaty is incomplete and vague since it does not provide the military infrastructure to make the alliance work and establishes no military organs. In fact, the use of armed forces is only mentioned as a possible sanction measure (in the last clause of Article 8), and no nation can be required to use armed force without its consent (Article 20). The Article 8 provision for armed force has been employed only once--during the Cuban Missile Crisis, as mentioned earlier--although other sanctions allowed by this article were imposed on the Dominican Republic in 1960 and on Cuba in 1962, 1964, and 1967. Child asserts that an analysis of the seventeen instances in which the Rio Treaty has been invoked since its inception in 1947 indicates it has never been employed against an outside threat (except very marginally in the Cuban situation). Of significance also is the fact that a majority of these cases was found in the Central American-Caribbean region.²⁴ Not surprisingly, this is the area of greatest concern to the system's dominant partner, the U.S. The fact that the Rio Treaty is not a military alliance in the strict sense of the word is a key point too, and has definite repercussions on the efficacy of an organization like the IADB.

The political sanctions against the Dominican Republic were lifted in late 1961, and there was no indication of IADB involvement at any point in the dispute. The Dominican Republic continued to occupy the news scene throughout the next few years whenever Cuba

did not steal a bigger headline. Another situation flared up in 1963, with Haiti charging that an armed invasion of its territory from the Dominican Republic had occurred, but it was inconclusive as to whether the Bosch government itself was behind it.²⁵ The dispute was solved by direct bilateral negotiations over the next couple of years. Here again, as usual, there is no indication of IADB involvement.

In 1964 Panama requested OAS intervention due to alleged U.S. aggression and broke diplomatic relations with Washington. With the mediation of a 5-man delegation from the OAS Council (but no IADB representatives), the two nations agreed to reestablish relations, to appoint special ambassadors with powers to negotiate, and to obtain a fair and just settlement of the dispute. The U.S. regarded Panama's criticism as being more motivated by nationalism than by Communism and agreed to renegotiate the Panama Canal Treaty.²⁶

The aura of good feeling to which I previously alluded was not to last long, as U.S. embroilment in Southeast Asia again placed cooperation and consultation with Latin America low on the political agenda. 1965 will forever be remembered in Latin American history as the year of the Dominican intervention. There is no shortage of material on this event, the sources ranging from sympathetic interpretations of a necessary U.S. action backed by Latin American support to virulent castigations of a renewal of "Yankee imperialism." Indeed, some of the literature is very colorful. For instance, Latin America scholar Martin Needler embarks upon his assessment

of the operation this way: "In 1965 the United States again undertook the kind of political operation that had long been thought possible only in the bad old days. As though the year were 1910 and the President William Howard Taft, the Marines were ordered into a Caribbean country."²⁷ The truth is probably somewhere in between the two extremes.

I shall provide only a brief background here, enough to set the stage for IADB participation. A full study of the Dominican crisis is beyond the scope of this thesis. As in Guatemala in 1954, although the OAS and other inter-American organs were involved, again it was U.S. unilateral action which was decisive. At least the IADB was peripherally involved in 1965, unlike 1954 when it was not consulted at all. In its official literature, the Board boasts that it "rapidly provided a plan outlining the structure, organization, and operation of an Inter-American Peace Force, and when peace negotiations were conducted, the IADB provided an advisor to assist in the talks."²⁸ In its command briefing, the Board claims it drew up a plan in 72 hours for organizing an "Inter-American Armed Force" and provided the OAS with a high-level advisor.²⁹

Notwithstanding such self-praise, others saw the situation differently. In fact, the Johnson Administration did not even consult the OAS until after U.S. Marines had landed on the island, undoubtedly because U.S. policy makers were skeptical of gaining the two-thirds vote necessary to authorize collective action.³⁰

Furthermore, the President ordered intervention before there was clear evidence that the civil war was in fact Communist-inspired, even though this deed was bound to resurrect traditional Latin hatred of the unilateral method.³¹ Johnson justified his decision and sought legitimacy through his declaration that "the American nations cannot, must not, and will not permit the establishment of another Communist government in the Western Hemisphere,"³² dubbed by some as the Johnson Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine.

When the intervention occurred, although nearly all the Latin American governments bluntly criticized the U.S. action, they unanimously voted on May 1 for the establishment of an OAS Special Committee to extend its good offices in resolving the conflict. Political scientist Yale Ferguson, in reviewing several works by others on the Dominican crisis, agrees with Jerome Slater that the OAS members acted as they did for the following reasons:

They were faced with a fait accompli and were reluctant to forego whatever influence the organization might have over United States policies and the on-going situation in the Dominican Republic. Later, especially after the United Nations entered the scene, they were motivated, to some extent, by a longstanding hemisphere practice of closing ranks so as to avoid outside interference.³³

Ferguson asserts further that there was, just as during the crisis in Guatemala once the facts were out, genuine concern about the ancillary Communist threat, particularly on the part of the more conservative military regimes. Padelford does not agree totally with the above assessment, claiming that the OAS action was not without dissenting votes. Furthermore, he observes that the only

significant contribution of troops other than U.S. was by Brazil.³⁴ Another critic cynically suggests that the only role played by the IADB in the whole affair was to provide "a collective window dressing for U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic."³⁵ Let us delve into the facts a little more deeply in an attempt to reconcile the conflicting views.

After the U.S. called upon the OAS to provide assistance against the revolutionary movement, the OAS Council convened the Tenth Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Ministers and set out to achieve a ceasefire between the armed factions.³⁶ With the adoption of a resolution on May 6, the OAS sent out appeals to member governments for troop contributions. Only six governments plus the U.S. responded positively. Their contributions as of June 30, 1965, are listed in the following table (the U.S. contingent was gradually reduced and withdrawn):³⁷

<u>NATION</u>	<u>OFFICERS</u>	<u>ENLISTED</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Brazil	145	1,007	1,152
Costa Rica	3	18	21
El Salvador	3	---	3
Honduras	10	240	250
Nicaragua	6	153	159
Paraguay	8	170	178
United States	---	---	11,935
TOTAL	175	1,588	13,698

Although representatives from Panama, Argentina, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Bolivia, and Colombia voted for the resolution, they did not participate in the Inter-American Peace Force (IAPF). Voting against the resolution were Mexico, Peru, Uruguay, and Chile,

with Venezuela abstaining. Many of these states, however, did contribute food and medicine, along with trained noncombatants to administer them.³⁸ The commander of the Force was Brazilian Army General Hugo Panasco Alvim, with his deputy being U.S. Army Lieutenant General Bruce Palmer, Jr. This curious arrangement of nationalities of the commanders was of course due to political reasons, the U.S. wanting to give a distinct multilateral Latin flavor to the military action.³⁹

The Special Committee previously mentioned was composed of representatives from those countries supplying troops to the IAPF and was created "to study the functioning and maintenance" of the Force. This group was supposed to be a "Watch Dog" committee which submitted its reports directly to the Meeting of Consultation. The committee accepted an offer by the IADB on May 21 to provide technical or military advice. In response to that offer, the OAS Secretary General requested, and the Board designated, Brigadier General Telmo O. Vargas of Ecuador, a Board member, as his military advisor.⁴⁰ The commander of the IAPF was answerable to the "Watch Dog" committee on the functioning of the Force and looked for policy guidance to the Secretary General and later to another body called the Ad Hoc Committee (including, among others, U.S. Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker) as representatives of the Meeting of Consultation. Not until May 23, a full month after the uprising began, was the IAPF formally constituted.⁴¹ The significant thing about the whole arrangement was the multinational symbol, despite

its tardy creation and the initial unilateral U.S. action. It should be remembered that the Dominican crisis, although severely maligned and taking its toll on inter-American goodwill, is unique in that it represents the only time in Latin American history that an inter-American force has been formed to counter a threat to the hemisphere.

The remainder of the 1960's found the U.S. so preoccupied with its war in Vietnam that little attention was paid to Latin America. The U.S. was somewhat concerned with the threat of Communist subversion in the hemisphere, but military planning to cope with any such contingencies received low priority. The one event that probably received the most publicity was Che Guevara's ill-fated attempt to spread insurrection into Bolivia. The Argentine-born former member of the Castro regime intended to create enough trouble for the Bolivian government that it would be forced to ask for substantial U.S. intervention. Guevara hoped to force the U.S. through its Rio Treaty obligations into what he envisioned would become another Vietnam. A substantial U.S. military presence in Bolivia would have inflamed the pro-Communist left and many moderate groups throughout Latin America, causing widespread reaction against "Yankee imperialism" on the continent. Bolivia was chosen because of its revolutionary potential and its strategic location bordering on five other South American nations, which Guevara thought would produce a chain reaction.⁴²

The insurrection failed on several accounts, one of which was an overestimation of U.S. response to armed leftist activity in Latin America. Despite my previous observation that the U.S. was more concerned in the early 1960's about the spread of Communism than the Latin American nations, by the latter half of the decade it had set up a commendable structure for training the Latin American military in counterinsurgency tactics. Unwilling and unable to commit its own forces to Latin America due to the heavy commitment in Vietnam, the U.S. instead sought to train indigenous armies using such assets as the Special Forces units in Panama, mobile training teams, the School of the Americas, and the Jungle Warfare Operations Course. Guevara miscalculated not only the extent to which the U.S. would become directly involved, but also the degree to which the Bolivian government forces had learned to employ the guerrillas' own hit-and-run tactics.⁴³ As a result, he was captured and executed, and the insurrection failed miserably. There is no indication that the IADB was in any way involved in this operation and, in line with my earlier comments about its wariness of getting mixed up with subversion, there is no reason to think that it would have been.

The last major event of the 1960's in which the IADB was involved was a dispute between Honduras and El Salvador in 1969 sometimes known as the "Soccer War." The Rio Treaty was invoked, a Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Ministers held, a special investigating committee formed, and a military observer group created to supervise the cease-fire and demilitarized zone. The

IADB as usual offered its assistance to the OAS and as usual was formally ignored. Nevertheless, informally the OAS employed Board officers on the military observer teams.⁴⁴

In retrospect, the 1960's was a period of great change in Latin America, both from the perspective of the U.S. and from the various points of view of the Latin American countries. The IADB was reassessed in light of these new concerns. In 1961 a U.S. State Department Policy Planning Staff paper envisioned a greatly increased role for the Board, with special emphasis on its potential contribution to peacekeeping efforts in the hemisphere. This was suggested as its primary role and would involve provision of military advice to the OAS Council and development of a standby inter-American peace force. To achieve this the Board would have to be more closely tied to the OAS as political organ and to the member states as well. The U.S. would have to be prepared to allow the IADB a more significant role in allocating MAP resources.⁴⁵ Despite the partial shift in orientation to civic action mentioned earlier, however, a complete realignment toward the scope of responsibilities suggested by the State Department was doomed never to gain much support among U.S. military officials, the majority of whom continued to favor the use of bilateral channels.

Child cites several attempts made during the decade to "institutionalize" the IADB and incorporate it more formally into the inter-American system. The first such attempt was a suggestion incorporated in Resolution LV in November 1961 that the Board

"be placed in a position to advise and aid the Council of the OAS in matters within its province."⁴⁶ Moreover, IADB interest in strengthening its legal ties continued through the next few years and culminated in an attempt to be included in the OAS Charter as revised by the 1967 Buenos Aires Third Special Conference. Even before this the IADB had analyzed its status within the inter-American system in a January 1966 study entitled "Location of the IADB within the Inter-American System" and recommended institutionalization of the IADB within the system.⁴⁷ However, despite State Department support, its efforts failed for the same reason that it had not been included in the original OAS Charter of 1948--leeriness of the Latin American nations of any significant extension of the Board's power or authority.⁴⁸

The 1970's and 1980's

The decade of the 1970's exacerbated the deteriorating state of inter-American relations that probably began with the forced harmony of the Dominican crisis of 1965 and the continued neglect of the region by the U.S. during the Vietnam War years. Child dates the period from 1967 to the present as one of "considerable decline, disarray, divergence, and dysfunction for the Inter-American Military System, a downward trend that was especially dramatic when contrasted with the apogee reached in the mid-1960's."⁴⁹ He goes on to suggest that this decline was only one element in a broad range of strains for the inter-American relationship in a

period offering a low profile by the U.S. under the tutelage of Nixon-Kissinger-Ford, followed by the Carter human rights crusade.

Another disturbing trend, at least in U.S. eyes, was the attempt by several Latin American states to break, or at least reduce, technological military dependency on the U.S. Fueled by the growing popularity of economic dependency arguments spewing forth from academic circles, the 1970's demonstrated both the establishment of indigenous Latin American arms industries and also the search for alternate overseas sources for weapons other than the U.S. By the early 1970's the U.S. had clearly lost its monopoly on arms sales in Latin America to such nations as France, the United Kingdom, the USSR, and Israel. One source claims that between 1965 and 1980 the U.S. dropped from being the preeminent arms supplier to Latin America to fifth place, behind West Germany, France, Israel, and Italy.⁵⁰ Brazil and Argentina soon were also exporting large quantities of arms, ammunition, vehicles, and aircraft to their Latin neighbors.⁵¹ Brazil in particular has become a significant arms exporter. A Brazilian officer serving in the U.S. recently noted that his country is currently selling weapons to more than thirty nations.⁵² Given that this huge country now ranks as the world's sixth largest arms exporter, second leading shipbuilder, fourth leading aircraft builder, and tenth largest steel producer, it is easy to see why the U.S. no longer has the leverage it once enjoyed.

What all this has meant to a multinational organ like the IADB was that competitiveness and natural suspicion among members

was bound to grow and complicate the achievement of concerted action in the hemisphere. The pendulum had swung from the U.S. being the dominant partner in the 1950's to a point in the 1970's when the U.S. was faced with independent-minded, and sometimes even recalcitrant, partners with divergent political goals and economic interests. Let us see how the Board functioned under these handicaps given incidents which sprang up in the 1970's.

In 1972 Guatemala charged that the United Kingdom was reinforcing its garrison in Belize and requested verification by the OAS. For the first time ever acting on the authority of a General Assembly resolution, the OAS sent a 2-man team to investigate the size and equipment of the British garrison. The team consisted of a lawyer from the OAS Secretariat and a Colombian general serving as its delegate to the IADB. Like several previous instances, however, the Board was not officially consulted in the matter.⁵³

In August 1976 the Board again supported peacekeeping operations during a renewal of the Honduras-El Salvador border dispute by providing the observer team commander, observers, and operational support. However, just as in the other disputes since the late 1960's, the OAS resisted formally requesting advice from the IADB and did not convene the long dormant ADC. Instead it created an ad hoc group of military observers, many of them IADB members. The 1976 incident offered the best opportunity yet for full utilization of Board expertise. The chief of the OAS observer team,

Major General Luis Maria Miro of Argentina, was also Chief of the Argentine Delegation to the IADB. He strongly recommended to the OAS Council that the IADB be permitted to assume responsibility for the mission. Predictably, the Council rejected his suggestion, arguing that the Council should not delegate its peacekeeping function or separate it from the political-diplomatic side of its mission.⁵⁴ No doubt there were fears in some circles that such an arrangement would revive the old Inter-American Peace Force concept that was the legacy of the Dominican intervention eleven years earlier. However unfounded these fears may be, it is obvious that they carry a lot of weight in determining the appropriate responses to hemispheric disputes.

Meanwhile other developments had eroded the IADB's credibility. In mid-1973 there was a renewal of the OAS Charter reform movement, and again the status of the Board came up. The OAS had earlier formed a Special Committee to Study the Inter-American System and to Propose Measures for Restructuring It (known by its Spanish acronym CEESI). This committee addressed a letter to the IADB and all other inter-American bodies in September 1973 requesting their views and observations on OAS Charter reforms. The Board, after some internal debate, replied in a noncommittal fashion, with no substantive comments other than expressing a desire for the status quo and continued operation of the IADB.⁵⁵ Such half-hearted self-confidence no doubt was a defense mechanism against the opposition incurred during previous attempts to institutionalize the Board by including it in the OAS Charter. Many Board

members probably heaved a sigh of relief when the final CEEI report indicated it never formally addressed the issue of the IADB, preferring to leave this matter to "a higher level" of the OAS.

Right on the heels of this bureaucratic maneuvering came the October 1973 ouster of the Allende government in Chile. Fortunately, there is no indication that the IADB was in any way involved in this scheme. On this occasion U.S. unilateral involvement was solely to blame, for there was no inter-American structure readily accessible to use as either a scapegoat or a rubber stamp for legitimization. Interestingly, two years later the OAS Special Consultative Committee on Security (SCCS), which had periodically been the brunt of demilitarization attempts along with the ADC, was disestablished by a vote of 17 (including the U.S.) to four (including Chile). The SCCS had been created by the Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Ministers in 1962 as a "watchdog" and charged with monitoring Cuban subversive activities. While not strictly a military organ, the SCCS had acquired a strong military orientation because of its anti-subversion mission and the fact that almost all its Latin members were military officers. The first proposal to eliminate the SCCS came from Chile under Allende in early 1973. By the time the disestablishment vote was taken in 1975, Chile under Pinochet had become one of its staunchest supporters. This is understandable considering the fact that one of the last studies the SCCS prepared before its demise dealt with Cuban infiltration of Chile during the Allende era.⁵⁶

Other events of the 1970's apparently did not warrant or encourage IADB participation, if the scant historical record is a true reflection. Developments in Angola in 1975 stirred up considerable concern in Latin America. The Cuban-Soviet military involvement there and elsewhere in Africa presented a new type of threat, that of Cuban intervention by consent or invitation on the part of one party in a civil war or conflict involving two hemisphere nations.⁵⁷ However, the perception of this threat varied from nation to nation depending on their respective state of relations with Cuba. Interestingly, in spite of all the trouble caused by Cuba in the 1960's, as of 1983 only six nations in Latin America had not reestablished diplomatic relations with Cuba, one of them being Brazil, the country closest to Africa.⁵⁸

Surely the IADB has developed plans to cope with such scenarios, but I have found no material evidence of them, likely due to the fact that recent activities tend to be treated as very sensitive and highly classified. There are other ongoing areas of tension in the region which await resolution, such as the age-old Andean dispute over Bolivia's purported right to an outlet to the Pacific, a continuing frontier dispute between Peru and Ecuador, and the Beagle Channel islands dispute between Chile and Argentina. However, there are other modes of mediation, some of them outside the inter-American system, coming into play in these cases, and the IADB has not as yet become involved.⁵⁹

Three recent situations which particularly drew my interest regarding possible IADB involvement are the new Panama Canal

Treaties of 1977, the Nicaraguan takeover of 1979, and the Falkland Islands war of 1982. The El Salvador situation is also intriguing and may deteriorate to the point that it suggests the possible involvement of some sort of inter-American force as in the Dominican Republic. However, at present the situation is just too complex to make a definitive assessment or even speculate how the OAS or the IADB might cope with it. Within the inter-American community there are two diametrically opposed views as to what the situation really is in El Salvador, i.e., whether it reflects an internal problem or an external threat to the entire Central American region. Consensus on the issue has proven impossible to forge, despite the best efforts of President Reagan and others. Therefore, I shall omit any further discussion of El Salvador and look briefly at the other three cases, keeping in mind that IADB deliberations of such recent events are kept much more close-hold than the historical material readily available on events in the distant past.

I previously alluded to 1964 as the year the U.S. promised Panama it would renegotiate the treaty governing the use of the Panama Canal. The particular dispute that engendered that decision was handled on a bilateral basis completely, and set the tone for the way the new treaties would be developed. I can find no evidence of any of the inter-American bodies becoming direct parties to this process on a multilateral basis. Of course, during the thirteen years of negotiation there were numerous declarations of support for Panama by many of the other Latin American republics who saw the opportunity for backing one of their own in a gesture

demonstrating to Washington that the era of being dictated to unilaterally was over. A check with sources at the IADB itself revealed no involvement whatsoever by the Board.⁶⁰ However, it is likely that a good deal of strategic planning was going on in anticipation of the sort of external influences that might have entered the arena had the negotiations turned sour. Strategically, the canal is simply too important to Western nations not to plan on contingencies in which it is closed to shipping.

Moving to the Nicaraguan situation, which heated up in 1977 but reached its climax in 1979 with the ouster of Anastasio Somoza, here again there is no evidence of IADB participation, although the potential for it existed. The major mediation efforts in this civil war, according to Child, came from the Andean Pact nations, the OAS, the U.S., and individual Latin American nations including Venezuela, Panama, Costa Rica, and Mexico. Notwithstanding all the outside interest, in the end it was popular support for the Sandinista Front for National Liberation (FSLN) that determined the outcome, with the mediation efforts being rather marginal.⁶¹

Interestingly, the OAS adamantly refused a U.S. suggestion to form a peacekeeping force in Nicaragua. This was followed by the Carter Administration's decision not to use force unilaterally and hence destroy the measure of credibility it had won regarding its commitment to human rights and democratization. Yale political scientist Alfred Stepan feels that decision could indicate a realization that "military intervention may finally be obsolete as a weapon in the U.S. hemispheric policy arsenal."⁶² Of course,

receiving widespread attention currently is an attempt by exile Somozistas to retake Nicaragua.⁶³ It is too early to predict how the inter-American system might respond to a scenario in which a decidedly leftist FSLN regime is threatened by rightists. Developments in either Nicaragua or El Salvador could prove Stepan wrong in the long run. The approval of a peacekeeping force is not totally out of the realm of possibility, nor is the IADB's eventual participation.

The final incident to be investigated in this chapter is the Falkland Islands conflict, which had been brewing for years but only came to receive worldwide public attention in the spring of 1982. This situation was fascinating to follow, since for the first time on a large scale two alliance systems previously thought to be pretty much mutually exclusive geographically came into direct conflict with each other in the Western Hemisphere, not militarily but politically. The U.S. was faced with the unenviable dilemma of having to back either one of its NATO allies or one of its Latin American partners; it was impossible in this case to refuse to take sides. Ultimately the Reagan Administration made the only decision it could under the tenets of honor and international law--it supported the United Kingdom (UK) and publicly chastised Argentina for its unwarranted aggression. In addition, Reagan ordered several economic measures, to include the suspension of all arms shipments to Argentina, the blocking of new Export-Import Bank credits to that country, and a pledge to respond positively to British requests for military aid.⁶⁴

Not surprisingly, Buenos Aires sought to legitimize its actions by attempting to invoke Article 3 of the Rio Treaty and seeking support in the OAS. Foreign ministers from OAS member states met in special session April 26-28, 1982, at Argentina's request and adjourned without taking any tangible action beyond calling in vain for both Argentina and the UK to refrain from military action. The organization did vote 17 to 0 to support Argentina's claim to sovereignty over the "Malvinas," with abstentions by the U.S., Colombia, Chile, and Trinidad-Tobago.⁶⁵ However, the attempt to mobilize multilateral military support under the Rio Treaty failed, and rightly so. On May 13 President Reagan was queried at a press conference about the situation and how the U.S. stance might jeopardize future relations with Latin America. He replied: "Well, I think there's a tendency on the part of many of the countries of South America to feel that their sympathies are more with Argentina than ours. I don't think there's been irreparable damage done."⁶⁶ It may still be too early to assess the long-term implications of the Falklands war for the health of inter-American relations; the political and military post-mortem's are still being written. However, it is clear that in the short run considerable damage has been done.

In fact, in a telephone interview with the aide-de-camp to Lieutenant General John McEnery, the current IADB Chairman, I was informed that at least one significant initiative by the Board is in jeopardy due in part to the Falklands backlash. In July 1981

the Council of Delegates approved a "convention" again renewing the attempt to establish a closer juridical tie to the OAS and sent it to the member governments for approval. The officer indicated the the Falklands factor represented a serious setback to the convention's chances for ratification.⁶⁷ The convention will be examined in greater detail in Chapter 5.

It is unfortunate that the IADB should be hurt by an event with which it had no direct connection, but of course that is the way political linkages work. Naturally, at least one Board member--Argentina--tried to portray the British response in the Malvinas as precisely the type of external aggression for which the organization was established. Another source on the IADB revealed that the Board was not involved in the Falklands conflict because its assistance was not solicited. Nevertheless, the situation was monitored very carefully because of the similarity with which some future invasion of a Latin American country might be implemented. I could not ascertain whether any formal strategic planning resulted from the war, but it was suggested that some informal planning was probably underway in anticipation of a possible similar intervention by the Soviets or their Cuban surrogates in such places as Guyana, Belize, or Grenada.⁶⁸ A wrap-up on just what the current external threat to Latin America is deemed to be will be provided in Chapter 5.

NOTES

1. John Child, Unequal Alliance: The Inter-American Military System, 1938-1978 (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1980), p. 146.

2. Paul T. Hanley, "The Inter-American Defense Board" (unpublished PhD dissertation, Stanford University, 1965), pp. 141-143. See also the report by Senators Wayne Morse and Bourke B. Hickenlooper to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the U.S. Senate, Punta del Este Conference, January 1962, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., 1962, p. 14.

3. Edwin Lieuwen, U.S. Policy in Latin America: A Short History (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965), p. 84.

4. Lieuwen, U.S. Policy in Latin America, p. 97.

5. LTC Roderick A. Stamey, Jr., The Inter-American Defense Board (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1965), pp. 66-67.

6. Child, Unequal Alliance, p. 169.

7. COL Johnnie Forte, Jr., "The Organization of American States: A Study of Its Economic and Security Capabilities," Air War College Report No. 5909, May 1976, pp. 41-42. See also Hanley, "The Inter-American Defense Board," p. 147.

8. LTC John Child, "Latin America: Military-Strategic Concepts," Air University Review, September-October 1976, reprinted in Strategic Intelligence Assessments: Readings on Terrorism and the Third World (Washington: U.S. Defense Intelligence School, 1977), p. IV-13. For a contrasting view, which is not at all sanguine about the capacity of the Latin American military to promote economic development programs, see Karen L. Remmer, "Evaluating the Policy Impact of Military Regimes in Latin America," Latin American Research Review, Vol. XIII, No. 2, 1978, p. 40. Of course, some observers feel it is impossible to segregate the military from evaluations of Latin American leadership in general, suggesting that economic and political development is not exclusively the domain of either civilian or military rulers. In a review article, Edward Gonzalez and Luigi Einaudi are cited as arguing that, "on the one hand, Latin American leaders are becoming more innovative because of fewer internal and international constraints but that, on the other hand, they have 'learned' from Cuba to be moderate and to avoid challenging U.S. security interests. Thus, the options for Latin American leadership are constricted by conditions not of the leaders' own choosing." See Susan Eckstein, "Whither Latin America?" Latin American Research Review, Vol. XIII, No. 3, 1978, p. 216.

9. Hanley, "The Inter-American Defense Board," p. 143. Various schools, both in Latin America and in the U.S., served as forums for instruction in civic action techniques and for the exchange of ideas regarding the concept among officers of the different countries. Child discusses military reformism in the 1960's as an adoption of the "Doctrine of National Security and Development." Two rather different models of reformism and the doctrine emerged, the Brazilian and the Peruvian. It is beyond the scope of this paper to delve into them any further, other than to say that these schools of thought were closely related to the U.S. promotion of the IDAD strategy. Child claims that the causal relationship between IDAD and military reformism is impossible to prove but acknowledges the link. He discusses in some detail the roles played by Brazil's Escola Superior de Guerra (ESG) and Peru's Centro de Altos Estudios Militares (CAEM) in spreading the doctrine. See Child, Unequal Alliance, pp. 190-194. Of course, these institutions are at the same level as the U.S. war colleges and the IADC. According to a Brazilian officer serving at Fort Leavenworth, in an interview on April 8, 1983, the doctrine espousing that national security equals development was promoted by ESG, but the concept of military civic action in the sense that the IADB was pursuing it was taught more at the command and staff college level. Moreover, he made a clear distinction between civic action and national security doctrine as being somewhat different concepts. He felt the IADB was probably not involved in these academic developments. A U.S. FAO who was both a student and an instructor at Peru's command and staff college shed some light on the issue from his perspective in an April 28, 1983, interview. He gave more credence to the possible involvement of the Board as a "foot in the door," a place where both the Brazilian and Peruvian models were exposed to officers from the other nations. He also strongly credited what he called the "Clube Militar" channel, i.e., the "old boy network" in which social gatherings in the back rooms of officers' clubs by such personnel as attachés, command and staff college students, and IADB delegates on tours offered a convenient forum for new ideas to be exchanged. This was an extremely valuable channel, since concepts usually were not exchanged in writing (e.g., copies of textbooks or programs of instruction from the various schools) due to cost or to a lack of printing assets. Alfred Stepan gives much credit to the schools run by the U.S. for spreading ideas in both the IDAD and civic action realms, plus a new stress on counterinsurgency ideology. "Latin American military officers and enlisted men were trained in schools run by the United States in Panama, Fort Leavenworth, and elsewhere, and were heavily exposed to U.S. doctrines at the Inter-American Defense College in Washington." He also cites several examples of a growing number of articles in U.S. military journals--most of which are widely distributed to the Latin American military and some, like CGSC's Military Review, published in Spanish and Portuguese editions--pushing these new concepts. See Alfred Stepan, The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1971), pp. 126-127. None of these sources goes so far as to establish any direct influence by the IADB in these changes nor offers any precise documentation, but several have hinted that the Board was nonetheless heavily involved.

10. O. Carlos Stoetzer, The OAS (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965), pp. 36-37.
11. Hanley, "The Inter-American Defense Board," pp. 147-148.
12. Undated fact sheet from the IADB entitled "Historical Resume."
13. The Inter-American Defense Board (cited throughout as IADB Pamphlet) (Washington: Inter-American Defense Board, undated), p. 10.
14. Child, Unequal Alliance, p. 158.
15. Lieuwen, U.S. Policy in Latin America, p. 99.
16. "Offensive Weapons in Cuba," IADB Resolution LXII, October 30, 1962. See also Child, Unequal Alliance, pp. 170-171.
17. Forte, "The Organization of American States," p. 43.
18. IADB Pamphlet, p. 11.
19. "Inter-American Defense Board Briefing," a draft command briefing, dated December 1982, cited hereafter as "IADB Command Briefing," p. 9.
20. No author, "Latin America: Cuba, Sí!" Newsweek, August 11, 1975, p. 40.
21. Lieuwen, U.S. Policy in Latin America, pp. 100-101.
22. Forte, "The Organization of American States," p. 39.
23. John Child, unpublished manuscript entitled "International Mediatory and Amelioratory Mechanisms in Latin American Conflicts," April 1981, cited hereafter as "International Mediatory Mechanisms," p. 35.
24. Child, "International Mediatory Mechanisms," pp. 10-11.
25. Forte, "The Organization of American States," p. 41.
26. Forte, "The Organization of American States," pp. 41-42.
27. Martin C. Needler, The United States and the Latin American Revolution (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1972), p. 81.
28. IADB Pamphlet, p. 11.
29. "IADB Command Briefing," p. 9.

30. Yale H. Ferguson, "The Dominican Intervention of 1965: Recent Interpretations," International Organization, Autumn 1973, p. 534.

31. John Spanier, American Foreign Policy Since World War II, 8th ed. (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1980), p. 135.

32. Robert E. Osgood, Alliances and American Foreign Policy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1968). The chapter entitled "Alliances Outside Europe" is reprinted in Readings in International Relations, Vol. II (West Point: Department of Social Sciences, U.S. Military Academy, 1970). The specific quote is taken from the reprint, p. 41.

33. Ferguson, "The Dominican Intervention of 1965," p. 534. The particular book to which Ferguson is referring is Jerome Slater, Intervention and Negotiation: The United States and the Dominican Revolution (New York: Harper and Row, 1970).

34. Norman J. Padelford, George A. Lincoln, and Lee D. Olvey, The Dynamics of International Politics, 3rd ed. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1976), p. 477.

35. Jeffrey Stein, "Grad School for Juntas," The Nation, May 21, 1977, p. 622.

36. Forte, "The Organization of American States," p. 44.

37. "National Support of International Peacekeeping and Peace Observation Operations," Background Papers, Vol. V, prepared under contract ACDA/IR-161 for the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency by the Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research, School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, February 1970, p. 277. This document will hereafter be referred to as "ACDA Peacekeeping Report."

38. "ACDA Peacekeeping Report," p. 274.

39. Forte, "The Organization of American States," p. 44.

40. "ACDA Peacekeeping Report," p. 274.

41. "ACDA Peacekeeping Report," p. 275.

42. CPT Robert C. Kleinpeter, "The Failure of Che Guevara's Bolivian Insurrection," Military Intelligence, July-September 1980, p. 55.

43. Kleinpeter, "The Failure of Che Guevara's Bolivian Insurrection," p. 57.

44. Child, "International Mediatory Mechanisms," p. 38.
45. Child, Unequal Alliance, p. 156.
46. Child, Unequal Alliance, p. 157.
47. Child, Unequal Alliance, p. 175.
48. Child, Unequal Alliance, p. 158.
49. Child, Unequal Alliance, p. 189.
50. No author, "Inter-American Security: Lessons from the South Atlantic," Great Decisions '83, p. 73. See also excerpts from a U.S. House Foreign Affairs Committee report released in 1981 by the Congressional Research Service entitled "Changing Perspectives on U.S. Arms Transfer Policy" and reprinted in "Sophisticated Armament for Latin America?" Inter-American Economic Affairs, Summer 1982, pp. 73-85.
51. Child, Unequal Alliance, p. 197.
52. COL Luiz G.S. Lessa, in a lecture presented to the Regional Security Perspectives elective course at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, February 15, 1983.
53. Child, "International Mediatory Mechanisms," p. 30. See also IADB Pamphlet, p. 11. For a humorous but cynical view, see Hope Aldrich, "Free for Lunch? The Languid Life of Foreign Attachés," The Washington Monthly, November 1982, p. 35.
54. Child, Unequal Alliance, p. 217.
55. Child, Unequal Alliance, pp. 201-203.
56. Child, Unequal Alliance, p. 203.
57. For an excellent interpretation of the ramifications of the Cuban presence in Africa, see Wolf Grabendorff, "Cuba's Involvement in Africa: An Interpretation of Objectives, Reactions, and Limitations," Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, February 1980, pp. 3-29.
58. Lessa lecture, February 15, 1983.
59. For an in-depth survey of the ongoing disputes in Latin America with potential for disrupting the inter-American equilibrium, see Adrian J. English, "Latin America: Power Balances and Potential Flash-Points," International Defense Review, No. 10, 1981, pp. 1273-1281.

60. Personal interview with COL Luiz G.S. Lessa, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, January 27, 1983. COL Lessa contacted some of his associates now serving on the IADB to ascertain any Board involvement in recent events.

61. Child, "International Mediatory Mechanisms," p. 40. For a deeper understanding of the Nicaraguan crisis, see Alfred G. Cúzan and Richard J. Heggen, "A Micro-Political Explanation of the 1979 Nicaraguan Revolution," Latin American Research Review, Vol. XVII, No. 2, 1982, pp. 156-170.

62. Alfred Stepan, "The United States and Latin America: Vital Interests and the Instruments of Power," Foreign Affairs, annual year-end edition "America and the World 1979," p. 661.

63. In an April 14, 1983, interview on NBC's "Today" program, former U.S. Ambassador to El Salvador Robert White blamed the U.S. for covert support of the "Contras" trying to invade Nicaragua from Honduras. He claimed that the U.S. government is violating OAS treaty provisions. As a result of the controversy, various committees of the U.S. Congress are investigating charges of CIA involvement and determining whether funding for such covert activity should be cut off. Although government spokesmen steadfastly deny any motive other than interdicting the arms flow from Nicaragua into El Salvador, Nicaragua is taking its case before the UN.

64. Warren Hoge, "U.S. Strategy Irks Latins," New York Times, May 5, 1982, p. A19.

65. No author, "Argentina Calls for an O.A.S. Meeting," New York Times, May 25, 1982, p. A15. For more details on OAS involvement, see Gordon Connell-Smith, "The OAS and the Falklands conflict," The World Today, September 1982, pp. 340-347. See also Susan Kaufman Purcell, "War and Debt in South America," Foreign Affairs, America and the World 1982, pp. 661-667.

66. "Transcript of President's News Conference on Foreign and Domestic Matters," New York Times, May 14, 1982, p. A16.

67. Telephonic interview with MAJ Charles L. Steel IV, aide-de-camp to the IADB Chairman, February 24, 1983.

68. Lessa interview, January 27, 1983.

Chapter 4

THEORY AND EVALUATION

Overview

Now that the history of the IADB has been reviewed from a somewhat pragmatic and systematic standpoint, it should prove illustrative to evaluate the organization in light of some different viewpoints not tied directly to history. History often tends to be tainted, in part because some of it is written by those so close to the object being studied that they cannot be completely objective and in part because the reader of it cannot totally take himself out of his present milieu and think in terms of the mindset that was prevalent at the time. Therefore, history is a valuable tool but should be supplemented by other points of reference. That is the purpose of this chapter.

First, we shall examine a few theoretical constructs to ascertain how well the Board stands up to some subjective, non-performance-oriented criteria. Several thought-provoking works on alliance politics and coalition warfare are investigated for insights that might be applicable for evaluating the Board. Unfortunately, they concentrate heavily on the U.S.-West European relationship since, as mentioned previously, the bulk of such writing has focused on Europe. This is not surprising given the ethnic legacy and the traditional focus of the U.S. public in

general and the specific concern of the U.S. government's security and defense policy throughout most of this century.

Some readers may in fact decide that such an approach is not applicable to the inter-American community. Granted, excessive extrapolation at times can be faulty, spurious, or even dangerous. Nevertheless, a tight, rigorous theoretical application is not the aim here. Instead, it is merely to provide a fresh point of departure in evaluating the health of the organization in question.

Other than their geographical bent, the reader may question the age of some of the pieces, especially that written by Karl Deutsch in the late 1950's. It is the feeling of the author, however, that a few works in political science are truly timeless. The astute reader can mentally update the facts and current events in a book while still being able to appreciate the larger concepts that transcend the years. The material I shall be citing is just as applicable to the alliances and coalitions of today as it was when it was first written. Still, the reader may see less benefit in this technique than the author or, on the contrary, may find the approach suggestive of further research. At any rate, if nothing else this section should offer an interesting sidelight to the serious student of international politics and hopefully not prove superfluous to the overall thrust of the thesis.

After the ideas of a few well-known works in the field of international organization theory are surveyed, another set of perspectives on the IADB more "close to home" will be presented through an analysis of the responses to the aforementioned survey.

In that section the views of some decidedly less theory-oriented individuals will be scrutinized. Not only do the subjects represent a cross-section of such factors as age, sex, military and non-military background, and geographical origin, but they range the spectrum of educational experience. Some no doubt have read and fully appreciate the theoretical works applied in the first section, while the majority probably have little knowledge of such theories and perhaps could care less.

The CGSC students get some very limited exposure to the study of alliances in the core curriculum. Several of them pursue such issues in greater detail in electives or have a good underpinning from their undergraduate days. A few of the students would tell you that they see absolutely no relevance to the military officer of studying politics. Most, however, at least understand the linkage. While some officers totally unfamiliar with the IADB have experience with international theories, others who do know something about the Board have no such theoretical background. Whatever the case, this level of analysis should prove to be much more concrete than the theory discussion in the first section. At the same time, its utilitarian, "real-world" flavor should be an enlightening supplement to the theoretical and historical perspectives that precede it.

This chapter in particular takes the thesis out of the realm of pure history into that of political science. It is hoped that the reader finds at least one section or the other to his liking. Better yet, it is hoped he will view them as an integrated whole that enlightens his overall understanding of the IADB.

Application of Alliance and Coalition Theory

Although it might be analytically less sound to take the theoretical pieces one at a time, that approach should be simpler for the reader to follow. The first book to be examined is Alliance Politics by Richard Neustadt. As mentioned earlier, we must be cautious in treating the IADB, the OAS, or any of the other inter-American institutions, to include the Rio Treaty, as a pure alliance. There is no hemispheric framework that comes close to meeting the strict definition of an "alliance" in the sense that NATO does. Nevertheless, some of the concepts discussed by Neustadt and others appear applicable to the Board. Keeping in the back of our minds the admonishment that the IADB is not an alliance, let us proceed anyway and think of it as a type of collegial security apparatus that possesses some of the same characteristics as an alliance.

The Board, like any other multinational body, is a collection of national representatives and, as Neustadt observes:

Alliance institutions, civil and military, are not sovereign states...but rather they are creatures, or at least creations, of the governments concerned. Thus their importance turns on their symbolic quality, together with their actual capacity (which often is not very great) to influence the work of men inside those governments.

Because allies are governments, each is a more or less complex arena for internal bargaining among the bureaucratic elements and political personalities who collectively comprise its working apparatus. Its action is the product of their interaction. They bargain not at random but according to the processes, conforming to the perquisites, responsive to the pressures of their own political system.

These characteristics have been evident on many occasions during the Board's history. Some of its actions could be labeled as nothing more than symbolic, but of course still important. After all, a resolution by any international or regional body is merely a political signal, a symbol of joint concern about an issue which assumes the status of an official communication. Having no binding authority, resolutions are sometimes ignored, but at least they are noticed and must be weighed by the target nation against the political costs of not heeding their message. We have also seen the effects of national bargaining on Board activities. Every time the organization recommended a defense measure or formulated a defense plan, the item took the form only of a proposal until the individual member governments approved it. Often this resulted in delays, "lowest common denominator" actions, and all the other side effects that naturally emerge from a process of bureaucratic politics.² Not only is bureaucratic politics practiced among the Board members themselves, but diverse forms of it exist within each national government as it considers IADB proposals. A fair appraisal of the Board's performance must take such constraints into account.

The purpose of Neustadt's book is to explore two Anglo-American crises which produced controversy between two traditional allies-- the Suez crisis of 1956 and the Skybolt affair of 1962.³ By exploring these two situations in case study fashion, Neustadt attempts to shed light on the relationships between governments

which have continued over many years to regard each other as peacetime friends. Neustadt suggests a pattern of behavior within alliances that can lead to crisis, consisting of four elements--muddled perceptions, stifled communications, disappointed expectations, and paranoid reactions. He finds that the pattern's first two strands are pervasive in Anglo-American behavior, the third commonplace, but the fourth is relatively rare and the one that most readily sets the stage for crisis.⁴

I see the first and third strands being most applicable to the inter-American system. For instance, Chapter 3 discussed how in the 1960's the U.S. perception of Latin American interests was that the Latins were just as concerned about the Communist revolutionary threat as were people in the U.S. As we found out, this was not the case. Instead, U.S. and Latin American interests began to diverge, and this fact affected the direction of the Board's focus. On the other hand, I do not see stifled communications as having been much of a problem. The structure of the Board itself facilitates close interaction and communication among delegates of member nations. Where communications tended to break down was between the Board and the OAS, the latter continually rejecting the offers of assistance from the former and refusing to recognize or understand its value. This situation, of course, fostered disappointed expectations.

It is becoming clear that the Board in the last twenty years has not lived up to the expectations of those who founded it forty years ago. Then again, it could be argued that the individual

governments which participated in the establishment of the Board never intended it to live up to the rather lofty expectations implied by various official pronouncements, for nationalistic, parochial, bureaucratic, or other reasons. Neustadt realizes, like most scholars of international relations, that "inter-allied outcome is produced by interaction of such intra-governmental games." This is what the author terms "alliance politics." This syndrome tends to follow most closely Graham Allison's conceptual "Model III," or what has come to be known as the "bureaucratic politics model."⁵

Regarding my positive observation about the relatively easy communications within the Board, it is interesting to note that Neustadt determines "close acquaintance can actually be more burdensome than beneficial, more conducive to misreading than to accurate perception." He elaborates on this sort of proximity as resulting from such indicators as a common language, a shared history, wartime collaboration, intermarriage, all of which are abetted by air travel and the telephone.⁶ Of course, within the NATO community, much is made of the "special relationship" existing between U.S. and British citizens due to these factors and others. Then again, one cannot avoid hearing how the U.S. also enjoys a "special relationship" with its Latin American neighbors. A cynic would remark that anytime Washington desires to use another country to satisfy a national interest it drums up talk about a "special relationship" existing to smooth over any potential wrinkles. Israel, Mexico, Canada, and Japan, among others, all have felt

at one time or another that they have a "special relationship" with the U.S., or at least have been sufficiently charmed by Washington to convince them of that.

Such special relationships can be either helpful or harmful. Neustadt concludes that the Anglo-American tie was not beneficial for the two cases he studied. Since they spoke the same language and assumed they knew a great deal about the nature of the other's government, the two countries took too much for granted. "Confidence in one's own expertise," Neustadt rightly observes, "diminishes one's sense of need to probe, reduces one's incentive to ask questions, removes from sight the specialists of whom these might be asked, and also pushes out of sight the usefulness of feedback."⁷

Perhaps this should suggest something about inter-American relations. Certainly, such institutions as frequent IADB Council sessions, tours to member countries, and lifelong friendships developed among IADC students are helpful in promoting hemispheric solidarity. But it must be realized that they can have pernicious side effects, that in fact sometimes "familiarity breeds contempt." A false sense of security resulting from knowing one's comrade well can lead to assumptions about the comrade's attitudes and behavior that prove faulty in a given situation. One should never cease probing, trying to learn more about those with whom one deals on a daily basis. This is especially true regarding national backgrounds. How an IADB delegate operates in Washington or how he represents his personal views may differ drastically from how he operates when back in his home capital. His government may place

certain constraints upon him that lead him to act differently on a given issue once he returns to Washington to carry out Board business.

Moreover, each government has its own character and its own motives. Despite the fact that most IADB delegates speak a common language--Spanish--and most U.S. personnel dealing with the Board or attending the IADC share this skill based on their FAO expertise, one should not assume that all necessarily share common motives or a common outlook.⁸ The view from Washington, and the political constraints of that environment, is distinctly different than the view from Buenos Aires or the view from San Salvador. Notes Neustadt, "When one side seeks to influence the conduct of another, everything depends upon the accuracy with which those who would wield influence perceive constraints impinging on the other side's behavior (and apply what they perceive in their own actions)."⁹

Another facet not discussed by Neustadt is how this interaction occurs when the nations dealing with each other are not of the same size and weight, i.e., when one nation is overwhelmingly more significant in the product of the relationship than the other. True, in the Anglo-American cases there was some mismatch. The U.S. had emerged as a superpower, while the UK was at best a deteriorating great power. But the imbalance is even more pronounced in the inter-American sphere. The dominant partner situation has been mentioned before but takes on even more salience in light of Neustadt's feeling that there is a tendency of men on one side

"to perceive the other side as a projection of their interests, their concerns, and to analogize accordingly." They project their concerns upon the other side. They see the other side's constraints and political stakes as akin to their own; hence, they are very parochial.¹⁰

We have seen throughout our discussion of the IADB how U.S. interests tended to dominate the direction of the Board's activities. Constraints on the U.S. have counted for more than constraints on the Latin American members. The Falklands case is a good example, although the Board itself was not directly involved. How the U.S. responded to Argentina and some of its other allies to the south was preconditioned by the overwhelming constraint of long-standing Anglo-American relations. In the eyes of many Latins, it was clear which "special relationship" took priority when it got down to basics. And, in the end, there was absolutely nothing that the Latin American nations could do to influence the situation. As dominant partner, the U.S. was in a position to make its decision to side with the UK a strictly unilateral one.

Despite the theoretical richness of Neustadt's and Allison's work, Neustadt claims that a conceptual framework, or merely frames of reference, are insufficient. In addition, we need information about our allies. This is no problem regarding the UK; we have many sources and much knowledge on how the government works internally (perhaps too much). This luxury does not exist regarding many other allies, one example he cites being West Germany. This was no great problem in the early days of NATO. When players

within an alliance are conscious of the frailty of their own structure and determined to let the U.S. take the lead, then Washington possesses a wide latitude for ignorance. However, once an ally's machinery begins settling in and its sense of dependency lessens with time, the U.S. needs to obtain new information about how this machinery runs.¹¹

I would submit that is exactly what has been happening to the inter-American relationship in the last two decades. Perhaps Washington needs to update its data base so that it can better deal with the new-found strength and diversity within the hemisphere. Neustadt feels that the government must look to the universities for this expertise. If not available in academia (e.g., due to an insufficient number of scholars of Latin America), then it must develop this needed expertise itself inside the government (e.g., by increasing the number of trained Latin American FAO's) or else it must reduce its expectations of alliances. He is not overly sanguine about the U.S. capability to achieve this, due to budget constraints, a lack of interest at the top and, most important, a need for continuous emphasis on gathering the expertise over more than one presidential administration.¹² It is my opinion that the Department of Defense is probably in the best position within the government to realize such an objective, given the Army's FAO program and the significant array of inter-American educational institutions, such as the IADC, already in place. I seriously doubt that lowering expectations of the inter-American system is politically feasible, either for the U.S. or for most of its hemispheric partners.

Another helpful reference in evaluating the worth of the IADB comes from a most unlikely source. A couple of years ago Kenneth Fleischer, then a cadet at the U.S. Military Academy, performed an individual study project that integrated several works on alliance theory into a case study quite effectively. The final paper's theme was that the study of the integration of Spain into NATO provides a suitable framework in which to discuss the theoretical determinants of alliance formation, cohesion, and duration.¹³ The paper dovetails nicely with Neustadt's observations about constraints and the basic concern of this thesis about the IADB's capability to plan against an external threat.

Quoting from noted international relations scholar Ernst Haas, Fleischer notes that how an alliance views a potential member depends upon whether or not the member nations collectively perceive an immediate external threat. If they do, then they will focus on power assessments and how a member's resources can contribute to a more favorable balance of power. If not, they will instead focus more on political considerations, historical attitudes, and other such variables that can be carefully weighed when not unduly pressed by time constraints or the urgency of a crisis environment. In other words, the allies will be more selective about choosing a new member that can contribute to the overall cohesiveness of the community in ways other than purely military.¹⁴

The latter situation seems to be the case regarding the inter-American system. Due to a dearth of tangible external threats over the years, the system has not been seriously tested and has usually

had the luxury of time in deciding how to deal with internal disputes. Consequently, the value of a single member's contribution to the community has been measured more by non-military criteria than military. The dominant partner aspect of the relationship has exacerbated this fact. There is no doubt that the greatest portion of military assets which will be brought to bear in any future hemispheric crisis will be U.S. The Latin American partners will be useful more for political and economic reasons, e.g., by demonstrating hemispheric solidarity in legitimizing a multinational response and by providing a large percentage of strategic materials. This fact of life, of course, is just one more manifestation of the reality that the inter-American arrangement is not a military alliance.

Not only do "alliances" serve to pool the political inputs of the member nations in a positive sense, but they also restrain the allies through imposing some degree of constraint upon the political action of each member nation. Furthermore, the importance of this function tends to increase as the perception of threat diminishes. In addition to restraining allies, alliances serve to thwart attempts by adversaries to influence individual member nations. For example, by bringing West Germany into NATO, the Western Alliance desired not only its military clout and its strategic position but also sought to control the pace of the country's rearmament through the alliance structure and to deter effective Soviet influence in that nation.¹⁵

An additional reason, and the most idealistic, for admitting new members to an alliance is to preserve and protect internal and international stability. In this respect an alliance is often used to maintain the status quo in a country if it is considered in the interests of the other member nations to do so. Thus, the alliance legitimizes the aid being given to support the existing government or to defend it against insurgency by hostile factions. This seems to be the idea behind the move within most of the inter-American institutions in the early 1960's toward emphasis on civic action rather than military preparation for some external threat. It was realized that the external threat, though real enough, would most likely manifest itself from within the hemisphere, not from without. Theoretically, an alliance can serve as a framework for compromise between the divergent policies of the member states, plus a stabilizing forum against an external adversary.¹⁶

According to Fleischer's study, most alliance theory is divided into three categories or topics: alliance formation, alliance performance, and alliance duration. The following determinants--a common perception of the threat, an equitable division of labor (i.e., burden-sharing), and the particular decision-making structure (i.e., political responsiveness)--to some degree affect all three aspects of alliances.¹⁷

We examined how the IADB came to be formed in Chapter 1; we reviewed its performance over time in Chapters 2 and 3. And we know for a fact that in terms of duration the Board has demonstrated a remarkable propensity for survival, at least when measured by

the length of its existence. In looking at the above determinants vis-à-vis the three topics of alliance theory, Fleischer asserts that political responsiveness is the most confusing and difficult to measure. He defines it as a function of the political stability of the individual member nations, the coherence and predictability of the foreign policies emanating from the national governments, and the degree to which these policies diverge from the interests of the alliance as a whole as well as from the policies of the other individual members.¹⁸ I would agree, but feel that the other two determinants are also rather problematic for the inter-American system. Needless to say, an equitable division of labor is physically impossible in hemispheric organizations, and the common perception of the threat is not that clear either. More will be said about the current threat in Chapter 5.

Suffice it to say here that if threat perception is high, military and economic considerations prevail over political and social issues. In peacetime, on the other hand, the role of ideology, political systems, and other non-utilitarian criteria are more likely to be important. When the threat is high, the duration of the alliance demands an increased capability. Furthermore, alliance cohesion improves as a natural result of a threat increase. In periods of relative peace, however, the duration of an alliance is more dependent on how it is maintained than on how it is drafted.¹⁹ The IADB and the other inter-American organs have enjoyed relative peace during most of their existence. Whether they would perform as well if large-scale war erupted in the Western Hemisphere is difficult to assess.

Karl Deutsch has also used common threat perception as a gauge for evaluating coalitions. In one noted study he and others performed analysis somewhat akin to Haas' relating to the integration of new members into alliances.²⁰ He distinguishes between a mere "military alliance" and what he calls a "security-community," producing a list of conditions for meeting the requirements of each. One of the requirements for a security-community is that there be a shared threat perception on the part of all the member nations, but Deutsch places less emphasis on this than Haas. He concludes it is possible that an alliance member can be used by the strong members of that alliance to help counter a threat not equally felt by all. In effect, a member can belong to the military alliance without being fully integrated into the security-community. This view rings true in some of the U.S.-dominated inter-American decisions over the years. In light of Deutsch's comment about how a nation can be "used," the case of the 1965 Dominican Republic intervention comes to mind. As previously discussed, the U.S. made a unilateral decision to act and after the fact sought legitimacy through the OAS and the IADB. I dare say the Brazilian general appointed head of the Inter-American Peace Force was just one visible reflection of a country being "used"; the fact a Brazilian was selected was merely to put a Latin American face on what was a decidedly U.S. military action.²¹

Of course, Deutsch's analysis is focused on Europe, not Latin America. Still, some of his thoughts are worthy of mentioning. His study, performed under the auspices of Princeton University's

Center for Research on World Political Institutions, concerns the problem of building a wider political community. It is interdisciplinary in approach, with history and political science associates collaborating closely during all stages. The comparative generalizations are mainly the work of Deutsch himself while at MIT and are based on his analysis of several detailed historical studies. He looks at the past experiences of Germany, the Habsburg Empire, Italy, Norway-Sweden, Switzerland, the UK, and the U.S. The contemporary application of historical findings is mainly the work of Princeton's Richard Van Wagenen, who originated the project and directed it throughout.²²

Despite not being able to label the grouping of nations which comprise the OAS, or belong to the IADB, or subscribe to the Rio Treaty as a "military alliance," it might be illustrative to see to what degree they meet Deutsch's criteria for a "security-community." He utilizes a chain of definitions to inform the reader as to what he means by this term:

A SECURITY-COMMUNITY is a group of people which has become "integrated."

By INTEGRATION we mean the attainment, within a territory, of a "sense of community" and of institutions and practices strong enough and widespread enough to assure, for a "long" time, dependable expectations of "peaceful change" among its population.

By SENSE OF COMMUNITY we mean a belief on the part of individuals in a group that they have come to agreement on at least this one point: that common social problems must and can be resolved by processes of "peaceful change."

By PEACEFUL CHANGE we mean the resolution of social problems, normally by institutionalized procedures, without resort to large-scale physical force.²³

In studying the historical cases, Deutsch found nine essential conditions for the establishment of an amalgamated security-community: (1) mutual compatibility of main values; (2) a distinctive way of life; (3) expectations of stronger economic ties or gains; (4) a marked increase in political and administrative capabilities of at least some participating units; (5) superior economic growth on the part of at least some participating units; (6) unbroken links of social communication, both geographically between territories and sociologically between different social strata; (7) a broadening of the political elite; (8) mobility of persons, at least among the politically relevant strata; and (9) a multiplicity of ranges of communication and transaction.²⁵

Of course, the nations in the inter-American community will never become amalgamated. Therefore, let us consider what Deutsch has to say about pluralistic security-communities. In the Latin American arena, he notes that the idea of a war against Mexico was clearly unpopular in the U.S. in the late 1920's and early 1930's, while such a war would have been "military folly" from the point of view of Mexico. Despite the tense dispute over U.S. oil properties in Mexico, the period witnessed the emergence of a pluralistic security-community between the two countries. The conditions which permitted this to occur in the twentieth century did not exist when the two countries went to war in the middle of the nineteenth. According to Deutsch, "The developing tradition of Pan-Americanism and later of Inter-American cooperation gradually found increasing embodiment in specific legislation and institutions. This contributed to a favorable background for the pluralistic security-community between the two countries."²⁶

Pluralistic security-communities have succeeded under far less favorable conditions than those required for an amalgamated community. Of the nine listed as essential for the latter, only two or three were found to be important for a pluralistic community as well. First is the compatibility of major values, and second is the capacity of participating political units to respond to each other's needs, messages, and actions quickly, adequately, and without resort to violence. Deutsch says that such capabilities for political responsiveness require in each participant state many established political habits and functioning political institutions favoring mutual communication and consultation. Based on my earlier comments about the deteriorating state of political responsiveness in the region, I am pessimistic that the inter-American organs fully qualify on this count. A third essential condition for a pluralistic security-community might be mutual predictability of behavior, but Deutsch feels less strongly about this condition than the first two.²⁷

Deutsch found four conditions that were helpful to both types of integration but not essential to either: (1) reluctance to wage "fratricidal" war; (2) an outside military threat; (3) strong economic ties; and (4) ethnic and linguistic assimilation. It is interesting to note that the inter-American system rates rather poorly on these conditions. Fratricidal war, though of limited scope and severity to the overall relationship, has occurred in Latin America. Like the predicament between Greece and Turkey in NATO, it cannot help but degrade the cohesiveness of the community

at large. Here again, the idea of an external threat comes up, but less weight is given to it than by some other scholars. Deutsch found that, where a foreign military threat existed, its effects were transitory. Most often it provided an impetus toward temporary military alliances, while more permanent unions derived their main support from other factors. It was determined that it is possible to amalgamate in the absence of such a threat, and the mere presence of a threat did not always suffice to bring about amalgamation.

Although sometimes helpful in inducing strong or privileged members to become more generous in sharing their privileges with smaller or potential partners, the total effect of a threat is hard to predict. Sometimes, in fact, it has the opposite effect by amplifying a state of fear which only produces rigidities and reduces the responsiveness of the stronger members. Due to the unreliability of the threat as a predictive condition, Deutsch downplays its salience in promoting integration.²⁸ Some strides are being made on the other two conditions. Regarding economic ties, such efforts as the Caribbean Basin Initiative could prove helpful in tightening the inter-American community, and programs such as bilingual education and acceptance of a certain number of migrant workers in the U.S. can help in the realm of ethnic assimilation.

It is curious to note that, in suggesting ways to strengthen the NATO community, Deutsch cites some inter-American arrangements as role models. He feels that the ministerial meetings of the

North Atlantic Council might be used for deeper discussion of non-military matters, as is done in almost all of the inter-American bodies, to include the IADB. Another method he suggests is to hold periodic conferences of the NATO countries in the way that the OAS holds periodic Inter-American Conferences.²⁹ In other words, although the inter-American system is not purely a military alliance, it performs certain functions that Deutsch sees as vital to the health of security-communities. Social, economic, and political concerns are just as relevant to the success of a security-community, whether amalgamated or pluralistic, as are military preparations and plans. We should not lament that we do not possess a true military alliance in the Western Hemisphere. In Deutsch's view, "Military alliances seemed to be relatively poor pathways toward amalgamation, as well as toward pluralistic integration. In and by themselves, such alliances did not seem to be very helpful. To be effective, they had to be associated with nonmilitary steps."³⁰ Far more important to the well-being of a region and to long-range peace is the fostering of conditions leading to the building of pluralistic security-communities.

In achieving integration, Deutsch's findings indicate the need for two general policies in the North Atlantic area. One is to experiment with functional organizations outside the framework itself, such as the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and the European Atomic Energy Agency (EURATOM), which later formed the foundation of the more all-encompassing European Communities. Such experimentation can help the participating governments and peoples to

develop firmer habits of responsiveness and to gain experience concerning the capacities and limitations of such organizations. Of course, the inter-American system too has functional organizations similar to the ECSC and EURATOM outside of any alliance structure, such as the IADB and the Inter-American Nuclear Energy Commission (IANEC). What Deutsch seems to be saying is that such organizations serve a useful purpose merely in that they provide valuable experience in multilateral cooperation and communication, whether they in fact achieve any concrete results or not. The other general policy he calls for is the preservation and further development of the chief international organization in the region-- NATO--and a progressive tilt toward stressing its "economic and social potentialities" and toward "the greater political possibilities that might come from new organs of consultation and decision which could be built into it." He advocates making NATO "much more than a military alliance," which I feel it has become in the quarter century since the book was published.³¹

Translating this idea to the Latin American arena, of course the chief international organization is the OAS, which already was doing many of the non-military functions Deutsch was seeking for NATO. The military aspect should not be discounted, and we do at least possess the Rio Treaty arrangement, the consultative aspects of the OAS, and the IADB ready and willing to lend assistance and expertise. Perhaps that is sufficient, given that the Western Hemisphere has managed to avoid full-scale war. Indeed,

Deutsch feels the non-military efforts of a security-community may be the most effective ways to advance the development of political community and to contribute to the eventual abolition of war.³²

The thoughts expressed in the last few pages in no way exhaust the rich literature on coalition theory. Other interesting works are available, notably some shorter and less well-known articles dealing directly with Latin America.³³ Although it is inappropriate to devote any more space to theory at this point, one more excellent book which briefly will be alluded to in Chapter 5 is The Anatomy of Influence by Cox and Jacobson. Let us now move on to examining a more realistic, pragmatic, and current perspective, that of individuals actually serving in the defense of the hemisphere.

Interpretation of Questionnaire

The environment at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC) lends itself to easy access to a large number of military personnel, both U.S. and foreign, with a broad range of skills and experiences. Therefore, based on my previously stated feeling that the IADB is not a well-known entity, even within the defense community, I decided to administer the questionnaire found at Appendix 2 to ascertain the level of awareness. The three groups at CGSC who were asked to complete it were: (1) all the Latin American students (hereafter referred to as Group A); (2) U.S. students with FAO-related assignment experience in Latin America (Group B); and (3) a random sample of all U.S. students

(Group C). It should be pointed out that Group B included neither all U.S. students having served in Latin America, some of whom were assigned to regular U.S. troop units mainly in Panama, nor all designated Latin American FAO's, some of whom like the author have yet to have served in Latin America. Instead, the intent was to identify those students whose assignment experience or academic preparation for the FAO specialty might have led them to become familiar with certain regional organizations.

Although no attempt was made to distinguish between respondents within each group by biographical background, the composite data are provided at Appendix 3 for the reader's information. The major thrust of the research was to determine if there were significant differences in the responses among the three groups and especially between Groups A and B. In addition to Group C, a fourth control group (Group D) was utilized consisting of college students enrolled in social science courses at the University of Wisconsin at La Crosse.³⁴ Although this group reflects a few present or former military personnel and there was one foreign respondent, it was felt that the results should offer a fairly good indication of the level of awareness among a predominantly civilian audience. The populations of the four groups of respondents are as follows: Group A--13 (out of 13 given the questionnaire); Group B--12 (out of 12); Group C--57 (out of 75); and Group D--37 (out of 37). Total N for all four groups was 119.

A total of 100 questionnaires was sent out to CGSC students, with 82 responding. Responses were solicited from 10.26% of the

total 1982-83 CGSC resident course, and returns represented a significant 8.41% of total course enrollment. At the time the questionnaire was administered in November-December 1982, there were 975 students in the class. That time frame was chosen both to insure that Reserve Component (RC) students who graduated in December would be included and to determine the level of student knowledge before any of them had a chance to be exposed to area electives or regional assessment core courses beginning in January. In other words, the students had taken all courses in common up to that point; any difference in knowledge could thus be attributed to pre-CGSC experience. As it turned out, five RC students appeared in the sample, four of them in the Army National Guard (ARNG) and one in the U.S. Army Reserve (USAR). Group C was obtained from a computer-produced random number generator table and the consolidated roster of all CGSC students. Substitution was utilized whenever one of the names already represented in Group A or B came up. To insure that at least 75 names could be selected for Group C, 100 numbers were generated to allow for substitution. Twelve turned out already to be in one of those two groups. Another thirteen names (to include one ARNG) were dropped randomly to bring Group C down to a manageable 75 students; the total for Groups A and B was 25. Responses were tallied manually.

The most logical way of examining the questionnaire results is to take the questions sequentially and attempt to analyze the responses. Although it is not deemed necessary to rank order the questions in terms of degree of difficulty based on the average

percentage "correct," it should prove useful to try to describe why the students responded the way they did in light of which group they represent and the way the question was worded. The term "correct" may be a misnomer; on some questions there really is no single "correct" answer, but rather an "expected" answer based on official literature about the Board. These "expected" answers are circled or written in the spaces on the sample questionnaire in Appendix 2, with the percent of responses for each group written next to the question.

Coding was made slightly more difficult by making the generally objective questions at least in part subjective through having a choice designated "other." The intent here was to make the questions somewhat open-ended in order to facilitate student leeway in responding. The last question is completely open-ended, and analysis of it will therefore be totally subjective. Limited statistical analysis was performed on the other questions. Upon initially discovering how seemingly close the results for Groups A and B were, I decided to evaluate some questions more closely using the Chi square statistic (χ^2). Anytime hereafter that mention is made of the difference in results being "statistically significant," reference is being made to that statistic. The probability value (p) used is .05.

Before addressing the IADB specifically, the questionnaire first sets the stage by asking about the OAS. This was done for three reasons: (1) Since students are being asked to identify acronyms, not normally considered a sound pedagogical approach,

they are "broken in" by first being given an acronym that a large number would be expected to know (and a cautionary note is provided to steer them away from another version of the same acronym taught as part of the tactics curriculum at CGSC); (2) since the geographic area of the world is not initially identified, the reference to the OAS in effect provides a "hint" to get the respondents thinking in terms of Latin America; (3) it was surmised that more would recognize the OAS than the IADB, and therefore it is logical on an exercise of this sort to move from the familiar to the less familiar.

The results of Questions #1 and #2 were as predicted in advance. Virtually all members of Groups A and B were familiar with the OAS, and most Group C personnel knew the term also. I would have guessed that the majority of students had been exposed to the OAS perhaps as far back as high school, but the results of Group D tend to discount that. It is surprising that so few of the Wisconsin group knew the term, especially considering that 40% are taking a course in Latin American politics, 49% a course in international relations, and 11% both. For the CGSC students, statistically there is no difference among Groups A, B, and C; they are equally familiar with the OAS. The χ^2 goodness-of-fit analysis was not performed for Group D on any of the questions. The large discrepancy of knowledge between Groups A, B, and C on the one hand and Group D on the other is likely attributable to the fact that the military students are on the whole older, more experienced, and evidently have been exposed to at least the defense aspects of the OAS sometime during their careers.

Moving to Question #3, the percentages tend to indicate that there is a difference in knowledge level among the three CGSC groups about the original purpose of the CAS. However, statistical analysis does not back this up; the differences (calculated on a 2x2 basis for each of the three combinations of pairs) are not statistically significant. That the dominant incorrect response was "political stability" is logical since one could argue that stability is a desired product of solidarity, or at least related to it. Only one person used the "other" option and wrote in "hemispheric co-operation," which is virtually the same as "hemispheric solidarity."

With Questions #4 and #5 we arrive at the real purpose of the questionnaire, i.e., to gain insights as to how much people know about the IADB. Not surprisingly, this is the first question in which the results proved to be statistically significant among the Latin America-oriented CGSC students versus the CGSC student population at large ($\chi^2_{A,C}=13.67$, $p<.01$; $\chi^2_{B,C}=15.68$, $p<.01$). Groups A and B generally knew what the IADB is, the difference between them being insignificant. Both differed significantly from Group C, and none of the members of Group D knew the term.

It was predicted that some individuals might confuse the IADB with the IDB, the Inter-American Development Bank, since the acronyms are so similar. It was also predicted that some of the Latin American students might be confused because the Spanish and Portuguese acronyms differ from the English; for example, the IADB in Spanish is JID (Junta Interamericana de Defensa) and the IDB is Bid (Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo). Still, it was decided

to keep the questionnaire totally in English, since all CGSC students are supposed to be fairly fluent. Both predictions proved to be true, although happily there was less confusion than expected, especially on the second point. Only two members of Group A thought the questions were referring to the IDB, and none had trouble with the English acronym after a couple approached the author for clarification. It is interesting that two of the four Latin American students who did not know what the IADB is are the two Brazilian officers. It is not known whether the fact they speak Portuguese instead of Spanish had anything to do with that outcome. Of course, the Brazilian Army is the largest in South America. Thus, there is a greater chance that representative officers sent from Brazil to CGSC would be more like the U.S. officers at the school (represented in Group C) who are typical of the largest army in North America.

Only one individual from Group B got IADB and IDB confused. This confusion accounts for the fact that with Group A a larger percentage claimed to know what the acronym is than could define it correctly. The equal percentage on Questions #4 and #5 for Group B results from the one person who was confused being balanced off by another claiming he did not know the acronym but guessing correctly anyway. This phenomenon occurred with Group C also, several of them guessing correctly undoubtedly due to the context of the other questions. None of the Group D members displayed such good fortune.

On Question #6, again the difference between Groups A and B is not significant. It is difficult to evaluate the results of Group C based on the small number who responded to that question. Based on total N for that group, only 14% answered correctly. If, however, the percentage is based on just those who in fact responded to the question (including those who were instructed not to but did anyway), a commendable 80% answered correctly. That is why two percentages are indicated in Appendix 2. Here again, though, several indicated they were guessing. The dominant incorrect response was "economic cooperation," due in large part to those individuals who were thinking in terms of the IDB. The only "other" option selected was "economic development," which varies little from "economic cooperation." Looking back in hindsight, the question probably should have been worded a little differently. As discussed in Chapter 3, the formal planning function of the Board was not legitimized until 1961. Up to that point, the Board was supposed to coordinate defense policies and recommend measures to member governments. Although some informal planning had occurred since 1942, that was not the raison d'être of the organization. Nevertheless, I doubt the poor wording of the question misled any respondees. Unfortunately, this flaw did not surface when the questionnaire was pre-tested.³⁵

Guessing reached its highest plane of excellence on Question #7. In fact, 61% of Group C correctly identified Cuba as not being a member of the IADB. However, the gap between this percentage and

those of Groups A and B is still statistically significant ($\chi^2_{A,C}=4.99$, $p<.02$; $\chi^2_{B,C}=4.50$, $p<.03$). I dare say that most members of Group C and nearly a majority of Group D selected "Cuba" because they realize it is the most castigated nation in the hemisphere. I doubt that many would know Cuba had been a member of the Board at one time or the circumstances surrounding its loss of membership. Perhaps the question offered no good distractors. I had hoped that some respondees might be swayed toward "Bolivia," given the publicity surrounding the Che Guevara incident and the long history of instability in that nation, but few were distracted from "Cuba." Not surprisingly, the dominant incorrect response was the "United States," which could perhaps be linked to the fact that on Question #9 "Washington" was selected the fewest times by Group C as the location of the Board headquarters. Apparently, a good number of U.S. students not overly familiar with inter-American affairs feels that those affairs are considerably less U.S.-centered than do those more cognizant of hemispheric politics.

A slight difference in our normal pattern surfaced on Question #8. In this case, unlike the other IADB questions, there is no significant difference between Groups A and C, but there is between Groups B and C ($\chi^2_{B,C}=4.38$, $p<.03$). On this question the dominant response overall was incorrect; however, this was expected. The "1960's" seems to be a reasonable choice when one considers how visible Latin America became in the news of that time, with such incidents as the Cuban Missile Crisis,

the Dominican Republic intervention, and the eruption of myriad revolutionary activities. That U.S. attention to the region was strongly renewed with the Alliance for Progress under President Kennedy could have lent some credence to that choice. Moreover, it should be remembered that the majority of respondees were just approaching adulthood and becoming fully politicized by that decade. Hence, they were more aware of political and military events occurring in the 1960's than they were of those in the 1940's and 1950's. Only those schooled intensively in Latin American history, e.g., the FAO's, could be expected to know that the IADB has been in existence as long as it has. Even here, though, the percentages are less than encouraging.

Few surprises were engendered by the results of Question #9. Both Groups A and B differ significantly from Group C ($\chi^2_{A,C}=35.88$, $p<.01$; $\chi^2_{B,C}=28.21$, $p<.01$), while Groups C and D scattered responses in an equally inconsistent fashion. There was no single dominant incorrect response. That so many members of Group C selected "Rio de Janeiro" is rather mysterious. After all, Rio is not even the capital city of its own country. It is difficult to imagine the headquarters of a regional organization being set up in a commercial center lacking the bureaucratic infrastructure and diplomatic contacts normally considered requisite for the functioning of such a body.

Question #10 is very important because it specifically relates to the exploratory theme of the thesis. In contrast to Question #6, I was interested in whether the students feel the IADB still performs

adequately what has allegedly been its major function all along. Interestingly, the percentages for Groups A and B indicate a prominent preference for the choice of "hemispheric security planning" on both Questions #6 and #10. Those of Group C responding (again with many guessing) actually rose in percentage; of course, this tells us little because most were instructed to skip Question #6. The dominant "incorrect" response was "receipt and distribution of foreign and military aid." It is difficult to explain why this choice was so popular, since it is not really a true answer at all. Perhaps if that option had been offered as a distractor on Question #6 as well, more students would have selected it. It was expected that a large percentage would opt for "officer training." That, in fact, is a legitimate function of the Board through the supervision and oversight of the IADC. Some sources on the IADB indicate that the IADC is the most viable function of the Board still being performed, but the results of Questions #10 and #11 fail to back up this view. The group differences on Question #10 turn out to be statistically insignificant.

There is no way to analyze the results of the final question other than a purely subjective interpretation, since the question was deliberately made open-ended to encourage unconstrained responses. Some excellent insights were gained and a few clear patterns emerged, especially from the students of Groups A and B. The most logical way to review the responses is to look at the individual groups in turn and then try to make some generalizations at the end.

Of the thirteen respondents in Group A, seven of their responses to Question #11 were meaningful. Two of the others answered in terms of the IDB, while the remaining four gave "I don't know" type responses. Three claimed that the IADB no longer serves a useful purpose, giving the following paraphrased reasons:

(1) It primarily serves U.S. interests instead of "American" interests; it is supposed to be working for the benefit of all countries on the continent.

(2) Some countries do not cooperate or do not accomplish the purpose for which it was created.

(3) Each nation has a different approach to its national interests/objectives; the primary purpose of the Board was to protect the hemisphere against Communist attack or extra-continental attacks; most of the countries are content to keep representatives on the Board, but merely as a political representation.

Four felt the IADB still serves a useful purpose, with the following rationales:

(1) All alliances, whether American or European, make a significant contribution in the fight against international Communism.

(2) The Board is good for continental planning, but has many political limitations and problems with sovereignty; there are different perspectives regarding military training, different ideas than the U.S. regarding counterinsurgency, difficulties with standardizing weapons systems, lack of cohesion, and different ideas regarding logistics and the organization of materiel.

(3) Its usefulness is relative because, in order to run effectively any multinational military organization or treaty, there must be a policy consensus between governments; this is not the situation today politically in the OAS.

(4) It provides an opportunity for members to exchange professional ideas and views from a wide range of sources; it is a hybrid institution because it depends on the OAS; if independent, perhaps it could better outline defined objectives; the OAS does not provide it with any guidance for its work.

It is imperative to confess that the final set of comments came from a Latin American officer who actually served on the IADB. The views follow very closely those of the sole Latin American liaison officer assigned to CGSC who, although having no prior assignments with the Board, has contacts with the organization and has done considerable research on the issue of hemispheric security. Some of his other ideas will be considered in Chapter 5.

Nine of the twelve Group B members provided useful responses. Two gave "I don't know" type responses, while one got the IADB and the IDB confused. Here is a capsulization of the two negative responses:

(1) It is more a political body of advisors than a military one; internal rivalries and mutual suspicions among the various Latin American nations, coupled with different attitudes toward the perceived threat to their nations, have driven the organization into oblivion; it lacks the capability for conducting effective hemispheric security planning.

(2) It is composed of a motley crew of officers living it up in the D.C. area; the planning they do contributes little or nothing to hemispheric security; the Board has no power to direct, only to suggest courses of action, and those suggestions have no importance or influence on the volatile Latin American governments.

Most of the U.S. FAO responses were guardedly positive:

(1) The Board provides a forum for exchange of ideas between Latin American countries.

(2) It offers a forum for discussion, but there are few concrete, important decisions; it can be used by the U.S. to increase Latin America's sense of participation.

(3) It serves the purposes of hemispheric security planning, inter-communications between the military forces, and hemispheric threat assessment and cooperation.

(4) It is useful as a high-visibility, political-military representative presence; it is not useful as a mission-specific, functionally oriented organization; from the Latin perspective, assignment to the Board is either a reward (monetary/consumer acquisition) or a temporary exile; from the U.S. perspective, it represents a physical manifestation of the psychological need for Latin America and pays lip service to hemispheric solidarity.

(5) It provides for an exchange of views among military/diplomatic personnel regarding hemispheric security issues; it also performs long-range combined training exercises/planning.

(6) The Board gets Latin American representatives together; some of its officers are very capable; it is like other multinational assemblages--bureaucratic and slow to move.

(7) It keeps open lines of communication which promote understanding and cooperation among the various members' military forces.

Of the ten respondees in Group C who correctly identified the IADB, five claimed in Question #11 not to know whether it serves a useful purpose and two others left the question blank. The three who answered the question were generally negative:

(1) It is merely a paper organization with no real power; it is not given much credence worldwide.

(2) The Board does nothing.

(3) The IADC may serve some useful political purpose for the U.S.

None of the Group D students had anything to say on Question #11, since none had correctly identified the Board earlier. However, the questionnaire was also administered to a Wisconsin faculty member with some Latin American background and prior enlisted service in the U.S. military (statistics not included in the sample). He claims the IADB can be used to transmit U.S. values to Latin American officers. Of secondary significance are its strategic benefits.

The overall gist of these responses to Question #11 is that the Latin American students tend to view the Board nationalistically. They see the IADB as a political animal, but one that is decidedly U.S.-centered. Only one respondent makes the argument that the Board is useful as a forum for discussion, which seems to be a common attitude among the U.S. FAO's. Not coincidentally, he is the sole officer to have served on the Board and has spent much

time in the U.S. As expected, a few of the U.S. officers openly admit that the Board offers the opportunity for the U.S. to control the Latin American members or to realize its own interests by using the Latin American representation.

Only a few members of any of the groups placed hemispheric security planning high on the agenda of priorities. Interestingly, only one individual, who was from Group C no less, mentioned the IADC. In much of the literature the College gets very high marks for promoting hemispheric solidarity, and some observers go so far as to say it is the major success of the Board. Moreover, the IADB itself, in its official literature, publicizes the fact that it oversees the College. Of course, it must be realized that few, if any, of the members of the groups have had any contact with the IADC. It is a senior service school, unlike CGSC which is a mid-career institution. There is little reason to expect that either the U.S. or Latin American officers would have much of an appreciation for the IADC at this stage of their careers.

To sum up, the questionnaire results proved most enlightening but offered few surprises. As predicted, the U.S. FAO's and the Latin American officers far outpaced the two control groups in knowledge about the IADB. Although the FAO's are more knowledgeable than the Latins from a percentage perspective, in most cases this gap turns out not to be statistically significant. There is really no reason to expect that the Latin Americans should be more knowledgeable. Theoretically, they should be on the same level as the U.S. students in Group C, i.e., above-average military officers with no specific orientation toward inter-American organizations.

In reality, however, they know considerably more about inter-American affairs than their U.S. counterparts. Similarly, no doubt the majority of West Europeans would know more about NATO politics than would the majority of U.S. citizens, simply because their home territory is directly involved and their nations' entire defense policies revolve around that alliance. An additional factor may be that the Latin American students are on the whole older, more senior (eight of thirteen are lieutenant colonels), and have more years of service than their U.S. counterparts at CGSC. Although generally having less civilian education, most of them attended their own country's command and staff college as part of the screening process for being selected to attend USAACGSC.

With these fresh individual perspectives in mind, and with the variegated history of the IADB as a base, let us now attempt to reach some conclusions about the organization. Of course, mere opinions by themselves serve little useful purpose unless some constructive recommendations are offered to remedy the problems.

NOTES

1. Richard E. Neustadt, Alliance Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970), p. ix.

2. Although Neustadt talks about "bureaucratic politics" throughout his book, and even moreso in his other works on presidential power, he never precisely defines the term. Nor do most scholars who commonly use it and generally accept its validity. The sense in which I apply the concept is in line with the model portrayed by Graham Allison (see note #5). In particular, the aspects of his "governmental (bureaucratic) politics paradigm" I find most revealing are such things as political bargaining among a number of independent players; inevitable differences over goals, alternatives, and consequences; and the process of conflict and consensus building. See Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1971), p. 162.

3. Most readers are familiar with the Suez Crisis. The Skybolt was a proposed air-to-surface missile which the British claimed they needed to sustain their independence as a nuclear power. After initial promises of joint cooperation, the U.S. unilaterally cancelled the project, producing considerable tension and a crisis of confidence leading to strained relations between the two allies. See Neustadt, Alliance Politics, p. 1.

4. Neustadt, Alliance Politics, pp. 56-71.

5. Neustadt, Alliance Politics, p. 140. See also Allison's "Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis," American Political Science Review, September 1969, pp. 689-718, which served as the pioneer piece for his later Essence of Decision. "Model I" is commonly known as the "rational actor model" and "Model II" as the "organizational process model." Some experts include also John D. Steinbruner's ideas on "cognitive process" as a "Model IV." See his The Cybernetic Theory of Decision: New Dimensions of Political Analysis (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1974). All of these efforts stemmed from the collegial work of a group of experts at the Institute of Politics of Harvard's John F. Kennedy School. The group was called the Research Seminar on Bureaucracy, Politics, and Policy and included at one time or another such scholars as Ernest May, Morton Halperin, Joseph Nye, Michel Crozier, Albert Hirschman, Stanley Hoffmann, Thomas Schelling, Adam Yarmolinsky, Allison, Neustadt, and Steinbruner. Their stated purpose in studying several events in recent years was ultimately to be able to move from the realm of mere explanation to prediction.

6. Neustadt, Alliance Politics, p. 73.

7. Neustadt, Alliance Politics, p. 73.

8. Of course, the largest Latin American nation--Brazil--is Portuguese-speaking, and a few of the smaller countries speak languages other than Spanish, such as Haiti which is of French descent and Guyana British. The issue of language will be addressed in more detail in the next section in conjunction with the survey.

9. Neustadt, Alliance Politics, p. 74.

10. Neustadt, Alliance Politics, p. 137.

11. Neustadt, Alliance Politics, pp. 143-144.

12. Neustadt, Alliance Politics, p. 145.

13. Kenneth P. Fleischer, unpublished manuscript, "Spain and NATO: A Case Study in Alliance Theory," dated May 6, 1981, p. 1.

14. Fleischer, "Spain and NATO," pp. 25-27.

15. Fleischer, "Spain and NATO," pp. 3-4.

16. Fleischer, "Spain and NATO," p. 4.

17. Fleischer, "Spain and NATO," p. 9.

18. Fleischer, "Spain and NATO," p. 11.

19. Fleischer, "Spain and NATO," pp. 28-29.

20. Karl W. Deutsch, Sidney A. Burrell, Robert A. Kann, Maurice Lee, Jr., Martin Lichterman, Raymond E. Lindgren, Francis L. Loewenheim, and Richard W. Van Wagenen, Political Community and the North Atlantic Area (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1957). Although somewhat dated, this work can be considered a classic from the point of view of its rich theoretical framework still applicable to this day.

21. The reasons why Brazil would allow itself to be used in this way were discussed previously in Chapter 3 (p. 59). In short, Brazil and the other participating nations desire influence in Latin American affairs and seek to prevent outside interference, namely Soviet or Communist. Sometimes, to achieve these aims, they realize they must bow to U.S. policy decisions and actions, even when it is distasteful to do so.

22. Deutsch, et. al., Political Community, pp. vii-viii.

23. Deutsch, et. al., Political Community, p. 5.

24. Deutsch, et. al., Political Community, pp. 6-7.
25. Deutsch, et. al., Political Community, p. 58.
26. Deutsch, et. al., Political Community, p. 116.
27. Deutsch, et. al., Political Community, pp. 66-67.
28. Deutsch, et. al., Political Community, pp. 154-158.
29. Deutsch, et. al., Political Community, pp. 194-195.

Not only do the civilian leaders of OAS states meet periodically but, beginning in 1960, the chiefs of staff of the various American armies began to hold annual conferences. According to Hanley, these conferences were held in the Panama Canal Zone until the fifth of the series, which was held at West Point. Similar conferences were held by the air force and naval chiefs with one notable difference--these services alternated their conference sites between U.S. locations and Latin American capitals. Agendas for the conferences have been prepared for the most part with U.S. leadership and limited participation by Latin American officials. Some IADB personnel have taken part in preparing the programs for these sessions, but only because they were also attachés or occupying comparable positions. In later years the Board has been invited to send observers to the meetings. Hanley feels it would be logical to ask the IADB to help prepare the meeting agendas, present briefings, and take part in the preparation of conference reports. Alternatively, the Board could offer to perform these services. The navy conferences of 1961 and 1963 adopted resolutions urging the IADB to improve the exchange of military intelligence within the hemisphere. In addition, IADB delegates were invited to attend later navy conferences to discuss defense of maritime traffic. During the 1963 air force conference, delegates visited the IADB and the IADC; the following year one of the agenda items centered on a broader role for the Board in its relations with the OAS. Ironically, reports of these conferences do not indicate that copies of the proceedings were sent to the IADB. The report of the third army conference in 1962 was sent to the IADC Director, who addressed the gathering, but not to the Board itself. The same occurred after the succeeding army conferences. Two IADB observers at the 1964 conference, in a written report to the Council of Delegates, pointed out that many of the subjects discussed were matters producing IADB resolutions more than two years before. See Paul T. Hanley, "The Inter-American Defense Board" (unpublished PhD dissertation, Stanford University, 1965), pp. 160-161. According to COL Luiz G.S. Lessa, Brazilian liaison officer to CGSC, in a January 27, 1983, interview, the so-called Conference of American Armies currently meets only every four years. Perhaps this is due to a recognized redundancy of agenda items with ongoing IADB initiatives. Although I was unable to find any other references dealing with recent conferences or IADB involvement with them, this forum has the potential to provide one more point of access for Board influence and expertise to be utilized in positive ways.

30. Deutsch, et. al., Political Community, p. 202.
31. Deutsch, et. al., Political Community, pp. 202-203.
32. Deutsch, et. al., Political Community, pp. 202-203.

33. See, for example, BG (Ret) E. Vandevanter, Jr., "A Further Inquiry into the Nature of Alliances: NATO and the OAS," RAND Corporation Study #P3832, April 1968, which compares the two alliances functionally as well as structurally. See also William Zimmerman, "Hierarchical Regional Systems and the Politics of System Boundaries," pp. 18-36, and Kathy Harmon, "The Schmitter Operationalization of the Size-Power Variable: A Research Note," pp. 136-142, both in International Organization, Winter 1972. The former article deals with the conditions under which member states of a hierarchical regional system, including both great powers and relatively small powers, seek to influence the salience that boundaries have for such a system. The evidence is drawn from a comparison of the OAS with the Warsaw Pact and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON). The latter article critiques the work of Latin America expert and sociologist Philippe Schmitter in light of Ernst Haas' claim that "the relative size of the member states in a regional grouping is not a good overall predictor of the success of integration." It represents one effort to examine the phenomenon I have discussed in which there is imbalance in the sizes of an organization's member states. For a less esoteric but more readable piece that looks at U.S. involvement in regional arrangements not only in Latin America but throughout the world, see Joseph S. Nye, "United States Policy Toward Regional Organization," International Organization, Summer 1969, pp. 719-740.

34. The author is indebted to Professor John T. Fishel for volunteering to administer the questionnaire to his students and for computing the statistics for this group. The author also wishes to thank MAJ Henry L. Thompson for his invaluable assistance in computing the statistics for the other three groups of respondees. These two individuals, both with doctorates and having considerable more expertise in performing statistical analysis than the author, continually have provided excellent guidance and advice throughout this project.

35. The questionnaire was pre-tested by the thesis committee members, by the Latin American liaison officer assigned to CGSC, and by the CGSC office responsible for approving surveys and monitoring their results.

Chapter 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Overview

From reviewing the IADB's report card over the years and canvassing the views of others, I believe it is fair to say the organization does have a useful purpose, albeit a rather narrowly defined one and certainly a much less significant one than was envisaged at its founding in 1942. A critical problem is that the world in which we now live is very much different than it was during the threatening years of World War II, when almost everyone could agree on the nature of the threat and how to deal with it. The challenges for the IADB have changed, dissipating its utility in its originally conceived role and creating ambivalence on the part of some of its members.

In the lexicon of international organization theory, perhaps it is reasonable to classify the IADB now as a "forum organization." That is the rubric used by Robert Cox and Harold Jacobson in their book The Anatomy of Influence to describe those international organizations which provide a framework for member states to carry on many different activities ranging from a mere exchange of views to the negotiation of binding legal instruments to collective legitimation of policies to propaganda. Cox and Jacobson contrast this type of entity to the "service organization," which conducts concrete activities itself and provides common services to its

members.¹ In 1942 the IADB likely was envisioned to be both but over the years has devolved primarily into the former. What seems to be needed most is a complete rethinking of the organization's mission. Latin American defense issues have evolved in the last three decades from an emphasis on external attack in the 1940's, to internal threats from Communist subversion in the 1950's and 1960's, to intra-regional disputes in the 1970's, to externally-supported insurgencies in the 1980's, or what one observer dubs as "radical nationalist" movements.² For an organization initially created to coordinate response to direct external threats from outside the hemisphere, it has been difficult to adapt to the changing scene while maintaining visibility and salience. The result is a body finding itself awash in a sort of nebulous purgatory, producing on occasion a spark of self-esteem but more often than not merely frustration and dashed expectations.

For a while in the moribund 1970's, the continuing shrinkage of the world along with superpower détente reduced hemisphere defense to where it approximated being a non-issue. However, the resurgence of U.S. interest in Latin American affairs in the 1980's portends at least a partial resuscitation of what some had come to regard as an obsolete concept. To be fair, the IADB all along diligently has gone about its daily chores of writing military plans, making inspection trips, and discussing strategy, but usually the mission being performed has been extremely low-key, even obscure. Few people worry about security until it is in jeopardy. Moreover, the greater participation in world affairs

by Latin American nations and by the Third World in general for the most part has made worldwide instruments of diplomacy more meaningful than regional ones.

For example, the Report by the Commission on United States-Latin American Relations, chaired by former U.S. Ambassador to the OAS and Panama Canal Treaties negotiator Sol Linowitz, recognized that "among other realities, it is necessary to admit that the majority of Latin American and Caribbean countries are at a stage to fulfill an active role on a world-wide and not just a hemispheric scale....The principal questions about U.S. policy toward Latin America will increasingly become not a matter of relations between the U.S. and Latin America, but will involve global political and economic relations."³ Cochrane agrees and purports that Latin American countries have moved toward a "new diplomacy," citing that with the Cold War largely out of the way "a new diplomatic climate was beginning to pervade Latin America. Except in Cuba, Soviet military influence existed nowhere in the region, and the U.S. chastened by the two traumatic experiences of the Dominican Republic and...of Vietnam, was willing to project a 'low profile' toward Latin America."⁴

Of course, these observations were made in the quieter years of the previous decade. I perceive that this trend has now peaked, however, with Soviet (or Cuban as its proxy⁵) influence again rearing its ugly head, particularly in Central America and the Eastern Caribbean. Throughout these alternating periods of relative calm or turmoil, it is nonetheless obvious that Latin America's role in world politics has changed considerably, both maturing and becoming more complex.

The Threat and Responses to It

The idea of a direct, long-range external threat, other than of course the universal threat of nuclear holocaust, has pretty much evaporated. When asked a few years ago "Who is the enemy?" an aide to Lieutenant General Gordon Sumner, then IADB Chairman, replied with a smile, "I couldn't tell you." The man who asked that question is convinced the IADB sits around frantically searching for a new external threat. After Cuban support to the war in Angola in 1975, in which Castro used Guyana as a relay point for moving supplies and troops, talk in military circles at the Pentagon and at the IADB resurrected the old idea of pushing for a South Atlantic Treaty Organization modeled after NATO.⁶ Of course, a "SATO" would have more clout than the IADB simply in that it would control operational forces. With little perceptible external threat, however, such an alliance would have trouble justifying its existence and might serve only to dilute the U.S. military commitment to other theaters, such as Western Europe or Southwest Asia.

In fact, the U.S. troop component devoted to Latin America, the U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), is the smallest of all the major U.S. unified commands and was not so long ago the victim of repeated rumors about Washington that its total demise was not too far in the future. The organization now seems to be on the upswing, however, and the Commander-in-Chief (CINC) billet is reportedly being upgraded from three- to four-star rank, as it was in its earlier years.⁷ Nevertheless, SOUTHCOM's role in Latin

America continues to be hamstrung in that it has no operational responsibility for the Caribbean other than a few military assistance programs and has the dubious distinction of being located in the former Panama Canal Zone, which carries with it considerable political baggage. A recent development in the U.S. Army which bodes well for military attention to the region and to the reality of low intensity conflict in general is the establishment of the new 1st Special Operations Command (SOCCOM) (Airborne) at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Formally activated on October 1, 1982, SOCCOM brings under a single headquarters the U.S. Army Institute for Military Assistance, the two CONUS Ranger battalions, and Army Special Forces, civil affairs, and psychological operations units worldwide. As reported by Army Times, special operations forces are now expected to take the place of conventional forces in some of the areas where the Soviets have made the greatest gains, such as Latin America.⁸

Of course, the U.S. has been more worried all along about the spread of Communist subversion in the hemisphere than has the bulk of Latin America. One historian remarks:

After the Second World War the U.S. constantly pressed the members of the OAS to take united action against communism; but Latin America's rulers--although they would blame 'communist agitators' for any uprisings against their regimes--were not seriously alarmed by the threat of communism in their lands...communist parties existed legally or illegally in all of the republics; but they had a foreign air about them, and it seemed that the communist faith had not undergone the 'sea change' which is necessary before any ideology from abroad can become fertile in Latin America.⁹

There is still a general feeling in much of Latin America that the time when there was danger of Castro's revolution spreading has past.

Cuba has not been able to become strong enough economically to shed Soviet influence and emerge as a model that other Latin American reformers could emulate, other than as a form of charismatic cult worship of Castro himself which has surfaced at times in Guyana, Jamaica, and Panama, and now is being felt in some of the newly independent island nations in the Eastern Caribbean.

After the OAS voted in 1975 to end political and economic sanctions against Cuba, the U.S. representative, Ambassador William Mailliard, commented, "Cuban subversion in the area is now at a low ebb compared with what it was some years ago. Times have changed."¹⁰ "And so must hemisphere relations," was the response by OAS Secretary General Alejandro Orfila, the former Argentine ambassador to the U.S. Continuing he added:

After more than four years of debate and eleven years of embargo, the OAS has voted to end...sanctions intended to quarantine Cuba from the diverse world of the Western Hemisphere, in which it increasingly lives. The vote does not instruct other nations what to do. It simply frees all to act toward Cuba the way they want to. In fact, that is just what most of them have been doing anyway.¹¹

Linowitz feels the U.S. should comply. "Special sympathy is merited toward the proposals to terminate the Cuban blockade and to recognize the legitimacy of diverse ideologies in Latin America."¹² The Carter Administration seemed to lean toward this sentiment as it moved closer to full recognition by setting up an "interest section" in Havana.¹³

Orfila's idea of nations acting independently leads us to a central point germane to the status of the IADB. Is there genuine solidarity in the hemisphere, or is there just a facade of agreement

on the surface on more or less artificial issues which lend themselves to lowest common denominator-type consensus? I submit the latter is the case. Child, who probably represents accurately the viewpoint of most military personnel involved, claims the IADB is the product of compromise and mainly a diplomatic symbol.¹⁴

Looking at the question from an historian's perspective:

Although the Latin American nations have so much in common, practical cooperation among them has made slow progress since 1826, the year in which Bolívar convened the first American conference at Panama....Many inter-American conferences have been held. Usually they have ended in declarations of solidarity, etc., without much practical consequence.¹⁵

A philosopher and student of Latin American philosophy agrees:

The geographical setting itself was hardly conducive to close cooperation...along with all of those forces holding or pulling the nations of Latin America apart there has been the crucial problem of distrust and a lack of spiritual unity. In his El Perfil Americano (The American Profile)...Nieto complains: 'We (Latin Americans) do not have the slightest idea of what cooperation is. The only thing we know is to quarrel with one another in the family.'¹⁶

Moreover, the idea of creating inter-American organs and balancing a great power like the U.S. with many lesser nations of varying interests has spawned conflict. According to social scientists Padelford, Lincoln, and Olvey:

It can be argued that the primary interests of the United States are in the political and security areas, whereas the primary interests of other members are in development and deterrence to outside intervention in case of internal instabilities. The political and social heterogeneity of its members, even among those Latin American members who share a common language, limits the degree of community.¹⁷

Similarly noting this phenomenon, a journalist observes:

The many past efforts to promote such regional co-operation have largely failed. Among the obstacles: cultural aloofness of the Latin countries...from the English-speaking islands, and jealousies and rivalries among those with an English colonial heritage.¹⁸

Although most of these perspectives are referring to the inter-American problem in general terms, I believe they can be extrapolated as a permeating affliction throughout all inter-American organs, including the IADB.

Added to these concerns is the feeling in Latin America that, when push comes to shove, the U.S. will act in its own interests and will do whatever it likes, notwithstanding regional agreements to the contrary. This came to the fore most obviously in the Dominican Republic crisis but also in the Panama Canal Treaty negotiations regarding the future defense of the canal. A senior Moscow-oriented party official in Panama said that "although the United States' unilateral right of intervention after the year 2000 might seem objectionable, one had to think about the international correlation of forces, and recognize that the U.S. would intervene in any country in the region should it deem it necessary to do so, with or without an agreement, just as they had in the Dominican Republic in 1965."¹⁹ During Senate hearings on the treaties Linowitz asserted, "We are under no obligation to consult with or seek approval from any other nation or international body before acting to maintain the neutrality of the canal."²⁰

Even though the canal issue was undoubtedly a special case, this sort of talk created a contradictory impression after the President brought in all of the Latin American heads of state to the treaty-signing ceremony to show off hemispheric solidarity on

the issue. It seems that hemispheric cooperation is highly touted when it serves unilateral interests but is just as easily ignored when deemed not convenient. Whether this is true can only be demonstrated if and when another Guatemalan or Dominican-type crisis occurs. There is little evidence since then, and the scheme against the Allende regime in Chile is certainly no reassurance, to convince us the U.S. would not act unilaterally again. Why should it get the OAS or the IADB involved when it knows that the slow grind of diplomatic machinery might not be as quick or decisive as required? The festering situations in El Salvador and Nicaragua may result in the type of crisis for the U.S. alluded to above. Only time will tell if the response ultimately will involve military force and, if so, whether it will be employed unilaterally or multilaterally.

In recent years the U.S. has found it much more convenient to utilize other diplomatic instruments in dealings with Latin America, particularly those relating to defense and security. The September 1977 gathering for the signing of the Panama Canal Treaties became in effect a "hemispheric summit and a series of mini-summits."²¹ Many countries took advantage of the opportunity to settle a gamut of pending problems. The Presidents of El Salvador and Honduras met Orfila regarding their border dispute. For the first time in a century, the Presidents of Peru, Bolivia, and Chile met to discuss Bolivia's perennial desire for access to the sea. The heads of state of Peru and Ecuador met to discuss border integration. Guatemala asked for U.S. help in dealing with the Belize

question. Such bilateral dealings have also been handled fairly well by the special bilateral commissions the U.S. has maintained with the larger countries over the years, often achieving quicker results than when working solely through the collegial bodies.

It should be noted, however, that it was on the basis of plans developed by the IADB that the U.S. entered upon most of these cooperative measures with its sister nations in the first place.²² As a matter of fact, virtually all the U.S. delegates to the IADB are "dual-hatted" in that they are also on the bilateral commissions. It is difficult to determine, however, which job consumes more of their time. Recent Presidents have also seen fit to rely heavily on VIP visits to individual countries for problem-solving. In August 1977 alone, for instance, five high-level emissaries from the U.S., to include UN Ambassador Andrew Young, Senator Frank Church, and three State Department dignitaries, were on separate trips to Latin America.²³ The Reagan Administration also has employed numerous fact-finding missions to Latin America. The most recent example was an April 1983 visit by Attorney General William French Smith. I am not saying these efforts are not useful. On the contrary, most have been fairly successful. The point is that they seem to be getting not only the headlines but also the priority of executive emphasis over the more traditional inter-American instruments, perhaps signaling U.S. government doubts about the efficacy of the latter.

It is true the U.S. continues to pay lip service to the inter-American system. In his address before the Permanent Council of the OAS on April 15, 1977, Jimmy Carter stated:

The peacekeeping function is firmly embedded in the OAS charter. I want to encourage the secretary general of the OAS to continue his active and effective involvement in the search for peaceable solutions to several long-standing disputes in the hemisphere. The U.S. will support these efforts and initiatives....The OAS, of course, is not the only instrument of cooperation among the nations of the Americas.²⁴

He went on to discuss several regional entities such as the IDB, the Central American Common Market, and the Andean Pact, plus global organs having considerable Latin American involvement such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD or World Bank), the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the Paris Conference on International Economic Cooperation, and the UN Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA). At no time was the IADB mentioned, however, and defense in general was only hinted at while discussing arms limitation agreements and the role of the OAS in settling disputes.

Shortly thereafter, in an address at the U.S. Defense Intelligence School, Orfila applauded Carter's speech and Mrs. Carter's trip to several Latin American countries, saying both were good omens that the U.S. was showing renewed interest in Latin American problems. He added that the accomplishments of various inter-American relationships over the years have not been felt except for Roosevelt's Good Neighbor Policy and that there has been much misunderstanding of what U.S. policy is regarding Latin America. Needless to say, Orfila did not discuss the IADB either and only touched on defense briefly when mentioning the canal talks and the Honduras-El Salvador dispute, with the preponderance of his speech stressing economic matters.²⁵

Many observers laud Ronald Reagan's administration for at least paying more attention to Latin American security than did Carter's. On February 24, 1982, the President made a similar appearance to Carter's before the OAS in Washington, at which he gave an overview of U.S. policy toward the region and also set forth his Caribbean Basin Initiative plan. Following are the key references to defense and security extracted from the address:

The United States of America is a proud member of this organization. What happens anywhere in the Americas affects us in this country. In that very real sense, we share a common destiny.

Now, I know in the past the United States has proposed policies that we declared would be mutually beneficial not only for North America but also for the nations of the Caribbean and Central and South America. But there was often a problem. No matter how good our intentions were, our very size may have made it seem that we were exercising a kind of paternalism.

At the time I suggested a new North American accord, I said I wanted to approach our neighbors not as someone with yet another plan, but as a friend seeking their ideas, their suggestions as to how we could become better neighbors.

The Caribbean region is a vital strategic and commercial artery for the United States. Nearly half of our trade, two-thirds of our imported oil, and over half of our imported strategic minerals pass through the Panama Canal or the Gulf of Mexico. Make no mistake: The well-being and security of our neighbors in this region are in our own vital interest.

The positive opportunity is illustrated by the two-thirds of the nations in the area which have democratic governments. The dark future is foreshadowed by the poverty and repression of Castro's Cuba, the tightening grip of the totalitarian belt in Grenada and Nicaragua, and the expansion of Soviet-backed, Cuban-managed support for violent revolution in Central America.

Our economic and social program cannot work if our neighbors cannot pursue their own economic and political future in peace but must direct their resources, instead, to fight imported terrorism and armed attack.

Our Caribbean neighbors' peaceful attempts to develop are feared by the foes of freedom because their success will make the radical message a hollow one. Cuba and its Soviet backers know this. Since 1978, Havana has trained, armed and directed extremists in guerrilla warfare and economic sabotage as part of a campaign to exploit troubles in Central America and the Caribbean. Their goal is to establish Cuban-style Marxist-Leninist dictatorships. Last year, Cuba received 66,000 tons of war supplies from the Soviet Union--more than in any year since the 1962 missile crisis. Last month, the arrival of additional high performance MIG-23 Floggers gave Cuba an arsenal of more than 200 Soviet war planes--far more than the military aircraft inventories of all other Caribbean Basin countries combined. For almost two years, Nicaragua has served as a platform for covert military action. Through Nicaragua, arms are being smuggled to guerrillas in El Salvador and Guatemala.

.....
 A determined propaganda campaign has sought to mislead many in Europe and certainly many in the United States as to the true nature of the conflict in El Salvador. Very simply, guerrillas, armed and supported by and through Cuba, are attempting to impose a Marxist-Leninist dictatorship on the people of El Salvador as part of a larger imperialistic plan. If we do not act promptly and decisively in defense of freedom, new Cubas will arise from the ruins of today's conflicts. We will face more totalitarian regimes tied militarily to the Soviet Union. More regimes exporting subversion, more regimes so incompetent yet so totalitarian that their citizens' only hope becomes that of one migrating to other American nations, as in recent years they have come to the United States.

I believe free and peaceful development of our hemisphere requires us to help governments confronted with aggression from outside their borders to defend themselves. For this reason, I will ask the Congress to provide increased security assistance to help friendly countries hold off those who would destroy their chances for economic and social progress and political democracy. Since 1947, the Rio Treaty has established reciprocal defense responsibilities linked to our common democratic ideals. Meeting these responsibilities is all the more important when an outsider power supports terrorism and insurgency to destroy any possibility of freedom and democracy. Let our friends and our adversaries understand that we will do whatever is prudent and necessary to ensure the peace and security of the Caribbean area.

In the face of outside threats, security for the countries of the Caribbean and Central American area is not an end in itself, but a means to an end....

We will not, however, follow Cuba's lead in attempting to resolve human problems by brute force. Our economic assistance, including the additions that are part of the program I have just outlined, is more than five times the amount of our security assistance. The thrust of our aid is to help our neighbors realize freedom, justice, and economic progress.²⁶

The President eloquently sums up current U.S. defense policy in regard to Latin America, and he clearly outlines the nature of the external threat to the region and how it has manifested itself internally.²⁷ He acknowledges that there traditionally has been asymmetry in the mutual relationship within the hemisphere and pledges to attempt to overcome it.

Despite the fact that this theme has been echoed by past administrations, I believe Reagan is more deeply concerned about the region.²⁸ After all, the President took a bold step when he made his plea for more military aid to El Salvador before a rare joint session of Congress on April 27, 1983. Although the focus of his speech was El Salvador and the Caribbean, he did assert that "the security of all (emphasis added) the Americas is at stake in Central America."²⁹ In contrast, it seems obvious from the rhetoric of Carter and other officials that economic development, not hemispheric defense, was the principal focus in the calmer days of the 1970's. At that time, the only genuine military concern was the internal threat produced from disputes among the Latin American members themselves. Reagan seems to espouse the idea of development being equated to national security, which of course

would be expected given the basic purpose of the address. Despite the positive tone of the speech, however, and the seemingly greater attention that will be paid to hemispheric security in the future, again nowhere in the entire address is the IADB mentioned. As usual, it appears that any role the Board intends to have in security planning will have to be carved out by the organization itself through hard-nosed "pulling and hauling," to borrow the cliché from bureaucratic politics literature. No one in high places, to include the U.S. government and the OAS, seems willing to help the IADB promote itself.

Prospects and Conditions

Despite negative comments made throughout this thesis about the operational environment in which the IADB finds itself, I must conclude that the organization has at least made the best of a bad situation and should be commended for surviving during four difficult decades. The Board has accomplished many useful, if not highly visible, tasks. It has the capacity to achieve much more, if only allowed to realize its potential. This section will highlight some of the conditional factors that either favor or discourage an enhanced role for the IADB in the inter-American system. The outlook for the Western Hemisphere to develop more fully as a security-community, to use Deutsch's terminology, now appears brighter than it has in quite some time. Of course, the Board is only a small part of that community and not yet fully legitimized commensurate with its potential.

First, let us look at some of the negative conditions, i.e., the factors gravitating against an enhanced mission for the IADB:

(1) Continuing OAS intransigence--We have seen where the IADB made repeated offers of expert assistance to the OAS and other inter-American organs but on most occasions was ignored. This syndrome is likely to continue as long as the IADB has no definitive institutional link to the OAS requiring its mandatory use in certain specific situations. Moreover, the fact that an increasing number of new OAS members are not also members of the Board is a disturbing trend, since these new states tend not to feel a strong vested interest in contributing to the defense of the hemisphere, whether through providing military forces or supporting that portion of the OAS budget that funds the IADB.

(2) Distrust of the military--Here again this is a long-standing, deep-seated attitude in many parts of Latin America that is not likely to dissipate soon. The increasing participation of the military in civic action and nation-building projects may erase some of the suspicion in time. However, as long as the military is tied in the minds of many with repressive military regimes, there will be some latent distrust that will have spill-over effects on the Board's range of activities.

For instance, one opinion is that "despite, and even in some cases because of, the developmental efforts of the Peruvian and Brazilian militaries, most Latin Americanists remain skentical about the willingness and capacity of military regimes to promote economic development." The same critic cites Lieuwen's observation

in the early 1960's, when the IDAD effort really began to take off, that the military is a conservative and even reactionary force, preoccupied mainly with preserving its corporate self-interest and generally lacking the political and administrative resources necessary for the pursuit of a successful developmental effort.³⁰ Of course, the Board cannot be equated to military regimes per se but, as long as the reality (or the perception of it) exists that some delegates are sent to Washington merely to prevent them from becoming a threat to the elites in power, mistrust is not likely to disappear.³¹

(3) Disagreement over the nature of the threat--This factor has been mentioned before. To reiterate, as long as there is not a clear, direct external threat to the hemisphere, some people will not be persuaded that an entity such as the IADB is needed. The previous section, I believe, clearly describes the threat. Nevertheless, that viewpoint is primarily a U.S. one, and many Latins see the situation differently. The IADB would likely thrive given an extreme external threat, such as a blatant Soviet invasion in Central America. Of course, no one wants that to occur just to prove the efficacy of the inter-American security system. The Board, on the other hand, has much to offer in helping to deal with the lesser type of external threat, such as Soviet-backed or Cuban-sponsored limited conflicts. It is my opinion that any evidence of support from outside the target country makes the threat an external one and hence one that falls under the purview of the IADB. It will take a considerable effort, however, to

convince many people that the threat is serious enough to risk political involvement by a group of senior military officers who, it is felt, may use the opportunity to overstep their bounds.

(4) Setback due to the Falklands conflict--As discussed in Chapter 3, the war in the Falklands presented a contingency not experienced before in Latin America. It raised many new questions about mutual loyalties among IADB members and, at least temporarily, poisoned bilateral relations between Argentina and the U.S. It will be some time before the permanent damage to hemispheric solidarity can be assessed, but it is clear that there was a dysfunctional jolt to the health of the inter-American system. It is certain that many OAS members will be reluctant to support any U.S.-promoted upgrading of the Board's status until the bad taste in their mouths over the Falklands response dissipates.

(5) El Salvador/Nicaragua backlash--Similar to the Falklands ramification will be that caused by current events in Central America. There is much speculation as to exactly what is going on and who is actually behind it. It is likely many OAS and IADB members will be wary of making any significant changes to the inter-American system until future U.S. intentions in the region become clearer. While there is increasing concern by most Latins regarding the leftist threat, there is also anxiety as to whether the U.S. will revert to its old habits of unilateralism in dealing with the crises.

Next, we shall examine some of the positive conditions, i.e., the factors favoring a larger role for the IADB:

(1) High-level U.S. interest in regional security--We have seen that the Reagan Administration is now focusing considerable attention on Latin America. Whereas in past years the Board languished in an environment of apathy, the potential now exists that its resources will be recognized by political leaders as being both available and useful. The high potential for conflict creates situations of the type in which the IADB has been employed before. The OAS, with or without IADB help, has been fairly successful in handling this type of intra-hemispheric conflict. The IADB itself has only been called in where the cases have been clearcut and relatively non-controversial. Interest at the top, however, may mollify this situation somewhat. Of course, what is needed is high-level concern about all of Latin America. Unfortunately, the U.S. government often portrays that it is concerned only about the Caribbean and its littoral areas--the old "American Lake" concept. More on target is the assessment of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) in its last annual military posture statement:

The defense of North America is this nation's primary security concern....US strategy has presupposed a friendly and supportive Latin America, which in time of conflict would not require the employment of substantial US forces.

It is becoming increasingly clear that a secure hemisphere is no longer a foregone conclusion and that the US must now play a more active and enlightened role in hemispheric affairs. Specifically, the US must continue to build on interests shared with Canada and Mexico, while viewing Latin America not as a Third World area removed from the traditional focus of US strategy, but as a contiguous region whose future bears directly on the security of the hemisphere as a whole.³²

(2) Global instability--Recent U.S. administrations have realized that simultaneous conflicts may break out in more than one region of the world. If the Soviets attempted any sort of military adventurism in Latin America, it is probable they would strike elsewhere too. If so, the U.S. forces that otherwise would be available for employment in the Western Hemisphere might have to be committed to Southwest Asia, Europe, or Korea, for instance. Such a scenario would reduce the chances of unilateral U.S. action in Latin America; the U.S. simply does not have the forces to go it alone. Hence, multilateral military action would be required, and a cooperative structure to plan for it needed, preferably under the formal aegis of the OAS. The IADB is the likely candidate to fill such a role when the dominant hemispheric partner is distracted elsewhere. Unilateral U.S. response should only be a last resort, and carefully cloaked under the provisions of the Monroe Doctrine.

(3) Reduced direct military influence by the U.S.--Related to the last factor is the trend toward greater military independence among the Latin American states, not only reflected by arms deals with other than U.S. or Soviet sources but also by a greater willingness to speak up in multilateral forums such as the IADB. As noted by one political scientist:

U.S. direct influence on the Latin American military has declined dramatically since it successfully countered Castro's Latin American forays in the early sixties through a military civic action policy, combining military force with a diplomatic and economic offensive aimed at influencing the Latin American's state of mind. Even before the death of Che Guevara in 1967, the U.S. had

(continued) begun to phase out this policy. In the 70's and early 80's, Castro opted for essentially the same policy with which the U.S. had earlier weakened his appeal. He has been rushing teachers, doctors, engineers-- and even priests, to susceptible clients such as Guyana, Grenada, and Nicaragua, along with proffering them assurances of military security.³³

Although ostensibly for humane purposes, it is becoming more obvious all the time that such inroads are only a first step at attempting to penetrate the client states militarily and economically. This threat should help solidify the Latin American members of the IADB at a time when the U.S. capability for bullying the organization or merely using it to rubber-stamp unilateral U.S. responses is reduced. In order to undermine Soviet or Cuban civic action initiatives, the U.S. and its hemispheric partners need to renew their joint efforts in this same field to provide an attractive counterweight.

(4) Reduced bilateral dealings--Tied to the above developments is the fact that recent times have seen reduced U.S. budgeting for bilateral assistance projects such as MAP. One cause for this was the series of negative consequences stemming from the Carter human rights crusade in Latin America, which upset traditionally strong bilateral relationships with such countries as Argentina and Brazil. Although this trend should not necessarily be considered positive, at least it opens the door for a higher pitch of activity in multilateral organizations such as the IADB.

(5) Public opinion--It is my impression, and partly just a "gut feeling," that public opinion in most Latin American nations and in the U.S. is beginning to swing toward a recognition of the

Soviet-Cuban threat and acceptance that we must make plans to counter it. This is a slow, almost imperceptible change of attitude, but it is beginning to make itself felt. Furthermore, there is a perception growing that the USSR would be less apt to challenge a united front in the Western Hemisphere than it would the U.S. acting alone. True, the Soviets see the former situation as being harmful for Moscow's prestige were it to commit aggression in the region, while the latter could be twisted about to its advantage. In other words, their formidable propaganda machine would attest that the Soviets are merely attempting to combat U.S. imperialism. At any rate, supportive public opinion is sorely needed if the IADB hopes to emerge from obscurity and gain in status.

Recommendations

With these conditions as a backdrop and forty plus years of experience contributing quietly to the security of the hemisphere, I think it is safe to say the IADB will continue to exist for at least the foreseeable future. No doubt it could continue to function in much the same way as it has in the past, moving from the current status quo through alternating high and low periods depending on the seriousness of the threat, the political inclinations of the OAS, and the level of interest of its member governments and leaders. However, I feel the IADB has the potential to be a much more vital organization, if only a few structural changes are made.

Contrary to the tone of my initial hypothesis in Chapter 1, I am convinced the Board is not totally ineffective. The positive ideas about the contributions of security-communities discussed in Chapter 4, plus the comments of the CGSC students familiar with the body, support the conclusion that the Board accomplishes some useful, if limited, functions. Namely, it serves as a convenient forum for military discussion and exchange of views on defense issues, it oversees a worthwhile educational institution, and it represents a significant symbolic presence through its resolution process. It has been a useful consultative body for the multi-lateral defense effort, coordinating standardization of weapons and equipment, acquisition of strategic materials and, on occasion, employment of forces. It also performs the planning role that for years has been its major rationale for continuing to exist, but it must shift the focus of its plans if it is to adapt to the changed nature of the threat. True, there have been attempts to adapt in the past that have fallen on deaf ears; there indeed have been dashed expectations. Nevertheless, rather than giving in to apathy, suspicion, and lowered expectations, the IADB should continue to strive for structural improvements so that proper expectations can be realized.

First, it is imperative that the IADB be institutionally tied to the CAS. The tenuous "association" and budgetary link between the two organizations is simply inadequate, for Board proposals have no binding force on member nations. I realize that my idea is not novel. It has been suggested on more than one occasion,

and the negative conditions set forth earlier make this change difficult to achieve. Nonetheless, there is no harm in continuing to push toward this goal. As a fallback position, the IADB as a minimum needs to have a formal charter or convention. It has been operating since 1942 on a mere resolution. The convention recently proposed to the IADB member states, in order to correct the situation in which the Board has enjoyed no central direction by its member nations other than that provided by the Council of Delegates, calls for two significant changes: (1) It establishes a biennial meeting of the highest national defense authorities to give direction to the work of the Board; such a grouping has never met. (2) It provides for Board funding by the member nations directly, rather than flowing through the OAS; this would accommodate the trend toward many OAS members not being members of the IADB. There is no logical reason for the Board to have to rely on OAS funds when that organization so far has not acceded to formal inclusion of the IADB in its structure. Of course, a formal tie to the OAS would obviate this proposal.

Second, consideration should be given toward establishing an Inter-American Security Council to replace the enigmatic ADC, which has never been convened. It would be preferable to make the IADB the core of this new Council. However, if this is not politically possible due to the lingering effects of the aforementioned negative conditions, then at least the IADB should be made an adjunct to the Council, in much the same way that in the U.S. the JCS has an advisory link to the National Security Council.

Another observer, in comparing NATO and the OAS, concludes that the latter would benefit by the sort of Military Committee the former possesses.³⁴

Whatever name it adopts, the result would be a body that could supervise peacekeeping efforts, such as the tardy but useful IAPF in the Dominican Republic crisis. The IADB could be given operational control (OPCON) of these forces and serve as a go-between for the member states providing input to the peacekeeping units. Of course, the Board would continue to perform its traditional functions, such as writing plans for external threat contingencies which might be addressed more adequately by the establishment of regional planning groups as are found in NATO. But the enhanced peacekeeping mission would breathe new vitality into an organization which increasingly has been limited to missions out of touch with current hemispheric realities. Moreover, the suggested arrangement would insure that the useful assistance provided by the IADB to OAS teams investigating intra-regional disputes becomes formalized. It would make automatic and official the consultation and advice that heretofore has had to be offered unofficially.

Third, the IADB should increase its involvement in non-military activities that are related to security. Such functions are in keeping with the IDAD strategies so crucial in a low intensity conflict environment. As suggested by Haas, many contributions of a non-military nature can be made to build community cohesiveness during periods when there is no crisis or urgent threat. Similarly, Deutsch offered constructive ideas on how important it is to forge a total security-community, of which the IADB is a part.

As aptly summed up by a retired U.S. general officer in his comparison of NATO with the OAS, "NATO is primarily a military venture; the OAS is designed to operate in the political, economic, and cultural fields, as well as the military. NATO is a collective 'defense' pact; the OAS is a collective 'security' arrangement."³⁵ The IADB has much to offer the OAS and other inter-American organs in the way of military expertise. It has proven that it can coordinate programs for effectively utilizing military personnel in traditionally non-military, but security-related, roles, if only it is allowed to function without undue constraint.

Finally, I would suggest a somewhat symbolic, and perhaps even cosmetic, change that really has nothing to do with the Board's mission or functions. It would be helpful, I think, if either the IADB or the IADC, or both, were to be moved from Washington to some Latin American capital. It would be wise to select a nation not considered overly beholden to the U.S. and its First World politics, but one that is large enough and influential enough in world affairs to support such institutions. Perhaps Mexico City or Brasília would be an excellent location.

Of course, the expected counter-argument to such a move is that, first of all, the U.S. is in the best position by far to handle the considerable infrastructure costs inherent in being the host nation for such institutions. Secondly, the U.S. government may not wish to forego the degree of control implicit in having these elements on its own soil. Both of these points are valid; in the end, any government in the "alliance" has to find the appropriate

fulcrum in balancing its unilateral interests versus the multi-lateral interest of hemispheric solidarity. That is the nature of alliances--a "quid pro quo" arrangement--to achieve one objective a member state must be willing to compromise on others. Moreover, it must weigh its position on any recommendation against what it deems are the consequences for not only itself but also for the other member states and for the community as a whole.

It is not for me to determine whether any U.S. administration would, or should, loosen its grip on the inter-American system in order to strengthen it. If moving the IADB and/or the IADC is too bitter a pill for the U.S. government to swallow, then I offer an alternative: keep the institutions in Washington but rotate the "hats" of the IADB Chairmen and IADC Directors so that other nations take their turn. At present the highest position attainable by a Latin American officer is Board Vice-Chairman.³⁶ Rotating the key positions would have a positive symbolic effect that should increase the feeling of worth among the Latin American delegates. U.S. officers would fill the number two slots whenever Latins are in the top positions.

Hanging like a cloud over everything we have discussed, there remains latent resentment over real or perceived U.S. dominance of the inter-American process. This situation certainly does not serve the cause of increased solidarity. In discussing this problem one observer questions, "Is there too much concentration of inter-American authority in Washington?"³⁷ Considering that the Pan

American Union (the OAS Secretariat), the IDB, the Inter-American Economic and Social Council, the Pan American Health Organization, the IADC, and the IADB, among others, are all located there, he obviously has a point. He adds, "It is easy to overemphasize physical location of an activity, but its psychological effect should not be discounted....The desirability of a degree of decentralization is certainly worthy of study."³⁸

I would add a few more "symbols" to his agenda for study of their psychological impact: (1) As currently configured, the Chairman of the IADB is always a U.S. officer of three-star rank; and (2) the Director of the IADC is always a U.S. officer of two-star rank. Worse yet, both of these "inter-American" entities are practically within earshot distance of the Pentagon. That fact alone should provide food for thought and further study.

NOTES

1. Robert W. Cox and Harold K. Jacobson, The Anatomy of Influence: Decision Making in International Organization (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1973), pp. 5-6. For a more current application of the ideas of Cox and Jacobson, see George A. Coddington, Jr., "Influence in International Conferences," International Organization, Autumn 1981, pp. 715-724. Coddington draws heavily on their categorization of the three major components of actual influence--reputational, positional, and behavioral. In his case study of one of the UN specialized organizations, he found that all the variables could be rolled together into a single composite influence variable to measure overall influence ranking. The U.S. and France ranked highest with a score of 10. The top Latin American nation was Brazil (5); Argentina, Mexico, and Jamaica were next (3); and five others got a score of 1.
2. Lynn-Darrell Bender, "Political Forces in Latin America," Problems of Communism, September-October 1980, p. 66.
3. Gabriel Valdes S., "The Americas in a Changing World as a Response to the Consensus of Viña del Mar," Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, May 1975, p. 213.
4. James D. Cochrane, "Some Perspectives on Latin American International Relations," Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, May 1975, p. 230.
5. Some observers might object to the use of the term "proxy," since it implies a lack of independence in Cuban military policy. "Surrogate" may be a softer rubric to use, but it still suggests the strong hand of Moscow. Admitting that Castro does exercise a good deal of initiative in deciding where Cuban assets are employed abroad, particularly in Latin America, I still feel it is reasonable to apply either of these terms to what is going on in the region. Even if Castro is the prime instigator of many of the schemes to export revolution in the area, without Soviet arms, moral encouragement, and especially financial backing the capability for Cuban power projection would be much smaller. As President Reagan pointed out in a news conference on April 22, 1983, in the Caribbean region there are "outside forces either sympathetic with, or aligned to, the Soviet Bloc." It is not difficult to guess what outside forces the President was referring to, and I dare say he would be the first to endorse the labeling of them as either "proxies" or "surrogates" of the USSR. Despite the fact Cuba is in Latin America and the Havana government is still a member of the OAS, for all practical purposes Cuban influence can be treated as an external threat in the sense we are discussing it here.

6. Jeffrey Stein, "Grad School for Juntas," The Nation, May 21, 1977, p. 622. See also LTC Luiz G.S. Lessa, "The Security of the South Atlantic: Is It a Case for 'SATO'--South Atlantic Treaty Organization?" (MMAS thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1982). As cited earlier, this is the most comprehensive investigation of SATO available.

7. No author, "Gorman to Head Southern Command," Army Times, April 11, 1983, p. 2. The upgrading of the billet to four stars "appears to underscore the increased significance of military and political developments in Central America." It is worthy of note also that the designated CINC is LTG Paul Gorman, currently in a strategically placed slot as Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, GEN John Vessey. The outgoing CINC, LTG Wallace Nutting, has also been nominated for a fourth star and assignment to a highly important position, CINC of the U.S. Readiness Command (REDCOM). More often than not in the past, the SOUTHCOM post has been considered a "retirement tour," and the most recent of its 4-star incumbents retired in 1975.

8. Don First, "Army Special Operations Forces to Expand and Be Consolidated," Army Times, September 27, 1982, p. 3.

9. George Pendle, A History of Latin America (Middlesex, Eng.: Penguin Books, Ltd., 1963), p. 226.

10. Alejandro Orfila, "Cuba--and Beyond," Saturday Review, September 6, 1975, p. 18.

11. Orfila, "Cuba--and Beyond," p. 18.

12. Valdes, "The Americas in a Changing World," p. 213.

13. No author, "Latin America: Spreading the Carter Gospel," Time, August 22, 1977, p. 33.

14. LTC John Child, in a lecture presented at the U.S. Defense Intelligence School, Washington, D.C., October 18, 1976.

15. Pendle, A History of Latin America, pp. 225-226.

16. John H. Haddox, "Dependence or Interdependence," Américas, March 1977, p. 3.

17. Norman J. Padelford, George A. Lincoln, and Lee D. Olvey, The Dynamics of International Politics, 3rd ed. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1976), p. 478.

18. John M. Goshko, "US Is Pressing New Effort to Aid Caribbean Economy," Washington Post, October 23, 1977, p. 42.

19. No author, "Panama: Pomp and Circumstance," Latin America Political Report, September 2, 1977, p. 269.

20. No author, "The Canal Debate Begins," Time, October 10, 1977, p. 15.

21. No author, "Latin America: Summits Behind the Summit," Latin America Political Report, September 16, 1977, p. 282.

22. John L. Mechem, The United States and Inter-American Security, 1889-1960 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1961), p. 355.

23. "Latin America: Spreading the Carter Gospel," Time, August 22, 1977, p. 30.

24. Jimmy Carter, "The United States' Policy Toward Latin America," Vital Speeches, May 1, 1977, p. 425.

25. Alejandro Orfila, in a lecture presented at the U.S. Defense Intelligence School, Washington, D.C., May 6, 1977.

26. Ronald Reagan, "The Organization of American States: The Caribbean Area," The Atlantic Community Quarterly, Spring 1982, pp. 3-9.

27. For deeper background on the overall nature of the external threat to the region, see James D. Theberge, The Soviet Presence in Latin America (New York: Crane, Russak and Company, Inc., for the National Strategy Information Center, Inc., 1974), LTC David J. André, "Gathering Storm in the Eastern Caribbean," Military Review, July 1981, pp. 2-14, and "The Real Soviet Threat in El Salvador--And Beyond," an interview with CIA Director William J. Casey in U.S. News and World Report, March 8, 1982, pp. 23-26. For a considerably more optimistic view, at least from the viewpoint of the U.S., see Robert H. Donaldson, "The Soviet Union in the Third World," Current History, October 1982, p. 315. Since Moscow's priorities in the Third World are conditioned more by geo-strategic interests than by ideology, the author claims, Latin America is the region of lowest priority, even when its revolutionary potential seems high. "Although much attention has focused in recent months on alleged Soviet designs in this region--Central America and the Caribbean in particular--the Soviet Union has neither economic nor military interests in Latin America that are vital to its well-being. In large part, relative Soviet disinterest has stemmed from Moscow's recognition of the chief geopolitical reality in the Western Hemisphere--the primacy of United States interests and power there....In general, then, Moscow's approach to Latin America has been cautious--exploiting limited opportunities for exacerbating United States difficulties but (except for Cuba) avoiding heavy investment or high-risk involvement." The true threat no doubt lies somewhere between this overly sanguine assessment and the current administration's position.

28. This point was brought out eloquently by Datus Proper of the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, U.S. Department of State, in a lecture at CGSC, April 11, 1983. Despite the administration's concern, however, Proper asserts the U.S. needs to rethink its military and security relationship within the region. Past U.S. policies have tended to be counterproductive, not so much due to executive misguidance as to legislative and public relations road-blocks.

29. Ronald Reagan, in a nationally televised address before a special joint session of the U.S. Congress, April 27, 1983.

30. Karen L. Remmer, "Evaluating the Policy Impact of Military Regimes in Latin America," Latin American Research Review, Vol. XIII, No. 2, 1978, p. 40.

31. This idea was synthesized from random conversations with Latin American officers at CGSC. An observer of the Washington scene claiming to paraphrase Child puts it more bluntly: "The board is simply a dumping ground for an excess of undesirable high-ranking military officers. The formula for assignment: 'A colonel is too powerful to be fired, too dangerous to be retired. Assign him to the board.'" Hope Aldrich, "Free for Lunch? The Languid Life of Foreign Attachés," The Washington Monthly, November 1982, p. 36. I believe this is an overstatement of the situation; nevertheless, it is a common perception of many having limited knowledge of Board activities.

32. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, United States Military Posture for FY 1983 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1982), p. 135.

33. Robin Navarro Montgomery, "Psychological Warfare and the Latin American Crisis," Air University Review, July-August 1982, p. 56.

34. BG (Ret) E. Vandevanter, Jr., "A Further Inquiry into the Nature of Alliances: NATO and the OAS," RAND Corporation Study #P3832, April 1968, p. 33. The idea of an Inter-American Security or Defense Council is not new (see p. 33), but times have changed considerably since the last time the subject was formally debated. In a January 27, 1983, interview COL Lessa emphasized the need for strong cooperation among military members of the various nations. He suggested that the IADB could perhaps be tied in somehow with the Rio Treaty, even though it is first and foremost a political treaty and not a military alliance. He felt that considerable cooperation is currently going on in the struggle against radical elements. However, most of this is done on a bilateral basis since such bodies as the IADB are not structured for this function. Perhaps the IADB or some other sub-element of an umbrella Security Council-type organization could be adapted to promote the sort of military cooperation Lessa rightly deems is so important.

35. Vandevanter, "A Further Inquiry into the Nature of Alliances," p. 7. To update this study, it should be remembered that the NATO Military Committee does in fact now perform both military and political functions, although its principal focus remains on the former.

36. Undated press release from the IADB entitled merely "Press Release." The Vice-Chairman is currently Peruvian Army MG César Rosas Cresto.

37. William Manger, Pan America in Crisis (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1961), p. 76.

38. Manger, Pan America in Crisis, p. 77.

APPENDIX 1

EXCERPTS FROM OAS AND IADB LEGAL DOCUMENTS

OAS Charter¹

Article 59

The Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs shall be held in order to consider problems of an urgent nature and of common interest to the American States, and to serve as the Organ of Consultation.

Article 63

In case of an armed attack within the territory of an American State or within the region of security delimited by treaties in force, a Meeting of Consultation shall be held without delay. Such Meeting shall be called immediately by the Chairman of the Permanent Council of the Organization, who shall at the same time call a meeting of the Council itself.

Article 64

An Advisory Defense Committee shall be established to advise the Organ of Consultation on problems of military cooperation that may arise in connection with the application of existing special treaties on collective security.

Article 65

The Advisory Defense Committee shall be composed of the highest military authorities of the American States participating in the Meeting of Consultation. Under exceptional circumstances the Governments may appoint substitutes. Each State shall be entitled to one vote.

Article 66

The Committee shall also meet when the General Assembly or the Meeting of Consultation or the Governments, by a two-thirds majority of the Member States, assign to it technical studies or reports on specific subjects.

¹ Excerpted from Charter of the Organization of American States as Amended by the Protocol of Buenos Aires in 1967 (Washington: General Secretariat of the OAS, 1970), pp. 18-19.

NOTE: To give the IADB its continued existence and to resolve its World War II ad hoc status, two Bogotá Conference resolutions were utilized. These were totally independent of the OAS Charter produced at Bogotá, which does not mention the IADB at all. Resolution XXXIV granted the IADB an indefinite existence as the organ of preparation for collective self-defense until a two-thirds majority of American states decided to terminate the Board. Resolution VII provided for the Board's budget to come from Pan American Union funds. According to Child, this resolution reflects a curious anomaly, i.e., the IADB is not a part of the OAS (as defined by its Charter), yet the OAS finances the Board without exercising control over it. Implicit in this financial link, of course, is the Pan American Union's power to cripple or kill the Board by cutting off its funds or by reducing its budget to a token level. See John Child, Unequal Alliance: The Inter-American Military System, 1938-1978 (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1980), p. 110.

Regulations of the IADB²

Article 1 Mission

To act as the organ of preparation and recommendation for the collective self-defense of the American Continent against aggression, and to carry out, in addition to the advisory functions within its competence, any similar functions ascribed to it by the Advisory Defense Committee of the Organization of American States.

²Excerpted from Regulations of the Inter-American Defense Board, dated November 25, 1980, p. 1.

APPENDIX 2

SUSPENSE: _____

To: _____

Section: _____

The attached questionnaire is being used in conjunction with an MMAS thesis. It has been approved by CGSC officials for distribution to selected students. You have been chosen as a respondee in one of the following three groups:

- a. All Latin American students.
- b. U.S. students with FAO or other related assignment experience in Latin America.
- c. A random sample of all other U.S. students.

Your cooperation in supporting this purely academic endeavor is heartily encouraged. According to the Student Handbook, students who receive a school-approved survey are expected to respond in a timely fashion. Therefore, please return the questionnaire to the undersigned by the suspense date indicated above. To insure the usefulness of your efforts, make an attempt to answer all the questions to which you are directed. You should do this based on your existing knowledge without checking any references. All responses should be made in English.

You can be insured that your responses will be kept completely anonymous. The biographical data that is solicited at the top of the form will be used only for statistical purposes. In addition to these general instructions, please follow the specific directions indicated after each question.

Thank you in advance for your time and invaluable assistance.

WILLIAM C. SPRACHER
Major, U.S. Army
Section 22D

APPENDIX 2

QUESTIONNAIRE

Please fill out the following biographical data to be used for statistical purposes only:

Age _____ Branch of service (e.g., armor, infantry, USAF) _____
 Sex _____ Years of military service (round to nearest whole year) _____
 Educational level (e.g., high school, college, or level of highest advanced degree) _____

A B C D

1. Do you know what the OAS is? (Answer Yes or No) Yes 100% 100% 91% 43%
 (NOTE: Do not confuse with "offensive air support")

2. If "yes," what does the acronym OAS stand for? Organization of American States

(NOTE: If you answered "no" to Question 1, skip to Question 4.)

100% 100% 91% 35%

3. Identify the single major function for which the OAS was founded:
 (Circle the correct response)

a. political stability	23%	8%	9%	5%
b. social welfare	8%	0	0	3%
☒ c. hemispheric solidarity	61%	92%	75%	30%
d. political modernization	0	0	4%	0
e. other: _____	0	0	2%	0

4. Do you know what the IADB is? (Answer Yes or No) Yes 85% 75% 12% 5%

5. If "yes," what does the acronym IADB stand for? Inter-American Defense Board

(NOTE: If you answered "no" to Question 4, skip to Question 7 and attempt to answer the remaining questions.)

61% 75% 18% 0

6. Identify the single major function for which the IADB was founded:
 (Circle the correct response)

a. military force development	8%	0	5%	5%
☒ b. hemispheric security planning	62%	75%	46%	5%
c. economic cooperation	15%	8%	0	5%
d. political development	0	0	0	0
e. other: _____	0	8%	0	0

- | | | <u>A</u> | <u>B</u> | <u>C</u> | <u>D</u> |
|---|--|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| 7. The following nation is <u>not</u> a member of the IADB: (Circle the correct response) | | | | | |
| a. Mexico | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 5% |
| b. United States | | 0 | 0 | 7% | 14% |
| ☒ c. Cuba | | 92% | 92% | 61% | 49% |
| d. Bolivia | | 0 | 0 | 2% | 0 |
| 8. The IADB was established in the: (Circle the correct response) | | | | | |
| a. 1920's | | 0 | 0 | 4% | 0 |
| ☒ b. 1940's | | 31% | 42% | 14% | 17% |
| c. 1960's | | 4% | 50% | 23% | 46% |
| d. 1970's | | 8% | 0 | 17% | 8% |
| 9. The IADB is located in: (Circle the correct response) | | | | | |
| a. Rio de Janeiro | | 0 | 0 | 21% | 14% |
| b. Mexico City | | 0 | 8% | 14% | 30% |
| c. Buenos Aires | | 0 | 0 | 16% | 8% |
| ☒ d. Washington | | 92% | 83% | 11% | 22% |
| 10. Today the IADB is primarily concerned with: (Circle the correct response) | | | | | |
| ☒ a. hemispheric security planning | | 54% | 58% | 33% | 24% |
| b. officer training | | 0 | 17% | 7% | 3% |
| c. receipt and distribution of foreign and military aid | | 23% | 17% | 12% | 35% |
| d. force development | | 0 | 0 | 5% | 5% |
| e. other: _____ | | 15% | 0 | 0 | 0 |

11. Does the IADB currently serve a useful purpose? Why or why not? _____

(END OF QUESTIONNAIRE)

DATA REQUIRED BY THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974

Authority: Title 5. U.S. Code, Section 3012

Principal Purpose: To obtain information and views from CGSC officers in support of MMAS thesis.

Routine Use: Biographical data included to aggregate views based on demographic characteristics and identify variations in responses according to background.

Disclosure and Effect: VOLUNTARY. Without the information, data will not be included in survey results.

APPENDIX 3

GROUP A
(Latin American Students)

N
13

<u>AGE</u>	<u><31</u>	<u>31-35</u>	<u>36-40</u>	<u>>40</u>
	0	3 (23%)	5 (38%)	5 (38%)

<u>SEX</u>	<u>Male</u>	<u>Female</u>
	13 (100%)	0

<u>SERVICE</u>	<u>Army</u>
	13 (100%)

<u>BRANCH</u>	<u>Infantry</u>	<u>Armor</u>	<u>FA</u>	<u>Engineer</u>
	5 (38%)	1 (8%)	5 (38%)	2 (15%)

<u>YEARS OF SERVICE</u>	<u><11</u>	<u>11-15</u>	<u>16-20</u>	<u>>20</u>
	0	3 (23%)	5 (38%)	5 (38%)

<u>EDUCATION</u>	<u><Bachelors</u>	<u>Bachelors</u>	<u>No Response</u>
	4 (31%)	8 (62%)	1 (8%)

<u>COUNTRY</u>	<u>Brazil</u>	<u>Colombia</u>	<u>Honduras</u>	<u>Mexico</u>	<u>Peru</u>	<u>Uruguay</u>	<u>Venezuela</u>
	2(15%)	2(15%)	2(15%)	1(8%)	1(8%)	1(8%)	4(31%)

APPENDIX 3A

GROUP B
(U.S. Latin American FAO's)

<u>N</u>				
12				
<u>AGE</u>	<u><31</u>	<u>31-35</u>	<u>36-40</u>	<u>>40</u>
	0	4 (33%)	7 (58%)	1 (8%)
<u>SEX</u>	<u>Male</u>		<u>Female</u>	
	12 (100%)		0	
<u>SERVICE</u>	<u>Army</u>			
	12 (100%)			
<u>BRANCH</u>	<u>Infantry</u>	<u>Engineer</u>	<u>MI</u>	<u>AG</u>
	6 (50%)	2 (17%)	3 (25%)	1 (8%)
<u>YEARS OF SERVICE</u>	<u><11</u>	<u>11-15</u>	<u>16-20</u>	<u>>20</u>
	0	7 (58%)	4 (33%)	1 (8%)
<u>EDUCATION</u>	<u>Bachelors</u>	<u>Masters</u>	<u>Doctorate</u>	
	1 (8%)	10 (83%)	1 (8%)	

GROUP C
(U.S. Control Group)

N
57

<u>AGE</u>	<u><31</u>	<u>31-35</u>	<u>36-40</u>	<u>>40</u>
	0	33 (58%)	24 (42%)	0

<u>SEX</u>	<u>Male</u>	<u>Female</u>
	54 (95%)	3 (5%)

<u>SERVICE</u>	<u>Army</u>	<u>Air Force</u>
	55 (96%)	2 (4%)

<u>BRANCH</u>	<u>Infantry</u>	<u>Armor</u>	<u>FA</u>	<u>ADA</u>	<u>Signal</u>
	15 (26%)	5 (9%)	5 (9%)	7 (12%)	2 (4%)
	<u>MI</u>	<u>MP</u>	<u>AG</u>	<u>Finance</u>	<u>QM</u>
	2 (4%)	1 (2%)	3 (5%)	2 (4%)	4 (7%)
	<u>Trans</u>	<u>Ordnance</u>	<u>Chaplain</u>	<u>Nurse</u>	<u>Veterinary</u>
	3 (5%)	2 (4%)	2 (4%)	1 (2%)	1 (2%)

<u>YEARS OF SERVICE</u>	<u><11</u>	<u>11-15</u>	<u>16-20</u>	<u>>20</u>
	8 (14%)	40 (70%)	8 (14%)	1 (2%)

<u>EDUCATION</u>	<u><Bachelors</u>	<u>Bachelors</u>	<u>Masters</u>	<u>Doctorate</u>
	1 (2%)	19 (33%)	35 (61%)	2 (4%)

APPENDIX 3C

GROUP D

(University of Wisconsin Students)

N

37

<u>AGE</u>	<u><21</u>	<u>21-25</u>	<u>>25</u>
	12 (32%)	20 (54%)	5 (14%)

<u>SEX</u>	<u>Male</u>	<u>Female</u>
	26 (72%)	10 (28%)

<u>CITIZENSHIP</u>	<u>U.S.</u>	<u>Foreign</u>
	36 (98%)	1 (2%) (India)

<u>MILITARY SERVICE</u>	<u>Prior</u>	<u>Current</u>
	4 (11%)	3 (8%)

<u>SERVICE</u>	<u>Army</u>	<u>Navy</u>
	6	1

<u>STATUS</u>	<u>Officer</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>	<u>Cadet</u>	<u>ARNG</u>	<u>USAR</u>
	1	4	2	2	1

<u>CLASS</u>	<u>Freshman</u>	<u>Sophomore</u>	<u>Junior</u>	<u>Senior</u>	<u>Other</u>
	5 (14%)	6 (16%)	9 (25%)	14 (38%)	3 (8%)

<u>COURSE</u>	<u>Latin American Politics</u>	<u>International Relations</u>	<u>Both</u>
	14 (40%)	17 (49%)	4 (11%)

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