



WIDE AREA RECOVERY & RESILIENCY PROGRAM (WARRP) INTEGRATED PROGRAM PLAN

June 2011



Report Documentation Page

Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188

Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.

1. REPORT DATE 01 JUN 2011	2. REPORT TYPE Final	3. DATES COVERED 01 Feb 2010 - 01 Jun 2011	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Wide Area Recovery and Resiliency Program (WARRP) Integrated Program Plan		5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
		5b. GRANT NUMBER	
		5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S) Mower, John		5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
		5e. TASK NUMBER	
		5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Cubic Corporation 2280 Historic Decatur Road, Suite 200 San Diego, CA 92106		8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Lori Miller Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Directorate Washington, DC 20538		10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S) DHS	
		11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S) 2.3.0	
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release, distribution unlimited			
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The original document contains color images.			
14. ABSTRACT The WARRP Integrated Program Plan documents the strategy and execution plan for WARRP. Execution is divided into five main tasks: (1) Front-End Systems Engineering Study and Gap Analysis; (2) Development of wide area consequence management guidance/frameworks to address integrated recovery and resiliency actions; (3) Identify and develop or improve methods, procedures and technologies enhancing the recovery process; (4) Provide an exercise, workshop and demonstration function that will tie together all of the Program efforts; (5) Manage the transition of guidance, frameworks, and processes, and technology solutions to end users at all levels of government. Additionally it provides chemical, biological, and radiological planning scenarios, based on National Planning Scenarios.			
15. SUBJECT TERMS WARRP, Program Management			
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UU
a. REPORT unclassified	b. ABSTRACT unclassified	c. THIS PAGE unclassified	
			18. NUMBER OF PAGES 35
			19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON

Program Plan Approved June 2011






Organization	Name	Signature
 Homeland Security	Chris Russell	
	Dan Alexander	
	Ryan Madden	
	Steve Morreale	
	John Koerner Angela Weber	<hr/> <hr/>
	Erica Canzler Shawn Ryan	

Table of Contents

Part I – Strategy.....	3
Purpose	3
Goal	3
Objectives	3
Background	3
Scope.....	4
Roles and Responsibilities.....	5
Outcomes.....	6
Management Structure.....	7
Oversight.....	8
Resources	8
Part II – Execution	9
Task 1:	9
Task 2:	9
Task 3:	10
Task 4:	10
Task 5:	10
Schedule.....	10
Master Schedule	11
Collaboration/Data Sharing Plan	11
Website:.....	11
SharePoint:.....	11
Yammer:.....	11
GoToMeeting:	12
Reporting	12
Deliverables	12
Transition	12
Appendix A: Capabilities-Based Planning and HSEEP	13
Capabilities-Based Planning and the Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP).....	13
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8 (HSPD-8)	14
National Preparedness Goal	14
National Planning Scenarios	14
Target Capabilities List (TCL)/ Universal Task List (UTL)	15
Appendix B: WARRP White Paper.....	16

Appendix C: WARRP Planning Scenarios – For Program Planning Purposes Only (subject to change).....	17
Chemical: Blister Agent.....	17
Agent Background.....	17
Scenario	17
Biological: Anthrax.....	18
Agent Background.....	18
Scenario	18
Radiological: Radiological Dispersal Devices	19
Radioisotope Background	19
Scenario	19
Appendix D: Organizational Structure	20
Appendix E: Multiyear Program Calendar (2011–2012).....	22
Appendix F: DHS Public Affairs Guidance	28
Appendix G: Acronyms and Definitions	29
Acronyms	29
Definitions.....	31

Part I – Strategy

Purpose

The purpose of the Wide Area Recovery and Resiliency Program (WARRP) is to study, develop and demonstrate frameworks, operational capabilities and interagency coordination, enabling a timely return to functionality and re-establishment of socio-economic order and basic services through execution of recovery and resiliency activities, as applicable. It should be noted, while this program must consider various response activities, the overall goal is to improve recovery and resiliency capabilities. This program will explore a coordinated systems approach to the recovery and resiliency of wide urban areas, including meeting public health requirements and restoring all types of critical infrastructure, key resources (both civilian and military) and high traffic areas (transit/transportation facilities) following a chemical, biological or radiological (CBR) incident. In this program, wide urban areas are defined as indoor and/or outdoor environments of a predetermined size. This program plan provides the overarching strategy, execution guidelines, and support needed to implement activities over the next eighteen to twenty-four months, tentatively planned from February 2011 to October 2012.

Goal

Working with interagency partners, including Federal/State/local /tribal governments, military, private industry and non-profit organizations, the goal is to develop solutions to reduce the time and resources required to recover wide urban areas, military installations, and other critical infrastructure following a catastrophic CBR incident. The greater Denver, Colorado urban area has been identified as the venue to conduct program efforts and the Denver area UASI is the primary point of contact for ongoing coordination efforts.

Objectives

The WARRP key objectives:

- Better understand the economic resilience and recovery challenges and develop innovative recommendations and strategies to accelerate economic recovery.
- Develop/refine guidance and decision frameworks that can be leveraged and transitioned to other parts of the United States and internationally as applicable.
- Identify, develop/refine, demonstrate, and transition technologies/standards that support recovery planning and operations.
- Better understand the public health situation and challenges related to recovery and recommend changes as needed to public health guidance and/or frameworks.
- Enhance long-term formal coordination between Department of Defense (DoD), Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Department of Energy (DOE), The United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) that can be optimized for stakeholder benefit at the State, regional, and local levels.
- Develop objective regional processes, exercises and capabilities for identifying and planning for CBR threats based on all-hazard doctrine.

In accordance with Homeland Security Presidential Directive-8 (HSPD-8) and the National Preparedness Goal, all program objectives will be completed with the intent of adhering to DHS capabilities-based planning and Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) methodologies in the planning and conduct of program tasks. See [Appendix A: Capabilities-Based Planning and HSEEP](#).

Background

Currently, limited Concepts of Operation (ConOps) exist to address wide area urban recovery, including characterization, remediation and clearance following a large-scale CBR incident. Federal, State, and local authorities have expressed concern and the need for an integrated system to use, should such an incident occur. Throughout the interagency community there is agreement that there are limitations for effective recovery from a CBR incident. Adequate sampling methods to efficiently determine the extent of the contamination zone and to determine the effectiveness of decontamination methods are lacking. Moreover, remediation and/or decontamination methods have not been developed or tested on wide-areas. Basic agreements and relationships have not been formally established to effectively deal with the long term effects of such an incident.

Regardless of the agent, actual recovery and re-occupancy of urban areas may require a rather lengthy process. Shutting down large areas for long periods of time has the potential to cause great damage to the nation; from social, economic and national security perspectives. At many levels, decision makers and others need to develop an understanding of the current State-of-the-art technology, applicable laws, roles and responsibilities to effectively deal with this complex challenge. This program will highlight these challenges and provide the forum to develop ways to reduce the time needed for planning the recovery of wide urban areas following a CBR incident. The development of frameworks and working relationships with organizations and validating these approaches in an operational environment will enhance the nation's ability to respond to, and recover from, a wide-area CBR release. For the official white paper, see [Appendix B: White Paper](#).

Scope

This program will leverage existing applied technologies and solutions developed; formalize long term working relationships among DHS, EPA, HHS, DoD, State, regional and local stakeholders; establish the body of knowledge to support operational planning; and document approaches to reduce the time necessary to recover and re-occupy urban areas, military installations and high transit facilities. In addition to overall recovery of wide urban areas, emphasis will be placed on community resiliency and how, at the local level, communities and local officials are better prepared to manage a large scale incident and re-establish economic, environmental and social functionality within the Denver urban area. This program will focus primarily on the formal establishment and exercise of recovery and community resiliency activities leading up to and following the large scale release of a CBR agent in an urban setting. While initial detection and response actions are extremely important considerations, it is not the intent of this program to cover these activities in great detail.

This program is the logical extension of the body of knowledge, understanding and application of solutions previously developed in the various phases of detection, emergency response and management. The procedures developed for this program will attempt to ensure the seamless transition from response to recovery activities, as well as address the need for enhancing community resiliency. To clarify, the term "seamless transition" involves the logical extension of planned activities, resource allocation and control, procedures and methods and coordination necessary to reduce time and work actions associated with response and recovery missions in support of the National Response Framework and other Federal, State, regional and local national disaster recovery frameworks as appropriate.

The WARRP program consists of five tasks, conducted over the next eighteen to twenty-four months.

Task 1: (2QFY11through3QFY11): Development and execution of a **front-end systems engineering study and gap analysis** (commonly referred to as a Systems Analysis) to establish a body of knowledge to inform National, State and local recovery capabilities. This effort includes the full breadth of study necessary to identify and prioritize gaps, align them with other national efforts, and to provide program leadership with the knowledgebase and situational awareness to support near, mid, and long-term investment decision making.

Task 2: Development of **wide-area consequence management guidance** to address integrated recovery and resiliency actions. The goal of this task is to develop/refine guidance and decision frameworks to include an all-hazards consequence management framework containing specific CBR annexes. Specifically, a comprehensive multi-level (Federal, State, local) regional framework will be developed for the Denver urban area. This framework can be leveraged and transitioned to other parts of the United States and internationally, as applicable.

Task 3: Identify, develop/refine, demonstrate and transition **technologies/standards supporting recovery planning and operations**. An evaluation and down-selection process may be employed during this task to identify technically feasible, sustainable and deployable material and non-material solutions.

Task 4: Provide an **exercise, workshop and demonstration** function that will tie together all of the Program efforts. The goal of this task is to plan and conduct a series of workshops, exercises and demonstrations coordinating military and civilian community interoperability and practical application of technology and concepts of operation. These events will follow HSEEP Processes and documentation and will drive interaction, with very specific objectives to accomplish the construction of frameworks and socialization of technical approaches.

Task 5: Supporting all of the above tasks will be an integration function that will manage the **transition of guidance, frameworks and processes, and technology solutions** to end users at all levels of government (to include regional UASIs). The goal is to develop Transition Agreements between the transitioning and sustaining organizations for all transitioning products. These efforts will also aid in building transition guidelines and frameworks for future transition efforts.

National Planning Scenarios 2 - Aerosolized Anthrax, 5 - Blister Agent- Mustard and 11 - Radiological Dispersal Device were selected as the basis for the WARRP CBR Scenarios. In order to help define the scope of the program, three program specific scenarios have been developed to fit unique aspects of the Denver region (see [Appendix C: WARRP Planning Scenarios](#)).

Roles and Responsibilities

The Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Directorate (DHS S&T), the Department of Defense – Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), and the Denver Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) will implement policy, oversight, program reviews, resource allocation, and technical direction for WARRP. The Department of Homeland Security will act as the primary point of contact and focal point for liaison activities with other civilian Federal agencies, HHS, EPA, and DOE. These agencies/departments will provide Program leads to coordinate with DHS. DTRA will act as the primary point of contact and focal point for liaison activities with other military organizations including Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD) and U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM). The Denver UASI will act the primary point of contact and focal point for liaison activities with local and State agencies.

Responsibilities include:

- Overall integration, execution and conduct of the program *[DHS, DoD, Denver UASI]*
- Contract for program integration and technical support *[DHS and DoD, as applicable]*
- Coordinate public affairs and legislative affairs with Federal and local partners *[DHS, DoD, Denver UASI]*
- Design, develop, coordinate and execute exercises, workshops and demonstrations as needed to achieve program objectives; exercises will integrate all elements of the program *[DHS, DoD, Denver UASI]*
- Provide a report and briefing schedule to convey results within 180 days of program completion anticipated by fiscal year-end 2012 *[DHS]*

- Transition program elements as appropriate to national and local organizations *[DHS and DoD, as applicable]*

DHS, DoD and Denver UASI (Collaborative Program Managers) will develop Memorandums of Understandings (MOUs) and/or Memorandums of Agreement (MOAs) as necessary with stakeholders and participating organizations to establish roles, responsibilities, and expectations for the program. These documents will serve as an acknowledgement of mutual understanding and willingness of all parties to participate in WARRP. MOUs, MOAs, and other mutually signed agreements will be undertaken in good faith with all parties involved in WARRP. For transition products, Transition Agreements (TAs) and Technology Transition Agreements (TTAs) will also provide acknowledgement of roles and responsibilities, special arrangements and conditions between the transitioning organization and the receiving, sustaining organization.

Outcomes

The following outcomes are associated with WARRP:

- Civilian and military guidance or frameworks for recovery operations aligned with Federal, DoD, State and local plans and policies/procedures. Specific deliverables include:
 - A comprehensive regional CBR incident recovery 'Framework' for the Denver Urban Area. The State of Colorado with support from Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) will be responsible for the oversight and coordination of the development of this framework with assistance from all Federal, State and local partners/stakeholders.
 - A generic CBR recovery framework/template transitional to other parts of the country (Regional). The Denver area regional CBR recovery framework will serve as the sample framework for this template.
 - CBR Annexes to the National Disaster Recovery Framework (NDRF).
 - Updates to existing technical guidance, as applicable.
- Science and Technology solutions
 - All science and technology (S&T) solutions will be a part of the WARRP transition plan. No S&T project will be started without taking final transition into consideration.
 - Continued development of consequence management tools. Current tools will be expanded to include CBR modules and designed to include an "all hazards" approach to the extent possible. (Consider integration into the FEMA-sponsored Integrated Public Alert and Warning System [IPAWS] and DoD-sponsored Decision Support System [DSS]).
 - Evaluate technologies for restoration (e.g., decontamination, sampling strategies). Part of this task will include the integration of Bio-Response Operational Testing and Evaluation (BOTE) activities and the transition of the results from the evaluation.
 - Agent fate and transport (e.g., goals of ruling in or ruling out areas for cleanup and clearance). Part of this task will include studies to determine if anthrax simulant reaerosolizes by conducting a series of outdoor test releases with monitoring and analysis.
 - Technology solutions identified by the Systems Study and further corroborated by technical working groups.
- Capabilities identified, developed, demonstrated and accepted by program sponsors and participants will be included in subsequent updates to the DHS Target Capabilities List (TCL).
- Transition agreements will be signed between the transition and sustaining organizations for all transitioning products. These efforts will also aid in building transition guidelines and frameworks for future transition efforts.
- As the program develops it is anticipated that further outcomes will be captured and incorporated into the program plan.

Management Structure

The management structure for WARRP is comprised of four primary groups: Interagency Steering Group, Collaborative Program Managers (CPMs), Program Management Support, and the Integrated Technical Team. Each group has been initially defined below and other organizations such as working groups will be added to the management structure as necessary.

The following management structure is established for the program, showing organizations arrayed in one or more of the following categories:

- Interagency Steering Group – primarily those organizations that provide policy, oversight, and reporting functions
 - DHS (S&T, FEMA, Office of Health Affairs [OHA], Infrastructure Protection [IP], Domestic Nuclear Detection office [DNDO])
 - S&T – Chris Russell
 - FEMA
 - Headquarters (HQ) – Chad Gorman/Janice McCarroll
 - Region VIII – Peter Bakersky
 - OHA – Michael Walter
 - IP – David Crafton
 - DNDO –Richard Vojtech
 - DoD (Joint Science and Technology Office [JSTO]/DTRA, OSD, USNORTHCOM)
 - JSTO/DTRA – Ryan Madden
 - OSD – *to be identified*
 - NORTHCOM –Bear McConnell
 - EPA (Office of Emergency Management [OEM], National Homeland Security Research Center [NHSRC])
 - OEM –Erica Canzler
 - NHSRC –Shawn Ryan/Hiba Ernst
 - DOE (Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center (FRMAC))
 - FRMAC–Steve Morreale
 - HHS (Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response [ASPR], Center for Disease Control and Prevention [CDC])
 - APSR –John Koerner
 - CDC –Angela Weber
 - Denver Urban Area Security Initiative – Dan Alexander
- Collaborative Program Managers
 - DHS - Appointed by Director, Chemical and Biological Technologies Portfolio – Chris Russell
 - DoD – Appointed by Director, Chemical and Biological Technologies Portfolio, DTRA – Ryan Madden
 - Denver UASI – Appointed by Denver UASI – Dan Alexander
- Program Management Support
 - Program Integrator – Cubic Applications, Inc (CAI)
 - DHS Science &Engineering and Technical Assistance (SETA)
 - DTRA Advisory and Assistance Services (A&AS)
- Integrated Technical Team
 - Task 1 (Systems Engineering) – Wayne Einfeld (Sandia National Laboratories)
 - Task 2 (Frameworks) – Steve Stein (Pacific Northwest National Laboratory)(Cubic support)
 - Task 3 (Science & Technology) – William Ginley (Edgewood Chemical Biological Center)
 - Task 4 (Exercises, Workshops and Seminars) – John Mower (Cubic)(Pacific Northwest Laboratory support)

- Task 5 (Product Transition) – Doug Hardy (SPAWAR SSC Pacific)(Cubic support)
- [See Appendix D: Organizational Structure.](#)

Oversight

The Interagency Steering Group will provide input to the CPMs to address interagency needs and policy. It will aid in scoping the program goals and objectives. This steering group will be critical in ensuring that WARRP program activities are not duplicative, unnecessary or in conflict with interagency activities and/or policy.

Each task area will have an interagency working group consisting of individuals from various organizations. These working groups will be tasked by the CPMs to study, assess and provide recommendations regarding technical, policy implementation, and coordination challenges encountered in the execution of WARRP. Working groups will be tasked to provide recommendations only and do not exercise decision making or oversight authority for the WARRP Program.

Stakeholders will be represented in working groups (WG), as appropriate. The Framework WG will include, but not be limited to, representation from the EPA (OEM and Region VIII), the Denver UASI, the HHS (CDC and ASPR), State Public Health, USNORTHCOM, DOE, FEM (HQ and Region 8), and the Transition Manager (SSC). The Technology WG will include, but not be limited to, representation from DTRA, DHS S&T, DOE, EPA, CDC, NIST, the Denver UASI, the Transition Manager (SSC), and the Technical Manager. The Exercise Workshop and Seminar WG will include, but not be limited to, representation from all Task Leads, the Denver UASI, the Integration Manager and the Transition Manager.

Resources

The following resources have been identified over the life of the program. Budget reviews and funding allocations will be planned and executed to support program priorities, scheduled activities and the sequencing of efforts depicted in Part II of this plan. Performing organization’s Statements of Work will reflect current changes as more information becomes known. The funding identified in the chart below should only be used for preliminary planning purposes and amounts will be applied to satisfy activities required each year.

Resources identified to DHS and DoD sources will be managed by program leadership and the management functions supporting each program lead. Reporting and contracts administration will be provided by program leadership with assistance provided in the A&AS/SETA function.

Fiscal Year	DoD	DHS	Combined/FY Total
FY 2011	\$1million	\$7million	\$8million
FY 2012	\$1million	\$5million	\$6million
Program/Sponsor Total	\$2million	\$12million	\$14million

Part II – Execution

WARRP will accomplish the following primary tasks:

Task 1: Front-End Systems Engineering Study and Gap Analysis (2QFY11through3QFY11)

The program will conduct a Systems Engineering Study to assess capabilities and deficiencies of both local and Federal entities to conduct wide area recovery following CBR events. The study will include both qualitative and quantitative assessments of the recovery process from a variety of perspectives that include: policy, process, knowledge, technology and capabilities. The study will also assess the adequacy or adaptability existing recovery frameworks for CBR events. Qualitative assessments will be made through interviews with key recovery personnel at both local and Federal levels. Quantitative assessments will incorporate the use of existing analysis tools further adapted for CBR recovery operations. These tools will enable a closer examination of the recovery process in terms of time and resources and will help in the determination of potential process choke points, gaps or other resource imbalances throughout the recovery process. This study will also leverage existing systems studies within the general area of recovery and restoration activities and study results will be used to update the IBRD systems study and the DHS 5-Year Research Roadmap. This task area will also utilize information developed in other program task areas as appropriate. Understanding the current capabilities and operating constructs in many already identified key procedural and technology areas will be an important variable for this systems study. The results and outcomes of the Systems Engineering study will establish a body of knowledge for Federal, State, regional and local recovery capabilities. A set of prioritized gaps and deficiencies in the overall CBR recovery process will be key outputs of this study that will be reviewed and vetted with program leadership, independent evaluators, performing organizations and stakeholders.

Task 2: Development of wide area consequence management guidance/frameworks to address integrated recovery and resiliency actions (4QFY11 through 1QFY13)

The goal is to develop/refine guidance and decision frameworks to be leveraged and transitioned to other parts of the United States and internationally as applicable. Specifically:

- A comprehensive regional CBR incident recovery 'Framework' for the Denver Urban Area. The State of Colorado with support from Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) will be responsible for the oversight and coordination of the development of this framework with assistance from all Federal, State and local partners/stakeholders.
- A generic CBR recovery framework/template transitional to other parts of the country (Regional). The Denver area regional CBR recovery framework will serve as the sample framework for this template.
- CBR Annexes to the National Disaster Recovery Framework (NDRF).
- Updates to existing technical guidance, as applicable.

Task 3: Identify and develop or improve methods, procedures and technologies enhancing the recovery process. (2QFY11 through 1QFY13)

The program will identify and demonstrate applied technology solutions enabling recovery efforts to initially include:

- Continued development of consequence management tools. Current tools will be expanded to include chemical and radiological modules and designed to include an “all hazards” approach to the extent possible. (Consider integration into the FEMA-sponsored Integrated Public Alert and Warning System [IPAWS] and the DoD-sponsored Decision Support System [DSS]).
- Evaluate technologies for restoration (e.g., decontamination, sampling strategies). Part of this task will include the integration and transition of BOTE testing results
- Improved understanding of agent fate and transport to better inform the characterization, cleanup and clearance process. Part of this task will include studies to determine if anthrax simulant reaerosolizes by conducting a series of outdoor test releases with monitoring and analysis to appropriately interpret and extrapolate results from field studies.
- Other projects as deemed essential by technical working groups as an output of a Systems Engineering Study.

Task 4: Provide an exercise, workshop and demonstration function that will tie together all of the Program efforts. (2QFY11 through 1QFY13)

The goal is to plan and conduct a series of workshops, exercises and demonstrations coordinating military and civilian community interoperability and practical application of technology and concepts of operation. These events will follow HSEEP Processes and documentation and will drive interaction, with very specific objectives to accomplish the construction of frameworks and socialization of technical approaches.

Task 5: Manage the transition of guidance, frameworks, and processes, and technology solutions to end users at all levels of government. (2QFY12 through 1QFY13)


The goal is to identify all program products for transition and potential candidates for transition. Following identification, key stakeholders will aid in prioritizing the products and candidates for transition. The transition of those products will be managed to ensure consistency, and establish agreements and timelines between the transition entity and the sustaining entity. Finally, an important objective will be to provide a transition framework extensible for future transitions.

Schedule

The following high-level schedule covers the execution years and portrays activities and major events. Performing organizations will utilize the high level schedule to plan, resource and allocate sub-tasks to achieve program outcomes within the timeframes identified below.

Performing organizations will develop their Statements of Work using the timelines established below to determine deliverable products and capabilities, allocate and manage resources, assign personnel and establish dependencies as appropriate to completion of major program tasks. Recommendations for changes to the master schedule will be provided to program leadership for a decision prior to actual changes occurring. Risk assessments and problem resolution results will accompany all requests for schedule changes.

Major tasks for WARPP will be completed in a parallel fashion.



Master Schedule

See [Appendix E: Multiyear Program Calendar \(2011–2012\)](#).

Collaboration/Data Sharing Plan

The following will be used for program collaboration:

- A dedicated Program web site (www.warrp.org)
- SharePoint for document sharing
- Yammer – a secure social networking application in use by Denver UASI
- GoToMeeting for online meetings

Website:

A traditional website (www.warrp.org) will be created for general public information and event registration purposes. It will not require user names and passwords. This site will also be an easy entry point to access the more secure applications such as SharePoint and Yammer. The website will be maintained by the Program Integrator.

SharePoint:

SharePoint will be used for a secure file share application and master program calendar. A robust document search application will be available to help users locate documents. An extensive program contact list, with search features will also be added to the SharePoint site. SharePoint will offer the WARRP security and backup capability. The website will be maintained by the Program Integrator.

Users will be required to have usernames and passwords and users may need to obtain independent access from respective organizations to this SharePoint site.

Yammer:

Yammer is in use by the Denver UASI and is a preferred method of collaboration by the local partners. Yammer is a secure social networking application with the look and feel of Facebook. This application allows for instantaneous threaded discussions, file sharing, polling and many other features to enhance the daily communications between team members, stakeholders and other WARRP members. Yammer interactivity using iPhone, Android and Blackberry applications has been tested and validated. This will allow for access to information when users are not able to access a computer or if an organization's IT/IS policies restrict access. There is also a desktop application which allows the user to monitor and respond to Yammer traffic without having to open a web browser. Yammer also offers the ability to have a virtual conversation. With the use of Groups, keeping the conversations segregated will help users from becoming confused about the topic of conversation.

Yammer also has a SharePoint integration plugin. This plugin makes sharing documents from SharePoint to a Yammer page easy and quick. For security reasons this is a one way plug in only. Other plugins such as Yammer Bookmarklet helps you quickly link a web page or text on a web page to a Yammer discussion. Twitter integration is an option also with a small plug in.

GoToMeeting:

GoToMeeting (GTM) will provide online collaboration and information sharing. GTM has not only telecom access but integrated voice over IP. The GoToWebinar access allows for groups larger than 15 connections to attend a single meeting. GTM is capped at 15 attendees (for larger groups, GoToWebinar or a standard Conference Line will be used).

Reporting

The lead integrator will coordinate with task and functional area leads to produce a bi-monthly newsletter and conduct bi-weekly leadership teleconference calls during which the task/functional area leads will provide progress updates. Monthly reports will be provided to the PM by the lead integrator as specified by contract.

Deliverables

Deliverables allow the WARRP CPMs to gauge the progress of the project and at the same time the accomplishments of the performing organizations. Deliverables also allow the CPMs to make adjustments as needed in the project so the stated program goals and objectives can be achieved. Deliverables will be tied to each performer's submitted tasks meeting the Program's Goals and Objectives. They can include (but are not limited to) reports, frameworks, procedures, exercises, demonstrations or equipment delivery. These deliverables will be clearly Stated in the submitted tasks and agreed to by the CPMs as both acceptable and furthering the Program's Goals and Objectives. When a performer's deliverable has been accepted, the CPM's support staff will add the task and deliverable milestones to the Master Project schedule.

All deliverables will be subject to a DHS Public Affairs (PA) approval process. DHS PA will recommend an appropriate distribution Statement which will determine what level of public distribution and release is authorized. For information on this approval process, see [Appendix F: DHS Public Affairs Guidance](#).

Transition

All tasks will have transition products and frameworks associated with them. As part of the planning process, each Task Lead will work with the Transition Manager to ensure a stakeholder(s) is identified prior to task execution. The Transition Manager will act as a liaison between the CPMs, Task Leads, and Stakeholders to ensure deliverables meet the needs, timelines and expectations of the respective stakeholders. The formation of a Transition Working Group may be necessary at the appropriate time to establish priorities, and ensure consistency across the program and with relevant stakeholders. No project will be undertaken without the identification of a stakeholder.

Appendix A: Capabilities-Based Planning and HSEEP

(source: HSEEP Volume IV)

Capabilities-Based Planning and the Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)

Capabilities-based planning seeks to identify capabilities suitable for a wide range of challenges and circumstances in all phases of incident management, while working within an economic framework that necessitates prioritization and choice. The National Planning Scenarios are one of four critical elements of the National Preparedness Guidelines and are often used by Federal, State and local stakeholders for capabilities-based planning. WARRP Scenarios have been developed using the National Planning Scenarios and are intended to fit unique aspects of the Denver/Colorado Springs regions. The Target Capabilities List (TCL) defines capabilities-based planning as “planning, under uncertainty, to build capabilities suitable for a wide range of threats and hazards while working within an economic framework that necessitates prioritization and choice.” As such, capabilities-based planning is all-hazards planning identifying a baseline assessment of State or urban area homeland security efforts. An assessment of this kind is necessary to begin any long-term exercise strategy. This determines where current capabilities stand against the Universal Task List (UTL) and TCL and identifies gaps in capabilities. The approach focuses efforts on identifying and developing the capabilities from the TCL to perform the critical tasks from the UTL.



Evolution of Capabilities-Based Planning



The purpose of incorporating HSEEP into overall program integration is to ensure a common methodology for WARRP Program and Project Management. “HSEEP includes consistent terminology that can be used by all exercise planners, regardless of the nature and composition of their sponsoring agency or organization. The volumes (I-V) provide tools to help exercise managers plan, conduct, and evaluate exercises to improve overall preparedness. HSEEP reflects lessons learned and best practices of existing exercise programs and can be adapted to the full spectrum of hazardous scenarios and incidents (e.g., natural disasters, terrorism, technological disasters). The HSEEP volumes integrate language and concepts from the National Response Plan (NRP), the National Incident Management System (NIMS), the National Preparedness Goal, the TCL/UTL, existing exercise programs, and prevention and response protocols from all levels of government. In the spirit of National Incident Management System (NIMS), all efforts should be made to ensure consistent use of the terminology and processes described in HSEEP.” HSEEP Volume III.

Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8 (HSPD-8)

On December 17, 2003, the President issued Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8 (HSPD-8): National Preparedness. Among other actions, HSPD-8 required establishment of a National Preparedness Goal, which establishes measurable priorities, targets, and a common approach to developing capabilities needed to better prepare the Nation as a whole. The National Preparedness Goal uses a capabilities-based planning approach to help answer the following questions:

- How prepared are we?
- How prepared do we need to be?
- How do we prioritize efforts to close the gap?

As a result of HSPD-8 and the National Preparedness Goal, a set of National Planning Scenarios was developed to illustrate the effects and conditions of incidents of national significance for which the Nation should prepare.

National Preparedness Goal

The National Preparedness Goal is designed to guide Federal departments and agencies; State, territorial, tribal and local officials; the private sector; nongovernmental organizations (NGOs); and the public in determining how most effectively and efficiently to strengthen preparedness for terrorist attacks, major disasters and other emergencies. The following eight national priorities were established by the DHS National Preparedness Goal:

1. Implement the NIMS and NRF
2. Expand regional collaboration
3. Implement the National Infrastructure Preparedness Plan
4. Strengthen information sharing and collaboration capabilities
5. Strengthen chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives (CBRNE) weapons detection, response, and decontamination capabilities
6. Strengthen interoperable communications capabilities
7. Strengthen medical surge and mass prophylaxis capabilities
8. Strengthen emergency operations planning and citizen protection capabilities

National Planning Scenarios

The 15 National Planning Scenarios address all-hazards incidents, which include terrorism, natural disasters and health emergencies. They represent the minimum number of scenarios necessary to illustrate the range of potential incidents, rather than every possible threat or hazard. The 15 National Planning Scenarios are:

1. Improvised Nuclear Device (IND)
2. **Aerosolized Anthrax**
3. Pandemic Influenza
4. Plague
5. **Blister Agent**
6. Toxic Industrial Chemical
7. Nerve Agent
8. Chlorine Tank Explosion
9. Major Earthquake
10. Major Hurricane
11. **Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD)**
12. Improvised Explosive Device (IED)
13. Food Contamination
14. Foreign Animal Disease (FAD)
15. Cyber

The National Planning Scenarios serve as the basis for identifying tasks that must be performed to prevent, protect against, respond to and recover from these incidents, as well as the capabilities required to perform the tasks. The 15 scenarios provide for common planning factors in terms of the potential scope, magnitude and complexity of major events helping to determine the target levels of capability required and apportion responsibility among all potential partners. Developing appropriate capabilities to address this range of scenarios will best prepare the Nation for terrorist attacks, major disasters and other emergencies. WARRP Scenarios have been developed using the National Planning Scenarios 2, 5, and 11 to fit unique aspects of the Denver/Colorado Springs regions and programmatic goals and objectives.

Target Capabilities List (TCL)/ Universal Task List (UTL)

The TCL includes 37 goals balancing the potential threat and magnitude of terrorist attacks, major disasters and other emergencies with the resources required for prevention, response and recovery. This list is designed to help jurisdictions understand what their preparedness roles and responsibilities are during a major incident and includes everything from all-hazards planning to worker health and safety. The UTL is a list of every unique task identified from the list of National Planning Scenarios developed under the leadership of the Homeland Security Council. The UTL is a reference to help plan, organize, equip, train, exercise and evaluate personnel for the tasks they may need to perform during a major incident.

Appendix B: WARRP White Paper

Subject: Wide Area Recovery & Resiliency Program (WARRP)

April, 2011

Background

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Denver Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) have initiated a collaborative program aimed at enhancing wide area recovery capabilities of large urban areas, military installations, and critical infrastructure following a large-scale chemical, biological or radiological (CBR) incident. This program builds on the success of the Interagency Biological Restoration Demonstration (IBRD) which took place in the greater Seattle, WA region from 2007-2010 and explored recovery from wide-area biological threats to civilian and military installations. As was the case with IBRD, DHS will closely coordinate with the Department of Defense (DoD) to meet WARRP objectives. Additional agencies, including the Department of Energy (DOE), The United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the Department of Health & Human Services (DHHS) are also collaborating in this effort.

Purpose

The purpose of the Wide Area Recovery and Resiliency Program (WARRP) is to develop and demonstrate solutions (i.e., frameworks, operational capabilities and interagency coordination) that will enable a timely return to functionality, restore basic services and re-establish social and economic order following a catastrophic event. WARRP focuses on a coordinated systems approach to the recovery and resiliency of wide urban areas, including all types of critical infrastructures, key resources (both civilian and military) and high traffic areas (transit/transportation facilities) following a CBR incident.

Goal

Working with interagency partners, including Federal /State / local / tribal governments, military, private industry and non-profit organizations, develop solutions to reduce the time and resources required to recover wide urban areas, military installations, and other critical infrastructures following a catastrophic CBR incident.

Objectives

- Better understand the economic resilience and recovery challenges and develop innovative recommendations and strategies to accelerate economic recovery.
- Develop/refine guidance and decision frameworks that can be leveraged and transitioned to other parts of the United States and internationally as applicable.
- Identify, develop/refine, demonstrate, and transition technologies/standards that support recovery planning and operations.
- Better understand the public health situation and challenges related to recovery and recommend changes as needed to public health guidance and/or frameworks.
- Enhance long-term formal coordination between Department of Defense (DoD), Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Department of Energy (DOE), The United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) that can be optimized for stakeholder benefit at the State, regional, and local levels.
- Develop an objective regional process/capability for identifying and planning for CBR threats; including exercising programmatic solutions for recovery based on all-hazard doctrine.

Summary

This program will leverage existing applied technologies and solutions developed; formalize long term working relationships between key Federal, State, regional, and local stakeholders; establish the body of knowledge to support operational planning; and document approaches to reduce the time necessary to recover and re-occupy urban areas, military installations, and high transit facilities. In addition to overall recovery of wide urban areas, emphasis will be placed on community resiliency and how, at the local level, communities and local officials are better prepared to manage a large scale incident and re-establish economic, environmental, and social functionality. While initial detection, characterization, and response actions are extremely important considerations, it is not the intent of this program to cover these activities in great detail. Rather, this program is the logical extension of the body of knowledge, understanding, and application of solutions previously developed in the various phases of detection, emergency response, and management.

Program Timeline

The WARRP Program officially commenced in February 2011 and will conclude October 2012.

Point of contact

Mr. Chris Russell; Chemical & Biological Division, DHS; 202-254-5876; christopher.e.russell@dhs.gov



Homeland Security




Appendix C: WARRP Planning Scenarios –

For Program Planning Purposes Only (subject to change)

Chemical: Blister Agent


(National Planning Scenario #5 tailored for Denver area)

- **Blister agent attack on a packed Coors Field (Downtown Denver).** 95 fatalities; over 1,000 hospitalized (max. capacity of field is 55,445)
- **Evacuations/Displaced Persons:** Tens of thousands evacuated and thousands seeking shelter (decontamination required)
- **Significant contamination in affected areas, including the stadium and surrounding area.** Agent has generated a downwind vapor hazard. Approx. contamination = over 5 miles
 - Several high value properties contaminated including Coors Field, Pepsi Center, and Invesco Field Mile High
 - Basic services affected
 - Local businesses affected



Agent Background

Agent YELLOW, which is a mixture of the chemical warfare agents Sulfur Mustard and Lewisite, is a liquid with a garlic-like odor. Sulfur mustard, also known as **mustard gas**, has the ability to form large blisters on exposed skin. Lewisite is a blister agent that contains arsenic, a poisonous element. Skin irritation from sulfur mustard gradually turns into large blisters filled with yellow fluid wherever the agent contacted the skin. Temporary blindness can occur if a victim's eyes are exposed. At very high concentrations, if inhaled, mustard agent causes bleeding and blistering within the respiratory system, damaging mucous membranes and causing pulmonary edema. Severe mustard gas burns (i.e., where more than 50% of the victim's skin has been burned) are often fatal, with death occurring after some days or even weeks have passed. The blister effects of Lewisite occur sooner, and extensive eye exposure can cause permanent blindness.



Scenario

Terrorist agents acquire 175 gallons of Agent YELLOW, equip a small airplane with sprayers and fly the plane at low altitude over **Denver's Coors Field** during a Rockies baseball game. At his closest approach to the stadium, the pilot veers directly towards the target. Ignoring frantic air traffic control calls and an approaching police helicopter, he cuts his speed and drops over the stadium, simultaneously hitting the spray release button. A coarse spray of Agent YELLOW is released. In the stadium, surprise at the appearance of the aircraft turns to panic when the spray is observed coming out of the rear of the plane. **In total, 53,000**

people have been either hit by, or breathe vapors of, the Agent YELLOW spray. Thousands are injured and many are killed in the rush to exit the stadium. People hit in the eyes experience immediate pain, and the first ones out of the stadium are trying to get away as soon and as far as possible. Numerous auto accidents occur in the parking lot and access roads. Some people track contamination into nearby residences, onto public transportation and into hospitals.

Biological: Anthrax

(National Planning Scenario #2: Biological Attack – Aerosol Anthrax)

- **Two covert anthrax aerosol attacks by an organized worldwide terrorist group.** Tens of thousands of people exposed and thousands of deaths.
- **Evacuations/Displaced Persons:** Tens of thousands evacuated, thousands seek shelter in immediate area (decontamination required)
- **Significant contamination in affected areas, including critical infrastructure, commercial, military & private property.**

Approx. contamination = 2 areas of 10 sq. miles each

- Hundreds of buildings contaminated
- Basic services affected
- Local military installations affected
- Local government operations relocated
- Local businesses affected



Agent Background



Anthrax is a bacterial disease caused by *Bacillus anthracis*. There are three types of this disease: cutaneous anthrax, gastrointestinal anthrax, and inhalation anthrax. Anthrax spores delivered by aerosol spray result in inhalation anthrax, which develops when the bacterial organism is inhaled into the lungs. A progressive infection follows. In most people, a lethal infection is expected to result from inhalation of about 8,000 spores however, a small number of people (particularly the elderly, very young and immunocompromised) may become ill from an exposure as small as 2-4 spores.

Respiratory infection in humans initially presents with cold or flu-like symptoms for several days, followed by severe (and often fatal) respiratory collapse. Historical mortality was 92%, but when treated early (as seen in the 2001 anthrax attacks) observed mortality was 45%. Distinguishing pulmonary anthrax from more common causes of respiratory illness is essential to avoiding delays in diagnosis and thereby improving outcomes. Illness progressing to the fulminant phase has a 97% mortality regardless of treatment.

Scenario


On an autumn Monday morning, a specially fitted truck drives north on I-25. When the truck reaches the Auraria section, the driver's companion turns on a concealed improvised spraying device with a conventional nozzle that rapidly aerosolizes approximately 100 liters of wet-fill *Bacillus anthracis* (anthrax) slurry. The release is sufficient to result in the potential exposure of tens of thousands of persons. Approximately 50 minutes later, a second truck drives along E. Alameda Pkwy. in Aurora, CO releasing a second cloud of anthrax. The wind blows the cloud over Buckley Air Force Base (AFB) contaminating the airstrip and an area extending nearly to the Denver airport.

Two days later, Denver area BioWatch samplers detect the presence of anthrax and it is determined that a bioterrorism event has occurred. The appropriate notifications are made, and patients begin to report to area hospitals.

Radiological: Radiological Dispersal Devices

(National Planning Scenario #11: Radiological Attack – Radiological Dispersal Devices)

- **Two Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD) attacks at the U.S. Mint (downtown) and the Anschutz Medical Campus (Aurora).** Tens of thousands of people exposed and hundreds of deaths.
- **Evacuations/Displaced Persons** 10,000 evacuated to shelters in safe areas (decontamination required prior to entering shelters) 25,000 in each city are given shelter-in-place instructions. Hundreds of thousands self-evacuate from major urban areas in anticipation of future attacks
- **Most radioactive fallout is within tens of miles**, some may be carried up to hundreds of miles.
 - Hundreds of buildings contaminated
 - Basic services affected
 - Local businesses affected



- Government operations relocated
- Mass Transit (East-West rail line) affected
- Local military installations affected

Radioisotope Background


Cesium-137 (^{137}Cs) is a radioactive isotope of cesium. **The half-life of cesium-137 is 30.17 years.** Because of the chemical nature of cesium, it moves easily through the environment. This makes the cleanup of cesium-137 difficult. People may ingest cesium-137 with food and water, or may inhale it as dust. If cesium-137 enters the body, it is distributed fairly uniformly throughout the body's soft tissues, resulting in exposure of those tissues. Exposure to cesium-137 may also be external (that is, exposure to its gamma radiation from outside the body). If exposures to cesium-137 are very high, serious burns, and even death, can result. People may become internally contaminated (inside their bodies) with radioactive materials by accidentally ingesting (eating or drinking) or inhaling (breathing) them, or through direct contact (open wounds). The sooner these materials are removed from the body, the fewer and less severe the health effects of the contamination will be.

Scenario


Terrorist obtain approximately **2,300 curies of ^{137}Cs (CsCl)**, and 1.5 tones of Ammonium nitrate/Fuel oil (ANFO). The explosive and the shielded CsCl sources are packaged into bombs and loaded onto a truck. The total explosive yield in each device is approximately 3,000 pounds. At 11:15 a.m. during the school year, terrorists detonate the **3,000-pound truck bomb** containing the 2,300 curies of ^{137}Cs outside the U.S. Mint in the downtown business district of Denver. The explosion collapses the front of one building and causes severe damage to three others. Windows are blown out of five other buildings. Amid the destruction, ^{137}Cs contamination covers the scene and the contaminated detonation aerosol is lifted more than 100 feet into the air and spread across a wide area.

In Aurora, a second explosion is timed to go off at approximately 12:30 p.m. on the same day outside The Children's Hospital's Emergency Department, the only Level I Pediatric Trauma Center in Colorado, located in the middle of sprawling Anschutz Medical Campus. The time lag is intended to maximize press coverage and spread fear and uncertainty. Local first-response capacity, however, is depleted in cities two and three because many responder assets have been dispatched to assist nearby Denver during the response.

Appendix D: Organizational Structure



Expanded Integrated Task Team



Appendix E: Multiyear Program Calendar (2011-2012)

2011			
Quarter 1	January	February	March
	<p>1 – Scenario Drafts due</p> <p>25 – Scenarios completed</p>	<p>16 - Official Program Kickoff / Threat Symposium (in Denver) ★</p> <p>17 – Brief CONUS follow-on to IBRD to NORTHCOM IC</p>	
Quarter 2	April	May	June
	<p>TBD – Denver Site Visits - Systems Engineering Study</p> <p>27-28 Apr – Team Coordination Meeting</p> <p>TBD – S&T Working Group Commences</p> <p>Flood Season begins this month.</p>	<p>May 2-6 – HHS Integrative Training Summit</p> <p>May 2 – NORTHCOM Briefing</p> <p>May 3 - Addressing the Federal-State-Local Interface Recovery Issues Following a Catastrophic Event (Denver Sheraton) ★</p> <p>May 5 - NCR/UASI Recovery Committee –</p> <p>May 16-20 - National Level Exercise</p> <p>May 23 – Denver WARRP Steering Committee</p> <p>May 25 - S&T Working Group Commences (Virtual GTM)</p>	<p>June 2 - NCR/UASI Recovery Committee</p> <p>June 6-17 CWID Exercise</p> <p>June 7-8 CWA/TIC Airport Remediation Workshop</p> <p>June 10 – BOTE Second MSEL Conference</p> <p>June 15 - Systems Analysis Workshop</p> <p>June 15 – Rocky Mountain Thunder (TTX)</p> <p>June 20 - 23 - UASI Conference</p> <p>June 27 – Denver WARRP Steering Committee</p> <p>June 29-30 BOTE Clearance Strategy Meeting</p> <p>Various - Regional Systems Analysis Study continues: -</p>

2011

2011			
Quarter 3	July	August	September
	<p>July 7 - NCR/UASI Recovery Committee</p> <p>July 12 – BOTE Final MSEL Conference</p> <p>July 12 – FEMA Regional Interagency Steering Committee (RISC) (Denver)</p> <p>July 25 – Denver WARRP Steering Committee (afternoon)</p> <p>July 25-26 – S&T Working Group Meeting (Denver)</p> <p>July 25-26 - Transition Working Group Commences (finalize Framework TA, continue working other TAs)</p> <p>Various - Regional Systems Analysis Study continues</p>	<p>Aug 2-3 BOTE Final Planning Conference</p> <p>August 4 - NCR/UASI Recovery Committee ★</p> <p>August 10 - 11 - Chem/Rad SME Workshop in Arlington, VA</p> <p>Aug 16 – BOTE Phase 1 Group Analyses Meeting (Briefing out Phase 1 to Phase 2 Results)</p> <p>August 16-18 - Framework Workshop (TENTATIVE) ★</p> <p>Aug 18-19? - Team Coordination Meeting ★</p> <p>August 22 – Denver WARRP Steering Committee</p> <p>August 22 - 27 – Bicycle Tour of Colorado</p> <p>Aug 23 – BOTE IC / ECC / TWG Meeting</p> <p>TBD Milestone - Draft Systems Engineering/Analysis Report – Sandia Briefs Recovery / Steering Committee ★</p> <p><i>Wildfire Season begins this month.</i></p>	<p>September 1 - NCR/UASI Recovery Committee</p> <p>September 6-9 – International TWG (Australia) ★</p> <p>September 10 - 24 - BOTE Exercise (Idaho)</p> <p>September 11 – 10th anniversary (9/11)</p> <p>September 19-23 - UASI Full scale exercise- Operation Mountain Guardian (OMG) (Ex on Sept 23)</p> <p>September 27-28 - S&T Working Group Meeting (DC/NCR)</p> <p>September 26 – Denver WARRP Steering Committee</p> <p>September 30 – BOTE Recommendations to IC Brief (teleconference)</p>

Quarter 4	October	November	December
	<p>TBD - Elected Officials Workshop</p> <p>October 6 - NCR/UASI Recovery Committee</p> <p>October 6 – Milestone - Final Systems Engineering Report – to Recovery / Steering Committee</p> <p>October 24 – Denver WARRP Steering Committee</p> <p>October 24 - Transition Working Group Meeting (San Diego, CA)</p> <p>TBD Public Health Threat Symposium / Fatality Management ★</p>	<p>November 1-3 EPA Decontamination Conference (RTP, NC)</p> <p>November 3 - NCR/UASI Recovery Committee</p> <p>November 9 = BOTE After Action Conference (teleconference)</p> <p>November 14-18 DTRA CB S&T Conference (Las Vegas, NV)</p> <p>November 28 - WARRP Steering Committee</p> <p>TBD - Economic Recovery Symposium ★</p> <p>November 29 - S&T Working Group Meeting (teleconference)</p>	<p>December 1 - NCR/UASI Recovery Committee</p> <p>December 6 – BOTE Briefing to Leadership (DC)</p> <p>December 7-8 - WARRP TTX/CPX (Denver) ★</p> <p>December 15 - BROOM TTA Acceptance Event (combine with above meeting)</p> <p>_____ - Briefing to Federal Interagency on progress and issues requiring action</p> <p>December 22 - Complete the Draft of Regional Recovery Framework ★</p> <p>December 31 – Regional Framework Due ★</p>

2012

2012			
	January	February	March
Quarter 1	<p>_____ - Communications Approach to Catastrophic Event: Federal, State, Local, Military, Private Sector Approach and ongoing - NSS OSTP Bio Communications Project ★</p> <p>Jan 18-19 - Team Coordination Meeting (Colorado Springs, CO) ★</p> <p>Jan 23 - Denver WARRP Steering Committee</p> <p>Jan 24 - Transition Working Group Meeting (Colorado Springs, CO)</p> <p>Jan 25-26 – Framework Working Group ★</p>	<p>_____ - Debris Management/Disposal Meeting ★</p> <p>Feb 27 – Denver WARRP Steering Committee</p> <p>Feb 28 - S&T Working Group Meeting</p>	<p>_____ - Regional Recovery Framework Integration with State and Feds (Transition)</p> <p>_____ - S&T Demonstrations</p> <p>Mar 26 - WARRP Steering Committee</p>

Quarter 2	April	May	June
	<p>_____ - NGO Workshop [Need to define objectives]</p> <p>_____ - COOP Planning [Need to define objectives and determine how the program adds value?]</p> <p>_____ - Fire and Police Policies & Procedures for Responding to a Contaminated Area Meeting</p> <p>_____ - Civilian-Military Roles & Responsibilities Workshop</p> <p>Apr 23 - WARRP Steering Committee</p>	<p>_____ - Transition Working Group Meeting</p> <p>May 28 -- WARRP Steering Committee (Regional Framework TTX Planning Meeting)</p> <p>_____ - S&T Working Group Meeting</p> <p>_____ - Final Framework Completed / Brief Framework</p>	<p>_____ - Team Coordination Meeting</p> <p><i>Capstone Event Planning</i></p> <p>June 25 - WARRP Steering Committee</p>
Quarter 3	July	August	September
	<p>_____ - Transition Working Group Meeting</p> <p>_____ - S&T Working Group Meeting</p> <p><i>Capstone Event Planning</i></p> <p>July 23 - WARRP Steering Committee planning for Regional Framework TTX</p>	<p>_____ - Regional Framework TTX (in Denver) ★</p> <p>August 15 – Seattle UASI Evergreen Regional Recovery Framework (PATH/AWARE acceptance event)</p> <p><i>Capstone Event Planning</i></p> <p>Aug 27 - WARRP Steering Committee</p>	<p>_____ - Briefing to Interagency on accomplishments and open issues</p> <p><i>Capstone Event Planning</i></p> <p>Sept 24 - WARRP Steering Committee</p>

Quarter 4	October	November	December
	<p>_____ - Capstone Event ★</p> <p>Oct 22 – WARRP Steering Committee</p>	<p>Program Completion</p>	

COLOR CODE KEY FOR CALENDAR
Overall Program
Systems Engineering
Planning
Science and Technology
Constraints
★ Denotes Major Events

Appendix F: DHS Public Affairs Guidance

All documents, presentations, journal articles, posters, newsletters and products which mention the WARRP program or DHS will be shared with DHS Public Affairs Office (PAO). PAO will also determine appropriate final markings and distribution. Documents should be cleared through any internal process prior to submission to PAO. Depending on content and markings, products may also need to be cleared through other agencies as well.

General Guidance:

- The DHS logo should always appear with the words “Homeland Security” and not as a stand-alone seal. Use this when also using the Department of Defense seal.
- When using the DTRA logo, you should use the DHS S&T logo. When using the DoD logo, you should use the DHS logo (i.e., not the S&T logo).
- All documents should have the standard WARRP cover page, followed by a “this page is left blank intentionally page” if required this should be followed by a performer cover page
- No document should have more than 2 cover pages
- In the acknowledgements, please ensure that it reads "U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Science and Technology Directorate" in all documents. The same is true for the “Prepared for ...” Statements.
- Appendices should not have a cover page and extra blank pages. Just put “Appendix #” and title at the top of the first page of each Appendix. The last (or only) Appendix in each document should be a list of Acronyms.
- Remove excess blank pages whenever possible. Some blank pages are necessary for the printed version of the reports, but try to minimize. This is a Paper Reduction Act issue.
- Do not use cover pages for Appendices. Just center the Appendix # and title on the top of the first page of each Appendix.
- Standardize how authors’ names are represented. Preferred format is Firstname. MiddleInitial. Lastname or FirstInitial. MiddleInitial. Lastname. Their affiliation/organization should also be noted in some way.
- Be sure that documents that require FOUO status are marked “FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY” and not simply “OFFICIAL USE ONLY”

Templates for programmatic and performer documents will be made available and be provided on the WARRP website.

Appendix G: Acronyms and Definitions

Acronyms

A&AS	Advisory and Assistance Services
ASPR	Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response
BOTE	Bio-Response Operational Testing and Evaluation
CAI	Cubic Applications, Inc.
CBR	Chemical, Biological, and Radiological
CBRNE	Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, or high-yield Explosives
CDC	Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
CI	Critical Infrastructure
CISM	Critical Incident Stress Management
ConOps	Concept of Operations
CPM	Collaborative Program Manager
DHS	Department of Homeland Security
DHS S&T	Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Directorate
DNDO	Domestic Nuclear Detection Office
DoD	Department of Defense
DOE	Department of Energy
DOJ	Department of Justice
DSS	Decisions Support System
DTRA	Defense Threat Reduction Agency
ECBC	Edgewood Chemical Biological Center
EMS	Emergency Medical Services
EOC	Emergency Operations Center
EPA	Environmental Protection Agency
FAD	Foreign Animal Disease

FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
FRMAC	Federal Radiological Monitoring Assessment Center
HHS	Department of Health and Human Services
HQ	Headquarters
HSEEP	Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program
HSPD	Homeland Security Presidential Directive
HSRC	Hazardous Substance Research Center
IBRD	Interagency Biological Restoration Demonstration
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
IMAAC	Interagency Modeling and Atmospheric Assessment Center
IND	Improvised Nuclear Device
IP	Infrastructure Protection
IPAWS	Integrated Public Alert and Warning System
JSTO	Joint Science and Technology Office
LE	Law Enforcement
LRN	Laboratory Response Network
MOA	Memorandum of Agreement
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
NARAC	National Atmospheric Release Advisory Center
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NHSRC	National Homeland Security Research Center
NIMS	National Incident Management System
NIST	National Institute of Technology and Standards
NRP	National Response Plan
OEM	Office of Emergency Management
OHA	Office of Health Affairs

OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
PAO	Public Affairs Office
PNNL	Pacific Northwest National Laboratory
POD	Point of Distribution
PPE	Personal Protective Equipment
RDD	Radiological Dispersal Device
SETA	Systems Engineering and Technical Assistance
SNL	Sandia National Laboratories
SSC	Space & Naval Warfare Systems Center
S&T	Science and Technology
SSC	SPAWAR Systems Center
TA	Transition Agreement
TTA	Technology Transition Agreement
TCL	Targeted Capabilities List
UASI	Urban Area Security Initiative
USNORTHCOM	United States Northern Command
UTL	Universal Task List
WARRP	Wide Area Recovery and Resiliency Program
WG	Working Group

Definitions

biological agent. A microorganism that causes disease in persons, plants, or animals or causes the deterioration of materiel (JP 1-02)

biological weapon. An item of materiel which projects, disperses, or disseminates a biological agent including arthropod vectors(JP 1-02)

blister agent. A chemical agent which injures the eyes and lungs, and burns or blisters the skin. Also called vesicant agent. (JP 1-02)

chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives consequence management. The consequence management activities for all deliberate and inadvertent releases of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives that are undertaken when directed or authorized by the President. Also called CBRNE CM (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02)

community recovery. In the context of the National Response Plan (NRP) and its annexes, the process of assessing the effects of an Incident of National Significance, defining resources, and developing and implementing a course of action to restore and revitalize the socioeconomic and physical structure of a community.

consequence management. Predominantly an emergency management function and included measures to protect public health and safety, restore essential government services, and provide emergency relief to governments, businesses, and individuals affected by the consequences of terrorism. The requirements of consequence management and crisis management are combined in the NRP. See also crisis management.

contamination. 1. The deposit, absorption, or adsorption of radioactive material, or of biological or chemical agents on or by structures, areas, personnel, or objects. 2. Food and/or water made unfit for consumption by humans or animals because of the presence of environmental chemicals, radioactive elements, bacteria or organisms, the byproduct of the growth of bacteria or organisms, the decomposing material (to include the food substance itself), or waste in the food or water. (JP 1-02)

crisis management. Measures to identify, acquire, and plan the use of resources needed to anticipate, prevent, and/or resolve a threat or an act of terrorism. It is predominantly a law enforcement response, normally executed under Federal law. Also called CrM (JP 1-02)

decontamination. The process of making any person, object, or area safe by absorbing, destroying, neutralizing, making harmless, or removing chemical or biological agents, or by removing radioactive material clinging to or around it. (JP 1-02)

homeland security, as defined in the National Strategy for Homeland Security, is “a concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur.” The Department of Homeland Security is the lead Federal agency for homeland security. In addition, its responsibilities extend beyond terrorism to preventing, preparing for, responding to, and recovering from a wide range of major domestic disasters and other emergencies.

National Incident Management System. A national crisis response system that provides a consistent, nationwide approach for Federal, State, local, and tribal governments; the private sector; and non-governmental organizations to work effectively and efficiently together to prepare for, respond to, and recover from domestic incidents, regardless of cause, size, or complexity. Also called NIMS (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02)

persistency. In biological or chemical warfare, the characteristic of an agent which pertains to the duration of its effectiveness under determined conditions after its dispersal. (JP 1-02)

protection. 1. Preservation of the effectiveness and survivability of mission-related military and nonmilitary personnel, equipment, facilities, information, and infrastructure deployed or located within or outside the boundaries of a given operational area. 2. Measures that are taken to keep nuclear, biological, and chemical hazards from having an adverse effect on personnel, equipment, or critical assets and facilities. Protection consists of five groups of activities: hardening of positions; protecting personnel; assuming mission-oriented protective posture; using physical defense measures; and reacting to attack. 3. In space usage, active and passive defensive measures to ensure that United States and friendly space systems perform as designed by seeking to overcome an adversary’s attempts to negate them and to minimize damage if negation is attempted. (JP 1-02)

recovery. The development, coordination, and execution of service- and site-restoration plans for impacted communities and the reconstitution of government operations and services through individual, private-sector,

nongovernmental, and public assistance programs that: identify needs and define resources; provide housing and promote restoration; address long-term care and treatment of affected persons; implement additional measures for community restoration; incorporate mitigation measures and techniques, as feasible; evaluate the incident to identify lessons learned; and develop initiatives to mitigate the effects of future incidents.

response. Activities that address the short-term, direct effects of an incident; response includes immediate actions to save lives, protect property, and meet basic human needs. Response also includes the execution of emergency operations plans and of incident mitigation activities designed to limit the loss of life, personal injury, property damage, and other unfavorable outcomes. As indicated by the situation, response activities include: applying intelligence and other information to lessen the effects or consequences of an incident; increased security operations; continuing investigations into the nature and source of the threat; ongoing public health and agricultural surveillance and testing processes; immunizations, isolation, or quarantine; and specific law enforcement operations aimed at preempting, interdicting, or disrupting illegal activity, and apprehending actual perpetrators and bringing them to justice.

restoration. Activities that bring something, especially a building, back to an earlier and usually better condition; this term could be used interchangeably with recovery activities defined above. To study, develop and demonstrate; plans, operational capabilities and interagency coordination that will enable a timely return to functionality and re-establishment of socio-economic order and basic services through execution of response, restoration and recovery activities as applicable.