Avoiding Another Hollow Force: Optimizing the Joint Force Despite Sequestration
Abstract
In today's austere fiscal environment, the Department of Defense (DoD) must implement a long-range strategy to reform its acquisition system, reallocate resources to preserve current force structure, and fund modernization programs while retaining the flexibility to adapt to unpredictable threats. This strategy must be accomplished in the context of the nation's current debt crisis. This thesis focuses on the impact of the Budget Control Act and sequestration on DoD acquisition; the reform of the DoD acquisition system; the planning, programming, budgeting, and execution (PPBE) process; and ways in which the U.S. Armed Forces can be more efficient and effective in the face of significant defense cuts. The post-Vietnam era and the 1990s were classic "hollow force" periods. After Vietnam, socioeconomic factors and funding decisions that favored the development of advanced weapon systems over manpower led to a hollow force. In the 1990s, a hollow force was created by "over-committing" the U.S. military relative to its size and resources. This was exacerbated by recruiting and retention problems and an emphasis on readiness-related funding versus modernization. While the United States has the world's most powerful military, near-peer competitors such as China are closing the gap. Because of slow economic growth, the federal deficit, the national debt, and soaring acquisition costs, U.S. military and civilian leaders face many challenges in mitigating national security risks. The DoD must reform its acquisition system to be more cost-effective and efficient while preserving critical combat capability and avoiding the creation of a hollow force.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Apr 01, 2013
- Accession Number
- ADA581252
Entities
People
- Michael D. Lay
Organizations
- National Defense University