Risk in War: Using History to Inform a Common Method for Understanding and Communicating Risk in Joint Operations
Abstract
Today's military doctrine fails to provide commanders and staffs with a process for exploring risk in military operations. The Joint Force Commander (JFC) requires a better method of understanding, estimating, and communicating risk to his/her troops to ensure the effective evaluation of potential hazards to joint operations. Building on civilian literature, current U.S. and Allied doctrine, and historical case studies, this thesis proposes a lexicon to enable a more meaningful understanding of risk, and to create a baseline for understanding and communicating risk. In a similar manner, the thesis develops a mental model for risk analysis to help planners examine the strategic and operational environment and better estimate the risk in proposed joint military operations. This methodology is similar to other mental processes utilized in joint operations planning, and it provides a sound basis for estimating risk. U.S. doctrine must change to provide essential guidance and tools to equip commanders and staffs to conduct worthwhile risk assessments to inform seniors and subordinates alike. The thesis proposes methods and processes to reach that objective.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- May 01, 2013
- Accession Number
- ADA581315
Entities
People
- Craig J. Price
Organizations
- National Defense University