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VARIATIONAL CONVERGENCE OF BIFUNCTIONS:MOTIVATING APPLICATIONS

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VARIATIONAL CONVERGENCE OF BIFUNCTIONS: MOTIVATING APPLICATIONS *

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Abstract. It's shown that a number of variational problems can be cast as finding the maxinf-points (or minsup-points) of bifunctions (= bivariate functions). These variational problems include: linear and nonlinear complementarity problems, fixed points, variational inequalities, inclusions, non-cooperative games, Walras and Nash equilibrium problems. One can then appeal to the theory of lopsided convergence for bifunctions to derive stability results for each one of these variational problems.

Keywords: lop-convergence, lopsided convergence, minsup-points, maxinf-points, Ky Fan functions, variational inequalities, Nash and Walras equilibrium points, fixed points, inequality systems, inclusion systems.

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1 Variational convergence of bifunctions

The analysis of bivariate functions, or more briefly *bifunctions*, and that of their *maxinf-points*, has played in key role in “Variational Analysis” at the conceptual, theoretical and computationally levels. Simply think about the Lagrangians, and augmented Lagrangians, and the role they play in the development of duality theory as well as in the design of algorithmic procedures such as interior point methods and Sequential Quadratic Programming to name just a couple of examples. The same applies to Hamiltonians associated with Calculus of Variations and Optimal Control problems as well as to the study of minimax functions initiated by Danskin [12] and further elaborated and exploited computationally by Polak [30], Konnov [27] and their associates. There is also an extensive class of problems that aren’t traditionally formulated in this mode, ‘find a maxinf-point of a bifunction,’ but can be recast advantageously, theoretically and computationally, in this framework. To bring to the fore this unifying relationship, more specifically as far as approximation issues are concerned, is the preeminent aim of this article. In the process, we also touch on existence; the interdependence between the tools used to obtain existence for a number of these problems was already brought to light by Aubin and Ekeland [7, Chapter 6]. In infinite dimensional spaces maxinf-points problems are related to the Mountain Pass Theorem, minimal surfaces problems, the Ky-Fan inequality and the Schauder fixed point theorem. In this article, we deal with the finite dimensional case

More explicitly, given a bifunction $F : C \times D \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$, we are interested in finding a point, say $\bar{x} \in C$, that maximizes with respect to the (first) x -variable the infimum of F , $\inf_{y \in D} F(\cdot, y)$, with respect to the (second) y -variable. We refer to such a point $\bar{x}$ as a *maxinf-point* and write

$$\bar{x} \in \operatorname{argmaxinf} F = \operatorname{argmaxinf}_{(x,y) \in C \times D} F = \operatorname{argmax}_{x \in C} \left(\inf_{y \in D} F(x, y) \right).$$

Our concerns extend to approximate maxinf-points

$$\text{for } \varepsilon \geq 0, x_\varepsilon \text{ is an } \textit{approximate maxinf-point} \text{ of } F \text{ if } F(x_\varepsilon, \cdot) \geq \supinf F - \varepsilon,$$

that both from an application’s viewpoint and operationally might, conceivably, be more important than maxinf-points themselves.

In some particular instances, for example when the bifunction is concave-convex, a maxinf-point can be a *saddle point* but, in general, it’s just a maxinf-point, or when minimization is with respect to the first variable and the maximization of F is with respect to the second variable, a *minsup-point*. To study the stability, and the existence, of such points, and the sensitivity of their associated values, one is led to introduce and analyze convergence notion(s) for bifunctions that in turn will guarantee the convergence of either their saddle points [6, 4, 9], or just, their maxinf-points.

This paper is devoted to describe and analyze this collection of problems that includes (geometric) variational inequalities, standard and set-valued fixed points problems, linear and nonlinear complementarity problems, Nash equilibrium for non-cooperative games and Walras economic equilibrium problems. Each one of these examples deserves, eventually, a more comprehensive analysis than what is appropriate to include in this motivating article; we essentially limit ourselves to illustrating how the general approach is applicable in all these various instances.

Our major tool is the notion of *lopsided convergence*, introduced in [5] but revisited, and more extensively analyzed in [25], so that a wider class of applications could be handled. In [25], the accent

was placed on finite-valued bifunctions defined on a product set which would allow us to clarify the connection with the earlier work [5] for the extended real-valued functions. The still slightly more general definition of lopsided convergence on which we rely in this article completely cuts its embryonic cord with the extended-real valued framework and allows us to analyze approximation results for an even wider class of variational problems.

In §2, we characterize variational inequalities, xed points problems, complementarity problems, Nash equilibrium and Walras economic equilibrium as maxinf-problems. In §3, we refine and extend a collection of results about lopsided convergence that provide the main instruments to analyze the stability properties for each one of these problems as detailed in §4-10.

2 Examples

In order to set up the pattern of our approach, let's construct for a few problems in this class the associated bifunctions and show that their solutions are exactly the maxinf-points of these bifunctions.

2.1 Linear complementarity problems

The *linear complementarity problem (LCP)* can be formulated as follows,

$$\text{find } z \text{ such that } 0 \leq z \perp Mz + q = w \geq 0,$$

where M a $n \times n$ -matrix, $q \in \mathbb{R}^n$ and $a \perp b$ means that two vectors are orthogonal. Let's associate the bifunction

$$K(z, v) = \langle Mz + q, v - z \rangle \quad \text{defined on } \mathbb{R}_+^n \times \mathbb{R}_+^n$$

with this complementarity problem.

2.1 Proposition (*maxinf-points and solutions of LCP*). $\hat{z}$ solves the linear complementarity problem if and only if

$$\hat{z} \in \operatorname{argmax}_{z \geq 0} [\inf_{v \geq 0} K(z, v)] \quad \text{and} \quad K(\hat{z}, \cdot) \geq 0.$$

Proof. Suppose $\hat{z}$ solve the LCP. Since $\inf_{v \geq 0} K(x, v) = -\infty$ unless $Mz + q \geq 0$, a condition satisfied by $\hat{z}$, $v = 0$ yields the minimum. Hence, $0 = \max_{z \geq 0} -\langle Mz + q, z \rangle$ and this maximum is attained by $\hat{z}$ with $K(\hat{z}, v) = 0 + \langle M\hat{z} + q, v \rangle \geq 0$ for all $v \geq 0$. On the other hand, when $\hat{z}$ is a maxinf-point of K on $\mathbb{R}_+^n \times \mathbb{R}_+^n$ and $K(\hat{z}, \cdot) \geq 0$, it implies (i) $\hat{z} \geq 0$, (ii) $K(\hat{z}, 0) \geq 0$ which yields $\langle M\hat{z} + q, \hat{z} \rangle \leq 0$, and (iii) $0 \leq -\langle M\hat{z} + q, \hat{z} \rangle + \inf_{v \geq 0} \langle M\hat{z} + q, v \rangle$ implies $M\hat{z} + q \geq 0$. Combining (ii) and (iii), one obtains $\langle M\hat{z} + q, \hat{z} \rangle = 0$, and thus $\hat{z}$ also solves the linear complementarity problem. $\square$

Stability analysis of the solutions to linear complementarity problems can thus be undertaken in terms of the stability properties of the maxinf-points of the corresponding bifunctions. More specifically, given a sequence of linear complementarity problems,

$$\text{find } z \text{ such that } 0 \leq z \perp M^\nu z + q^\nu = w \geq 0$$

where M^ν and q^ν converge 'appropriately' to M and q , one can define a sequence of approximating bifunctions

$$K^\nu(z, v) = \langle M^\nu z + q^\nu, v - z \rangle \quad \text{defined on } \mathbb{R}_+^n \times \mathbb{R}_+^n$$

and recast the convergence of the solutions of the approximating linear complementarity problems in terms of the convergence of the maxinf-points of the bifunctions K^ν .

A similar argument, would work when dealing with a *nonlinear complementarity problem (NCP)*,

$$\text{find } z \text{ such that } 0 \leq z \perp H(z) \geq 0$$

where $H : \mathbb{R}^n \times \mathbb{R}^n$ is a vector-valued function and the associated bifunction $K : \mathbb{R}_+^n \times \mathbb{R}_+^n$ is defined by $K(z, v) = \langle H(z), v - z \rangle$. However, one can also view such a problem, as well as the linear complementarity problem, as a special case of the next class of problems.

2.2 Variational inequalities and fixed points

Let's consider the following *variational inequality (V.I.)*: find $\bar{u} \in C$, a non-empty, convex subset of $\mathbb{R}^n$, such that

$$\bar{u} \in C, \quad -G(\bar{u}) \in N_C(\bar{u})$$

with

- G a function from C into $\mathbb{R}^n$, usually, but not necessarily, continuous,
- $N_C(\bar{u}) = \{z \in \mathbb{R}^n \mid \langle z, u - \bar{u} \rangle \leq 0, \forall u \in C\}$ the *normal cone* to C at $\bar{u}$.

With $\{C^\nu \subset \mathbb{R}^n, \nu \in \mathbb{N}\}$ a sequence of convex sets converging to C and $\{G^\nu : C^\nu \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^n, \nu \in \mathbb{N}\}$ a sequence of continuous functions converging (appropriately) to G , we like to find conditions under which one can refer to the variational inequalities: find

$$u \in C^\nu \text{ such that } -G^\nu(u) \in N_{C^\nu}(u),$$

as approximating V.I.'s. In particular, one would like to be able to assert that the solutions of the approximating variational inequalities converge to the solution(s) of the limit one.

As, in the case of the linear complementarity problem, the approach that we follow is to reformulate the problem in the following terms: Define the bifunctions

$$K(u, v) = \langle G(u), v - u \rangle \quad \text{on} \quad \text{dom } K = C \times C$$

and, for $\nu \in \mathbb{N}$,

$$K^\nu(u, v) = \langle G^\nu(u), v - u \rangle \quad \text{on} \quad \text{dom } K^\nu = C^\nu \times C^\nu.$$

and, as the next proposition shows, the solutions of the variational inequality can be identified with the maxinf-points of the corresponding bifunction.

2.2 Proposition (identifying V.I.-solutions as maxinf-points). *Consider the V.I.,*

$$u \in C \text{ so that } -G(u) \in N_C(u).$$

and the associated bifunction $K : C \times C \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ with

$$K(u, v) = \langle G(u), v - u \rangle.$$

Then, $\bar{u}$ is a solution of the variational inequality if and only if it's a maxinf-point of K , i.e., $\bar{u} \in \operatorname{argmax}_C g$ where $g(u) = \inf_{v \in C} [K(u, v)]$ on C^2 , and $K(\bar{u}, \cdot) \geq 0$.

Proof. Observe that $\bar{u} \in C$ is a solution of the variational inequality then $-G(\bar{u}) \in N_C(\bar{u})$ implies $K(\bar{u}, \cdot) \geq 0$ that, in turn, implies $g(\bar{u}) \geq 0$. On the other hand, by definition, for all $u \in C$, $g(u) \leq \langle G(u), u - \bar{u} \rangle = 0$. Consequently, $g(\bar{u}) = 0$ and hence, $\bar{u}$ maximizes g on C , or still, it's a maxinf-point of K .

Conversely, if $\bar{u}$ maximizes g on C and $K(\bar{u}, \cdot) \geq 0$, then $\langle -G(\bar{u}), v - \bar{u} \rangle \leq 0$ for all $v \in C$, i.e., it's a solution of the variational inequality. $\square$

Of course, the same argument applies to the approximating variational inequalities and their corresponding bifunctions. Convergence of the solution(s) of the variational inequalities can thus be formulated in terms of the convergence of the *maxinf-points* of the bifunctions K^ν to the maxinf-points of K . The main issue will be to identify the appropriate convergence notion for bifunctions that will yield the convergence of these maxinf-points.

To see how the nonlinear complementarity problem,

$$\text{find } z \text{ such that } 0 \leq z \perp H(z) \geq 0,$$

is equivalent to the variational inequality

$$\text{find } z \geq 0 \text{ so that } \langle -H(z), v - z \rangle \leq 0, \quad \forall v \geq 0,$$

can be argued as follows:

- if $\bar{z}$ solves NCP then $\langle H(\bar{z}), \bar{z} \rangle = 0$, $\bar{z} \geq 0$ and $H(\bar{z}) \geq 0$ imply $\langle H(\bar{z}), \bar{z} \rangle = 0 \geq \langle -H(\bar{z}), v \rangle$ for all $v \geq 0$, i.e., $\bar{z}$ solves the V.I.,
- if $\bar{z}$ solves V.I., $\bar{z} \geq 0$ and one has $\langle H(\bar{z}), \bar{z} \rangle \geq \langle H(\bar{z}), v \rangle$ for all $v \geq 0$. Hence $H(\bar{z}) \geq 0$ since otherwise there is no solution ($\rightarrow -\infty$). Also, $\langle H(\bar{z}), 0 \rangle = 0 \geq \langle H(\bar{z}), \bar{z} \rangle$ and hence $H(\bar{z}) \perp \bar{z}$, i.e., $\bar{z}$ solves the NCP.

Although the details will be provided in §6 and §9, let's already suggest how *fixed point problems* are related to solving variational inequalities and, consequently, fit into this class of maxinf-problems. Given G a continuous function from a convex set C into $C \subset \mathbb{R}^n$, finding $\bar{x}$ such that $G(\bar{x}) = \bar{x}$ can be reformulated as solving the variational inequality $(x - G(x)) \in N_C(x)$ since, in particular, this last inclusion requires that a solution must satisfy $|x - G(x)|^2 = 0$.

2.3 Non-cooperative Games

Consider a game with a finite collection of players $\mathcal{A}$: For each player $a \in \mathcal{A}$, $C_a \subset \mathbb{R}^n$ denotes the set of available strategies. The choice of $x_a \in C_a$ yields a return $r_a(x_a, x_{-a})$ where x_{-a} is the vector of the strategies selected by the remaining players: $\mathcal{A} \setminus \{a\}$;

$$\forall \tilde{a} \in \mathcal{A} : \quad u_{\tilde{a}} : C_{\tilde{a}} \times \prod_{a \in \mathcal{A} \setminus \tilde{a}} C_a \rightarrow \mathbb{R}.$$

²The function g has been extensively studied in the variational inequalities literature under the name of *gap function*, a specific instance of a *merit function* for a variational inequality, cf. [17, §1.5.3]

The strategies $x^* = (x_a^*, a \in \mathcal{A})$ determine a *Nash equilibrium point* of this game, when

$$\forall a \in \mathcal{A} : \quad x_a^* \in \operatorname{argmax}_{x_a \in C_a} r_a(x_a, x_{-a}^*);$$

for further reference, let's denote this game by $\mathcal{G} = \{(C_a, r_a) \mid a \in \mathcal{A}\}$.

For all $a \in \mathcal{A}$, $\{C_a^\nu, \nu \in \mathbb{N}\}$ a sequence of sets converging to C_a and $\{r_a^\nu, \nu \in \mathbb{N}\}$ a sequence of payoff functions converging in an appropriate sense to r_a , we are looking for conditions that will allow us to assert that the games $\mathcal{G}^\nu = \{(C_a^\nu, r_a^\nu) \mid a \in \mathcal{A}\}$ approximate $\mathcal{G}$, i.e., that the Nash equilibrium points of the games $\mathcal{G}^\nu$ approximate those of the game $\mathcal{G}$.

Our approach to obtain existence and continuity results again relies on setting up a bifunction N , known as the *Nikaido-Isoda bifunction*, defined as follows: $N : C \times C \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ where $C = \prod_{a \in \mathcal{A}} C_a$ and

$$N(x, y) = \sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \left(r_a(x_a, x_{-a}) - r_a(y_a, x_{-a}) \right).$$

2.3 Proposition (Nash equilibrium points as maxinf-points). *The strategies $x^* = (x_a^*, a \in \mathcal{A})$, with $x_a^* \in C_a$ for all $a \in \mathcal{A}$, determine a Nash equilibrium point if and only if*

$$\sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \left(r_a(x_a^*, x_{-a}^*) - r_a(y_a, x_{-a}^*) \right) \geq 0 \quad \text{for all } y_a \in C_a,$$

or equivalently, if and only if

$$x^* \text{ is a maxinf-point of } N \text{ and } \inf_{y \in C} N(x^*, y) \geq 0,$$

where $x = (x_a, a \in \mathcal{A}), y = (y_a, a \in \mathcal{A})$.

Proof. If $x^* = (x_a^*, a \in \mathcal{A})$ is a Nash equilibrium point, for all $a \in \mathcal{A}$,

$$r_a(x_a^*, x_{-a}^*) - r_a(y_a, x_{-a}^*) \geq 0, \quad \forall y_a \in C_a,$$

and consequently the sum over $a \in \mathcal{A}$ must also be nonnegative. On the other hand, if

$$\sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \left(r_a(x_a^*, x_{-a}^*) - r_a(y_a, x_{-a}^*) \right) \geq 0 \quad \forall y_a \in C_a,$$

it implies, in particular, that given any player $a \in \mathcal{A}$, for all $y_a \in C_a$,

$$r_a(x_a^*, x_{-a}^*) - r_a(y_a, x_{-a}^*) + \sum_{a' \in \mathcal{A} \setminus a} \left(u_{a'}(x_{a'}^*, x_{-a'}^*) - u_{a'}(x_{a'}^*, x_{-a'}^*) \right) \geq 0.$$

The second term in this sum is 0, and thus $x_a^* \in \operatorname{argmax}_{x_a \in C_a} r_a(x_a, x_{-a}^*)$, i.e., $x^* = (x_a^*, a \in \mathcal{A})$ is a Nash equilibrium point.

Turning to the second identity involving N , observe that for all $x \in C$, $\inf_y N(x, y) \leq 0$. Indeed, if for all $a \in \mathcal{A}$, $x_a \in C_a$,

$$\inf_{y \in C} N(x, y) = \sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \left[r_a(x_a, x_{-a}) - \sup_{y_a \in C_a} r_a(y_a, x_{-a}) \right].$$

Clearly,

$$\forall a \in \mathcal{A} : \quad r_a(x_a, x_{-a}) - \sup_{y_a} r_a(y_a, x_{-a}) \leq 0,$$

and hence $\inf_y N(x, y) \leq 0$. But since for $x^* = (x_a^*, a \in \mathcal{A})$, a Nash equilibrium point, $\inf_y N(x^*, y) = N(x^*, x^*) = 0$, it follows that

$$x^* \in \operatorname{argmax}_x [\inf_y N(x, y)].$$

Conversely, if $x^* = (x_a^*, a \in \mathcal{A}) \in C$ is a maxinf-point of N such that $\inf_{y \in C} N(x^*, y) \geq 0$, it means

$$\sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \left(r_a(x_a^*, x_{-a}^*) - r_a(y_a, x_{-a}^*) \right) \geq 0 \quad \text{for all } y_a \in C_a,$$

i.e., x^* is a Nash equilibrium point as follows from our first assertion. $\square$

One defines similarly the Nikaido-Isoda functions N^ν associated with the games $\mathcal{G}^\nu$, and in view of Proposition 2.3, $x^\nu = (x_a^\nu, a \in \mathcal{A})$ is a Nash equilibrium point for $\mathcal{G}^\nu$ if and only if it's a maxinf-point of N^ν .

Here again, the question of the convergence of Nash equilibrium points can be formulated in terms of the convergence of the maxinf-points of the (bivariate) Nikaido-Isoda functions N^ν to those of the function N .

2.4 Walras economic equilibrium

Our last example is a classical equilibrium problem in Economics. Here, we deal only with the *Pure Exchange model* or equivalently a Walras barter problem, but one can easily extend the result to the case when the economy also includes producers [3]. The economy is described by

$$\mathcal{E} = \{(u_a, C_a, e_a), a \in \mathcal{A}\},$$

where

$\mathcal{A}$: the finite set of agents;

$e_a \in \mathbb{R}^n$: agent's $a \in \mathcal{A}$ *endowment*, a bundle of goods to be traded;

$C_a \subset \mathbb{R}_+^n$ non-empty, convex set identifying agent's a *survival set*,

$u_a : C_a \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$, agent's a *utility function*.

Trading takes place at a per-unit market price p_j for good j , $j = 1, \dots, n$. The bundle of goods agent a could acquire is limited by the budgetary constraint $\langle p, x \rangle \leq \langle p, e_a \rangle$. It's assumed that agents act as utility maximizers. Thus, given $p \in \mathbb{R}_+^n$, each agent $a \in \mathcal{A}$ will end up with its (consumption) demand

$$c_a(p) = \operatorname{argmax}_{x \in C_a} \{u_a(x) \mid \langle p, x \rangle \leq \langle p, e_a \rangle\}$$

which we assume to be well (uniquely) defined. Note that $c_a(p) = c_a(\alpha p)$ for any positive scalar α , i.e., the agents demand functions are homogeneous of degree 0 with respect to prices. So, we may as well restrict the choice of p to $\Delta = \{p \in \mathbb{R}_+^n \mid \sum_{j=1}^n p_j = 1\}$, the *price simplex*.

This economy $\mathcal{E}$ is operational only if for each good, total supply exceeds total demand, i.e., if

$$\sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} s_a(p) = s(p) \geq 0 \quad \text{where } s_a(p) = e_a - c_a(p);$$

this is the *market clearing* condition. The function $s : \mathbb{R}_+^n \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^n$ is called the *excess supply function*. Following Walras [36], a price vector $\bar{p} \in \Delta$ so that $s(\bar{p}) \geq 0$ is called an *equilibrium price (system)*; the existence of such an equilibrium price isn't clear-cut, albeit well-known since the mid-50's [13].

Insatiability, usually expressed in terms of one of more goods being persistently attractive to some agents, will mean that at equilibrium whenever $s_l(p) > 0$, i.e., good l is in excess supply, there is no interest in further trading and, consequently, $p_l = 0$. On the other hand, when $p_l > 0$, indicating that some agents might still be interested in further acquisition of this good, however supply has now been exhausted, i.e., $s_l(p) = 0$. Thus, every equilibrium price system satisfies $\langle s(\bar{p}), \bar{p} \rangle = 0$ ³. Our predominant objective is the analysis of the stability of equilibrium prices to (global) perturbations of the economy:

- perturbations of the agents' utilities,
- perturbations of the agents' endowments.

For this purpose, one introduces the bifunction $W : \Delta \times \Delta \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$, to which one refers as the *Walrasian*,

$$W(p, q) = \langle q, s(p) \rangle;$$

and the 'approximating' Walrasians

$$W^\nu(p, q) = \langle q, s^\nu(p) \rangle \quad \text{on} \quad \Delta \times \Delta,$$

where $s^\nu(p) = \sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} (e_a - c_a^\nu(p))$ and

$$c_a^\nu(p) = \operatorname{argmax}_{x \in C_a} \{u_a^\nu(x) \mid \langle p, x \rangle \leq \langle p, e_a^\nu \rangle\}.$$

Eventually, existence and stability results will be deduced from general results applied to the functions W and W^ν . At this point, our only aim is to identify the maxinf-points of the Walrasian W with the equilibrium prices of $\mathcal{E}$.

2.4 Proposition (Walras equilibrium prices and maxinf-points). *Every maxinf-point $\bar{p}$ of the Walrasian such that $W(\bar{p}, \cdot) \geq 0$ on Δ is an equilibrium point. Moreover, under insatiability, every equilibrium point $\bar{p}$ of $\mathcal{E}$ is a maxinf-point of the Walrasian such that $W(\bar{p}, \cdot) \geq 0$ on Δ .*

Proof. Suppose $\bar{p}$ is an equilibrium price then $W(\bar{p}, \cdot) \geq 0$ on Δ . For every $p \in \Delta$ that's not an equilibrium point, for some l , $s_l(p) < 0$, i.e., $\inf_{q \in \Delta} \langle q, s(p) \rangle < 0$ which in turns implies that $p \notin \operatorname{argmaxinf} W$ since for equilibrium point, under stationarity, $0 = \maxinf W = \langle \bar{p}, s(\bar{p}) \rangle$.

Conversely, if $\bar{p}$ is a maxinf-point of the Walrasian with $W(\bar{p}, \cdot) \geq 0$, it follows that for all unit vectors $e^j = (0, \dots, 1, \dots, 0)$, the j th entry is 1, $\langle e^j, s(\bar{p}) \rangle \geq 0$ which implies $s(\bar{p}) \geq 0$. $\square$

3 Lopsided convergence

Having suggested a unified framework for this family of variational problems, one can reasonably expect that also that a significant number of their properties can be brought to light when examining those of

³Jesse Holzer pointed out the need to include explicitly the insatiability condition

the maxinf-points of the associated bifunctions⁴. That's certainly the case as far as existence of solutions is concerned and, as will now be laid out, the stability of these solutions under various perturbations. The major tool in deriving these stability results is the notion of *lop-convergence*, or *lopsided convergence* for bifunctions.

In this section, not only do we review the basic definitions but, in the process, expand the family of bifunctions to which the basic results derived in [25] are applicable. Precisely, to deal with these applications, we had to revisit the 'classical' definition of convergence for *bifunctions*. The (almost) classical framework, going back to Rockafellar's work on saddle functions [32, Sections 33-39], was primed in considering bifunctions that are extended real-valued and defined everywhere on the product of two linear spaces, here $\mathbb{R}^n$ and $\mathbb{R}^m$. It turns out that this paradigm comes with unnecessary technical obstacles on the theoretical side and renders it ungainly when dealing with the rich family of applications being considered here. This has led us to a 'parallel' framework where the bifunctions—and also functions in the univariate case—are real-valued and only defined on the product of certain subsets of $\mathbb{R}^n$ and $\mathbb{R}^m$. In [25] we restricted our attention to a class of bifunctions that, via a 'natural' embedding, allowed us to connect lopsided convergence of these finite-valued bifunctions to that of 'proper' extended-real valued bifunctions. This relationship is now lost and it doesn't seem that it can be recovered. The definition of lop-convergence is necessarily one-sided, in that one is either interested in the convergence of maxinf-points or minsup-points but not both; in general, the maxinf-points are not minsup-points and vice-versa. Here, as in [25], definitions and results are stated for the 'maxinf'-case. We conclude the section with an application of lopsided convergence to obtain an extension of Ky Fan's Inequality [19] to situations when the domain of definition is not necessarily compact; for further analysis refer to [25].

Henceforth, the term *bifunction* is reserved for *finite-valued bivariate functions* defined on the product of two non-empty subsets of $\mathbb{R}^n$ and $\mathbb{R}^m$. One writes,

$$fv\text{-}biv(\mathbb{R}^{n+m}) = \{F: C \times D \rightarrow \mathbb{R} \mid \emptyset \neq C \subset \mathbb{R}^n, \emptyset \neq D \subset \mathbb{R}^m\}$$

to denote this class of bifunctions. For $F \in fv\text{-}biv(\mathbb{R}^{n+m})$, let

$$\supinf F \text{ denote the 'optimal' value, i.e., resulting from maximizing on } C, \inf_{y \in D} F(\cdot, y),$$

$\bar{x}$ is a *maxinf-point* of $F \in fv\text{-}biv(\mathbb{R}^{n+m})$ if

$$\bar{x} \in \operatorname{argmaxinf}_{(x,y) \in C \times D} F = \operatorname{argmaxinf}_{(x,y) \in C \times D} F = \operatorname{argmax}_{x \in C} \left(\inf_{y \in D} F(x, y) \right).$$

and

$$\text{for } \varepsilon \geq 0, x_\varepsilon \text{ is an } \textit{approximate maxinf-point} \text{ of } F \text{ if } F(x_\varepsilon, \cdot) \geq \supinf F - \varepsilon$$

the set of all such approximating maxinf-points⁵ is denoted by $\varepsilon\text{-argmaxinf } F$.

⁴One might also expect that the design of algorithmic procedures can also be guided by this viewpoint as has been the case in our own work on stochastic equilibrium problems [15, 14]

⁵Alternative definitions of an approximating maxinf-point could be considered, for example, one would allow also for approximating the infimum with respect to y as well as the supremum with respect to x . Although, this gets notionally a bit more involved, it pretty much leads to same type of results than those developed here. In fact, in many applications, the infimum in the second variable is actually attained and a maxinf-point becomes a maxmin-point however, because the bifunction is usually not concave with respect to the first variable getting to such a maxmin-point, often, turns out to be quite challenging.

3.1 Definition (lop-convergence, *fv*-biv). A sequence in $fv\text{-biv}(\mathbb{R}^{n+m})$, $\{F^\nu : C^\nu \times D^\nu \rightarrow \mathbb{R}\}_{\nu \in N}$ lop-converges, or converges lopsided, to a function $F : C \times D \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$, also in $fv\text{-biv}(\mathbb{R}^{n+m})$, if

(a) for all $y \in D$ and all $(x^\nu \in C^\nu) \rightarrow x \in C$, there exists $(y^\nu \in D^\nu) \rightarrow y$ such that

$$\limsup_\nu F^\nu(x^\nu, y^\nu) \leq F(x, y),$$

(b) for all $x \in C$, there exists $(x^\nu \in C^\nu) \rightarrow x$ such that given any $(y^\nu \in D^\nu) \rightarrow y$,

$$\liminf_\nu F^\nu(x^\nu, y^\nu) \geq F(x, y) \quad \text{when } y \in D \quad \text{and} \quad F^\nu(x^\nu, y^\nu) \rightarrow \infty \quad \text{when } y \notin D.$$

Lop-convergence is ancillary tight when (b) is strengthened to

(b-t) (b) holds and for any $\varepsilon > 0$ one can find a compact set B_ε , possibly depending on $\{x^\nu \rightarrow x\}$, such that for all ν sufficiently large,

$$\inf_{D^\nu \cap B_\varepsilon} F^\nu(x^\nu, \cdot) \leq \inf_{D^\nu} F^\nu(x^\nu, \cdot) + \varepsilon.$$

Finally, it's said to be tight if it's ancillary-tight and (a) is strengthened to

(a-t) (a) holds and for all $\varepsilon > 0$ there is a compact set A_ε such that for all ν large enough,

$$\sup_{x \in C^\nu \cap A_\varepsilon} \inf_{y \in D^\nu} F^\nu(x, y) \geq \sup_{x \in C^\nu} \inf_{y \in D^\nu} F^\nu(x, y) - \varepsilon,$$

Not only does the following results apply to a wider family of bifunctions but they sharpen markedly the assertions of [25, Theorem 4] As will be made clear in the subsequent sections, they also allow for substantial improvements of the quite limited collection of results, available in the literature, when they are applied to our family of variational problems.

3.2 Theorem (convergence of maxinf-points). When the bifunctions $\{F^\nu\}_{\nu \in N}$ lop-converge ancillary tightly to F , all in $fv\text{-biv}(\mathbb{R}^{n+m})$ with $\supinf F$ finite, and $\varepsilon_\nu \searrow \varepsilon \geq 0$, then every cluster point $\bar{x} \in C$ of a sequence of ε_ν -maxinf-points of the bifunctions F^ν is a ε -maxinf-point of the limit function F .

In particular, this implies that in these circumstances, every cluster point of a sequence of maxinf-points of the bifunctions F^ν is a maxinf-point of the lop-limit function F .

Proof. Let $x^\nu \in \varepsilon_\nu\text{-argmaxinf } F^\nu$ and, without loss of generality, assume that the entire sequence $x^\nu \rightarrow \bar{x} \in C$ and let y_ε be such that $F(\bar{x}, y_\varepsilon) \leq \inf_D F(\bar{x}, \cdot) + \varepsilon$. That $\bar{x} \in \varepsilon\text{-argmaxinf } F$ is inferred from the following string of inequalities,

$$F(\bar{x}, y_\varepsilon) \geq \limsup_\nu F^\nu(x^\nu, y^\nu) \geq \liminf_\nu F^\nu(x^\nu, y^\nu) \geq \liminf_\nu (\supinf F^\nu - \varepsilon_\nu) \geq \supinf F - \varepsilon.$$

The first one of the inequalities follows from 3.2(a) which provides an appropriate sequence $(y^\nu \in D^\nu) \rightarrow y_\varepsilon$. The next one is immediate. The third one follows from $F^\nu(x^\nu, y^\nu) \geq \inf_{D^\nu} F^\nu(x^\nu, \cdot) \geq \supinf F^\nu - \varepsilon_\nu$. The last one relies on 3.2(b-t) as is shown next.

Indeed, with $\tilde{x} \in C$ such that $\inf_D F(\tilde{x}, \cdot) \geq \supinf F - \varepsilon$, let $(\tilde{x}^\nu \in C^\nu) \rightarrow \tilde{x}$ be one of the sequences, and B_ε , the corresponding compact set, postulated by 3.2(b-t), such that for ν sufficiently large

- (i) $\forall (y^\nu \in D^\nu) \rightarrow y$, $\liminf_\nu F^\nu(\tilde{x}^\nu, y^\nu) \geq F(\tilde{x}, y)$ or $F^\nu(\tilde{x}^\nu, \tilde{y}^\nu) \nearrow \infty$ depending on $y \in D$ or not,
- (ii) $\exists \tilde{y}^\nu \in D^\nu \cap B_\varepsilon$ such that $F^\nu(\tilde{x}^\nu, \tilde{y}^\nu) \leq \inf_{D^\nu} F^\nu(\tilde{x}^\nu, \cdot) + \varepsilon_\nu$; recall $\varepsilon_\nu \searrow \varepsilon$.

Passing to a subsequence, if necessary, let $\tilde{y}^\nu \rightarrow \tilde{y}$. Either $F^\nu(\tilde{x}^\nu, \tilde{y}^\nu) \nearrow \infty$ in which case so does $\inf_{D^\nu} F^\nu(x^\nu, \cdot)$ and also $\supinf F^\nu$ which certainly implies $\liminf_\nu (\supinf F^\nu - \varepsilon_\nu) = \infty \geq \supinf F - \varepsilon$. Or, $\liminf_\nu F^\nu(\tilde{x}^\nu, \tilde{y}^\nu) < \infty$, and one has

$$\begin{aligned} \liminf_\nu (\supinf F^\nu - \varepsilon_\nu) &\geq \liminf_\nu (\inf_{D^\nu} F^\nu(\tilde{x}^\nu, \cdot) - \varepsilon_\nu) \geq (\liminf_\nu F^\nu(\tilde{x}^\nu, \tilde{y}^\nu) - \varepsilon_\nu) \\ &\geq F(\tilde{x}, \tilde{y}) - \varepsilon \geq \inf_D F(x^\nu, \cdot) - \varepsilon \geq \supinf F - \varepsilon \end{aligned}$$

again yielding $\liminf_\nu \supinf (F^\nu - \varepsilon_\nu) \geq \supinf F - \varepsilon$. $\square$

When lopsided convergence is (fully) tight, some additional properties turn out to be valuable.

3.3 Theorem (under tight lop-convergence). *When the bifunctions $\{F^\nu\}_{\nu \in N}$ lop-converge tightly and $\supinf F$ is finite, then $\supinf F^\nu \rightarrow \supinf F$. In fact, if for any $\varepsilon_\nu \searrow 0$ and $x^\nu \in \varepsilon_\nu \text{-argmaxinf } F^\nu$, then $\varepsilon_\nu \text{-supinf } F^\nu = \inf_{D^\nu} F^\nu(x^\nu, \cdot) \rightarrow \supinf F$.*

Proof. It suffices to show that $\limsup_\nu \supinf F^\nu \leq \supinf F$ since we just finished showing that under ancillary tightness, $\liminf_\nu \supinf F^\nu \geq \supinf F$; setting $\varepsilon_\nu = \varepsilon = 0$. When the sequence $\{F^\nu, \nu \in N\}$ is (fully) tight, in view of 3.2(a-t), given $\varepsilon > 0$, for all ν large enough, one can always find $x^\nu \in (C^\nu \cap A_\varepsilon)$ such that $\inf_{D^\nu} F^\nu(x^\nu, \cdot) \geq \supinf F^\nu - \varepsilon$ with A_ε the pertinent compact set. Passing to a subsequence, if needed, $x^\nu \rightarrow \tilde{x}$ in A_ε . Let $\tilde{y} \in D$ be such that $F(\tilde{x}, \tilde{y}) \leq \inf_D F(\tilde{x}, \cdot) + \varepsilon \leq \supinf F + \varepsilon$ and $(y^\nu \in D^\nu) \rightarrow \tilde{y}$ such that $\limsup_\nu F^\nu(x^\nu, y^\nu) \leq F(\tilde{x}, \tilde{y})$. One has

$$\varepsilon + \supinf F \geq F(\tilde{x}, \tilde{y}) \geq \limsup_\nu F^\nu(x^\nu, y^\nu) \geq \limsup_\nu (\inf_{D^\nu} F^\nu(x^\nu, \cdot)) \geq \limsup_\nu \supinf F^\nu.$$

Since this holds for all $\varepsilon > 0$, $\supinf F^\nu \rightarrow \supinf F$ again follows.

The same argument applies when $\supinf F^\nu$ is replaced by $\varepsilon_\nu \text{-supinf } F^\nu$ with $\varepsilon_\nu \searrow 0$ and rather than calculating $\sup_{x \in C^\nu} \inf_{D^\nu} F^\nu(x, \cdot)$ one is content with a ε_ν -maxinf point. $\square$

3.4 Corollary (existence of approximating solutions). *When the bifunctions $\{F^\nu\}_{\nu \in N}$ lop-converge tightly and $\supinf F$ is finite. If, for $\varepsilon \geq 0$, $\bar{x}$ is a ε -maxinf-point of F , one can always find sequences $\varepsilon^\nu \searrow \varepsilon$ and $x^\nu \in \varepsilon^\nu \text{-maxinf } F^\nu$ such that $x^\nu \rightarrow \bar{x}$. Conversely, if for $\varepsilon = 0$ such sequences exist, then $\sup_x \inf_y F^\nu(x, y) \rightarrow \inf_y F(\bar{x}, y)$.*

Proof. We already proved that under these hypotheses $\supinf F^\nu \rightarrow \supinf F$ which also implies that for ν sufficiently large, $\supinf F^\nu$ is finite-valued. Thus, the functions $x \mapsto \inf_{D^\nu} F^\nu(x, \cdot)$ are well-defined finite valued on a nonempty domain. We obtain the hypo-convergence of these functions to $x \mapsto \inf_D F(x, \cdot)$ from [25, Theorem 3]. The assertions then follow from [25, Theorem 2]. $\square$

It might be useful at this point to emphasize the role played by ancillary tightness, cf. Theorem 3.2. Let's begin with a simple example where F^ν lop-converge to F , $\supinf F$ is finite and $\text{argmaxinf } F \neq \emptyset$ but $\supinf F^\nu \not\rightarrow \supinf F$ precisely because for all $\varepsilon > 0$ there is no compact set B_ε —and a corresponding index ν_ε —such that for $x \in C^\nu$, $\inf_{B_\varepsilon} F^\nu(x, \cdot) \leq \inf F^\nu(x, \cdot) + \varepsilon$ for all $\nu \geq \nu_\varepsilon$. Let $C^\nu = C = \mathbb{R}$ and

$$F^\nu(x, y) = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{when } y \neq \{0, \nu\} \\ 1 & \text{for } y = 0 \\ \nu & \text{for } y = \nu. \end{cases}$$

Clearly, the F^ν lop-converge to F for $F(x, 0) = 1$ and $F(x, y) = 0$ when $y \neq 0$. $\supinf F = 1$ is finite and attained at any point in $\mathbb{R} \times \{0\}$, but $\supinf F^\nu \nearrow \infty \neq 1$! It's obvious that there is no compact set and an index set with the desired properties. This example would also work defining $F^\nu(x, \nu) = \kappa$, with κ any finite number greater than 1 instead of $F^\nu(x, \nu) = \nu$.

In particular, this implies that the [existence](#) of an maxinf-points doesn't allows us to conclude that the 'required' compact sets exist. One can translate this as follows: *the existence of a maxinf-point for the limit problem doesn't guarantee ancillary tightness, as one might have expected or hoped for*. The example shows that one must be concerned about other maxinf-points that disappear at ($\sim$ converge to) the horizon.

3.5 Definition (Ky Fan functions). A bifunction $F: C \times C \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ in $fv\text{-}biv(\mathbb{R}^{2n})$ with C a non-empty convex subset of $\mathbb{R}^n$ such that

- (a) $\forall y \in C: x \mapsto F(x, y)$ is usc (upper semicontinuous) on C ,
- (b) $\forall x \in C: y \mapsto F(x, y)$ is convex on C .

is said to be a Ky Fan function.

Note that the set C is not required to be compact. However,

3.6 Lemma (Ky Fan's Inequality; [19], [7, Theorem 6.3.5]). Suppose $F: C \times C \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ is a Ky Fan function with C compact and such that $F(x, x) \geq 0$ (on $C \times C$). Then, the set of maxinf-points of F is a nonempty subset of C . Moreover, for every maxinf-point $\bar{x}$ of C , $F(\bar{x}, \cdot) \geq 0$ on C .

When, the domain is not compact, one can nevertheless obtain the existence of maxinf-points by relying on [25, Theorem 8] which shows that the lop-limit of a sequence of Ky Fan functions is also a Ky Fan function. Consequently,

3.7 Corollary (extension of Ky Fan's Inequality; [25, Theorem 9]). If F is a Ky Fan function defined on $C \times C$ with $\emptyset \neq C$ convex and one can find sequences of compact convex sets $\{C^\nu \subset \mathbb{R}^n\}$ and (finite-valued) Ky Fan functions $\{F^\nu: C^\nu \times C^\nu \rightarrow \mathbb{R}\}_{\nu \in \mathbb{N}}$ lop-converging ancillary tightly to F , then every cluster point $\bar{x}$ of any sequence $\{x^\nu, \nu \in \mathbb{N}\}$ of maxinf-points of the F^ν is a maxinf-point of F .

3.8 Remark (a word of caution). It should be kept in mind that all one can expect from this general approach when applied to specific instances is that, mostly, one can come up with sufficient conditions. For example, in §6 when dealing with the convergence of fixed points, we place ourselves in a 'standard' environment, i.e., the limit problem is to find $\bar{x}$ in a compact, convex set $C \subset \mathbb{R}^n$ that is a fixed point of a continuous function $G: C \rightarrow C$ and this limit problem is being approximated by a sequence of problems having similar characteristics. Of course, one can trivially find examples of mappings G , not necessarily continuous, that map C into C but nonetheless have a fixed point and the approximating sequence would just consist of problems reproducing the limit one. In such a situation, one might even be able to prove lop-convergence, but the conditions of Theorem 6.2 wouldn't apply. The same type of observation could be made in the case of variational inequalities, cf. §5, as well as to any other class of variational problems analyzed here.

4 Complementarity Problems

Let's now return to the linear complementarity problem,

$$\text{find } z \geq 0 \text{ so that } Mz + q \geq 0, \quad (Mz + q) \perp z,$$

and a sequence of 'approximating' (truncated) linear complementarity problems,

$$\text{find } z \in [0, r^\nu] \text{ so that } M^\nu z + q^\nu \geq 0, \quad (M^\nu z + q^\nu) \perp z,$$

where $M^\nu \rightarrow M$, $q^\nu \rightarrow q$ and for $j = 1, \dots, n$, $0 < r_j^\nu \rightarrow \infty$ as $\nu \rightarrow \infty$. We associate the bifunction

$$K(z, v) = \langle Mz + q, v - z \rangle, \quad K: \mathbb{R}_+^n \times \mathbb{R}_+^n \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$$

with the linear complementarity problem and the bifunctions

$$K^\nu(z, v) = \langle M^\nu z + q^\nu, v - z \rangle, \quad K^\nu: [0, r^\nu] \times \mathbb{R}_+^n \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$$

with the 'approximating' problems. We used the word 'approximating' with quotes, because these are genuine approximating problems only if it can be shown that these approximating problems actually generate approximating solutions of the given linear complementarity problem. In view of our analysis in §2.1, in particular Proposition 2.1, and the results in §3, one could validate the term *approximating* by finding conditions under which the bifunctions K^ν lop-converge to K .

4.1 Theorem (lopsided convergence of LCP). *As long as $M^\nu \rightarrow M$, $q^\nu \rightarrow q$ and $r^\nu \nearrow \infty$, the bifunctions K^ν lop-converge to K . If in addition, $P = \{z \geq 0 \mid Mz + q \geq 0\}$ is included in the inner limit, $\text{Liminf}_{\nu \rightarrow \infty} P^\nu$, of the polyhedral sets $P^\nu = \{z \in [0, r^\nu] \mid M^\nu z + q^\nu \geq 0\}$, then the sequence $\{K^\nu, \nu \in \mathbb{N}\}$ lop-converges ancillary tightly to K which means that any cluster point of the solutions of the sequence of 'truncated' linear complementarity problems is a solution of the limiting linear complementarity problems.*

In fact, this is also the case if rather than maxinf-points of the approximating problems, one would allow for just ε_ν -maxinf-points with $\varepsilon_\nu \searrow 0$.

Proof. For any sequence $\{z^\nu \in [0, r^\nu]\}_{\nu \in \mathbb{N}}$ converging to $z \geq 0$ and any $v \geq 0$, $\langle M^\nu z^\nu + q^\nu, v - z^\nu \rangle \rightarrow \langle Mz + q, v - z \rangle$ yields condition 3.1(a); the case $z^\nu \rightarrow z$ with $z \notin \mathbb{R}_+^n$ doesn't have to be considered since no sequence $\{z^\nu \in [0, r^\nu]\}_{\nu \in \mathbb{N}}$ can converge to a point $z \notin \mathbb{R}_+^n$. Finally, given $z \in \mathbb{R}_+^n$, eventually $z \in [0, r^\nu]$ for all ν sufficiently large, say $\nu \geq \nu_z$, since the entries of the vector r^ν all converge to ∞ . So, given $z \geq 0$, define the sequence $z^\nu \rightarrow z$ to be any point $z^\nu \in [0, r^\nu]$ for $\nu < \nu_z$ and $z^\nu = z$ when $\nu \geq \nu_z$. Clearly, such a sequence converges to z and whatever be the sequence $v^\nu \geq 0 \rightarrow v \geq 0$, one has $\langle M^\nu z^\nu + q^\nu, v^\nu \rangle \rightarrow \langle Mz + q, v \rangle$, i.e., condition 3.1(b) is also satisfied.

Ancillary tightness requires in addition that given any sequence $z^\nu \in [0, r^\nu] \rightarrow z$, for all $\varepsilon > 0$, one can find a compact set B_ε and an index ν_ε such that for $\nu > \nu_\varepsilon$,

$$\inf_{v \in \mathbb{R}_+^n \cap B_\varepsilon} \langle M^\nu z^\nu + q^\nu, v \rangle \leq \inf_{v \in \mathbb{R}_+^n} \langle M^\nu z^\nu + q^\nu, v \rangle + \varepsilon;$$

note that B_ε isn't necessarily a rectangle of the type $[0, r^\nu]$. This condition can only be satisfied if the right-hand sides stay bounded, this requires that the (limiting) linear program,

$$\min \langle Mz + q, v \rangle \text{ so that } v \geq 0,$$

and the approximating ones, for ν sufficiently large,

$$\min \langle M^\nu z^\nu + q^\nu, v \rangle \text{ so that } v \geq 0,$$

be bounded, i.e., their optimal solutions is $v = 0$ with optimal value 0. This will only occur if $Mz + q$ and $M^\nu z + q^\nu$, for ν sufficiently large, are both non-negative. So, to satisfy condition 3.1(b-t), it's necessary that for all $\bar{z} \in P = \{z \in \mathbb{R}_+^n \mid Mz + q \geq 0\}$, one can find a sequence $z^\nu \in P^\nu = \{z \in [0, r^\nu] \mid M^\nu z + q^\nu \geq 0\}$ converging to $\bar{z}$. This means precisely that P must be included in the inner limit of the polyhedral sets P^ν , cf. [33, Definition 4.1]. $\square$

One can seek conditions that will guarantee: the inner-limit of the polyhedral sets P^ν is included in P . As it turns out, as long as the sets P^ν are non-empty for ν sufficiently large, P always includes the outer limit, $\limsup_{\nu \rightarrow \infty} P^\nu$, when $M^\nu \rightarrow M$, $q^\nu \rightarrow q$ and the entries of $r^\nu \rightarrow \infty$. This follows almost immediately from the definition [37, Proposition 1]. Thus, we are essentially requiring that $P = \lim_{\nu \rightarrow \infty} P^\nu$, i.e., P is actually the limit of the polyhedral sets P^ν . A substantial literature, surveyed and complemented in [37, 28], has been devoted to this issue. Hence, we won't deal here with all specific instances that are of particular interest in the theory underlying the linear complementarity problem, cf. [11], that would lead us too far astray from the main theme of this paper. Let's just record a couple of sufficient conditions that will serve as examples.

Let's suppose the approximating problems are formulated without upper bounds on z , i.e.,

$$\text{find } z \in \mathbb{R}_+^n \text{ so that } M^\nu z + q^\nu \geq 0, \quad (M^\nu z + q^\nu) \perp z,$$

with associated bifunctions

$$K^\nu(z, v) = \langle M^\nu z + q^\nu, v - z \rangle, \quad K^\nu: \mathbb{R}_+^n \times \mathbb{R}_+^n \rightarrow \mathbb{R}.$$

Let $\text{pos } A$ denote the *positive hull* of the columns of the matrix A . Then, ancillary tightness of the collection of bifunctions $\{K^\nu, \nu \in \mathbb{N}\}$ can be characterized as follows:

4.2 Corollary (continuity of polyhedral set-valued mappings). *With $P = \{z \geq 0 \mid Mz + q \geq 0\}$, $P^\nu = \{z \geq 0 \mid M^\nu z + q^\nu \geq 0\}$, then $P = \lim_{\nu \rightarrow \infty} P^\nu$ if and only if*

$$\text{pos} \begin{pmatrix} M^\top & I & 0 \\ -q & 0 & -1 \end{pmatrix} \supset \limsup_{\nu \rightarrow \infty} \text{pos} \begin{pmatrix} (M^\nu)^\top & I & 0 \\ -q^\nu & 0 & -1 \end{pmatrix}.$$

where q and q^ν are the row-versions of these vectors. Thus, under this last condition, the bifunctions K^ν are ancillary tight, and consequently, any cluster point of solutions of the approximating LCP's is a solution of the limiting linear complementarity problem.

Proof. It suffices to appeal to [37, Theorem 3].⁶

References [35, 28] provide a number of sufficient conditions. Situations that are more amenable to immediate verification can be found in [37], for example:

⁶for a slightly sharper but more involved condition, cf. [28, Corollary 4.6]

4.3 Corollary (non-empty interior criterion, [37, Corollary 7]). *Suppose that for ν sufficiently large, the polyhedral set P^ν and P have non-empty interior and no row of the matrix $[M, q]$ is identically 0, then $P^\nu \rightarrow P$.*

Of course, one could consider other approximation schemes than the one discusses so far. One could rely on truncations: for example, for a sequence $0 < r^\nu \nearrow \infty$,

$$\text{find } z \in [0, r^\nu] \text{ so that } M^\nu z + q^\nu \in [0, r^\nu], \quad (M^\nu z + q^\nu) \perp z,$$

with corresponding bifunctions

$$K_\square^\nu(z, v) = \langle M^\nu z + q^\nu, v - z \rangle, \quad K_\square^\nu: [0, r^\nu] \times [0, r^\nu] \rightarrow \mathbb{R}.$$

Since $[0, r^\nu]$ is compact convex, it's known that problems of this type always have a solution, see [24], for example.

4.4 Theorem (lop-convergence of LCP, variant). *The bifunctions $K_\square^\nu$ lop-converge to K when $M^\nu \rightarrow M$, $q^\nu \rightarrow q$ and $r^\nu \nearrow \infty$. If in addition, $\text{Liminf}_\nu P_\square^\nu \supset P = \mathbb{R}_+^n \cap \{z \mid Mz + q \geq 0\}$ where*

$$P_\square^\nu = [0, r^\nu] \cap \{z \mid M^\nu z + q^\nu \geq 0\},$$

then lop-convergence is ancillary tight, and this means that any cluster point of a sequence of solutions of the approximating problems is a solution of the (given) limit problem.

Proof. The same arguments as those used to obtain lop-convergence and ancillary tightness in Theorem 4.1 also work here; except that now the sequence $v^\nu \rightarrow v$ is such that $v^\nu \in [0, r^\nu]$. $\square$

One could also rely on the truncation used by Gowda and Pang [21], and more recently by Flores-Bazán and López [20], in their stability analysis of the solutions of linear complementarity problems. Namely, let $0 < d \in \mathbb{R}^n$ and $\alpha_\nu \nearrow \infty$, a sequence of positive scalars. The approximating problems are

$$\text{find } z \in \Delta^\nu = \{z \in \mathbb{R}_+^n \mid \langle d, z \rangle \leq \alpha_\nu\} \text{ so that } M^\nu z + q^\nu \geq 0, \quad (M^\nu z + q^\nu) \perp z,$$

with

$$P_\Delta^\nu = \Delta^\nu \cap \{z \mid M^\nu z + q^\nu \geq 0, \}$$

and associated bifunctions

$$K_\Delta^\nu(z, v) = \langle M^\nu z + q^\nu, v - z \rangle, \quad K_\Delta^\nu: \Delta^\nu \times \Delta^\nu \rightarrow \mathbb{R}.$$

Again, since Δ^ν is compact convex, it's known that problems of this type always have at least one solution.

4.5 Theorem (lop-convergence of LCP, another variant). *The bifunctions K_Δ^ν lop-converge to K when $M^\nu \rightarrow M$, $q^\nu \rightarrow q$ and $\alpha^\nu \nearrow \infty$. If in addition, $\text{Liminf}_\nu P_\Delta^\nu \supset P = \mathbb{R}_+^n \cap \{z \mid Mz + q \geq 0\}$ then lop-convergence is ancillary tight, and it means that any cluster point of a sequence of solutions of the approximating problems is a solution of the (given) limit problem.*

Proof. Similar to that proof of Theorem 4.4 except that the sequence $v^\nu \rightarrow v$ now has $v^\nu \in \Delta^\nu$. $\square$

Existence of solutions to the truncated LCP problems is well-known. Here, one could derive it directly from Ky Fan's Inequality 3.6 since the sets $[0, r^\nu]$, as well as Δ^ν , are non-empty, compact and convex and the functions $K_\square^\nu$ and K_Δ^ν are Ky Fan functions, cf. §3. But even ancillary tight lop-convergence of these functions doesn't settle the question of the existence of solutions to limit LCP. This can be illustrated by the following simple example.

4.6 Example (ancillary tightness and existence of solutions). *Let*

$$M^\nu = \begin{bmatrix} 0 & \nu^{-1} \\ 1 & 1 \end{bmatrix}, \quad M = \begin{bmatrix} 0 & 0 \\ 1 & 1 \end{bmatrix}, \quad q^\nu = \begin{pmatrix} -1 \\ -1 \end{pmatrix} = q, \quad r^\nu = \begin{pmatrix} \nu \\ \nu \end{pmatrix},$$

then $P_\square^\nu \rightarrow P = \emptyset$ and, consequently, the lop-convergence of the bifunctions $K_\square^\nu$ to K is ancillary tight, but clearly the solutions $z^\nu = (\nu, 0)$ of the truncated problem don't converge to a solution of the (limit) linear complementarity problem that happens to have no solution; Gowda and Pang [21] and Flores-Bazán and López [20] go through a detailed analysis that allows then to guarantee the existence of solutions for matrices M that fall in very specific classes.

Deriving simple verifiable conditions that enable us to assert that the sequence is tight requires a challenging study of quadratic forms that goes beyond the scope of this article.

5 Convergence of variational inequalities

We return to variational inequalities as introduced in §2.1, i.e., let $\emptyset \neq C \subset \mathbb{R}^n$, convex, compact and $G : C \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^n$ a, not necessarily continuous, function. The problem is

$$\text{find } u \in C \quad \text{such that} \quad -G(u) \in N_C(u)$$

where $N_C(u)$ is the normal cone of C at u . Such a problem can be reformulated (Proposition 2.2) as finding the maxinf-point of the following Ky Fan bifunction, namely,

$$K(u, v) := \langle G(u), v - u \rangle \quad \text{with} \quad \text{dom } K = C \times C.$$

Clearly, this bifunction is convex (linear) in v , it's usc in u on C when G is continuous and moreover, $K(u, u) = 0$. Ky Fan's inequality 3.6 then guarantees the existence of maxinf-point, say $\bar{u}$, that is a solution of this variational inequality with $K(\bar{u}, \cdot) \geq 0$.

The variational inequality problem can also be written as

$$\text{find } u \in C \quad \text{such that} \quad \langle G(u), v - u \rangle \geq 0, \quad \forall v \in C.$$

In this context, given $\varepsilon \geq 0$, the concept of a ε -approximate solution u_ε means that the inequalities $\langle G(u_\varepsilon), v - u_\varepsilon \rangle \geq 0$ might fail, for some $v \in C$ but never by more than ε . Implicitly, the problem becomes

$$\text{find } u \in C \quad \text{such that} \quad \langle G(u), v - u \rangle \geq -\varepsilon, \quad \forall v \in C;$$

it's essentially this approach that's used in the design of a solution procedure for *stochastic* variational inequalities in [10].

From the convergence results in §3, Corollary 3.7 and Theorem 3.2, it follows that a sequence of Ky Fan bifunctions $\{K^\nu\}_{\nu \in N}$ lop-converges ancillary tightly to the bifunction K will yield a maxinf-point of the limit bifunction K if the sequence of maxinf-points of the bifunctions K^ν admits a cluster point. The implication for variational inequalities is the following:

5.1 Proposition (convergence of variational inequalities). *The variational inequality: find $u \in C$ such that $-G(u) \in N_C(u)$ where $G : C \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^n$ and $\emptyset \neq C \subset \mathbb{R}^n$ is convex will have a solution as long as we can find a sequence of sets $\{C^\nu\}_{\nu \in N}$ convex, compact, converging to C , and a sequence of lsc functions $\{G^\nu : C^\nu \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^n\}_{\nu \in N}$ converging continuously to G with respect to the sequence $C^\nu \rightarrow C$.*

Proof. The functions $G^\nu : \mathbb{R}^n \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^n$ converge continuously to G (on the sequence $C^\nu \rightarrow C$), i.e., for all $x^\nu \in C^\nu \rightarrow x \in C$, $G^\nu(x^\nu) \rightarrow G(x)$. Define

$$K^\nu(u, x) = \langle G^\nu(u), v - u \rangle \quad \text{on} \quad \text{dom } K^\nu = C^\nu \times C^\nu.$$

Then, K^ν are Ky Fan bifunctions that converge lopsided ancillary tightly to K , i.e., any cluster point of the solutions of the approximating variational inequalities is a solution of the limit one. $\square$

Requiring continuous convergence might appear to be bit too stringent, but possibly only in some very specific instances, it's unavoidable. To support this assertion, let's go through two completely different arguments. One that studies the convergence of variational inequalities in terms of generalized equations, or equivalently, as set-valued inclusions. A second one that consider the special case when the variational inequalities can be identified with (convex) optimization problems.

5.2 Example We consider the same collection of variational inequalities with $C^\nu \rightarrow C$ and G^ν converging appropriately to the continuous function G adding, already, the assumption that C is compact. It's this 'appropriately' that we want to investigate rewriting the variational inequalities as set-valued inclusions,

$$u \in C \text{ such that } A(u) \ni 0 \text{ where } A(u) = N_C(u) + G(u)$$

and for $\nu = 1, \dots$,

$$u \in C^\nu \text{ such that } A^\nu(u) \ni 0 \text{ where } A^\nu(u) = N_{C^\nu}(u) + G^\nu(u)$$

Detail. The assumption that $C^\nu \rightarrow C$ and C convex and bounded means that for ν sufficiently large enough, all sets C^ν lie in a bounded region [33, Corollary 4.12]. Without loss of generality, we may as well assume that all sets $C^\nu \subset U$ a bounded subset of $\mathbb{R}^n$. Taking this for granted, we now concern ourselves with conditions under which the solutions of $A^\nu(u) \ni 0$ will converge to those of $A(u) \ni 0$. In view of [33, Theorem 5.37], the question essentially boils down to asking if $A^\nu \xrightarrow{g} A$. Now, $C^\nu \rightarrow C$, by Attouch's Theorem [33, Theorem 12.35] yields $N_{C^\nu} \xrightarrow{g} N_C$, in fact because these are convex cones $N_{C^\nu} \xrightarrow{t} N_C$, i.e. *totally converge* to [33, Theorem 4.25(b)]. By continuity $\text{rge } G$, the range of G , is bounded in C and $\text{gph } G$ is clearly connected, it follows that for ν sufficiently large, $\text{gph } G^\nu$ are uniformly bounded if $G^\nu \xrightarrow{g} G$, cf. again [33, Corollary 4.12]. Moreover, in this situation, when $\text{gph } G^\nu \rightarrow \text{gph } G$, they actually totally converge [33, Theorem 4.25(d)]. There now remains only to appeal to [33, Exercise 4.29(c)] to

conclude that $A^\nu \xrightarrow{g} A$ when $G^\nu \xrightarrow{g} G$ and $N_C \cap (\text{gph } -G)^\infty = \{0\}$. This last condition is innocuous since G is bounded on C . We now turn to [33, Corollary 5.45] to conclude that since G is single-valued and bounded, then for all practical purposes $G^\nu \xrightarrow{g} G$ is equivalent to G^ν converges continuously to G . $\square$

Let's note that Robinson [31, 22], working to obtain error bounds, under significantly more restrictive conditions (subdifferentiability type-conditions) is also led to require continuous convergence of the mappings G^ν to G . In [23, §3], Gürkan and Pang make a thorough analysis of the convergence of the variational inequalities associated with finding Nash equilibrium points of non-cooperative games. Their results are a bit more specific since they deal with a class of non-cooperative games where the strategies sets are 'fixed', i.e., don't change with the convergence parameter ν . Interestingly enough, they are also led to impose continuous convergence on the gradients of the reward functions that in this framework correspond to the continuous convergence of the functions the G^ν .

One might still hope that one could escape 'continuous convergence' in the absolute nicest of all situations.

5.3 Example We again consider the same collection of variational inequalities with $C^\nu \rightarrow C$ and G^ν converging appropriately to the continuous function G but adding now the assumption that the functions G^ν and G are monotone with domain $\mathbb{R}^n$.

Detail. The functions G^ν can be viewed as the gradients of convex functions, say g^ν and g , and the solutions of the variational inequalities are the optimal solutions of the convex optimization problems

$$\min g^\nu + \iota_{C^\nu} \quad \text{and} \quad \min g + \iota_C$$

where ι_D is the indicator function of the set D . The question about the convergence of the solutions then comes down to the epi-convergence of these functions g^ν to g . Since $C^\nu \rightarrow C$, $\iota_{C^\nu} \xrightarrow{e} \iota_C$, the sums will converge when $\text{dom } g$ and C cannot be separated, certainly satisfied when $\text{dom } g$ is $\mathbb{R}^n$, and the functions g^ν epi-converge to g [33, Exercise 7.47(b)]. But, now again, via Attouch's Theorem [33, Theorem 12.35], $g^\nu \xrightarrow{e} g$ cannot occur unless their gradients $G^\nu = \nabla g^\nu$ converge graphically to $G = \nabla g$ which brings us back to continuous convergence via [33, Theorem 12.35] already cited earlier. $\square$

Let's conclude this section by summarizing our results as follows:

5.4 Theorem (convergence of the solution sets of V.I.). Suppose $\{C^\nu \subset \mathbb{R}^n, \nu \in \mathbb{N}\}$ is a sequence of convex, compact sets converging to $C \neq \emptyset$, necessarily convex but not necessarily compact, and the functions $\{G^\nu : \mathbb{R}^n \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^n, \nu \in \mathbb{N}\}$ converge continuously to a (continuous) bounded function G . Then, the solution set

$$D = \{u \mid G(u) + N_C(u) \ni 0\}$$

of the limiting variational inequality contains the outer-limit of the solutions sets of the variational inequalities, i.e., $\text{Limsup}_\nu D^\nu \subset D$ where

$$D^\nu = \{u \mid G^\nu(u) + N_{C^\nu}(u) \ni 0\}, \quad \nu \in \mathbb{N}.$$

Moreover, if $\bar{u} \in D$, then there exists approximate solutions $u^\nu \in C^\nu$ of the variational inequalities $-G^\nu(u) \in N_{C^\nu}(u) \ni 0$ such that $u^\nu \rightarrow \bar{u}$.

Proof. Let's begin by observing that in these circumstances the sets D^ν are nonempty as observed at the beginning of this section and $(u^\nu \in D^\nu) \rightarrow u$ yields $u \in D$ by Proposition 5.1.

On the other hand, if $\bar{u} \in D$, then $\bar{u} \in \operatorname{argmax}_{u \in C} (\inf_{v \in C} \langle G(u), v - u \rangle)$ which in view of Corollary 3.4 means that there exists $\{\varepsilon_\nu \searrow 0, u^\nu \in \varepsilon_\nu\text{-argmax}_{u \in C^\nu} [\inf_{v \in C^\nu} \langle G^\nu(u), v - u \rangle]\}$, or equivalently

$$\exists \varepsilon_\nu \searrow 0 \text{ and } (u^\nu \in C^\nu) \rightarrow \bar{u} \text{ such that } \langle -G^\nu(u^\nu), v - u^\nu \rangle \leq \varepsilon_\nu, \quad \forall v \in C^\nu,$$

which yields the sequence of approximating solutions. $\square$

6 Convergence of fixed points

Brouwer's Fixed Point Theorem, and its classical generalizations, can be derived from Ky Fan's inequality. Indeed, with C a non-empty, compact, convex subset of $\mathbb{R}^n$ and $G : C \rightarrow C$ a continuous function, let's define the bifunction

$$F(x, y) = \langle x - G(x), y - x \rangle, \quad \text{i.e.,} \quad F : C \times C \rightarrow \mathbb{R}.$$

F is clearly a Ky Fan bifunction defined on a product of compact, convex sets and for all $x \in \mathbb{R}^n$, $F(x, x) = \langle x - G(x), x - x \rangle \geq 0$. Hence, from Lemma 3.6 follows the existence of a maxinf-point $\bar{x}$ of F such that

$$\forall y \in \mathbb{B} : \quad F(\bar{x}, y) = \langle \bar{x} - G(\bar{x}), y - \bar{x} \rangle \geq 0.$$

Since $G(\bar{x}) \in C$, recall $G : C \rightarrow C$, and since $F(\bar{x}, \cdot) \geq 0$, again by Lemma 3.6, choosing $y = G(\bar{x})$, one has

$$\langle \bar{x} - G(\bar{x}), G(\bar{x}) - \bar{x} \rangle = -|\bar{x} - G(\bar{x})|^2 \geq 0$$

and this can only occur when $G(\bar{x}) = \bar{x}$. We encapsulate this conclusion in the well-known theorem⁷:

6.1 Theorem (existence of a fixed point). *Let $G : C \rightarrow C$ be continuous where $C \subset \mathbb{R}^n$ is (nonempty), compact and convex. Then, G admits a fixed point, i.e., for some $\bar{x} \in C$, $G(\bar{x}) = \bar{x}$.*

Let's now turn to approximation issues and consider the following situation, the compact, convex sets $C^\nu \rightarrow C$ which is nonempty, convex and compact. In particular, this means [33, Corollary 4.11] that for ν sufficiently large, all sets C^ν are contained in $C + \eta\mathbb{B}$ for some $\eta > 0$. The continuous functions $G^\nu : C^\nu \rightarrow C^\nu$ are converging continuously to $G : C \rightarrow C$ with respect to $C^\nu \rightarrow C$: $\forall x^\nu \in C^\nu \rightarrow x \in C$, $G^\nu(x^\nu) \rightarrow G(x)$. It's then straightforward to verify that the bifunctions $K^\nu(x, y) = \langle x - G^\nu(x), y - x \rangle$ defined on $C^\nu \times C^\nu$ *lop-converge* tightly to $K : \langle x - G(x), y - x \rangle$ defined on $C \times C$ and, via Theorems 3.3 and 3.2, this implies,

6.2 Theorem (convergence of fixed points). *In the situation described here above,*

1. *for all ν , the functions G^ν have a least one fixed point in C^ν as is also the case for G in C ,*
2. *for $C^\#$ the set of cluster points of all the fixed points of the functions G^ν , $\emptyset \neq C^\# \subset C$,*
3. *if $\bar{x} \in C^\#$, then $\bar{x}$ is a fixed point of G on C ,*

⁷in [5] a coercivity condition had been imposed on $G : \langle x, G(x) \rangle \leq |x|^2$ to obtain this result via the Ky Fan inequality.

4. if $\bar{x} \in C$ is a fixed point of G , there exist approximate fixed points of G^ν , $x^\nu \in C^\nu$ converging to $\bar{x}$.
5. if $\bar{x}$ is a cluster point of ε_ν -maxinf-points of the functions $F^\nu(x, y) = \langle x - G(x), y - x \rangle$ defined on $C^\nu \times C^\nu$ with $\varepsilon_\nu \searrow 0$, then $\bar{x}$ is a fixed point of G on C .

Proof. All the assertions are covered by the paragraph preceding the statement of the theorem. $\square$

7 Stability and existence of Nash equilibrium

We next turn to non-cooperative games as introduced in §2.3 and deal with the existence and the stability of Nash equilibrium points. We consider a game $\mathcal{G} = \{(C_a, r_a) \mid a \in \mathcal{A}\}$ and an approximating sequence $\mathcal{G}^\nu = \{(C_a^\nu, r_a^\nu) \mid a \in \mathcal{A}\}$ with a finite number $|\mathcal{A}|$ of players. For each player $a \in \mathcal{A}$, the sets C_a or C_a^ν , subsets of $\mathbb{R}^n$, determine the available strategies x_a and the associated reward is $r_a(x_a, x_{-a})$, or $r_a^\nu(x_a, x_{-a})$, where x_{-a} is the vector of the strategies selected by the remaining players. *Nash equilibrium points* are strategies that satisfy

$$\forall a \in \mathcal{A}: \quad x_a^* \in \operatorname{argmax}_{x_a \in C_a} r_a(x_a, x_{-a}^*) \text{ or } x_a^{\nu,*} \in \operatorname{argmax}_{x_a \in C_a^\nu} r_a^\nu(x_a, x_{-a}^{\nu,*}).$$

Existence and continuity results for Nash equilibrium points will be derived via the properties of the maxinf-points of the bivariate *Nikaido-Isoda bifunctions*, $N : C \times C \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ where $C = \prod_{a \in \mathcal{A}} C_a$,

$$N(x, y) = \sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \left(r_a(x_a, x_{-a}) - r_a(y_a, x_{-a}) \right),$$

and $N^\nu : C^\nu \times C^\nu \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ where $C^\nu = \prod_{a \in \mathcal{A}} C_a^\nu$,

$$N^\nu(x, y) = \sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \left(r_a^\nu(x_a, x_{-a}) - r_a^\nu(y_a, x_{-a}) \right).$$

ε -approximate solutions are of a totally different character than those for variational inequalities or fixed point problems. Here it means that if we add up by how much each individual player fails to meet its maximum rewards the total won't turn out to be no more than ε ; when evenly split, each individual player might fall short by no more than $\varepsilon/|\mathcal{A}|$.

Existence, a well-known result (cf. [7, Theorem 4.2], for example), is obtained here as a direct consequence of Ky Fan Inequality's 3.6, and is extended by appealing to Corollary 3.7; refer to the last few paragraphs of §3 and the fact that the Nikaido-Isoda bifunction N is finite-valued on $C \times C$.

7.1 Theorem (existence of Nash equilibrium points). *If for all $a \in \mathcal{A}$ the sets C_a are convex and compact and the Nikaido-Isoda bifunction $N : \mathbb{R}^{n \times |\mathcal{A}|} \times \mathbb{R}^{n \times |\mathcal{A}|} \rightarrow \overline{\mathbb{R}}$ satisfy:*

- (a) *for all $y \in \mathbb{R}^{n \times |\mathcal{A}|}$, $x \mapsto N(x, y)$ is usc,*
- (b) *for all $x \in \mathbb{R}^{n \times |\mathcal{A}|}$, $y \mapsto N(x, y)$ is convex,*

then $\mathcal{G}$ has a Nash equilibrium point.

Proof. One simply appeals to Ky Fan's Inequality 3.6 after observing that $N(x, x) \geq 0$. $\square$

It's immediate from the definition of the Nikaido-Isoda bifunction that it will be a Ky Fan bifunction under the following conditions:

7.2 Proposition (Nikaido-Isoda as a Ky Fan bifunction). *A sufficient condition for N to be a Ky Fan bifunction is the following: for all $a \in \mathcal{A}$, the sets C_a are convex and,*

- a) r_a is usc and for all $x_a \in \mathbb{R}^n$, $r_a(x_a, \cdot)$ is lsc;
- b) for all $x \in \mathbb{R}^{n \times |\mathcal{A}|}$, $r_a(\cdot, x_{-a})$ is concave.

Let's now turn to stability issues related to perturbations of *both* the strategy sets and the payoffs. For this purpose we introduce the following convergence notion for a sequence of (approximating) games: $\mathcal{G}^\nu = \{(C_a^\nu, r_a^\nu), a \in \mathcal{A}\}$ for $\nu \in \mathbb{N}$.

7.3 Definition (convergence of non-cooperative games). *Convergence of a sequence of games $\{\mathcal{G}^\nu, \nu \in \mathbb{N}\}$ to a game $\mathcal{G}$ is defined in the following terms: for all $a \in \mathcal{A}$,*

- a) *the nonempty compact convex sets C_a^ν converge to the nonempty compact set C_a ;*
- b) *the sequence of Nikaido-Isoda bifunctions N^ν associated with the games $\mathcal{G}^\nu$ lop-converge ancillary tightly to the Nikaido-Isoda bifunction N associated with game $\mathcal{G}$.*

When the collection of sets C_a^ν , nonempty, compact, convex converge to C_a , this limit set is also convex [33, Proposition 4.15]. Also, if $C_a^\nu \rightarrow C_a$ for all $a \in \mathcal{A}$, then $\prod_{a \in \mathcal{A}} C_a^\nu \rightarrow \prod_{a \in \mathcal{A}} C_a$ [33, Exercise 4.29].

An extension of continuous convergence usually defined relative to a fixed set, say C , cf. [33, §7.C] turns out to be a sufficient condition for lopsided convergence of the Nikaido-Isoda bifunction sequence N^ν . Indeed, a sequence of functions $\{f^\nu : \mathbb{R}^n \rightarrow \overline{\mathbb{R}}, \nu \in \mathbb{N}\}$ is said to *converge continuously to $f : \mathbb{R}^n \rightarrow \overline{\mathbb{R}}$ relative to a sequence of sets $C^\nu \rightarrow C$* if for all $x^\nu \rightarrow x$ such that for all $\nu \in \mathbb{N}$, $x^\nu \in C^\nu$: $f^\nu(x^\nu) \rightarrow f(x)$. Thus, it's easy to see that condition a) in the definition of convergence of games jointly with the continuous convergence of r_a^ν relative to C_a^ν for all $a \in \mathcal{A}$ imply the ancillary tight lopsided convergence of Nikaido-Isoda bifunctions associated with the games $\mathcal{G}^\nu$.

Combining the previous results and observations, we can formulate our first stability result for Nash equilibrium points.

7.4 Theorem (convergence of Nash equilibrium points). *Suppose the games $\{\mathcal{G}^\nu, \nu \in \mathbb{N}\}$ converge to a game $\mathcal{G}$ and the Nikaido-Isoda bifunctions N^ν associated with them are Ky Fan, then, there exist strategies $\{\bar{x}^\nu = (\bar{x}_a^\nu, a \in \mathcal{A}), \nu \in \mathbb{N}\}$ that, for all $\nu \in \mathbb{N}$, are Nash equilibrium points of $\mathcal{G}^\nu$. Moreover, any cluster point, say $\{\bar{x} = (\bar{x}_a, a \in \mathcal{A})\}$ of such a sequence of Nash equilibrium points is itself a Nash equilibrium point of $\mathcal{G}$.*

Proof. Since the games $\{\mathcal{G}^\nu, \nu \in \mathbb{N}\}$ converge to a game $\mathcal{G}$ and the bifunctions N^ν are finite on $\prod_{a \in \mathcal{A}} C_a^\nu$, we obtain from Theorem 7.1 and the properties of lopsided convergence, cf. Theorem 3.2, the assertions of the theorem. $\square$

The next corollary translates the stability result in terms of the original formulation of the games.

7.5 Corollary (sufficient conditions for convergence of Nash points). *Suppose the games $\{\mathcal{G}^\nu, \nu \in \mathbb{N}\}$ are such that for all $a \in \mathcal{A}$ the sets C_a are convex and compact and that the payoff functions satisfy:*

- a) r_a^ν is usc and for all $x_a \in \mathbb{R}^n$, $r_a^\nu(x_a, \cdot)$ is lsc;
- b) for all $x \in \mathbb{R}^{n \times |\mathcal{A}|}$, $r_a^\nu(\cdot, x_{-a})$ is concave.

Suppose also that for all $a \in \mathcal{A}$, r_a^ν continuously converges relatively to C_a^ν . Then, there exist a Nash

equilibrium $\{\bar{x}^\nu = (\bar{x}_a^\nu, a \in \mathcal{A}), \nu \in \mathbb{N}\}$ of $\mathcal{G}^\nu$ for all $\nu \in \mathbb{N}$, and any cluster point of this sequence is a Nash equilibrium of the game $\mathcal{G}$.

Independently, and at about the same time we started to circulate some of the results in this article, Gürkan and Pang [23] developed an alternative approach to the convergence of Nash equilibrium points based on *multi-epi convergence*, more precisely, *multi-hypo convergence* since the formulation is in terms of rewards-maximization for the players. The sequence of games $\mathcal{G}^\nu$, they consider, is less general than those being analyzed here. In their framework, the strategies sets C_a are constant, i.e., don't depend on the approximation parameter ν . We extend Gürkan and Pang [23] definition and allow for this dependence in the definition below. Let

$$C_{-a} = \prod_{a' \in \mathcal{A} \setminus \{a\}} C_{a'} \quad \text{and similarly} \quad C_{-a}^\nu = \prod_{a' \in \mathcal{A} \setminus \{a\}} C_{a'}^\nu.$$

7.6 Definition (multi-hypo convergence á la Gürkan-Pang). *For all $a \in \mathcal{A}$, suppose that for all $\{x_{-a}^\nu \in C_{-a}^\nu, \nu \in \mathbb{N}\}$ converging to x_{-a} , the functions $\{r_a^\nu(\cdot, x_{-a}^\nu), \nu \in \mathbb{N}\}$ hypo-converge to $r_a(\cdot, x_{-a})$; for the definition of hypo-convergence for finite-valued functions defined on subsets of $\mathbb{R}^n$, cf. [25, §2].*

We now relate the (extended) Gürkan-Pang approach to that based on lopsided convergence.

7.7 Theorem (hypo-convergence of the reward functions). *Suppose the games $\{\mathcal{G}^\nu, \nu \in \mathbb{N}\}$ are such that their reward functions multi-hypo converge to the reward functions of $\mathcal{G} = \{(C_a, r_a), a \in \mathcal{A}\}$. Then the corresponding sequence of Nikaido-Isoda bifunctions $\{N^\nu, \nu \in \mathbb{N}\}$ lop-converges to N , the Nikaido-Isoda bifunction associated with the game $\mathcal{G}$.*

Proof. For each player $a \in \mathcal{A}$, hypo-convergence of the functions $\{r_a^\nu(\cdot, x_{-a}^\nu), \nu \in \mathbb{N}\}$ to $r_a(\cdot, x_{-a})$ means [25, Proposition 2]

- a)-a $^\infty$) $\forall x^\nu \in C_a^\nu \rightarrow x \in C_a, \limsup_\nu r_a^\nu(x^\nu) \geq r_a(x)$ and $r_a^\nu(x^\nu) \searrow -\infty$ when $x \notin C_a$,
- b) $\forall x_a \in C_a, \exists x_a^\nu \rightarrow x_a$ such that $\liminf_\nu r_a^\nu(x_a^\nu) \geq r_a(x_a)$.

Let's first verify that condition 3.1(a) is satisfied, namely for all $y \in C$ and $x^\nu \in C^\nu \rightarrow x, \exists (y^\nu \in C^\nu) \rightarrow y$ such that $\limsup_\nu N^\nu(x^\nu, y^\nu) \leq N(x, y)$ when $x \in C$ and $\limsup_\nu N^\nu(x^\nu, y^\nu) \searrow -\infty$ when $x \notin C$, or equivalently that given any $y \in C$ and any $x^\nu \in C^\nu \rightarrow x \in C$ one can find $y^\nu \rightarrow y$ such that

$$\limsup_\nu \sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} (r_a(x^\nu) - r_a(y_a^\nu, x_{-a}^\nu)) \leq \sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} (r_a(x) - r_a(y_a, x_{-a}))$$

when $x \in C$ and otherwise

$$\limsup_\nu \sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} (r_a(x^\nu) - r_a(y_a^\nu, x_{-a}^\nu)) \searrow -\infty.$$

Condition b) guarantees that for all $y_a \in C$ and $x_{-a}^\nu \in C_{-a}^\nu \rightarrow x_{-a} \in C_{-a}$, one can find $y_a^\nu \in C_a^\nu \rightarrow y_a \in C_a$ such that $\liminf_\nu r_a^\nu(y_a^\nu, x_{-a}^\nu) \geq r_a(y_a, x_{-a})$. On the other hand, given the sequence $x_{-a}^\nu \in C_{-a}^\nu \rightarrow x_{-a} \in C_{-a}$ and any sequence $x_a^\nu \in C_a^\nu$ either $\limsup_\nu r_a(x_a^\nu) \leq r_a(x_a, x_{-a})$ or $r_a(x_a^\nu) \searrow -\infty$. This means that for any sequence $x^\nu \in C^\nu \rightarrow x$ and $y \in C$ with, for all $a \in \mathcal{A}$, the

appropriate choice of $y_a^\nu \rightarrow y_a$ one has

$$\begin{aligned} \limsup_{\nu} [r_a^\nu(x^\nu) - r_a^\nu(y_a^\nu, x_{-a}^\nu)] &\leq \limsup_{\nu} r_a^\nu(x^\nu) - \liminf_{\nu} r_a^\nu(y_a^\nu, x_{-a}^\nu) \\ &\leq \begin{cases} r_a(x) - r_a(y_a, x_{-a}) & \text{if } x_a \in C_a, \\ -\infty & \text{if } x_a \notin C_a. \end{cases} \end{aligned}$$

Clearly, this remains valid once we take the sum with respect to $a \in \mathcal{A}$ and thus the first condition for the lopsided convergence of the sequence Nikaido-Isoda N^ν to N is satisfied.

Let's now turn to verifying 3.1(b). Given $x \in C$, let's choose our sequence $(x_a^\nu, x_{-a}^\nu) \in C^\nu \rightarrow (x_a, x_{-a})$ in such a way that for each $a \in \mathcal{A}$, $\liminf_{\nu} r_a^\nu(x^\nu) \geq r_a(x)$ as predicated by the hypo-convergence of the reward functions, more specifically, by assumption b). Given any sequence $\{y^\nu \in C^\nu, \nu \in \mathbb{N}\}$ converging to y , from a)-a $^\infty$) one knows that $\limsup_{\nu} r_a^\nu(y_a^\nu, x_{-a}^\nu) \leq r_a(y_a, x_{-a})$ when $y_a \in C_a$ or $r_a^\nu(y_a^\nu, x_{-a}^\nu) \searrow -\infty$ otherwise, or equivalently, $\liminf_{\nu} -r_a^\nu(y_a^\nu, x_{-a}^\nu) \geq -r_a(y_a, x_{-a})$ when $y_a \in C_a$ or $r_a^\nu(y_a^\nu, x_{-a}^\nu) \nearrow \infty$ otherwise. This immediately carries over to the Nikaido-Isoda bifunctions by taking sums. $\square$

In [23], Gürkan and Pang make a thorough analysis of the convergence of the variational inequality associated with finding Nash equilibrium points for non-cooperative games. Their results are a bit more specific since they deal with a class of non-cooperative games where the strategy sets are 'fixed', i.e., don't change with the convergence parameter ν . Interestingly, they are also led to impose continuous convergence on the gradients of the reward functions that in this case correspond to the functions G^ν in our formulation of approximating variational inequalities in §5; refer also to the more detailed comments about continuous convergence in that section.

8 Existence and stability of Walras equilibria

One can rewrite the Walras barter problem as a non-cooperative game and then apply the results of the two preceding sections, in particular §7. Let's begin by following this path but in the end, as we shall see, a more direct approach via the Walrasian bifunction turns out to be more expedient.

Returning to the Walras model introduced in §2.4, our collection of players will consist of the individual agents $a \in \mathcal{A}$ in addition to a so-called *Walrasian auctioneer*, a panoptic player whose main function is to choose a market price system aimed at securing a market equilibrium. The reward functions are

$$\forall a \in \mathcal{A} : \quad r_a(x, x_{-a}, p) = u_a(x) \quad \text{when} \quad \langle p, e_a - x \rangle \geq 0, \quad x \in C_a$$

and for the Walrasian auctioneer,

$$r_W(p, x_{\mathcal{A}}) = \inf_{q \geq 0} \langle q, \sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} (e_a - x_a) \rangle \quad \text{if } 0 \leq p \neq 0$$

where $x_{\mathcal{A}}$ consists of the strategies of all the individual agents. In this model,

- r_a doesn't depend on x_{-a} , it's included in the arguments simply for consistency,
- when $0 \leq p \neq 0$, $r_W(p, x_{\mathcal{A}}) = -\infty$ unless $\sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} (e_a - x_a) \geq 0$ in which case $r_W = 0$, its upper bound.

Now, suppose that $(\bar{x}_A, \bar{p})$, with $\bar{p} \neq 0$, is an equilibrium point of the Walras barter model which implies that the excess supply $\sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} (e_a - \bar{x}_a) \geq 0$. Then, clearly, for all $a \in \mathcal{A}$, $\bar{x}_a \in \operatorname{argmax}_x r_a(x, \bar{x}_{-a}, \bar{p})$ and $\bar{p} \in \operatorname{argmax}_{0 \leq p \neq 0} r_W(\cdot, \bar{x}_A)$. The reward function of the Walrasian auctioneer doesn't depend explicitly on p but actually does so indirectly; in fact, once a price system has been chosen so that $\sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} (e_a - x_a) \geq 0$ given that for all $a \in \mathcal{A}$, $x_a \in \operatorname{argmax}_x r_a(x, x_{-a}, p)$, in theory any other non-negative price system would "maximize" r_W but that wouldn't guarantee that each $\bar{x}_a$ would then maximize $r_a(\cdot, \bar{x}_{-a}, \bar{p})$. Hence, $(\bar{x}_A, \bar{p})$ is a Nash equilibrium point for the non-cooperative game defined by the rewards functions $((r_a, a \in \mathcal{A}), r_W)$.

On the other hand, if $(\bar{x}_A, \bar{p})$ is a Nash equilibrium point of a game with reward functions $((r_a, a \in \mathcal{A}), r_W)$, then necessarily for all $a \in \mathcal{A}$, $\bar{x}_a \in \operatorname{argmax}_x \{u_a(x) \mid \langle \bar{p}, e_a - x \rangle \geq 0\}$ and $\sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} (e_a - \bar{x}_a) \geq 0$ since otherwise $\operatorname{argmax} r_W$ would be empty. This means that $0 \leq \bar{p} \neq 0$ with $\bar{x}_A$ is an equilibrium point of the Walras barter model.

One can then proceed to writing down the corresponding Nikaido-Isoda bifunction,

$$N((x, p), (y, q)) = \sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} (r_a(x_a, x_{-a}, p) - r_a(y_a, x_{-a}, p)) + (r_W(p, x_A) - r_W(q, x_A))$$

but an explicit expression, in terms of the given utility functions and the associated budgetary constraints, gets a little unwieldy that makes the analysis and, in particular, the study of the convergence properties, more involved than they should be.

So, let's proceed as in §2.4 and work with the Walrasian bifunctions and deduce both existence and stability from the general results for bifunctions. Recall that $\mathcal{E} = \{(u_a, C_a, e_a), a \in \mathcal{A}\}$ provides the description of the economy, $W(p, q) = \langle s(p), q \rangle$ on $\Delta \times \Delta$ is the Walrasian with Δ the unit simplex in $\mathbb{R}^n$ and $s(\cdot)$ is the excess supply function.

8.1 Theorem *Suppose that $p \mapsto s(p)$ is usc on Δ , then $\mathcal{E}$ has at least one Walras equilibrium point, say $\bar{p}$. Moreover, $W(\bar{p}, \cdot) \geq 0$.*

Proof. When s is usc, so is $W(\cdot, q)$ for all $q \in \Delta$ and hence W is then a Ky Fan bifunction, finite-valued on the compact convex set $\Delta \times \Delta$. Since for any $p \in \Delta$, $W(p, p) \geq 0$, Ky Fan's inequality 3.6 immediately yields the existence of a maxinf-point. Moreover, $W(\bar{p}, \cdot) \geq 0$ when $\bar{p}$ is a maxinf-point, again by Lemma 3.6. $\square$

Conditions on the original data of the economy $\mathcal{E}$ under which the excess supply function is usc are provided in the next proposition; basically, the same conditions as those used by Arrow and Debreu [3] to derive their existence result.

8.2 Proposition *If for all $a \in \mathcal{A}$ the utility functions u_a are usc and concave on C_a , and the initial endowments $e_a \in \operatorname{int} C_a$, then $W(\cdot, q)$ is usc on Δ , for all q , i.e., W is a Ky Fan bifunction.*

Proof. This is an immediate consequence of the classical results for the sup-projection of a bivariate function, here $s_a(p) = e_a - \sup \{u(x) \mid \langle p, x - e_a \rangle \leq 0, x \in C_a\}$, cf. for example, [33, Chapter 7]. $\square$

Next, we consider a sequence of economies $\mathcal{E}^\nu = \{(u_a^\nu, C_a^\nu, e_a^\nu) \mid a \in \mathcal{A}\}$, that can be interpreted as perturbation of the utility functions, survival sets and initial endowments $e_a^\nu \in \operatorname{int} C_a^\nu$.

8.3 Definition A sequence of economies $\{\mathcal{E}^\nu, \nu \in \mathbb{N}\}$ is said to be converging to an economy $\mathcal{E}$ if the Walrasians $W^\nu(p, q)$ associated with the economy $\mathcal{E}^\nu$ lop-converge ancillary tightly to the Walrasian W associated with $\mathcal{E}$.

This means that convergence of the economies is defined in term of the convergence of their associated Walrasians. Sufficient conditions to guarantee the lop-convergence ancillary tightly of the Walrasian bifunctions W^ν were given in one of our earlier paper [26]. Indeed, if for all $a \in \mathcal{A}$ the utility functions u_a^ν are usc and concave with the same domain, the initial endowments satisfy $e_a \in \text{int } \mathbb{R}_+^n$ and the u_a^ν continuously converge to u_a then W^ν lop-converge ancillary tightly to W .

8.4 Theorem Suppose the economies $\{\mathcal{E}^\nu, \nu \in \mathbb{N}\}$ converge to $\mathcal{E}$ and that the Walrasians W^ν associated with them are Ky Fan bifunctions, then for every $\mathcal{E}^\nu$ comes with Walras equilibrium prices $\{\bar{p}^\nu, \nu \in \mathbb{N}\}$. Moreover, any sequence of such equilibrium points has at least one cluster point and any such cluster point is a Walras equilibrium for $\mathcal{E}$.

Proof. As the sequence $\mathcal{E}^\nu$ converges to $\mathcal{E}$ and the functions W^ν are finite on $\Delta \times \Delta$, Theorem 8.1 allows us to infer the existence of equilibrium points for each one of the economies $\mathcal{E}^\nu$. The conclusions follow from Theorem 3.2 about the convergence of maxinf-points and the fact that Δ is compact. $\square$

9 Convergence of solutions to generalized equations

There is an extensive literature dealing with the local behavior of the solutions to generalized equations, or inclusions, under perturbations of some specific parameters, cf. the recent monograph of Dontchev and Rockafellar [16] and references therein; see also the work of Ait Mansour, in particular [1, 2]. A more global approach was already followed Aubin and Wets [8] but with a boundedness condition on the coderivatives of the mappings. Here, the conditions imposed are on the properties of the mappings themselves rather than on their coderivatives. Moreover, we limit ourselves to a simplified situation; a full analysis deserve an independent treatment, a special case was dealt with in §5 as an alternative approach to the convergence of variational inequalities, see the examples that follows Proposition 5.1. Our immediate aim is to illustrate how lop-convergence can be exploited to get us on the way to convergence results for the solutions of $S^\nu(x) \ni d^\nu$ to the solutions of $S(x) \ni 0$ when the mappings S^ν ‘approximate’ S and $d^\nu \rightarrow 0$.

Let $S^\nu, S : \mathbb{R}^n \rightrightarrows \mathbb{R}^m$ be convex-valued, osc mappings and consider the inclusions $S^\nu(x) \ni d^\nu$, $S(x) \ni 0$ with $d^\nu \rightarrow 0$. For $x \in \text{dom } S^\nu = \{x \mid S^\nu(x) \neq \emptyset\}$, let’s designate by $\sigma^\nu(x, \cdot)$ the *support function* of $S^\nu(x)$ and define $\sigma(x, \cdot)$ as the support function of S . The bifunctions that get associated with the limit and the approximating problems are defined by

$$K(x, v) = \sigma(x, v) \quad \text{and} \quad K^\nu(x, v) = \sigma^\nu(x, v) - \langle d^\nu, v \rangle,$$

Again, we plan to rely on Ky Fan’s Inequality for existence of maxinf-points of these bifunctions. Of course, for all x , these functions are convex in u . The need for the upper semicontinuity of these support functions leads us to impose some further conditions on the collection of mappings $\{S, S^\nu, \nu \in \mathbb{N}\}$. Although it’s far from a vital condition, let’s carry on with the assumption that our mapping are

also *locally bounded*. When that's the case, the outer semicontinuity of the mappings is enough to guarantee that the mappings $\sigma^\nu(\cdot, v)$, $\sigma(\cdot, v)$ are usc. The argument is provided for the function σ , it's similar for σ^ν . Indeed, first note that then the mapping S is compact-valued and for all $x \in \text{dom } S$, $\sup \{ \langle v, u \rangle \mid u \in S(x) \}$ is attained at some $u \in S^\nu(x)$. If $x^k \rightarrow x$ in $\text{dom } S$, the corresponding points $u^k \in \text{argmax} \{ \langle v, u \rangle \mid u \in S(x^k) \}$ have a cluster point $u \in S(x)$ as follows from local boundedness and outer semicontinuity of S . Hence,

$$\limsup_k \sigma(x^k, v) = \limsup_k \langle v, u^k \rangle \leq \sigma(x, v).$$

Let's now proceed to show that the bifunctions K^ν lop-converge to $K = \sigma$ when the mappings S^ν graphically converge to S , i.e., $\text{gph } S^\nu \rightarrow \text{gph } S$.

9.1 Lemma (range of a compact-valued osc mapping). *Compact-valued osc mappings defined on a compact domain have compact range and, hence, are locally bounded.*

Proof. Let $S : D \rightrightarrows \mathbb{R}^m$ be such a mapping and let's show that $\text{rge } S$ is bounded. To the contrary, suppose $\text{rge } S$ was unbounded which means there exists $u^k \in S(x^k)$ with $|u^k| \nearrow \infty$ and $x^k \in D$. Since D is compact, passing to a subsequence, if necessary, $x^k \rightarrow \bar{x} \in D$ and since S is compact-valued and osc at $\bar{x}$ it follows that for any $\varepsilon > 0$ arbitrarily small and k sufficiently large, $S(x^k) \subset S(\bar{x}) + \varepsilon B$ which negates the possibility of having such a sequence $\{u^k\}$ and consequently, $\text{rge } S$ must be bounded. That $\text{rge } S$ is also closed follows from a similar argument: when $u^k \in S(x^k) \rightarrow \bar{u}$, again passing to a subsequence if necessary, implies that $x^k \rightarrow \bar{x} \in D$ and since S is osc, $\bar{u} \in S(\bar{x}) \subset \text{rge } S$. $\square$

9.2 Proposition (inclusions: lop-convergence of support functions). *Suppose $d^\nu \rightarrow 0$, the osc (outer semicontinuous) mappings $\{S^\nu : D^\nu \subset \mathbb{R}^n \rightrightarrows \mathbb{R}^m, \nu \in \mathbb{N}\}$ are uniformly locally bounded and converge graphically to $S : D \subset \mathbb{R}^n \rightrightarrows \mathbb{R}^m$. Then, the bifunctions*

$$\{K^\nu = \sigma^\nu - \langle d^\nu, \cdot \rangle : D^\nu \times \mathbb{R}^m \rightarrow \mathbb{R}\} \text{ lop-converge to } K = \sigma : D \times \mathbb{R}^m \rightarrow \mathbb{R}.$$

Proof. It really suffices to prove that the support functions σ^ν lop-converge to σ . The graphical convergence of the mappings S^ν to S implies that $\text{gph } S$ is closed and thus, S is also osc. Moreover, since the graphical limit at some point $\bar{x} \in D$ can be expressed as

$$\bigcup_{\{x^\nu \rightarrow \bar{x}\}} \text{Limsup}_{\nu \rightarrow \infty} S^\nu(x^\nu) \subset S(\bar{x}) \subset \bigcup_{\{x^\nu \rightarrow \bar{x}\}} \text{Liminf}_{\nu \rightarrow \infty} S^\nu(x^\nu),$$

see [33, Proposition 5.33], it immediately follows that S is locally bounded since the mappings S^ν are uniformly locally bounded.

Let's now turn to condition 3.1(a). Given $\bar{v}$ and $(x^\nu \in D^\nu) \rightarrow \bar{x}$, we have to exhibit $v^\nu \rightarrow \bar{v}$ such that $\limsup_\nu \sigma^\nu(x^\nu, v^\nu) \leq \sigma(\bar{x}, \bar{v})$. Let's simply choose $v^\nu \equiv \bar{v}$ and let $u^\nu \in \text{argmax} \{ \langle \bar{v}, u \rangle \mid u \in S^\nu(x^\nu) \}$. Now recall that the mappings S^ν and S are uniformly locally bounded and, consequently, every subsequence of $\{u^\nu, \nu \in \mathbb{N}\}$ comes with a further converging subsequence. For any cluster point $\bar{u}$ of $\{u^\nu, \nu \in \mathbb{N}\}$, restricting our attention to the subsequence converging to $u^\nu \rightharpoonup \bar{u}, N \subset \mathbb{N}$, one has

$$\lim_{\nu \in N} \sigma^\nu(x^\nu, \bar{v}) = \lim_{\nu \in N} \langle u^\nu, \bar{v} \rangle = \langle \bar{u}, \bar{v} \rangle \leq \sigma(\bar{x}, \bar{v})$$

from which one immediately concludes that $\limsup \sigma^\nu(x^\nu, \bar{v}) \leq \sigma(\bar{x}, \bar{v})$.

Condition 3.1(b) is verified as follows. For $\bar{x} \in D$ and $v^\nu \rightarrow \bar{v}$, let $\bar{u} \in \operatorname{argmax} \{ \langle \bar{v}, u \rangle \mid u \in S(\bar{x}) \}$. Graphical convergence, in particular $\operatorname{Liminf}_\nu \operatorname{gph} S^\nu \supset \operatorname{gph} S$, implies that there exists a sequence $(x^\nu, u^\nu) \in \operatorname{gph} S^\nu \rightarrow (\bar{x}, \bar{u})$. Taking this into account, with

$$(i) \quad \sigma(x^\nu, v^\nu) \geq \langle v^\nu, u^\nu \rangle, \text{ and}$$

$$(ii) \quad \langle v^\nu, u^\nu \rangle \rightarrow \langle \bar{v}, \bar{u} \rangle,$$

one obtains, $\liminf_\nu \sigma(x^\nu, v^\nu) \geq \sigma(\bar{x}, \bar{v})$ as required. $\square$

10 Set-valued fixed points

Given C a compact, convex subset of $\mathbb{R}^n$ and $S : C \rightrightarrows C \subset \mathbb{R}^n$, a convex-valued osc mapping, Kakutani's extension of Brouwer fixed point problem deals with

$$\text{finding } x \in C \text{ such that } x \in S(x).$$

It's easy to verify that a solution of such a problem is also a maxinf-point of the mapping $F : C \times C \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ with

$$F(x, v) = \sup \{ \langle x - v, z - x \rangle \mid z \in S(x) \subset C \}$$

and vice-versa. Our approximating problems and the associated bifunctions:

$$\begin{aligned} &\text{find } x \in C^\nu \text{ such that } x \in S^\nu(x), \\ &F^\nu(x, v) = \sup \{ \langle x - v, z - x \rangle \mid z \in S^\nu(x) \subset C^\nu \} \end{aligned}$$

with the finite-valued bifunctions F^ν defined on $C^\nu \times C^\nu$. Existence issues can again be resolved via an appeal to Ky Fan's inequality since the bifunctions F, F^ν are clearly convex in v , non-negative on the diagonal, i.e., $F(x, x) \geq 0$ on $C \times C$ and $F^\nu(x, x) \geq 0$ on $C^\nu \times C^\nu$, and upper semicontinuous in x as follows immediately from the properties of sup-projection [38] when the mappings S, S^ν are outer semicontinuous. Convergence of the maxinf-points and the approximate solutions (ε -maxinf-points) will follow from the results in §3, if we come up with conditions under which the lop-convergence of the bifunctions F^ν to F is, not just ancillary tight, but actually tight.

10.1 Theorem (convergence of the fixed points of set-valued mappings). *Consider the (set-valued) fixed points problems described above and their associated bifunctions F and F^ν . If the sets $C^\nu \rightarrow C$ and the osc mappings S^ν converge graphically to S , i.e., $\operatorname{gph} S^\nu \rightarrow \operatorname{gph} S$, then the bifunctions F^ν lop-converge tightly to F . Consequently, for any $\varepsilon_\nu \searrow 0$, any cluster point of a sequence of ε_ν -maxinf points is a maxinf-point of F and every fixed point of the limit problem is the limit of approximate fixed points of the approximating problems.*

Proof. Since C is compact and convex, it follows that for ν sufficiently large, the sets C^ν must lie in a bounded region [33, Corollary 4.12]. We proceed as if this is the case for all ν . This implies, Lemma 9.1, that the ranges of the mappings S and S^ν are uniformly bounded. Hence, verifying 3.2(a-t) and 3.2(b-t) really comes down to checking 3.2(a) and 3.2(b).

For any sequences $v^\nu \in C^\nu \rightarrow v \in C$ and $x^\nu \in C^\nu \rightarrow x \in C$, since $\text{gph } S^\nu \rightarrow \text{gph } S$, the functions

$$g^\nu(z) = \langle x^\nu - v^\nu, z - x^\nu \rangle \text{ defined on } S^\nu(x^\nu) \subset C^\nu$$

hypo-converge tightly to

$$g(z) = \langle x - v, z - x \rangle \text{ defined on } S(x) \subset C.$$

We can apply [25, Theorem 2] and with $z^\nu \in \text{argmax } g^\nu$ —recall that $S^\nu(x^\nu)$ is compact—, one has $g^\nu(z^\nu) \rightarrow g(\bar{z}) = F(x, v)$ where $\bar{z}$ is any cluster point of the sequence $\{z^\nu\}_{\nu \in N}$. Whence, both 3.2(a) and 3.2(b) are satisfied now implying that the bifunctions F^ν lop-converge tightly to F and the full implications of Theorem 3.2, Theorem 3.3 and its Corollary 3.4 are available. $\square$

10.2 Example (fattening up a function with a fixed point). *This problem was brought to our attention by Jong-Shi Pang in connection with his work, and that of his collaborators, on cognitive radio games [29, 34, 18]. Let $F : C \rightarrow C$ be continuous on C a nonempty convex compact subset of $\mathbb{R}^n$ such a mapping has, at least, one fixed point, say $\bar{x} \in C$, Theorem 6.1. What are the conditions under which one can ‘fatten up’ F , say $F^\varepsilon : C \rightrightarrows C$, such that their fixed points as $\varepsilon \searrow 0$ will converge to those of F , and in particular, to $\bar{x}$.*

Detail. It’s easy to see that one can’t proceed arbitrarily. A minimal requirement is to make sure that these mappings $\{F^\varepsilon : C \rightrightarrows \mathbb{R}^n, \varepsilon \searrow 0\}$ are outer semicontinuous (osc) in order to guarantee the existence of fixed points, as well as approximate fixed points. One might be tempted to require, in fact, that these mappings are continuous, i.e., are also inner semicontinuous, so as to be able to appeal to a ‘generalized’ implicit function theorem. However, this a pretty strong requirement, not well suited to the applications [29]. Let’s take for granted that are we only referring to $0 < \varepsilon \leq \bar{\varepsilon} < \infty$. Then, these mappings $\{F^\varepsilon\}_{\varepsilon > 0}$ are uniformly locally bounded, in fact, their range is (uniformly) bounded. This brings us in the reach of the previous theorem which tells us that if the fattened up mapping graphically converge to F as $\varepsilon \searrow 0$, we are assured that any sequence of fixed points of the mappings F^ε will cluster to a fixed point of F . Moreover, via Corollary 3.4, one can always find a sequence of approximate fixed points of the mappings F^ε that converges to $\bar{x}$. $\square$

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