Third-Party Opportunism and the (In)Efficiency of Public Contracts

Abstract

The lack of exibility in public procurement design and implementation reflects public agents' political risk adaptation to limit hazards from opportunistic third parties--political opponents, competitors, interest groups--while externalizing the associated adaptation costs to the public at large. Reduced exibility limits the likelihood of opportunistic challenge lowering third parties' expected gains and increasing litigation costs. We provide a comprehensible theoretical framework with empirically testable predictions.

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Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
Jul 29, 2012
Accession Number
ADA581956

Entities

People

  • Marian W. Moszoro
  • Pablo T. Spiller

Organizations

  • University of California, Berkeley

Tags

Communities of Interest

  • Biomedical

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Acquisition
  • Business Administration
  • California
  • Commerce
  • Contractors
  • Contracts
  • Distribution Functions
  • Economics
  • Employment
  • Governments
  • Law
  • Management Personnel
  • Military Acquisition
  • Political Science
  • Procurement
  • Public Administration
  • Public Policy

Readers

  • Agent-Based Social Robotics and Mobile-Assisted Learning in Virtual Environments.
  • Economics
  • Theoretical Analysis.