Stable Structures of Coalitions in Competitive and Altruistic Military Teams
Abstract
In heterogeneous battlefield teams, the balance between team and individual objectives forms the basis for the internal topological structure of teams. The team structure is studied by presenting a graphical coalitional game (GCG) with Positional Advantage (PA). PA is Shapley value strengthened by the Axioms of value. The notion of team and individual objectives is studied by defining altruistic and competitive contribution made by an individual; altruistic and competitive contributions made by an agent are components of its total or marginal contribution. Moreover, the paper examines the dynamic team effects, by defining three online sequential decision games. These sequential decision games are based on marginal, competitive and altruistic contributions of the individuals towards team. The stable graphs under these sequential decision games are studied and found to be any connected, complete, or tree respectively.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Mar 17, 2013
- Accession Number
- ADA582590
Entities
People
- Dariusz Mikulski
- Edward Gu
- F. L. Lewis
- Gregory R. Hudas
- M. Aurangzeb
Organizations
- United States Army Tank Automotive Research, Development and Engineering Center