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THESIS

GROUNDING THE UNDERGROUND

by

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June 2013

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GROUNDING THE UNDERGROUND

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ABSTRACT

The majority of the doctrine currently published by the U.S. Army Special Operations Command intended to guide operators in conducting Unconventional Warfare (UW) focuses overwhelmingly on training and employing a “guerrilla force.” But how are these guerrillas recruited and, once enlisted, how are they equipped, paid, and sustained? The answer for successful guerrilla movements in the past has been a well organized resistance underground. In this thesis I will examine the underground movements that provided UW resistance fighters during two wars; the three underground movements in the Philippines that continued to fight Japan between MacArthur’s hasty departure and triumphant return and the resistance movement in South Vietnam that vexed American forces between the partitioning of the country in 1954 until the U.S. departure in 1974.

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I. INTRODUCTION

The most important guiding principle for our early activities was armed propaganda [by armed units] ...political activities were more important than military activities. Fighting was less important than agit-prop work. Armed activities were used to safeguard, consolidate, and develop the political bases.

—Vo Nguyen Giap

A. SCOPE AND SIGNIFICANCE

The majority of the doctrine currently published by the U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) intended to guide operators in conducting Unconventional Warfare (UW) focuses overwhelmingly on training and employing a “guerrilla force.”¹ But how are these guerrillas recruited and, once enlisted, how are they equipped, paid, and sustained? The answer for successful guerrilla movements in the past has been a well organized resistance underground. In this thesis, I will examine the underground movements that provided UW resistance fighters during two wars; the three underground movements in the Philippines that continued to fight Japan between MacArthur’s hasty departure and triumphant return and the resistance movement in South Vietnam that vexed counterinsurgent forces between the partitioning of the country in 1954 until the U.S. departure in 1973.

A literature review demonstrates a range of substantive guidance in unconventional warfare doctrine in the development of an underground. History offers a depth of work regarding successful underground movements, and in some cases specific doctrine and regulations for the establishment of cells and committees. Social science also offers substantive analysis of resource and population mobilization as well as analysis of successful organizational practices in underground movements. This thesis

¹ Department of Defense, Headquarters, Department of the Army, Training Circular 18–01 Special Forces Unconventional Warfare (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2008). See also Field Manual 3–05.130 Army Special Operations Forces Unconventional Warfare (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2008).

proposes to help bridge the gap between doctrine and academia by reviewing the role of the underground movements in these two conflicts.

B. METHODOLOGY

I will begin with a review of U.S. Army doctrine in the development of an underground, from the inception of USASOC until present. The thesis will then move on to a brief review of the body of literature concerning the underground, followed by a review of social movement theory. The intent behind this review is to develop a theoretical foundation from which to add or subtract practices and theory, as the research indicates.

I will then review two historical case studies: the National Liberation Front in South Vietnam from its creation by the communist party of North Vietnam in 1960 until the Tet offensive in 1968, and the resistance movement in the Philippines from approximately 1942 until the U.S. and Philippine re-conquest of the islands in 1945.

Finally, I will present a synthesis of organizational and operational practices in the development of an underground with a recommendation for structure and planning.

II. UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE IN U.S. ARMY DOCTRINE COMPARED AND CONTRASTED WITH CLASSIC AND MODERN SOURCES, AND SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY

This chapter will first review current U.S. doctrine in Unconventional Warfare (UW) for potential strengths and weaknesses in the organization, sustainment, and employment of underground movements. It will then compare those shortfalls with notable works by unconventional warriors such as Mao Tse-Tung, Vo Nguyen Giap, and Vladimir Lenin, as well as the work of social movement theory thinkers, such as Doug McAdam and Sydney Tarrow. The current doctrine underspecifies the role and importance of mass organizations and security and recruitment in underground organizations. Social movement theory offers a conceptual framework for how to build resistance networks in authoritarian regimes or under foreign occupation that may supplement the missing pieces in doctrine. This chapter will conclude by proposing three essential tasks to be performed, across five phases of underground activity.

A. CURRENT U.S. DOCTRINE

Current, published UW doctrine is encompassed in Field Manual (FM) 3–05–130, Army Special Operations Forces Unconventional Warfare, and Training Circular (TC) 18–01, Special Forces Unconventional Warfare. Both works are largely derivative of Andrew Molnar’s work.² Both the FM and the TC draw heavily from Molnar’s work in an attempt to make a large field of research manageable for the military professional. However, both inadequately capture the conclusions of the original research. The differences between the two lie in their respective fundamental approaches to unconventional warfare. Whereas Molnar focuses on the development of the underground prior to the emergence of a guerrilla force, current doctrine assumes the existence of a guerrilla force and focuses on that element as the primary vehicle for unconventional warfare. In doing so, doctrine provides only a cursory examination of underground

² Andrew Molnar’s first work, *Human Factors Considerations of Undergrounds in Insurgencies* is an expansion of his earlier work, *Undergrounds in Insurgency, Revolutionary, and Resistance Warfare*. *Human Factors Considerations of Undergrounds in Insurgencies* was published in 1966 as Department of the Army Pamphlet No. 550–104, since superseded by the current TC 18–01 and FM 3–05–130.

functions such as operational cells and shadow governments in order to focus more fully on the guerrilla.³ This chapter will briefly review the two manuals, underground theory, and social movement theory. Ultimately this review will suggest a more complete review of the organization and functions of the underground in a resistance movement.

1. Definitions

In arriving at a common operational guideline, a set of criteria defining the underground is necessary. Molnar defines the underground as “those clandestine or covert organizational elements of a subversive or insurgent movement which are attempting to weaken, modify, or replace an existing governing authority.”⁴ Historically, the U.S. military has conducted UW alongside partisans or guerrillas in countries occupied by enemy states,⁵ as purposeful underground provocateurs in enemy territory,⁶ and as organizers of underground subversion in other states.⁷ It is the latter that this work will focus upon. In doing so, definitions for UW and the underground will be covered.

a. Unconventional Warfare

The 10th Special Forces Group was formed in 1952 and drew from the Jedburgh and OSS experiences in Europe during the Second World War.⁸ The Special

³ A specific example of this is Figure 2–2. Structure of an Insurgency or Resistance Movement on page 2–4 of TC 18–01. The figure depicts the functions of the underground as actions supporting large and minor guerrilla actions. This figure is a maladaptive reprisal of Molnar’s Figure 1–1. Covert and Overt Functions of the Underground on page 6 of Human Factors Considerations of Undergrounds in Insurgencies, which simply delineates between clandestine and overt activities without placing an emphasis on any one function. The effect of the TC’s version of the figure is to place primacy on guerrilla action as the ultimate output of unconventional warfare. The focus on the guerrilla in unconventional warfare is counterproductive in the context of Admiral Olson’s definition as the first two effects of unconventional warfare activities, coerce and disrupt, do not necessarily require a guerrilla force to emerge.

⁴ Andrew Molnar, *Human Factors Considerations in Underground Insurgencies* (Washington, DC: American University Center for Research in Social Systems, 1966), 1.

⁵ R. W. Volckmann, *We Remained: Three Years Behind the Enemy Lines in the Philippines* (New York: WW Norton & Company, 1954).

⁶ Thomas K. Adams, *U.S. Special Operations Forces in Action: The Challenge of Unconventional Warfare* (London, UK: Frank Cass Publishers, 1998), 27–51.

⁷ Kermit Roosevelt, *Counter Coup: the Struggle for the Control of Iran* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1979).

⁸ Thomas K. Adams, “U.S. Special Operations Forces in Action: The Challenge of Unconventional Warfare,” (London, UK: Frank Cass Publishers, 1998), 54–55.

Forces Group was initially intended to be a covert force for developing and employing anti-Soviet resistance in Eastern Europe, in the event of war.⁹ Throughout Vietnam and the Cold War both the definitions and associated tasks have changed to place emphasis on various combinations of tasks from raids¹⁰ to advisory missions.¹¹ Currently, Special Operations Command is functioning under the definition from Admiral Olson's UW working group:

Activities conducted to enable resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt or overthrow an occupying power or government by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary and guerrilla force in a denied area.¹²

The focus that doctrine places on the guerrilla in unconventional warfare is counterproductive in the context of Admiral Olson's definition as the first two effects of unconventional warfare activities, coerce and disrupt, do not necessarily require a guerrilla force to emerge. Rather than place emphasis on the guerrilla, unconventional warfare needs would be better met with a sponsor-centric, mission-specific force team that is indigenous movement oriented.

b. The Underground

Special Operations Forces (SOF) doctrine defines the underground as an organization that operates in areas denied to the guerrilla force, or conducts operations not suitable for guerrilla forces.¹³ The definition includes the guerrilla force without specifying a role for the underground when in fact the guerrilla force need not emerge at all to accomplish coercion or disruption. The definition disregards Mao's writings on the

⁹ Thomas K. Adams, "U.S. Special Operations Forces in Action: The Challenge of Unconventional Warfare," (London, UK: Frank Cass Publishers, 1998), 54.

¹⁰ Lucien S. Vandenbroucke, *Perilous Options: Special Operations as an Instrument of U.S. Foreign Policy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993)136.

¹¹ Cecil E. Bailey, "OPATT: The U.S. Army SF Advisors in El Salvador," in *Special Warfare* , December 2004.

¹² UW Definition Working Group Out-brief, U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School. April 9, 2009. Admiral Olson added to the definition by asserting that UW was bigger "...that UW is bigger than SOF and bigger than DoD. Other agencies of government also perform many 'activities' of UW."

¹³ Department of Defense, Headquarters, Department of the Army, Training Circular 18-01 Special Forces Unconventional Warfare (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2008), Glossary-4.

necessity of organizing the “sea,”¹⁴ and suggests that the underground is a secondary effort. In *Basic Tactics*, Mao does not specifically define the underground, rather assigns the guerrilla leader and political officer the task of mobilizing the people into associations, professional organizations, and “resist-the-enemy” associations for the purpose of supplementing guerrilla capacity.¹⁵ Vo Nguyen Giap was more specific in defining the political force as the organization of workers and peasants that was the mainstay of the political war in the denied area. He further describes this force as the basis for the emergence of the revolutionary forces.¹⁶ In Giap’s description, once the underground is developed then the guerrilla emerges. Molnar’s definition combines the two, and will be used in this thesis:

An **underground** is defined as those clandestine or covert organizational elements of a subversive or insurgent movement which are attempting to weaken, modify, or replace an existing governing authority.¹⁷

Current doctrine describes the underground as one of three parts to the resistance or insurgency which includes the auxiliary and the guerrilla force. Many successful resistance movements suggest that the underground is the initial organization from which later organizations are formed.¹⁸

Put differently, the underground is arguably the mainstay of resistance. It is inherently self-sustaining as it is comprised of the local people in a given area. It is capable of drawing on all elements of the population, for what they have to offer. The

¹⁴ Mao Tse Tung, *On Guerrilla Warfare* (Griffith translation, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1961), 66. “The guerrilla must move among the people as a fish swims in the sea.”

¹⁵ Ibid., 55–56.

¹⁶ Vo Nguyen Giap, *Vo Nguyen Giap: Selected Writings* (Hanoi: The Gioi Publishers, 1994), 238–240.

¹⁷ Andrew Molnar, *Human Factors Considerations in Underground Insurgencies* (Washington, DC: American University Center for Research in Social Systems, 1966), 17.

¹⁸ Examples of this include the development of the National Socialist Party in Germany through the 1920s and 1930s, and the Polish Catholic resistance movements from the 1950s through the Solidarity movement, discussed in chapters three and four in *Social Movements and Networks* (2003). In Chapter one of *Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach* (2004), Hafez discusses the migration of portions of the Islamic Salvation Front to the radical Armed Islamic Group. In chapters three and four of *Poor People’s Movements: Why they Succeed and How they Fail* (1979), Piven and Cloward discuss many examples of workers and minorities organizing clandestinely as a precursor to organized political contention. In RAND publication *Sharp Dressed Men: Peru’s Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement* (1993), McCormick discusses the development of cadre and the underground prior the emergence of the guerrilla.

underground can work through overt as well as covert organizations to gain support for the movement, and is capable of infiltrating existing institutions of government for the purpose of subversion. When the opportunity to create a guerrilla force presents itself, the guerrilla force will emerge from, be supported by, and feed intelligence through the underground.¹⁹

2. Seven Phases

Current UW doctrine offers a “seven phased” approach to operational planning: preparation, initial contact, infiltration, organization, build up, employment, and transition.²⁰ However, the UW phases discussed in current doctrine generally underspecify the importance of how to organize the underground. Therefore, I rely on three notable irregular warfare thinkers, Lenin, Mao, and Giap, to synthesize a more underground centric approach to UW planning.

Lenin’s work preceded both Mao’s and Giap’s, and is more focused on the political education of the workers and subsequent violent revolution. His interpretation of Marx and Engels led him to advocate, “By educating the workers party, Marxism educates the vanguard of the proletariat...”²¹ the idea being that by raising political consciousness, workers would be able to look past “narrow trade union interests” and take control of state production capability, causing the state to “wither away” from lack of purpose.²² By directing ‘ “Social Democrats” ‘ to educate themselves as revolutionary vanguards, Lenin sought to send out the intelligentsia as a vanguard, or cadre, to raise the political consciousness of the proletariat. The demonstrations and strikes of the working

¹⁹ Andrew R. Molnar, *Undergrounds in Insurgent, Revolutionary, and Resistance Warfare* (Washington, DC: American University, 1963), 40.

²⁰ Department of Defense, Headquarters, Department of the Army, Training Circular 18–01 Special Forces Unconventional Warfare (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2008), 1–9.

²¹ Vladimir Lenin, *State and Revolution: The Marxist Theory of the State and the Tasks of the Proletariat in the Revolution* (Moscow, Russia: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1952), Kindle edition, location 350.

²² *Ibid.*, 289–318.

class will only be successful, argues Lenin, if the workers are given political education and led by this vanguard.²³

Organizationally, Lenin advocated that the vanguard infiltrate other labor and mass organizations that may not be strictly socialist, gain control through covert membership, and manipulate those organizations through the use of united fronts against the state.²⁴ Mao and Giap agree with Lenin in the application of guerrilla warfare; that it is an inevitable phase in an insurgency, that it must be controlled and disciplined to avoid hurting the people, and that it should be replaced with conventional fighting when possible.²⁵

Mao Tse Tung's *On Guerrilla Warfare* was less concerned with phases of operation, and more concerned with the development of national unity in opposition to Imperial Japan.²⁶ To that end, he discussed the guerrilla force in two different manners. First, purely military aspects of guerrilla operations would grow into a regular force. The regular, mobile army would eventually produce victory, and the guerrilla operations would assist them in doing so.²⁷ Second, the guerrilla effort was inherently political. "Without a political goal," writes Mao, "guerrilla warfare must fail."²⁸ The political goal of the guerrilla must be compatible with the goals and desires of the people, in order to gain their participation in the guerrilla effort.²⁹

In developing the political war, Mao assigned three fundamental tasks. First, there must be spiritual unification between the officers and the men, and then between the army and the people. By contrast, the unification of the enemy forces must be

²³ Vladimir Lenin, "What is to be Done" in *V. I. Lenin: Collected Works Volume 5, May 1901 – February 1902* (Moscow, Russia: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1961), 347.

²⁴ Vladimir Lenin, "'Left Wing Communism' – an Infantile Disorder" in *V. I. Lenin: Collected Works Volume 31, April – December 1920* (Moscow, Russia: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1966), 17.

²⁵ Vladimir Lenin, "Guerrilla Warfare" in *V. I. Lenin: Collected Works Volume 11, June 1906 – January 1907* (Moscow, Russia: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1962), 213.

²⁶ Mao Tse-Tung, *On Guerrilla Warfare* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1961), 42–43.

²⁷ Mao Tse-Tung, *On Guerrilla Warfare* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1961), 56.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 43.

²⁹ *Ibid.*

destroyed.³⁰ In this model for political war, the officers undertake to educate the soldiers in the political aspects of the war. The guerrilla cannot be against the Japanese because he is in the militia; he must be in the militia because he is anti-Japanese.³¹ With that level of political conviction, the soldiers will be disciplined by strength of conviction rather than fear of punishment. The army then must undertake to spread the same political conviction among the people through education and disciplined behavior. In this manner, the “sea” of the people becomes hospitable to the “fish,” or guerrilla.³²

Vo Nguyen Giap’s resistance theory is an application of Lenin’s work to his situation and goals in Vietnam. This was an expansion of Ho Chi Minh’s *The Road to Revolution*, which applied Lenin’s writings to the problem of colonialism in Asia, with emphasis placed on the peasant farmer rather than the proletariat.³³ Giap focuses more attention on building unity among the people to create mass organizations, and has two additional phases of psychological preparation compared to Mao’s three, prefacing organization with varying degrees of psychological preparation of the people and organizing people into “mass organizations” before admitting them into “the party.”³⁴

From the above discussion, we can present Molnar’s five phases of revolution as a synthesis of Lenin, Mao, and Vo Nguyen Giap’s various principles of underground mobilization:

1. Clandestine organization
2. Psychological offensive
3. Expansion
4. Militarization
5. Consolidation

³⁰ Mao Tse-Tung, *On Guerrilla Warfare* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1961), 90.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 88–89.

³² *Ibid.*, 90–93.

³³ William J. Duiker, *The Communist Road to Power in Vietnam* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1981), 16–21.

³⁴ Vo Nguyen Giap, *Vo Nguyen Giap: Selected Writings* (Hanoi: The Gioi Publishers, 1994), 238–240.

The above framework suggests three essential tasks to build and sustain underground organizations: establishing a professional cadre, the establishment and operation of covert cells, and the development of mass organizations. These three tasks will be further developed by drawing upon by drawing key concepts from social movement theory and synthesizing the two.

B. THREE TASKS

1. Establishing a Cadre

Lenin argues was that spontaneous demonstrations and strikes were not sufficient to bring about change on their own, that the mass of workers were not capable of achieving class consciousness from within, and would need it brought to them from without. “The principle thing, of course,” argues Lenin, “is propaganda and agitation among all strata of the people.”³⁵ The need for a trained cadre to agitate among the masses was recognized and adopted by Giap³⁶ and the Shining Path’s Abimael Guzman³⁷ in their programs for training cadre prior to sending them to agitate among the people. In an underground, the selection and education of a cadre in the subversive doctrine becomes necessary before further development can be achieved.

The cadre must be trained to target the masses with a specific application of the resistance narrative, as it applies to them:

We should go to the masses and learn from them, synthesize their experience into better, articulated principles and methods, then do propaganda among the masses, and call upon them to put these principles and methods into practice so as to solve their problems and help them achieve liberation and happiness.³⁸

³⁵ Vladimir Lenin, “What is to be Done” in *V. I. Lenin: Collected Works Volume 5, May 1901 – February 1902* (Moscow, Russia: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1961), 422–425.

³⁶ Vo Nguyen Giap, *Vo Nguyen Giap: Selected Writings* (Hanoi: The Gioi Publishers, 1994), 224.

³⁷ Simon Strong, *Shining Path: Terror and Revolution in Peru* (New York: Times Books, 1992), 3–23.

³⁸ Mao Tse-Tung, *Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse Tung* (Peking, China: Foreign Languages Press, Second Edition, 1966), Kindle edition, location 1179. From “Get Organized!” (November 29, 1943) *Selected Works*, Vol III, 158.

By “going among the masses” the operator is able to conduct a census of local grievances, and incorporate it into the resistance narrative. This enables the underground to “do propaganda among the masses” in a manner that resonates with the targeted demographic. A narrative with strong resonance will increase the likelihood that the population will respond to the underground’s call to action.

In developing the “experiences of the masses” into a subversive doctrine, Snow and Benford’s three core framing tasks provide a comprehensive framework to identify essential components of narrative.³⁹ The first task is diagnostic framing, in which the narrative should assign blame for a particular problem or problems to a specific actor or actors.⁴⁰ The second task is prognostic framing, in which a strategy for addressing the problem is laid out.⁴¹ Lastly, the motivational frame should issue a call to arms in which the target audience is called upon to take action.⁴² A narrative successfully framed in this manner should have a degree of mobilizing effect among the desired population when it is central to the belief system of the target audience.⁴³ A low degree of centrality can be mitigated by broadening the range of the frame to include other items within the belief system of the audience.⁴⁴ A broad list of interrelated items within the belief system, and a master frame that has high centrality should result in a frame with high resonance among the target audience.⁴⁵

When cadres have been trained in how to formulate a resistance narrative, they must be dispersed into different communities to establish an underground. Cadres, as individual activists or in small groups, are what Helmut Anheier referred to as movement entrepreneurs. A movement entrepreneur’s goal is to establish, expand, and ultimately

³⁹ David A. Snow and Robert D. Benford, “Ideology, Frame Resonance, and Participant Mobilization,” *International Social Movement Research* 1 (1988): 199.

⁴⁰ Ibid., 200.

⁴¹ Ibid., 201.

⁴² Ibid., 201–201.

⁴³ Ibid., 205.

⁴⁴ David A. Snow and Robert D. Benford, “Ideology, Frame Resonance, and Participant Mobilization,” *International Social Movement Research* 1 (1988): 205–206.

⁴⁵ Ibid., 206–207.

maximize movement operations at his or her level.⁴⁶ In the case discussed by Anheier, single members of the National Socialist Party in Germany went to communities without party chapters, and embedded themselves in existing social networks and organizations. Embeddedness in this sense is the degree to which cadre can infiltrate existing social networks in a given community. Cadre embedded in this way enjoy a degree of influence within the community that corresponds to the degree they are embedded.⁴⁷

Similarly, Lenin proposed that the social democrats leave their study circles and go out “... among all classes of the population” as theoreticians, as propagandists, as agitators, and as organizers.”⁴⁸ Cadre dispersed and embedded in this fashion can begin developing trust based relationships and locally dense network structures.⁴⁹ Trust based relationships will enable the cadre member to align the frame of the underground to the local target audience more effectively, and will give him greater credibility. Locally dense networks will allow the cadre member to connect his network hub with those of other cadres, creating structures for greater resource mobilization.⁵⁰

2. Cells and Security

The basic unit of the underground is the cell, it typically has three to five members, and performs one of four functions: operations, intelligence, recruiting and vetting, and manufactory.⁵¹ Operational cells perform specific underground functions, such as delivering propaganda, facilitating contentious politics, terrorism, collecting

⁴⁶ Anheier, Helmut “Movement Development and Organizational Networks: The Role of ‘Single Members’ in the German Nazi Party, 1925–1930.” In *Social Movements and Networks*, ed. Mario Diani and Doug McAdam, (Oxford, NY: Oxford University Press, 2003), 53.

⁴⁷ Anheier, Helmut “Movement Development and Organizational Networks: The Role of ‘Single Members’ in the German Nazi Party, 1925–1930.” In *Social Movements and Networks*, edited by Mario Diani and Doug McAdam, (Oxford, NY: Oxford University Press, 2003), 49–71.

⁴⁸ Vladimir Lenin, “What is to be Done” in *V. I. Lenin: Collected Works Volume 5, May 1901–February 1902* (Moscow, Russia: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1961), 422–425.

⁴⁹ Doowan Lee, “A Social Movement Theory Approach to Unconventional Warfare” unpublished draft, forthcoming in *Special Warfare Magazine* 26 (2013).

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ Andrew Molnar, *Human Factors Considerations in Underground Insurgencies* (Washington, DC: American University Center for Research in Social Systems, 1966), 6–14.

money, or political warfare tasks.⁵² In *The Theory of Unconventional Warfare: Win, Lose, and Draw*, authors Diver and DeFeyter conclude that in the beginning of developing an insurgency the focus is on maintaining security and using mobilizing structures to expand the organization.⁵³ Security at this stage of organization is maintained by creating layers of compartmentalized cells that control information.⁵⁴

Security can be enhanced by establishing cells within pre-existing trust-based networks. Mobilizing structures are “formal and informal collective vehicles through which people mobilize and engage in collective action.”⁵⁵ These structures can be informal or formal networks through which regular affairs are conducted, or structures created for a specific purpose.⁵⁶ Cells within existing social networks can utilize trust-based relations such as friendship or kinship, lowering the cost of mobilization, and facilitating expansion.⁵⁷ Interpersonal relations between networks also facilitates resource mobilization, particularly in areas experiencing a great degree of state imposed order, or repression. According to Osa, in closed regimes social networks provide information about the conduct of illicit activity; what official can be bribed, for instance. Because of this sort of situation, social networks function as both “media” and mobilization organization.⁵⁸ By using pre-existing social networks this way, movement entrepreneurs can lower the information and transaction cost of resource mobilization.

⁵² Andrew Molnar, *Human Factors Considerations in Underground Insurgencies* (Washington, DC: American University Center for Research in Social Systems, 1966), 6–14.

⁵³ William “Dave” Driver and Bruce E. DeFeyter *The Theory of Unconventional Warfare: Win, Lose, and Draw* (Monterey, CA: NPS Press, 2008), 13. The authors cite Doug McAdams, McCarthy, & Zald, (2008), 3.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ Doowan Lee, “A Social Movement Theory Approach to Unconventional Warfare” unpublished draft, forthcoming in *Special Warfare Magazine* 26 (2013).

⁵⁶ Sydney G. Tarrow, *Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 157–169.

⁵⁷ Helmut Anheier, “Movement Development and Organizational Networks: The Role of ‘Single Members’ in the German Nazi Party, 1925–1930.” In *Social Movements and Networks*, edited by Mario Diani and Doug McAdam, (Oxford, NY: Oxford University Press, 2003), 53.

⁵⁸ Maryjane Osa “Networks in Opposition: Linking Organizations Through Activists in the Polish People’s Republic.” In *Social Movements and Networks*, ed. Mario Diani and Doug McAdam (Oxford, NY: Oxford University Press, 2003), 77–104.

They can also maximize participation by manipulating the same social networks for event turn-out.⁵⁹

As cadres expand network clusters and form cells, security is enhanced by reducing risk to the individual. Risk is reduced by diffusing the tasks that make up a given illicit activity among the members of a network of cells. This also contributes to the development of a collective identity as members share in the risk of the illicit activity.⁶⁰

3. Mass Organizations, Social Networks, and Buffering

Lenin proposes that the use of mass organizations would increase subversive activity and decrease risk to the individual.⁶¹ Further, the mass organizations act as a legal auxiliary cell so that citizens not yet ready for subversive work or party membership might be included in the insurgency or at the very least prevented from supporting the state. As members of the mass organization are gradually involved in increasingly illicit or subversive activities, they are identified by cadre members and moved deeper into the underground. In this sense, the mass organization has a “transmission belt” function that recruits potential underground cadre.⁶²

In establishing security for itself, the overt branch of the underground has two key tasks: taking on buffering organizations that can be used to absorb repression, and sustaining itself with popular support and new members. Buffer organizations are those

⁵⁹ Helmut Anheier “Movement Development and Organizational Networks: The Role of ‘Single Members’ in the German Nazi Party, 1925–1930.” In *Social Movements and Networks*, edited by Mario Diani and Doug McAdam, (Oxford, NY: Oxford University Press, 2003), 49–54.

⁶⁰ Maryjane Osa “Networks in Opposition: Linking Organizations Through Activists in the Polish People’s Republic.” In *Social Movements and Networks*, ed. Mario Diani and Doug McAdam (Oxford, NY: Oxford University Press, 2003), 78–79. While risk rises in correlation to activity, the risk to the individual is reduced as illicit workload is spread.

⁶¹ Michael Conley, *The Communist Insurgent Infrastructure in South Vietnam: A Study of Organization and Strategy*, (Washington, DC: Center for Research in Social Systems, The American University, 1966), 77–79.

⁶² Michael Conley, *The Communist Insurgent Infrastructure in South Vietnam: A Study of Organization and Strategy*, (Washington, DC: Center for Research in Social Systems, The American University, 1966), 224.

social or political networks that attract the attention and resources of the state away from more mainstream groups.⁶³

Coalitions of organizations may be created from existing groups, when ideologically neutral groups act as brokers between groups with conflicting ideologies. An example of this is the radical youth and nationalist groups in Poland from 1976 to 1981. Groups with greatly differing ideologies were able to coalesce over civic action oriented groups, developing a focus on humanitarianism in the center of the organization. This allowed the liberal left and conservative right, as well as radical youth and nationalists, to work together. Being the most threatening, the radical youth and nationalists groups attracted government repression, moving it away from the main resistance network.⁶⁴

Attracting buffer organizations and generating new membership is done by creating an increase in public support for the underground. In the RAND study *Understanding and Influencing Public Support for Insurgency and Terrorism*, the authors demonstrate how effectively insurgencies generate public support. In the study, organization effectiveness has several subfactors: leadership, ideological packaging, presence of leadership and the ability of the organization to take action and mobilize resources.⁶⁵ These subfactors can be a guide to the movement entrepreneur at the community level in many ways, primarily in that the continuous presence of cadre at the community level is critical. First, the presence of cadre members in the community allows the narrative of resistance to be packaged with the local population in mind. Second, cadre can take advantage of opportunities for resource mobilization or political contention. Third, community level cadre can tailor underground action and development to local conditions, such as the presence or absence of state security forces.

⁶³ Maryjane Osa “Networks in Opposition: Linking Organizations Through Activists in the Polish People’s Republic.” In *Social Movements and Networks*, ed. Mario Diani and Doug McAdam (Oxford, NY: Oxford University Press, 2003.), 101.

⁶⁴ Maryjane Osa “Networks in Opposition: Linking Organizations Through Activists in the Polish People’s Republic.” In *Social Movements and Networks*, ed. Mario Diani and Doug McAdam (Oxford, NY: Oxford University Press, 2003.), 101.

⁶⁵ Paul K. Davis et al., *Understanding and Influencing Public Support for Insurgency and Terrorism* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2012), 25–28.

Cadres that are embedded in social networks can conduct bloc recruiting during the execution of the third task. Embedded cadre use trust relationships to recruit or convert existing organizations into the underground. The recruited organization brings with it resources and behavioral norms that members are socialized to and transfer them to the underground organization. This allows the underground organization to appear as though it had always been a part of local civil society.⁶⁶ The advantage to bloc recruiting is convincing key communicators or decision makers within an organization to advocate for the movement, and organize portions of the population on its behalf. In the case of the network, the individual brings an entire group of people. Cialdini observed that when in doubt people look to the group or community as a whole for a model of correct behavior. The principle of “social proof,” as he calls it has the potential to offer other organizations an opportunity to participate simply because “everyone is doing it.”⁶⁷

When mass organizations are formed, it becomes necessary to take some small actions in order to establish the movement’s credibility and facilitate recruitment. In *Power in Movement*, Sydney Tarrow discusses three broad types of collective action in contentious politics: disruption, violence, and contained behavior.⁶⁸ These three categories offer the practitioner a variety of techniques on a scale that starts with articles and posters, and ends with purposeful violence against targets chosen for psychological reasons. The less violent end of the scale will attract the political activist and mobilize the less radicalized segments of the population and is appropriate for the when coercion is desired.⁶⁹ Purposeful violence will pit the movement against the state’s ability to impose order and will cause the less radical to drift away, leaving the true believers to embrace

⁶⁶ Helmut Anheier “Movement Development and Organizational Networks: The Role of ‘Single Members’ in the German Nazi Party, 1925–1930.” In *Social Movements and Networks*, edited by Mario Diani and Doug McAdam, (Oxford, NY: Oxford University Press, 2003), 52–53.

⁶⁷ Robert B. Cialdini, *Influence, The Psychology of Persuasion* (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1984).

⁶⁸ Sidney G Tarrow, *Power in Movement* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 95.

⁶⁹ Ibid., 103–104.

increasingly radical tactics.⁷⁰ This is appropriate when overthrow is desired. A repertoire of creative disruption and contained behavior that goes beyond leaflets but is limited to protests and scuffles is likely to be the optimal level of action for sustained growth of the organization.⁷¹

Returning to Molnar's phasing for the underground, the three essential tasks take place primarily in the first three phases. In the fourth and fifth phases, the emergence of the guerrilla force is expected. Recruiting and preparing a professional cadre occurs in the organizational phase. The establishment and operation of covert cells occurs in the psychological offensive phase, and the development of mass organizations occurs in the expansion phase. The application of these phases do not need to be uniform across different geographical areas, and may regress from later to phase to an earlier phase dependent upon the state's ability to impose order or otherwise repress the underground.

C. FIVE PHASES

1. Organization

In the organizational phase, four items or events should occur. First, a census⁷² of the area should be taken. Second, the creation of a subversive doctrine based on the census should be created. Third, a carefully vetted, indigenous cadre should be recruited and given training in the subversive doctrine. Fourth, the cadre should be infiltrated into communities.

⁷⁰ Mohammed M. Hafez, "From Marginalization to Massacres: A political Process Explanation of GIA Violence in Algeria" in *Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach*, ed. Quintan Wiktorowicz (Bloomington IN: Indiana University Press, 2004), 40–41. In a review of the experience of the Armed Islamic Group of Algeria, Hafez notes that groups become increasingly exclusive in order to shield themselves from government repression. As groups become increasingly exclusive, there is possibility for an echo chamber effect, in which honest self-appraisal of the group becomes less likely. In the case of the Armed Islamic Group of Algeria the reliance on "brothers" in the group for evaluation of the groups purpose led to increasingly violent action against the civilian population that formerly supported them.

⁷¹ Sidney G Tarrow, *Power in Movement* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 95–118.

⁷² A complete census of an operational area would include segments of the population vulnerable to mobilization, segments of the population that have a vested interest in maintaining the status quo, local grievances, and existing networks and organizations. The Viet Cong employed village survey team to assess the geographical situation, the enemy situation, the mass, or social, situation, and the strength of party members. for example. Andrews, William R. *The Village War* (Colombia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 1973), 45.

A census of the area of operations should reveal a list of existing organizations and social networks, as well as an understanding of local grievances. This should also give the operator an idea of what networks might be subject to infiltration. Using the census, a subversive doctrine should be created that has high resonance among the largest population that is susceptible to mobilization. Members of the targeted segment of the population should be vetted, revealing possible candidates for recruitment as cadre. Once recruited, cadre members should be indoctrinated. Once trained, cadre members should be sent to infiltrate existing social or political organizations. When cadre members have been successfully integrated into existing networks, the psychological offensive should begin.

2. Psychological Offensive

During the psychological offensive three events must occur continuously. First, the embedded cadre member begins recruiting for the underground. Second, cadre members in different communities should begin to connect their networks. Third, the subversive doctrine should be socialized, with varying degrees of intensity.

When the embedded cadre member begins initial recruitment, it is on an interpersonal level and based on trust relationships. The underground is at its most vulnerable in this phase and security is preferred over recruitment. As possible the cadre should recruit underground members and place them into cells. Cells should be compartmentalized, and identities of members known by as few people as possible, for as long as the size of the organization permits. The subversive doctrine should be socialized in a manner that allows the underground to expand but not so much that it attracts state repression. The psychological offensive should transition when cells have expanded to a point that they can accommodate an auxiliary and facilitate contentious politics.

3. Expansion

In this phase, the underground should develop a mass organization that can take on part time members. Part-time members should be led in an appropriate level of political contention in order to develop public support and thereby gain new members and greater notoriety as an organization in opposition to the regime. As the organization

develops public support the underground should begin coordinating with other political and social networks to expand opposition into a united front.

The underground cadre should be monitoring part time members for potential recruitment into the underground. Potential recruits should be gradually given increasingly subversive or illicit tasks to bring them deeper into the underground. When potential recruits are sufficiently engaged in underground activities, the organization should function as a transmission belt and move them deeper into the underground.

As united mass organizations receive more state attention and new members of the underground are recruited, cells should expand into new areas and organizations. New organizations should include cadre infiltration of other organizations in the united front. This phase should end as the local underground cadre gain a measure of control over other organizations in the united front.

4. Militarization

A guerrilla force is formed in this phase, following Mao's theory of strategy in protracted warfare. The guerrilla force is initially defensive, focused on harassment and building force until increasingly ambitious strategies may be realistically followed.⁷³ The underground supports the development of guerrilla warfare by recruiting members through the mass organizations and moving them on to the guerrilla force. Operational cells support the guerrilla force through sabotage in key infrastructure, raiding for or purchasing supplies and establishing caches. Manufactory cells are established in this phase in order to produce necessary items in short supply. Logistical support to guerrilla operations comes from local underground cells.⁷⁴ This phase should end when projecting force into the guerrilla's area becomes excessively costly for the state.

⁷³ Mao Tse Tung, "On Protracted War," in *On Revolution and War*, ed Mostafa Rejal (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Doubleday, inc, 1969), 227–253.

⁷⁴ Andrew R. Molnar, *Undergrounds in Insurgent, Revolutionary, and Resistance Warfare* (Washington, DC: American University, 1963), 32–33.

5. Consolidation

This phase begins when mass organizations begin to exercise more political control over the entire movement. The underground begins to establish shadow governments in response to this demand, using armed guerrillas to enforce its authority. First, as the state's ability to impose order in a given area is reduced, underground members propose that a vote is held for liberation committees and the underground ensures that it is staffed by the underground in "elections." The liberation committee establishes schools, courts, and other symbols of authority under its control in order to bring the population to heel. The shadow governments put reactionaries, corrupt officials, and other elements of an unknown quantity on trial in order to demonstrate that justice is restored and order has been brought about by the underground, as well as to impose the desired amount of control upon the population.⁷⁵

D. SUMMARY

In this chapter, I have reviewed both existing UW doctrine and Andrew Molnar's work on UW for specific practices and identified the underground as the basic organizational element in unconventional warfare. I then reviewed Molnar's five phases of underground development against the writings of Lenin, Mao, and Giap, ultimately concluding that Molnar's five phases were the best framework for underground development. From that review, I concluded that there were three tasks to be completed in order to develop a resilient organization capable of supporting the emergence of a guerrilla force. I then reviewed several prominent works on social movement theory for key concepts that could be used to further develop those three tasks, to be conducted across Molnar's five phased approach to revolution. The case studies in chapters three and four will review the development of underground resistance networks in Vietnam from 1954 to 1974, and in the Philippines during the Japanese occupation in World War II.

⁷⁵ Andrew Molnar, *Human Factors Considerations in Underground Insurgencies* (Washington, DC: American University Center for Research in Social Systems, 1966), 48–53.

III. THE NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT IN SOUTH VIETNAM

A. INTRODUCTION

The National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NLF) employed a methodical template for infiltrating and converting a village into a mobilized force, in a “people’s revolution” against the Government of South Vietnam.⁷⁶ This was done in four phases consisting of clandestine organization building, psychological preparation of the people, expansion of control, and consolidation of power.⁷⁷ This case study demonstrates critical aspects of developing the underground. First, a doctrine for resistance is an effective method for the development of a cohesive structure among existing resistance groups. Second, the development of liberation associations as social networks enables both security and recruitment. Third, agitation-propaganda is an effective tool in support of underground development and population control. Finally, the application of contentious politics and selective violence is also an effective tool in developing and controlling the underground membership.

The chapter begins with a brief historical review of resistance in Vietnam from the partitioning of the country in 1954 until the U.S. departure in 1974, and then review the development of the underground at the village level using Molnar’s five phases of underground development.⁷⁸ In each phase, the expansion of the organizational structure and its capacity for operations is discussed.

⁷⁶ William R. Andrews, *The Village War* (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 1973), 156.

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ Andrew Molnar, *Human Factor Considerations in Underground Insurgencies* (Washington, DC: American University Center for Research in Social Systems, 1966), 16–18. Andrew Molnar’s five phases for protracted war are clandestine organization, psychological offensive, expansion, militarization, and consolidation.

B. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Ho Chi Minh, after studying the work of Lenin in Paris and Moscow, returned to Asia and assisted in the formation of the Revolutionary Youth League in 1925.⁷⁹ Recognizing the need to bring the nationalist and the communist organizations under a single banner, Ho wrote an application of Marx to the question of revolution in Vietnam, and struggled to bring groups together.⁸⁰ In the 1930s, the global economic recession and communist organizers combined to organize workers and peasants, and fan the flames of discontent, resulting in strikes in a series of factories.⁸¹ Strikes in factories spread into the countryside, resulting in demonstrations that escalated into violence and political disorder.⁸² Communist organizers encouraged the creation of village associations to replace local government and the establishment of local militias.⁸³ The French Foreign Legion ultimately put this down with vigor,⁸⁴ but the foundations of underground resistance had been laid.

After the French had been displaced by the Japanese in World War II, a campaign of resistance against the Japanese was initiated in conjunction with operatives from the Office of Strategic Services.⁸⁵ The underground continued to develop following the Japanese occupation of Vietnam. Following the war, the British and Nationalist Chinese were assigned responsibility for managing Vietnam, the Chinese in the north and the British in the south. Whereas the Chinese did not actively repress Viet Minh activity in the north, British forces in the south, under Major General Douglas Gracey, were wont to antagonize the locals by arming French and Japanese to police the peninsula, giving the

⁷⁹ Ibid., 18.

⁸⁰ William J. Duiker, *The Communist Road to Power in Vietnam* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1981), 19–21.

⁸¹ Ibid., 36.

⁸² Ibid., 37.

⁸³ Ibid.

⁸⁴ Ibid., 40.

⁸⁵ Thomas K. Adams, *U.S. Special Operations Forces in Action: The Challenge of Unconventional Warfare* (London, UK: Frank Cass Publishers, 1998), 27–51.

Viet Minh reason to resist.⁸⁶ Viet Minh resistance to the French continued until the 1954 Geneva conference, when fighting was brought to a halt following the French disaster at Dien Bien Phu. Ho Chi Minh summoned the Viet Minh in the south back to Hanoi while negotiations could be undertaken with regards to unification.⁸⁷ These forces would re-infiltrate the south as it became clear that the U.S. and the new Government of South Vietnam were unlikely to allow national unification elections.⁸⁸

In September 1960, the North Vietnamese Third Party Congress created the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NFL) in order to more fully infiltrate South Vietnamese society. This was an effort to disguise the cadre mobilization of the peasantry as a movement organic to South Vietnam. Subsequently, the Viet Minh era Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN) was re-opened as the southern branch of the North Vietnamese Lao Dong (Communist) Party.⁸⁹ Peaceful unification of the Vietnamese peninsula by means of the plebiscite outlined by the Geneva Conference of 1954 was unlikely, and a naked invasion by the north into the south was militarily untenable. Because President Ngo Dinh Diem's political control over the rural population was weak and his ability to impose political order minimal, the political tool chosen by the communist party of North Vietnam was a people's revolution led by communist party cadre. Various cadre members, remnants from resistance to the Japanese and subsequent French occupations, had remained in South Vietnam after the peninsula was split, waiting for the promised plebiscite and potential unification. When it became apparent that the south would refuse to participate in the referendum, these former cadres began organizing

⁸⁶ Robert B. Asprey *War in The Shadow's: The Guerrilla in History* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, Inc, 1975), 676–683.

⁸⁷ Robert B. Asprey *War in The Shadow's: The Guerrilla in History* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, Inc, 1975), 826–827. Not all Viet Minh cadre returned, many remained in the south, took families, and settled in villages. These cadre were later persecuted by the Diem regime and became a part of the early NLF cadre.

⁸⁸ J.J. Zasloff, "Origins of the Insurgency in South Vietnam, 1954–1960: The Role of the Southern Vietminh Cadres," The Rand Corporation (May 1968), 15.
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_memoranda/2008/RM5163.2.pdf (accessed October 24, 2012).

⁸⁹ Central Intelligence Agency, The Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN): It's History, Organization, and Functions (Washington, DC: CIA 1969).
http://www.foia.cia.gov/docs/DOC_0000354548/DOC_0000354548.pdf (accessed October 23, 2012).

along former lines of resistance.⁹⁰ They were joined by cadre from the north in 1959,⁹¹ and organized under the National Liberation Front in 1960.⁹²

The underground organization in the south was conducted under the leadership and direction of the communist party of North Vietnam. The national front organizations, village associations, and other mass or popular organizations in South Vietnam were largely controlled by the communist party.⁹³

C. PHASE ONE: ORGANIZATION

In 1960,⁹⁴ the Lao Dong Party Central Committee had decades of experience with resistance to foreign powers. The Vietnamese had experience rousing the masses in demonstration and uprising, many former Viet Minh, to include Ho Chi Minh, had experience with the U.S. Office of Strategic Services against the Japanese in the 1940s.⁹⁵ The organization already had a sizeable force of trained cadre with experience against the French-Bao Dai government as well as other subversive movements in South Vietnam.⁹⁶

⁹⁰ J. J. Zasloff, "Origins of the Insurgency in South Vietnam, 1954–1960: The Role of The Southern Vietminh Cadres," The Rand Corporation (May 1968), 15.
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_memoranda/2008/RM5163.2.pdf (accessed October 24, 2012).

⁹¹ Ibid.

⁹² Michael Conley, *The Communist Insurgent Infrastructure in South Vietnam: A Study of Organization and Strategy*, (Washington, DC: Center for Research in Social Systems, The American University, 1966), 15–17.

⁹³ Because this chapter is concerned primarily with underground organization, references will be made to the front organization rather than the larger communist apparatus; unless otherwise noted, it is assumed that the guidance and direction originated in North Vietnam.

⁹⁴ Central Intelligence Agency, *The Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN): It's History, Organization, and Functions* (Washington, DC: CIA 1969).
http://www.foia.cia.gov/docs/DOC_0000354548/DOC_0000354548.pdf (accessed October 23, 2012). 1960 was chosen for this case study because that was the year the front organization was formed. The resistance movements that preceded it date back to the 1890s.

⁹⁵ Thomas K. Adams, *U.S. Special Operations Forces in Action: The Challenge of Unconventional Warfare* (London, UK: Frank Cass Publishers, 1998), 27–51.

⁹⁶ Douglas Pike, *Viet Cong: The Organization and Techniques of the National Liberation Front of South Viet Nam* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1966), 43–54.

1. Structural Configuration

The NLF was established as united front organization that was intended to disguise the hand of the North Vietnam based communist party. The front was used to hide a national chain of command for the village and provincial and interprovincial party chapters.⁹⁷

Vertically, the organization was designed along the provincial lines that the Viet Minh had organized the peninsula into during their resistance against the French. The Peninsula was divided into nine inter-zones, again into 44 provinces, and further into villages.⁹⁸ Similarly, the NLF was organized with a central committee, a provincial committee, then district, and then village party chapter.⁹⁹ Within the village, in the organizational phase, the village party chapter consisted of three to five man teams that included a village area specialist who was typically from the general area.

2. Intelligence and Recruitment

The village assessment team would establish a base within a reasonable distance of the village in question. The assessment team would travel to the village to conduct a census and ascertain the geography of the area, regime presence, the village social situation, and potential strength of the party within the village.¹⁰⁰ Subsequent census taking would categorize villagers into one of five demographics, from very poor farmers to rich farmers and landlords. Targeted recruiting for potential party members would follow, with the recruiting pool being divided into six categories: families with relatives in the party, people with family problems, people with debt or legal troubles, lower classes in general, popular young people, and finally, anyone not “burdened” with

⁹⁷ Michael Conley, *The Communist Insurgent Infrastructure in South Vietnam: A Study of Organization and Strategy*, (Washington, DC: Center for Research in Social Systems, The American University, 1966), 15–17.

⁹⁸ Douglas Pike, *Viet Cong: The Organization and Techniques of the National Liberation Front of South Viet Nam* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1966), 46–49.

⁹⁹ Michael Conley, *The Communist Insurgent Infrastructure in South Vietnam: A Study of Organization and Strategy* (Washington, DC: Center for Research in Social Systems, The American University, 1966), 165.

¹⁰⁰ William R. Andrews, *The Village War* (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 1973), 44–45.

education.¹⁰¹ The intent of the census taking was to create a picture of potential party or mass organization members, landlords and wealthy villagers to be dispossessed, and regime representation to be removed from office and punished.¹⁰² The organizational outcome of the census taking was that the cadres were able to create an attractive menu of incentives with which to recruit. Those recruited were obviously those with least amount invested in the current system, by and large the poor and landless. The organization was then able to target the obvious enemy of the people, the wealthy landowners, for selective violence. This effectively removed those who would support the state, and empowered those who had nothing to lose.

Recruiting for the civil affairs committee in the organizational phase was focused very much on quality rather than quantity. The general preference for recruiting was for popular young people who could influence other young people, and the uneducated, whose minds were not “cluttered with incorrect political and social thought.”¹⁰³ Once a small number were recruited to the party, it would represent the party within the village.¹⁰⁴ In this early period, recruiting was focused on “...persuasion, “sweet talk,” and the manipulated, gradual involvement of the youth...”¹⁰⁵ The narrative of independence, nationalism, and communism had what Snow and Benford referred to as a narrative with broad range.¹⁰⁶ That is, the National Liberation 'Front's framing effort was linked to core values that did have high resonance with village youth. In an effort to expand the inclusiveness of the primary narrative, recruiters incorporated other values into the narrative, in this case popularity and the allure of high adventure. This process is

¹⁰¹ William R. Andrews, *The Village War* (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 1973), 46–47.

¹⁰² William R. Andrews, *The Village War* (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 1973), 42–46.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, 47.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, 47–48.

¹⁰⁵ John C. Donnell, “Viet Cong Recruitment: Why and How Men Join,” The Rand Corporation (November 2, 1966), V, <http://www.rand.org/pubs/documents/2006/D14436.pdf> (accessed October 23, 2012).

¹⁰⁶ David A. Snow and Robert D. Benford, “Ideology, Frame Resonance, and Participant Mobilization,” *International Social Movement Research* 1 (1988):208–209.

referred to by McCarthy as frame bridging, wherein the organization links itself to “...unmobilized sentiment pools or public opinion preference clusters.”¹⁰⁷

The cadre members that made up the village assessment teams and early civil affairs committees were comprised of a large number of former Viet Minh cadres that remained in the south after 1954, and whose ranks were bolstered with former cadre that infiltrated from the north, many of whom had familial ties to the south.¹⁰⁸ Key strengths for these cadres were pre-existing social networks, and the networks of former members that remained in the south. Cadres that remained in the south were able to use legal status to provide intelligence to the front or monitor local families for potential recruits. Returning cadres were able to call upon old networks to reenlist former cadre members.¹⁰⁹ When President Diem announced in 1955 that the reunification election would not be held, an attempt was made to identify and incarcerate former Viet Minh members, ultimately leading to a galvanized force of insurgent cadre.¹¹⁰ Former cadre members that escaped identification, or who were released, created secure “base areas” in geographically remote regions such as the swampy Plain of Reeds or in thick jungle areas where it was difficult for the government to penetrate. In these areas, cadres reformed, trained, and went out to conduct propaganda campaigns and establish civil affairs committees.¹¹¹ These embedded¹¹² cadres were similar to the single members of the National Socialist Party in Germany (NSDAP) in the 1920s and 1930s. Referred to as movement entrepreneurs by Helmut Anheier, the goal of the movement entrepreneur is to

¹⁰⁷ David A. Snow et al., “Frame Alignment Process, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation,” *American Sociological Review* 51, no. 4 (1986): 466–469.

¹⁰⁸ J.J. Zasloff, “Origins of the Insurgency in South Vietnam, 1954–1960: The Role of The Southern Vietminh Cadres,” The Rand Corporation (May 1968), 15–16, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_memoranda/2008/RM5163.2.pdf (accessed October 24, 2012).

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., 15–16.

¹¹⁰ Ibid., 5–13.

¹¹¹ Ibid., 15–21

¹¹² Discussed in Chapter II, Embeddedness is the degree to which organizers are involved in community organizations.

maximize the organization at the local level.¹¹³ NSDAP members joined community organizations, embedded themselves, and then converted or recruited those organizations into party chapters.¹¹⁴ There are two critical benefits to this style of embedding and recruiting. First is that the pre-existing organizational structures in place are coopted into the underground. Pre-existing structures allowed the new cadres to develop resource mobilizing and operational systems along traditional lines, making the new system seem as if it had always been. Second is that embedded recruiters are able to conduct efficient bloc recruiting as members of the targeted organization.

The security of the civil affairs committee during the organizational phase was paramount to all other concerns. The committee personnel were expected to hide their status from the community and even immediate family. The committee itself was highly compartmentalized; each cell within the party maintained separate and secret egress and refuge locations for inevitable regime searches of the area.¹¹⁵ Communication between the civil affairs committee and the district committee was conducted via a drop box consisting of a clay jar with a message at a pre-designated location, to be changed periodically in order to avoid establishing a pattern.¹¹⁶ Compartmentalizing cells in this manner, and restricting communication to remote drop boxes is a critical practice in maintaining security.

As demonstrated above, the underground movement in South Vietnam performed all three essential tasks in the organizational phase. A trained and disciplined cadre was created leveraging the French occupation and President Diem's repression. The same cadre established a system of committees at the village and provincial levels. A united front organization established in 1960 was capable of bringing together revolutionary

113 Helmut Anheier "Movement Development and Organizational Networks: The Role of 'Single Members' in the German Nazi Party, 1925–1930." In *Social Movements and Networks*, ed. Mario Diani and Doug McAdam (Oxford, NY: Oxford University Press, 2003), 53.

114 Helmut Anheier "Movement Development and Organizational Networks: The Role of 'Single Members' in the German Nazi Party, 1925–1930." In *Social Movements and Networks*, ed. Mario Diani and Doug McAdam (Oxford, NY: Oxford University Press, 2003), 51–54.

115 William R. Andrews, *The Village War* (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 1973), 48–49.

116 Ibid., 49–50.

groups such as the People's Revolutionary Party together with the Buddhists and Catholics.

D. PHASE TWO: THE PSYCHOLOGICAL OFFENSIVE

This phase is characterized as the psychological preparation of the people. Broadly speaking, the intent in this phase of protracted revolutionary warfare is to first break down or co-opt civil society and subsequently rebuild it into mass, or social, organizations. Those organizations are then used to educate the people, raise their political consciousness, and prepare them for conflict with the regime. There are three essential tasks in this phase. First, embedded cadre members should start limited local recruiting. Second, the same cadre members should start connecting their networks with those of other cadre members. Third, the doctrine for resistance should begin to be socialized, with varying degrees of intensity.

1. Horizontal Expansion

In this phase, the horizontal structure of the party at the village level was expanded to include a propaganda section, and a security section. Operational security was lessened as the cells took on new members. However, this compromise was mitigated as not all members of the new cells are necessarily members of the party. The two new sections worked closely in this phase, as the first use of armed propaganda teams brought the party out of strictly clandestine operations.

2. Propaganda

Mao Tse Tung, in *On Revolutionary Warfare*, divided propaganda into three broad categories: that conducted among between the soldiers and the officers, between the army and the people, and among the soldiers of the enemy.¹¹⁷ Propaganda efforts among the enemy were those operations undertaken among the rural people living in areas controlled by the Diem regime. Actions among the people were those actions taken

¹¹⁷ Mao Tse Tung, *On Guerrilla Warfare*, ed. and trans. by Samuel Griffith (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1961), 90.

in areas controlled by the front. Action among the troops was a campaign conducted among the civil service and soldiers of the government of Vietnam.¹¹⁸

Propaganda at the inter-provincial level and below was organized into two essential agencies; one, a training and propaganda agency, and two, an agency for enemy troop and civilian propaganda.¹¹⁹ The training and propaganda agency published print and film media with regards to statements and claims by the NLF, maintained a propaganda school, and conducted reeducation for those with flagging orthodoxy. The other agency divided its work between the enemy troops and the civilian population. Among the enemy, work was further broken into two activities: assisting the young people in evading conscription, and creating a network within the security forces for information, promoting desertion, and lowering morale. Within the civilian population, a concerted effort was made to put every individual into a mass organization, which was in and of itself a psychological operation, as it was believed that the individual would develop a vested interest in the organization based on personal effort over time.¹²⁰

Until the militarization phase, the ratio of underground activity to open propaganda activity leaned in favor of underground activity. As noted above, membership in the various liberation associations was expected to perform the function of communication of the front narrative with groups of people, once they had been brought to an association meeting.¹²¹ Interpersonal communication was believed to be a more effective than a statement on the radio or in print. For that reason, as well as concern for security, individual association members were expected to bring friends and family members to association meetings, where they would receive indoctrination.¹²² Overt propaganda generally came in the form of the struggle movement, when large

¹¹⁸ Douglas Pike, *Viet Cong: The Organization and Techniques of the National Liberation Front of South Viet Nam* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1966), 85.

¹¹⁹ Michael Conley, *The Communist Insurgent Infrastructure in South Vietnam: A Study of Organization and Strategy*, (Washington, DC: Center for Research in Social Systems, The American University, 1966), 29–30.

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*, 29–31.

¹²¹ Douglas Pike, *Viet Cong: The Organization and Techniques of the National Liberation Front of South Viet Nam* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1966), 119–126.

¹²² *Ibid.*

groups would be brought together to present an unsolvable issue to local, legitimate authority using some mode of contentious politics.¹²³

The propaganda strategy at the village level, prior to village liberation, had two lines of operation. First, an informational strategy stressed four themes: one, increasing feelings of discontent and subsequently mobilizing patriotic feelings; two, explaining the efforts being made to separate party and people; three, educating the locals on the political and military struggle for South Vietnam; and four, educating the locals on party policy, North Vietnam, socialism, and world news.¹²⁴ This framing strategy performed all three of Snow and Benford's core framing tasks: diagnosis of the problem, with a proposed solution, followed by a call for action.¹²⁵ First, the poverty of the villagers was diagnosed as the result of political injustice. Second, the proposed solution was a village specific variation on the themes of nationalism, communism, independence, or a blending of the three.¹²⁶ Finally, the call to action was for each villager to do his or her part by joining one of the front associations or networks.

This approach to framing by the agitation-propaganda team performed four actions in mobilizing the village. First, by discussing the difficulties of the village, the propaganda team was attempting to realign the view that social conditions were "just and immutable" to a view that they were "unjust and mutable."¹²⁷ Second, by invoking patriotic feelings the propaganda team employing what is referred to in social movement theory as value amplification. This is a process by which values that are presumed to be important to the audience, but have not produced action, are given new emphasis in order to produce a result. A secondary benefit to value amplification is that it can also be used

¹²³ Michael Conley, *The Communist Insurgent Infrastructure in South Vietnam: A Study of Organization and Strategy*, (Washington, DC: Center for Research in Social Systems, The American University, 1966), 343–347.

¹²⁴ William R. Andrews, *The Village War* (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 1973), 53–54.

¹²⁵ David A. Snow and Robert D. Benford, "Ideology, Frame Resonance, and Participant Mobilization," *International Social Movement Research* 1 (1988):199.

¹²⁶ Douglas Pike, *Viet Cong: The Organization and Techniques of the National Liberation Front of South Viet Nam* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1966), 41–42.

¹²⁷ Frances Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward, *Poor People's Movements: Why They Succeed, How They Fail* (New York: Vintage Books Edition, Random House, Inc, 1979), 12.

by the movement entrepreneur to realign the image of the movement.¹²⁸ Third, through discussing the party policies and goals, as well as the military and political struggle, a process called belief amplification occurred. Belief amplification is liberally explained as relationships between a thing and a characteristic about that thing.¹²⁹ In this case, the thing was the U.S.–Diem clique, and the characteristic was their exploitation of the peasants and farmers. Finally, by discussing world events, party policies such as land reform and education, and giving lectures on party doctrine the agitation team extended their frame to include other possible points of interest that might have proved important to the audience.¹³⁰

The other strategy was referred to as the destruction of the oppression.¹³¹ This was the first emergence of agitation propaganda teams and armed propaganda units. The general intent behind this program was to eliminate traditional village leadership roles, eliminating legitimate state institutions, and intimidating the population into non-compliance with the Diem government, effective, as noted by the following witness:

In 1959, many leaflets and posters were spread in my hamlet. They were leaflets and posters made by the [party]. One night the party's followers came into my village, all of a sudden, to carry out the "destruction of the oppression." They arrested the chairman of the National Revolutionary Movement, led him to the rice field, shot, and killed him. After that, they disseminated leaflets which accounted for this killing and mentioned the charges against the dead...the villagers were very afraid. The 'party's followers were then led by a man, named Dong, who came from my village. He was a poor peasant and several months before he had left the village for an unknown place.¹³²

Destruction of the oppression made general usage of terrorism in the form of "reduction in prestige" operations¹³³ against government officials, selective assassination, and

¹²⁸ David A. Snow et al., "Frame Alignment Process, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation," *American Sociological Review* 51, no. 4 (1986):469.

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*, 469.

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*, 472.

¹³¹ William R. Andrews, *The Village War* (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 1973), 55.

¹³² *Ibid.*, 56.

¹³³ In 'reduction in prestige' a government official would be taken away for 'reeducation,' brought back to the village, denounced, and forced to recant.

general intimidation.¹³⁴ The intent was to force the government officials, landlords, and anyone with a vested interest in the Diem regime to live away from the village for fear of party punishment; a crucial first step in establishing a shadow government.¹³⁵

Agitation propaganda teams (agit-prop) teams were employed to execute the informational strategy in the rural hamlets and villages that comprised the backbone of the insurgency. Teams were typically given two weeks of communist indoctrination, followed by ten days of training in agit-prop technique.¹³⁶ The use of the agit-prop teams rests on several fundamental ideas about information warfare. First, that propaganda itself is for the indoctrination of cadre members.¹³⁷ The masses are to be agitated in to motion, hence the agit-prop team. Second, the real indoctrination of the masses is done through work in organized mass education and criticism sessions managed by agit-prop teams.¹³⁸ Third, the most powerful medium is interpersonal communication.¹³⁹ Fourth, that simple communication is normally ineffective, as most people have anchor points for their perceptions, and that the opinion of the majority and concurrent social pressure count for more than leaders and experts.¹⁴⁰ The success of the agit-prop team did not lie in simply passing out pamphlets and handbills, rather in persistent interaction with villagers through meetings and classes in which the cadre would lead the peasant through the Socratic Method into correct political thought.¹⁴¹

The Vietnamese Communist Agit-Prop System: A Short Study (1967) offers a comprehensive review of the theory of agit-prop:

¹³⁴ William R. Andrews, *The Village War* (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 1973), 55–62.

¹³⁵ Ibid.

¹³⁶ Douglas Pike, *Viet Cong: The Organization and Techniques of the National Liberation Front of South Viet Nam* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1966), 129.

¹³⁷ Douglas Pike, *Viet Cong: The Organization and Techniques of the National Liberation Front of South Viet Nam* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1966), 120–121.

¹³⁸ Ibid.

¹³⁹ Ibid.

¹⁴⁰ Douglas Pike, *Viet Cong: The Organization and Techniques of the National Liberation Front of South Viet Nam* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1966), 126–135.

¹⁴¹ Ibid.

Mass media, to the [Vietnamese] Communists, are reinforcement tools only, and not considered strong enough to carry the burden of convincing the unconvinced. Thus, VC agit-prop cadre are employed to explain to ordinary citizens the current line of the party and also to justify by whatever arguments are most likely to be effective, the current party line and whatever changes are necessary. The complex VC political infrastructure is in fact part of the VC propaganda apparatus; the Communists, since about 1961, enmeshed the rural Vietnamese in a network of so-called “liberation associations”...and under the guidance of propaganda cadre, these are used as the vehicle for the communication of ideas. In every village where they operate, the VC uses this organizational weapon to indoctrinate the people at rallies, mass meetings, etc.¹⁴²

The use of agit-prop teams as armed propaganda was a powerful technique in garnering participation. First, the presence of an armed team that came to the village implied both the threat and strength of an authority. Threat and strength compelled the villagers to participate in the performance put on by the agit-prop team, which invoked Cialdini’s principles of social proof¹⁴³ and commitment and consistency¹⁴⁴, maintaining involvement and interest. Breaking the crowd into small groups, led by cadre members, in order to discuss the information presented created a situation in which the villager feels he or she must speak but does not want to offend the armed cadre. Since cadre members tailored narratives to fit audiences based on a census of local grievances, the village member finds a few positive things to say and negotiates an awkward social situation. That further invoked the commitment/ consistency principal, in that people have a tendency to maintain a position once they have publicly stated it. Finally, the cadre brought the crowd together again for testimonials. These interactive processes made the village, if not supportive, at least open to further discussion and possible liberation associations.

¹⁴² United States Government, *The Vietnamese Communist Agit-Prop System: A Short Study* (1967), 14.

¹⁴³ Social Proof is “the tendency to see an action as more appropriate when others are doing it...” Robert B. Cialdini, *Influence, The Psychology of Persuasion* (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1984), 116.

¹⁴⁴ There is a psychological drive for consistency in our behavior, which is reinforced by commitment. Robert B. Cialdini, *Influence, The Psychology of Persuasion* (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1984), 57 – 113.

While commitment and consistency and social proof¹⁴⁵ may bring villagers into front organizations, the decision to become a participant in a movement is not a constant over time. Participation in a movement, particularly a dangerous, taxing movement such as an insurgent underground movement, is subject to rethinking when the agit-prop team has gone. By establishing democratic discussion, criticism and self-criticism sessions, and a menu of positive and negative incentives¹⁴⁶ in front regulations, the front ensured favorable frame transformation. Frame transformation is the process by which values, decisions, and beliefs are reviewed and reinforced discarded as no longer valid.¹⁴⁷

E. PHASE THREE: EXPANSION

Underground development in the third phase is the mass organization. The NLF was not the first to create such organizations, and capitalized on the existence of others; in particular the People's Revolutionary Party Youth League, and the Vanguard Youth League.¹⁴⁸ Both organizations were socialist, the former for teens and the latter for pre-teens, were focused on hating imperialism and educating the young people in correct political thought, and perhaps most importantly, put emphasis on strict obedience to the directives of the party.¹⁴⁹

There are three priorities of work in the third phase of underground development. First, mass organizations should be created that take on part time members. Second, the underground should begin conducting some level of political contention in order to gain credibility and aid in recruiting. Finally, as the organization develops, effort should be made to create a united front with other organizations.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid.

¹⁴⁶ Michael Conley, *The Communist Insurgent Infrastructure in South Vietnam: A Study of Organization and Strategy*, (Washington, DC: Center for Research in Social Systems, The American University, 1966), 275–276. Regulations of the National Front for Liberation of South Viet Nam.

¹⁴⁷ David A. Snow et al., "Frame Alignment Process, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation," *American Sociological Review*, 51, no. 4 (1986): 473.

¹⁴⁸ Douglas Pike, *Viet Cong: The Organization and Techniques of the National Liberation Front of South Viet Nam* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1966), 150–153.

¹⁴⁹ Douglas Pike, *Viet Cong: The Organization and Techniques of the National Liberation Front of South Viet Nam* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1966), 150–153.

1. Hierarchical Expansion

In this phase, the village level organization saw hierarchical growth with limited horizontal expansion. As the village civil affairs committee grew beyond the proscribed three or more official party members, a party chapter was established; nine or more and a Chapter Party Committee was formed, and elected three to seven members to manage daily business. This organization would execute tasking's from higher echelons of command, establish and manage mass organizations, and enforce operational security and member discipline.¹⁵⁰ Eventually this organization would establish the local shadow government, impose taxes, and, in theory, would become the liberation committee if the revolution moved beyond guerrilla war into conventional fighting.¹⁵¹ In the expansion phase, however, the liberation committee established and managed three basic associations: the Farmer's Liberation Association, the Women's Liberation Association, and the Youth Liberation Association.¹⁵²

2. Mass Organizations

As noted above the purpose of the mass organization was inherently psychological, and deemed to be the most efficient way to mobilize the masses by ensuring that everyone from young to old could contribute in some fashion. The NLF had three primary goals: first, maintain support for the insurgency through the formation and control of the organizations, two, draw support from the population into the organization, and three, neutralize support for state efforts to reform and pacify.¹⁵³

¹⁵⁰ Michael Conley, *The Communist Insurgent Infrastructure in South Vietnam: A Study of Organization and Strategy*, (Washington, DC: Center for Research in Social Systems, The American University, 1966), 244–245. Regulations of the Communist Party and Communist Youth Organizations in South Vietnam.

¹⁵¹ Andrew Molnar, *Human Factor Considerations in Underground Insurgencies* (Washington, DC: American University Center for Research in Social Systems, 1966), 18.

¹⁵² William R. Andrews, *The Village War* (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 1973), 72–74.

¹⁵³ Michael Conley, *The Communist Insurgent Infrastructure in South Vietnam: A Study of Organization and Strategy* (Washington, DC: Center for Research in Social Systems, The American University, 1966), 77.

For the NLF, the liberation associations performed these functions effectively. The Women's and Farmer's liberation associations were regulated in nearly the same manner, with members paying association dues, being responsible for indoctrinating unaffiliated neighbors and acquaintances, preserving secrecy, electing members and delegates for higher echelon work, and being subject to awards and discipline as proscribed by party regulation. The youth association differed in that members were expected to improve themselves through vigorous education, and to extend that education to other young people in an effort to expand the recruiting pool by raising political consciousness.¹⁵⁴

Liberation associations were managed, by and large, through three mediums of control. First, associations were managed by at least one overt cadre member.¹⁵⁵ Second, potential association members underwent a vetting process that at the most permissive level required the approval of an executive committee and at the more exclusive required some level of indoctrination,¹⁵⁶ and occasionally a challenge of some sort.¹⁵⁷ Finally, criticism and self-criticism sessions imposed a social control over individual members by which they self-reinforced behavioral norms through a process in which the individual would critique his and his neighbors for correct behavior.¹⁵⁸ As noted above, there also existed a proscribed list of fines and punishments to reinforce behavioral norms.

¹⁵⁴ Michael Conley, *The Communist Insurgent Infrastructure in South Vietnam: A Study of Organization and Strategy*, (Washington, DC: Center for Research in Social Systems, The American University, 1966), 281–290, the translated by-laws and regulations of all three associations.

¹⁵⁵ William R. Andrews, *The Village War* (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 1973), 72.

¹⁵⁶ Michael Conley, *The Communist Insurgent Infrastructure in South Vietnam: A Study of Organization and Strategy*, (Washington, DC: Center for Research in Social Systems, The American University, 1966), 281, 284, 289, the requirements for admission to the youth, women's, and farmers liberation associations.

¹⁵⁷ Michael Conley, *The Communist Insurgent Infrastructure in South Vietnam: A Study of Organization and Strategy*, (Washington, DC: Center for Research in Social Systems, The American University, 1966), 341.

¹⁵⁸ Michael Conley, *The Communist Insurgent Infrastructure in South Vietnam: A Study of Organization and Strategy*, (Washington, DC: Center for Research in Social Systems, The American University, 1966), 271–274.

3. Recruitment

After 1963 the underground developed a three-stage process for creating volunteers. First, young people would be talked into joining the NLF in some capacity, and subsequently marched off to a remote training area.¹⁵⁹ Once in a training area, recruits would be put to work in menial tasks and eventually put into deep political indoctrination. Eventually, conscripts are given an opportunity to “volunteer” for service, at which point they may be moved back to the village for work in the local resistance or packed off to the “main force.”¹⁶⁰ Volunteers lacking sufficient revolutionary zeal might be given an opportunity to serve on a farming unit until some combat duty began to seem appealing.¹⁶¹

Another technique of recruiting and vetting was gradual involvement in order to transition a potential recruit from “legal” to “illegal” status. Typically, young village people would initially be given some small task, such as passing out flags or transporting rice, and then minor acts of sabotage and propaganda.¹⁶² The assignments would continue until the activity was discovered and the unwitting recruit became illegal and was forced to join the “main force” or a fifth column in order to avoid punishment.¹⁶³

Recruiting techniques varied from compelling individuals to volunteer for some sort of service, from hamlet militia or propaganda to joining the main force, to simply conscripting young people and marching them off to a training and indoctrination camp

¹⁵⁹ John C. Donnell, “Viet Cong Recruitment: Why and How Men Join,” *The Rand Corporation* (November 2, 1966), 146–148, <http://www.rand.org/pubs/documents/2006/D14436.pdf> (accessed October 23, 2012).

¹⁶⁰ Ibid.

¹⁶¹ John C. Donnell, “Viet Cong Recruitment: Why and How Men Join,” *The Rand Corporation* (November 2, 1966), 148, <http://www.rand.org/pubs/documents/2006/D14436.pdf> (accessed October 23, 2012).

¹⁶² Ibid., 16. “I enlisted people in the VC ranks and collected information which I channeled to the VC. I made propaganda for the VC, tried to build up their prestige, and sabotaged GVN activities. My status remained legal. I investigated [for the VC] and closely watched the families whose members had regrouped to the north, or the dissatisfied elements, or the persons who were sympathetic to the VC, in order to enlist them in the VC organizations. If I found them to be reliable, I would assign small tasks to them at the start. Afterwards, I would entrust them with more important and difficult missions.”

¹⁶³ John C. Donnell, “Viet Cong Recruitment: Why and How Men Join,” *The Rand Corporation* (November 2, 1966), 121–123, <http://www.rand.org/pubs/documents/2006/D14436.pdf> (accessed October 23, 2012).

in the jungle. The recurring theme is that recruiting generally focused on individuals, and relies on the individual to become entangled in the Viet Cong system and for interpersonal interaction and indoctrination to create an “awakening” moment in which the individual embraces the movement.¹⁶⁴

4. Developing Public Support

A RAND Corporation study in influencing public support offers the following four factors and related sub factors as measures of effectiveness in developing support for an illicit movement.¹⁶⁵ The first factor in developing public support is the effectiveness of the organization in packaging ideology, mobilizing resources, and providing leadership in action. The second is generating motivation for supporting the movement. Third is the perceived legitimacy of violence, and fourth is the acceptability of costs and risks.

As previously noted, the effectiveness of the NLF organization at the village level was in the development of committees and associations. First village assessment teams conducted a census of an area and conduct clandestine, targeted recruiting.¹⁶⁶ Later a civil affairs committee was formed.¹⁶⁷ As the committee grew, the village organization would expand to include associations and a wider hierarchy of village leadership, managed by party members.¹⁶⁸ This system of organizing allowed the underground to mobilize resources with taxes, association dues, and labor.¹⁶⁹ Leadership was at the village level, in the underground organizations, and thus able to take advantage of

¹⁶⁴ John C. Donnell, “Viet Cong Recruitment: Why and How Men Join,” The Rand Corporation (November 2, 1966), 165–172, <http://www.rand.org/pubs/documents/2006/D14436.pdf> (accessed October 23, 2012).

¹⁶⁵ Paul K. Davis et al., *Understanding and Influencing Public Support for Insurgency and Terrorism* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2012), 11–30.

¹⁶⁶ William R. Andrews, *The Village War* (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 1973), 45–48.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid., 49.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid., 72–103.

¹⁶⁹ Michael Conley, *The Communist Insurgent Infrastructure in South Vietnam: A Study of Organization and Strategy*, (Washington, DC: Center for Research in Social Systems, The American University, 1966), 244–245.

opportunities. The underground was also able to mobilize the village for contentious action,¹⁷⁰ or in the terms of the RAND study, presence, words, and deeds.

The combination of agitation-propaganda teams and a menu of positive incentives were successful in generating motivation for front organizations in the village. Teams made extensive use of the sub-factors of attraction, duty, and honor by making appeals to patriotism and self-interest,¹⁷¹ mass recruitment meetings,¹⁷² and highly personalized appeals to either join the guerrilla force or at least to serve near the home.¹⁷³ The land for the landless, or land to the tiller campaigns provided an obvious reward for the portion of the population that the front was interested in recruiting:

The cadre propagandized that the youths should fight the enemy and reclaim the land. This propaganda made me very enthusiastic because I wanted to kill the enemy and I wanted to have the land. I knew very well how miserable the life of a landless peasant was.¹⁷⁴

The negative impact of the land reform was its effect on motivation to take part in action beyond joining the mass movement. Once the demand for land was satisfied, interest in action decreased.¹⁷⁵

For the cadre organizing at the village level, the acceptability of costs and risks factor was a dichotomy of positive and negative incentives. The villager was often in a position where he was farming land that belonged to an absentee landlord who would periodically extract rent.¹⁷⁶ The presence of the cadre and the underground organization prevented that, but also took a toll on the peasantry in the form of taxes and service requirements. While the peasant may have had a difficult time in assessing who would

¹⁷⁰ William R. Andrews, *The Village War* (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 1973), 118–123.

¹⁷¹ John C. Donnell, *Viet Cong Recruitment: Why and How Men Join* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1966), 34.

¹⁷² *Ibid.*, 108.

¹⁷³ John C. Donnell, *Viet Cong Recruitment: Why and How Men Join* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1966), appendix D.

¹⁷⁴ William R. Andrews, *The Village War* (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 1973), 66.

¹⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 68.

¹⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 67.

win the war in Vietnam, he certainly could see who was controlling his village. Even had there been a local, reliable security or policing apparatus to report front activities to, it would have led to reprisals against the family of the informant.

F. PHASES FOUR AND FIVE: MILITARIZATION AND CONSOLIDATION

The key tasks in the final phases is creating and employing military force, while still controlling the population. The expansion of the NLF security section into guerrilla warfare marked the beginning of the militarization phase. At the village level, paramilitary forces were organized to support the development of shadow government and underground operations, as well as to support “regular force” operations.¹⁷⁷

The village paramilitary was divided into three categories of militant: combat guerrillas, village guerrillas, and self-defense militia.¹⁷⁸ These forces were the bulwark of the underground security element. Combat guerrillas were generally armed with a variety of second-hand small arms and were supported with village rice contributions. Their contribution to the underground was more like that of an aggressive police force. They guarded the village, assisted in collecting taxes, established roadblocks and checked strangers for identification, and assisted the propaganda section as needed¹⁷⁹. Village guerrillas were equipped with anti-personnel devices to injure the unwary.¹⁸⁰ Self-defense militia consisted of unarmed peasants who provided labor and assistance with sabotage.¹⁸¹

1. Underground Application of Violence

While the inter-provincial military elements made use of ambush and harassment of South Vietnamese government and U.S. security forces, the underground at the village level was focused on sabotage, subversion, violence against individuals, and selective use

¹⁷⁷ William R. Andrews, *The Village War* (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 1973), 104–107.

¹⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 105.

¹⁷⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁰ *Ibid.* Anti-personnel devices ranged from grenades to laying spiked boards intended to injure patrols.

¹⁸¹ *Ibid.*

of terror.¹⁸² These tactics served the three basic imperatives of security, recruitment, and intimidation by impressing rural villagers with the NLF's ability to use violence at will to both resist the government and punish traitors.¹⁸³

2. Population and Information Control

The fifth phase has begun when a shadow government is established. The shadow government must be capable of controlling three facets of the local area. First, the actions of the local population must be controlled. Second, outside information that the local population receives must be controlled in order to manipulate the popular perception of the resistance.¹⁸⁴ Finally, information that the local population transmits outside of itself must be controlled in order for the underground to protect its information advantage.¹⁸⁵ The National Liberation Front managed the population and information at the village level in six categories: village surveillance, manipulation of information, restriction of movement, communalization of labor, targeted violence, and party internal control devices.¹⁸⁶

Surveillance as a system of population control¹⁸⁷ was achieved through an adaptation of the *pao chia* system of families living in clustered areas being assigned to watch another family, and mutual surveillance conducted in organizations between party

¹⁸² Douglas Pike, *Viet Cong: The Organization and Techniques of the National Liberation Front of South Viet Nam* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1966), 245–252.

¹⁸³ *Ibid.*, 245–252.

¹⁸⁴ Andrew Molnar, *Human Factor Considerations in Underground Insurgencies* (Washington, DC: American University Center for Research in Social Systems, 1966), 48–53. An effective shadow government controls the population by replacing old institutions with new ones, offering an array of positive and negative incentives, and with inter-locking social institutions (court systems, sports leagues, and farmers' cooperatives, for instance). These institutions are managed by cadre members, who filter the information that is received by the local population.

¹⁸⁵ Gordon McCormick, "The Mystic Diamond" (Seminar in Guerrilla Warfare, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, November, 2011). In an insurgency or guerrilla warfare the insurgent and the counterinsurgent each enjoy a distinct advantage. The counterinsurgent has a large force advantage and could defeat the insurgent, if they knew where or who the insurgent is. The insurgent has an advantage in information, which protects it from the counterinsurgent's force advantage. McCormick states that "the winner of this contest will be the side that can most quickly resolve its disadvantage."

¹⁸⁶ William R. Andrews, *The Village War* (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 1973), 108.

¹⁸⁷ Jennifer Earl, "Tanks, Tear Gas, and Taxes: Toward a Theory of Population Control," *Sociological Theory*, 21, No. 1 (2003): 44–68.

members and less trustworthy elements.¹⁸⁸ The party eliminated competing information in liberated areas by prohibiting any listening to “enemy” radio broadcasts, censoring mail and print media coming into the village, by allowing only party produced print media into the village. In order to further isolate individual villages, the names of roads and landmarks were all changed in order to prevent commonality between liberated areas and areas controlled by the state.¹⁸⁹ Village residents were severely restricted in movement through the use of land confiscation, that is, should a resident relocate to a government controlled area, his or his families land would be confiscated for re-distribution. Family members of residents serving the Diem government could be sent for re-education or worse.¹⁹⁰ The farmer’s liberation association created labor exchange squads in which it organized famers to perform menial labor throughout the hamlet and province, in order to condition the peasants to understand that the fruits of their labor did not belong to them, and were inherently cooperative.¹⁹¹ Targeted violence came in the form of “people’s courts” where peasants were selectively brought before the village to answer for “crimes.” During the trial, the party would ask for the crowd’s verdict, and party members planted in the crowd would call for whatever the pre-determined verdict was to be, release, re-education, or death.¹⁹² Finally, party members were managed with criticism and self-criticism sessions in which their behavior and incorrect political thought would be reviewed.¹⁹³

While not all unique to the final phase, these methods of population control were steadily developed, and by the consolidation phase could all be expected to be in employment, the hallmark of the consolidation phase.

¹⁸⁸ Floyd L. Singer, *Control of the Population in China and Vietnam: The Pao Chia System Past and Present* (China Lake, CA: U.S. Naval Ordnance Test Station, 1964), 46–47.

¹⁸⁹ William R. Andrews, *The Village War* (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 1973), 110–111.

¹⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 112–114.

¹⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 114–115.

¹⁹² Douglas Pike, *Viet Cong: The Organization and Techniques of the National Liberation Front of South Viet Nam* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1966), 250–252.

¹⁹³ Carson Hoke et al *Influence Operations: Redefining the Indirect Approach* (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School Department of Defense Analysis, 2011), 25–31.

3. Village Revolutionary Activities

The fully mobilized village performed three general functions in support of the insurgency: the “struggle movement” or contentious politics, logistical support to operations conducted by regular forces, and manpower support to operations conducted by regular forces.¹⁹⁴

The struggle movement was essentially a well-organized protest. First, a mass meeting of residents and association members was held, a single protest issue was raised and attendants were encouraged to speak about it. Party members were planted in the crowd to shout slogans and share emotional testimonials. Second, the mass meeting would turn into a protest group and descend upon government offices, disrupt traffic or daily activities, disrupt activities by a local official, and generally disrupt the normal routine of the area. Finally, when the protest was over, the attendants would return to the original meeting place to praise high levels of demonstrated zeal, and to criticize poor performance.¹⁹⁵

When regular military forces were conducting operations in a given region, the local underground was expected to provide logistical and manpower support. Logistically, the self-defense militia and the myriad liberation associations on hand were meant to provide transportation and food, prepare caches of munitions and supplies, house soldiers, prepare field hospitals, and provide messenger services.¹⁹⁶ For manpower, the commander of the local guerrilla force was obligated to assist operations to the extent that he was capable. In an insightful nod to the difficulties inherent in underground activities, the local guerrilla commander enjoyed a certain amount of autonomy, and was free to refuse to participate if he disagreed with the plan. He was, however, obligated to provide soldiers, and in the time honored military tradition of

¹⁹⁴ Michael Conley, *The Communist Insurgent Infrastructure in South Vietnam: A Study of Organization and Strategy*, (Washington, DC: Center for Research in Social Systems, The American University, 1966), 348–357, “Experiences in Turning XB Village in Kien Phong Province into a Combatant Village.”

¹⁹⁵ William R. Andrews, *The Village War* (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 1973), 118–120.

¹⁹⁶ William R. Andrews, *The Village War* (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 1973), 120–122.

“passing off the slackers,” troublemakers were traditionally sent to support the regular force, while quality soldiers were retained at the local guerrilla level.¹⁹⁷

G. CONCLUSION

The National Liberation Front cadre was able to effectively complete the three tasks outlined in chapter two by utilizing a methodical approach to infiltrating and subverting the village. First, creating village assessment teams and civil affairs committees with former Viet Minh cadre¹⁹⁸ enabled the National Liberation Front to adapt its revolutionary doctrine to the specific grievances of the village population.¹⁹⁹ Second, dismantling competing village institutions²⁰⁰ and replacing them with party organizations²⁰¹ created a situation in which the cadre members could recreate a segment of civil society in a manner more suited to their operational needs. Third, involving as many segments of the village population as possible in a liberation association created a situation wherein villagers participated in the underground by virtue of membership.²⁰² Finally, the circulation of agitation-propaganda teams through villages

¹⁹⁷ Ibid., 123–128.

¹⁹⁸ J.J. Zasloff, “Origins of the Insurgency in South Vietnam, 1954–1960: The Role of The Southern Vietminh Cadres,” The RAND Corporation (May 1968), 15–16, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_memoranda/2008/RM5163.2.pdf (accessed October 24, 2012).

¹⁹⁹ Douglas Pike, *Viet Cong: The Organization and Techniques of the National Liberation Front of South Viet Nam* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1966), 41–41. From Viet Minh organizational guidelines, “us communism as dogma, stressing those aspects that are well regarded by the people; don’t hesitate to interpret Marxism-Leninism in any way that proves beneficial. Soft pedal the class-struggle idea except among cadres.”

²⁰⁰ William R. Andrews, *The Village War* (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 1973), 50.

²⁰¹ Douglas Pike, *Viet Cong: The Organization and Techniques of the National Liberation Front of South Viet Nam* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1966), 112–113. Administrative Liberation Associations were managed by a small body of cadre, and were a pre-cursor to shadow government. These organizations were used to replace existing institutions.

²⁰² Douglas Pike, *Viet Cong: The Organization and Techniques of the National Liberation Front of South Viet Nam* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1966), 113–114. Functional Liberation Associations such as farmers groups or youth leagues allowed each village resident to participate to the degree they were either capable of, or willing to.

was a reinforcing mechanism that introduced new propaganda and forced villagers to hear and discuss the revolutionary doctrine.²⁰³

²⁰³ Douglas Pike, *Viet Cong: The Organization and Techniques of the National Liberation Front of South Viet Nam* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1966), 126–132. Agitation-Propaganda teams traveled a circuit between villages, disseminated propaganda, and engaged villagers in a discussion about the information.

IV. THE JAPANESE OCCUPATION OF THE PHILIPPINES

“If I worked in those sugar fields, I’d be a Huk myself.”²⁰⁴

—Douglas MacArthur

A. INTRODUCTION

This case study was chosen for its wide variety of resistance movements and underground structures. Although there were 50 acknowledged guerrilla organizations,²⁰⁵ this chapter will offer a review of the more prominent American and Filipino guerrilla organizations, and will then conduct an analysis of their organization of the underground across Molnar’s five phases: clandestine organization, psychological offensive, expansion, militarization, and consolidation. The first guerrilla movement is the Hukbalahap movement,²⁰⁶ the second movement is the United States Armed Forces, Far East (USAFFE), and the third is the United States Forces in the Philippines (USFIP). These three movements were chosen for three reasons. First, they were the largest guerrilla organizations.²⁰⁷ Second, they each formed robust undergrounds in different manners. Finally, they each operated against the Japanese differently. Russell Volckmann and Don Blackburn spent time among the tribes of northern Luzon conducting bloc recruitment. In contrast the Huks of central Luzon were already organizing when the Japanese defeated the American-Filipino army. Like the Huks, Wendel Fertig, on Mindanao, was establishing civil governance as a way to unify the many bands of guerrillas that were forming. The variety and depth in this case study could be broken into three separate studies on the underground, dealing with each of the three major organizations.

²⁰⁴ Stanley Karnow, *In Our Image: America’s Empire in the Philippines* (New York: Random House, 1989), 311.

²⁰⁵ Robert B. Asprey. *War in the Shadows: The Guerrilla in History Vol. 1* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1975), 514.

²⁰⁶ Filipino: **Hukbong Bayan Laban sa mga Hapon**, English: *The Nation’s Army Against the Japanese*.

²⁰⁷ Each guerrilla movement eventually consolidated several smaller organizations and population centers, and spanned a large geographical area.

This chapter will begin with a brief review of the events leading up to the Japanese occupation, and the categories of guerrilla organizations that subsequently emerged. There will be a brief overview of the three core resistance groups and the events that facilitated their initial formation, as well as an example of a “false start” group. It will then review specific instances that enhanced or retracted the expansion of underground organizations across Molnar’s five phases of underground development.²⁰⁸ Because the types of guerrilla organizations varies widely, at end of each phase there will be a review of the actions of each guerrilla organization. The real significance of this chapter lies in five key points. First, dispersing forces is a protective measure against repression. Second, individuals can effectively conduct bloc recruitment among pre-existing organizations. Third, guerrilla formations evolved into shadow government and began conducting political warfare. Finally, establishing separate cells is an effective security measure.

B. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

After fifteen days of air strikes 43,000 Japanese soldiers landed at Lingayen Gulf, on the north end of Luzon, on December 22, 1941. General Douglas MacArthur, with an out-gunned and under-trained force of American service men and Filipino conscripts and reservists, sent Major General Jonathan “Skinny” Wainwright IV with infantry and cavalry to fight a defense in depth, causing casualties and yielding ground in exchange for time while MacArthur maneuvered the remainder of the force from metropolitan Manila up into the high ground at Bataan. Lacking airpower and modern impedimenta of war, as well as basic items, such as food, allied forces were compelled to surrender. While the majority surrendered, a large number of soldiers and civilians alike decided that they would prefer to either continue resistance or wait for the wars end in the remote wilderness regions.²⁰⁹

²⁰⁸ Andrew Molnar, *Human Factor Considerations in Underground Insurgencies* (Washington, DC: American University Center for Research in Social Systems, 1966), 16–18. Andrew Molnar’s five phases for protracted war are clandestine organization, psychological offensive, expansion, militarization, and consolidation.

²⁰⁹ Stanley Carnow, *In Our Image: America’s Empire in the Philippines* (New York: Random House, 1989), 287–301.

1. The Hukbalahap, USAFFE, and USFIP: Setting the Stage for Resistance

Prior to the Japanese invasion of the Philippines, four conditions were set to facilitate resistance to the coming occupation. First, Fascism in general, and the Japanese invasion of China, specifically, had developed a significant amount of concern in Manila.²¹⁰ Second, the United States had already promised that the Philippines would be independent before the invasion; the Japanese intended to incorporate the Philippines into their empire.²¹¹ Third, because of the aggressive nature of the Japanese foreign policy and the growing conflict between the Japanese and the Americans, Filipinos saw the looming threat of invasion coming, and knew they would have to make a choice between the two foreign powers, and gamble on the outcome. Fourth, abandoned military equipment and supplies throughout the island was on hand to equip guerrilla outfits.²¹²

Three major movements emerged to resist the occupation, the Hukbalahap, U.S. Armed Forces Far East (USAFFE) guerrillas, and United States Forces in the Philippines (USFIP) guerrillas. Each of these three had separate catalysts that enabled them to emerge in the face of Japanese imposed social order. These will be discussed below in order.

a. The Huks

The Hukbalahap organization officially formed March 29, 1942.²¹³ Prior to that, the various political movements in Manila had been meeting to voice opposition to fascism and Japanese foreign policy; following the December 8, 1941 invasion pro-democracy groups, semi-socialist, openly communist, and trade unionists set aside their differences to elect a committee of fifteen members to direct national resistance through a

²¹⁰ Benedict J. Kerkvliet *The Huk Rebellion: A Study of Peasant Revolt in the Philippines* (Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1977), 96–97.

²¹¹ Benedict J. Kerkvliet *The Huk Rebellion: A Study of Peasant Revolt in the Philippines* (Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1977), 67–68.

²¹² Bernard Norling, *The Intrepid Guerrillas of North Luzon* (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 1999), 6.

²¹³ Benedict J. Kerkvliet *The Huk Rebellion: A Study of Peasant Revolt in the Philippines* (Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1977), 79–80.

united front in February, 1942.²¹⁴ These groups had been meeting in smaller groups prior to the invasion; the Friends of China and the Communist Party (PKP), for instance, had joined together to organize boycotts of Japanese goods or picket stores that sold Japanese goods in response to the Japanese war in China.²¹⁵ The collective group was able to form a coalition so readily because the individual goals of groups were not necessarily in competition with one another. Groups opposing Japanese aggression and fascism in general were not terribly interested in the agrarian issues that General Workers Union or AMT, and the National Society of Peasants in the Philippines, or KPMP were struggling with, for instance. Neither were the socialist and communists necessarily opposed to the League for the Defense of Democracy; the founder of the league, Vicente Lava, was also an officer in the PKP. All of the groups were specifically interested in an Independent Philippines, and generally interested in social and economic problems.²¹⁶ When the Japanese occupied Manila and arrested those who had spoken out against imperial Japan, including PKP officers,²¹⁷ there was much more interest in a united front.

Once formed, this group took two subsequent actions. First, it petitioned President Manuel Quezon to organize and train the civilian population to resist the Japanese. Second, it proposed to elect four members to form a military committee and organize a national resistance army. The President did not react to the petition, and subsequently went to the U.S. to form a government in exile. The military committee, comprised of members of the two largest, barrio based tenant farmer movements, formed the Hukbalahaps, or Anti-Japanese Army.²¹⁸

The military committee members, previous members of the AMT and the KPMP, militarized their former tenant farmers organizations.²¹⁹ The tenant farmers had

²¹⁴ Ibid., 96–98.

²¹⁵ Benedict J. Kerkvliet *The Huk Rebellion: A Study of Peasant Revolt in the Philippines* (Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1977), 97.

²¹⁶ Benedict J. Kerkvliet *The Huk Rebellion: A Study of Peasant Revolt in the Philippines* (Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1977), 97.

²¹⁷ Ibid., 98.

²¹⁸ Ibid.

²¹⁹ Ibid., 98.

formed barrio-based organizations throughout the 1930s in response to an increase in absentee landlordism, the erosion of traditional peasant rights, and increasingly oppressive treatment of the peasant class.²²⁰ The organizations were intended to be a means of mutual support between harvests and a platform for collective bargaining with landlords and government.²²¹ The barrio based organizations had spent the 1930s organizing to protest the landlords with contentious politics, such as burning or refusing to harvest crops. As political contention increased, landlord oppression increased correspondingly.²²² For the population that the Huks were organizing, the Japanese represented an escalation of the repression and resistance that they had been involved with for nearly a decade. When the military committee members agreed to join together to form the Huks, they reorganized into regionally distributed squadrons of one hundred soldiers each.²²³ Regions were naturally subdivided by barrios, with squadrons subdivided into squads at the barrio level.²²⁴ As the Japanese fought USAFFE regular forces and chased guerrillas, the Huks took on a governing role in response to banditry and the general breakdown of society.²²⁵ The Huk shadow government developed into a political organization with a staff and local policemen.²²⁶ The local shadow government expanded into the Barrio United Defense Corps to support the guerrilla organization.²²⁷

²²⁰ Benedict J. Kerkvliet *The Huk Rebellion: A Study of Peasant Revolt in the Philippines* (Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1977), 36–60. As absenteeism increased, peasant court cases increased, and the landlords began appointing loyal followers. In response, peasants organized. In response to peasant organization, landlords used the constabulary force as a personal army against the peasants and their organizations.

²²¹ Ibid., 31.

²²² Benedict J. Kerkvliet *The Huk Rebellion: A Study of Peasant Revolt in the Philippines* (Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1977), 36–39.

²²³ Ibid.

²²⁴ Ibid., 70.

²²⁵ Ibid.

²²⁶ Ibid., 72. In the example of San Ricardo, the staff consisted of a president, vice president, treasurer, secretary, and five policemen.

²²⁷ Ibid., 94.

The guerrilla organization expanded to include remote training camps²²⁸ as well as underground propaganda cells.²²⁹

b. USAFFE Guerrillas

The U.S. Armed Forces Far East guerrillas were initially a part of the uniformed, conventional formation that was defeated on Bataan and Corregidor. Following the surrender, a large number of soldiers opted to not give up.²³⁰ These initially congregated in camps in the remote corners of the archipelago.²³¹ As the isolated groups converged, they established a chain of command among themselves, and reached out to local communities for support.²³² They developed a sizeable underground support system and regimented themselves geographically.²³³ They were able to contact General MacArthur in Australia for operational guidance, and became a part of the South West Pacific Command's intelligence apparatus and provided MacArthur with detailed intelligence until the invasion of the Philippines by the Allied Army. During this period, they waged a campaign of attrition in advance of the landings, and conducted a large scale guerrilla assault during the invasion. Following the liberation of the Philippines, they became a regular portion of the army.²³⁴

c. USFIP Guerrillas

On Mindanao a large number of "guerrillas" and bands of outlaws emerged in the power vacuum left by the Japanese invasion. The ranking officer, Lieutenant Colonel Wendell Fertig, promoted himself to general and assumed command

²²⁸ Ibid., 74.

²²⁹ Ibid., 95–96.

²³⁰ Mike Guardia, *American Guerrilla: The Forgotten Heroics of Russell W. Volckmann* (Philadelphia, PA: Casemate Publishers, 2010), 39. I cite Volckmann for this paragraph, but the accounts of Ramsey, Lapham, and Fertig are very similar.

²³¹ Ibid., 56–57.

²³² Ibid., 72–77.

²³³ Ibid. 99–115.

²³⁴ Mike Guardia, *American Guerrilla: The Forgotten Heroics of Russell W. Volckmann* (Philadelphia, PA: Casemate Publishers, 2010), 129–146.

over the guerrilla organizations operating on the island.²³⁵ Fertig began imposing martial discipline upon the organizations,²³⁶ and establishing cells to gather intelligence and transmit it to General MacArthur.²³⁷ Fertig directed Filipino organizations in his command to establish civil governance in their areas that could be recognized by Qezon's government in exile, print money in that government's name, and organize the people for intelligence gathering and guerrilla operations.²³⁸ Fertig's command continued to gather intelligence, and transmit information via radio and submarine to MacArthur's staff through his return and the liberation.

d. Walter Cushing's False Start

Notable in this first phase of underground development in the Philippines during the Japanese occupation is Walter Cushing. Walter Cushing, a Mexican-American civilian managing a gold mine in the Llocos Sur Mountains, decided to mobilize his employees into a two hundred (or so) man private army after the Japanese invaded Luzon. First, he organized them into the 121st (Guerrilla) Light Infantry Regiment. Second, he harangued a wandering U.S. Army officer into providing them with some rudimentary training. Third, he gathered the arms and ammunition in the nearby Filipino training camps, and cached it in the mine. When that was accomplished, he set about ambushing Japanese soldiers, destroying bridges, and harassing Japanese garrisons by throwing dynamite into their barracks and stealing their ammunition by night.²³⁹

Following the fall of Corregidor, Cushing realized that further small unit action against the Japanese would be ineffective, and he dispersed the 121st into small camps in the Llocos Sur Mountains. Subsequently, he established a psychological

²³⁵ John Keats, *They Fought Alone* (New York: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1963), 84–89. Fertig did this to represent himself as MacArthur's chief of guerrilla warfare in the Philippines. The intent of this ruse was to bring together bands of guerrillas and outlaws, and impose military order on the situation.

²³⁶ *Ibid.*

²³⁷ *Ibid.*, 171–172.

²³⁸ Ira Wolfert, *American Guerrilla in the Philippines* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1945), 135–136.

²³⁹ Bernard Norling, *The Intrepid Guerrillas of North Luzon* (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 1999), 1–13.

operations cell using radio sets from the mines to gather news from a San Francisco radio station and had it typed into the *The Echo of the Free North* newspaper, which circulated through Luzon throughout 1942.²⁴⁰

Once the propaganda cell was established, Cushing infiltrated Manila and met with wealthy Filipino contacts in order to mobilize resources needed for the resistance. While in Manila, he was able to gather automatic weapons, ammunition, medicine and radios, twenty two American soldiers hiding in a church, and four Filipino doctors. He used these to establish a series of underground, operational cells stretching from Manila to the Llocos Sur Mountains.²⁴¹

Cushing then attempted to contact Colonel Thorpe in order to coordinate resistance efforts against the Japanese. While attempting to move south he was ambushed and killed; nevertheless, the cells he established continued to operate throughout the war.²⁴² The Cushing case is an example of what Tarrow refers to as an “early riser” movement, or an organization that emerges and potentially creates a model of action for other groups that have not emerged, expose an opponent’s weakness, or produce new opportunities for action.²⁴³ In the example of Cushing, his organization fought the Japanese as partisans as long as was practicable before establishing dispersed guerrilla cells for long term resistance.²⁴⁴

²⁴⁰ Bernard Norling, *The Intrepid Guerrillas of North Luzon* (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 1999), 9.

²⁴¹ Bernard Norling, *The Intrepid Guerrillas of North Luzon* (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 1999), 9–10.

²⁴² Bernard Norling, *The Intrepid Guerrillas of North Luzon* (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 1999), 11–13.

²⁴³ Sydney G. Tarrow, *Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 167.

²⁴⁴ Volckmann, Ramsey, and Blackburn each note Cushing’s rise and fall in their biographies.

2. The Emergence of Substantive Resistance

There were three catalytic events²⁴⁵ that greatly contributed to the emergence of resistance. First, the shock of invasion, followed closely by excessive repression by the Japanese toward civilians, combined with a drastic increase in rural banditry created a situation in which Filipinos had to organize for protection.²⁴⁶ Second, pre-war organization of the United Front against the Japanese prepared the Huks in advance of the occupation.²⁴⁷ Finally, the abandonment of large stores of small arms and ammunition in training camps throughout Luzon armed resistance groups that would otherwise have faced the Japanese with Bolo knives and farming implements.²⁴⁸

Japanese soldiers made sport of torture, made ill use of young women, and otherwise indiscriminately killed civilians.²⁴⁹ At the same time, groups of young Filipinos armed with bolo knives and stolen rifles formed to raid villages for money, food, and women.²⁵⁰ In central Luzon, Japanese use of the Philippine Constabulary against the rural population as well as bands of outlaws increased the solidarity of barrio residents with the Huks.²⁵¹ In Mindanao, numerous bands of outlaws and guerrillas were fighting Lilliputian wars of territory throughout the island causing emergent regional power brokers to seek the ranking officer in the area to assume command of all forces.²⁵²

Repression is a negative selective incentive imposed upon the resisting or protesting population.²⁵³ It can have the effect of deterring resistance if the repressed are

²⁴⁵ David Hess and Brian Martin, "Repression, Backfire, and the Theory of Transformative Events," *Mobilization: An International Journal* 11, no. 2 (2006): 249. "A transformative event is a crucial turning point for a social movement that dramatically increases or decreases the level of mobilization."

²⁴⁶ Benedict J. Kerkvliet *The Huk Rebellion: A Study of Peasant Revolt in the Philippines* (Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1977), 70.

²⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 97–98.

²⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 79–80.

²⁴⁹ John Keats, *They Fought Alone* (New York: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1963), 71–76.

²⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

²⁵¹ Benedict J. Kerkvliet *The Huk Rebellion: A Study of Peasant Revolt in the Philippines* (Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1977), 74–75.

²⁵² John Keats, *They Fought Alone* (New York: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1963), 85–89.

²⁵³ Pamela Oliver, "Rewards and Punishments as Selective Incentives for Collective Action: Theoretical Investigations," *American Journal of Sociology* vol 85, no 6, (May, 1980), 1356.

in a social group that applies a negative social sanction upon those participating in behavior that leads to repression,²⁵⁴ joining an underground resistance, for example. If the repression is especially brutal or otherwise deemed illegitimate, it can have the opposite effect, “When the demonstrators become the victims of brutal repression, their movement gains sympathy and even material support from people who have not suffered directly from the government’s excesses.”²⁵⁵ This begins a micromobilization process that “raises the rewards and diminishes costs of participation.”²⁵⁶ Japanese repression was applied indiscriminately and in manners inconsistent with the Filipino concept of justice, bringing about a micromobilization process in favor of resistance groups. In occupied Manila, for instance, although the Japanese were able to effectively repress the United National Front movement initially, underground groups continued to form. The League for National Liberation was formed by businessmen and professionals, presumably those with the least incentive to resist, for the purpose of funneling intelligence to guerrilla organizations.²⁵⁷

The United Front against the Japanese was a gathering of the political left and various agrarian movements before and immediately after the Japanese invasion. Their purpose was to set aside political differences and create a “united front” against Japan. One of their contributions to the resistance was to elect a military committee representative of many of the different groups in the front.²⁵⁸ This was important because the members of the military committee came from pre-existing organizations that emerged for the purpose of resisting. The interaction between the group leaders developed interpersonal relationships that were able to bridge different organizations for the purpose of resistance to the Japanese. This was critical for three reasons. The

²⁵⁴ Karl-Dieter Opp, Wolfgang Roehl, “Repression, Micromobilization, and Political Protest,” *Social Forces* vol 69, no 2 (Dec., 1990), 522.

²⁵⁵ Karl-Dieter Opp, Wolfgang Roehl, “Repression, Micromobilization, and Political Protest,” *Social Forces* vol 69, no 2 (Dec., 1990) 521–547. The authors quote Denardo.

²⁵⁶ Karl-Dieter Opp, Wolfgang Roehl, “Repression, Micromobilization, and Political Protest,” *Social Forces* vol 69, no 2 (Dec., 1990) 521–547. The authors quote Denardo.

²⁵⁷ Benedict J. Kerkvliet *The Huk Rebellion: A Study of Peasant Revolt in the Philippines* (Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1977), 99–100.

²⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 98.

formation of the Huks from many previously developed groups gave the larger conglomerate organization a strong foundation.²⁵⁹ Second, the formation of a larger group gave the individual organizations a greater capacity to resist the Japanese.²⁶⁰ Finally, the cohesive group was able to develop as an organization with a common narrative, greater discipline, and a robust “collective identity” that aided in the development of underground structures.²⁶¹

Before the invasion, in his capacity as “Field Marshall of Military Advisory to the Commonwealth Government of the Philippines,” MacArthur undertook to train the Philippine Constabulary and the Philippine Army Reserve in a series of camps throughout Luzon. As the invading Japanese army moved south from Lingayen Bay, the Filipino soldiers retreated to Bataan, leaving the arms and ammunition in the camps. This equipment was taken and cached by many guerrilla groups immediately following the invasion, such as Walter Cushing²⁶² and the Huk’s and their predecessors.²⁶³ This abandoned equipment in many cases represented the only means of industrial age resistance for the Filipinos and the isolated groups of soldiers.

C. PHASE ONE: ORGANIZATION

Following the Japanese invasion, guerrillas fell into several categories. Americans, civilian and service member alike, had four options: surrender to the Japanese, resist, attempt to hide in the mountains or among the population, or finally, to

²⁵⁹ Helmut Anheier “Movement Development and Organizational Networks: The Role of ‘Single Members’ in the German Nazi Party, 1925–1930.” In *Social Movements and Networks*, ed. Mario Diani and Doug McAdam, (Oxford, NY: Oxford University Press, 2003), 70–71.

²⁶⁰ Doug McAdam “Beyond Structural Analysis: Toward a More Dynamic Understanding of Social Movements.” In *Social Movements and Networks*, ed. Mario Diani and Doug McAdam, (Oxford, NY: Oxford University Press, 2003), 289–290.

²⁶¹ Ibid.

²⁶² Bernard Norling, *The Intrepid Guerrillas of North Luzon* (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 1999), 6.

²⁶³ Benedict J. Kerkvliet *The Huk Rebellion: A Study of Peasant Revolt in the Philippines* (Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1977), 76–79.

attempt to escape to Australia.²⁶⁴ Filipinos guerrillas generally fell into two categories: bandits attempting to profit by the situation,²⁶⁵ or Filipino army officers organizing resistance.²⁶⁶ As isolated individuals and groups fled from the Japanese army they found one another, organized among a supportive Filipino population, and settled in for resistance.²⁶⁷ Ultimately, MacArthur's 1945 campaign to liberate the archipelago would be supported by 182,000 organized and armed guerrillas, a network of 126 radio stations, and 27 weather-reporting stations.²⁶⁸ As will be demonstrated using the following four of the more prominent examples, across the five phases of the underground, organizing resistance was both pragmatic for reasons of survival as well as securing themselves from Japanese brutality.

Two key observations should be noted in the first phase of underground development. First, the guerrillas emerged before the underground, and second, existing structures were used to develop the underground. After a few false starts the guerrillas largely began developing underground networks to sustain themselves with resources and information, as well as to buffer themselves against repression. This is consistent with Giap's assertion²⁶⁹ that the underground must develop sufficiently before the guerrilla emerges in order that the whole might be resilient.

²⁶⁴ Major Peter T. Sinclair II, *Men of Destiny: The American and Filipino Guerrillas During the Japanese Occupation of the Philippines* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff College, 2011), 27.

²⁶⁵ Ibid., 31.

²⁶⁶ Ira Wolfert, *American Guerrilla in the Philippines* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1945), 121–126.

²⁶⁷ ²⁶⁷ Mike Guardia, *American Guerrilla: The Forgotten Heroics of Russell W. Volckmann* (Philadelphia, PA: Casemate Publishers, 2010), 56–57.

²⁶⁸ William B. Breuer, *Retaking the Philippines: America's Return to Corregidor and Bataan, October 1944 – March 1945* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986) 21. This doesn't account for Huk activities.

²⁶⁹ Vo Nguyen Giap, *Vo Nguyen Giap: Selected Writings* (Hanoi: The Gioi Publishers, 1994), 238–240.

The second item is the use made of mobilizing structures²⁷⁰ in the development of the underground. In each of the cases reviewed in this chapter, the guerrilla forces used pre-existing structures, such as barrio leadership or labor organizations, to create an underground. In this manner, the guerrillas converted villages and tribes into large auxiliaries, in which cells could be established.²⁷¹ All of these mobilizing structures come from formal and informal social networks.²⁷² Passy notes three essential functions of social networks that are critical to the understanding of the embedded organizer in developing a resistance network: the socialization function, structural connection function, and decision shaping function.²⁷³ To paraphrase, individual participation in social networks will be indicative of the intensity of the individuals participation in the resistance network, interpersonal ties invoke culture and trust in recruiting new members, and the social network itself will give the potential recruit a model of “correct” social behavior.²⁷⁴

Interpersonal relations between networks also facilitates resource mobilization, particularly in areas experiencing a great degree of state imposed order, or repression. According to Osa, in closed regimes social networks provide information with regards to safely navigating illicit systems, what the going rate is for bribing an official, for example.²⁷⁵ Because of this sort of situation, social networks function as both “media”

²⁷⁰ Doowan Lee, “A Social Movement Theory Approach to Unconventional Warfare” unpublished draft, forthcoming in *Special Warfare Magazine* 26 (2013). In general mobilizing structures are the pre-existing channels of communication, informal information exchange, traditional resource mobilization mediums, and methods of social exchange.

²⁷¹ Robert B. Baer, *The Devil We Know*, (New York: Crown Publishing Group, 2008), 88. The case of the guerrillas organizing existing groups in the Philippines is similar to that of Hezbollah organizing existing groups in Lebanon, and later in Basra.

²⁷² Quintan Wiktorowicz, “Introduction: Islamic Activism and Social Movement Theory,” in *Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach*, ed. Quintan Wiktorowicz (Bloomington IN: Indiana University Press, 2004), 9–13.

²⁷³ Florence Passy, “Social Networks Matter. But How?” in *Social Movements and Networks*, ed. Mario Diani and Doug McAdam, (Oxford, NY: Oxford University Press, 2003), 23–28.

²⁷⁴ Ibid.

²⁷⁵ Maryjane Osa, “Networks in Opposition: Linking Organizations Through Activists in the Polish People’s Republic.” In *Social Movements and Networks*, ed. Mario Diani and Doug McAdam (Oxford, NY: Oxford University Press, 2003), 77–104.

and mobilization organization.²⁷⁶ By using pre-existing social networks this way, movement entrepreneurs can lower the information and transaction cost of resource mobilization. They can also maximize participation by manipulating the same social networks for demonstrations and other contentious actions.²⁷⁷

The effect of interpersonal relationships or the lack thereof is evident throughout this case study. The relationships developed by the united front before the occupation were critical to the development of the Huk movement; by contrast the Huks and the USAFFE guerrillas were unable to develop a relationship and as a consequence fought one another as much as the Japanese.²⁷⁸

1. Structural Configuration in Phase One

The organizations that formed the Huks were able to create a resilient network capable of resisting a determined occupying power, unburdened by rules of engagement.²⁷⁹ First, interpersonal relationships existed prior to the occupation. These interpersonal relationships bridged developed social networks, enabling the collective to resist occupation across a large portion of Luzon.²⁸⁰ Second, the individual groups had already developed a common narrative against the structures utilized by the Japanese to impose order.²⁸¹ Third, when the military committee formed the Hukbalahap movement and expanded throughout central Luzon, a collective identity as a people in resistance

²⁷⁶ Osa, Maryjane “Networks in Opposition: Linking Organizations Through Activists in the Polish People’s Republic.” In *Social Movements and Networks*, ed. Mario Diani and Doug McAdam (Oxford, NY: Oxford University Press, 2003), 77–104.

²⁷⁷ Anheier, Helmut “Movement Development and Organizational Networks: The Role of ‘Single Members’ in the German Nazi Party, 1925–1930.” In *Social Movements and Networks*, ed. Mario Diani and Doug McAdam, (Oxford, NY: Oxford University Press, 2003), 49–54.

²⁷⁸ Mike Guardia, *American Guerrilla: The Forgotten Heroics of Russell W. Volckmann* (Philadelphia, PA: Casemate Publishers, 2010)61–63. Volckmann reports that Thorpe rejected the Huks offer to work together against the Japanese, resulting in an ongoing standoff. By Ramsey’s account, the Huks sentenced him to death in absentia, and made several efforts to kill him.

²⁷⁹ Benedict J. Kerkvliet *The Huk Rebellion: A Study of Peasant Revolt in the Philippines* (Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1977), 97–98.

²⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 97–98. As noted earlier in the text, the military committee, by design, had leaders from several of the barrio based networks.

²⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 68, 102. The armed guards used by absentee landlords to enforce their policies on the tenant farmers and the Philippine Constabulary force were used to repress agrarian peasant movements throughout the 1930s; each of the barrio based movements had a common grievance against them.

quickly developed as a result of the common narrative. Finally, the interpersonal relationships that developed outside of the united front, among other things, gave the Huks sufficient resiliency to survive the near dissolution of the formal organization of the united front.²⁸²

Initially, the Huk organization at the Barrio level was indistinguishable from its KPMP or AMT roots. The chief function of the organization was in response to the power vacuum immediately following the Japanese invasion. First, the Japanese army moved through villages with great violence.²⁸³ Second, following the surrender of U.S. Forces in Bataan and Corregidor, Japanese soldiers and the Philippine Constabulary were pursuing guerrillas. This resulted in a situation where peasants were hiding in evacuation camps in the remote jungle and mountainous regions of the country. Because of this, there was no government apparatus to perform the routine functions of the state, including law enforcement; there was a great deal of Carabao rustling and looting, and the Huks stepped in to restore law and order to the rural countryside.²⁸⁴

In the first phase, the Huks had already organized themselves into five one hundred man squadrons. They had divided Central Luzon into five districts and assigned a squadron to each. Presiding over the five squadrons was a single echelon of command, the general headquarters, led by El Supremo, Luis Taruc along with three other community leaders from Central Luzon.²⁸⁵ This organization was able to effectively manage shadow government and offer the Japanese resistance because of the semi-autonomous nature of the squads and squadrons. The absence of a centralized command and a rigid order-execution process allowed squad leaders at the barrio level to take as much or as little action as was appropriate to their situation. A squad with limited

²⁸² Benedict J. Kerkvliet *The Huk Rebellion: A Study of Peasant Revolt in the Philippines* (Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1977), 99–104. The united front was quickly reduced to a few underground organizations with limited goals and abilities. Organizations like the PKP, or communist party, survived but were unable to wield control over the Huks.

²⁸³ *Ibid.*, 62–63.

²⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 70.

²⁸⁵ Benedict J. Kerkvliet *The Huk Rebellion: A Study of Peasant Revolt in the Philippines* (Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1977), 79–80. While Volckmann and Blackburn were still evading north, they were sheltered briefly by a local Huk commander and greatly impressed by their organization and discipline.

ammunition or facing a heavy enemy presence would obviously have fewer operations than a resource and opportunity rich squad. The squad leaders were enabled to take action accordingly.²⁸⁶ This system of organization also offered the Huks a boost in resiliency. The fully developed system had a robust vertical hierarchy that started with the Barrio United Defense Corps, the underground system at the barrio level, its associated squad, the squadron and finally the command level. Horizontally, the system was replicated across central Luzon, making the Huk movement itself very resilient to repression.

The other two types of guerrilla organizations, sanctioned and semi sanctioned groups under Colonel Thorpe and the independent movements of Volckmann and Fertig established themselves at a less ambitious rate than the Huks. The guerrilla movements established by these officers was initially isolated groups of two or three attempting to, “Do any damn thing but surrender.”²⁸⁷ These small groups eventually coalesced in evacuation camps in the rugged hinterlands, where Filipinos and American businessmen and their families were hiding from the Japanese.²⁸⁸

It was these camps that transitioned soldiers and officers into guerrillas by bringing them together and directing them to other guerrilla organizations. Volckmann and Blackburn were guided to Lieutenant Colonels Moses and Noble through the evacuation camps,²⁸⁹ and how Lieutenant Ramsey was able to get a copy of the book of Mao’s writings on guerrilla warfare that inspired his own organization.²⁹⁰

286 Benedict J. Kerkvliet *The Huk Rebellion: A Study of Peasant Revolt in the Philippines* (Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1977), 94. Luis Taruc’s guidance, as commander-in-chief, was to conduct three actions monthly; this was not uniformly acted upon.

287 John Keats, *They Fought Alone* (New York: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1963), 10. LTC Fertig’s response was to a soldier accompanying him asking what they were going to do during their initial evasion of Japanese forces.

288 Mike Guardia, *American Guerrilla: The Forgotten Heroics of Russell W. Volckmann* (Philadelphia, PA: Casemate Publishers, 2010), 49. Evacuation camps were “Operated on a small network throughout most of Luzon. Their inhabitants came from every walk of life: American businessmen and their families, wealthy Filipinos, tenant farmers, missionaries, school teachers - civilians who had lost their homes during the invasion and fled to the wilderness in hopes of waiting out the Japs.”

289 Philip Harkins, *Blackburn’s Headhunters* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1955), 58–73.

290 Edwin Price Ramsey, Stephen J. Rivele, *Lieutenant Ramsey’s War: From Horse Soldier to Guerrilla Commander* (New York: Knightsbridge Publishing Company, 1990), 111–112.

Evacuation camps provided for a safe haven for the guerrilla or underground organizer. Although it was happenstance²⁹¹ and fantastic fortune²⁹² that evading groups of soldiers found safe haven among the civilian population in the hinterlands, it was nevertheless a key organizational structure that funneled soldiers into nascent guerrilla organizations. These remote camps were a good example of the safe haven called for by Maoist doctrine, and very similar to Mao's own remote mountain camps during his revolution.

2. Intelligence and Recruitment in Phase One

Intelligence in the first phase was as a result of the “bamboo telegraph,” a system whereby designated runners would carry news and gossip from one village to the next.²⁹³ This information supply chain brought a great deal of false intelligence, but it was also how the USAFFE guerrilla bands received word about other guerrilla organizations that were forming.²⁹⁴

This is an example of an emerging underground taking advantage of an organic, informal channel to protect itself from state repression. Using this system of transferring information from village to village, the underground was able to leverage an existing capability, invisible to the counterinsurgency force, to transfer intelligence.²⁹⁵ Cunning guerrilla leaders such as Volckmann and Blackburn were also able to leverage this for

²⁹¹ Mike Guardia, *American Guerrilla: The Forgotten Heroics of Russell W. Volckmann* (Philadelphia, PA: Casemate Publishers, 2010), 43–49. Volckmann and Blackburn's escape from Bataan is series of fortunate events that bring them to an evacuation camp.

²⁹² Ira Wolfert, *American Guerrilla in the Philippines* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1945), 63–73. Lieutenant Richardson was attempting to sail a small boat from the Philippines to Australia, and cap sized the craft within sight of the shore; eight hours of ocean swimming brought them near both death and shore, and only the support of the local natives saved them.

²⁹³ Mike Guardia, *American Guerrilla: The Forgotten Heroics of Russell W. Volckmann* (Philadelphia, PA: Casemate Publishers, 2010), 73.

²⁹⁴ Mike Guardia, *American Guerrilla: The Forgotten Heroics of Russell W. Volckmann* (Philadelphia, PA: Casemate Publishers, 2010), 73–74.

²⁹⁵ Mike Guardia, *American Guerrilla: The Forgotten Heroics of Russell W. Volckmann* (Philadelphia, PA: Casemate Publishers, 2010), 73–74. There was no way to validate information coming from the “telegraph” system.

counterintelligence purposes, by feeding it misinformation intended to be fed into the Japanese intelligence cycle.²⁹⁶

In the organizational phase, the Japanese forces were still violently repressing the civilian population, and as such the greatest security threat to the isolated groups of guerrillas and Huks alike was avoiding Japanese patrols. Interaction between the emerging resistance groups was high as movement entrepreneurs²⁹⁷ like Volckmann and Taruc encountered one another in evacuation camps and during movements.²⁹⁸ Volckmann and Blackburn's interaction with the Thorpe organization caused them to reject his preference for Americans and seek recruits from the Igorot tribes;²⁹⁹ The Huk's interaction with the USAFFE organizations led them to take pride in their preference for continuous engagement with the Japanese.³⁰⁰

The USAFFE and USFIP guerrilla organizations had a large number of early volunteers, but a majority of these were interested in establishing camps and waiting out the war, such as the soldiers at the Faussett camp described by Blackburn.³⁰¹ The Huks had a slightly different variation of the same problem; initially anyone could join a Huk group. This led to discipline issues wherein new members would abuse their new status as a guerrilla and a man with a gun.³⁰² It also created a situation that allowed the organization to be infiltrated by informers. In response to this, the Huk's placed new

²⁹⁶ Mike Guardia, *American Guerrilla: The Forgotten Heroics of Russell W. Volckmann* (Philadelphia, PA: Casemate Publishers, 2010), 82.

²⁹⁷ This is defined in Chapter II: "A movement entrepreneur's goal is to establish, expand, and ultimately maximize movement operations at his or her level."

²⁹⁸ Sydney G. Tarrow, *Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 122–123. Tarrow noted that organizations "...emerge out of episodes of contention through interaction with authorities, allies, and third parties."

²⁹⁹ Mike Guardia, *American Guerrilla: The Forgotten Heroics of Russell W. Volckmann* (Philadelphia, PA: Casemate Publishers, 2010), 61–63.

³⁰⁰ Benedict J. Kerkvliet *The Huk Rebellion: A Study of Peasant Revolt in the Philippines* (Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1977), 93–94.

³⁰¹ Philip Harkins, *Blackburn's Headhunters* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1955), 58–73.

³⁰² Benedict J. Kerkvliet *The Huk Rebellion: A Study of Peasant Revolt in the Philippines* (Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1977), 71.

members on probation and restricted guns to experienced, trusted members. This ultimately resulted in an increase in popularity and discipline within the ranks.³⁰³

3. Summary of Guerrilla Groups in Phase One

The dispersed nature of the evading soldiers was also instrumental in aiding the guerrilla in favor of the Japanese. First, pursuing the small groups took soldiers and resources away from consolidating the Japanese occupation. Second, two or three evading soldiers were not particularly burdensome on the civilian population. They could be housed, fed, and guided on to the next evacuation camp or village without undue risk to the community that they imposed upon. These groups were not acting in coordination. Rather they had decided individually that they would not surrender and they would resist the Japanese efforts at governance and calls for surrender.

The account of Walter Cushing is interesting in that, while he did kill over a thousand Japanese soldiers and destroy a sizeable amount of equipment, he also recognized that when the USAFFE surrendered, further overt resistance on his part was futile. Rather than continuing his assaults on Japanese garrisons he dispersed his forces into small bands to maintain resistance and gather intelligence. This deliberate delay in resistance allowed the Japanese to fall into a routine and allowed Cushing to mobilize resources through his contacts in Manila and establish cells throughout Luzon. By contrast, the Huk insistence on immediate action against the Japanese earned them immediate reprisals, via the “Zona” technique, whereby the Japanese would surround a barrio with 30 to 40 men, detain anyone suspicious, and take them off for torture and imprisonment.³⁰⁴

Security in phase one was largely nonexistent for each of the groups reviewed above. Volckmann’s organization in this phase had made one aborted attempt to seize a collaborator, the results of which were Japanese pursuit of him and his staff in the mountains of north Luzon. During the pursuit, through the use of a local “spotter”

³⁰³ Benedict J. Kerkvliet *The Huk Rebellion: A Study of Peasant Revolt in the Philippines* (Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1977), 71.

³⁰⁴ Benedict J. Kerkvliet *The Huk Rebellion: A Study of Peasant Revolt in the Philippines* (Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1977), 66–67.

Volckmann discovered that the Japanese were searching for Blackburn and himself by name. The realization taught him that there were informers in his organization, and that he could do little about it;³⁰⁵ from that point on, he made it operational policy to tell the locals that he was doing the opposite of what he intended. Likewise the Huks learned that a poor screening process would bring Japanese collaborators into the squadron at worst, at best some recruits alienated the local population through a lack of discipline.³⁰⁶

The first phase in this case study is heavy with activists, or what are referred to social movement theory lexicon as movement entrepreneurs. Movement entrepreneurs are active, full-time movement developers that facilitate the development of bridging structures between networks; the goal is the maximization of participation in the movement.³⁰⁷ In the examples of Ramsey and Volckmann, each initially began to expand his organization by contacting local, informal civil leadership in the communities within their respective areas of operation; once contact was made they combined the resources of these separate communities toward a common purpose.

³⁰⁵ Mike Guardia, *American Guerrilla: The Forgotten Heroics of Russell W. Volckmann* (Philadelphia, PA: Casemate Publishers, 2010), 85. Japanese forces were within two hours of catching Volckmann at his camp as a result of local informers.

³⁰⁶ Benedict J. Kerkvliet *The Huk Rebellion: A Study of Peasant Revolt in the Philippines* (Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1977), 71.

³⁰⁷ Helmut Anheier "Movement Development and Organizational Networks: The Role of 'Single Members' in the German Nazi Party, 1925–1930." In *Social Movements and Networks*, ed. Mario Diani and Doug McAdam (Oxford, NY: Oxford University Press, 2003), 53.



Figure 1. Guerrillas in the Philippines, 1942–1945³⁰⁸

³⁰⁸ General Staff of General MacArthur, *Reports of General MacArthur, Volume 1* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 1994), 299.

D. PHASE TWO: THE PSYCHOLOGICAL OFFENSIVE

Following the surrender of USAFFE forces³⁰⁹ and the subsequent Bataan Death March, the Japanese army turned to the business of occupation. In April 1942, the Japanese restricted the unmitigated violence by soldiers against civilians, and circulated leaflets directing civilians to return from evacuation camps to the barrios, and plant their crops. A Filipino puppet government was established, schools were re-opened, taxes imposed, and the Japanese brought in agricultural experts to improve productivity. Since the Japanese were not interfering with property rights, the absentee landlords moved to Manila, and supported the puppet government, leaving the rural farm and hinterland areas for the disparate guerrilla outfits and the Japanese to fight over.³¹⁰

This turn to governance generally marked the transition from the organizational phase to the psychological offensive phase in the development of the underground. Once USAFFE guerrillas like Ramsey and Thorpe established camps and chains of commands they set about establishing operational and intelligence cells without delay.³¹¹ Independent guerrillas such as Volckmann and Richardson fell under existing chains of command; Wendell Fertig promoted himself to general and assumed command of nearby Filipino guerrillas and bands of outlaws.³¹²

When the Japanese directed that civilians return to the barrio, they also directed them to establish “neighborhood associations” that were responsible for monitoring and reporting on the activities of neighbors,³¹³ which the Huks gladly established. The neighborhood associations that Huks established gave the illusion of compliance, while

³⁰⁹ Not to be confused with the USAFFE resistance group.

³¹⁰ Benedict J. Kerkvliet *The Huk Rebellion: A Study of Peasant Revolt in the Philippines* (Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1977), 63–66.

³¹¹ Edwin Price Ramsey, Stephen J. Rivele, *Lieutenant Ramsey's War: From Horse Soldier to Guerrilla Commander* (New York: Knightsbridge Publishing Company, 1990), 109–111. When Ramsey arrived at Thorpe's guerrilla camp, he organized work crews to build a series of headquarters buildings, found a Filipino with a mimeograph machine, and started producing anti-Japanese propaganda to rally local support.

³¹² Major Peter T. Sinclair II, *Men of Destiny: The American and Filipino Guerrillas During the Japanese Occupation of the Philippines* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff College, 2011), 12–13.

³¹³ Benedict J. Kerkvliet *The Huk Rebellion: A Study of Peasant Revolt in the Philippines* (Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1977), 66.

providing a cover for subversive activities; this was the basic element of the Huk underground organization.³¹⁴

Resistance organizations form exclusive insider groups as shields against state repression. Exclusive groups allow the organization to overcome the states use of informants, compartmentalize the organization against state action, and facilitate clandestine activity.³¹⁵ In the previous examples of organizational development, the growing compartmentalization allowed the guerrillas to reduce the effectiveness of informers. It also allowed a gradual inclusion process to develop, whereby recruits would move through lower echelons of the system in a transmission belt fashion, rising through the organization as appropriate.

1. Establishing Cells in Phase Two

Guerrilla organizations, from 1942 until the liberation in 1944, generally fell into one of two operational categories: intelligence gathering for MacArthur, or conducting operations against the Japanese.³¹⁶ Volckmann and Ramsey fell decidedly into the first camp, and the Huks decidedly in the latter; Colonel Kangleon's outfit conducted both out of necessity, in response to Japanese counter-insurgency efforts.³¹⁷ All of the guerrillas found themselves administering civil government in one form or another, requiring a different series of cells to be established.³¹⁸

³¹⁴ Benedict J. Kerkvliet *The Huk Rebellion: A Study of Peasant Revolt in the Philippines* (Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1977), 74–75.

³¹⁵ Mohammed M. Hafez, "From Marginalization to Massacres: A political Process Explanation of GIA Violence in Algeria" in *Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach*, ed. Quintan Wiktorowicz (Bloomington IN: Indiana University Press, 2004), 40–41.

³¹⁶ Major Peter T. Sinclair II, *Men of Destiny: The American and Filipino Guerrillas During the Japanese Occupation of the Philippines* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff College, 2011), 27–28.

³¹⁷ Ira Wolfert, *American Guerrilla in the Philippines* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1945), 202–208. Colonel Kangleon's guerrillas fell organizationally under General Fertig's command.

³¹⁸ Major Peter T. Sinclair II, *Men of Destiny: The American and Filipino Guerrillas During the Japanese Occupation of the Philippines* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff College, 2011), 29–30.

a. Intelligence gathering

MacArthur's guidance to Thorpe was to organize the civilian population, gather intelligence, and prepare to support his return; in doing so, the Luzon guerrilla organization did not lack volunteers. Cells within Manila were established to gather intelligence and resources, cells-in-a-series were established as couriers to move information overland to meet U.S. submarines, and transfer information to MacArthur in Australia, and distribute resources to rural guerrillas.³¹⁹ Common between these cells is the utilization of traditional practices, such as coastal spotters watching for ships and relaying news or runners moving information between villages, into the underground.³²⁰

b. Operational Cells

In this phase, the operational cells were focused on propaganda and resource mobilization. In the north, Volckmann organized voluntary labor units under local leadership, called "Bolo Battalions,"³²¹ by issuing a call to support his guerrilla staff to local village leaders. Initially, his call for support was to rebuild an old sawmill, fix phone lines connecting other former sawmill-guerrilla camps, and to provide material support in the form of food and other dry goods. In return, he offered I.O.U. vouchers to be reimbursed upon liberation.³²² This is an example of effective bloc recruitment, where rather than recruit individuals into assisting the organization, Volckmann was able to leverage his credibility as a U.S. Army officer to gain collective support from local

³¹⁹ Edwin Price Ramsey, Stephen J. Rivele, *Lieutenant Ramsey's War: From Horse Soldier to Guerrilla Commander* (New York: Knightsbridge Publishing Company, 1990), 114–145.

³²⁰ Helmut Anheier "Movement Development and Organizational Networks: The Role of 'Single Members' in the German Nazi Party, 1925–1930." In *Social Movements and Networks*, ed. Mario Diani and Doug McAdam (Oxford, NY: Oxford University Press, 2003), 53. The use of preexisting social networks enhances the development of the organization when structures emerge along traditional lines. This decreases the time and resources necessary to the development of the network, as it is already in place, and decreases the time necessary to develop efficiency.

³²¹ R. W. Volckmann, *We Remained: Three Years Behind the Enemy Lines in the Philippines*, (New York: WW Norton & Company, 1954), 126–127.

³²² Mike Guardia, *American Guerrilla: The Forgotten Heroics of Russell W. Volckmann* (Philadelphia, PA: Casemate Publishers, 2010), 79–80. Volckmann wasn't certain the civilians would respond to his call for support or not, he did so anyway, believing that "if he acted like an officer from a defeated army, he would be treated as such."

communities. Similarly, Ramsey formed his initial intelligence network by reaching out to nearby communities to establish cells.

In this phase, both Ramsey and Cushing had established cells for receiving information from San Francisco via radio. The information from these broadcasts was then distributed in newsletters that had not been censored by the Japanese. In addition to being a news source, they vilified the occupying army, and called for local support to the guerrillas.³²³

Fertig, a civilian civil-engineer in the reserves, had thought ahead of time to secure the components for a radio transmitter, an encoding device, and scrounged parts for a telegraph. While attempting to bring all of the guerrillas, outlaws, and unaffiliated resistors in Mindanao under his command, he established a cell consisting of an Army Air Corp soldier and two radio operators from the Navy. This cell eventually contacted San Francisco and General MacArthur's Southwest Pacific Headquarters.³²⁴

2. The Psychological Contest for Popular Support

The Huks established a cultural and information committee headed by Jaun Feleo. It was responsible for organizing skits, songs, and short dramas to be performed by a group traveling between barrios as a means to counter Japanese propaganda and boost civilian morale. The committee also issued a newsletter that praised the Huks, denigrated fascism and the Japanese, and praised the coming liberation by American arms.³²⁵ These mobile Huk morale organizations were good examples of employing what Lenin referred to as going among the people agitators and organizers,³²⁶ and what Giap would refer to

³²³ Ibid., 110.

³²⁴ Ira Wolfert, *American Guerrilla in the Philippines* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1945), 133–135.

³²⁵ Benedict J. Kerkvliet *The Huk Rebellion: A Study of Peasant Revolt in the Philippines* (Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1977), 95–96. The committee was comprised of peasants, trade unionists, and university personnel hiding in the mountains. They had a mimeograph machine and were able to produce about three thousand copies of a one to two page newsletter a week.

³²⁶ Vladimir Lenin, "What is to be Done" in *V. I. Lenin: Collected Works Volume 5, May 1901 – February 1902* (Moscow, Russia: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1961), 422–425.

as an armed propaganda team.³²⁷ These were effective for two reasons. First, they demonstrated to communities that the resistance movement was taking action. Second, demonstrating that a resistance movement was organized and taking action contributed to cognitive liberation among the civilian population.³²⁸ This was done by diffusing the idea that the Japanese were being fought and that there was hope for the future.

All of these early propaganda efforts were important early efforts at framing. Framing is the process by which the resistance movement develops interpretive schemata that define the world by simplifying it into “who we are,” “who they are,” “and what happens next.” This is how movements attempt to connect with other movements and aids in the development of the movement’s narrative.³²⁹ The efforts to publish newsletters, spread information via runners and propaganda teams were important to the development of the resistance because they informed other less developed groups or isolated groups of would-be resistors that they were not alone, that they could resist occupation, and that MacArthur would return. This increased the development of cognitive liberation among the civilian population.

Colonel Kangleon, the guerrilla leader on Leyte that was to later fall under General Fertig’s organization, organized a self-sufficient organization,³³⁰ in a region overrun with other “guerrillas” that looted villages at gun point, made speeches, and left for the hills. The Japanese were content to allow the guerrillas to alienate the population, and took no early action to restore order. Kangleon’s fair practices with the civilian population, as well as his status as the only native Filipino to serve in the pre-war army as

³²⁷ Douglas Pike, *Viet Cong: The Organization and Techniques of the National Liberation Front of South Viet Nam* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1966), 34–35.

³²⁸ Doowan Lee, “A Social Movement Theory Approach to Unconventional Warfare” unpublished draft, forthcoming in *Special Warfare Magazine* 26 (2013).

³²⁹ Sydney G. Tarrow, *Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 142–145.

³³⁰ Ira Wolfert, *American Guerrilla in the Philippines* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1945). Colonel Kangleon’s headquarters manufactured soap and initially sustained itself by proceeds from its sale. Blackburn’s “headhunters” similarly made and sold baskets to support the guerrillas.

a division commander, gave his outfit credibility with the population as a legitimate organization for liberation.³³¹

Recognizing the need to maintain contact with the guerrillas and civilians, MacArthur went to great lengths to ship propaganda items via submarine to the guerrillas. Typically such match books and cigarettes had “I shall return – MacArthur” stamped on them. Included was the *Free Philippines* magazine produced by the 8th Army psychological warfare branch as well as other supplies such as small arms, ammunition, and boots.³³² By comparison the Japanese spent little time attempting to generate public support. Japanese soldiers would tell villagers that they were there to liberate them during operations.³³³ Japanese engineers conducted agricultural programs and other civic projects intended to increase the productivity of the country.³³⁴

The repressive methods utilized by the Japanese army in general, and the Kempeitai in particular, generated a great deal of what Hess and Martin refer to as “backfire.”³³⁵ Repression used by the state in order to impose order can be viewed as unjust by the population, resulting in massive public outrage and contributing to mass mobilization.³³⁶ The Japanese attempts at civic projects were seen, rightfully, as an attempt to make a colony more profitable.³³⁷ The Japanese counter-insurgency efforts

³³¹ Ira Wolfert, *American Guerrilla in the Philippines* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1945), 89–90; 125–126.

³³² Ira Wolfert, *American Guerrilla in the Philippines* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1945), 172–173. A local edition of the *Free Philippines* magazine was published by an underground cell using ink supplied by the army, and paper stolen from the Japanese.

³³³ Ira Wolfert, *American Guerrilla in the Philippines* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1945), 202–205.

³³⁴ Benedict J. Kerkvliet *The Huk Rebellion: A Study of Peasant Revolt in the Philippines* (Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1977), 64–65.

³³⁵ David Hess and Brian Martin, “Repression, Backfire, and the Theory of Transformative Events,” *Mobilization: an International Journal* 11(2): 249–267.

³³⁶ The authors argue that there are a series of strategies and techniques for defusing the backfire, and inhibiting the growth of social movements, while maintaining societal equilibrium. Japanese efforts at inhibiting backfire were incredibly lopsided in comparison to their liberal application of repression.

³³⁷ David Joel Steinberg, *Philippine Collaboration in World War II* (Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press, 1967), 86–87. Japanese efforts to make the Philippines into a large scale cotton plantation were part of scheme to produce needed goods efficiently. Philippine commercial agriculture was based on sugar; the Japanese empire had sufficient sugar from the Taiwan colony, and sought a cotton plantation in the Philippines. This effort contributed to an economic collapse in the Philippines.

consisted of enlisting the former Philippine Constabulary, the traditional enemy of the rural Filipino,³³⁸ creating a network of informants and puppet officials,³³⁹ and taking hostages from families to force compliance, and confiscating property.³⁴⁰

Japanese efforts at governance also failed to win the psychological battle in the rural farmlands. The puppet government that the Japanese set up was comprised of many relatives of the absentee landlord class that moved to Manila to avoid the fighting. So long as property rights were unmolested, the landed elite had an incentive to support the pro-Japanese government.³⁴¹ Unfortunately for the Japanese, this was also the class that had given rise to the predecessors of the Hukbalahap movement during the 1930s, and certainly was not going to garner support from the tenant farmers and peasants during the occupation.³⁴²

Finally, Japanese propaganda fell largely under the “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.” This rested on the idea that Japanese were superior and thus the natural leaders of East Asia.³⁴³ The East Asian war itself was being fought for the betterment of all East Asian races. The Japanese used a combination of carrots and sticks in attempting to pacify the Filipinos. At the puppet government level, this included promises for independence and threats for cooperation with the Americans.³⁴⁴ The Japanese propaganda efforts toward the civilian population were generally limited to making ridiculous claims.³⁴⁵ Japanese efforts at an information campaign directed toward the Philippine Citizenry failed to resonate at nearly all levels. As noted by David Snow

³³⁸ R. W. Volckmann, *We Remained: Three Years Behind the Enemy Lines in the Philippines* (New York: WW Norton & Company, 1954), 120–121.

³³⁹ Ibid.

³⁴⁰ Ibid.

³⁴¹ Benedict J. Kerkvliet *The Huk Rebellion: A Study of Peasant Revolt in the Philippines* (Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1977), 65–66.

³⁴² Benedict J. Kerkvliet *The Huk Rebellion: A Study of Peasant Revolt in the Philippines* (Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1977), 65–68. All of the enemies of the peasants and tenant farmers, the Philippine Constabulary, the landed elite, government officials, and police, were brought together by the Japanese to become the Vichy government of the Philippines.

³⁴³ A. J. Grajdanzev, “Japan’s Co-Prosperity Sphere,” *Pacific Affairs* 16 (1943) 313.

³⁴⁴ A. J. Grajdanzev, “Japan’s Co-Prosperity Sphere,” *Pacific Affairs* 16 (1943), 324–325.

³⁴⁵ Bernard Norling, *The Intrepid Guerrillas of North Luzon* (Lexington KY: University Press of Kentucky, 1999), 178–179.

and several others, participation in a social movement requires the correct interpretation of grievance, frame alignment, and narrative maintenance.³⁴⁶

3. Summary of Guerrilla Groups in Phase Two

MacArthur's mandate to the guerrillas, known as the "lay low order" put strong emphasis on gathering intelligence, organizing the civilian population, and avoiding contact with the enemy.³⁴⁷ In executing this, Ramsey and Volckmann's organizations spent a great deal of time organizing cells for the transmission of information and getting the local population involved in supporting the organization with labor and other low risk activities. This initial support was similar in nature to the Viet Cong approach to recruiting, by involving recruits initially in small tasks, and then increasingly difficult or dangerous tasks over time. By gathering the peasants together in work details, people became accustomed to providing support to the guerrillas. This was also the early development of redundant layers in the organization; as guerrilla leaders developed bridging structures to civic leaders they effectively created subordinate organizations, and additional buffering layers that would allow the organization as a whole to absorb repression.

The tertiary effect of avoiding contact with the Japanese was the deliberate delay effect noted in the first phase. By concentrating on propaganda and peasant mobilization without giving the Japanese cause for alarm (as compared to the Huks, who were actively attacking the Japanese) allowed the Japanese to either become lackadaisical in matters of security or to simply focus their attention elsewhere. This also allowed the nascent groups to develop their respective frames through interaction with the population without invoking repression from the Japanese.

The guerrilla bands avoided predatory practices with the civilian population, greatly increasing their credibility. The Huks were known to pay either in pesos for food

³⁴⁶ David Snow, et al., "Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation," *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 51, No. 4. (August, 1986), 464–481.

³⁴⁷ R. W. Volckmann, *We Remained: Three Years Behind the Enemy Lines in the Philippines*, (New York: WW Norton & Company, 1954), 120–121. There are many interpretations of the "lay low" order; notable among these is that MacArthur feared guerrilla warfare could be effective and would further discredit his actions at the outset of the war.

and supplies or even share their own food.³⁴⁸ Colonel Kangleon's early organization was largely self-sufficient in terms of sustaining themselves with the basic necessities by farming in their remote camps, and even selling homemade soap.³⁴⁹ Blackburn's Headhunters partially supported themselves by weaving baskets and chicken coops from rattan and selling them in Antipolo.³⁵⁰ Ramsey went so far in regards to protecting the population from deprivation, that he restricted action to small acts of sabotage and avoided any grand acts of violence that would put the population at risk of reprisal.³⁵¹ Combined with the advantage of popular support stemming from harsh Japanese repression, resource sufficiency greatly enhanced the operational independence of the underground. As a result, the Japanese' population control measure had little impact on the underground's ability to continue operations.

Early propaganda efforts alerted potential guerrilla recruits that there were means of resistance at hand, and that the United States was not going to abandon the Philippines, despite Japanese propaganda. Likewise, the Huk propaganda efforts caused the rural population to know that there was a purpose to resistance. The support from MacArthur, as a link to the outside world and unavailable consumer and guerrilla goods, in the propaganda phase contributed greatly to countering Japanese propaganda; another productive result of MacArthur's support and communication was a second newsletter produced by Volckmann for the guerrillas, in which he related Allied milestones in the Atlantic and his personal communication with MacArthur.³⁵² By establishing the propaganda cells early on, the guerrillas were able to contribute to preventing the Japanese propaganda effort from gaining resonance among the population.

³⁴⁸ Benedict J. Kerkvliet *The Huk Rebellion: A Study of Peasant Revolt in the Philippines* (Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1977), 64.

³⁴⁹ Ira Wolfert, *American Guerrilla in the Philippines* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1945), 124–125.

³⁵⁰ Philip Harkins, *Blackburn's Headhunters* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1955), 150.

³⁵¹ Edwin Price Ramsey, Stephen J. Rivele, *Lieutenant Ramsey's War: From Horse Soldier to Guerrilla Commander* (New York: Knightsbridge Publishing Company, 1990), 254–255.

³⁵² Mike Guardia, *American Guerrilla: The Forgotten Heroics of Russell W. Volckmann* (Philadelphia, PA: Casemate Publishers, 2010), 110.

E. PHASE THREE: EXPANSION

In the case of the Philippines during the Japanese occupation, the expansion phase saw the most activity and organization. The Japanese had lost the counter insurgency initiative as guerrilla outfits and underground cells formed in the country side and within Manila, and MacArthur was able to run submarines with supplies through blockades in support of the resistance.

Two significant events in this phase are the expansion of the guerrilla organizations into shadow government and the use of embedded movement entrepreneurs for bloc recruitment. Embeddedness is the degree to which early organizers and recruited members are involved in social networks within a given community.³⁵³ First, an organizer embedded in formal and informal networks enjoys a corresponding degree of authority and influence in the community.³⁵⁴ Embedded organizers also have the ability to recruit entire social networks from within the network, as opposed to either recruiting individuals or soliciting organizations from the outside.³⁵⁵ There is likewise an increase in resilience as a result of the amount of networks that an organizer is embedded in. Second, breadth of network membership grants access to a corresponding level of resource mobilization allowing for greater levels of collaboration and, dispersion of the risk.³⁵⁶ When the risk is dispersed and collectivized, it is easier to achieve a “cognitive liberation,” which in turn can make the movement more sustainable.³⁵⁷

³⁵³ Christopher Ansell “Community Embeddedness and Collaborative Governance in the San Francisco Bay Area Environmental Movement .” In *Social Movements and Networks*, ed. Mario Diani and Doug McAdam, (Oxford, NY: Oxford University Press, 2003), 125.

³⁵⁴ Helmut Anheier, “Movement Development and Organizational Networks: The Role of ‘Single Members’ in the German Nazi Party, 1925–1930.” In *Social Movements and Networks*, ed. Mario Diani and Doug McAdam, (Oxford, NY: Oxford University Press, 2003), 49–71.

³⁵⁵ Saul, Alinsky, *Rules for Radicals: a Pragmatic Primer for Realistic Radicals*, (New York: Random House, 1971), 98–125.

³⁵⁶ Florence Passy, “Social Networks Matter. But How?” in *Social Movements and Networks*, ed. Mario Diani and Doug McAdam, (Oxford, NY: Oxford University Press, 2003), 21–48.

³⁵⁷ Doug McAdam, *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930–1970*, (Chicago, IL; The University of Chicago Press, 1982).

1. Recruiting and Security in Phase Three

The Huks learned from their early experiences that recruiting for the guerrilla force and the underground had to be selective. Early discipline problems as well as informants infiltrating as a result of non-selective recruitment were solved by instituting a probationary policy for new recruits, and tighter discipline in general, increasing their popularity with the people.³⁵⁸ By increasing the recruiting standards and discipline of Huk guerrillas, they also increased their collective identity as “soldiers defending the people from abuse” and increased the resonance of their narrative with the people they undertook to defend against abuse.

As Ramsay and Volckmann instituted a regimental system within their respective areas, security was increased as native members of regiments were assigned to a district. The location of the regimental camps was known only to the members of the regiment, and information came from couriers.³⁵⁹ This not only increased security by compartmentalizing the organization, it also increased the organizations capacity for steering the movement and bridging geographical networks by freeing upper echelons from the routine tasks of the lower echelons.

The courier system Volckmann instituted established relay stations in the jungles and mountains also increased security. Each relay station was managed by a sergeant, who would verify the identity of the courier and verify the veracity of the message being relayed. Within each relay station was a cell of couriers, the couriers to be switched between stations to protect the identity and location of the next relay station and its staff.³⁶⁰

³⁵⁸ Benedict J. Kerkvliet *The Huk Rebellion: A Study of Peasant Revolt in the Philippines* (Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1977), 71. The Hukbalahap had a large number of potential recruits rejected for disciplinary reasons. One of the complaints that the Huks had of the Americans, particularly Lapham’s Raiders and Ramsey’s organization, is that they took in the Huk’s rejects as well as former Constabulary soldiers.

³⁵⁹ Mike Guardia, *American Guerrilla: The Forgotten Heroics of Russell W. Volckmann* (Philadelphia, PA: Casemate Publishers, 2010), 101–107.

³⁶⁰ Mike Guardia, *American Guerrilla: The Forgotten Heroics of Russell W. Volckmann* (Philadelphia, PA: Casemate Publishers, 2010), 106.

Volckmann and Blackburn recruited among the various Igorot tribes in the sub province of Ifugao, by living in the various barrios. Aided by Bruno,³⁶¹ the pair would appeal to individual tribal leaders and the mayors of the various barrios. In this manner, Volckmann was able to recruit large blocs of guerrillas and underground supporters to his side.³⁶² By living among the tribes and taking active part in their lives and activities, the pair acted as movement entrepreneurs and effectively embedded themselves deeply into the tribal network. They were able to leverage this embeddedness to recruit entire tribes, bringing with them their organic command structures and organizational practices.

Through Colonel Kangleon, General Fertig utilized a similar technique in Leyte. Fertig's guidance to Kangleon was that first there must be unification, followed by recognized civil government in the name of President-in-Exile Quezon. With recognition, they could print legal tender backed by Quezon's exile government in Australia.³⁶³ With this in mind, Kangleon reached out to the other guerrilla leaders in Leyte, and with threats and persuasion managed to join their groups to his, with one exception.³⁶⁴ This expansion of the guerrilla organizations into shadow government increased the organizational security as civic leaders were appointed, increasing the organizational depth of the resistance.

Edwin Ramsey recruited Filipino's into intelligence cells and into the guerrilla force by contacting the community leaders in local barrios.³⁶⁵ While not embedded in the

³⁶¹ R. W. Volckmann, *We Remained: Three Years Behind the Enemy Lines in the Philippines*, (New York: WW Norton & Company, 1954), 120–121. Bruno was a Filipino soldier that joined the two and encouraged them to move to Ifugao.

³⁶² Philip Harkins, *Blackburn's Headhunters* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1955), 120–130. Japanese mistreatment of the local population certainly aided the guerrillas in winning over the support of the tribes.

³⁶³ Ira Wolfert, *American Guerrilla in the Philippines* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1945), 135–136.

³⁶⁴ Ira Wolfert, *American Guerrilla in the Philippines* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1945), 141–142. Kangleon was unable to convince a guerrilla band in the vicinity of Baybay; during an armed confrontation over 200 civilians were used as human shields (and ultimately killed) by the rogue band. The rogue outfit maintained its independence with the use of .50 caliber machine guns until the Japanese solved the problem for Fertig's group.

³⁶⁵ Edwin Price Ramsey, Stephen J. Rivele, *Lieutenant Ramsey's War: From Horse Soldier to Guerrilla Commander* (New York: Knightsbridge Publishing Company, 1990), 111.

communities, Ramsey was still able to conduct bloc recruitment by leveraging his status as a U.S. Army officer with community leaders.

2. Network Expansion in Phase Three

Operational cell networks expanded in this phase, allowing existing operational cells connect with one another. This situation enabled guerrilla networks to begin to operate as cells-in-a-series. In this operating style, a cell would perform a specific function, such as receiving information from a radio transmitter. The information would be relayed to another cell that would print the information, while yet another cell would distribute.³⁶⁶ An example of this is the coastal spotter and courier organization. Information on enemy troop and ship movements was received from spotters via courier networks, and transmitted to the Pacific South West Command.³⁶⁷ News about the war and pending liberation would be transmitted back to the radio cells, and sent by courier network to another cell that would feed information into a manufactory process.³⁶⁸ The information would be processed through a cell-in-a-series manufactory that would type the news in one cell, print copies in another, and distribute via courier network.³⁶⁹

a. Spotters and Couriers

Coastal organizations, notably Fertig's, made great use of the Filipino tradition of coastal spotters, who would watch for ship and plane movements, chart minefields, and report on the weather. When transmitters were available and working, the cells would transmit the information via radio.³⁷⁰ When they were not, vast lines of

³⁶⁶ Department of Defense, Headquarters, Department of the Army, Training Circular 18-01 Special Forces Unconventional Warfare (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2008), 2-10-2-11.

³⁶⁷ Edwin Price Ramsey, Stephen J. Rivele, *Lieutenant Ramsey's War: From Horse Soldier to Guerrilla Commander* (New York: Knightsbridge Publishing Company, 1990), 115-116. Ramsey discusses the manpower-intensive, overland courier system used to relay information. This system was used in Luzon until radio transmitters could be shipped via submarine to the guerrillas.

³⁶⁸ Ira Wolfert, *American Guerrilla in the Philippines* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1945), 234-244. This is a good example of a cell operating a radio that transmitted intelligence to the Allied force, and received news of the war in return.

³⁶⁹ Edwin Price Ramsey, Stephen J. Rivele, *Lieutenant Ramsey's War: From Horse Soldier to Guerrilla Commander* (New York: Knightsbridge Publishing Company, 1990), 254.

³⁷⁰ Ira Wolfert, *American Guerrilla in the Philippines* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1945), 246-258.

couriers, costly in terms of manpower and opportunity costs would march the information over land to pre-designated submarine landings, when the information could be passed along to the submarine crew.³⁷¹

b. *Manufactories*

The greatest common problem before the submarines could reliably run the Japanese blockades, were small arms and ammunition. Initially the guerrillas captured weapons and ammunition from the Japanese using stores liberated from abandoned training camps.³⁷² When that ran out, manufactory cells were established to create them. Other requirements for items such as fuel, a telegraph system, batteries, and eventually printing currency were established in a similar manner: the guerrillas would find somebody that knew the rudimentary work that needed to be done, train some other members, and then produce goods until the war was over or the Japanese stopped production.³⁷³ In Colonel Kangleon's guerrilla network, U.S. Navy Lieutenant Richardson established cells that scavenged for items that could be used for bullet cartridges, brass curtain rods, for example. These were brought to another cell that cut them to fit, and then moved them to another cell that assembled the bullet. Powder and projectiles were scavenged by other cells that retrieved powder from a wide variety of sources.³⁷⁴

Increasing the activities of cells to the greatest possible extent increased the ability of the resistance organizations as a whole. By involving as much of the population as possible, there is a corresponding increase in support for the movement as participants develop a vested interest as a result of the effort expended on behalf of the

³⁷¹ Edwin Price Ramsey, Stephen J. Rivele, *Lieutenant Ramsey's War: From Horse Soldier to Guerrilla Commander* (New York: Knightsbridge Publishing Company, 1990), 115–116.

³⁷² Bernard Norling, *The Intrepid Guerrillas of North Luzon* (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 1999), 1–13.

³⁷³ Ira Wolfert, *American Guerrilla in the Philippines* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1945), 152–159.

³⁷⁴ Ira Wolfert, *American Guerrilla in the Philippines* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1945), 143–145. In this example, the author describes native guerrillas dragging a volatile and unstable naval mine from the ocean and cracking it open with rudimentary tools.

organization.³⁷⁵ Second, this represents an increase in the redundancy of the organization; as new redundant cells are created to perform routine functions, the organization as a whole can more readily absorb repression. Finally, the participation of an increasing number of people has a corresponding increase in cognitive liberation.

3. Civil Government

As mentioned earlier, the key to gaining status and external support as a guerrilla organization was establishing a recognized civil government; “even if it’s only governing twelve nipa huts and a tin outhouse...”³⁷⁶ There were two types of civil governance that the guerrillas instituted. First, the regimental districting emplaced by the USAFFE guerrillas began administering barrios by default, as the local power brokers.³⁷⁷ The Huks and other Filipino led organizations, such as Kangleon’s purposefully established shadow governments in either an attempt to restore rule of law, gain recognition as an official representative of the government-in-exile, or both.

The Huks had originally created neighborhood associations to both placate the Japanese and provide cover for subversive activities. As the regionally based Huk squadrons expanded and developed more control over their regions, they converted the neighborhood associations clandestinely into Barrio United Defense Corps. The Defense Corps were responsible for gathering resources and providing support to the guerrilla squadrons. These in turn began to provide civil administration to the barrios that they defended, in the form of baptisms, weddings, jury trials, and the issuance of official documents.³⁷⁸ This organization assumed control over civil society, replaced the political organization with new symbols of authority, and developed institutions that exercised

³⁷⁵ Michael Conley, *The Communist Insurgent Infrastructure in South Vietnam: A Study of Organization and Strategy*, (Washington, DC: Center for Research in Social Systems, The American University, 1966), 19–31. This is the thought behind mass organizations in communist revolution.

³⁷⁶ Ira Wolfert, *American Guerrilla in the Philippines* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1945), 135. Wendell Fertig’s guidance to Richardson in establishing a guerrilla operation.

³⁷⁷ Edwin Price Ramsey, Stephen J. Rivele, *Lieutenant Ramsey’s War: From Horse Soldier to Guerrilla Commander* (New York: Knightsbridge Publishing Company, 1990), 180.

³⁷⁸ Benedict J. Kerkvliet *The Huk Rebellion: A Study of Peasant Revolt in the Philippines* (Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1977), 94–96.

control over the individual; this is the definition of shadow government.³⁷⁹ This structure also established an underground wherein those not suited to guerrilla work can participate in the resistance to the extent of their capacity. As the underground spans civil society in a given region the collective identity and a village in resistance emerges.

Kangleon's Filipino shadow government used its legal authority to appoint municipal functionaries and a police force. The chief function of the government was enforcing the loyalty tax, which was used for civil projects like roads and telegraphs, and mobilizing resources in response to guerrilla need.³⁸⁰

As Ramsey's control over northern Luzon grew, his ability to manipulate the politics of the puppet government increased. By encouraging underground members to run for office he was able to control several seats in the national assembly. When the Japanese pressured the assembly to vote for war against the United States, the underground members holding office were able to successfully block the vote and Japanese political warfare effort.³⁸¹ Ramsey took this action based on his interpretation of MacArthur's "lay low" order; he saw no benefit to fighting the puppet government, and reasoned that infiltrating could prove useful.

4. Developing Public Support

Two critical factors for generating public support in this case study was the presence and actions of American guerrillas in remote villages increased public support for the guerrilla's effort against the Japanese. First, guerrillas demonstrated leadership in resource mobilization by actively organizing the local population in productive, subversive tasks.³⁸² By establishing civil governance and avoiding predatory practices

³⁷⁹ Andrew Molnar, *Human Factors Considerations in Underground Insurgencies* (Washington, DC: American University Center for Research in Social Systems, 1966), 48–53.

³⁸⁰ Ira Wolfert, *American Guerrilla in the Philippines* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1945), 146–152.

³⁸¹ Edwin Price Ramsey, Stephen J. Rivele, *Lieutenant Ramsey's War: From Horse Soldier to Guerrilla Commander* (New York: Knightsbridge Publishing Company, 1990), 181.

³⁸² Mike Guardia, *American Guerrilla: The Forgotten Heroics of Russell W. Volckmann* (Philadelphia, PA: Casemate Publishers, 2010), 78–80. In this example, Volckmann recounts that local communities responded "quickly and eagerly" to his request for labor and supplies.

when mobilizing resources,³⁸³ guerrilla organizations were also able to generate public support. Taking action against the Japanese for psychological purposes³⁸⁴ also demonstrated that the guerrilla force was growing and would be successful, also contributed to public support.

This case study has two examples of actions failing to develop public support. First was the “lay low” order given by MacArthur to the USAFFE guerrillas, who were intentionally avoiding taking large actions against the Japanese.³⁸⁵ The Huk’s, however, were as actively engaging the Japanese as resources would allow.³⁸⁶ The second was the recruitment by USAFFE groups, of guerrillas that had been rejected by the Huks.³⁸⁷ These two actions not only failed to develop public support for the USAFFE organization in Central Luzon, but also led to significant fighting between the two organizations.³⁸⁸

5. Summary of Guerrilla Groups in Phase Three

Bloc recruitment served each of the guerrilla organizations in several different ways. For the Huks recruiting from within the already established KPMP and AMT brought large groups of organized peasants in the barrio under guerrilla leadership. For Kangleon’s organization bloc recruitment brought guerrilla organizations and the regions that they controlled under their leadership and expanded their ability to mobilize resources, gather intelligence for Southwest Pacific Command, and conduct operations

³⁸³ Ira Wolfert, *American Guerrilla in the Philippines* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1945), 150–154. In this example, Richardson issues a proclamation on behalf of the shadow government confiscating required goods in exchange for a U.S. voucher, good for repayment upon liberation. This exchange demonstrated a great concern for not alienating the local population with predatory practice.

³⁸⁴ Edwin Price Ramsey, Stephen J. Rivele, *Lieutenant Ramsey’s War: From Horse Soldier to Guerrilla Commander* (New York: Knightsbridge Publishing Company, 1990), 255–256.

³⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 254–255. Ramsey’s reasons for avoiding contact with the Japanese.

³⁸⁶ Benedict J. Kerkvliet *The Huk Rebellion: A Study of Peasant Revolt in the Philippines* (Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1977), 94. The guidance to each squadron was to conduct at least three actions per month. This did not always happen, in practice. “We couldn’t fight all the time...for one thing because we didn’t have enough ammunition to do that.”

³⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 71–72.

³⁸⁸ Edwin Price Ramsey, Stephen J. Rivele, *Lieutenant Ramsey’s War: From Horse Soldier to Guerrilla Commander* (New York: Knightsbridge Publishing Company, 1990), 307–310. The Huks had sentenced Ramsey to death in absentia, and numerous attempts were made by the Huks to kill him. In this example, Ramsey and the Huks avoid violence on their way to support the Allied invasion of the Philippines.

against the Japanese. Volckmann was able to bring entire tribes into his organization for the cost of living among the jungle tribes and cannibals of the Ifugao province, and Ramsey was able to establish intelligence cells in nearby communities by dealing directly with civic leaders. The process of bloc recruitment by dealing with previously organized groups was far more efficient than the individual recruitment conducted in the first phase, without the associated security risk; the security concerns of a barrio mayor or an independent guerrilla organization can largely be presumed to have been in existence before the organization was recruited.

Probationary recruitment increased the reputation of the Hukbalahap movement by reducing discipline problems, and weeding out unfit members before they can do damage. For a group that did not have the legitimacy of the Quezon government or the United States military, nor the external support of MacArthur's submarines and supplies, legitimacy was critical to both sustainment and operations. The participation in the gradual vetting process of the Huk organization contributed to a collective identity as individual members acknowledged the behavioral norms and participated in the more disciplined system.

Using the development of civil society in the advancement of the underground contributed in several ways. First, civilians not inclined or physically unable to participate in guerrilla activities or even arduous underground activities can contribute through the administration of the population. Second contributing to the shadow government, while perhaps not as risky as participating in guerrilla operations or charting sea mines, has the effect of creating a situation wherein the individual has participated and through the expenditure of personal effort will have a vested interest in seeing the effort to be successful. Finally, sharing the burden of the underground and the guerrilla force creates a collective identity and substitutes for a social network in which participants identify themselves as part of a group. Cialdini observed that when in doubt people look to the group or community as a whole for a model of correct behavior. The principle of "social proof," as he calls it, has the potential to offer other organizations an

opportunity to participate simply because “everyone is doing it.”³⁸⁹ Increasing participation increases the “rightness” of what is happening.

F. PHASES FOUR AND FIVE: MILITARIZATION AND CONSOLIDATION

In the final phases, the guerrilla groups that had not been conducting aggressive action took two steps critical to expanding their efforts; the exception to this is the Hukbalahap’s, who had been taking action against the Japanese from the beginning.³⁹⁰ The first step was organizing their respective regions into districts with a leadership hierarchy. The second was to mobilize the guerrillas into regiments and assign them to districts.³⁹¹ Organizing into regionally based regiments increased security by compartmentalizing information; locations and identities only being known to those assigned to the regiment. The regimental system also took a greater hand in shadow government within their respective regions. This increased the control of the guerrilla by giving the organization greater depth vertically, from the lowest level in the village to the higher chains of command.

1. Sabotage, Demolition, and Localized Fighting

As the liberation drew near, MacArthur’s staff demanded a greater amount of intelligence from the guerrilla organizations as well as an increase in violence and sabotage:

“MacArthur to Ramsey, starting immediately, destroy enemy wire communications, railroad tracks, rolling stock and trucks, planes concealed in dispersal areas, ammunition, oil and supply dumps...unleash maximum possible violence against the enemy...”³⁹²

³⁸⁹ Robert B. Cialdini, *Influence, The Psychology of Persuasion* (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1984).

³⁹⁰ Benedict J. Kerkvliet *The Huk Rebellion: A Study of Peasant Revolt in the Philippines* (Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1977), 94–96. Luis Taruc’s guidance to cells was to conduct at least three actions per month: ambush, sabotage, or raid.

³⁹¹ Mike Guardia, *American Guerrilla: The Forgotten Heroics of Russell W. Volckmann* (Philadelphia, PA: Casemate Publishers, 2010), 101–107. Both Ramsey and Volckmann’s organizations arranged themselves along this line.

³⁹² Edwin Price Ramsey, Stephen J. Rivele, *Lieutenant Ramsey’s War: From Horse Soldier to Guerrilla Commander* (New York: Knightsbridge Publishing Company, 1990), 301.

Ramsey responded by sending saboteurs into the lubricant factories and docks of Manila, destroying several hundreds of thousands of gallons of fuel and lubricant oil, as well as sinking two ships and damaging another.³⁹³ In August of 1944, Volckmann sent Southwest Pacific Command his targeting priorities in advance of the liberation army – supplies and logistics, critical infrastructure, and ambushing patrols. The purpose of this was to maintain Japanese attention in order to prevent them from concentrating on defending the island, and to erode as much of their fighting strength as possible.³⁹⁴ Kangleon had started offensive operations as early as February, 1944, with a series of ambushes and raids in Leyte, resulting in months of pre-invasion back and forth fighting with Japanese garrisons.³⁹⁵

2. Fighting Under Sixth Army

When MacArthur's forces began retaking the Philippines, the sanctioned guerrillas were fed and supplied, and became a conventional fighting force under 6th Army, fighting conventionally from June to September of 1945, when General Yamashita surrendered. The Huk's, vaguely communist and pro-American at this point, were neither made a conventional force nor disarmed. MacArthur's attitude toward the Hukbalahap movement was seemingly confused.³⁹⁶

G. CONCLUSIONS

In the case of resistance of the Japanese in the Philippines, the guerrilla emerged in response to the Japanese occupation, prior to the development of the underground. After a period of evasion, guerrilla organizations coalesced and began developing

³⁹³ Edwin Price Ramsey, Stephen J. Rivele, *Lieutenant Ramsey's War: From Horse Soldier to Guerrilla Commander* (New York: Knightsbridge Publishing Company, 1990), 259–261. The result was a massive boost in morale for the population involved with the underground and massive reprisals against the population as the Kempeitai and the Army attempted to root out the underground; this drew resources away from preparing to meet MacArthur.

³⁹⁴ Mike Guardia, *American Guerrilla: The Forgotten Heroics of Russell W. Volckmann* (Philadelphia, PA: Casemate Publishers, 2010), 129–134.

³⁹⁵ Ira Wolfert, *American Guerrilla in the Philippines* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1945), 219–244.

³⁹⁶ Stanley Karnow, *In Our Image: America's Empire in the Philippines* (New York: Random House, 1989), 311.

underground structures from pre-existing social and political structures to support the guerrilla force. Operational and intelligence cells were created within those structures in order to further facilitate operations until the allied liberation of the archipelago.

There are two key differences in the development of resistance in this case study, and that of the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam. First, the emergence of the guerrilla and the development of the underground occur in the opposite order. The NLF infiltrated cadre into villages and slowly developed clandestine organizations until an underground had fully developed prior to the emergence of a guerrilla. In the Philippines, the sudden emergence of the guerrilla force preceded a gradual development of the underground.

Second, the NLF underground systematically removed traditional leadership and civil society, and replaced them with a civil affairs committee and liberation associations. In the Philippines, guerrillas recruited village leadership into the underground, and used the existing social networks and their mobilization structures to support underground and guerrilla efforts.

While the methodology in establishing shadow government differs in each of these examples, the guerrillas establishing shadow government as a crucial step in building resistance highlights the need for a robust underground movement capable of supporting guerrilla warfare. This underscores Molnar's assertion that the guerrilla ideally emerges in later phases of resistance development. Supporting the guerrilla force with recruits and supplies requires a certain amount of self-deprivation on the part of the population.³⁹⁷ For the population to voluntarily deprive themselves requires consensus building. The guerrilla bands in this case study emerged as a result of the occupation, and so building underground structures that develop consensus was not possible. Establishing the different forms of shadow government in communities by the guerrillas imposed behavioral norms and degree of participation upon the population. Adherence to behavioral norms and participation in the system begins cultivating a socialization function, where the individual's interpretive frame is shaped through participation in a

³⁹⁷ Ira Wolfert, *American Guerrilla in the Philippines* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1945). Throughout this account, guerrillas received support from the civilian population.

network. Once involved in the network, the individual defines and redefines interpretive frames and create a political consciousness with regards to the organization;³⁹⁸ in this case, the underground and the guerrillas.

³⁹⁸ Passy, Florence, “Social Networks Matter. But How?” in *Social Movements and Networks*, ed. Mario Diani and Doug McAdam (Oxford, NY: Oxford University Press, 2003), 23–24.

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V. CONCLUSION

The general components of an unconventional warfare campaign are the guerrilla force and the underground. U.S. Army doctrine is primarily focused on the development of the guerrilla force in unconventional warfare campaigns. The focus of this thesis has been to supplement that doctrine with a comprehensive review of resistance efforts for a standard list of practices in developing the underground. The primary lessons for the underground are distilled by comparing a revolutionary movement against a standing government apparatus with a resistance movement against an occupying power.

In developing an underground, there five phases: organization, psychological offensive, expansion, militarization, and consolidation. Of these five, the first three are where the movement is more vulnerable to repression; the remaining two where the movement is less susceptible to the state's ability to disrupt the movement. Each geographic area or element of the underground movement does not necessarily need to be in the same phase as the others.

A. LESSONS LEARNED:

1. Pre-Organization

In developing the underground, three fundamental pre-requisites must be met before the operator moves into the organizational phase. First, a grievance must be identified that impacts a large segment of the population. Second, the operator must develop a solution that requires an underground and justifies illegal action. Finally, an

organization, such as agitation-propaganda teams, must be created. These teams would then develop the revolutionary doctrine through interaction with the population.³⁹⁹

a. Doctrine

Generally, individuals do not wholly commit themselves to a movement all at once, particularly in illegal underground movements. The decision to participate in a movement will be influenced by the social networks in the individual participant's life before a decision is made. Where familial and friendship networks may discourage or encourage participation, religious or social networks may do the opposite.⁴⁰⁰ A doctrine can more easily penetrate social networks and influence this process when they have expansive bodies of literature that can be broken down into small portions that are applicable to many circumstances. In this manner, many social networks circulate portions of the doctrine, exposing many to it in a positive manner and protecting it from scrutiny.⁴⁰¹ An example of this in the case study is Mao's writing that was circulating the Philippines during the Japanese occupation.⁴⁰² A more recent example is Anwar al Awlaki's, *44 ways to support Jihad*, wherein he called upon readers to "fight the lies of

³⁹⁹ Developing the revolutionary message through interaction with the masses is a recurring theme in Mao's writings on revolution. "To link oneself with the masses, one must act in accordance with the needs and wishes of the masses. All work done for the masses must start from (sic) their needs and not from the desire of one individual, however well intentioned, it often happens that objectively the masses need a certain change, but subjectively they are not yet conscious of the need, not yet willing or determined to make the change. In such cases we should wait patiently. We should not make the change until, through our work, most of the masses have become conscious of the need and am (sic) willing and determined to carry it out. Otherwise we shall isolate ourselves from the masses. Unless they are conscious and willing, any kind of work that requires their participation will turn out to be a mere formality and will fail... There are two principles here: one is the actual needs of the masses rather than what we fancy they need, and the other is the wishes of the masses, who must make up their own minds instead of our making up their minds for them." Mao Tse-Tung, "The United Front in Cultural Work," *Selected Works* vol. III (1944), in *Quotations From Chairman Mao Tse-Tung*, 237–239.

⁴⁰⁰ Florence Passy, "Social Networks Matter. But How?" in *Social Movements and Networks*, ed. by Mario Diani and Doug McAdam, (Oxford, NY: Oxford University Press, 2003).

⁴⁰¹ Eric Hoffer *The True Believer* (New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1951), 79. Eric Hoffer wrote that active movements must strive to place an unverifiable screen between the faithful and the realities of the world. He further proffered that the screen be an infallible doctrine that should not be easily falsifiable, explaining that once it was understood it would become fallible and vulnerable to argument.

⁴⁰² Edwin Price Ramsey, Stephen J. Rivele, *Lieutenant Ramsey's War: From Horse Soldier to Guerrilla Commander* (New York: Knightsbridge Publishing Company, 1990), 111–112.

the Western Media, to spread the writings of Jihad, and guide others to the truth.”⁴⁰³ Doctrine reduced to small portions in this way can also cause potential participants to begin participating in gradual increments, such as donating money to Jihad, ⁴⁰⁴by creating a commitment and consistency effect.⁴⁰⁵ A doctrine is also fuel for group solidarity by invoking Henri Tajfel’s *minimum group paradigm*, made famous as the Granfalloo technique by Kurt Vonnegut.⁴⁰⁶ Even a simple narrative utilizing Tugwell’s *Mobilization Trinity*⁴⁰⁷ will create a sense of solidarity pitting resistance members against non-believers.

In the first case study, it was noted that there was a substantial number of nationalist movements emerging and subsequently succumbing to suppression during the 1920s and 1930s. It was during this period that Ho Chi Minh discovered and fused Leninism and anti-colonialist nationalism in his quest for an independent Vietnam,⁴⁰⁸ not for love of a proletarian utopia, but for a unifying doctrine with which to weld together the divergent, quarreling factions. Ho’s early writing, the *Road to Revolution*, put ideology to practical use and aided in consolidating groups into the Revolutionary Youth League.⁴⁰⁹ The *Road to Revolution* assigned colonialism the blame for the country’s

⁴⁰³ Anwar al Awlaki, “44 Ways to Support Jihad” *The NEFA Foundation* February 5, 2009. Accessed August 3, 2012. <http://www.nefafoundation.org/file/FeaturedDocs/nefaawlaki44wayssupportjihad.pdf>

⁴⁰⁴ Ibid., Number 3. Jihad with your wealth.

⁴⁰⁵ Robert B. Cialdini, *Influence, The Psychology of Persuasion* (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1984), chapter 3, commitment and consistency.

⁴⁰⁶ Anthony Pratkanis and Elliot Aronson, *Age of Propaganda: The Everyday Use and Abuse of Persuasion* (New York: Holt Paperbacks, 1992), 216. The minimum group paradigm is one in which strangers are grouped for reasons of very little importance. Participants are found to develop a preference for group members, despite the frivolity of the reason for the grouping. Kurt Vonnegut called these groupings *granfalloons*, or groups wherein members display preference for group members outwardly, despite the meaninglessness of their association.

⁴⁰⁷ Maurice Tugwell. “Terrorism as a Psychological Strategy,” in *Case Studies in Psychological Operations*, ed. Janos Radvanyi (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1985).

⁴⁰⁸ William J Duiker, *The Communist Road to Power in Vietnam* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1981), 7. “Ho Chi Minh once remarked that, for him, the road to communism ran through nationalism. Put in concrete terms, the most significant part in Ho Chi Minh’s intellectual life took place in 1920 when, as a young patriot living in Paris, he obtained a copy of Lenin’s famous “Theses on the national and colonial questions,” presented at the second congress of the comintern in Moscow. At that moment, Ho became a Leninist, primarily because of Lenin’s elucidation of communist strategy in colonial areas seemed to provide the best means for liberating Vietnam from French colonialism.”

⁴⁰⁹ William J Duiker, *The Communist Road to Power in Vietnam* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1981), 7.

difficulties, declared that the answer was mobilizing the agrarian peasantry, and called on the other political and revolutionary factions to join the Revolutionary Youth League. This was an example of a frame alignment that enjoyed a high degree of resonance with the target audience.

Two narratives were used in the second case study. First, the Huks made use of the writings of Mao Tse Tung that had filtered through the Philippine Communist Party to the Hukbalahap, and even to Lieutenant Edwin Ramsey.⁴¹⁰ Second, for the USAFFE and the USAFIP, MacArthur's promise to return, as well as President Qezon's government in exile, served the purpose of a doctrine around which resistance could coalesce. This observation is supported by Volckmann's ability to mobilize support with the credibility of his rank as a commissioned officer in the United States Army.⁴¹¹ Similarly, Fertig invoked both MacArthur and Qezon when he presented himself as a "general officer" and representative of the legitimate government in exile.⁴¹² In both cases, potential members of the underground are presented with a choice between the two main combatants.⁴¹³ A more significant point in this case study is that of the two frames that failed to gain traction. First, was the failure of Marxism to resonate among Huk guerrillas in mountain training camps. The diagnostic and prognostic frame alignment, the Japanese occupation must be ended through guerrilla warfare, had high resonance, the motivational framing did not.⁴¹⁴

⁴¹⁰ Edwin Price Ramsey, Stephen J. Rivele, *Lieutenant Ramsey's War: From Horse Soldier to Guerrilla Commander* (New York: Knightsbridge Publishing Company, 1990), 111–112.

⁴¹¹ R. W. Volckmann, *We Remained: Three Years Behind the Enemy Lines in the Philippines*, (New York: WW Norton & Company, 1954), 79–80. When Volckmann issued his call for support to the nearby barrio leaders, he reasoning was that if he acted as if he were confident of victory, he would be treated accordingly.

⁴¹² John Keats, *They Fought Alone* (New York: J.B. Lippincott Company, 1963), 91. Fertig presented himself as a general officer and as MacArthur's appointed representative to guerrilla forces on Mindanao. In doing so he directed groups of bandits and resisters alike to declare for the government in exile, and to establish shadow government.

⁴¹³ In the case of the Philippines, this was a choice between the Japanese and the Co-Prosperity Sphere, or the United States and an independent Philippines.

⁴¹⁴ Benedict J. Kerkvliet *The Huk Rebellion: A Study of Peasant Revolt in the Philippines* (Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1977), 74. Religio Felipe, on Marxism, 1943. "We also had a few sessions on Marxism, but I don't think anybody understood it nor saw the relevance. Anyway, hardly any time was spent on it."

Likewise, the Japanese co-prosperity sphere never gained traction among the Filipinos. Western colonialism was vaguely condemned, but no specific problem was diagnosed. The prognostic and motivational frames were similarly vague, and unable to overcome anti-Japanese sentiment.

b. *Agitation Propaganda*

Agitation propaganda teams must be created to circulate the underground's ideology among the aggrieved population. In doing so, the teams must engage the population with the ideology, discuss it, and develop the frame according to popular feedback. Mao Tse-Tung wrote and spoke a great deal about the necessity for organizers to go among the population and raise consciousness as necessary for successful revolution.⁴¹⁵ The North Vietnamese agitation propaganda teams also practiced this, making a circuit through villages and engaging the rural population in active discussion about the National Liberation Front's narrative.⁴¹⁶ In addition to developing the doctrine, agitation-propaganda teams will also circulate the doctrine among sympathetic audiences, reinforcing opinions and commonly held beliefs, and contributing to the emergence of collective identity. Mobile propaganda teams were also able to support, to a lesser extent, the Hukbalahap movement with Mao's writings on communism and the conduct of guerrilla warfare.⁴¹⁷

⁴¹⁵ For example: "Our congress should call upon the whole party to be vigilant and see to it that no comrade at any post is divorced from the masses. It should teach every comrade to love the people and to listen attentively to the voice of the masses; to identify himself with the masses wherever he goes, and instead of standing above them, to immerse himself among them; and, according to their present level, to awaken them or raise their political consciousness and help them gradually to organize themselves voluntarily and to set going all essential struggles permitted by the internal and external circumstances of the given time and place." Mao Tse-Tung, "On Coalition Government," *Selected Works* vol. III, in *Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-Tung*, 241.

⁴¹⁶ Douglas Pike, *Viet Cong: The Organization and Techniques of the National Liberation Front of South Viet Nam* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1966), 126–130.

⁴¹⁷ Benedict J. Kerkvliet *The Huk Rebellion: A Study of Peasant Revolt in the Philippines* (Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1977), 74.

c. Early Cadre

An indigenous cadre must be formed that is steeped in revolutionary ideals and is capable of identifying potential recruits and organizing them into early clandestine cells.

In the first case study, a large supply of cadre were on hand to develop the underground. Former Viet Minh guerrillas that had returned to the north when the Vietnamese peninsula was divided, as well as former guerrillas that had remained in the south were able to begin developing underground structures.⁴¹⁸

In the second case study, the Japanese invasion, and the nature of their occupation, obviated the need for great care in developing cadre. Among the Huks and the USFIP guerrillas, the underground organization and the guerrilla force formed without a cadre developing.⁴¹⁹ The USAFFE experience differed greatly; Volckmann and Blackburn did not go alone to live among the Igorrot, they were guided there by their guide, Bruno, who was from the area. Bruno interpreted for them and aided them in making their case for resistance among the tribes.⁴²⁰

Dedicated single members, or movement entrepreneurs, are a critical element in expanding the underground into new regions. In Anheier's analysis of single members in the National Socialist Party in Germany in the 1920s and 1930s, he demonstrated that single members embedded themselves into pre-existing social networks, recruited those networks, and converted them into party chapter.⁴²¹ By moving cadre into new areas unannounced, there is the possibility of infiltrating existing social

⁴¹⁸ J.J. Zasloff, "Origins of the Insurgency in South Vietnam, 1954–1960: The Role of The Southern Vietnam Cadres," *The RAND Corporation* (May 1968), 5–15.

⁴¹⁹ The underground organizations included active participants in resisting the occupation, referred to here as cadre, and those who planned to sit out the war. Those planning to sit out the war, while not active, did provide support to active participants on a number of occasions.

⁴²⁰ Mike Guardia, *American Guerrilla: The Forgotten Heroics of Russell W. Volckmann* (Philadelphia, PA: Casemate Publishers, 2010), 91–93.

⁴²¹ Anheier, Helmut "Movement Development and Organizational Networks: The Role of 'Single Members' in the German Nazi Party, 1925–1930." In *Social Movements and Networks*, ed. Mario Diani and Doug McAdam, (Oxford, NY: Oxford University Press, 2003), 49–71.

networks, converting local leaders, and recruiting broad segments of the population with the effort of single members.

2. Organization

The early development of the underground is focused upon organizational development and agitating the population. In this phase, the first priority is for the individual cadre member to create more cadre members. Developing a group of core individuals will allow the underground to infiltrate and connect networks, aiding in network development, as well as resource mobilization.

The second priority is to identify and infiltrate existing social networks. Analysis of the immediate social topography should be subsequently conducted for future infiltration, until a network of networks has been infiltrated and can be subverted to the movement's will. In the absence of existing organizations, mass or popular organizations with un-threatening or neutral intentions should be formed in order to organize the local population into a resistance coalition. These groups are the pre-cursors to mass organizations that will serve as transmission belts, or auxiliary cells, moving future, potential cadre deeper into the resistance movement.

In her network analysis of resistance organizations in Poland from the 1950s through the Solidarity movement, Osa noted that the development of civic oriented groups created links between opposing resistance groups. By emphasizing human rights and equality and avoiding divisive topics, groups ideologically opposed were able to unify to create a large organization. Referred to as neutral brokerage links, these groups could keep ideologies from clashing and could facilitate the political left and right working in unison. She further noted that the presence of radical organizations acted as repression sinks, whereby they would attract the bulk of state attention, and make the actual goal of the organization less threatening.⁴²² The principal lesson for the unconventional warfare planner is that overt groups may be as important as underground groups. In addition to developing robust operational cells, legitimate, overt organizations

⁴²² Osa, Maryjane "Networks in Opposition: Linking Organizations Through Activists in the Polish People's Republic." In *Social Movements and Networks*, ed. Mario Diani and Doug McAdam (Oxford, NY: Oxford University Press, 2003), 77–104.

should be created as well. By creating overt organizations, the underground increases its options for action against the state and other networks, and for leveraging resources.

One of the fundamental challenges of underground movements is the trade-off between security and access. Security is paramount, but security without access can potentially undermine the popular support, social and logistical, necessary to sustain the movement.⁴²³ Therefore, organizations must be created that mobilize the portion of the population not suited to illicit activity. Overt legitimate organizations and networks are formed in the second and third phases in order to organize this portion of the population into sympathetic or pro-underground activities. These activities should be legitimate, such as legal⁴²⁴ and semi-legal⁴²⁵ services to subversives and cadres or as simple as popular education classes.⁴²⁶ In this way, resources are mobilized in a legitimate manner. A portion of the population that may have been vulnerable to government reform or pacification programs is rendered neutral. Cadres may then use this organization as a transmission belt from licit to illicit activity.

The National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NLF) made extensive use of Giap's dictum⁴²⁷ that the entirety of the people be mobilized in People's war. Organizations were created at the village and urban levels that mobilized as many different segments of the population as possible, from children as young as six in the

⁴²³ Doowan Lee, "A Social Movement Theory Approach to Unconventional Warfare" unpublished draft, forthcoming in *Special Warfare Magazine* 26 (2013).

⁴²⁴ An example of legal services provided to subversives is the Popular Aid of Peru organization established by the Shining Path for providing a wide variety of services from medical and legal to fundraising. Gabriela Tarazona-Sevillano, "The Organization of Shining Path," *The Shining Path of Peru*, ed. David Scott Palmer (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992).

⁴²⁵ William R. Andrews, *The Village War* (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 1973), 114–123. The bulk of village revolutionary activities in mobilized villages were providing support in the form of semi-legal activities such as stockpiling food or labor exchange. These activities were subversive in nature but not illegal in and of themselves.

⁴²⁶ Benedict J. Kerkvliet *The Huk Rebellion: A Study of Peasant Revolt in the Philippines* (Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1977), 94–96. While the Japanese would not have tolerated suspicious semi-legal activities, the BUDC was able to conduct fund raising and to host cultural and information committee meetings under the cover of the "Japanese Good Neighborhood Associations."

⁴²⁷ Vo Nguyen Giap, *Vo Nguyen Giap: Selected Writings* (Hanoi: The Gioi Publishers, 1994), 238.

Village Children's Group to the Soldiers Mothers Association.⁴²⁸ The purpose of these groupings was to put every member of society to work for the revolution. The practical outcome of this situation is that if you are putting effort into the revolution, Cialdini's principle of commitment and consistency⁴²⁹ will take effect by causing deeper commitment to the movement as a result of efforts made on its behalf.

The Hukbalahap movement made use of the Japanese order to establish Neighborhood Associations to establish their primary underground agency, the Barrio United Defense Corps.⁴³⁰ This cover gave the underground organization the ability to operate overtly as all civilian organization or resource mobilization could be done in the name of the neighborhood association. The USAFFE guerrilla organization also engaged in subversive organizational politics by infiltrating the Japanese puppet government, ultimately frustrating Japanese war efforts.⁴³¹ While Ramsey would not have realized it, this is a play directly out of Lenin's 1902 pamphlet "What is to be done?" and "Left Wing Communism: an Infantile Disorder" wherein he directs revolutionaries to infiltrate political organizations, form clandestine parallel structures, and subvert the organization. By this methodology Lenin claims that the larger puppet organization can be manipulated to achieve the ends of elite cadres. Lenin was discussing political parties in resistance to standing government rather than infiltrating the actual government, yet this is a clear example of the subversive doctrine in action. This is a clear example of the guerrilla force increasing participation in political warfare.

Viet Minh organizational law dictates subversion as the main effort: "Don't try for too much; don't smash the existing social system, use it, don't destroy opposition

⁴²⁸ William R. Andrews, *The Village War* (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 1973), 76–78.

⁴²⁹ Robert B. Cialdini, *Influence, The Psychology of Persuasion* (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1984).

⁴³⁰ Benedict J. Kerkvliet *The Huk Rebellion: A Study of Peasant Revolt in the Philippines* (Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1977), 66.

⁴³¹ Edwin Price Ramsey, Stephen J. Rivele, *Lieutenant Ramsey's War: From Horse Soldier to Guerrilla Commander* (New York: Knightsbridge Publishing Company, 1990), 181.

organizations, take them over.”⁴³² In the case of the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam, it was itself a front organization meant to disguise the hand of North Vietnamese communist infiltration.⁴³³ The underground organizers also made use of party members in the South Vietnamese military and civil service for the purpose of agitation and subversion.⁴³⁴

3. Psychological Offensive

Agitation propaganda teams were Lenin’s answer to the problem of raising political consciousness among the masses.⁴³⁵ Giap expanded on this idea by calling for a “cadre of faithful ideologues” that would organize and agitate among the targeted population.⁴³⁶ Agitation propaganda teams are the work horse of the first three phases of underground development. The task of the agitation propaganda team is to introduce revolutionary doctrine to the aggrieved population, organize them into rudimentary discussion groups, and lead them into cognitive liberation. Numerous agitation-propaganda teams were trained in North Vietnam and deployed to the south, where they would circulate between villages, lecture the villagers on revolution, organize discussion groups, and engage the population in critical thinking.⁴³⁷ The Hukbalahap movement employed a similar technique, where teams would travel between barrios with news and entertainment.⁴³⁸

⁴³² Douglas Pike, *Viet Cong: The Organization and Techniques of the National Liberation Front of South Viet Nam* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1966), 41–42. Organizational Law from Viet Minh history.

⁴³³ Central Intelligence Agency, *The Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN): It’s History, Organization, and Functions* (Washington, DC: CIA 1969).
http://www.foia.cia.gov/docs/DOC_0000354548/DOC_0000354548.pdf (accessed October 23, 2012).

⁴³⁴ Douglas Pike, *Viet Cong: The Organization and Techniques of the National Liberation Front of South Viet Nam* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1966), 253–256. The Binh Van, or struggle among the enemy troops, program was specifically intended to infiltrate and subvert.

⁴³⁵ Vladimir Lenin, “What is to be Done” in *V. I. Lenin: Collected Works Volume 5, May 1901 – February 1902* (Moscow, Russia: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1961), 422.

⁴³⁶ Vo Nguyen Giap, *Vo Nguyen Giap: Selected Writings* (Hanoi: The Gioi Publishers, 1994), 244.

⁴³⁷ Douglas Pike, *Viet Cong: The Organization and Techniques of the National Liberation Front of South Viet Nam* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1966), 126–135.

⁴³⁸ Benedict J. Kerkvliet *The Huk Rebellion: A Study of Peasant Revolt in the Philippines* (Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1977), 95–96.

Agitation propaganda teams supplement the published doctrine by circulating among groups and communities for three general reasons. First, they must maintain a current and accurate understanding of the targeted population; if necessary they adjust their message to the population. Secondly, agitation-propagation teams demonstrate that the underground is active and gaining in popular strength. Finally, these teams must press the population into discussing the doctrine and propaganda of the movement in order to begin developing adherents. This process of interaction with the population over the doctrine will allow the agitation team to develop their analysis of the doctrines resonance, and adjust its centrality or interrelatedness accordingly.

In the case of the NLF, the emphasis on psychological preparation of the people throughout the revolutionary process caused cadre to plan operations and agit-prop work psychologically, rather than operations with psychological support to another objective.⁴³⁹ Mass organizations were exactly that, a psychological platform for gradually indoctrinating and mobilizing everyone. Recognizing that not everyone would fit into a youth, women's, or farmer's liberation association, special interest organizations were created based on census taking of a given area. Ultimately, the goal was to get maximum participation and eventual mobilization, not just in fighting but even small contributions such as letter writing campaigns in support of propaganda among the troops⁴⁴⁰ or laying out anti-personnel devices as part of a village defense program.⁴⁴¹

In order to create a blank slate, the destruction of the oppression technique of removing traditional village leadership in a wave of terror had the effect of disorienting the people and blocking support for government reform efforts. It further put villagers in a position where they were psychologically dependent upon the party apparatus in the village, as it replaced traditional ways of life. As liberation associations gained in membership size and participation, they were able to mobilize resources in the form of logistical and manpower support for main force operations. As with the gradual vetting

⁴³⁹ Michael Schaad, *More Effective Warfare: Warfare Waged Psychologically* (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School Department of Defense Analysis, 2012), 93–103.

⁴⁴⁰ William R. Andrews, *The Village War* (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 1973), 76–78.

⁴⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 105.

and membership process, this shared risk and effort created a collective identity whereby participants were able to see themselves as part of a larger effort.

4. Expansion—Balancing Recruitment and Security

a. Bloc Recruitment

Bloc recruitment is the process of recruiting numerous organizations as opposed to individuals. Organizations bring with them resources and societal and behavioral norms that their members are accustomed to obeying, and transfer that to the underground. The pre-existing social and resource mobilizing networks that the recruited organization brings will transfer to the underground, allowing the underground to appear as if it has always been part of the historical or cultural more. This function is enhanced by cadre, or as Anheier calls them, movement entrepreneurs, whose function is to connect groups, creating new political alliances, and exploiting opportunity.⁴⁴²

Auxiliary or mass organizations are used in the expansion phase to manage the recruitment of the organizations that were infiltrated or co-opted in the first phase. The auxiliary uses the organizations for low risk illicit or semi-illicit tasks and screens members for potential for greater tasks, higher in the organization. In this manner, the organization operates as a transmission belt, moving members deeper as they are individually ready. In South Vietnam villages, there was a dearth of social organizations beyond the village or the family unit. In overcoming this obstacle, the NLF cadre created associations for the different segments of population. Farmers, for instance, joined the Farmer's Liberation Association, and youth joined the Youth Liberation Association.⁴⁴³ These associations were generally inclusive, engaged the members in local tasks and resource mobilization, and were used to farm potential party members.⁴⁴⁴ The Barrio United Defense Corps (BUDC) in the Philippines served a similar purpose, in

⁴⁴² Helmut Anheier "Movement Development and Organizational Networks: The Role of 'Single Members' in the German Nazi Party, 1925–1930." In *Social Movements and Networks*, ed. Mario Diani and Doug McAdam (Oxford, NY: Oxford University Press, 2003), 49–71.

⁴⁴³ William R. Andrews, *The Village War* (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 1973), 74–80.

⁴⁴⁴ William R. Andrews, *The Village War* (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 1973), 74–80.

a similar manner. The barrio associations that formed in response to landlord repression were recruited in bulk into the BUDC, which was used for barrio level underground tasks, such as resource mobilization for the guerrilla force. Members of the BUDC were moved up as necessary.⁴⁴⁵

The popular or mass organizations created in the first and second phase likewise have a dual purpose. It is fundamental to the underground that few people are simply “ready” for subversive or otherwise illicit activity. In the Stalinist sense, these organizations serve as “transmission belts”⁴⁴⁶ that identify members that are ready for greater involvement. Once identified, members are given increasingly illegal tasks to accomplish, and moved deeper into the organization. As they progress, they are sent for indoctrination or education in training camps in the rural country or abroad, and in this way become not only steeped in the doctrine, but committed to it as well.

Collective Identities emerge as social networks and organizations share risks and otherwise engage in activities supportive to the underground, such as demonstrations, or even outright illegal activities such as simple sabotage.⁴⁴⁷ As the collective identity emerges, societal and behavioral norms adjust to the new identity and become self-propagating. In this way, recruitment becomes less of a problem and is replaced with the problem of identifying members that are ready to move deeper into the underground.

Uniformly in the examples presented in the case of the Philippine resistance, the underground developed around communities; either through the residents of a barrio establishing a KPMP organization, Don Blackburn’s recruitment of an Ifugao tribal community, or ’Fertig’s directive to guerrilla community leaders to form civil

⁴⁴⁵ Benedict J. Kerkvliet *The Huk Rebellion: A Study of Peasant Revolt in the Philippines* (Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1977), 94–96.

⁴⁴⁶ C. A. Hathaway, “On the Use of “Transmission Belts” In Our Struggle for the Masses,” *The Communist* (1934): 409–423, accessed January 23, 2013, <http://www.unz.org/Pub/Communist-1931may-00409?View=PDF> Hathaway discusses the use of organizations as “transmission belts” in reaching workers and preparing them for party membership.

⁴⁴⁷ Osa, Maryjane “Networks in Opposition: Linking Organizations Through Activists in the Polish People’s Republic.” In *Social Movements and Networks*, ed. Mario Diani and Doug McAdam (Oxford, NY: Oxford University Press, 2003), 79–81.

governance in President Qezon's name.⁴⁴⁸ This situation created four benefits to the underground and guerrilla organizations: first, a collective identity emerges in which being a part of the resistance is something that a given community does, similar to a social norm that promotes communal sharing or mistrust of strangers; second, when a collective identity emerges, participation increases as societal norms change; third, block recruitment becomes either possible or easier as larger segments of the population become a part of the collective identity; finally, security is increased with participation, as risk is diffused when the dangers of illicit participation are shared by many.

b. Doctrine

Indoctrinating members at all levels, commensurate with their involvement, brings its own security. Members and underground "tourists" alike are more likely to be influenced in favor of the underground to the degree that they are exposed to indoctrination.⁴⁴⁹ A supportive tendency will develop relative to the personal effort they have expended discussing the doctrine and goals of the underground movement.

The risk of illicit activity is spread among numerous people as the organization grows. Illegal or questionable tasks broken into many small parts reduce the risk of life changing prosecution to the individual, increasing the likelihood of participation. This further aids in the development of collective identity as many take a small part in a wholly illegal operation. In village associations in Vietnam, villagers were given numerous small tasks such as laying out anti-personnel traps, caching small arms and medical supplies, and so forth.⁴⁵⁰ The net result of all of these small tasks was that policing areas became increasingly difficult for the state, and the guerrilla operations

⁴⁴⁸ Ira Wolfert, *American Guerrilla in the Philippines* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1945), 135–136.

⁴⁴⁹ Robert B. Cialdini, *Influence, The Psychology of Persuasion* (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1984), 92–94. Cialdini cites (among other things) the essay contests held in Chinese POW camps in North Korea. In the contests, Americans would be given the opportunity to write political essays for small prizes. In an effort to win the prize, entrants would make a few statements derogatory to the U.S.. Because a small reward is an internal pressure, the entrants are forced to accept internal responsibility for the statement, and eventually come to believe what they wrote.

⁴⁵⁰ William R. Andrews, *The Village War* (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 1973), 118–123.

were facilitated. In the Philippines, the use of spotters and runners to relay information to other points of information relay reduced the amount of time that an individual was exposed to risk.⁴⁵¹

Finally, the cellular organization of the underground provides its greatest insurance against state repression. All intelligence, operational, auxiliary, and manufactory cells are broken down into their prime functions. Those functions are separated by an intermediary of some sort, breaking the cells down and leaving the network, as a whole, unknown to any one member.

B. STRENGTHS AND LIMITATIONS

Developing the underground in a resistance is an immense topic with an equally immense body of literature. While this thesis does ascertain the best practices for developing an underground organization, it does not delve deep into any one of those practices. The best practices discussed, such as agitation propaganda or political warfare, are topics that have significant bodies of literature. Future research should review the employment of agitation propaganda as a method of psychological support to unconventional warfare. Particularly in case studies that demonstrate a movement sponsored by a foreign power that are successful without the emergence of a guerrilla force, such as the Polish Resistance Movement or Operation Ajax, the 1953 coup in Iran that restored the Shah to power.⁴⁵²

C. IMPLICATIONS FOR MILITARY INFORMATION SUPPORT

The seven doctrinal phases of unconventional warfare begin with psychological preparation of the people for resistance.⁴⁵³ The Military Information Support community should become the proponent for the first phase and “left of beginning” or phase zero activities. A doctrine dealing with the psychological preparation of the people must be

⁴⁵¹ Mike Guardia, *American Guerrilla: The Forgotten Heroics of Russell W. Volckmann* (Philadelphia, PA: Casemate Publishers, 2010), 106.

⁴⁵² Doowan Lee, “A Social Movement Approach to Unconventional Warfare” unpublished draft, forthcoming in *Special Warfare Magazine* 26 (2013).

⁴⁵³ Department of Defense, Headquarters, Department of the Army, Training Circular 18–01 Special Forces Unconventional Warfare (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2008), 1–9.

developed that outlines the early activities noted in this study. Finally, a training program for must be created for the purpose of preparing organizers of subversion.

The seven phased approach to the problem of unconventional warfare is adequate to supporting an existing guerrilla force with training and equipment. It is not sufficient, however, for creating an underground movement capable of welding existing social and political movements into resistance. In developing a doctrine for the psychological preparation of the people, Molnar's five phases of underground development should be a subset of the first phase of unconventional warfare. Adding this underground foundation to the doctrine would provide an ideological base for creating a mission essential task list for subversive organizers; a piece of training literature that does not currently exist.

The existing body of individual tasks in Military Information Support doctrine includes tactical and planning tasks in support of operations, information development and dissemination tasks, and foreign internal defense tasks.⁴⁵⁴ This list prepares the information specialist to analyze a given demographic, produce a message tailored to it, and deliver the same, in support of larger operations. It also provides training guidance for preparing the information specialist to train a host nation force in the same tasks. For the branch to undertake psychological preparation, and subsequent organization, of a given population for resistance, training doctrine must prepare the operator for conducting independent operations among the population. Tasks that might be included, based off the findings of this study, include organizational design, network mapping, agitation propaganda tasks, intelligence analysis, and managing information sources. Future study in this field should include analysis of historical agitation propaganda techniques to develop such a list.

In areas designated as potential sites for unconventional warfare, the "left of beginning" activities must begin as early as possible. To that end, a replication of the current system of regional foreign internal defense work should be created wherein subversive operators embed themselves in innocuous social networks using the pretext of language immersion or higher education programs. In this capacity, the embedded

⁴⁵⁴ <https://atn.army.mil/> (accessed December, 2012). The Army Training Network has a list of military information support tasks.

operator could constantly evaluate and catalogue potential grievances and existing networks. This would provide a menu of options for redirecting networks in the event that conducting underground activities becomes desirable.

D. CONCLUDING REMARKS

Current special operations doctrine for unconventional warfare focuses on infiltrating Special Forces support into an existing movement for the purpose of creating a better guerrilla force. Organizational development and psychological warfare are briefly discussed as items that should support the guerrilla force, but not with any depth. This leaves the Civil Affairs or Military Information Support planners and operators without a guideline to refer to, and creates a situation wherein planning and operations rely upon the bright ideas from individuals. The purpose in reviewing the development of the underground for “best organizational practices” is to supplement the doctrine by providing a mission essential task list to the unconventional warfare practitioner. The lessons learned from the case studies are particularly relevant to the early phases of developing an indigenous resistance movement.

The case studies used in this thesis highlight a potential methodology for constructing an underground movement. When that methodology is examined in terms of social movement theory a play book begins to emerge from which templates might be applied in support of a given policy objective. Regardless of the policy objective or the scope of the desired movement, a number of ““musts”” on the operator’s checklist must be considered to start even a modest resistance movement to influence or disrupt regimes. First, before any organization is engaged or any doctrine developed, the operator must undertake to conduct a census of the area of operations. Even a rudimentary census should reveal what social networks are active, and of those which are likely to be friendly, hostile, or indifferent to social movement; a census should also reveal which movements are accessible for an organizer to embed. Second, organizers must monitor existing grievances and social networks, and continue to develop the census. Third, a doctrine must be developed around which to recruit a cadre of movement entrepreneurs. Fourth, where needed, a party or committee must be organized to steer the movement into

acceptable directions. Fifth, movement entrepreneurs should establish supporting committees that perform basic unconventional warfare functions, such as psychological operations, political action committees, and so forth. These committees should be headed by movement entrepreneurs and staffed by members of larger social groupings.

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