

UNDERSTANDING STRATEGIC SUCCESS AND TACTICAL FAILURE IN 1973: AN EXAMINATION FROM A SPATIAL-TEMPORAL PERSPECTIVE

A Monograph

by

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14. ABSTRACT On 6 October 1973 at 2:00 pm, the world witnessed a conflict that continues to be discussed and researched within the professional military community. Military powers of the period would observe the event and modify their existing practices of combined arms warfare with an emphasis on the relationship between infantry and armor. Military institutions pondered the actions and results of an asymmetrical conflict in which the stronger force was surprised and attacked. Students of military history often overlooked the asymmetry in logic that existed between Israel and Egypt that facilitated the dichotomous strategic-tactical results. This monograph is an exploration into the asymmetric logic of President Sadat that rejected the accepted paradigm of the destruction of one's enemy. His logic called on Near East cultural influences of space time and conflict that allowed him to envision a different type of conflict to change the regional political inertia of 1973. The author relies on an anthropological perspective to examine the role culture can play in the construction of a creative and imaginative strategic aim to achieve a distinct aim, and isolating the outcome of the mechanical action. The monograph represents an opportunity for the Western military student to deconstruct previous held notions of the levels of war and their interactions.				
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ABSTRACT

STRATEGIC SUCCESS AND TACTICAL FAILURE IN 1973: AN EXAMINATION FROM A SPATIAL-TEMPORAL PERSPECTIVE, by MAJ Lucas J.A. Braxton, 71 pages.

On 6 October 1973 at 2:00 pm, the world witnessed a conflict that continues to be discussed and researched within the professional military community. This battle would be the fifth engagement between Egypt and Israel. Both actors and environments were a familiar backdrop to the outside community that observed this region. The armies used modern equipment and techniques on the desert floor of the Sinai Peninsula. Military powers of the period would observe the event and modify their existing practices of combined arms warfare with an emphasis on the relationship between infantry and armor. Military institutions pondered the actions and results of an asymmetrical conflict in which the stronger force was surprised and attacked. Students of military history often overlooked the asymmetry in logic that existed between Israel and Egypt that facilitated the dichotomous strategic-tactical results.

This monograph is an exploration into the asymmetric logic of President Sadat that rejected the accepted paradigm of the destruction of one's enemy. His logic called on Near East cultural influences of space, time and conflict that allowed him to envision a different type of conflict that had a chance in changing the regional political inertia of 1973. The author relies on an anthropological perspective to examine the role culture can play in the construction of a creative and imaginative strategic aim to achieve a distinct aim. It investigates the symbiosis of culture and conflict, the roots of Western and Eastern military doctrine, and the emergence of a spatial-temporal understanding within the environment. The monograph serves as an opportunity for the Western military professional to challenge an existing understanding of the relationship between military success and failure. The method is a historical case study used to create an awareness of the cognitive boundaries set by Western epistemological traditions on the appropriate interactions in the levels of war.

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INTRODUCTION

Conflict commenced on October 6, 1973 at 2:00 p.m. along the northern portion of the Suez Canal. The conflict was another violent argument between Egypt and its neighbor, Israel. Since 1948, Egypt was a member of the Arab nations that continually engaged in war against the Israel. Each time, Israel was able to defend itself and recognized as the victor. The 1973 October War was their fifth engagement. The difference in this war was that it was fought to a tactical stalemate; however, Egypt eventually emerged with the strategic advantage in recovering the Sinai Peninsula that it had ceded in 1967 to Israel after the Six-Day War.

Theorists describe war as a duel. It is a contest between two actors with strong wills by trying to force the other to submit to its goals. Despite the impact of technology on the military and its equipment, violence and conflict remain a human endeavor. It is for that reason the study of war is enhanced from an anthropological perspective. Cultures and societies influence the strategic thought of its lead actors because of the epistemological traditions embedded within its citizens. It manifests itself in the strategic logic on the ways in which conflict and war is used to achieve strategic aims. The value of examining the 1973 October War from an anthropological perspective is that it gives the reader an opportunity to transgress the bounds of conventional thought and examine a conflict in which strategic success emerged from tactical failure. It is a historical case study that challenges the conventional Western understanding of the relationship between strategy, operations and tactics in conflict.

Leaders can produce unexpected results when managing armies in spite of asymmetry between their forces and the opponents, or ceding hostilities before the reciprocal action of force can reach its full destructive potential. Observers often overlook the asymmetry of logic between the actors, and it being a root cause of success in conflict. The author provides an examination of how the national leader of Egypt formed an asymmetric logic that would lead to strategic success in war and facilitate the recovery of the Sinai Peninsula. It is an investigation into the roots of that

logic and how Western observers may broaden their thinking when a conflict that is tactically lost or fought to a stalemate may have the potential to result in strategic success.

LITERATURE REVIEW

The interest in the relationship between culture and conflict has reemerged since America's struggle in the Near East since 2001. At the tactical level, the focus is on the mechanistic and routine expressed through battle drills and rehearsed action. The locus of interest shifts towards the cognitive dimension needed to link tactical actions to an overall purpose and aim. The term asymmetry has been used to such an extent in modern military times that it has lost its significance. Professionals use it to call attention to the difference in strength between two armies. It is used less to note the important difference in the logic of the parties to a conflict. The underlying logic of each opponent is what generates the organizing principles of each army, and the way it has postured itself in accordance with its strategic purpose. The West invests time examining Eastern ways of war as a reference to understand itself by noting the difference in thinking and praxis of conflict. The most distant cultures and societies have received the most attention, while the Near East has often received the least analysis. Yet cultural differences in this region provide opportunities for research into non-Western military thought and the innovative methods that thought has produced.

An investigation of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the 1973 War in particular, sheds light on the inter-relationship between culture and conflict. It ultimately suggests that strategic purpose can be supported and enabled despite conventional tactical failure when winning is succinctly defined as simply achieving the conditions necessary for strategic advantage. The Egyptian strategy and performance in 1973 is obscured to Western audiences when the definition of success on the battlefield is rigidly attached to Clausewitzian notions of destruction and attrition. Western audiences liberally apply this theory and the doctrine it has inspired when it does not take into account the regional context in which the conflict emerged. In short, the Western

military student is quick to deduce that strategic success is dependent on tactical success, and without it, no strategic goals can be advanced. Interestingly, if one can adopt the perspective of the Egyptians, particularly in the wake of the 1967 Arab-Israeli conflict through the realization of the Israel-Egypt peace treaty in 1979, it is quite possible to see that what the American military has considered a tactical failure or stalemate- as a military success that facilitated its regional political goals.

This research is interdisciplinary and is both historical and theoretical. It relies on primary and secondary sources on Middle East history, anthropology, ethnography, and military theory. Generally, the resources for the historical portions of the monograph are from an American or Israeli perspective. Few Egyptian authors were used because most have been written in Arabic and have not been translated yet into English. However, a number of first-hand personal accounts exist on the war. Each of them proposed fundamentally different understandings because of their different frames of reference for assessing what happened and the consequences of the events. President Sadat's autobiography, *In Search of Identity*, claimed the war was a success as he viewed it strictly from the strategic and political perspective.¹ Mohammed Heikal, Field Marshal el-Gamasy, and LTG (R) Shazly both experienced the war at the operational and strategic level and provided competing narratives about the reasons for the overall outcome. They disagree on the nature of the events that transpired that yielded the initiative to the Israelis after 14 October, but fundamentally agree on having successfully changed the contextual equation that facilitated strategic success. Gamasy and Shazly debated the tension that was inevitable in a plan that was unclear as to what would happen if they did have success in establishing bridgeheads East of the canal. Shazly, to this day, fiercely insists that true military victory was sacrificed because of having extended the army past its line of air-defense.

¹Anwar el-Sadat, *In Search of Identity* (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1978), 270.

Field Marshal el-Gamasy acknowledged he made mistakes in crossing the air-defense line, but that the army needed to remain flexible in exploiting any opportunity that emerged.² Despite the difference in opinion on the true nature of the operational plan, President Sadat ordered General Ismail to advance the army after October 14. Of these authors, the politically connected Mohammed Heikal provided a critical and important assessment of the war from the Egyptian perspective. Having access to both Nasser and Sadat, he was in a position to take in the totality of the road to war and its effects. In his book, *The Road to Ramadan*, he calls the war as a success because he believes the army properly prepared itself at the operational level. However, he did take issue with Egyptian leaders not properly managing the political situation, or the ceasefire, once they had lost the initiative in the fight.³ There is a sense in all the readings that the Egyptian perspective of the war was an emotional and internal battle to prove they had the mettle to face a familiar enemy, and recover the territory that was intrinsically theirs.

The Western and Israeli perspectives also tended to look inward at the event. The majority of literature that reviewed this conflict acknowledged the failings of the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) in the opening stages of the war, but also credited the IDF with pulling victory out of imminent defeat because of the strength found in its ability to adapt. Decisive victory at times leads to an overwhelming burden of readiness and vigilance at the peripheries of the state that it sometimes is unable or incapable of managing. An unpublished document by Zvi Lanir, *Fundamental Surprises*, challenged the notion that the Egyptians masterminded a great deception operation. He asserted the Egyptians did have a deception plan to enable surprise, but it was not uncharacteristic of any other military operation. He proposed that the magnitude of the surprise in the war was a result of a disconnect in the political and military logic that emerged in the Israeli

² Mohamed Abdel Ghani el-Gamasy, *The October War*, (Cairo: The American University Press, 1993), 270-272.

³ Mohamed Heikal, *The Road to Ramadan* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1975), 247.

mindset after 1967. Edgar O'Ballance's, *No Victor, No Vanquished*, and Cohen and Gooch's short examination of the 1973 war, yielded a broader perspective. O'Ballance suggested a stalemate of military and political dimensions, but that the Egyptians gained more advantages than their counterparts did.⁴ In *Military Misfortunes*, Cohen and Gooch examined the Israeli failure to anticipate what should have been obvious to them since they were positioned next to the Egyptian Army for six years prior to the October War. This was the first article encountered that emphasized the success the Egyptians achieved was the result of changing the logic that had governed the strategic space for so long.⁵ The significance of the exchange of the tangible goal of seizing the entire peninsula for the intangible goal of seizing a strategic narrative was the foundation to the Egyptian's success.

Anthropologists and political scientists informed the research in several categories. The first group identified how culture and conflict intertwine with each other, and how neither can be separated from its socio-political context. The Western way of warfare was examined from the known literature from Russell Weigley's *The American Way of War* and John Keegan's *A History of Modern Warfare*. These works coupled with army doctrine and the military theory of Clausewitz assisted in the formulation of the logic that is dominant in Western schools of conflict. Keegan proposed that, during the 20th century, Western thought had become the dominant influence based on the global spread of Western styled instruments of national power. This may be helpful in promoting ideals and goals, but the logic can obscure more than it can reveal when examining wars. Is our doctrine and knowledge absolute when assigning value to Eastern conflict? Observers must consider violence from within the environment from which it emerged. Dr. Graicer, in her PhD thesis on Orde Wingate, formulated that patterns are a result of the

⁴ Edgar O'Ballance, *No Victor, No Vanquished* (Novato: Presidio Press, 1978), 330.

⁵ Eliot A. Cohen and John Gooch, *The Anatomy of Failure in War: Military Misfortunes* (New York: Free Press, 1990), 100.

combination of space and action. Each space is unique relative to another, so different patterns will emerge with the change in context. The thesis delved into how perception of spatial and temporal components can be used in strategic thought. Each culture cognitively encodes the use of space and time differently; therefore, what conflict can achieve in the physical realm differs with regions. Combining the cultural works of Raphael Patai's work, *The Arab Mind*, and Majid Khadduri, *War and Peace within the Law of Islam*, a reader can conclude that there is a difference between what armies defined as successful performance. Asymmetry is a key term in magnifying the comparison of physical superiority, but it can also highlight the difference in logic that exists between wartime belligerents.

Together the literature revealed this dichotomy- tactical failure and strategic success- what does an army have to do to achieve strategic success? Is there a set equation in war that will consistently reveal with meaning the circumstances in which strategy is autonomous from tactical effort? Is culture and conflict so intertwined that the understanding of an army must be rooted in its society to understand its motives and goals? The investigation of literature revealed that there is an intimate relationship between culture and conflict. There are dominant schools of thought on conflict that are Western inspired but it does not render weaker or asymmetric actors less relevant. These actors may be willing to expend an effort that one side would deem wasteful and extravagant, but serves a useful purpose that in the end achieves what it was seeking and could not have reached through traditional means. Culture can be a basis for assessing success and failure in military operations, and the nature of the relationship between military commanders and their political leaders. In order to elucidate cultural considerations this monograph will first examine its relationship to conflict. It will show that conflict cannot be considered outside of a societal context. The research will then transition to a comparison of Western and Near Eastern logic on conflict and its differences in spatial and temporal perspectives. The research will culminate by providing a foundation for understanding how a national leader was able to find a

creative solution to a problem that the world had already determined they were unable to undertake and extract success.

METHODOLOGY

This narrative will be a case study examining the 1973 October War between Egypt and Israel. It will begin with a descriptive history of the war and the events that are pertinent to an anthropological discussion of the war and its effects. The case study will serve as a basis to compare and contrast the impact of culture on war, and socio-political context in which it resides. A comparison between the Western and near-Eastern perspectives of conflict will be examined to understand the degree of difference between the two and to raise awareness that despite the Western dominance on military thought and doctrine, conflict can be used in a form that is counter-intuitive and still achieve the aim it was seeking.

Some components of war are rooted in cultural characteristics; therefore, the reader can analyze and contrast those elements that distinguish armies of difference societies and civilizations. In this instance, the narrative will show how spatial and temporal perspectives manifest themselves in each culture and its influence on the development of strategies and policy. The total examination will be on how culture informs conflict and on the importance of the asymmetry of logic that can exist between two cultures. That one of them does not ascribe to the Western mode of conflict and still earns a measure of strategic success, despite tactical failure, may suggest that our logic may not be valid for each conflict we observe. Being aware of this difference can facilitate a deeper and more meaningful study of campaigns and conflicts between actors that are not Western in nature or thought. Operational planners can account for cultural differences in conflict and understand that success is a variable condition subject to the values and perspectives of opponents.

THE 1973 OCTOBER WAR

Our situation will have to change, or our cause will end, die, and disintegrate in 1973.⁶

-President Anwar el-Sadat, *The October War*

The strategy of a nation is an articulation of what goals it must achieve in order to secure its interests with limited or finite resources available for its use.⁷ The result of achieving the goals of strategy, in whole or part, is the ability to advance the nation to a position of advantage relative to its peers, competitors and enemies.⁸ The Egyptian national government, prior to October 1973, had witnessed a transition in national leadership, a shift in superpower sponsorship and a balancing of internal interests by the government to remain in power. Anwar Sadat assumed the presidency after the death of President Nasser, and while the country was recovering from the aftermath of the 1967 War and the War of Attrition. Nevertheless, Sadat was able to construct his own unique strategic vision that adapted to the changing context of his environment.

The 1973 October War came about as a direct result and aftermath of the 1967 war. There was little doubt that Egypt would eventually stage an attempt to recover control of the Suez and the Sinai Peninsula. The question would be when and under what strategic conditions. President Nasser declared, “whatever that has been taken by force, will be returned by force”- this was a foreshadowing of the conflict Egypt would initiate to recover its lost territory. After the resounding defeat of 1967, Nasser began to rebuild the Army by disposing of the cronyism that had been one of its characteristics that limited its ability. Egyptian military leadership began to

⁶el-Gamasy, *The October War*, 127.

⁷Strategy has been in use and defined since times of Ancient Greece and has come to mean a variety of things than its original use. Strategos was the original Hellenic word used to define the subject matter dealt with by military generals. Today, strategy is used to define the logic of National or Military senior leaders. The Joint Publication 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, Washington DC: Government Printing Office, April 2012, pg 307 defines strategy as a prudent idea or set of ideas for employing the instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, and/or multinational objectives.

⁸Everett Carl Dolman, *Pure Strategy* (New York: Taylor & Francis Group, 2005), 13.

restructure in a manner where work, talent, and results were valued. Military leaders began to pursue the design of a new campaign against the Israelis that would involve a crossing of the Suez and an eastward advance into the Sinai.

Transitioning into leadership from the vice-presidency, Sadat was not his predecessor in outlook or desires and did not carry the nationalist cause that forced Nasser to react to situations in a prescriptive manner.⁹ What he did have in common with Nasser was a deep commitment to recover the lost lands of Egypt from 1967. President Sadat was firmly rooted in the values of the Bedouin ethos. Courage was more valuable and prized than fear and disunity. He was aware of what fear and a lack of confidence could have on the individual and the collective if not rehabilitated. Sadat recognized the need to whiten Egypt's face-to restore its honor- as essential for the future of the country both from a domestic perspective as well as for a regional strategic position.¹⁰

The USSR-Egypt alliance remained in place after the transition in leadership from Nasser to Sadat; however, as the context of the Cold War changed it had unwanted consequences for the Egyptians. The Egyptians looked to the USSR to rebuild its armed forces after the 1967 defeat. Simultaneously, the US and USSR began a series of diplomatic exchanges designed to enhance the possibilities for détente between the two countries. While the Near East was not a priority for either country, it still represented an area of interest in which both sought a balance of power as a means to avoid conflict or an expanded arms race. President Sadat was insistent on developing his military for a future retaliation against Israel. It would be imperative that he receive from the Soviets as much military capability as possible. However, Moscow and the Soviet military leadership remained dubious of Egypt's ability to prosecute another war with its equipment.

⁹Heikal, *The Road to Ramadan*, 112-114.

¹⁰Raphael Israeli, *Man of Defiance-A Political Biography of Anwar Sadat* (Totowa: Barnes & Noble Books, 1985), 73-74.

Moscow had an interest in supplying those that would not be decisively beaten as the Egyptians had been in 1967. Sadat became overwhelmed with this friction and intransigence on the part of the Soviets to support his just cause in retrieving lost Arab land. In frustration, President Sadat declared 1971 would be the “Year of Decision”.¹¹ However, no one witnessed a conflict in 1971, and relevant actors dismissed the new leader.

President Sadat guided Egypt into 1973 with a vision to change the political inertia that had settled within the region. Heikal discusses in, *The Road to Ramadan*, the interests and conditions Egypt was attempting to manage and how conflict could solve some of these issues. Egypt was suffering from the economic strain of reduced operations in the Suez Canal paired with the costs of rebuilding the army. Sadat was becoming fearful that a lack of interest on the part of the Superpowers and Israel to address the Egyptian grievance represented a shrinking window of opportunity. As result, Sadat believed that Egypt would have to act in its own interest and accept the risk of starting a conflict if there was to be a chance to restore its national territorial integrity. The final reason for a preemptive operation was to address the popular will and the administration’s credibility. The people demanded the government take offensive action against the Israelis. The risk of not acting would only embolden the growing strength of the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist groups bent on changing the power structure within Egypt. It would create the opportunity for a second revolution to happen in Egypt but without addressing the issue of Sinai being in foreign hands.¹² Considering these issues, Sadat outlined his strategic vision and the utilization of force. Egypt needed to engage in a conflict that would exchange its 1967 defeat and shame with one of courage and valor that the world could witness. The effects of attrition and losses on the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) would define winning the armed conflict. Egypt intended to show the Israeli logical flaw of securing their state with

¹¹Ibid., 67.

¹²Heikal, *The Road to Ramadan*, 208-210.

strategic territorial depth for peace.¹³ The ultimate goal of the effort would be to shift the strategic advantage towards Egypt so that it could enhance its dialogue within the Arab-Israeli conflict from a position of strength.

President Sadat decided to go to war formally on November 15, 1972.¹⁴ Generals Ismail, Shazli and Gamasy developed the concept Operation Badr as a cross-canal offensive with a limited advance. Operation Badr had its roots in unfinished plans previously developed by the Nasser administration called Defense Plan 200 and the Granite series. They were military plans that envisioned a strategic and tactical offensive driving to different limits of advance in the Sinai Peninsula. Operation Badr drew on these antecedents and was the maturation of those plans with Sadat's strategic guidance.¹⁵

Since the inception of the Egyptian nationalist government, the army had shown a talent for set-piece battle with little variation. Subordinate leaders tended to lack the initiative and creativity essential to decentralized maneuver warfare. However, the Egyptian unit could still be effective on the battlefield if guided by prescriptive orders pre-planned and deliberately thought out. Following the 1967 War, the Egyptian General Staff sought out to understand themselves and their enemy before acting again. They concluded that their strength was the infantry in static defensive positions.¹⁶ Therefore, an operational campaign needed limited objectives that highlighted that strength of the Egyptian Armed Forces (EAF). Sadat assessed that he only

¹³George W. Gawrych, *The 1973 Arab-Israeli War: The Albatross of Decisive Victory* (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute, 1996), 12.

¹⁴Anwar el-Sadat, *In Search of Identity* (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1977), 232.

¹⁵Lieutenant General El-Shazly discusses the maturation of Operation Badr in chapter 2 of *The Crossing of the Suez*. From the concepts developed from the Nasserite "Granite" of Plans 41 and the High Minarets that envisioned a crossing of the Suez with different lines of advance in the Sinai interior based on friendly capability and threat assessment. Field Marshal Gamasy echoes a similar nod to the evolution of Operation Badr from pre-existing plans the Egyptian General Staff had reviewed in his memoir *The October War*.

¹⁶Kenneth Pollack, *Arabs at War-Military Effectiveness, 1948-1991* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2002), 99.

needed an operation that achieved control of only a fraction of land in the Sinai to change the political landscape. While Nasser's plans called for the liberation of the entire Sinai, operational planners were keen to scale back any effort that would exceed the capabilities of their units. Therefore, Operation Badr was to be a surprise attack with a set piece tactical defensive and a strategic offensive. Senior leaders intended for the employment of forces to serve the political goal of the Egyptian government and not the traditional Arab goal of a decisive and destructive victory over the IDF. They reasoned an attrition style approach in time and space could achieve a reasonable chance at success against the Israelis.¹⁷

The Ramadan War of 1973 started on October 6, 1973 at 1400hrs. This war would be different in its scope and its outcome relative to Egypt's past military conflicts. The President and the rest of the senior military staff were confident with the plan that emerged--that it was an appropriate marriage of strategic guidance and tactical capabilities. Military action remained in strict subordination to the political management of the war.¹⁸ Ultimately, what would transpire on the desert battlefield of the Sinai Peninsula would have tremendous strategic consequences for all the parties involved. Regardless of the future narratives, Sadat desired to maintain a relative position of success and victory within the tactical context of the war because he regarded it as the avenue to the peace Egypt needed.¹⁹

Egypt commenced the 1973 War with a coordinated aerial, artillery and infantry assault onto the Sinai Peninsula. At 1400hrs on October 6, 1973, 222 fighter aircraft were released to attack pre-planned targets. After 20 minutes, the initial air interdiction paused to shift efforts to

¹⁷Ibid., 102.

¹⁸The subordination of the Egyptian military to President Sadat is uniquely symbolized by a picture used on the cover of Dani Asher's analysis, *The Egyptian Strategy for the Yom Kippur War*. President Sadat is flanked by Generals Ismail and el-Shazly overlooking battle positions on a map on October 15, 1973 assessing the effects of the Israeli counter-offensive. Accordingly, the officers are in their uniforms, but so is President Sadat demonstrating both his military past, but also a symbolic gesture that both strategic and operational leaders were uniquely managing the war.

¹⁹el-Sadat, *In Search of Identity*, 270.

the direct and indirect fires assets stationed west of the Suez Canal. The intent was to attack those Israeli defensive positions along the Bar-Lev line and in depth to allow the unimpeded crossing of infantry forces across the canal. The Egyptian 2nd and 3rd Armies were successful in crossing the canal, scaling the sand ramparts and initiating the process of seizing the defensive outposts of the Bar-Lev line. Supporting the initial crossing the night prior of 5-6 October, engineering units were able to dismantle a critical obstacle that the IDF had constructed to integrate with the sand ramparts. The obstacle was a pipeline designed to deliver flammable product along the length of the canal over watched by the Bar-Lev Line.

Operation Badr ideally envisioned and advance by the Egyptian Army to secure the passes of the Sinai Peninsula; thereby, containing any mobilized reserves of the IDF to the Eastern portion of the Sinai Peninsula. The army needed to advance to a position where they could control the passes that connected the west and east portions of the Sinai Peninsula. On the evening of October 6, Egyptian SOF units inserted via rotary wing transportation in vicinity of the passes to interdict and disrupt the existing IDF units. In addition, it also planned to disrupt the flow of anticipated IDF armored reinforcements and infantry reserves. The SOF units would have limited success as attested by the eventual counter-attacks by Israeli armored forces onto the bridgeheads. An Egyptian special operations unit was able to hold the Sirdar Pass for 16 days following insertion that would effectively deny this avenue of approach to reinforcing IDF forces.²⁰ The following days, October 7-8, would see fighting at al-Qantara and the first Israel response to the Egyptian crossing. Egypt would continue to consolidate their gains by expanding their bridgeheads and complete the movement of the forces that they would commit to the East side of the canal.

²⁰el-Gamasy, *The October War*, 211.

Egypt succeeded in gaining the initiative in the opening hours. While Israel had concluded 24-48 hours prior to the assault that an Egyptian attack was imminent, it was too late for them to react. The IDF would have to fight with the units it had in place, and rely on the efficacy of the defensive plan that supported the establishment of the Bar Lev Line. The initial success of Operation Badr was also having positive effects on the Egyptian people. While the population had struggled to understand the losses resulting from the Six Days War, the opening salvos of October 6, 1973 were a welcomed event. The army had started to redeem itself in the eyes of the nation with the successes it was achieving. Crossing the canal was as much of surmounting a psychological obstacle in the minds of the Egyptians, as it was a physical barrier for the military to cross.²¹ The Egyptian Armed Forces were clearly in control of the initiative. The plan might have been overly prescriptive, but it kept Egyptian forces in contact with the enemy so that they were dictating the action. On the morning of 7 October, the EAF had crossed the canal, breached and rendered the Bar Lev Line ineffective and constructed bridgeheads with a depth of 6-10 kilometers across the frontage of the 2nd and 3rd Armies.²²

The USSR became an active and vocal advocate of a ceasefire after the first day of fighting. Premier Brezhnev and his staff actively worked to move President Sadat towards a pre-planned cease-fire once initial goals had been achieved.²³ The motives behind such diplomatic maneuvers were grounded in their perception of recent history. First, the USSR did not want the war with Israel to expand into a confrontation between it and the US. Keeping the Six Days War in mind, they did not want to see another potential defeat of an Arab nation equipped with Soviet arms. The USSR also did not want a defeat of a client state when active Soviet advisor were

²¹Saad el-Shazly, *The Crossing of the Suez* (San Francisco: American Mideast Research, 2003), 7.

²²el-Gamasy, *The October War*, 216-217.

²³el-Sadat, *In Search of Identity*, 252-253.

present mentoring Arab senior military leaders. President Sadat ignored these diplomatic overtures in favor of retaining the initiative and exploiting its successes.²⁴

The first Israeli reaction came on 7 October. Under the command of General Mindler, the existing reserves of IDF armored units attempted to stall the Egyptian advance. As Israeli units moved forward to search for gaps and seams in the Egyptian line to exploit, they encountered anti-tank infantry teams that were able to stop the IDF. The IDF had little success and decided to reorganize to the east to await additional reinforcements. The surprise of the Egyptian attack, its ability to repel armored forces, and its air defense systems had effectively countered the strengths of the IDF. The IDF invested in intelligence, armor, and air superiority as the pillars of their military from lessons learned from their past conflicts. Not realizing the EAF had adapted, the IDF would accept a heavy price in casualties as long as the EAF were effectively combining the effects of their assets. Battles continued to emerge along the Sinai front as the bridgeheads were expanding and the EAF looked to seize the small towns such as al-Qantara and al-Fridan that occupied the western edge of the Sinai Peninsula.

The EAF repelled the first IDF tactical counter-action and secured additional depth to their initial bridgeheads. The EAF had achieved their 'specific mission': Bridgeheads with depths of 15km's and sufficient combat power in defensive positions to await the Israeli counter-offensive.²⁵ The EAF desired to create an iron wall that the IDF units would crash against once they moved to retake the seized portions of the Sinai. Recognizing the advantageous position the Egyptians had reached, the Russians again implored President Sadat on the issue of a ceasefire. Recognizing the accumulation of tactical successes, President Sadat had no desire to stop any exploitation of the achievements that could continue to contribute to his strategic goal. However, all military operations are subject to the physics of endurance and reach that effect the duration of

²⁴el-Gamasy, *The October War*, 259.

²⁵Ibid., 257.

unabated tactical action. General Ismail believed it prudent to conduct an operational pause to refit and consolidate the existing units on the east side of the canal. The operational pause the Egyptians took would be the turning point in the war.

Military commanders implement operational pauses for a number of reasons. They provide the opportunity to replenish and refit units that have taken the initial toll of combat. In addition, they allow commanders to assess the progress of the fight and determine what adjustments are needed to the operational plan and tactical directives. The risk associated with operational pauses is the potential loss of the initiative. The loss of initiative can occur owing to the amount of time that elapses between periods of the offensive. Operational pauses are necessary to link periods of offensive activity. However, they must be constrained to the minimum amount of time needed to resupply the force to resume the next offensive and exploit success.²⁶

Egypt implemented an operational pause from 10-14 October. At the strategic level, the pause accounted for the diplomatic and strategic issues that began to shift as result of the commencement of hostilities. At the military level, it was an opportunity to contemplate the offensive to reach the passes of the Sinai. President Sadat was aware of the ceasefire proposals by the Russians at that time. Reinforcing his success made a ceasefire unattractive, but he had yet to consider the developments on the Syrian front. By 10 October, the IDF was successful in stopping the initial Syrian advance despite their combat power augmented by Iraqi and Jordanian brigade sized units. The IDF launched a successful counter-offensive that showed the ability to

²⁶US, Department of the Army, *ADRP 3-0 Unified Land Operations*, Washington DC: Government Printing Office, May 2012, 4-46 outlines the elements of operational art which are cognitive tools utilized by commanders and their supporting staffs to design and manage tactical effort within the boundary of strategic guidance. In this instance, operational pause is being used to highlight the gap in time and activity that characterizes Phasing and Transitions.

threaten Damascus itself.²⁷ They chose to handle the northern front first and would then refocus their efforts to the Sinai. Believing that the Egyptians would not take a tactical halt until they penetrated to a depth of 100km or had seized the Sinai passes, the Syrians were shocked that the EAF stopped at such a shallow depth after 4 days of fighting. President Assad requested that military action continue on the southern front. The Syrians believed a resumption of the Egyptian offensive would relieve pressure in the north by forcing the Israelis to reallocate combat power to the south. President Sadat would direct his military to resume the offensive despite the advice given to him by his military leaders.

General Gamasy recalled that the strategy behind the October War was to destroy Israeli concentrations in the Sinai and reach the strategic lines in which to achieve the political goals. The first stage was the reduction of the Bar Lev Line and the second was the seizure of the passes.²⁸ However, the three senior military leaders never settled how far they were to advance into the Sinai. Each acknowledged that reaching the passes was a sequel within Operation Badr prescribed by previous plans. General Ismail was fervent in his belief that the army should not extend past its operational reach. The operational reach was defined as the limit that its combined arms team could effectively support the advance of the armor and infantry. He believed that it was beyond the tactical capabilities of the army to reach the passes. Hence, any political directive given before the war about reaching the passes constituted an acknowledgement as a subordinate.²⁹ Shazli also was an adamant believer of not driving towards the passes despite his reputation as an aggressive commander. Shazli refutes the popular misconception and provides an emotional argument as to why he always believed the resumption of the offensive was a military mistake that sacrificed a potential Egyptian tactical victory. Shazli operated under the assumption

²⁷ Pollack, *Arabs at War-Military Effectiveness, 1948-1991*, 114.

²⁸ el-Gamasy, *The October War*, 264.

²⁹ Pollack, *Arabs at War-Military Effectiveness, 1948-1991*, 101.

that Sadat's political directive was limited only to seizing a foothold in the Sinai. Any attack beyond that limited objective would constitute a blunder. He firmly believed any offensive would be defeated and would provide the IDF the opportunity to destroy the existing bridgeheads.³⁰ Both Ismail and Shazly firmly maintained that any chance of success in the Sinai was limited to their current positions. Gamasy was the only military official that saw an opportunity in resuming the offensive if done quickly.

Gamasy was well aware of the risks of the armor and infantry being exposed to IDF close air support without the support of its air defense assets. However, Gamasy recognized that advancing to the passes was necessary to obey the political demands, and the military could only advance the strategic goals if they reached the passes. The Egyptian forces would have to resume the offensive before the IDF could consolidate, shift forces from the north, or employ new equipment provided by the Americans. The initiative would only remain with Egypt if they could quickly do this.³¹ Unfortunately, the audacity needed to exploit the conditions on the ground was sacrificed for cautiousness and a belief that greater results could be obtained by fighting the Israelis from the defensive. General Ismail, after the war, recounted to Mohammed Heikal why the offensive was not carried out with the speed it was perceived to have needed. General Ismail believed the value of the military effort was to maintain to plan, see how the enemy reacted, and reduce the risk of any major casualties as much as possible.³² He was cowed from the history of conflict between the two nations, and saw opportunities on the battlefields as dangerous adventures that would likely lead to a replay of another rout akin to 1967. Despite his misgivings to continuing the offensive, General Ismail acquiesced to President Sadat and honored his

³⁰el-Shazly, *The Crossing of the Suez*, 242-246.

³¹el-Gamasy, *The October War*, 264-265.

³²*Ibid.*, 269.

directive to resume the offensive. The decision to resume the offensive was a political decision.³³ If the overall strategic aim was going to be met there would be a risk of failure that accompanied it when the army advanced from its current positions.

The Egyptian offensive was to resume on October 13, but it General Ismail postponed it for 24 hours due to additional needed preparation. During the multi-day tactical halt, the IDF was successful in reorganizing itself and integrating arms and intelligence support from the US. The Egyptian offensive commenced at 0630 am on October 14th and its goal was to reach the western entrance of the Mitla, Gedy and B'ir Gifgafah passes in the Sinai. Flaws reminiscent of past wars immediately hampered the Egyptians. The Egyptians needed initiative and an ability to adapt to the unknown positions of the Israeli defenses as they moved forward. The attack became piecemeal and uncoordinated as units began maneuvered without mutual support. The prescriptive nature of the first phase of Operation Badr was unable to be replicated in such a short period for the sequel of the second phase. Intelligence was unable to pinpoint defensive locations. Fires did not have an integrated plan supporting the movement of armor and infantry past the SAMS umbrellas. Armor and infantry resorted towards wave-style attacks and attempted to overwhelm the Israelis with firepower.³⁴ The Egyptian attacked failed, they seized no more terrain of the peninsula. The Israelis pushed the Egyptians back to their initiating lines of October 14th. The net result was they had lost approximately 465 armored vehicles.³⁵ Egypt had squandered the opportunity to quickly reach their strategic goals through tactical action. Egyptian deliberation allowed the IDF sufficient time to shift resources and adequately defend and resume the attack from any developed offensive. The achievement of the original Egyptian goal would now be have to defend a Israeli counter-offensive.

³³Ibid., 270.

³⁴Pollack, Arabs at War-Military Effectiveness, 1948-1991, 117.

³⁵Ibid., 117.

Why was Israel compelled to conduct a counter-offensive into Egypt proper? It was not realistic to think any IDF territorial gain west of the canal would have been secured or politically feasible to maintain. The reason for the offensive highlights the existing doctrinal tenet of the IDF to provide security for Israel. Strategic doctrine was based on the assumption that the offense would be the best means to conduct warfare, and that any action needed to be in enemy territory.³⁶ During the interwar years between 1967 and 1973, Israel had contemplated the possibility of meeting an Egyptian attack and a subsequent counter-attack into the Egyptian interior. Given the Israelis understood the disposition of the Second and Third Armies with respect to a cross-canal offensive, Israeli Southern Command developed options on how they could penetrate available seams between the two units. Following the penetration of the two armies, the army could cross the canal and disperse to affect a wide area to achieve their objectives.³⁷

The IDF armored forces under Generals Sharon and Adan executed a similar plan. Having withstood the Egyptian attack of October 14, the IDF confirmed that Egypt's strategic reserve had been committed to the East side of the canal to shore up the bridgeheads.³⁸ They searched and found a seam between the Second and Third Armies of approximately 40kms. The gap allowed for a crossing at the top of the Great Bitter Lakes and seizure of crossroads that would allow forces to attack on a north and south axis on the west side of the Suez canal.

Egypt failed to detect the successful efforts by the IDF to cross into the Egyptian interior and thus mount a collective effort to prevent their crossing. The failure in situational awareness was due in part to the efforts to consolidate and reorganize after the failed offensive of October 14th. It was not until President Meir of Israel addressed her nation and informed them that the IDF

³⁶Avraham Adan, *On the Banks of the Suez* (San Francisco: Presidio Press, 1980), 245.

³⁷Heikal, *The Road to Ramadan*, 208-210.

³⁸*Ibid.*, 234-235.

was now fighting on both the east and west side of the canal.³⁹ Units stationed on Second Army's right flank battled with General Sharon's division and a paratroop brigade that were attempting to secure a breaching lane. Some personnel and equipment were able to cross independently, but the IDF would have to secure an assembly area in vicinity of the Chinese Farm in order to facilitate the future crossing. Egyptian General al-Nabi employed his division to develop the situation. Fierce fighting took place between the two belligerents until additional IDF units were injected into the fight for Israel's advantage.⁴⁰ The fight to prevent the IDF from securing a crossing site would last from October 15-17. The IDF would secure a site and begin to cross two divisions that would eventually exploit a north axis towards Ismailiya and a southern axis that would encircle the Egyptian Third Army and Suez City.

As the IDF continued their exploitation on the west bank of the Suez Canal, General Shazly was deployed to the Second Army to assess a potential solution in sealing the penetration of the East bank and attacking the IDF forces that were on the west bank. He returned and only provided a solution that was ultimately not politically feasible or acceptable. General Shazly firmly recommended that four brigades from the East be withdrawn to meet the IDF on the west bank.⁴¹ The Military Command requested President Sadat attend an operational update the evening of October 20-21. A decision point had been reached. Based on the developing conditions of the west bank, President Sadat had to decide whether he would continue the fight status-quo, withdraw forces to the west, or actively work for a ceasefire. He was given updates from all representatives of the major commands and war fighting functions. All recommendations, with exception of General Shazli, tended towards maintaining the Eastern

³⁹Ibid., 236.

⁴⁰el-Gamasy, *The October War*, 286.

⁴¹el-Shazly, *The Crossing of the Suez*, 265-266.

positions.⁴² In order to meet the political objective, the military believed it had to maintain their positions on the East bank. Any effect Egypt could inflict on Israel would be meaningless if it did not accompany the seizure of key terrain and land. That was the lesson learned from the War of Attrition. It did not matter how many artillery rounds were exchanged between both sides. As long as the armies remained static, no diplomatic or political solution could be achieved to recover the Sinai and the Suez.

Having received the final operational update from his commanders, President Sadat decided to press for a ceasefire. The military had exhausted its means to advance the strategic interest. Accepting the diplomatic intervention of the UN, Sadat accepted three UN Resolutions designed to enact and enforce a ceasefire. However, Egypt and Israel continued to engage each other as both sides searched for the most advantageous tactical position to seize before the conclusion of hostilities. The UN Security Council, realizing the previous two resolutions were ineffective, passed Resolution 340 to have an international force supervise and maintain the ceasefire. The dialogue between the two countries would have to enter the diplomatic and political realm in order to seek a resolution to the conflict. Both belligerents, Egypt and Israel, concluded the conflict in unique positions with respect to strategy and tactics. The conflict ended as a stalemate when viewed by the measure of how much land was traded. As Egypt was able to successfully surprise and assault IDF defensive positions to retake portions of the Sinai, so too was Israel able to respond and reclaim portions of the Sinai and occupy for the first time a portion of the Egyptian interior. Tactically, Israel was able to respond adequately to reverse Egyptian gains and forced them to revert to old habits that proved to be their downfall. However, Israel could not gain any strategic advantage within the region or with her allies by keeping forces west of the canal.

⁴²el-Gamasy, *The October War*, 291-292.

Egypt demonstrated its will to fight and an ability to overcome its past weaknesses within the military with a prescriptive plan that was well rehearsed. While the Egyptians were able to make progress in inculcating the value of talent and merit within the army it was not enough in such a short period from 1967. The country was able to generate a strategic and operational plan to confront Israel, but it lacked depth and awareness of what could happen on the battlefield. When Egypt needed its forces to work creatively after the first phase of the operation, it slouched back to the habits that led to failure in the previous conflicts. It was able to hold onto the land it seized within the bridgeheads but it was unable to replicate its initial tactical success when it had to answer to Israel's counter-offensive. Strategically, the event would favor Egypt and it served as a milestone in the original political aim of recovering the Sinai. While it took additional years, Egypt would have the Sinai Peninsula returned to her and it would be the first nation that would formally make peace with Israel. While war did not immediately produce the strategic goal, it was a key contributing factor of changing the political dynamics in the region so it would achieve its goal.

The war was, and produced an interesting narrative on the nature of the interaction between strategy and tactics. Egypt had been tactically defeated by the end of the war, but went on to secure a strategic advantage. Israel successfully answered the threat of the Egyptian attack and showed it still had the tactical skill to counter regional military threats. However, strategically, it was limited in what it could achieve when conflict re-emerged in the region. Israel and its allies questioned the theory and doctrine of projecting force as a best method to preserve its existence. It would have to readjust to defend itself within the borders of its own territory and not by extending.

THE STRANDS OF CULTURE & CONFLICT

War embraces much more than politics: that it is always an expression of culture, often a determinant of cultural forms, in some societies the culture itself.⁴³

-John Keegan, *A History of Warfare*

Carl von Clausewitz wrote war is a duel and it pursues the submission of an opponent by an actor's available means of force.⁴⁴ The imagery of a duel, or a contest, conjures up the intimate interaction of violence between humans. People seeking to exert their will to attain a higher objective or a lasting advantage define the purpose and object of war. War is a human event, despite the impact of technology and the exponentially greater destructive power it has given armies. The human dimension of conflict, despite its complexity, is the lasting and unchanging aspects of the nature of war. Entities attack to exert their influence to attain a positive goal, and they defend to preserve and maintain the existence of an idea or territory with a negative goal. The intensity of the conflict is a function of the value belligerents ascribe to the goal. Regardless the reasons for war-- passion, chance, and reason remain its fundamental components. The character of warfare evolves for a number of reasons, perhaps none so great though as why an actor fights for an object. John Keegan suggests in Chapter 1 of, *A History of Warfare*, one of the components that defines the essence of a culture is the way it is expressed as a function of what the its society desires and pursues.⁴⁵

Conflicts between Western states have been broadly characterized by intense competition and reciprocal action dedicated to the annihilation of the enemy. The East has been described with an emphasis on the indirect or oblique approach to preserve combat power by avoiding the

⁴³John Keegan, *A History of Warfare* (New York: Vintage Books, 1993), 12.

⁴⁴Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 75.

⁴⁵Keegan, *A History of Warfare*, 12.

direct clash of forces until it was necessary.⁴⁶ Cultures are different in their practice of war because of how the people uniquely grasp conceptions of time, space and purpose in relation to themselves and their existing social values. War is one of many cultural artifacts, so an observer may draw conclusions about what war says about a culture based on its reasons for initiation, effort and outcome. The nature of war as a violent human event is unchanging, but its expression- the logic of its manifestation- varies with culture and the different values sources that guide participants. If war is an expression or extension of politics, its expression is also culture by other means.⁴⁷ Warfare is then a dependent variable of the existing social framework of the culture.

Students of the martial profession gravitate to documents on the character of warfare to understand the complexity of the event. Western military history begins with Herodotus' *The Histories*, and Thucydides' *The Peloponnesian War*.⁴⁸ Both works are classical analyses of the ancient Hellenic armies and their engagement with their Eastern or Persian counterparts. Its depth and commentaries continues to influence the current and emerging body of knowledge on conflict and international relations. However, it can be valuable for other fields than the military institution. Echoing John Keegan's comments in, *A History of Warfare*, on culture and war, their intertwinement can reveal characteristics of the other. In its narrowest form, military history records the achievements of battle, preserves the singular perspective of the commander, or searches to validate existing principles and theories of conflict.⁴⁹ Audiences will leave the reflection and lessons learned of battles to the military institution itself. Because it lacks the confidence to analyze it because it has not been a member of the institution, or it is the

⁴⁶Ibid., 387.

⁴⁷Ibid., 387.

⁴⁸Ofra Graicer, "Between the Feasible and the Fantastic: Orde Wingate's Long-Range Penetration- A Spatial View of the Operational Manoeuvre" (PhD diss., Tel Aviv University, 2008), 41.

⁴⁹Eliot A. Cohen and John Gooch, *The Anatomy of Failure in War: Military Misfortunes* (New York: Free Press, 1990), 35-36.

responsibility of its experts to capture and analyze the lessons war's experiences produce. Cohen & Gooch in *Military Misfortunes* comment that the post 1945 period witnessed a shift of military history to the "War and Society" approach:

Military historians turned instead to the study of "War and Society", a resolute attempt to place military institutions and events in ever broadening contexts. Instead of studying battles, historians (often equipped with the latest statistical techniques and computer databases) examined patterns of recruitment, the relationship between arms industries and economic development, the daily life of soldiers.⁵⁰

Culture occupies a dynamic and shifting position within the study of war.⁵¹ Military history tends to stress the practical aspects and lessons for its professionals to know for future conflict. It can hyper-focus on battle and the combat experience in isolation. Historians can broaden the perspective of the history of combat by intertwining concepts of culture in reference to warfare and demonstrating how it can illuminate a greater depth of understanding of the whole.⁵² Considering war as part of a cultural milieu and in the context of the time and society from which it emerged provides deep and even startling insights into the rationale of conflict and the assignment of the object in war.

The relative hegemony of the U.S. coupled with the expeditionary utilization of its armed forces highlight the need for cultural awareness and understanding. The years of conflict since 9/11, the coalition counter-insurgency strategy, and the introspection on what we as professionals

⁵⁰Ibid., 39.

⁵¹Culture is a term that has come to symbolize a variety of characteristics that are bound up within a people and a region. Anthropologists use it in describing the mechanisms of society, but also by philosophers and artists to articulate the artifacts that symbolize the human experience. Culture can broadly be categorized as the working values and distinct practices of one generation that are handed down to subsequent generations. The history of the term culture originated from Cicero in Roman philosophy that developed the definition to identify a cultivation of the soul as a one would with agriculture. Dr. Gracier, within her PhD dissertation, uses the word culture in accordance with *The Oxford Companion to Philosophy*. Culture expresses a spectrum where on one end it can signify the values implicit in it or at its broadest, it contains all the characteristics of human beings. The essence of culture is the attempt at abstracting the common behaviors and actions of humans and encoding that into language by which we might know ourselves and others better.

⁵²Patrick Porter, *Military Orientalism: Eastern War through Western Eyes* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009) 6-13.

have lacked has pushed cultural awareness and its impact on conflict to the forefront.⁵³ Culture will continue to serve as a useful and practical lens in understanding opponents and the goals and solutions parties pursue not aligned with our own perspective.

Culture is a means of expressing and preserving the human experience. The same experience is what speaks to and defines the nature of war and informs its character.⁵⁴ Culture is a distinctive way of thinking and behaving, manifesting itself in various human endeavors to include the practice of statecraft.⁵⁵ Adda Bozeman recommends in, *War and the Clash of Ideas*, embracing the emotions and values of war that are critically demoted and neglected. Historians of war must consider the influences of human subjectivity on the expression of national will, the influence of spiritualism on motives and our willingness as humans to resort to violence. Not addressing these issues, institutions would tend to see all societies and civilizations as having the same philosophy and approach to war.⁵⁶ Conflict theorists may use anthropology as an ideal starting point to initiate conflict research.

Culture provides a vital understanding of the values and principles for which an actor would fight to preserve. It serves as a framework for understanding what influences, or constitutes termination and resolution for the parties to a conflict. Strategy, developed by the fusion of both public officials and generals, captures the ideas that motivate the people within the state not just the desires of a single party. The nation represents the interests and desires of the people. The culture and ideals of the government representing the nation influence implicitly the strategic goals developed to generate progress.

⁵³Ibid., 1-6.

⁵⁴Pollack, *Arabs at War-Military Effectiveness, 1948-199*, 3-4.

⁵⁵John W. Jandora, "War and Culture: A Neglected Relation", *Armed Forces and Society* 25, 4 (Summer 1999): 541-557.

⁵⁶Ibid., 543.

It is a vital asset for any military professional to enhance the cultural awareness of allies and potential enemies. The military professional should look outwards at the depth of the operational environment. Western observers have always been interested in the Eastern approach to war because of how it amplified an understanding of itself. Studying the Eastern approach and other visions of war, permits a student to reflect more clearly relative to another that is distinct and unique.⁵⁷ The pursuit of the knowledge and awareness of an enemy is simply reframing of the frequently quoted maxim of Sun Tzu, “[k]now the enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles you will never be in peril. When you are ignorant of the enemy but know yourself, your chances of winning or losing are equal. If ignorant both of your enemy and of yourself, you are certain in every battle to be in peril”.⁵⁸

The study of culture serves three purposes for the military. The first two are the means and ways to understand an opposite actor thought and behavior, and a basis of understanding for interacting with foreign societies.⁵⁹ The third and most important is it connects the military to the importance of the anthropological perspective of warfare. Actors use force to achieve ends based on the progress it wishes to achieve. The US military institution proclaimed a revolution in military affairs (RMA) with the introduction of precision-guided munitions run parallel to the growth of information-sharing technology in the early 90’s. Tools and scientific advances would again change the character of warfare and the face of combat as it had for countless field marshals and generals. Material and systemic superiority could overcome any enemy and permit a reduction in the friction of war.⁶⁰ However, military professionals must guard against the recurrent obsession of believing it can conduct warfare on the cheap and with minimal efforts

⁵⁷Patrick Porter, *Military Orientalism: Eastern War through Western Eyes* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), 2.

⁵⁸Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, ed. Samuel B. Griffith (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), 84.

⁵⁹Porter, *Military Orientalism: Eastern War through Western Eyes*, 9.

⁶⁰*Ibid.*, 8.

based on available technology. The character of warfare will evolve and with it the emphasis that is placed on technology to meet its demands.

The utilization of culture can be an essential perspective to a greater level understanding outside the norms of Western values and institutions. International law and state theory root our perspectives to Western norms and standards of behavior. It can skew the interpretation of enemy actions and how to counter them effectively.⁶¹ Adda Bozeman comments in *War and the Clash of Ideas* on the friction that exists within America on culture's role in strategic research due to history and ideals:

It is much harder for Americans than for other peoples to accept such a world-view because the United States, almost by definition, stands for the denial of cultural differences and the neglect or irrelevancy of the past. In this respect America departed long ago from the European tradition-inaugurated by Herodotus when he explained the Persian Wars as a confrontation between rival civilizations of Europe and Asia- and is reluctant today to differentiate between wars fought within a culturally unified sphere and those between wars fought within a culturally unified sphere and those between societies of disparate cultures or idea systems.⁶²

Difficulties do exist with examining culture as a foundation for conflict research. Societal awareness may help to uncover a root issue of a military problem, but it also carries the danger of inescapable subjectivity. History is replete with culturally based strategic assessments indulging in existing prejudices and biases. The investment in cultural analysis without a balance of context can lead to analysis and estimates of distortion.⁶³ According to DeAtkine, the flaw is that “[t]he temptation is to impute cultural attributes to the enemy state that negate its superior numbers or weaponry”.⁶⁴

⁶¹Adda Bozeman, *Strategic Intelligence & Statecraft: Selected Essays, War and the Clash of Ideas* (Washington DC: Brassey's Inc, 1992), 58.

⁶²*Ibid.*, 58.

⁶³Norvelle B. De Atkine, “Why Arabs Lose Wars”, *Middle East Quarterly*, December 1999, <http://www.meforum.org/441/why-arabs-lose-wars> (accessed January 10, 2013).

⁶⁴*Ibid.*

Study of culture in preparation to meet an opponent must be sophisticated and avoid a reliance on assumptions based on past observations. Cultures remain consistent but their dynamic societies will adapt to peer competition and the changing environment in which it resides. Its means of force will also evolve to remain relevant and preserve itself. The preparation and initial performance by the Egyptian Army in 1973 for the Suez crossing illustrate the ability of an institution and its army to transform itself despite a record of failure. An excessive investment in the cultural approach can link rigid cultural conceptions of the enemy to the potential and capability of their armed forces.⁶⁵ This has been cited as a contributing factor as to why the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) was forced into the defense during the opening days of the 1973 October War.

A balance of approaches and theories are useful to extract all the significance out of a conflict; culture can be one of those tools. Despite its pitfalls of subjectivity and an over-reliance in the past, culture can be a powerful foundational element to the study of conflict. The human dimension of a conflict is complex but studying it and endeavoring to uncover meaning and structure permits a greater awareness of the idiosyncratic source of strategic vision. It should provide a greater depth in analyzing and understanding the roots of the goals and efforts willing to be expended for the value of the object.

⁶⁵Cohen and Gooch, *The Anatomy of Failure in War: Military Misfortunes*, 95-96.

THE WESTERN EQUATION OF WAR

Military institutions and the manner in which they employed violence depended on the economic, social, and political conditions of their respective states...States were shaped by their particular past and present circumstances.⁶⁶

-Peter Paret, *The Genesis of On War*

When an American military officer examining a conflict in which a state is able to advance its interests, despite tactical performance, in the face of a stronger and more prestigious opponent cognitive dissonance arises. The dissonance is a product of having accepted and placed confidence in an interpretation of a military theory of war as objective truth that possesses universal principles. The student assumes that armed forces can achieve victory when superiority exists to allow the greater reciprocal use of force relative to our opponent. This pre-supposes an accepted mental model that dictates conflict is efficiently prosecuted with strategies of annihilation and attrition serving a political objective of removal or destruction of another political entity.⁶⁷ A weaker state is disregarded in what it can achieve strategically as long as it is limited by the force it can project. Cognitive boundaries are limitations because of the emphasis accorded to physical superiority and technical acuity. A weaker entity initiating conflict for the purposes of political coercion and co-option should not be able dictate the terms of termination or resolution because it does not fit within the accepted model.⁶⁸

Classical 19th century theories of war, particularly Clausewitz's *On War*, remain a foundational reference for analysis of conflict for Western military powers. Wars are distinct human endeavors that lead towards violence. They are expressed as a state function using an

⁶⁶ Peter Paret, "The Genesis of On War", In *On War*, ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), 6.

⁶⁷ Helmuth Karl Bernhard Graf von Moltke, quoted in Michael Howard, "The Influence of Clausewitz", In *On War*, edited by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), 30.

⁶⁸ Ivan Arreguin-Toft, "How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict", *International Security*, Vol. 26, No. 1 (Summer, 2001), 93.

armed force submissive to policy. The emphasis on ‘means of force’ and ‘aiming to render the enemy powerless’ can lead to a linear and dogmatic belief that brute military strength is a pre-requisite to achieve the political motive through violence. This assumption may hold true for many instances of state-on-state conflict, but it is also an exceedingly restrictive prism through which to interpret anomalous conflicts. Our accepted or dominant belief in the classical theory of war has cognitive limitations as to what it can explain.

Ideas and theories are the most powerful tools human beings have.⁶⁹ Ideas codified as theory and accepted into science endure in the face of corroding and irrelevant technology. We familiarize ourselves with the theories that encapsulate the range of knowledge we seek on a particular subject. Empirically tested with rigor and discrimination, observers accept these theories of subject matter experts that determine whether it is value added to the existing body of knowledge.⁷⁰ However, acceptance of those same theories to an overwhelming level achieves a different status. Observers of that high level of acceptance see those theories as describing the truth and law of nature. If truth and law are determined, then there is the satisfaction of eliminating uncertainty and unexpected outcomes. Therefore, one can achieve the goals of scientific knowledge by attaining understanding and a sense of control over discreet phenomena.⁷¹

However, there are pitfalls in becoming wedded to a theory that was relevant in a specific time and context. There is a risk that it can become overtly causal promising the simplicity of a mathematical equation. An individual can reduce the physical aspects manifested in a phenomenon into the different variables of the equation and derive a solution to understand the

⁶⁹Huba Wass de Czege, The School of Advanced Military Studies Mini Documentary, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5M_y8n_KNOg (accessed January 10, 2013).

⁷⁰Paul Davidson Reynolds, *A Primer in Theory Construction* (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1971), 11-13.

⁷¹*Ibid.*, 7.

past and predict the future. If one can reduce the variables of nature into an equation then it should apply to a broad range of instances within that context of natural occurrences. This is the impulse, if not the underpinning logic of the Western military philosophy.⁷²

The two approaches-- of prioritizing research or theory-- expose the distinctive perspectives of nature. On one hand, nature can be distinctive truths found through trial and error. Observers can also observe nature and define what they observe and then empirically validate the abstractness of their theory.⁷³ Theories that have been developed and crafted about conflict often reside at a cognitive neutral point between the two perspectives of nature. War theories strive to be both simultaneously reflective and predictive. Theorists develop conflict theories in part by their personal observances and experiences in conflict. The intent is to try to uncover the essence and underlying principles that govern a conflict to provide a metric to understand future wars. Thucydides spanning to the classical Western theorists of the Enlightenment still have an impact today with their conflict premises. Their thinking has served as part of the rationale and education for Western military professionals up to the present day.⁷⁴

The extent to which their philosophies have influenced the current body of knowledge indicates the overwhelming influence their ideas still have for both the strategic and military context.⁷⁵ Their works remain the essence of a Western theory of war that has achieved a level of

⁷²Graicer, "Between the Feasible and the Fantastic: Orde Wingate's Long-Range Penetration- A Spatial View of the Operational Manoeuvre", 13.

⁷³Ibid., 140-144.

⁷⁴Field Grade Officers of the US Army and Allied partner nations are instructed at the US Army Command & General Staff College-ILE. In preparation for attendance to the School of Advanced Military Studies- SAMS, each candidate is required to attend lecture A699- Evolution of Military Thought. The purpose is to ground each student in the history and development of military theory that continues to inform us to this date in our doctrine. The course begins with an analysis of Thucydides' *The Peloponnesian War* and demonstrates the progress of military thought through Vegetius to De Saxe, ultimately setting the stage for the discussion on the dominance of Jomini & Clausewitz.

⁷⁵The Melian Dialogue of Thucydides' *The Peloponnesian War* is a foundation of the Realism school of international relations and conflict theory. "Might makes right" and "the strong do what they may", while the weak suffers its consequences are well-known axioms from the manuscript that serve to educate students on the essence of realpolitik. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy contains a variety

acceptance within the military community akin to truth and reality with respect to armed conflict.⁷⁶ The degree of acceptance has been aided by its relevance in addressing the nature and purpose of war despite the evolution of conflicts and its technological advancements.⁷⁷

What is the appropriate and accepted expression for the duel? The way military institutions employ violence is dependent upon the conditions in which they are maintained.⁷⁸ The existing political, social and economic conditions of the state are a medium through which military force is applied. War is an act of force that seeks to alter the enemy's will. Force is the means by which war is employed. The object of any war is to render the enemy powerless and create the vacuum for a will to be expressed in the absence of a former opponent. War should be the expression of a political motive thought about, defined, and agreed to by the political leader and military commander before the commencement of hostilities. Therefore, war cannot be autonomous from context or direction. Once hostilities commence, there is no logical limit to the introduction of violence. As long as the means exist, both parties will employ reciprocal actions that will lead to greater destruction until the exhaustion of their means. War is force expressed through violence, or its threat of use, and to win the military must exert a maximum effort. Therefore, the equation of war is such that an army's usefulness to policy is its ability to inflict damage and destruction to achieve the aim. Regardless of political motive, once the nation

of journal entries and articles on political science, one of which is "Political Realism in International Relations" by Julian W. Korab-Karpowicz. The article acknowledges and traces the history of the Realism school of thought back to the debate between the Realists of Athens and the Idealists of Melos.

⁷⁶Jomini and Clausewitz continue to influence Joint and Service specific doctrine with their books *The Art of War* and *On War*, respectively. Conflict today has evolved beyond the strict context of the nation-state as existed in the 19th century. Nevertheless, their ideas on the principles of warfare and the mechanics of centers of gravity remain to this day. Service manuals, JP 1-02 and ADRP 1-02 serve as the dictionary for military terms and graphics define the concept of center of gravity. JP 3-0 and ADRP 3-0 reference the concept of the principles of war as governing the laws of war when planning and executing operations. Our doctrine is a testament to the enduring legacy of 19th century military philosophy and values.

⁷⁷Martin van Creveld, *Clausewitz and Modern Strategy*, ed. Michael I. Handel (London: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., 1986), 46.

⁷⁸von Clausewitz, *On War*, 6.

employs the army it must seek to annihilate the enemy to render it separate from its will. The polity may use its army for coercion or cooption destroying only discreet portions of an opponent, or by the threat of force. Nevertheless, the physical or cognitive duel remains centered on the submission of the opponent. The Western equation of war has been that a strategic advantage must lie in a proportional relationship to tactical effort and achievement, and tactical effort must come from superior means that an entity is able to deploy and manage on the battlefield. The point being underscored is Western armies are influenced by a body of thought and knowledge of the rationalist tradition that is thoroughly embedded within that it can no longer be disassociated.⁷⁹ The effect is there is an internal metric that is an obstacle when conflicts of different values and purposes emerge. The effect is most often found within conflicts that emerge in non-Western environments and actors that see conflict not as an end to itself, but rather a component of an ongoing dialogue with a competitor. The industrial revolution ushered in a period of Western hegemony. Naturally, a spread of Western thought and values have accompanied it, but it did not erase competing logics especially within the arena of the violence and management of conflict.

Regional conflicts have challenged the American military institutional adherence to achieving strategic advantage by a total destruction of the enemy. COL Charles Pfaff argued in his article *Aligning Means with Ends: Towards a New Way of War* that the military misunderstands the nature of war aims when distinguishing between imposing our will and persuading an opponent to accept interests.⁸⁰ A source of institutional misunderstanding is the dogmatic adherence to classical war theory in which the physical imposition of our will is

⁷⁹Graicer, "Between the Feasible and the Fantastic: Orde Wingate's Long-Range Penetration- A Spatial View of the Operational Manoeuvre", 13.

⁸⁰Charles A. Pfaff, "Aligning Means and Ends: Toward a New Way of War", *Military Review Journal*, Sep-Oct 11, 78.

dominant.⁸¹ It leads its adherents to believe that war does something politics cannot, and its efforts and effects are discrete. Military objectives and political motives become synonymous and a loss of the recommended hierarchy manifests itself between military and policy. As evidenced, military professionals have identified the shift towards Clausewitzian thought and perspectives as preventing a level of flexibility and adaptation needed in the spectrum of conflict where coercion and compulsion are the goals.⁸² What is needed is an ability to be creative in thinking about the different ways aligning means and ways to strategy, and understanding culture and how it can transform the purpose and goals for which conflict is used. Military professionals must be confident enough to separate from rigidly adhering to a national way of war binding performance to a standard methodology of action. Culture has the potential of altering the character of warfare and can account for the difference in belligerent perspectives.⁸³

As the history of American military might has developed, each conflict has been an incremental advance in the building and exporting of military might. Leaders have been able to contemplate strategies of annihilation and the ability to destroy the enemy as objectives that are within our capability because of the military instrument that was available to be deployed.⁸⁴ The

⁸¹Zvi Lanir and Gad Sneh, *The New Agenda of Praxis* (Tel Aviv: Praxis Publishing; Lanir-Decisionmaking and Learning Systems, 2000), 16-17. Lanir and Sneh's monograph is a discussion on the effects post-modernism has had on knowledge. It has given rise to information in raw form and has de-emphasized the analysis needed to transform it into truth that is free of context. They cite the rise of the modernist movement where there was a strict and disciplined approach coupled with the post-modernist obsession with the deconstruction of knowledge and narratives underscores the urgent need for a reconstruction of epistemology. We need to conform to the environment, and not attempt to force the environment to conform to us, or our understanding of it. Awareness of forms of knowledge are critical in being able to make the cognitive leaps from one environment to the next and that we should be able to find meaning in the interpretations of what we observe. In conclusion, Lanir and Sneh remind us "human awareness does not contain objective images reflecting an independent reality. Instead, knowledge is the outcome of the subjective interpretation of human experience within given contexts, structured by intricate mutual relationships as well as tensions between (context-free) theory and (context-bound) practice".

⁸²Pfaff, "Aligning Means and Ends: Toward a New Way of War", *Military Review Journal*, 79.

⁸³Tony Corn, From Mars to Minerva: Clausewitz, Liddell Hart, and the two Western Ways of War, *Small Wars Journal*, <http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/767-corn.pdf> (accessed January 13, 2013), 6.

⁸⁴Russell F. Weigley, *The American Way of War* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973),

defining characteristics of the Western way of war- its historical logic- has also become part of the American way of war. The Western conflict equation demands military superiority to support the destruction of the enemy through strategies of annihilation and attrition. Strategies are supported by means of technology, unit and individual discipline, aggressive élan of troops, ability to project force, and the economic means to sustain the effort.⁸⁵

Despite the growth in American military power and conflict experiences since WWII, military and technological superiority have not been reliable guides to the outcome of wars.⁸⁶ Researchers in the field of conflict dynamics have examined this mid-20th century phenomena that defies the Western equation of war. Andrew Mack in “Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict” makes the initial look at this problem. Sullivan and Arreguin-Toft are subsequent authors that build on his argument by furthering the examination of the nuances of asymmetrical wars. Common to each of their arguments is that the Western theory of war does not hold for all conflict cases as demonstrated by events where indigenous weaker forces have been able to force a withdrawal of larger formations. Mack submits that resolve and interest are key factors that are able to strengthen the material asymmetry of weaker forces.⁸⁷ The resolve and interest in the struggle, or the value attributed to their object, is able to demand a cost on the larger force that it is unwilling to pay. Asymmetrical forces are able to succeed not solely by the attrition of opposing military forces. It cannot. Asymmetrical elements know they do not have the means to defeat tactically the superiority of a stronger force. Rather, the weaker belligerent is able, through protracted conflict, to attrit the political will and capability of the

xxii.

⁸⁵Geoffrey Parker, *The Cambridge History of Warfare* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 1-11.

⁸⁶Andrew Mack, “Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict”, *World Politics*, Vol. 27, No. 2 (Jan 1975): 175.

⁸⁷Ivan Arreguin-Toft, “How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict”, *International Security*, Vol. 26, No. 1 (Summer, 2001), 94.

stronger force. The importance of conflict asymmetry was reviewed by Belgian political scientist Henrotin and de Swielande in “Ontological-Cultural Asymmetry and the Relevance of Grand Strategies”.⁸⁸ The asymmetry of logic is what is more important in the conflict than the asymmetry of materiel and forces. The stronger force sees a limited war of limited objectives on the same battlefield that the weaker force sees a total war and is willing to sustain greater losses and exploit every capability to affect the opponent.⁸⁹

Sullivan in “Why Powerful States Lose Limited Wars”, expands the concept of asymmetrical warfare by proposing the theory that an increase in military capacity masks the cost-tolerance of a more powerful nation prior to the initiation of violence. Military capacity assures the military force that it will easily be able to destroy the military capacity of a weaker force, and if the means were removed then there is no physical way for the will to be demonstrated. However, the weaker force is able to engage the stronger force in such a way that it increases the cost-tolerance risk of the stronger nation. Military defeat is unlikely for the stronger nation, but the risk is the cost expended in an effort that is not deemed appropriate for achieving the political aim.⁹⁰ The weapons of the weak are its ability to attrit and target the political capital that deployed stronger forces and to attrit that same capital to force a withdrawal of the stronger opponent before it can accomplish its goals. In order to be successful weaker belligerents must be able to employ an indirect strategy avoiding the strengths and power of the stronger opponent.

Arreguin-Toft in “How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict” demonstrates

⁸⁸Joseph Henrotin and Tanguy Struye de Swielande, “Ontological-Culture Asymmetry and the relevance of Grand Strategies”, *Journal of Military and Strategic Studies* (Winter 2004) Vol.7, Issue 2, 1-3. In the article, the authors assert that asymmetry emerges from the emphasis we place on symmetry and looking for patterns in the environment. As people and states fight each other, they invariably lose the understanding of the opponent’s reciprocal actions. Common rules are impossible to adopt in conflict because all are acting in accordance with how their practices are dictated as result of culture.

⁸⁹Andrew Mack, “Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict”, *World Politics*, Vol. 27, No. 2 (Jan 1975): 181.

⁹⁰Patricia L. Sullivan, “War Aims and War Outcomes: Why Powerful States Lose Limited Wars”, *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 51, No. 3 (Jun 2007), 497-498.

that the weak can seize and retain the advantage for success in conflict when they are able to fight in a conflict where opposite indirect and direct strategies are employed.⁹¹ The significance of these theories by Sullivan and Arreguin-Toft is how they were demonstrated in 1973. The aforementioned logics were developing within the minds of the Egyptian senior leadership as they began to lay out the motives and goals for recovering their lost territory. Egypt acknowledged it was unable to defeat decisively the IDF. There was no need to continue to reinforce the failure of past conflicts under Nasser. Sadat knew he should not concentrate on attempting to destroy or pose an existential threat to the state of Israel. The value of an offensive operation had to seize the initiative in a conflict with a key effect being the threatening of the cost-tolerance on Israel. Forcing a potential future of exponential security costs for possessing the Sinai, Egypt would have an opportunity to attrit the Israeli political will in projecting force as part of their security.

Dichotomous results emerging from a conflict in which the participants are perceived in having a near instrumental symmetry clouds the asymmetry of logic that likely existed between the actors. How can strategic success, emerging from tactical failure, be best understood? A recommended first step should be to reflect upon the dominant forms of philosophy and theory of conflict. Recognize the dominant strand of thought that guides the historical employment of forces, and be aware of the obstacles in logic that prevent synthesizing conflicts classified as asymmetrical. Each philosophy and theory has its limitations for interpreting the natural world and its events. War is a tool, and its expression is a dependent variable that changes based on the characteristics of the entity that employs it. The military has wisely invested in understanding war from its historical and theoretical perspective, but it should remain aware that there would always be conflicts to study that fall outside normative parameters. Anomalous conflicts are valuable pieces of empirical evidence of the character of conflict that can challenge the existing paradigms

⁹¹Ibid., 121-122.

and force its reevaluation to ensure its relevance.

THE THEOLOGICAL PRISM OF WAR

They were a people of starts, for whom the abstract was the strongest motive, the process of infinite courage and variety, and the end nothing. They were as unstable as water, and like water would perhaps finally prevail.⁹²

-T.E. Lawrence, *Seven Pillars of Wisdom*

To this point in the narrative, the research has presented a descriptive history of the 1973 October War with an emphasis on the Egyptian experience. This historical event was chosen as a case study to highlight the asymmetry of logic that arises when two opponents of diametrically opposed cultures face each other on the field of battle. An army, as a representative of its people, is a component of the political, social and economic context of its environment. Each army was an example of the opposing traditions in warfare best represented by the Western and “other” or Eastern tradition of warfare. In the previous sections, an examination was made of the mesh between culture and conflict. The pillars of thought and logic were defined that constitute the hallmarks of Western philosophy on conflict. This section will examine its opposite represented by the relationship between war and peace that is influenced by theology in the Near East. Establishing a polarity between the two can shed light on the unique source and inspiration of the Egyptian strategic logic in 1973. Different cultures can serve to inspire unique spatial and temporal perspectives such as that found in the Near East. Developing an asymmetric advantage in thought, the Egyptians were able to use the 1973 October War to deconstruct an archaic model of regional conflict and rebuild anew to achieve a strategic advantage and progress.

The relationship between war and peace in the Near East has developed differently than the West. The Western perspective of conflict formed in the competition between allied and opposing nation-states within a finite territory empowered by its population to raise armies and

⁹²T.E. Lawrence, *Seven Pillars of Wisdom* (London: Penguin Books, 1935), 41.

taxes. The Western nation-state sought power and the extension of its influence by amassing its own territorial natural resources and wealth and the domination of its neighbors when capabilities permitted. According to Raymond Ibrahim in, “Studying the Islamic Way of War”, the Near East perspective developed from a different tradition. It specifically developed from the combination of the existing Bedouin traditions and practices combined with the rise of Islam.⁹³ Warfare and conflict were also theologically inspired in the West, but it did not take root as a key and enduring characteristic. The schism between polity and church would allow Western strategic perspectives to check undue theological influence. The analogy in the Near East is non-existent since governance and theology are ideally inseparable. They are to work together to serve the needs of the Islamic community at large as prescribed by its theological doctrine. This is but one component, albeit defining, of the Near East cultural milieu.

The Near East remains distinct because of the enduring desire to keep theology unified with governance over the Islamic community. An observer cannot fully comprehend or understand the conflict theory of the Near East without acknowledging the foundation that theology has served to classify the character of emerging threats and battles, and the object and purpose of justly sanctioned wars. Military theorists distinguish East and West by their approaches to conflict by their known differences in the direct versus indirect approach, mobility techniques, and emphasis on deception. Fundamental in their differences are the strategic outlooks that direct the object and purpose of a conflict. Western actors, as mentioned previously, value a strategy that pursues a better and lasting endstate by eliminating or reducing an opponent’s means to resist. The Near East perspective in conflict does not necessarily seek the annihilation of an opponent but rather the use of conflict as a means for the acceptance of a

⁹³Raymond Ibrahim, “Studying the Islamic Way of War”, *National Review Online*, September 11, 2008, <http://www.meforum.org/2050/studying-the-islamic-way-of-war> (accessed April 2, 2013).

righteous ideology to achieve a desired and lasting peace.⁹⁴

The most powerful example of the transmittance of Bedouin culture, Islam, and hence its logic and practices is to consider a word whose significance is the basis for the sense of community that exists in the region. The word Arab or Arabic is synonymous with the Near East at large although its precise use refers to a person of the Arabian Peninsula. The term enables a partial transcendence of the varieties of identities that exist within the region. For instance, Egypt has a distinct cultural past that is separate from its Islamic heritage. The present day visual reminders of the cultural artifacts from the Pharaonic period empowers the Egyptians to identify with both past narratives despite the cultural tension it may produce.⁹⁵ Raphael Patai in *The Arab Mind* addressed the significance of the commonality established by use of this word. It permits an outside observer to simplify the heterogeneity of the entire Arab community that can be divided ad-infinitum with little hope of generating understanding.⁹⁶ It serves as an efficient abstraction to consider the tendencies of a region that is so vast but maintains a cognitive bond through the devotion of a common belief.

Islam was the key component to the unification of the Near East people under a common system of behavior and practice.⁹⁷ The relationship between war and peace in the early Islamic

⁹⁴Majid Khadduri, *War and Peace in the Law of Islam* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010), 141.

⁹⁵P.J. Vatikiotis, *The History of Modern Egypt: from Muhammad Ali to Mubarak* (Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), 415.

⁹⁶Patai, *The Arab Mind*, 13-15. P.J. Vatikiotis also similarly addresses the unification of the diverse ethnicities and cultures that are a part of the Near East. In chapter 1 of *The Middle East from the End of Empire to the End of the Cold War*, he asserts that Arabs should not be defined as a monolithic political community or nation-state facsimile of the West. There are vast differences, but a common language unites them. Language is a significant unifier as it was the encodement of the theology Muhammed defined as Islam.

⁹⁷Khadduri refers in his work *War and Peace in the Law of Islam* in chapter V “The Doctrine of Jihad” to the work of Ibn Khaldun. Ibn Khaldun was an early Islamic scholar who tackled the articulation of the relationship between war and peace in early Islamic society. His writings continue to serve as the basis for war from the Near Eastern perspective. His position was opposite from what early thinkers had proposed on war. That war was a social calamity; Ibn Khaldun reversed that position in asserting that war was the natural state of man because of the emotional motives that bring forth conflict. Importantly, he

period was rooted in the conflict mandates of the Koran. The strategic outlook of the Islamic community, that remains today, is a reflection on the perceived dichotomous nature of the world. There is good and bad, holy and profane, birth and death, and peace and war. Peace and war were not legal conditions in the Western tradition. They were bound in a unique spatial awareness. The spatial perception that dominated the Islamic psyche was the distinction between the Dar al-Islam (House of Peace) and the Dar al-Harb (House of War).⁹⁸ The world was geographically cleaved between the unification and the existence of peace that was only possible under Islam, and the outside where the unbeliever and those institutions resided. There is no separation between theology and governance within the Islamic community. The state or empire serves as the instrument to spread religion; therefore, it must be ever expanding. The state of expansion will ensure that along some points it will always remain in conflict with those that do not accept Islam.

Khadduri in *War and Peace in Islam* addresses this concept of enduring conflict along the lines of differences between the two houses of Islam. In order for a war to be just and valid, leaders must align its purpose with religion. Wars might occur because of threats from the outside but this is a testament to the reality of men, weapons and equipment existing outside of the Dar al-Islam. Jihad is the tool and means to ensure Islam does not co-exist with apostate faiths. It establishes litigation whereby punishment may exist for the inhabitants of the Dar al-Harb for not aligning with God's word. Religious leaders sanction violence only for religious purposes and jihad is its tool. War as a concept is meaningless if the world has come under the influence of Islam. War would still exist but only as an aberration due to the nature and flaws of man. The

differed from his other peers. He did not believe victory lay solely with military preparedness. Instead, he articulated that hidden causes that were the deeper causes of victory. The very nature of man- warlike- ensures the recurrence of war as permanent as social life itself.

⁹⁸Bassam Tibi, "War and Peace in Islam", *The Ethics of War and Peace: Religious and Secular Perspectives* ed. Terry Nardin (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 129.

struggle and conflict remain a continuous process that is not limited to a single point or battlefield but to the expanse of where the Islamic community resides. The process of war and conflict in the Islamic sense therefore has a lessened emphasis on end-state, and more on a continued dialogue and management of conflict.⁹⁹

Western and Near Eastern paradigms for war are not analogous. In the East, the logic of war cannot be understood by categorizing the familiar levels of strategy, operations, and tactics in the same way. The levels of war for the West are an analog for the stratification of power and means in Western society. Strategy reflects the logic and thought of the motives of war that emanate from the seat of political power. Tactics are the tangible mechanisms expressed through society's ability to generate personnel, weapons and equipment to achieve those motives. In the Near East, an observer will not note the historical emergence of these discreet divisions that hierarchically categorize sanctioned violence like the West because conflict was not meant to serve the many changing purposes of the state. It was to serve the singular goal to proselytize or defend Islam as part of a combined polity of government and religion. No other purpose could be prioritized ahead of what the tradition of Islam had laid out. Arab nations may subscribe to a form of Westernized military doctrine. Nevertheless, theology law, language, and a sense of unity structures spatial and temporal thinking about success and failure. The Western derivatives of the levels of war are difficult to adapt and use as a metric because they do not conform to the strategic outlook-time, and space horizon- that becomes evident in the Near East.

⁹⁹Khadduri, War and Peace in the Law of Islam, 64.

THE FOLDS OF REGIONAL SPACE & TIME

Empty your mind, be formless, shapeless like water. Now you put water into a cup and it becomes the cup; you put water into a bottle and it becomes the bottle; you put it into a teapot and it becomes the teapot. Now water can flow, or it can crash. Be water, my friend.¹⁰⁰

-Lee Jun-Fan, *Like Water*

War described as a duel is perhaps the best metaphor that acknowledges the competitive violent behavior between humans.¹⁰¹ It enables observers to reduce the complexities of war to its essence. Combative disciplines can also be a complimentary metaphor illuminating conceptions of space and time within the context of war. Grappling and boxing are useful violent competitive practices that demonstrate different approaches on space and time to achieve dominance over an opponent. In grappling, decision and termination of the exchange is sought by verbal or physical submission of the other. The grappler achieves his goal by closing the distance, eliminating the space and applying balanced pressure to manipulate his opponent for submission. Counter-intuitively, patience emerges within the one with the advantage as he continues to gain a greater degree of control over his opponent. It is a graceful art, in the context of violence, which pursues the attrition of the opponent's will and his endurance. Now think about boxing.

Two opponents circle each other. What might seem a pointless and brutal display of human interaction is actually a continual search for the right space and time to engage the opponent. Boxers work in seconds to act faster than the intuition of their opponent would allow them to defend themselves. The boxer circles, constantly searching and adjusting for the angle, balance and footing that harmonizes his position relative to the other that allows him to strike. He does not eliminate the space like the grappler; he seeks to maintain and control an exact and proper distance from his opponent. To do this, he hopes his balletic potential that emphasizes the

¹⁰⁰ *Like Water*, directed by Pablo Croce, Lions Gate Films, 2012, opening scene.

¹⁰¹ von Clausewitz, *On War*, 75.

footwork needed to overcome his opponent.¹⁰² The boxer rarely wants to close the distance because he needs the distance to strike at his opponent.

Armies of different cultures may approach their use of space and time in war much like the grappler and boxer. On the one hand, there is the West acting as the grappler. He deploys his forces to close the distance, gropes to place his hands on the opponent to secure him and applies the destructive power to grind his opponent into submission. Think of the East as the boxer, constantly searching for angles. He manages the space by keeping his distance and surprises the other by the quickness of his punch or the delivery of his left or right hand. He strikes when the time is right and when the window of opportunity allows him to use his forces to seize the fleeting initiative. He endeavors to hide his intentions by protecting his face with his hands and peering out from between his gloves. The grappler relies on the submission and acknowledgement of defeat of his opponent to know when the engagement is complete. The boxer, excluding a knockout, endeavors in his effort to exert his will- the extent to which a subjective decision is made by observers to declare a winner or loser.

Considering the importance of space and time within the context of violence can acknowledge a link between cultural expression and the conduct of war. Space is the environment in which force is applied. Environments are the vehicles for the cultures that reside within their territorial continuity. Time prescribes the urgency to which opponents pursue their goals. It also brackets the start and finish of the event. The two variables of the environment exist within an exchange peculiar to a particular region. The space of a given region is marked by the repetitive events that happen there. They repeat themselves to an extent that becomes a characteristic of the space.¹⁰³ The space facilitates the event, and the repetition of the event transforms the character of

¹⁰²*When We Were Kings*, directed by Leon Gast, Gramercy Pictures, 1996, Norman Mailer scene.

¹⁰³Graicer, "Between the Feasible and the Fantastic: Orde Wingate's Long-Range Penetration- A Spatial View of the Operational Manoeuvre", 2.

the region which in turn molds the culture of the area.¹⁰⁴ Christopher Alexander in *The Timeless Way of Building* describes that the pattern that emerges from this interaction becomes an element of the culture that distinguishes a particular region.

Patterns are the composition and mixture of context, problem and solution that gives rise to action. Existing and dominating patterns provide us a guide to know how and when to act, but the degree to which the context changes generates new patterns or new approaches to existing or recurrent problems.¹⁰⁵ Alexander's approach serves as a hypothesis to understand why regions are associated with their events. Why is the Khyber Pass important to Afghanistan or the Sinai to Egypt? Because the space is a unique template that permits a typology of events to occur that is complementary to its terrain. Human interaction is another variable that is introduced that becomes associated with the region. The human interaction within these spaces is what provides the connective tissue to space and action and contributes to the tapestry of culture that is associated with a region.

The fighting disciplines as a cultural metaphor serve as an analogy to underscore the differences existing between the spatial and temporal perceptions of West versus Near East. How space is rationalized is culturally inspired because of the intertwining of events and space. Space is the chessboard in which actions take place, and they can be measured by their duration. The tools and products that are made to manage, adapt to and emphasize the uniqueness of the environment are part of the catalog of artifacts that distinguish cultures. Two perspectives emerge when considering space and time. The first is the striation of space and the mechanism of time. Order and boundaries captures the essence of this methodology. Space is defined by the furthest

¹⁰⁴Christopher Alexander, *The Timeless Way of Building* (Cambridge: Oxford University Press, 1979), xii. He discusses in his book that the action and space are indivisible. The action is supported by this kind of space. The space supports this kind of action. The two form a unit, a pattern of event in space...It simply means that a pattern of events cannot be separated from the space where it occurs.

¹⁰⁵Graicer, "Between the Feasible and the Fantastic: Orde Wingate's Long-Range Penetration- A Spatial View of the Operational Manoeuvre", 2.

points in which power can be exerted by its institutions, or the terrain that restricts the extension of that power. Linearity exists between the past, present and the future. The past serves as the foundation for interpretive meaning of actions in the present and serves as a predictor of the future. The striated space is the residence of the patriot. He is the descendant of the ancient Greeks whose loyalty was to their city-state and the values they embodied. He maintains a similar allegiance to the values and the established institutions of his state. The accepted mechanisms for the causality of events within his area are the accepted models he uses to apply to all other events he observes in and outside the state's borders.

Western thought functions in terms of the striation of space. It defines space geographically and attempts to draw boundaries of the different states that characterize the completeness of a culture.¹⁰⁶ The nation-state concept that divides the world into different countries is a product of the Western perspective. Therefore, there is a sense of limitation and finiteness to the Western mind when thinking about the space that can be manipulated.¹⁰⁷ All space must be under the control of the state, so rigid boundaries and lines that cannot be crossed define the world. To change the space, an event that serves as a catalyst to reinforce those boundaries or erase them must occur. History has been a chronology of conflict and its result. It serves as a constant reminder to use that the institutions that we manage today and the states we live in are products of war.¹⁰⁸ The strategy that emerges from the striated space is based in destruction. In order to alter the space and rearrange the existing boundaries, armies must concentrate on destroying the points that define the state.¹⁰⁹ This paradigm worked well for Western military theorists where they were able to see this destruction within the small land mass

¹⁰⁶Ibid., 42.

¹⁰⁷Ibid., 42.

¹⁰⁸Keegan, *A History of Warfare*, 4.

¹⁰⁹Graicer, "Between the Feasible and the Fantastic: Orde Wingate's Long-Range Penetration- A Spatial View of the Operational Manoeuvre", 42.

of Europe where many states were fitted. A cycle emerged where there was a constant deconstruction of the state, an absorption into a more powerful entity, a decline, and then a subsequent deconstruction. State armies that became specialized in this method of destruction became the dominant means to describe what one state could do to another.¹¹⁰ Their counterparts were the armies of the nomads that characterized the alternative approach to war by prolonging its engagement and being comfortable in wide-open and vast spaces.

The second perspective embraces the smoothness of space and the cyclical nature of time. The desert is a vast piece of terrain whose form and shapes are influenced by the natural elements. The undulation of the dunes hint at a structure, but their condition of change is their nature. The regions of the smooth space cannot be strictly defined with the lines and points of striation because they have no means to be anchored. They can only be defined with respect to their zone of contact to the striated space. Hence, we can only distinguish the two in acknowledging the existence of another. Time is sensed with less rigidity; the measure of events is inconsequential because existence is a cycle of recurring events and not a linear projection into the constant unknown of the future. The nomad is the smooth space resident. He is the ideal character that can survive in an environment of constantly changing foundations and freedom of movement. He can move in all directions observed because he is not jailed by geography. The nomad is never away from home because his territory is the ground he and his clan find themselves on at that moment in time. Life is fluidity and movement to the nomad and it forms the root of his logic and ethics. Mobility is embedded within him. In addition, his language encodes a de-emphasis for the need of restraints or temporal rigidity.

The nomadic army that exists in the smooth space differs from his state counterpart. The nomad, or war-machine, takes his strategy to wherever he can find a weakness in his counterparts

¹¹⁰Ibid., 40.

system. It is not wed to a rigid model that dictates how and when he should fight.¹¹¹ The nomad is liberated from defending specific points. The nomad is content to be patient and to seize the initiative after the enemy has revealed himself through his form. The state army desires and needs confrontation to achieve a decision. The nomadic army is content to remain fluid and mobile. The fluidity and mobility of the nomadic army naturally prolongs any conflict. The ability to exhaust the state army is the strength the nomadic army must maintain if it desires to achieve an advantage over the state. It does not have to be tied down to a specific point or border that provides its support; therefore, it can remain in the field for an indeterminate amount of time. The nomad's essence is to remain on the move; once it stops it succumbs to the strength of the state army where it can use its destructive force to eliminate the existence of the other. It seeks then not to destroy or confront its opponent but to interrupt its plan and to reconfigure it.¹¹²

The contradicting approaches between the sedentary West and the nomadic East have been established. A zone of confrontation develops along the line where the striated space and smooth space overlaps and touches. The source of conflict exists at the seam where the two meet because of their differences. Within the state, power and order are well established by its functions. However, outside the state lies a constant struggle between entities that struggle to dominate and compete to set the rules of law and order.¹¹³ The seam between the two creates a meeting place for the flash point between cultures and civilizations that can be cited as a source of conflict; this is especially prevalent when the seam separates peoples of different ideological

¹¹¹Dr Graicer cites in her dissertation on *The Histories* of Herodotus in which he tells the story of the dialogue between the Persians and the Scythians. The dialogue between the two is the basis for her comparison of the state versus the war machine and their respective characteristics. The Persians are frustrated that they cannot isolate and fix the Scythians at a point for the purpose of destruction. The Scythians respond that their essence is movement, and unlike the Persians, they are not wed to a specific location for survival or sense of location in space and time. Therefore, they deny the Persians the ability for them to wield their destructive power against an assumed fixed point.

¹¹²Ibid., 43.

¹¹³Ibid., 9.

and theological beliefs.¹¹⁴ The purpose is not to describe a rigid methodology that each unwittingly subscribes to in times of conflict. The importance is to magnify the perception of the rival to the other.¹¹⁵ The state army sees the nomad as its uncivilized and barbaric counterpart. The state fails to see that its rigidity is inherent weaknesses in its systems. It mistakes structure with strength and it influences the logic of its practitioners. The nomad sees the state as infinitely more powerful, but it must stay mobile if it has a chance of defeating its opponent. Today, institutions have striated the world into different states. Therefore, the value of the nomadic example is not physical but cognitive. The nomad and his fluidity represent how military leaders should be unafraid in transgressing boundaries of doctrine and established methods. The operational thought of our system should value the ability to change, transform and move faster than the ability of the state to establish new boundaries and rigid modes of thought.¹¹⁶

Space has been discussed to demonstrate the different approaches West and East have in developing strategic approaches for the employment of their tactical units. Space is the environment in which actions take place and after repetition for patterns to emerge that are distinct to that area. If cognitive generating principles are different across cultures with respect to space then a corollary exists for time. Cognition and the emphasis cultures place on time must also be different. Again, West and East, in particular the Near East, serve as models for comparison to evaluate the differences. Time is considered with space because time is what

¹¹⁴Samuel Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), 208. Part IV of Huntington's work is where he concentrates on the conflict of civilizations peculiar to secular Western and Islamic Near East states. The lack of the bi polar system that marked the Cold War years has created a vacuum for order and allegiance where cultural differences were put aside. Now the differences are accentuated especially, where secular and theological states share a border. Huntington cites six reasons for these conflicts on pg 208: relative influence in shaping global developments, relative military power, economic power and welfare, exclusion of people or the protection of one group from another, values and culture, territory that creates fault lines between states.

¹¹⁵Ibid., 41.

¹¹⁶Graicer, "Between the Feasible and the Fantastic: Orde Wingate's Long-Range Penetration- A Spatial View of the Operational Manoeuvre", 42.

allows observers to sequence and synchronize actions and patterns within the past and the present. The meaning that is ascribed to those events is culturally dependent and is influenced by the language that is used to encode the memory and significance of the event. West and Near East demonstrate a difference in their perception of time where one demands sequence and discreteness, and the other combines events to formulate a significant whole in which time becomes less important.

The considerations of temporal perspectives are not new to the arena of anthropological or psychological studies. They are challenging topics to challenge within the study of society because of attempting to capture and articulate the cognitive processes of a metric that is intangible. Time can only be sensed; therefore, actions and events must be injected into the discussion of time because its ordering gives it a physical shape. General conclusions have been derived from the body of academic knowledge that the spatial-temporal perspectives can make up the reflection of a society.¹¹⁷ The social structure plays a role in how its constituents form a general temporal sense that treats and manages the value placed on its events. The emphasis the structure places on events yields an observance on the independence and discreteness of events or how all events are tied to another.¹¹⁸ Simply put, does the society look at past, present, and future as distinct periods or is it meshed into one whole. No social structure is completely independent of its spatial environment, nor is it entirely dependent.¹¹⁹ The people that make up the structure select what elements are best for its uses and marginalize the others.¹²⁰ The elements prioritized within society are employed within the spatial and temporal orientation that ultimately structures

¹¹⁷S.N. Eisenstadt, "The Perception of Time and Space in a Situation of Culture-Contact", *The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland*, Vol 79 (1949): 63.

¹¹⁸*Ibid.*, 63.

¹¹⁹*Ibid.*, 63.

¹²⁰*Ibid.*, 63.

a continuous process of human activity that has order and meaning.¹²¹

All cultures deal with time and order the events of their lives in some chronological fashion.¹²² The choices for temporal expression can range from an atomistic to an abstract approach. Events are synchronized within space to an nth degree based on a specific subdivision of time. Year, month, day, hour, minute, and second would be common subdivisions. The alternative would be patterns and actions that are recorded with an abstract approach, where synchronization is dependent on the aggregate phases of the earth – the changing of season or the solar and lunar cycle. Today, the modernization and globalization of the world has ensured actions are synchronized as a whole according to the atomistic approach. The differences are evident between cultures with inter-temporal reasoning.¹²³ The synthesis that has emerged from inter-temporal societal research asserts the West is firmly influenced by the role of causality, and Arab culture tends to integrate events into a gestalt for the understanding and explanation of present actions.¹²⁴

As expressed before, a nuanced sense of time is difficult to grasp. To the Western mind, it is constantly moving forward and can never be recaptured. A past event is constantly moving away from an observer. The observer may have personally experienced the event but as it progresses, it will be described differently as its definitiveness loses shape with the progression of time. As events serve to give shape to a conception of time, so does the concept of inter-temporal reasoning. It serves as a rubric that aids in the reconstruction of cultural history and to determine what events are valuable and significant to carry forward to inform future decisions and

¹²¹Ibid., 64.

¹²²Donald G. MacGregor and Joseph R. Godfrey, *Arab Cultural Influences on Intertemporal Reasoning* (Arlington: Office of Naval Research (HSCB Program), 2011), 1.

¹²³MacGregor and Godfrey explain that inter-temporal reasoning is the psychosocial and cultural processes engaged in when people either integrate past experiences and events or project forward to the future.

¹²⁴Ibid, 1.

actions.¹²⁵ Reasoning is the operative word of the inter-temporal reasoning phrase because it is represents how members of society use its culture to view the present as a continuation of the past and how it projects and forms the yet unknown future.¹²⁶

It is common to ascribe to the Arab culture the verdict that it lacks timeliness and punctuality.¹²⁷ Sweeping judgments without investigation and research are the type of Western stereotypes that all too often feed prejudices and biases. Nevertheless, observers have recorded where it is noted that the emphasis on the rigidity of punctuality is not as valued as it is in the West.¹²⁸ Raphael Patai in, *The Arab Mind*, attributes this characteristic of Arab culture to its language.¹²⁹ What is most interesting is the oversight we give to language. Often, when we think about the spatial-temporal perspectives of a culture, we become focused on the actual element of terrain and time itself. Forgotten is that the expression and the encodement of these elements is what deliver the message between two actors. What varies throughout cultures is language! How language captures time and space is what can separate cultures in their grasp of these elements. Patai cites a quote from linguist Edward Sapir that is helpful that formed the well-known Sapir-Whorf linguistic theory:

¹²⁵Ibid., 2.

¹²⁶Ibid., 2.

¹²⁷The term Arab culture refers to those countries where Islam is the dominant theology practiced and where the Arabic language regardless of dialect, vocabulary or accent is the primary language of the country. It is bounded by the east by the eastern most Gulf States stretching to western limit of North Africa and Algeria.

¹²⁸M. Nydell, *Understanding Arabs: A guide for modern times* (4th ed.), 206. Quoted in Donald G. MacGregor and Joseph R. Godfrey, *Arab Cultural Influences on Intertemporal Reasoning* (Arlington: Office of Naval Research (HSCB Program), 2011), 7.

¹²⁹Judith R. Williams, *The Youth of Haouch El Harimi, A Lebanese Village*, Harvard Middle Eastern Monograph Series XX (1968): 118, 125, cited in Patai, *The Arab Mind*, 69-70. Patai discusses the findings of anthropologist Judith Williams on conducting research on the temporal perspectives of activities within a Lebanese village. He recounts her observations that there is an inability to order the past. Patai contrasts the temporal differences between Westerners and Arabs. He cites the difference in expressing meeting and appointments. The Westerner would assign a time to the day he would visit, but the Arab generalizes the portion of the day. The common phrase “insha-Allah” is used to cover the meeting with a level of uncertainty. Invoking Allah as the determinant of the actual meeting makes it inappropriate to humanly assign a time that Allah will ultimately control.

“Human beings do not live in the objective world alone, nor alone in the world of social activity as ordinarily understood, but are very much at the mercy of the particular language which has become the medium of expression for their society...the “real world” is to a large extent unconsciously built up on the language habits of the group. No two languages are sufficiently similar to be considered as representing the same social reality.”¹³⁰

Patai utilizes this theory to assert that the Arab language features devaluation on verb tenses that would magnify the importance of past, present and future.¹³¹ Contrast this to the Western languages where the value of tenses and the linearity of subject, verb and object within sentence structure reveal the devotion to the importance of temporal definitions and management.¹³² The resulting effect of the Arabic language on temporal perspective is one where events are easily interchangeable and shifted to emphasize their value. Events are not fixed actions within space that are assigned a date or can only be spoken of within a specific historical context. No doubt, Arab culture cares a great deal about past events but less so on its place within historical chronology.¹³³ If the event was important in the past it has the same relevance for today. Therefore, events regardless of period can be grouped together to form an overall gestalt of historical significance and meaning.¹³⁴

The importance the West places on time is clear from the common retribution that accompanies “wasting time”. Time is treated as an asset within the West. The emphasis on time is clearly seen in the synchronization of separate and distinct events to support and facilitate the other.¹³⁵ As language was a component to the treatment of time within Arab culture, so too is the same for Western cultures. Western language clearly defines the use of verb tenses, which give

¹³⁰Edward Sapir, The Status of Linguistics as a Science, *Language* (Charlottesville: Linguistic Society of America), vol.5 (1929), 209, quoted in Raphael Patai, *The Arab Mind* (New York: Hatherleigh Press, 2002), 72.

¹³¹Patai, *The Arab Mind*, 74.

¹³²Godfrey and MacGregor, Arab Cultural Influences on Intertemporal Reasoning, 8.

¹³³*Ibid.*, 14.

¹³⁴*Ibid.*, 14.

¹³⁵Patai, *The Arab Mind*, 70.

shape and form to past, present and future.¹³⁶ The resultant treatment of time within Western cultures demonstrates the emphasis we place on causality and how we attempt to tie the meaning from past to inform the present and future. The chronology and aggregation of events make up the story of Western civilization. Periods separate defining modes of thought, and how it influenced action. Western historians typically interpret the past with a causal explanation. Historical events are important because of their present day significance. Think of the continuing significance of the Melian Dialogue. It remains a template to explain hegemonic thinking and action. Causality, as an element of historical analysis, serves as motivation for us to base our logic on inquiry, research and report.¹³⁷ The meaning of today and the relevance of future decisions are dependent on the ability to correctly order the events of the past and clearly articulate the connectivity between them.

What role do space and time play in the context of war? All commanders would acknowledge both as forms of physical boundaries to manage for victory. Strategy and operational art both rest on a foundation of creativity and imagination of experienced leaders to manipulate space and time in a manner that sets up tactics for success. Marrying skill and innovation are the essence of these logics. Nevertheless, all creativity and imagination are constrained by boundaries at some point. Commanders would assist themselves if they were also able to think of space and time as idiosyncratic cognitive boundaries. Traversing past cognitive striation into its opposite smooth space would reveal the creativity and imagination needed to act in unexpected ways that enemies would be unprepared to meet or expect.

¹³⁶Ibid., 74.

¹³⁷Godfrey and MacGregor, *Arab Cultural Influences on Intertemporal Reasoning*, 11.

THE TRANSFORMATION OF SUCCESS

Surprises are inevitable; they come from the limits of people's knowledge and understanding of their environment and themselves.

-Zvi Lanir, Fundamental Surprises

The monograph has evaluated the relationship between culture and conflict. Inhabitants of a region can demonstrate the unique aspects of their culture in a variety of ways. Within the context of conflict, observers may take note of the difference in spatial and temporal perspectives maintained by opponents in a conflict. West and East serve as abstract models of opposing and contrasting points of view. They serve as analytical binaries to compare and contrast the logic of strategy that emerges from their environments. To understand ourselves more fully is to employ a "other" in which the differences make our own characteristics even more clear. The purpose in examining these cultural influences on conflict is to examine how strategic success can emerge from an instance of tactical failure. Is it possible for an opposing cultural tradition to permit a relationship between strategy and tactics that is not traditionally acknowledged by Western observers? The Western military student may acknowledge the difference in logics between the levels of war; however, Western military thought demands that strategy, operations, and tactics fundamentally complement each other. Therefore, dissonance arises when military failure results in achieving a strategic aim.

The October War of 1973 is one such historical instance where tactical victory was not necessary or critical to advance the strategic discourse between Egypt and Israel. The success that emerged from it was possible because, despite the existing political intransigence, the obsession with a tangible or physical achievement was exchanged for cognitive goals. Egypt under President Sadat learned not to reinforce failure by besieging the striated boundaries of an expanded Israel that posed an existential threat to the Israeli people. President Sadat succeeded in part by understanding what needed to be exchanged to achieve success. He shifted the existing

paradigm of engagement to a concept not expected by the Israelis or deemed acceptable by the traditional equation of war.

The October War was a natural extension of the conflict that attempted to be resolved through diplomatic channels, when Egypt did not have any ability to respond militarily. After the conclusion in 1970 of the little-known War of Attrition, Egypt was left no better off than when its leadership had terminated conflict with its defeat in 1967. Despite Nasser's goal of attempting to take back by force what was taken by force, Egypt suffered immensely for three years exposed to IDF raids and air strikes west of the canal. Assuming national leadership after Nasser's death, Sadat inherited an economy that was suffering from the effects of two wars and the denial of the economic resource the canal could provide Egypt. Israel and its allies failed to see how these conditions would lead to some type of action that would break out of the current stalemate.¹³⁸ The stalemate was both military and political.

The stalemate and settling of political inertia to resolve the defensive Bar-Lev line on the east bank of the Canal represented the issue. An acknowledgement existed between both the US and USSR's of how a conflict in this region could develop into a wider war.¹³⁹ Egypt's senior leaders remained aware of the military superiority of the Israelis, and how it was a crucial means to their security theory.¹⁴⁰ The Egyptian experience throughout the War of Attrition served as a reference point for leaders to think differently about what could be done to retake the Sinai. Assessing the disparity from the asymmetry in military power, Egyptian senior leaders concluded a repeat episode of attrition could not be afforded. The Egyptian Army could not match the full capability of the IDF, so any campaign designed to seize the Sinai in its entirety would not be

¹³⁸Cohen and Gooch, *The Anatomy of Failure in War: Military Misfortunes*, 99.

¹³⁹T.V. Paul, "Asymmetric Conflicts: A study of war initiation by lesser powers" (PhD diss, UCLA, 1991), 292.

¹⁴⁰*Ibid.*, 286.

feasible.¹⁴¹ That strategy would be unable to achieve any strategic purpose; hence, the vision of retaking the Sinai in its entirety was impractical.¹⁴² There would have to be a shift from the mechanistic or practical to the abstract and cognitive. Politicians and military leaders did just that when they formed a consensus that the offensive would be an integral piece of national strategy.¹⁴³ The military would now serve an intangible or cognitive goal.

Western parties and Israel did not account for how the inertia could galvanize Egypt in an offensive manner. For years, the vision of leaders to solving the crisis in the Middle East depended solely on a military solution.¹⁴⁴ A military solution demanded a capable army, but realistically one that would take years to train and become proficient enough to re-engage on an equal footing with the Israelis.¹⁴⁵ This became problematic because the lines between how policy informs military strategy become blurred. Israeli policy assumed that the inertia that existed between Egypt and Israel was acceptable because of the following military assumptions on Egypt: incapable of an offensive until 1975, aircraft and counter-air systems remained a generation behind, incapable of ranging strategic targets inside Israel with current missile systems, unable to address the armored and mechanized IDF capability.¹⁴⁶ Deterrence by the Israelis in the form of a strategic defense was acceptable as it afforded them the time to reassess the growth of its Arab neighbor's military strength.¹⁴⁷

¹⁴¹el-Gamasy, *The October War*, 130.

¹⁴²*Ibid.*, 130.

¹⁴³*Ibid.*, 130.

¹⁴⁴Eliot Cohen and John Gooch in *Military Misfortunes* account for how the opinion held by military experts in the US, USSR, and Israel was that Egypt would be unable to mount an offensive in 1973. Despite the warnings and rhetoric by President Sadat in previous years, it was assessed that Egypt did not have enough capability based on the assumption that it would conduct an offensive to retake the Sinai in its entirety.

¹⁴⁵T.V. Paul, "Asymmetric Conflicts: A study of war initiation by lesser powers" (PhD thesis, UCLA, 1991), 295.

¹⁴⁶*Ibid.*, 298.

¹⁴⁷*Ibid.*, 299.

Egypt was able to employ strategic and tactical surprise on the Israelis because it avoided preponderance on military potential and capability. Reflecting on the popular need for a resolution, President Sadat developed a unique strategic aim that had not been used in the region. Ultimately, he wanted to conduct a military action that would be a message to the IDF that any form of occupation of Arab land was not worth the expenditure and risk. His objectives in doing this would be an offensive that could use action externally to break the diplomatic stalemate and discredit the Israeli security theory, and execute an operation that could restore some level of confidence and hope internally among the Egyptian people.¹⁴⁸ He believed he could do this with the smallest seizure of land east of the canal. Conflict was only a means to a strategic end; the EAF sought specific effects by employing enemy focused and not terrain focused objectives. Egypt would not use war to threaten the existence of a nation. It would be used to galvanize a political stalemate that would demand the attention of the world.¹⁴⁹

The world was a bi-polar environment owing to the existence of the Cold War. Any conflict that had the potential to disrupt the developing larger narrative of détente between the US and USSR would receive its attention. Therefore, decisive military success was not necessarily critical to Egypt. It only needed a well-concerted military effort that would reverberate in the political sphere where strategic logic would ask of tactics what it was capable of, but also give strategy autonomy from tactical effort. Knowledge of their capabilities was the foundation from which the Egyptian operational concept emerged. The operational concept designed by Generals Gamasy and Shazly was built on the idea of avoiding IDF air contact, tactical depth, and the establishment of a defensive line capable of absorbing armored attacks.¹⁵⁰ The concept would be best employed under the cover of surprise and limited dimensions. Those limited dimensions

¹⁴⁸Cohen and Gooch, *The Anatomy of Failure in War: Military Misfortunes*, 100.

¹⁴⁹Paul, "Asymmetric Conflicts: A study of war initiation by lesser powers", 300.

¹⁵⁰el-Shazly, *The Crossing of the Suez*, 27.

would encompass its participants, duration, and terrain.¹⁵¹

The Egyptians did not expect a decisive victory; in fact, they were realistic about the potential losses they could face based on their previous experiences fighting Israel.¹⁵² Therefore, outright tactical failure was a realistic outcome to the offensive they would undertake. The calculus was any tactical effort made across the Suez Canal on the Bar-Lev Line could be used to change and seize the political discourse that had ceased since 1967.¹⁵³ Separating strategy from tactics was a lesson the Egyptians learned from their efforts in the War of Attrition. That same war also failed to produce a decisive result. The strategy of that war was to allow the small discreet reciprocal actions of violence play out along the canal in the hopes of creating negotiation opportunities.¹⁵⁴ However, the reciprocal effects of violence drove Israel to become more entrenched in the Sinai. In addition, it reacted with overwhelming force against any attempt by Egypt to seize portions of the Sinai. With the loss of the economic resource of operating the canal, Egypt could not afford to engage again in an attrition style event that guaranteed an overwhelming response from Israel.

Going forward, Egyptian leaders focused on a conflict that focused on the space and time relevant to achieving its desired goals. Regardless of outcome, political safety valves would rely on the intervention of the US and USSR to ensure a de-escalation of the conflict.¹⁵⁵ The Egyptian leaders calculated that their safety valves of political dialogue could contain the conflict to limited risks if the tide turned against them.¹⁵⁶ Reflecting on the previous discussion of the use of space

¹⁵¹Heikal, *The Road to Ramadan*, 264.

¹⁵²Paul, "Asymmetric Conflicts: A study of war initiation by lesser powers", 304.

¹⁵³*Ibid.*, 304.

¹⁵⁴*Ibid.*, 304.

¹⁵⁵*Ibid.*, 305.

¹⁵⁶Shimon Shamir, "Arab Military Lessons from the October War", *Military Aspects of the Israeli-Arab Conflicts* (1975), 175 quoted in T.V. Paul, "Asymmetric Conflicts: A study of war initiation by lesser powers" (PhD thesis, UCLA, 1991), 306.

between Western and Eastern perspectives, the Egyptian General Staff assumed that the striation of Israeli space had reached its limit.¹⁵⁷ The defensive capability of Israel within pre-1967 borders placed them at an advantage of interior lines that could quickly deliver personnel, weapons and equipment to crisis areas. Now with the occupation of the Sinai they extended their reach to its furthest limits. It was politically unfeasible for them to occupy any more land west of the canal outside the context of a conflict; therefore, the outer defenses of Israel became its handicap. The striation of the previous smooth space of the Sinai lengthened Israel's supply line to its defensive thereby, creating a lag in response to any action that took place. The distance away from the canal and its defenses also carried a visual fog of estimation and assessment by military leaders back in Tel Aviv. As long as Egypt could remain formless and hide their intentions, it would have exponential effects on the already stressed IDF systems of covering the distance to the engagement.¹⁵⁸

The success of the October War has been popularly conceived as a triumph of Egyptian surprise and deception. That for once, after failed attempts at engaging Israel on the battlefield, Egypt was able to recover some level of success that restored her honor and reputation as a regional power in the Near East. Literature has commented on how Egypt finally employed the elements of evasion and delay that were the hallmarks of the Arabic character of warfare, and the IDF's underestimation of the Egyptians created a cognitive gap where the eventual surprise could maximize its effect.¹⁵⁹ Zvi Lanir comments extensively on the issue of surprise and its role in

¹⁵⁷Paul, "Asymmetric Conflicts: A study of war initiation by lesser powers", 306.

¹⁵⁸Al-Ahram, November 18, 1973 quoted in John Amos II, *Arab-Israeli Military/Political Relations: Arab Perceptions and the Politics of Escalation*, (New York: Pergamon Press, 1979), 143 cited in T.V. Paul, "Asymmetric Conflicts: A study of war initiation by lesser powers" (PhD diss, UCLA, 1991), 307.

¹⁵⁹John Keegan in *A History of Warfare* describes on pg. 387 the character of warfare traits that are consistent with the Arab tradition: evasion, delay, and surprise. Norvell B. De Atkine in his article *Why Arabs Lose Wars* cites Avraham Adan's *On the Banks of the Suez* as the reason why the surprise was so effective was because the underestimation the IDF attributed to the Egyptian Army after 1967.

1973. His emphasis was not to take away from the achievement of the Egyptian innovation. It was to show the sedentary logic that crept into the IDF. Lanir comments that Egypt planned a deception operation that was no more significant or radical than what the Soviet doctrine they ascribed to would demand of an offensive along a broad front. The difference was that Israeli doctrine could not adapt and be flexible to an environment where it was not employing an existential defense for its homeland. Would it be politically acceptable to contest any Egyptian gain east of the canal in the same manner that they had met them in previous war? If Egypt did take only a centimeter of the Sinai back from them, would that pose an existential threat to the Israeli community at large? The political logic of Israel was that victory was equated with preventing its destruction. In order to be effective, Israel had to employ its military in such a fashion that demanded a strategy of attrition against its opponent to create more time for the enemy to reconstitute itself for the next fight unless peace was settled first. A temporal and cognitive gap needed to be an effect of each conflict. Mobilization of the military had to generate an overwhelming destructive energy in the minimum time possible against a numerical superiority it was likely to face. Lanier continues to comment that the military logic therefore dictated an extension of space to afford Israel the opportunity to keep its enemy at arm's length distance from its borders. The result was a contradiction in strategic and military logic in which the doctrine remained focused on fighting as rapidly as possible for a short duration but set against the backdrop of exponential spatial proportions. The contradiction was a logical seam that could be exploited by a leader who was willing to invest in a paradigmatic shift in regional strategy.

Egypt demonstrated a level of military proficiency in the October War that had escaped it in previous engagements with the Israelis. The army was successful because it thoroughly examined itself after the 1967 War and the War of Attrition to understand how to exploit their strengths and minimize their weaknesses. When grapplers or boxers engage their action is only

possible with respect to their opponent. Without the opponent, the grappler can only stand in isolation or the boxer shadowboxing in the corner. In 1973, Egypt was able to fill in the gap and seam that the logic of Israel's political and military institutions left for exploitation. President Sadat was able to do this by discarding the legacy strategic aims of the Arab community-at-large that called for the destruction of Israel by all tactical means. Now tactics had been placed in subordination to strategy. The offensive was arranged so that minimal tactical success, relative to their past achievements, was able to serve strategy. He envisioned he could do this with the minimal terrain or the devaluation of terrain even though one of the long-term objectives was to regain that same terrain. Therein was the asymmetry of logic between Egypt and Israel. Israel believed it needed the greatest amount of land to preserve itself. While Egypt believed, the value of regaining the Sinai was by not investing in the land itself. Much like the nomad, he needs the territory in which to roam and express what is part of his culture, but his movement is also indicative of his detachment from the earth because he does not need to remain invested in one location. Similarly, Sadat was able to explore the logic needed to create a new pattern out of the shifted context. Sadat transgressed his own culture's boundaries of logic by not developing another existential threat to Israel. He developed a strategic aim that ensured the autonomy of the strategic goal from the tactical effort where the political inertia could still be shifted in rational favor of Egypt.

CONCLUSION

The inspiration for this monograph began in the course electives curriculum of Command and General Staff College in which students explored the seeds of Middle East conflict. The investigation initially began as a question to determine if a unique practice of operational art could have been identified within the Egyptian military institution because of the outcomes surrounding the 1973 October War. Surely, there could be a discussion on the application of Soviet military doctrine in the Near East environment based on Egypt's client state status to the

Soviets, and their experience in training with Soviet equipment and doctrine. However, there was a limitation in the depth of existing commentaries linking the two. More prevalent were chronologies on the war and common talking points that emphasized an initial surprise by the Egyptians but an eventual reversal of fortune by the Israelis. Initially, a potential technical or mechanical advantage was investigated to explain how the Egyptians were as successful as they were in the opening hours of the conflict. However, the literature confirms what existed at the time, that the IDF remained a foe with advantages in aerial superiority and armored platforms.

This monograph questioned whether the outcome of the war was a result of actors thinking differently about what had happened within the same space. The years following WWII and the transformation of the political structure of the Near East region saw repetitive effusions of existential violence aimed at another. Leaders of the region failed to adapt to the changing context and strategic challenges that were being influenced by external and internal factors. The repetitive interaction of event and space within this small region created patterns that eventually become solidified as a part of the environment. The pattern that existed was as long as the engagement between Israel and its Arab neighbors relied on a tangible and physical goal of the destruction of Israel very little would change. Evidence to this was the complacency that began to creep into the logic of the Superpowers at the time. The logic held as long as Israel remained militarily superior, and neither side would substantially supply the regional actors, then the status quo would remain and there was no need for deliberate action. Therefore, in order for the status quo to be changed there had to be a shift in logic as to what could be reasonably achieved in the physical space as quickly as possible in order to generate disproportionate effects in the strategic realm. What strategic vision could support a tactical performance of limited means that could translate into achieving an overwhelming strategic advantage in the form of recovering the lost territory of the Sinai? The strategic challenge had to be found in identifying a way to change the regional context and thus create a new and unexpected pattern that could transcend tactical performance and

immediately place the emphasis on the strategic narrative.

The description is difficult for a student of Western military affairs to grasp because it challenges the notion that a proper tactical effort is a necessary component to strategic success. Strategy may be autonomous, but tactics cannot be independent if it is to have purpose and meaning. Therefore, the monograph questioned ways to understand an instance where strategic success emerged from tactical failure. How could this be possible if understanding is rooted in a causal and linear relationship between the levels of war? It is possible to find new meaning and understanding of their logic and grammar if the examination of a conflict is approached with an awareness of military theory, the inter-relationships between culture and conflict, and how culture can inform strategic thinking by generating different cognitive mechanisms in which we perceive our environment for military use. The awareness must first be based on an awareness of self. Acknowledging the epistemological past in rationalism and causal methods of thinking underpin a devotion to a logic in warfare that appreciates the destruction of the enemy and is often troubled when it observes occurrences that do not match with what is expected. It is due in part because readers often misinterpret or gloss over the subtleties a theorist attempts in articulating the non-linearity of human events. Despite the success of Western military logic, it does have cognitive boundaries that cannot adequately explain the broad spectrum of conflicts especially in the cases of asymmetrically weaker forces. Culture informs thinking and shapes the ways in which the environment is perceived so that space and time are thought about in a very structured manner. Combined with a belief in classical military theory the tendency is to geometrically stratify the terrain and associate military success with breaking down those points and lines that create the boundaries throughout its depth.

Acknowledging the limitations in Western military logic can better position future commanders in thinking and understanding the potential effectiveness of asymmetric logic and forces in war. The conflict patterns that have existed in an environment for centuries will inform

the culture of a society as to the value of conflict in pursuit of specific aims and the acceptable methods to achieve those aims. Culture, in turn, will be the vehicle that will hand down to generations the logic of those conflict patterns. Every environment is unique; hence, different conceptions of conflict and their goals are possible and opponents are not necessarily wed to the thinking or doctrine that may be dominant in that era. If there can be different goals that exist and different ways in which to think about those goals then the military might be better enabled to see the new patterns emerging in an environment. The new patterns will challenge any preconceived expectation of how strategy and tactics should interact to achieve success. Therefore, commanders should be prepared to go beyond their own cognitive boundaries to recognize the new patterns that may emerge in the environment. In so doing, leaders might be better able to perceive the different ways space and time can be viewed within the context of limited gains and objectives. Moreover, that perception is the key to understanding the example of dichotomous results that emerged in the 1973 October War that facilitated the eventual achievement of Egyptian strategic success.

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