Returning the Deep Attack as an Option for the Operational Commander
Abstract
Deep operations and the deep attack remain an integral part of the full spectrum of military capabilities the U.S. Army is expected to perform in support of operational and strategic objectives. But there exists debate about the Army's ability to execute a deep attack that does support operational and strategic objectives. The objectives of this monograph are to study how the deep attack capability provides options to the operational commander, and to show that an Unmanned Aircraft System's (UAS) deep attack capability increases operational flexibility and reduces operational risk. The monograph uses operational art as the overarching framework for the discussion, and specifically addresses operational risk, operational flexibility, deep operations, and options available to operational commanders. An analysis of the U.S. Army's execution of deep operations in support of NATO's Operation Allied Force during the 1999 Kosovo War and Operation Iraqi Freedom during the Iraqi War from 2003 to 2011 serve as the historical context for the Army's lack of capability. Recommendations to regain the deep attack capability are informed by the Aviation-focused actions and recommendations of the U.S. Army's Howze Board from 1962. In short, a UAV's deep attack capability will reduce operational risk, increase operational flexibility, and provide viable options to the operational commander necessary to achieve operational and strategic objectives.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- May 23, 2013
- Accession Number
- ADA583737
Entities
People
- John W. Brengle
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College