Covert Coercion: A Formal Analysis of Unconventional Warfare as an Interstate Coercive Policy Option
Abstract
In the current global environment, interstate coercion methods are used to compel behavior modification amongst state and state-sponsored actors. Traditional compellence is commonly considered in its overt, diplomatic manifestation. However, in the age of low-intensity conflict where domestic and international exigencies often constrain U.S. coercive policy options, covert methods in the form of unconventional warfare, subversion, sabotage and other associated paramilitary and political actions are occasionally pursued as the means to support the U.S. s coercive overtures. Under the rubric of covert coercion there are state-level decision frames, strategies, and resistance force alliance conditions that contribute to either the success or failure of covert coercion ventures that utilize unconventional warfare approaches. This analysis utilizes game theoretic models, as well as insights from prospect theory, to explain the conditions under which unconventional warfare could prove a viable U.S. coercive policy option.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jun 01, 2013
- Accession Number
- ADA583804
Entities
People
- Luke A. Wittmer
Organizations
- Naval Postgraduate School