

THE FALL OF THE GENERAL STAFF MODEL: TOWARDS A THIRD GENERATION U.S. ARMY STAFF THEORY

A Monograph

by

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2013-01

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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE				Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
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1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 23-05-2013		2. REPORT TYPE SAMS Monograph		3. DATES COVERED (From - To) July 2012 - May 2013	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE The Fall of the General Staff Model: Towards a Third Generation U.S. Army Staff Theory				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S) Gabriel, John, A. (Major, U.S. Army)				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) School of Advanced Military Studies ATTN: ATZL-SWD-GD 250 Gibbon Avenue Ft. Leavenworth, KS 66027-2134				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) SSTUDIES				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT The internal staff structure within division and corps headquarters is not designed to achieve its purpose in the current environment. The first section details the unchanging fundamental principles and the change in context from that which originally drove the current headquarters design during World War I to the current context. The second section describes the inefficiencies inherent to using the current modular staff structure. The third section crosses the newly identified contextual understanding and current staff inefficiencies with organization theory to identify an alternate candidate for the Army's staff structure. In conclusion, a recommended operations process-oriented horizontal staff structure that focuses on informing, influencing, and creating and maintaining a shared understanding of the environment addresses the current context with a whole-of-staff approach; while newly established redundant teams within each section enable rapid adaptation and partner integration. The internal staff structure within corps and division headquarters is ill-designed to achieve its purpose in the current environment.					
15. SUBJECT TERMS Headquarters, Corps, Division, Organization Theory, World War I, Current Operating Environment, Culture, Process Technology, Afghanistan					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT (U)	b. ABSTRACT (U)	c. THIS PAGE (U)			19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (include area code)

MONOGRAPH APPROVAL PAGE

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Monograph Title: The Fall of the General Staff Model: Towards a Third Generation U.S.
Army Staff Theory

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

THE FALL OF THE GENERAL STAFF MODEL: TOWARDS A THIRD GENERATION U.S. ARMY STAFF THEORY, by Major John A. Gabriel, 62 pages.

Although the United States Army made significant strides in the last decade reorganizing its deployable forces to better respond to an uncertain operating environment, the Army retained the echelons-above-brigade headquarters with an old-fashioned organization staff structure. This monograph argues that the internal staff structure within division and corps headquarters is not designed to achieve its purpose in the current environment. The first section details the unchanging fundamental principles and the change in context from that which originally drove the current headquarters design during World War I to the current context. The second section describes the inefficiencies inherent to using the current modular staff structure. The third section crosses the newly identified contextual understanding and current staff inefficiencies with organization theory to identify an alternate candidate for the Army's staff structure. In conclusion, a recommended operations process-oriented horizontal staff structure that focuses on informing, influencing, and creating and maintaining a shared understanding of the environment addresses the current context with a whole-of-staff approach; while newly established redundant teams within each section enable rapid adaptation and partner integration. The internal staff structure within corps and division headquarters is ill-designed to achieve its purpose in the current environment, and a restructuring of internal staff relationships and functionality is necessary for future success.

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ACRONYMS

ACOS	Assistant Chief of Staff
ADP	Army Doctrine Publication
ADRP	Army Doctrine Reference Publication
AEF	American Expeditionary Force
ATTP	Army Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
FM	Field Manual
FSR	Field Service Regulation
HQ	Headquarters
IJC	International Security and Assistance Force Joint Command
ISAF	International Security and Assistance Force
IT	Information Technology
MTOE	Modified Table of Organization and Equipment
TOE	Table of Organization and Equipment
US	United States
WWI	World War I
WWII	World War II

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INTRODUCTION

Although the United States Army made significant strides in the last decade reorganizing its deployable forces to better adapt to an uncertain operating environment, the Army retained the echelons-above-brigade headquarters with an old-fashioned organization staff structure. While this Army-wide reorganization did address division and corps level headquarters, final approved staff designs depict only internal tailoring of capabilities and manpower without changes to systematic processes and relationships of authority.¹ Recently, this staff structure restricted commanders of some division and corps headquarters requiring them to adjust to the demands of the current operating environment with *ad hoc* systems and in-stride changes to structure. This recognition by some field commanders that the traditional staff model may no longer be useful for all situations drives this study.

This monograph argues that the internal staff structure within division and corps headquarters is ill-designed to achieve its purpose in the current environment. A restructuring of internal staff relationships and functionality may be necessary for future success; however, internal staff structure will not change until an adequate solution is created, vetted and adopted. This study focuses on identifying the ill-designed structural elements and on developing a possible new design for the internal staff structure of division and corps headquarters, hereafter referred to as modular headquarters.

Those responsible for the design of recently deployed headquarters believe that aspects of the Iraq and Afghanistan operating environments are a poor fit for the traditional staff structure. Upon completion of his top-down review of coalition forces in June 2009, General Stanley

¹Department of the Army, *FMI 3-0.1: The Modular Force* (Washington D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2008), 4-5 – 4-20.

McChrystal, commander of the International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF), recognized the need for an intermediate level International Joint Command (IJC) to synchronize counterinsurgency operations across the regional commands. Lieutenant General David Rodriguez, the future IJC commander, provided Colonel Wayne Grigsby, his interim chief of staff, the freedom to design an effective IJC headquarters structure unencumbered by any traditional staff models.² The new headquarters would consist of the United States Army V Corps as the staff nucleus with significant allied and joint augmentation, a situation addressed by doctrine.³ This composition required unique systems and relationships to rapidly “develop the institutional understanding and situational awareness necessary to conduct military-civilian operations in a counterinsurgency environment.”⁴ Believing that the traditional staff model “would be too slow and cumbersome to act quickly and responsively,” Grigsby’s team stripped the General Staff model functions of personnel and placed all expertise into four cross-functional areas under the permanent authority of those cross-functional leads.⁵ The officers in charge of the current operations, future operations, future plans, and the information dominance center cross-functional teams would synchronize themselves under the guidance of the chief of staff while their subordinates would utilize the deputy chiefs of staff for specialty functional guidance.⁶ This

²Wayne W. Grigsby, et al., “Cross-Functional Team Staff Structure in the Afghanistan Counterinsurgency,” *Army* (June 2012), 35.

³Wayne W. Grigsby, interview by John A. Gabriel, *Establishment of IJC Headquarters*, August 16, 2012. See Department of the Army, *FM 3-92: Corps Operations* (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2010), 5-1 – 5-16, for a discussion on converting a corps headquarters into a joint task force headquarters.

⁴Grigsby, et al., 38.

⁵*Ibid.*, 36.

⁶Grigsby, interview by John A. Gabriel.

model flattened the internal staff structure by eliminating one of three hierarchical levels between traditional cross-functional teams and the commanding general, thereby increasing efficiency by reducing bureaucratic nodes.

Other deployed United States (U.S.) Army headquarters also self-adjusted internal staff structure to better address the current environment. For example, when the 101st Airborne Division headquarters deployed to Afghanistan in 2010 to serve as the Regional Command-East Combined Joint Task Force-76, it developed *ad hoc* information operations cells prior to deployment to address what the commander considered ‘holes’ in the internal staff’s ability to respond to environmental inputs.⁷ While these changes were not as drastic as those that defined the IJC staff structure in 2009 per the Grigsby model, their occurrence indicates that a sub-optimal perspective in the doctrine existed.

The application of the Army’s headquarters’ design, and its evolution, can be considered and understood through a Kuhnian lens. Thomas Kuhn, author of *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, argues that the scientific body of knowledge evolves through a non-linear process in which a universally accepted paradigm reaches its limit of applicability due to its inability to predict the results of environmental anomalies.⁸ He refers to this process as normal science.⁹ The occurrence of an unpredicted anomaly may create a crisis within the community that eventually leads to the development of a new paradigm better suited to understanding the studied

⁷Ted Shinkle, interview by John Gabriel, *Staff Structure CJTF-101 in Afghanistan*, March 22, 2012.

⁸Thomas S. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolution: 50th Anniversary Edition* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2012) 23, 53. Kuhn also explains that a paradigm is “an accepted model or pattern,” and that “[d]iscovery commences with the awareness of anomaly, i.e., with the recognition that nature has somehow violated the paradigm-induced expectations that govern normal science.”

⁹*Ibid.*, 23 – 34. See Chapter three for an explanation of normal science.

phenomenon. However, change is difficult and often a lengthy process, especially when an organization is professionally wedded to an idea that has proven to be historically valid, because “once it has achieved the status of paradigm, a scientific theory is declared invalid only if an alternate candidate is available to take its place.”¹⁰ Therefore, normal-science practitioners “will devise numerous articulations and *ad hoc* modifications of their theory in order to eliminate any apparent conflict.”¹¹

In relation to this study, the phenomenon of interest is U.S. Army corps and division headquarters design. The adoption of the General Staff model by General John J. Pershing in 1917 replaced the original U.S. Army staff model, and established the second generation paradigm that strong hierarchical staff functions with minimal cross-functional integration best support the commander.¹² Since World War I (WWI) the normal science of doctrinal iterations and force structure evolution produced a more robust hierarchical staff system to address changing environments in which a headquarters could operate (See Appendix 1 for the evolution of U.S. Army staff doctrine). In fact, *Field Manual 3-92: Corps Operations*, published in 2010, is the result of nearly ninety years of refinement, addressing all environments in which the army operated in the past and multiple methods in which to employ a hierarchically focused staff.¹³

¹⁰Ibid., 77.

¹¹Ibid., 78.

¹²See Michael R. Matheny, *Carrying the War to the Enemy: American Operational Art to 1945* (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 2011), 29 – 30, for a discussion on organizing the staff during WWI.

¹³Department of the Army, *FM 3-92: Corps Operations* (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2010). See Section II for an analysis of the multiple methods to deploy a hierarchically focused staff. See Department of the Army, *ATTP 5-0.1: Commander and Staff Officer Guide* (Washington D.C., 2012) for a similar discussion on staff employment. These two doctrinal manuals serve as the basis for this study’s research on U.S. Army staff employment.

Though, recent *ad hoc* staff changes indicate that the Iraq and Afghanistan operating environments may be anomalies and that the Army's theory on staff interaction may well be reaching the limits of its applicability.

The U.S. Army has never published a general theory of staff interaction to guide specific organizational development.¹⁴ However, one can deduce patterns from iterations of doctrinal publications that identify a deliberate and accepted configuration. In 1917, General Pershing formally adopted the French Army's General Staff model for all units within the American Expeditionary Force. Hierarchical sections of similar functional specialties (G1-personnel, G2-intelligence, G3-operations, G4-supply, and G5-training) led by staff officers subordinate to a chief of staff defined this model.¹⁵ Each "G" section had its own duties and responsibilities that rarely required integration with others; although, doctrine did recommend close coordination.¹⁶ The 1923 U.S. Army *Field Service Regulations*, and the *Staff Manual: TR 550-5*, codified lessons learned from the WWI experience to include retention of this combat-proven headquarters structure and its applicability to all levels of command.¹⁷ The twelve subsequent updates of this staff doctrine only reinforced the General Staff model's validity while expanding its size with

¹⁴After an exhaustive search, the author was unable to identify any such publication on general staff philosophy and was only able to use past doctrine to discern a pattern.

¹⁵Matheny, 30. Immediately prior to the adoption of the General Staff structure in 1917, the U.S. Army staff system consisted of a chief of staff with two subordinate section that oversaw operations and intelligence, and a small personal staff section for the commander. For further information on pre-WWI staff structure see Department of the Army, "Staff Manual," 1917, <http://archive.org/stream/staffmanualunit02corpgoog#page/n2/mode/2up> (accessed September 5, 2012), 8 – 9.

¹⁶Department of the Army, *Field Service Regulations* (Washington D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1923), 5.

¹⁷The author was unable to locate the TR 550-5 Staff Manual.

additional independent functions.¹⁸ Further refinements codified the establishment of multiple command posts, cross-functional integration cells based on time-horizon, and, most recently, the replacement of the General Staff functions with warfighter functions. While minute evolutions are apparent, the defining characteristic remains the same; the preponderance of staff actions are completed within independent sections internally dominated by officers of similar functional background. In essence, the Army's current theory of staff interaction is defined by a dominating series of functional hierarchies organized around the General Staff model, currently masked by warfighter functions, divided by space between multiple command posts, and partially integrated through established time-horizon, cross-functional teams.

This monograph only focuses on the relevance of the current, second generation U.S. Army staff theory established by General Pershing. While a unique staff structure existed within the U.S. Army from its inception to WWI, its study is minimally applicable because of the considerable differences in context. Pershing created a new staff paradigm by replacing an established structure incapable of supporting large unit maneuver in coordination with foreign partners. The original paradigm, established by the Continental Congress during the Revolutionary War and solidified by Congressional legislation in 1796, reflected the enduring tension between a standing military and the civilian-led democracy of the United States. A fear of growing military power by civilian authorities generally stymied any pursuit by military officers

¹⁸The first doctrinal manual published after WWI, *Field Service Regulation* (1923), discussed command, staff, and combat orders production. Headquarters, Department of the Army then published the *Staff Officer's Field Manual* in 1928 and 1932. The first *FM 101-5* was published in 1940 with revisions in 1950, 1954, 1960, 1968, 1972, 1984, and 1997. *FM 5-0* (2005) and *FM 6-0* (2003) carried the lineage of the previous staff manuals. The twelfth and most recent iteration since WWI, *ADP 5-0* (2012) and *ADP 6-0* (2012), focuses on the fundamentals of mission command and the planning, leaving the details of staff structure and planning integration to *ATTP 5-0.1* (2011).

throughout this period of time for staff structural and officer educational change in the name of military efficiency and effectiveness.

This first generation U.S. Army staff paradigm centered on the dominating role of a commander who personally established maneuver plans which were then supported by a small staff of specialty officers. While individual positions were added or detracted over the century, the staff typically consisted of an Adjutant General, Inspector General, Judge Advocate General, Quartermaster, Commissary, Chief of Artillery, Chief of Engineers, and Chief of Signals.

Although the Field Service Regulations published immediately prior to WWI (1905, 1908, 1910, 1913, and 1914) described the organizations of divisions, corps, and armies, they were, however, only notional organizations predicated on a threat-based restructuring undertaken to counter an enemy force invasion of the continental United States. The U.S. Army prior to WWI was based on regiments, and the staff structure of the time was better suited for dispersed irregular threats like those faced by small units in the Philippines from 1900 – 1902, and during frontier Indian patrols. The American Civil War, a conventional war fought between large units, stands out as a time-period anomaly. During the Civil War, the weak staff structure forced Union and Confederate commander's to create *ad hoc* positions, like Chiefs of Staff, to better synchronize echeloned actions. This battle-tested knowledge was soon lost when the Army returned to its pre-Civil War regimental duties and the staff structure remained generally unchanged until WWI.

The first-generation pre-WWI U.S. Army staff paradigm was based on the centrality of a unit commander's genius in understanding all relevant input to military action, and then personally creating plans of action. Because of its specificity to the size of unit and its successful

use in only small-scale irregular conflicts the first generation U.S. Army staff paradigm is ignored to better focus on the second generation staff paradigm and its current utility.¹⁹

In order to assess the utility of the current staff structure and address the possibility of adopting a new, third generation staff paradigm, this study uses three sections to compare the context between WWI and the current environment, address current doctrine's understanding of staff relationships, and then present a new structure based on the current context. The first section, "First Principles," details the unchanging fundamental principles and the change in contextual dimensions that originally drove design and employment of division and corps headquarters during World War I. The second section describes the inefficiencies inherent to using the current modular staff structure. Finally, the third section crosses the newly identified contextual understanding and current staff inefficiencies with organization theory to identify an alternate candidate for the Army's modular staff structure.

FIRST PRINCIPLES

In order to understand the possible incongruence of the staff structure defined in doctrine and contemporary operational environment, it is necessary to reconsider the first principles of staff functionality and the context for which the theory of staff interaction was created. Although

¹⁹See James D. Hittle, *The Military Staff: Its History and Development* (Harrisburg, PA: The Stackpole Company, 1961), 166 – 210, for a detailed overview of the first generation staff paradigm from the Revolutionary War to WWI. Also, see the following Field Service Regulations for a doctrinal discussion of the staff role in unit operations prior to WWI: War Department, Office of the Chief of Staff, *Field Service Regulation* (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1905); War Department, Office of the Chief of Staff, *Field Service Regulation* (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1908); War Department, Office of the Chief of Staff, *Field Service Regulations* (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1910); War Department, Office of the Chief of Staff, *Field Service Regulations* (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1913); and War Department, Office of the Chief of Staff, *Field Service Regulations, 1914 Change 7* (Menasha, Wisconsin: George Banta Publishing Company, 1917).

the term ‘first principles’ is typically associated with the foundational facts from which scientific and mathematical theory is derived, it is still pertinent to other academic fields.²⁰ Within the realm of social science, first principles describe the unchanging aspects of a specific social phenomenon. While first principles do not change, context does. Context sets the true value of the theory, and a considerable change in context may completely invalidate the original theory. Richard J. Daft, a professor of organization studies from Vanderbilt University, provides a theoretical framework to study organization first principles and context. Daft’s theory relates an organization’s purpose to its structural and contextual dimensions. These dimensions interact with one another and provide an interdependent system within which changes of specific dimensions can alter the system’s ability to accomplish its purpose. Contextual dimensions include size, technology, goals and strategies, environment, and culture, while structural dimensions include formalization, specialization, hierarchy of authority, centralization, professionalism, and personnel ratios.²¹ Organization designers “adjust structural and contextual dimensions to most efficiently and effectively transform inputs into outputs and provide value.”²² This holistic framework of structure, context, and purpose lends significant assistance in comparing the same organization through time. If the U.S. Army’s staff purpose is enduring, a change in the contextual dimensions should be balanced with a change in the structural dimensions.²³

²⁰F.S.C. Northrop, "Science and First Principles," *Internet Archive*, 1931, <http://archive.org/details/scienceandfirstp032176mbp> (accessed September 17, 2012), ix.

²¹Richard L. Daft, *Organization Theory and Design*, 10th Edition (Mason, OH: South-Western, 2010), 15.

²²*Ibid.*, 20. Daft defines effectiveness as the “degree to which an organization achieves its [purpose]” and efficiency as the quantity of resources required “to produce a given level of output.”

²³Of the five contextual dimensions, size and goals and strategies do not pertain because of the uniqueness of the military. Goals and strategies relate only to competitive civilian

Therefore, an analysis of a staff's purpose and comparison of the dimensions of environment, process technology and culture from WWI to the current operating environment indicate that the context has changed, effecting a misalignment of structure to purpose.

Organization Purpose

The staff's purpose serves as the only true first principle. Daft defines an organization as a goal-oriented social entity, "designed as deliberately structured and coordinated activity systems...[and] linked to the external environment."²⁴ The concept of goal orientation is essential. An organization must have a goal; purpose is the seed of existence. Brigadier General James Hittle, USMC, in his 1944 study of European and U.S. Army staff systems, stated that the general purpose of a military staff is to "assist the commander in his exercise of command...[and] to perform the basic functions of procuring information for the commander, preparing details of his plans, translating his decisions and plans into orders, and then causing the orders to be transmitted to the troops."²⁵ The 1917 *Staff Manual, United States Army* states that the staff "has but the one purpose—to assist the commander in his mission," while the 1928 *U.S. Army Staff Officer's Field Manual*, refined from WWI lessons learned, specifies an identical purpose.²⁶ In addition, the U.S. Army's recently published, *Army Doctrinal Reference Publication (ADRP) 6-0: Mission Command*, states that the purpose of the staff is to support "the commander in

organizations and size describes numbers of employees to total assets or sales.

²⁴Ibid., 11.

²⁵Hittle, 3.

²⁶Department of the Army, "Staff Manual," 1917, <http://archive.org/stream/staffmanualunit02corpgoog#page/n2/mode/2up> (accessed September 5, 2012), 7; Department of the Army, *Staff Officer's Field Manual* (Washington D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1928), 7.

understanding situations, decision-making, and implementing decisions throughout the operations process.”²⁷ A survey of army doctrinal references published between WWI and the publication of ADRP 6-0 shows that while some of the references expand on how a staff achieves its purpose, none alter their understanding of why a staff exists in the first place.²⁸ The purpose of a staff, in the eyes of the U.S. Army, is enduring and has not changed since WWI.

Environment

Of the three contextual dimensions under consideration, the environment offers the most profound and obvious differences. The environment in which an organization exists plays an essential role in how the organization structures itself to achieve its purpose. An organization’s environment encompasses “all elements that exist outside the boundary of the organization and have the potential to affect all or part of the organization.”²⁹ Less important than the actual environment is the organization’s perception of its relationship with external variables. The environment in which Pershing established his staff system in 1917 is remarkably different than what recent U.S. strategic guidance perceives as the current operating environment and potential threats.

²⁷Department of the Army, *ADRP 6-0: Mission Command* (Washington D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2012), 3-9.

²⁸Department of the Army, *FM 101-5: Staff Officer's Field Manual: The Staff and Combat Orders* (Washington D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1940), 1-3; Department of the Army, *FM 101-5: Staff Officer's Field Manual: Staff Organization and Procedures* (Washington D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1960), 3 – 4; Department of the Army, *FM 101-5: Staff Officer's Field Manual: Staff Organization and Procedures* (Washington D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1972), 1-1 – 1-4; Department of the Army, *FM 101-5: Staff Organization and Operations* (Washington D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1984), 1-4 – 1-5; Department of the Army, *FM 101-5: Staff Organization and Operations* (Washington D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1997), 1-3 – 1-4.

²⁹Daft, 140.

The sole domain in which the U.S. military operated during WWI was conventional warfare.³⁰ General Pershing created the American Expeditionary Force (AEF) for a very specific purpose: to fight the German Army on the Western Front. Pershing understood the strategic objectives of the President of the United States, Woodrow Wilson, and pursued the development and employment of an American military force in order to achieve those objectives. While the Western Front posed unique military concerns, the overall issue was to be resolved by a military force defeating another military force; all Western Front belligerents operated within the Congress of Vienna nation-state construct. Since the enemy was a single, uniformed entity operating within a defined area, the issues facing commanders and staffs at all levels involved transportation, supply, maneuver coordination, and training. Although this was still a difficult task, there were only a set number of available solutions.³¹ Staffs solely needed to understand fixed capabilities in order to piece them together in the most effective and efficient way.

Finally, the U.S. Congress officially sanctioned American entry into WWI through a declaration of war. By sinking commercial vessels and engaging in secret talks with Mexico, Germany branded itself as an existential threat to the sovereignty of the United States, forcing a

³⁰Although the U.S. Army did partake in what Lawrence Yates considers stability operations in the early 20th century, it is widely accepted that warfare on the Western Front during WWI was conventional. See Lawrence A. Yates, *The US Military's Experience in Stability Operations, 1789-2005: Occasional Paper 15* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2005), 7-10 for a discussion of U.S. military stability operations in the Philippines (1899 – 1913), China (1900), Cuba (1906 – 1919), and Mexico (1914). See Gideon Rose, *How Wars End* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2010), 12 – 49, for a detailed discussion on the cessation of WWI hostilities. In addition, the AEF 3rd Army conducted occupation duties in the Rhineland, Germany from 1919 to 1923. American Battle Monuments Commission, *American Armies and Battlefields in Europe*, 487 – 494. See Center of Military History, *United States Army in the World War 1917 – 1919: American Occupation of Germany*, 1991 Edition (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1948) 157 – 170 for how 3rd Army reorganized its force for occupation duty.

³¹See George C. Marshall, *Memoirs of My Services in the World War 1917-1918* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1976), 137 – 142 for then Colonel George C. Marshall's plan for the Muese-Argonne Campaign.

war of necessity on the American people.³² Soon after the declaration of war, President Wilson established the national level Committee of Publicity as a propaganda machine to maintain public support of the war effort.³³ The military only needed to validate itself as a fighting force in battle with the enemy.³⁴ Pershing established the AEF to confront a defined threat within a stable, yet complicated, operational environment with little requirement for any level of command to manage anything other than a set of combat related tasks.

The current operating environment is significantly different than that faced by General Pershing. First, military conflicts since WWI have broadened the current understanding of a military's role in accomplishing political objectives.³⁵ This expansion of purpose is best defined within the current U.S. Army's operating concept, *Unified Land Operations*: "Army units...gain a position of relative advantage...through simultaneous combination of offensive, defensive, and stability operations that set conditions for favorable conflict resolution."³⁶ Stability operations include humanitarian assistance, support to governance, economic stabilization, and other unique

³²Woodrow Wilson, "Wilson's War Message to Congress," *Brigham Young University World War I Document Archive*, April 2, 1917, http://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/Wilson's_War_Message_to_Congress (accessed September 20, 2012).

³³Robert T. Davis II, *The US Army and the Media in the 20th Century: Occasional Paper 31* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2009), 16 – 17.

³⁴American Battle Monuments Commission, *American Armies and Battlefields in Europe*, 1995 ed. (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1938), 15; Mark A. Stoler, *George C. Marshall: Soldier-Statesman of the American Century* (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1989), 36.

³⁵Robert T. Davis II, *The Challenge of Adaptation: The US Army in the Aftermath of Conflict, 1953-2000: Occasional Paper 27* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2008), iii.

³⁶Department of the Army, *ADP 3-0: Unified Land Operations* (Washington D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2011), 5.

military tasks.³⁷ In addition, recent regional alignment of Army units highlights a new “strategy of risk reduction through military engagements in areas with failed or failing states and spillover consequences from civil wars and other internal conflicts.”³⁸ Army forces no longer have the luxury of focusing operational readiness on just conventional war scenarios with predictable threats.

The expansion of military activities in conjunction with the current lack of a clear existential threat opens the aperture of possible military employment scenarios. Ulrich Beck, a German sociologist, most clearly defines this environment in his work *Risk Society*:

We are moving away from a world of enemies to one of dangers and risks, where the risks are unquantifiable, nor do we know the specifics of the risks, nor the time, likelihood or location they may manifest themselves. They are not geographically nor temporarily contained, but are global and infinite in nature.³⁹

In an attempt to codify the nature of these unquantifiable risks, the 2009 Department of Defense’s *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations* characterized the future operating environment as uncertain, complex, and rapidly changing.⁴⁰ The *Capstone Concept* further explains that interaction between international self-serving entities results in a “complex interactive environment in which events are largely unpredictable and sometimes counterintuitive.”⁴¹ While

³⁷Department of the Army, *ADRP 3-07: Stability* (Washington D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2012), 2-7.

³⁸Frans Osinga and Julian Lindley-French, "Leading Military Organizations in the Risk Society: mapping the new strategic complexity," in *Managing Military Organizations* (New York: Routledge, 2010), 17.

³⁹*Ibid.*, 18.

⁴⁰Department of Defense, *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations Version 3.0*, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense (Washington D.C.: Headquarters, Department of Defense, 2009), 2.

⁴¹*Ibid.*, 2.

the nature of the environment is ever changing and uncertain, the character of the threat is also difficult to discern. The 2012 *Army Strategic Planning Guidance* describes the types of possible adversaries as “organized military or paramilitary forces, terrorist and criminal elements who may be proxies for or in partnership with other actors, or irregular groups.”⁴² In addition, these threats “may have access to stand-off weaponry and other advanced technologies such as weapons of mass destruction.”⁴³ Dealing with this “dynamic complexity,” in which military forces are operating “amongst the people” and “cause and effect [of relationships] are subtle,” compels military organizations “to find out what is going on in order to be able to deal with the problems it is confronted with.”⁴⁴ Because of infinite possibilities, the environment and threat are difficult to coherently define. This type of environment is “often unresponsive to the reductionist and mechanistic narratives generated by the detailed planning system of logic.”⁴⁵ Therefore, a deployed staff must be capable of rapidly adapting to an unstable environment saturated with intertwined self-interested entities by establishing a shared understanding of the environment.

The current operating environment severely blurs the line between the type of war comfortably accepted as the military’s domain and that that is required: persistent conflict with threats that may not be perceived as existential. Using military force to execute wars of choice in

⁴²Department of the Army, *Army Strategic Planning Guidance*, Secretary of the Army, Department of the Army (Washington D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2012), 4.

⁴³*Ibid.*, 4.

⁴⁴Eric-Hans Kramer, *Organizing Doubt: Grounded Theory, Army Units and Dealing with Dynamic Complexity* (Copenhagen: Copenhagen Business School Press, 2007), 13. Also, General Rupert Smith coined the phrase “war amongst the people” in: Rupert Smith, *The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2007).

⁴⁵Ben Zweibelson, “Design Theory and the Military’s Understanding of Our Complex World,” *Small Wars Journal*, Small Wars Foundation, August 7, 2011, <http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/design-theory-and-the-military’s-understanding-of-our-complex-world> (accessed September 20, 2012), 11.

which allies are essential to operations causes additional concerns of perceived legitimacy.⁴⁶ Compounding this matter is the “accelerating transparency and connectivity [of actions due to] pervasive media coverage and the growing ubiquity of personal communication devices.”⁴⁷ Lawrence Freedman, professor of War Studies at King’s College London, recognizes the vital “ability to turn potentially hostile public opinion in one’s favor, but also to retain the support of a home population.”⁴⁸ The Department of Defense acknowledges the criticality of winning this narrative battle and states, “commanders even at subordinate levels will find themselves nearly consumed with shaping the narrative of those events as with planning and conducting the operations that produce them.”⁴⁹ The ability to define the narrative and synchronize narrative-affecting actions from the senior political authority down to the individual soldier is crucial to maintaining the legitimacy required to see the conflict through to resolution. The current military force must be designed to confront an undefined threat within an unstable and complex operational environment with a strategically critical ability to manage and win the battle of the narrative.

The differences between the environment in which General Pershing designed his expeditionary force and the current operating environment are significant. The nature of the threat and environment allowed the staffs within the AEF to focus internally on the technical elements of sustainment and maneuver. The uncertain and complex nature of the current operating

⁴⁶See Department of the Army, *ADRP 6-0: Mission Command*, 3-4, for a discussion on the essential nature of allies.

⁴⁷Department of Defense, 5.

⁴⁸Lawrence Freedman, *The Transformation of Strategic Affairs* (London: Routledge, 2006), 73.

⁴⁹Department of Defense, 5.

environment forces deployed staffs to focus externally in order to understand the environment and define the problem, and then remain engaged with external organizations to dictate the strategic narrative.

Process Technology

The contextual dimension of process technology “refers to the tools, techniques, and actions used to transform inputs into outputs” in order to achieve the organization’s purpose.⁵⁰ Although technology is most commonly understood as machines or information systems, technology in relation to the service industry is intangible.⁵¹ In accomplishing its institutional purpose of supporting the commander, an Army staff takes information and produces knowledge, and takes knowledge and guidance and produces directives in the name of the commander.⁵² Also, the process of information flow and relationships between organizational entities constitute a portion of the directives-issuing process inherent in the Army system. Of specific concern is from where are inputs received and to whom are outputs directed. Although the staff inputs and outputs address the same purpose, the methods and directional flow of how that transformation from input to output is achieved are different.

General Pershing faced a unique organizational problem; in order to accomplish his purpose he needed to create an entirely new military organization. Prior to the establishment of the AEF, the U.S. Army consisted of less than four divisions worth of combat units and lacked nearly every requirement of modern warfare. The new force rapidly created for the Western Front

⁵⁰Daft, 253.

⁵¹See Daft, 267, for a description of service industries. Service industries produce intangible outputs that are knowledge-based instead of capital intensive. It is this author's belief that a service firm is the closest civilian descriptor that properly describes an army staff.

⁵²Department of the Army, *ADRP 6-0: Mission Command*, 3-9.

“contained organizations previously unheard of” in the U.S. Army, armed with new weaponry. Because most commanders of armies, corps, and divisions had not attended the staff college and since the majority of the organizations were new, commanders relied on their staff for technical advice, highlighting the need for a technically focused staff.⁵³ Only a small portion of a staff actually focused on developing and issuing directives, and these individuals integrated intelligence of enemy positions into coordinated fires and maneuver plans.⁵⁴ Finally, minimal doctrine existed to aid the commander-staff relationship, specifically regarding organizational decisionmaking. The 1923 *Field Service Regulations* (FSR 1923) only stated that the “commander must be the controlling head...and from him must flow the energy and the impulse which are to animate all under him.”⁵⁵ In addition, FSR 1923 stated, “it is the task of the staff to furnish the commander with such information, data, and advice as he may require in reaching his decision,” without providing any analytical process for creating such advice.⁵⁶ The commanders’ decisionmaking process was self-directed and unencumbered by institutional processes and directed staff foci. Finally, commanders were expected to issue orders based on a higher headquarters directive with little input from subordinate commands. The 1923 *Field Service Regulations* states:

Personal conferences between the higher commanders and the subordinates who are to execute may at times be advisable, in order that the latter may arrive at a correct understanding of the plans and intentions of their superiors and may correctly interpret the orders issued. But such conferences are not for the purpose of criticizing the orders or

⁵³Peter J. Schifferle, *America's School for War: Fort Leavenworth, Officer Education, and Victory in World War II* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2010), 9 – 10.

⁵⁴Marshall, 137 – 142; Schifferle, 14.

⁵⁵Department of the Army, *Field Service Regulations* (Washington D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1923), 4.

⁵⁶*Ibid.*, 4.

plans of the higher commander, nor to influence the latter's actions....The decision, no matter how arrived at, is his alone.⁵⁷

The process technology used by staffs within the AEF supported commanders with limited technical knowledge and facilitated coordination in a top-down directive manner.

Process technology has changed considerably since WWI. Specifically, the Army's transformation to a modular force and the recent adoptions of the mission command philosophy and the operations process have altered the methods in which a staff achieves its purpose. First, modularity established the Brigade Combat Team as the lowest deployable fully-contained combat echelon; severed the previously established relationships between brigades, divisions and corps; and negated most of the staff's technical and direct advisory roles.⁵⁸ Both division and corps level headquarters are individually deployable nodes that must adapt to a multitude of roles to include the senior army headquarters, joint force land component command headquarters, or a joint task force headquarters.⁵⁹ Second, the preferred role of the theater army command is the executor of *U.S. Code Title 10* functions as the Army Service Component Command of each Geographic Combatant Commander.⁶⁰ This facilitates a further dismantling of a modular headquarters' technical responsibilities by removing sustainment, medical, and signal units from the task organization. Echelons-above-brigade sustainment, medical, and signal units are

⁵⁷Ibid., 4.

⁵⁸ Department of the Army, *FMI 3-0.1: The Modular Force*, vii.

⁵⁹See Department of the Army, *ADRP 3-90: Offense and Defense* (Washington D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2012), 2-17 for the roles of a division headquarters; See Department of the Army, *FM 3-92: Corps Operations* (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2010), vii, for the roles of a corps headquarters.

⁶⁰Department of the Army, *FM 3-93: Theater Army Operations* (Washington D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2011), viii – 1-7.

controlled at the theater level and only serve in a supporting role to combat units.⁶¹ In addition, fires tasks typically executed by division or corps level headquarters previous to transformation are now executed by an assigned Fires Brigade serving as the “force field artillery headquarters.”⁶² Modular headquarters only serve a minimized role of synchronizing subordinate actions in order to achieve the higher headquarters’ intent, and leave the fighting of engagements and battles to brigades.⁶³ This broad reorganization negates the need for technical actions within functional staff stovepipes and highlights the utility of a whole-of-staff integrated approach in accomplishing the headquarters’ purpose.

Adoption of the mission command philosophy by the U.S. Army is significant to the evolving change in staff process and acknowledges the enduring uncertainty of the current operating environment. According to Lieutenant General David Perkins, current commander of the Combined Arms Center, “mission command is a philosophical shift that emphasizes the centrality of the commander and the decentralization of capability and authority in increasingly complex operational environments.”⁶⁴ Initiative and advantage are relative in a complex environment and can easily be lost by inappropriate action or inaction; decisions cannot wait for the full revelation of facts but must balance prudent risk and opportunity. Key to mission command is the role of communication in developing and continuously refining a common understanding of the environment. The traditional view of communication, in which

⁶¹Department of the Army, *FMI 3-0.1: The Modular Force* (Washington D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2008), 3-9 – 3-11.

⁶²Department of the Army, *FMI 3-0.1: The Modular Force*, 1-16.

⁶³*Ibid.*, 1-10.

⁶⁴David G. Perkins, "Mission Command: Reflections from the Combined Arms Center Commander," *Army* (June 2012), 32.

“subordinates send commanders information, and commanders provide subordinates with decisions and instructions,” is no longer sufficient.⁶⁵

In a mission command setting, “information coming from the lowest tactical echelon is as important as that coming from the highest strategic echelon.”⁶⁶ Lieutenant General Michael Flynn, former senior intelligence officer to ISAF, stated, “[t]actical-level information is laden with strategic significance,” and described tactical ground units as “the most important consumers *and* suppliers of information. [emphasis added]”⁶⁷ A modular staffs’ role in this process is critical; it acts as a feedback loop by first refining inputted information into knowledge, then applying judgment to create situational understanding, and finally disseminating that understanding to other staffs and commanders (see figure 1).⁶⁸ This iterative and continuous exchange of ideas inherent to mission command is a fundamental shift in how staffs at different echelons interact.




Figure 1: Achieving Understanding

Source: Department of the Army, *ADRP 6-0: Mission Command* (Washington D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2012), 2-7.

⁶⁵Department of the Army, *ADRP 6-0: Mission Command*, 2-14.

⁶⁶Perkins, 32.

⁶⁷Michael T. Flynn, Pottinger Matt and Paul D. Batchelor, *Fixed Intell: A Blueprint for Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan* (Washington D.C.: Center for a New American Security, 2010), 11 – 12.

⁶⁸Department of the Army, *ADRP 6-0: Mission Command*, 2-7.

Current doctrine provides a defining aid to the commander-staff relationship regarding organizational decisionmaking. The operations process is the result of decades worth of staff doctrinal evolution and is the “Army’s overarching framework for exercising mission command.”⁶⁹ Since WWI, the U.S. Army has attempted to understand and codify the developing relationship between a commander and the commander’s staff, and the symbiotic role of both the commander and the staff in making decisions and issuing orders. While FSR 1923 provided formats for issuing written orders, doctrine did not present an actual planning process until after World War II.⁷⁰ The Army republished its staff doctrine six times between 1940 and 1997, incrementally expanding its analytical approach to detailed planning and orders production.⁷¹ The 1997 version of *FM 100-5: Staff Organization and Operations* presented the most detailed planning construct with a thirty-eight step procedure military decisionmaking process, further institutionalizing a methodical and deductive approach to solving problems.⁷² However, the 1997 version of FM 101-5 also presented the prelude to the current operations process as *battlefield visualization*, in which commanders develop an understanding of the situation along with a conceptual way forward while the staff assists in developing that understanding and communicates the way forward to subordinates.⁷³ Since 1997, military deployments reinforced

⁶⁹Department of the Army, *ADRP 5-0: The Operations Process* (Washington D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2012), 1-2.

⁷⁰Christopher R. Paparone, "US Army Decisionmaking: Past, Present and Future," *Military Review*, July-August 2001, 46.

⁷¹Headquarters, Department of the Army updated *FM 101-5* in 1940, 1950, 1954, 1960, 1968, 1972, 1984, and 1997.

⁷²Paparone, 47.

⁷³Department of the Army, *FM 101-5: Staff Organization and Operations* (Washington D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1997), 1-3.

this need to balance detailed planning with conceptual planning. Current doctrine acknowledges this balance with the recent introduction of the army design methodology, a tool for conceptual thinking and problem framing.⁷⁴ The operations process encompasses the three Army planning methodologies (Army design methodology, the military decisionmaking process and troop leading procedures) and serves as the cumulative understanding of decisionmaking within a modular headquarters.⁷⁵ The process provides the logical and iterative approach necessary to maintain the initiative over an adversary in any environment.

Within the operations process, staffs plan, prepare, execute, and continuously assess while the commander drives the process by understanding, visualizing, describing, directing, leading, and assessing (see figure 2).⁷⁶ The most important aspect of the operations process is that doctrine situates it as the defining tool used by the staff to achieve its single purpose. As the preeminent process, the preponderance of the staff must be dedicated to it. The operations process requires a unity of effort; the staff serves as a single body of wisdom, intuition, and experience. As this single entity, the staff assists the commander in providing “purpose, direction, and guidance to the entire force.”⁷⁷ All other staff tasks are either self-inflicted (and thus irrelevant), or subordinate to the operations process. The operations process serves as the overarching framework within which a commander can exercise mission command over a modular force structure, and can accomplish its objective within any deployed environment.

⁷⁴Wayne W. Grigsby, Scott Gorman, Jack Marr, Joseph McLamb, Michael Stewart and Peter J. Schifferle, "Integrated Planning: The Operations Process, Design, and the Military Decision Making Process," *Military Review* (January-February 2011), 29.

⁷⁵Department of the Army, *ADRP 5-0: The Operations Process*, 2-1.

⁷⁶Department of the Army, *ADRP 6-0: Mission Command*, 3-3.

⁷⁷Department of the Army, *ADRP 5-0: The Operations Process*, 3-5.




Figure 2: Operations Process

Source: Department of the Army, *ADRP 6-0: Mission Command*, 3-3.

The technological differences between how WWI-era staffs achieved and current staffs achieve their organizational purpose are significant. During WWI, commanders were unencumbered by institutionalized planning processes and relied on their technically focused staff sections to ensure an efficient top-down dictation of directives. Operations in uncertain and complex environments over the past twenty years required logical changes to organizational structures and processes. Modularity severed the link between division and corps headquarters and the technical functions that support operations. The adoption of the mission command philosophy emphasized the two-way dialogue between echelons and the decentralized nature of decisionmaking required to maintain the initiative, and the operations process established the iterative and integrated planning approach that provides a unifying direction to commanders and staffs.

Culture

Finally, the contextual dimension of culture refers to the underlying “set of key values, beliefs, and norms shared by members of an organization,” and “signifies what is important.”⁷⁸ An organizational culture should reinforce the organization’s purpose within its environment.⁷⁹ While an organization’s culture has significant impact on its success, it is difficult to assess; certain aspects are observable while others are indiscernible.⁸⁰ Identifying those observable artifacts can infer that which is important to the organization itself. Doctrine, uniforms, organizational structure, and regulations are all observable artifacts within a military organization, but doctrine is unique in the way that it not only provides written evidence of cultural accumulation but also folds in new and desired values and beliefs. The most significant facet of culture concerning this study relates to inter-organizational interaction with foreign militaries, governmental organizations, and intergovernmental organizations.

General Pershing and the AEF deployed to a foreign country institutionally unprepared to fight alongside foreign armies, separated from them by distinct language and cultural differences. Although the Americans entered WWI three years after the outbreak of hostilities, they were unprepared to fight in an alliance; during this time Mexican raids into Texas and Pershing’s Mexican expedition from 1915 – 1917 largely distracted the Army from focusing on Europe.⁸¹

⁷⁸Daft, 399. The Army defines culture as “the shared beliefs, values, norms, customs, behaviors, and artifacts members of a society use to cope with the world and each other.” Department of the Army, *ADRP 5-0: The Operations Process*, 1-9.

⁷⁹Daft, 381.

⁸⁰*Ibid.*, 375.

⁸¹Stoler, 34; Matt M. Matthews, *The US Army on the Mexican Border: A Historical Perspective: Occasional Paper 22* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2007), 59-72; Also, General Pershing stated: “We were totally unprepared for war and our army was inexperienced in the conduct of joint operations in conjunction with the armies of Allied powers.

The American declaration of war in 1917 indicated the imminent deployment of the largest American force to fight alongside allies since the Revolutionary War. General Pershing recognized the importance of close integration with the allied forces but foresaw issues with troop integration, declaring that the mixing of American and French troops could not happen “because of the difference in language.”⁸² However, some within Pershing’s staff believed that enough French speaking officers within the AEF could be consolidated for use.⁸³

General Pershing foresaw the value of creating certain “mechanical agencies” to coordinate between the allied armies.⁸⁴ The AEF General Headquarters exchanged military missions with the French Ministry of War, and Interallied, British, Belgian, and Italian Army Headquarters. Pershing authorized American officers who were familiar with French language and culture to liaise with French headquarters and requested French officers and interpreters for

Practically our sole participation in such operations up until our war with Germany had been the minor one of the China Expedition of 1900;” Center of Military History, “United States Army in the World War, 1917-1919: Reports of the Commander-in-Chief, Staff Sections and Services, Volume 12,” *Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library*, January 15, 2013, <http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/singleitem/collection/p4013coll7/id/848/rec/2> (accessed February 17, 2013), 71.

⁸²Department of the Army, Historical Division, “United States Army in the World War, 1917 – 1919: Policy-Forming Documents American Expeditionary Force,” *Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library*, U.S. Government Printing Officer, February 19, 2009, <http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/compoundobject/collection/p4013coll7/id/471/rec/70> (accessed February 17, 2013), 181.

⁸³ Department of the Army, Historical Division, “United States Army in the World War, 1917 – 1919: Organization of the American Expeditionary Force,” *Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library*, U.S. Government Printing Office, November 17, 2008, <http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/compoundobject/collection/p4013coll7/id/391/rec/69> (accessed February 17, 2013), 78.

⁸⁴Center of Military History, “United States Army in the World War, 1917 – 1919: Reports of the Commander-in-Chief, Staff Sections and Services, Volume 12,” 73.

each of his divisions, corps, armies and smaller combat forces.⁸⁵ Within this mission exchange construct, allied officers willingly offered secret material to AEF headquarters to facilitate an in depth understanding of the environment and situation.⁸⁶ Pershing found his English-speaking French Officer trainers indispensable and retained their services throughout the war to interpret local laws and customs.⁸⁷ The local population openly welcomed the American Army: “the French people have everywhere received [American soldiers] more as relatives and intimate friends than as soldiers of a foreign army.”⁸⁸ The AEF Headquarters took extreme measures to ensure the continued support of the French; rule number twenty-two to the mail Censure Board in Paris stated: “[a]ny reference to the French people which would...show a lack of consideration for differences of language and customs must be avoided.”⁸⁹ However, not all friction due to language and culture could be avoided and liaison officers were not available to every unit. The use of French military hospitals for American soldiers proved unwise because “[t]he differences in standards of hospital care, the barrier of language, and the inability to get accurate records of cases admitted produced a most unsatisfactory situation.”⁹⁰ General Pershing addressed a clear

⁸⁵Ibid., 74.

⁸⁶Ibid., 75.

⁸⁷Ibid., 74.

⁸⁸Ibid., 13.

⁸⁹Center of Military History, "United States Army in the World War, 1917 – 1919: Reports of the Commander-in-Chief, Staff Sections and Services, Volume 13," *Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library*, January 15, 2013, <http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/singleitem/collection/p4013coll7/id/849/rec/73> (accessed February 17, 2013), 86.

⁹⁰Center of Military History, "United States Army in the World War, 1917 – 1919: Reports of the Commander-in-Chief, Staff Sections and Services, Volume 12," 106.

communication issue with the allied force and local-nationals by facilitating exchanges of military missions and liaison officers.

General Pershing and the AEF deployed to France without any recent precedent for fighting alongside partners with different native languages and cultures; the situation, however, was not bleak. The AEF internally possessed the language expertise necessary to engage with its partners. Trained and vetted uniformed officers filled American liaison positions to the French, British, Belgian, and Italian Armies, allowing the trusted exchange of secret documents mentioned above. At the time, most Americans emigrated from Europe and still maintained cultural ties to their native country.⁹¹ Personnel officers within Army headquarters were responsible for tracking soldiers with foreign language proficiencies within their ranks.⁹² In fact, the board that censured soldier mail home had to maintain the capability to read fifty different languages besides English, included languages from Asian, African, Pacific, and most of the European countries.⁹³ Although institutionally unprepared to fight alongside partners, the AEF possessed the language and cultural skills necessary to communicate with the local population and to coordinate with other armies. This internal awareness of French culture and language allowed the AEF to adjust to the Western Front environment with less difficulty when the surprise of war arrived.⁹⁴

⁹¹Stoler, 32.

⁹²Department of the Army, Historical Division, "United States Army in the World War, 1917 – 1919: Policy-Forming Documents American Expeditionary Force," 112.

⁹³Center of Military History, "United States Army in the World War, 1917 – 1919: Reports of the Commander-in-Chief, Staff Sections and Services, Volume 13," 112.

⁹⁴The idea of adjusting with less difficulty came from: "Our goal is, by a careful consideration of the future, to suggest the attributes of a joint force capable of adjusting with minimum difficulty when the surprise inevitably comes," United States Joint Forces Command, *The Joint Operating Environment* (Norfolk, VA, 2010), 5.

The ability to adjust to uncertain environments with less difficulty is a valuable lesson for the current military force. While attaining the skills necessary for adjustment to any environment is difficult, it is less so when operating within well-developed partnerships. Careful not to attempt prediction, the 2010 *Joint Operating Environment* states:

The nature of human condition will guarantee that uncertainty, ambiguity, and surprise will dominate the course of events. However carefully we think about the future; however thorough our preparation; however coherent and thoughtful our concepts, training, and doctrine; we will be surprised.⁹⁵

While the threat and operating environment are uncertain, the necessity to use force is still genuine. The use of unilateral American military force alone, however, is not ideal. Within this uncertain environment, “the presence, reach, and capability of U.S. military forces, working with like-minded partners, will continue to be called upon to protect [American] national interests.”⁹⁶ To best protect national interests, the 2012 *Army Strategic Planning Guidance* positions the Army as an integral element within the joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multi-national holistic approach to conflict resolution.⁹⁷ The Department of Defense’s *Unified Action* and the Army’s operational framework, *Unified Land Operations*, both emphasize the necessity of synchronizing the distinct capabilities of these partners.⁹⁸ Yet, each element is not a set entity; the elements are composed of a multitude of different organizations. The joint element is the most easily defined, composed of the U.S. Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps. The interagency element is composed of all non-military executive agencies to include the Department of State and Central

⁹⁵United States Joint Forces Command, 5.

⁹⁶*Ibid.*, 4.

⁹⁷Department of the Army, *Army Strategic Planning Guidance*, 4.

⁹⁸Department of the Army, *ADRP 3-0: Unified Land Operations*, 1-3; Department of the Army, *ADP 1-0: The Army* (Washington D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2012), 1-2.

Intelligence Agency. The intergovernmental element includes the United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and other alliances; and multi-national describes coordination of militaries from at least two nations, typically as part of an alliance or a coalition.⁹⁹ Each of these organizations has its own distinct language and culture that, if not understood, could make adjustment to the deployed environment more difficult. To make this work, it is necessary to shrink the differences between similar and divergent cultural outlooks prior to conflict.¹⁰⁰

The U.S. Army is currently positioned to decrease differences in cultural outlooks by increasing interaction and cooperation with future partners. Current doctrine addresses this ability to *shape* as one of the Army's three strategic roles: "[t]he Army provides the United States with the landpower to prevent, shape, and win in the land domain."¹⁰¹ The Army fosters mutual understanding and trust with foreign military forces through consistent engagement and capacity building. Security cooperation and regional alignment facilitate this engagement.¹⁰² Although shaping doctrinally refers to international engagement, the Army is also shaping its partnership with interagency organizations. The Interagency Fellowship Program involves exchanges between Army field grade officers and civilians from other government agencies, allowing time

⁹⁹Department of the Army, *ADRP 3-0: Unified Land Operations*, 1-3 – 1-6.

¹⁰⁰The author adopted the phrase "divergent cultural outlooks" from Department of the Army, *FM 3-16: The Army in Multinational Operations* (Washington D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2010) 1-3.

¹⁰¹Department of the Army, *ADP 1-0: The Army*, 1-1.

¹⁰²According to the 2012 *Army Strategic Planning Guidance*: "[s]haping activities may include rotational deployments for exercises and training, participation at Army Institutional training and senior professional military education, OCONUS security assistance teams, building partner capacity, security force assistance, civil affairs support for stabilization, reconstruction, and development efforts, foreign internal defense, counterterrorism and support to counterterrorism, smaller footprint combat operations short of major conflict, foreign humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, and efforts to counter weapons of mass destruction." Department of the Army, *Army Strategic Planning Guidance*, 5.

to interact.¹⁰³ Increasing contact and engagement with future partners leads to eased coordination and cooperation in a deployed environment, but coordination is not enough. The current environment requires the ability to assess changes through a holistic lens and rapidly respond with a wide range of tools. This unified action requires synchronization and integration, both of which are higher forms of interaction that cannot occur without the willingness to share and participate as part of a cohesive team.¹⁰⁴ Teams are built through mutual trust based on shared confidence, personal qualities, and shared understanding, while shared understanding demands open dialogue and frank exchanges of information.¹⁰⁵ This team building and shared understanding occurs within the headquarters of the synchronizing decisionmakers and cannot be achieved by mere liaison officers. To facilitate the required synchronization, personnel from civilian and military partners should be integrated into all aspects of the staff and the processes that support decisions. Although the Army can increase cooperation between future partners through mutual cultural awareness, the current environment requires more than just cooperation.

The cultural requirements of the current environment are different than those faced by General Pershing and the AEF. While on the surface both situations look familiar—forces deployed within a coalition of partners with distinct languages and cultures—the allies on the Western Front only required coordination. Exchanges of military missions and liaison officers facilitated this coordination to the best of their abilities. The current context requires integration

¹⁰³Gordon B. Davis and James B. Martin, "Developing Leaders to Adapt and Dominate for the Army of Today and Tomorrow," *Military Review* (Combined Arms Center), (September-October 2012), 65.

¹⁰⁴"*Unified action* is the synchronization, coordination, and/or integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort (JP 1)." Department of the Army, *ADRP 3-0: Unified Land Operations*, 1-3.

¹⁰⁵Department of the Army, *ADRP 6-0: Mission Command*, 1-1 – 1-2.

and synchronization, both of which can only be achieved through mutual trust and open dialogue. Integration of partners into the Army's planning and decisionmaking processes is essential to foment trust and facilitate rapid actions.

Summary

Within Daft's organization theory framework the staff's purpose serves as the only true first principle while the elements of environment, process technology, and culture serve as relevant contextual dimensions of organization design. Comparison of the WWI context and the current operating environment using these dimensions show that the context in which the design of an army field headquarters was originally created has drastically changed. The nature of the environment allowed the staffs within the AEF to focus internally on the technical elements of sustainment and maneuver, while the dynamically complex nature of the current operating environment forces staffs to focus externally in order to refine the problem and dictate the strategic narrative. In terms of process, WWI commanders relied on their technically focused staff members to ensure an efficient top-down dictation of directives; while current doctrine removes a modular headquarters' technical requirements and emphasizes decentralized decisionmaking, a multi-echeloned approach to situational awareness, and the necessity of an integrated and iterative planning process. The removal of support units from the operational chain of command allows all staff members to focus less on their individual specialties and contribute to a whole-of-staff approach in a unified, desegregated manner. Culturally, the Army is attempting to alter its understanding of partners by promoting desirable interaction skills to promote a high level of cohesion and trust with joint, interagency, and multinational partners. Finally, implications to a future redesign of modular headquarters include the need for three integrated staff concentrations, one focused on establishing and maintaining the staff's shared understanding of the environment, one focused on influencing operations through the operations

process and one dedicated to informing the strategic narrative. The necessity of integration with joint, interagency, and multinational partners requires a structure that facilitates assimilation and is unencumbered by systematic barriers that erode partner support. Because the context is so different, the old organizational structure should be out of alignment with current organization needs.

HEADQUARTERS ANALYSIS

Although assessment of the contextual dimensions shows that the modular headquarters structure should be out of alignment with its needs, an analysis of current doctrine and regulatory documents is needed to identify if the structure actually is out of alignment. Specifically, analysis of the current operating environment highlights the importance of a whole-of-staff approach towards the iterative operations process and the need to easily integrate non-US military personnel into the operations process. By assessing Army doctrine with Army Force Development Process documents and organization theory, structural deficiencies are apparent.

Fundamentals of Organization Structure

In order to assess internal organization relationships and processes, one must first understand the fundamentals of organization structure. According to Richard Daft, there are three components of organization structure:

1. Organization structure designates formal reporting relationships, including the number of levels in the hierarchy and the span of control of managers and supervisors.
2. Organization structure identifies the grouping together of individuals into departments and of departments into the total organization.

3. Organization structure includes the design of systems to ensure effective communication, coordination, and integration of efforts across departments.¹⁰⁶

The visual manifestation of an organization's structure is its organization chart, which depicts the groupings of individuals and their relationships to each other. An organization chart most commonly positions the highest ranking element at the top from which groupings of lesser entities cascade below. The dominant relationship descriptors are 'horizontal' and 'vertical,' with vertical referring to the official chain-of-command hierarchy of authority and horizontal describing the coordinating relationships between groups of equal authority. Horizontal relationships can also be described as integrating or cross-functional (if the hierarchy is defined by function).¹⁰⁷ There is an inherent tension between these elements, "whereas vertical linkages are designed primarily for control, horizontal linkages are designed for coordination and collaboration, which means reducing control."¹⁰⁸ Groupings of individuals within this hierarchy can serve different purposes. A functional grouping is comprised of those performing similar roles or have similar backgrounds, while a horizontal grouping places employees of different functions together to support specific work processes. According to Daft, the most significant role of an organization leader is to understand the needs of the organization to better align its internal structure.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁶Daft, 90.

¹⁰⁷Ibid., 90 – 93.

¹⁰⁸Ibid., 93.

¹⁰⁹Ibid., 102 – 125.

Operations Process

There are incongruities between Army doctrine's conceptual understanding of how the staff integrates its efforts within the operations process and how the Army's Force Development Process established actual formal reporting relationships and groupings of staff officers. While *Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 5-0: Operations Process* and *ADP 6-0: Mission Command* provide the fundamental principles of command and staff operations, only *Army Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (ATTP) 5-0.1: Commander and Staff Officer Guide*, *Field Manual (FM) 3-92: Corps Operations*, and Table of Organization and Equipment System documents from the Force Development Process provide the most current and requisite detail for modular headquarters analysis.¹¹⁰ Army doctrine appreciates the preeminence of the operations process. However, the current operating environment requires that execution of the iterative operations process be imbued with the qualities of speed and relevance; speed to maintain the initiative within the enemy's decisionmaking cycle, and relevance to ensure all staff elements that could add value to the process are positioned to do so. Structure must facilitate integration of all appropriate stakeholders into the process and ensure its timely execution.

Army doctrine provides the Army's understanding of how it thinks the staff should function. Doctrine recognizes that time-based planning horizon teams serve as the primary executors of the operations process and that these teams reside within a matrix structure, the third of three structural options described in *ATTP 5-0.1*.¹¹¹ The three options offered to commanders

¹¹⁰Department of the Army, *ATTP 5-0.1: Commander and Staff Officer Guide* (Washington D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2011) and Department of the Army, *FM 3-92: Corps Operations* (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2010) are the most up to date doctrinal manuals that reference staff structure and operations. *FM 71-100: Division Operations* was last published in 1996 prior to the Army's recent transformation and the new *FM 3-92: Echelons Above Brigade* is not scheduled to be published until 2014.

¹¹¹Department of the Army, *ATTP 5-0.1: Commander and Staff Officer Guide*, 3-6.

in doctrine include a hierarchical structure by function and specialty, a geographically distributed structure, and a matrix structure. These options closely mirror the previously identified theory of staff interaction defined by a dominating series of functional hierarchies organized around the General Staff model, currently masked by Warfighter Functions, divided by space between multiple command posts, and partially integrated through established time-horizon, cross-functional teams. One must first understand the relationship of the three options in order to see the utility in the planning horizon teams. Of the three, the dominating option from which the other options are derived is the hierarchical structure by function and specialty.




Figure 3: Doctrinal Army Staff Structure

Source: Department of the Army, *ATTP 5-0.1: Commander and Staff Officer Guide*, 2-4.

Within this hierarchical structure, commonly referred to as the General Staff model, all staff members report to principal staff officers serving within the personal, coordinating, or special staff (see figure 3). Personal staff officers “work under the immediate control of, and have

direct access to, the commander.”¹¹² The chaplain, staff judge advocate, and inspector general are required by law or Army regulation to serve in this capacity.¹¹³ Special staff officers serve as subject matter experts on specific bodies of knowledge, ie. air and missile defense officer, engineer officer, and military deception officer. The coordinating staff officers, commonly referred to as a G-staff for headquarters echeloned above brigades, serve a significant role as principle assistants to the chief of staff and focus on functional areas of expertise. They also provide supervisory authority over the special staff officers.¹¹⁴ The commander may organize his coordinating staff officers by the historical G-staff or by the newly implemented warfighter functions (See Table 1). This description of the basic staff structure depicts the defining hierarchical staff sections within a modular headquarters.

Table 1: Principle Staff Officer Positions

Assistant Chief of Staff (ACOS), G-1 – Personnel
 ACOS, G-2 – Intelligence, *Chief of Intelligence Warfighter Function*
 ACOS, G-3 – Operations, *Chief of Movement and Maneuver Warfighter Function*
 ACOS, G-4 – Logistics, *Chief of Sustainment Warfighter Function*
 ACOS, G-5 – Plans
 ACOS, G-6 – Signal
 ACOS, G-7 – Inform and Influence Activities
 ACOS, G-8 – Resource Management
 ACOS, G-9 – Civil Affairs Operations
 Chief of Fires, *Chief of Fires Warfighter Function*
 Chief of Protection, *Chief of Protection Warfighter Function*
 * *The Chief of Staff serves as Chief of Mission Command Warfighter Function*

¹¹²Department of the Army, *ATTP 5-0.1: Commander and Staff Officer Guide*, 2-25.

¹¹³*Ibid.*, 2-3.

¹¹⁴*Ibid.*, 2-5.

Source: Table created by author. Department of the Army, *ATTP 5-0.1: Commander and Staff Officer Guide*, 2-5 – 2-6.

The second option offered by *ATTP 5-0.1* is a geographically distributed structure. Doctrine describes two different command posts and a command group from which the commander can conduct mission command activities. These command posts are comprised of slices from each coordinating staff section and are separated by a mission dependent distance to facilitate survivability. The Main Command Post contains the “majority of the staff designed to control current operations, conduct detailed analysis, and plan future operations.”¹¹⁵ The Tactical Command Post contains a “tailored portion of a unit headquarters designed to control portions of an operation for a limited time.”¹¹⁶ Finally, the Command Group consists of the commander and other selected staff officers who assist in mission command away from the command posts. When the Commander does not utilize the Command Group or the Tactical Command Post, the assigned staff officers integrate into the Main Command Post.¹¹⁷ These command posts provide G-staff or warfighter function oversight in multiple locations.

Third, doctrine presents a matrix structure to coordinate and synchronize the warfighter functions through time (see figure 4). Organization theory positions the matrix structure as most in tune, of the three options, to the complexity and uncertainty of the current operating environment because of the speed and flexibility it creates. The matrix structure, or what organization theorists George Stalk and Jill Black consider a functional organization with process overlays, combines the typical stovepipe of hierarchical functions with cross-functional teams in

¹¹⁵Ibid., 3-1.

¹¹⁶Ibid., 3-2.

¹¹⁷Ibid., 3-2.

order to encourage adaptive behavior to produce a higher quality product.¹¹⁸ According to Richard Daft, a matrix structure works best in quickly changing environments because it facilitates adaptation and discussion along multiple lines.¹¹⁹ In the Army's case, the warfighter functions serve as the hierarchical specialties and the cross-functional teams are based on planning horizons: current operations, future operations, and plans.¹²⁰ According to *ATTP 5-0.1*, "execution of the operations process primarily resides in the plans, future operations, and current operations integration cells" (see figure 5).¹²¹ Because all warfighter functions are integrated across the planning horizons those functions that specialize in receiving and analyzing inputs from outside the headquarters can incorporate those inputs across all horizons, helping the organization create the most relevant environmental frame to guide operations. Since the six warfighter functions contain oversight of the majority of the Army's "destructive, constructive, and information capabilities that a military unit or formation can apply at a given time," integrating all the functions together provides a focused whole-of-staff approach to conducting the operations process.¹²² Figure 4, from *ATTP 5-0.1*, presents an image of a well-balanced matrix, in which all functional cells are equally represented within the integrating cells and the preponderance of personnel from each functional cell are integrated. Theoretically, this matrix structure causes a whole-of-staff approach to the operations process. It best integrates all of the

¹¹⁸George Stalk Jr. and Jill E. Black, "The Myth of the Horizontal Organization," *Canadian Business Review* 21, no. 4 (Winter 1994), 28.

¹¹⁹Daft, 112.

¹²⁰Department of the Army, *ATTP 5-0.1 Commander and Staff Officer Guide*, 3-5.

¹²¹*Ibid.*, 3-6.

¹²²Department of the Army, *ADRP 3-0: Unified Land Operations* (Washington D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2012), 3-2.

staff functions through time, allowing the commander to maintain situational awareness and to drive the operations process in order to retain the initiative.




Figure 4: Functional and Integrating Cell Matrix Structure

Source: Department of the Army, *ATTP 5-0.1: Commander and Staff Officer Guide*, 3-5.




Figure 5: Operations Process and Time Horizons

Source: Department of the Army, *ATTP 5-0.1: Commander and Staff Officer Guide*, 3-7.

Unfortunately, operating within the realities of the structure actually authorized by the Army's Force Development Process creates significant issues not identified by doctrine. Because of this, modular headquarters are better structured for operations in which the enemy and environment are predictable, not for operations in an uncertain and complex environment. The Army's Force Development Process serves as the bridge between conceptual requirements and combat ready units composed of actual personnel and equipment.¹²³ Modified Tables of

¹²³ A portion of this process, the Table of Organization and Equipment System, takes approved generic organizational designs and standardizes them into detailed Tables of Organization and Equipment (TOE) documents. These documents specify organizational structure and the minimum mission-essential wartime equipment and personnel requirements for specific types of organizations, like corps headquarters. Finally, the Force Management Process

Organization and Equipment (MTOE) documents are the final manifestation of the Force Development Process and dictate actual placement of personnel within specific combat ready units. In addition, the differences between original approved design concepts Corps Design 4.1 and Division Design 9.1 (which initiate specific developments) and the final MTOEs for Corps and Division headquarters are minimal enough to use just one document for analysis (See Appendix B for a comparison of the Corps Design 4.1, TOE 52400R000 Corps HQ and HQ BN, and MTOE 52400RFC84 I Corps HQ and HQ BN). Specifically, the *Modified Table of Organization and Equipment 52400RFC84: Corps Headquarters and Headquarters Battalion (MTOE 52400RFC84)* provides a specific headquarters staff structure divergent from the doctrinally accepted structure (see figure 6).

The authorization document for I Corps headquarters, *MTOE 52400RFC84*, provides the grade and skill qualifications for each staff officer along with the approved distribution of personnel among staff sections. Analysis of this document shows that the I Corps staff is not equipped with the personnel mix required to achieve a balanced matrix with functional representation across all planning horizons. The warfighter functions are only manned to operate hierarchically between two geographically separate command posts. In addition, only 24% of the field grade officers within this specific modular headquarters are integrated into the time-based horizons and, thus, less than one quarter of the staff's critical and creative thinking capability are operations process focused.¹²⁴ The other 76% still serve their principle staff officer within the

adjusts TOEs by incorporating institutional resource constraints and addressing specific unit missions. These Modified Tables of Organization and Equipment (MTOE) documents serve as authorizations for actual requisition and represent specific units, like I Corps, III Corps, and XVIII Corps (Airborne). Department of the Army, *Army Regulation 71-32: Force Development* (Washington D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1997), 1 – 15.

¹²⁴ This analysis only includes officers in the pay grades of CW-4, CW-5, O-4, O-5, and O-6 that are not serving within the Command Group (total of 215 officers, see table below for

hierarchy of the functional cells, relationships previously made extraneous by the removal of a modular headquarters' technical requirements. Because the majority of functional officers reside in the functional cells and not in the integrating cells, principle staff officers are not stakeholders in the operations process and any input forced by the chief of staff into the process is created in isolation. Gareth Morgan states the matrix organizations in which the functional divisions retain control “fail to innovate and perform their project tasks in an effective way.”¹²⁵ In trying to adjust to a matrix organization the Army repeated the mistakes made by nearly one-third of integration-seeking businesses analyzed by Stalk and Black; the Army “attempted to overlay new processes on old infrastructure” and ignored the infrastructure required to institutionalize the new processes.¹²⁶ The Army matrix “kept a vertical structure and added process overlays...but work still continued inside the functions,” reinforcing old habits and debilitating new relationships.¹²⁷ The structure created to ensure that input-receiving specialties would distribute inputs across all planning horizons, actually hampers planning by inconsistently forcing different inputs into each horizon. The only way to fix this issue is through a battle rhythm, an *ad hoc* system of forced

specifics). This author believes that officers of these ranks are the critical and creative thinkers on a corps staff that should participate in the operations process. This 24% only include the Plans, Current Operations, and Future Operations sections.


Staff Sections	Special Staff	Plans	Current Operations	Future Operations	Tactical Command Post	Non-Integrated G-staff
Officers	37	15	22	15	21	105

¹²⁵Gareth Morgan, *Images of Organization* (Thousand Oaks, California: SAGE Publications, 2006), 51.

¹²⁶Stalk and Black, 27.

¹²⁷*Ibid.*, 27.

meetings, working groups, and boards that repeats itself on a consistent basis.¹²⁸ While this system does force functional representation within each planning horizon, it also unfortunately entails that plans and organizational responses are time based rather than input based, which cancels any gained process speed.



¹²⁸Department of the Army, *ATTP 5-0.1: Commander and Staff Officer Guide*. 3-11-3-13.

CMD: Command	ORSA: Operations Research/Systems Analysis
EN: Engineer	PAO: Public Affairs Office
EW: Electronic Warfare	Protect: Protection
Force Man: Force Management	SJA: Staff Judge Advocate
IG: Inspector General	Space Ops: Space Operations
Intell: Intelligence	SURG: Surgeon
KM: Knowledge Manager	TACP: Tactical Air Control Party

Figure 6: I Corps Staff

Source: Graphic created by author. Department of the Army, "Modified Table of Organization and Equipment 52400RFC84: I Corps Headquarters and Headquarters Battalion," Force Management System Web Site, <https://fmsweb.army.mil> (accessed August 5, 2012).

Second, because of the specific nature of the headquarters' planning horizons and the role of the chief of staff, the true gains expected from a matrix structure concerning the limitation of error in decisionmaking are not realized. In the article "Design of Decision-Making Organizations," Michael Christenson and Thorbjorn Knudsen discuss organizational designs that optimize decision-making by limiting error in judgment.¹²⁹ The authors find that since a hierarchical model reduces the possibility of rejecting a superior alternative and that a polyarchical model reduces the possibility of accepting an inferior alternative, the optimal model is a hybrid.¹³⁰ In theory, a matrix structure is a form of hierarchical-polyarchical hybrid because of the possibility of an option propagating two different realms consisting of specialists with different biases. This ensures that any legitimate option receives its due process and refinement prior to presentation for final decision to the commander. However, the matrix envisioned by Army doctrine is not a true matrix. In actuality, the three planning horizons are a disguised form of hierarchical decisionmaking process in which the chief of staff acts as the single cross-functional integrator. Because the horizons are predicated on time, the moment of planned event

¹²⁹Michael Christenson and Thorbjorn Knudsen, "Design of Decision-Making Organizations," *Management Science* 56, no. 1 (January 2010), 71.

¹³⁰*Ibid.*, 72 – 73.

execution dictates which horizon takes ownership. Operational plans originating within the plans horizon are only passed to the future operations horizon upon initial approval by the chief of staff and final approval by the commander.¹³¹ The future operations, and eventually the current operations, horizon can only minutely adjust the plan based on recently acquired environmental inputs, like available resources.¹³² This eliminates the polyarchical portion of the staff matrix and ensures only a reduced possibility of rejecting a superior alternative to the plan. Additionally, since the majority of warfighter function input to the operations process is formulated within the functional cells and not the integrating cells, the chief of staff must serve as principle integrator of all staff activity. This ensures that all staff activity is channeled through a single point of failure. The single horizon emphasis on a plan and the dominating role of the chief of staff further hinders any efficiency created in the operations process by organizing into a matrix staff.

Differences between Army doctrine and its Force Development Process authorization documents show a misunderstanding of how the staff realistically operates. Doctrine presents a matrix structure theoretically suitable for the current operating environment. Although dominated by hierarchy, if properly instituted, the Army's matrix structure could have addressed the headquarters' needs. However, improper implementation caused the continued domination of hierarchical functions within the staff. The value of a matrix organization is its process speed and integration capability, both of which were negated within a corps headquarters by the implementation of the Corps Design 4.1, and specifically for I Corps Headquarters by *MTOE*

¹³¹Wayne R. Philip and Christopher P. Martin, "A Philosophical Approach to Time in Military Knowledge Management," *Journal of Knowledge Management* (Emerald Group) 13, no. 1 (2009), 180.

¹³²Department of the Army, *ATTP 5-0.1: Commander and Staff Officer Guide*, 3-6 – 3-8.

52400RFC84. The operations process is only addressed by a fifth of the staff's analytical capability and thus excludes the majority of the headquarters.

Interagency Integration

The current context depicts integration of interagency partners as a necessity during operations. Army doctrine acknowledges that it is common to augment military staffs with other civilian agencies that specialize in human intelligence, reconstruction, and redevelopment.¹³³ *Army Doctrine Publication 3-0: Unified Land Operations* discusses the symbiotic relationship between elements of the "larger national effort characterized as unified action."¹³⁴ Often, other national agencies are privy to a wealth of information that drive the staff's planning process and organizational focus. However, modular headquarters rely on information technology (IT) systems to manage knowledge and integration of interagency partners into the headquarters structure. *Field Manual 3-92: Corps Operations* states that modular headquarters rely on information and knowledge "to support the execution and assessment of operations," and that specific Army IT systems, such as the Army Battle Command System, must be utilized to ensure distribution of information across the staff.¹³⁵ Information technology has been successfully used in the business industry to decrease vertical emphasis and increase knowledge sharing by capitalizing on individual collaboration.¹³⁶ The Army though, relies on its IT systems to integrate organizational knowledge into its processes, and the intricacies of the specific information

¹³³Department of the Army, *FM 3-92: Corps Operations*, 5-6.

¹³⁴Department of the Army, *ADP 3-0: Unified Land Operations*, 3.

¹³⁵Department of the Army, *FM 3-92: Corps Operations*, 3-2 – 3-5.

¹³⁶Margaret Schweer, Dimitris Assimakopoulos, Rob Cross and Robert J. Thomas, "Building a Well-Networked Organization," *MIT Sloan Management Review* (Massachusetts Institute of Technology), (Winter 2012), 35 – 36.

systems require security clearances and “trained and skilled operators.”¹³⁷ As important as these agency and multinational inputs are to the planning process, non-Army integration into the Army’s IT systems is difficult, making partners subservient to Army staff personnel that possess proper access and training.¹³⁸ Interagency contributions to staff planning are limited by IT constraints, ensuring that the majority of inputs utilized for planning are militarily related and off balance with an environment that requires non-military knowledge.

Second, in an uncertain environment in which military organizations benefit from interagency expertise, the subjugation of the civilian augmentees to the military staff because of IT and knowledge sharing requirements, and the dominant role of the battle rhythm to better integrate staff work sets the stage for a clash of significantly different cultures. While the Army’s modular headquarters rely on a deliberate planning process that involves fixed meeting times and specific approval gates, most civilian agencies utilize informal processes that “encourage the rapid exchange of information” directly with the necessary decisionmaking authorities.¹³⁹ The headquarters’ reliance on the time-driven battle rhythm to force cross-functional integration only adds to the frustration of civilian augmentees and the appearance of staff actions too slow to maintain the initiative.¹⁴⁰ Although senior military and civilian agency leaders agree “that it will be impossible for a...commander to accomplish the mission by applying military power in isolation,”¹⁴¹ current infrastructure and organization design of the modular headquarters only

¹³⁷Department of the Army, *FM 3-92: Corps Operations*, 3-6.

¹³⁸*Ibid.*, 5-6.

¹³⁹Christopher M. Schnaubelt, "After the Fight: Interagency Operations," *Parameters* 35, no. 4 (Winter 2005), 55.

¹⁴⁰Shinkle.

¹⁴¹Schnaubelt, 57.

serve to isolate the civilian augmentees that are necessary to accomplish the mission. According to Christopher Schnaubelt, this clash of cultures that turned the success of the initial Iraq invasion into failure could happen again unless addressed.¹⁴² Although the Army recognizes the importance of integrating interagency personnel into the staff structure, the deep-rooted dependence on technology and a time-based battle rhythm serve as significant divides between the Army and its non-military partners.

Summary

The Army considers its modular headquarters to be fully integrated and capable of rapidly turning environmental inputs into synchronized outputs. While doctrine supports this view, significant issues with actual staff structure inhibit the sought after integration and create internal stress. Systems that should create a whole-of-staff approach and increased process speed, like the matrix staff structure and incorporated information technology, only serve to degrade the quality and integration of environmental inputs by staff sections. Although the Army understands the importance of partnership with certain interagency partners, little has been done to ease the inherent issues of integrating different cultures. Quality information into the system does not equal quality decisions and plans out of the system. Though *ad hoc* structures and relationships can ease the tension within a staff, modular headquarters are not structured to succeed in the current operating environment.

TOWARDS A HORIZONTAL APPROACH

The current staff structure is misaligned with the current environment; the existing staff theory of interaction is showing signs of irrelevance. The first generation U.S. Army theory of

¹⁴²Ibid., 47.

staff interaction promulgated prior to WWI was based on the centrality of a unit commanders' genius in personally translating all relevant inputs into military action with only peripheral support from specialized staff officers. General Pershing found this unsuitable to the demands of his time and established a new structure that has endured since. This new structure, or second generation theory of staff interaction, is defined by a dominating series of functional hierarchies organized around the General Staff model, currently masked by warfighter functions, divided by space between multiple command posts, and partially integrated through established time-horizon, cross-functional teams. This theory is diminishing in value and, thus, there is worth in not only relooking the current staff structure but in recommending a significant shift in how staffs function. The current structure should be fractured and rebuilt under a new theory, one that completely reorganizes personnel within the staff to better address the requirements of the current context. Findings from the contextual analysis of the environment, process technology, and culture dimensions not only identify an overall reorganization to replace the inefficient General Staff model but also recognize three essential tasks that must be addressed by each staff, regardless of its placement within the deployed hierarchy. These three tasks serve to focus distinct staff sections in their support to the commander. Finally, within each newly defined staff section redundant cross-specialty teams allow the section lead the flexibility to rearrange personnel to best utilize individual skills and integrate partners into the process. The new theory of staff interaction should be defined by cross-specialty teams fully integrated into event-driven, process-oriented staff sections aligned around the operations process that focus on the three primary tasks of influencing, informing, and understanding, and facilitate complete integration of partners.

Environmental Implications

Dynamic complexity and the expanding role of media in illuminating military intervention serve as the defining characteristics of the current environmental context. These characteristics suggest the surfacing of distinct organizational tasks that must be accomplished by any element of a deployed military force. Within this context the central qualities of deployed military units are their ability to influence the operational environment and inform the strategic narrative. While the terms influence and inform serve specific roles within Army doctrine, their limited definitions and specific placement amongst secondary tasks within the Mission Command Warfighting Function severely diminish their overarching importance.¹⁴³ Doctrine defines neither influence nor inform but does group them together under Inform and Influence Activities, linking the terms with only synchronization of messages and themes.¹⁴⁴ The term influence also serves as a stability mechanism within ADRP 3-0, “to alter the opinions, attitudes, and ultimately behavior of foreign friendly, neutral, adversary, and enemy populations through inform and influence activities, presence, and conduct.”¹⁴⁵ This fails to place the rightful importance on the term.

In a broader more relevant sense, influencing relates to more than cognitive messaging. The term influence identifies with every interaction within the operating environment that assists the environment’s evolution to the desired state. The Army influences through its core competencies: combined arms maneuver and wide area security.¹⁴⁶ Prussian military theorist Carl

¹⁴³Department of the Army, *ADRP 6-0: Mission Command*, 1-3.

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 3-4.

¹⁴⁵Department of the Army, *ADRP 3-0: Unified Land Operations*, 2-10.

¹⁴⁶Department of the Army, *ADRP 3-0: Unified Land Operations* (Washington D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2012), 2-9 – 2-10, provides the doctrinal definitions of combined arms maneuver and wide area security.

von Clausewitz describes war as a battle of wills.¹⁴⁷ Victory is only achieved when the enemy admits defeat and submits his will to the will of the victor. Within a complex environment one actor cannot singularly create the conditions for lasting favorable conflict resolution without other actors willfully accepting those conditions. The definition of *Unified Land Operations* is missing the logical link between gaining and maintaining a position of relative advantage and creating the conditions for a resolution.¹⁴⁸ The position of relative advantage facilitates the influencing of the relevant actors to create those conditions for favorable conflict resolution. If the aggressing actor fails to properly influence the relevant actors within the operating environment to willfully accept the aggressing actors terms, then favorable resolution is unattainable and the operational environment will most likely digress to its original state once the aggressor departs. Influencing relevant actors is the preeminent task of not only the Army, but all military elements within the operating environment.

Influencing a dynamically complex environment requires time and resources gained by means of domestic and international support through strategic credibility. This support and credibility is obtained and maintained through a cohesive information campaign positioned to dominate the strategic narrative. Like the term influence, doctrine only addresses informing within the context of Inform and Influence Activities. Army doctrine recognizes that media can “rapidly influence public opinion and decisions concerning military operations,” but does not

¹⁴⁷Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 75.

¹⁴⁸Department of the Army, *ADP 3-0: Unified Land Operations*, 1, defines Unified Land Operations as “how the Army seizes, retains, and exploits the initiative to gain and maintain a position of relative advantage in sustained land operations through simultaneous offensive, defensive, and stability operations in order to prevent or deter conflict, prevail in war, and create the conditions for favorable conflict resolution.”

apply the same importance to winning the battle of the narrative as recent joint documents.¹⁴⁹ The 2009 *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations* states that all levels of commanders will be “consumed with shaping the narrative” in order to maintain international credibility.¹⁵⁰ The importance of maintaining domestic and international support in an age dominated by ever-present media elevates the importance of a sound information campaign informing the strategic narrative. Although Army doctrine relegates informing and influencing to a secondary role within *Unified Land Operations*, they are essential for success in the current environmental context and serve as defining tasks to be accomplished by staff sections within the new structure.

Process Technology Implications

Within the process technology context, mission command and the operations process are the Army’s most recent perspectives on power and decisionmaking. Mission command is a philosophy of authority and decentralization that explains the relationships between commanders, staffs, and other echelons of the Army’s hierarchy. The operations process is an iterative planning framework for executing mission command.¹⁵¹ Both mission command and the operations process require a perspective of the environment in which force is deployed in order to provide relevance to their outputs. Within mission command, the commander’s intent, “a concise expression of the purpose of the operation and the desired military end state,” is underpinned by a shared understanding of environmental dynamics.¹⁵² The operations process provides direction

¹⁴⁹Department of the Army, *FM 3-13: Inform and Influence Activities* (Washington D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2013), 1-1.

¹⁵⁰Department of Defense, 5.

¹⁵¹Department of the Army, *ADRP 5-0: The Operations Process*, 1-2.

¹⁵²*Ibid.*, 1-5.

for action in order to address a problem, which is also derived from an understanding of the environment. However, in a dynamically complex environment, it is nearly impossible to know everything that is relevant to the military problem. Operational action must occur in order to force the more applicable information to the surface.¹⁵³ Environmental understanding is never complete, yet it is the foundation for action. Operational actions must be based on the most current understanding of the environment shared by all pertinent stakeholders. Thus, it takes considerable focus and iterative dialogue to create and continuously adjust such shared understanding. Because of this, the third central quality of deployed military units is their ability to understand the environment for which they are responsible, and to continuously contribute to the shared environmental understanding of the whole deployed organization.

The current context shows that influencing, informing, and understanding are the essential tasks that must be performed by every element of a U.S. military force deployed in support of strategic objectives. During sustained land operations, it is the Army's responsibility to influence actors within the environment, to inform the strategic narrative with its perspective of its operations, and to drive the iterative dialogue necessary to create the shared understanding of the environment. Because of this, every echelon of force from the smallest tactical unit to the highest Army headquarters committed to the operation must focus their energy on these tasks. Though, corps and division headquarters may commit more resources to the informing of the narrative than the influencing of the operational environment while battalions and brigades operate vice versa (see figure 7). The current context depicts a force's ability to understand, inform, and influence as necessary to achieve strategic objectives.

¹⁵³Kramer, 12 – 13.




Figure 7: Relationship Between Army Echelons and the Three Essential Tasks

Source: Created by author.

Furthermore, the operations process is more than a heuristic. It provides a logical flow of action within a staff to support the commander's decisionmaking. As such, the process, itself, can be used as a model to define internal staff relationships. If a battle rhythm is currently required as an *ad hoc* time-driven solution to integrate hierarchically separated staff functions into the operations process, then completely restructuring the staff into process focused sections eliminates this dependency. A process focused restructuring transforms the staff from a time driven entity to an event, or initiative, driven entity.

A process-focused structure is referred to in organization theory as horizontal. Richard Daft describes a horizontal organization as one that has shirked hierarchy and has organized

employees around the company’s core processes or workflows.¹⁵⁴ A process is “an organized group of related tasks and activities that work together to transform inputs into outputs that create value for customers.”¹⁵⁵ Within a horizontal organization invisible boundaries between functions are broken down and employees work directly for the process owners, who have responsibility for the entire process.¹⁵⁶ A horizontal reorganization of a modular staff eradicates the need for functional G-staff oversight and places resources directly into the operations process.




Figure 8: Recommended Staff Structure

Source: Created by author.

A restructured modular staff should be comprised of process-focused teams dedicated to executing the three essential military tasks. Within this new structure three separate staff groupings address the essential tasks (see figure 8 and 9). The influencing section utilizes the operations process to provide tactical “purpose, direction, and guidance to the entire [subordinate]

¹⁵⁴Daft, 115.

¹⁵⁵Ibid., 115.

¹⁵⁶Ibid., 116.

force.”¹⁵⁷ The influencing section also executes the targeting and risk management processes. The informing section utilizes the operations process to maintain a coherent information campaign. Finally, the environmental framing section executes the intelligence preparation of the battlefield process and establishes context by “selecting, organizing, interpreting, and making sense of an operational environment.”¹⁵⁸ It enters into a dialogue with the commander, internal staff sections, subordinate and senior headquarters and external agencies to facilitate this shared understanding (see figure 10). This section integrates operational assessments and serves as an information clearinghouse to “organize and disseminate...all reports and data analysts gather from the ground level.”¹⁵⁹ From this section, any partnering agency can access up-to-date information. Finally, the elements of the operations process serve as the subsections. Tasks associated with planning will be conducted in the plans section, preparing occurs in the future operations section, executing occurs in the current operations section, and assessments are completed in the assessments section. This structure serves as a possible new design for the internal staff structure of corps and division headquarters.

¹⁵⁷Department of the Army, *ADRP 6-0: Mission Command*, 3-5.

¹⁵⁸Department of the Army, *ADRP 5-0: The Operations Process*, 2-5.

¹⁵⁹Flynn, 19.




Figure 9: Relationship between Staff and Essential Tasks

Source: Created by author.




Figure 10: Shared Understanding of Environment Created by Iterative Dialogue

Source: Created by author.

Cultural Implications

Finally, the cultural context identifies the necessity to integrate joint, interagency, and multinational partners into a staff structure that facilitates synchronization and is unencumbered by systematic barriers that erode partner support. This is accomplished through expanding the small team approach currently utilized in the Plans and Future Operations sections to all of the sections within the recommended structure, allowing team members to build trust through interpersonal relationships and creating a holographic-like structure that enables adaptation. According to Gareth Morgan, a holographic-like structure in which multiple teams take on fractal-like qualities, enable an organization to rapidly adapt to the requirements of specific environments. Morgan provides principles of holographic design that are useful to a new staff structure: redundancy, variety, and minimum specifications.¹⁶⁰ Within the context of staff structure minimum specifications means limiting the organizational constraints placed on staff leaders by not dictating a generic hierarchy within the section. Assigning officers with a variety of backgrounds and specialties to the section allows the leader to organize teams based on individual skills and knowledge. Providing enough officers to each section allows the leader to form redundant teams; since the ideal team size is six, a minimum of eighteen officers per section is necessary.¹⁶¹ This allows the section lead to utilize multiple teams for the same project in order to produce different perspectives or to use teams for different projects during a high operational tempo. It also allows the leader to rearrange teams within the section to enhance internal cohesion

¹⁶⁰Morgan, 99 – 100.

¹⁶¹Michael L. Hammerstrom, "Size Matters: How Big Should a Military Design Team Be?," Monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff College (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 2010), 2.

(see figure 11 for an example). Partner personnel can be easily integrated into teams without subjugating them to the requirements of the Army's information technology systems. Providing a variety of officers and the flexibility to arrange the section any way chosen empowers the staff leader and ensures a structure capable of rapidly adapting to unforeseen issues.




Figure 11: Holographic Team Concept Internal to Staff Sections

Source: Created by Author.

Summary

The current contextual dimensions of environment, process technology, and culture provide insight into important characteristics required of a new staff structure. The environmental context shows that deployed Army headquarters must be capable of influencing the operational environment to create the conditions for favorable conflict resolution, and informing the strategic narrative to maintain the international credibility needed to gain time and resources. The process

technology context describes the importance of developing and maintaining a shared understanding of the operational environment between all relevant stakeholders. Finally, the cultural context identifies the necessity to integrate partners within the staff structure in a way that enhances trust and leads to more synchronized actions within the operational environment. A process-oriented horizontal staff structure that focuses on informing, influencing, and creating and maintaining a shared understanding of the environment addresses these characteristics. Internal to each horizontal staff section, redundant teams enable rapid adaptation and partner integration. This new staff structure better addresses the purpose of an Army staff in the current operating environment.

CONCLUSION

The Army's second generation staff structure has not changed since its establishment during WWI. In essence, the army's current theory of staff interaction, which highlights this unchanging structure, is defined by a dominating series of functional hierarchies organized around the General Staff model, currently masked by warfighter functions, divided by space between multiple command posts, and partially integrated through established time-horizon, cross-functional teams. Recognition by recently deployed commanders that the traditional staff structure did not address what the environment required denotes value in a re-examination of the internal staff structure within division and corps headquarters. A relook at the first principles and contextual dimensions that drove the current staff structure design illustrated that while the purpose of the staff has not changed the context in which the structure is relevant has significantly changed. While this does not mean that the current staff structure is irrelevant, it does identify that the structure is out of alignment with organizational needs. Comparison of Army staff doctrine to the actual staff structure dictated by the Army's Force Development Process shows that doctrine misrepresents the realities of staff relationships. An understanding of the staff's

overarching processes in conjunction with the actual structure makes one aware of a considerable amount of friction inherent to functioning. This friction slows down response time while the only answer to combating this friction, a battle rhythm, only adds to the sluggishness by ensuring the staff is a time-based entity. Finally, the analysis of the current contextual dimensions provides insight into important characteristics required of a new staff structure. An operations process-oriented horizontal staff structure that focuses on informing, influencing, and creating and maintaining a shared understanding of the environment addresses these characteristics with the majority of the staff; while redundant teams within each section enable rapid adaptation and partner integration. The internal staff structure within corps and division headquarters is ill designed to achieve its purpose in the current environment, and a restructuring of internal staff relationships and functionality is necessary for future success.

APPENDIX A: EVOLUTION OF U.S. ARMY STAFF DOCTRINE SINCE 1923

1. 1923 Field Service Regulations
2. 1928 Staff Officer's Field Manual
3. 1932 Staff Officer's Field Manual
4. 1940 FM 101-5: Staff Officer's Field Manual: The Staff and Combat Orders
5. 1950 FM 101-5: Staff Officer's Field Manual: Staff Organization and Procedure
6. 1954 FM 101-5: Staff Officer's Field Manual: Staff Organization and Procedure
7. 1960 FM 101-5: Staff Officer's Field Manual: Staff Organization and Procedure
8. 1968 FM 101-5: Staff Officer's Field Manual: Staff Organization and Procedure
9. 1972 FM 101-5: Staff Officer's Field Manual: Staff Organization and Procedure
10. 1984 FM 101-5: Staff Organization and Operations
11. 1997 FM 101-5: Staff Organization and Operations
12. 2003 FM 6-0: Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces
2005 FM 5-0: Army Planning and Orders Production
13. 2011 ATTP 5-0.1: Command and Staff Officer Guide
2012 ADP 6-0: Mission Command
2012 ADP 5-0: The Operations Process

APPENDIX B: DEVELOPMENT OF CORPS STAFF CONCEPT




Figure 12: Corps Design 4.1, Approved on July 20, 2009 by the Chief of Staff of the Army

Source: Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate, 25.




Figure 13: Corps Table of Organization and Equipment, Approved on October 1, 2010

Source: Created by Author. Department of the Army, "Table of Organization and Equipment 52400R000: Corps Headquarters and Headquarters Battalion," Force Management System Web Site, <https://fmsweb.army.mil> (accessed August 5, 2012).




Figure 14: I Corps Modified Table of Organization and Equipment, Approved on October 16, 2010

Source: Created by Author. Department of the Army, "Modified Table of Organization and Equipment 52400RFC84: I Corps Headquarters and Headquarters Battalion."

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