Impacts of Worldview, Implicit Assumptions, Biases, and Groupthink on Israeli Operational Plans in 1973

Abstract

This monograph examines the impact of cognitive constructs such as worldview, complexity, implicit assumptions, biases, groupthink, and cognitive blind spots on Israeli operational planning during the Arab-Israeli War of 1973. Documentation of this conflict provides insight into the inner workings of Israeli planning groups. The investigation shows that Israeli leaders and planners struggled with cognitive biases, flawed assumptions, faulty worldview, and groupthink. The biases included anchoring, status quo bias, confirmation bias, sunk-cost bias, framing trap, halo and pitchfork effect, narrative fallacy, and the self-fulfilling prophecy bias. These cognitive constructs affected Israeli operations and the relationship between operational planners and strategic leaders.

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Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
May 23, 2013
Accession Number
ADA584193

Entities

People

  • Barry L. Johnson

Organizations

  • United States Army Command and General Staff College

Tags

Communities of Interest

  • C4I
  • Energy and Power Technologies
  • Human Systems
  • Materials and Manufacturing Processes
  • Weapons Technologies

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Air Defense
  • Air Force
  • Anti-Tank Guns
  • Case Studies
  • Doctrine
  • Education
  • Governments
  • Middle East
  • Military Planning
  • New York
  • Psychology
  • Security
  • Social Psychology
  • Thinking
  • Training
  • United Nations
  • United States

Readers

  • International Relations and Conflict Resolution
  • Military History of the United States in the 20th Century.
  • Regression Analysis.