Structuring Analysis to Support Future Decisions About Nuclear Forces and Postures
Abstract
This paper is a think piece than looks freshly at how to evaluate future nuclear forces and postures. A fresh look is needed for the New Start era because the role of nuclear weapons in security continues to change but in ways that are not well understood and have not been much discussed analytically. After reviewing past and present criteria for nuclear assessments, and contrasting enduring stances on such matters by policymakers, I recommend evaluating options for ability to achieve generalized versions of five top-level objectives: strategic stability; crisis stability; ability for the United States to act, defeat, and defend; nonproliferation and other policy goals; and risk control. Here stability relates to avoiding coercion, war, and arms competition generally not just to nuclear-related issues. Crisis stability relates to both first-action stability, whether conventional or nuclear, and to subsequent escalation control. Ability to act, defeat, and defend recognizes that in most crises and conflicts the U.S. will want military options and, if war begins, will want to defeat the opponent and defend against opponent actions even in a hypothetical but imaginable war that included some limited use of nuclear weapons (as in a rogue leader s last-gasp flailing out to deter the U.S. from defending an ally or overturning a regime). Force-structure/posture options should, of course, be assessed for their contributions to nonproliferation and other foreign-policy goals. Finally, options should be assessed not only for their allegedly likely consequences, but for various risks of worse-than-expected consequences. Some risks, such as underestimating the deterrent value of an option, can be part of assessing strategic stability and crisis stability. Other risks distinguishing among options relate to implementability and sustainability, military/technical matters such as reliability and survivability, and domestic and international perceptions about the balance of power.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Sep 01, 2011
- Accession Number
- ADA585443
Entities
People
- Paul K. Davis
Organizations
- RAND Corporation