

Technical Report 1326

**Transforming Effective Army Units:
Best Practices and Lessons Learned**

Trevor M. Conrad
Jonathan J. Bryson
ICF International

Brian T. Crabb
U.S. Army Research Institute

Ryan P. Riley
ICF International

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**United States Army Research Institute
for the Behavioral and Social Sciences**

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**Trevor M. Conrad
Jonathan J. Bryson**
ICF International

Brian T. Crabb
U.S. Army Research Institute

Ryan P. Riley
ICF International

**Fort Hood Research Unit
Scott Shadrick, Chief**

**U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences
6000 6th Street, Bldg. 1464
Fort Belvoir, Virginia 22060**

August 2013

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TRANSFORMING EFFECTIVE ARMY UNITS: LESSONS LEARNED AND BEST PRACTICES

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Research Requirement:

The research was intended to produce lessons learned and best practices for transforming units across the relevant Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Leadership and Education, Personnel, Facilities (DOTMLPF) and cultural domains and to share strategies for resolving operational requirements with limited personnel. The research had three specific tasks:

1. Using the DOTMLPF construct, identify and consolidate the challenges and lessons learned associated with brigade-level transformation. In addition, examine the processes or approaches that facilitate culture change and create the “mental shift” required to successfully train and prepare transforming units.
2. Identify the common operational needs that require units to transform their organization and personnel in order to appropriately address them. Given those new operational requirements, identify the most effective methods and techniques for selecting and training personnel to develop the needed capability within the unit.
3. Develop easy-to-use tools that convey recommendations, timelines, steps, and processes that support the planning and execution of transformation at the brigade, battalion, or company level.

Procedure:

A review of military, business, and behavioral research literature served as a foundation for the research on lessons learned. Interviews were conducted with reserve and active duty Stryker leaders to further explore the issues associated with transformation. The information gathered from these sources were compared and the lessons learned that were well supported by both sources were retained. Focus groups with Combat Training Center Trainer-Mentors and operational unit leaders helped to build an understanding of the common operational needs that units face and how they effectively adapt to them.

Findings:

A total of 62 lessons learned or best practices regarding Culture, Personnel, Organization, Leadership and Education, and Training were derived from the literature and interviews. Analysis of the focus group data identified 20 operational needs where strategies for selecting and training can effectively build necessary unit capabilities.

Utilization and Dissemination of Findings:

The findings contributed to the development of four products: a matrix for identifying when specific issues will be encountered, a glide path for transformation best practices, a “smart card” for culture change, and a matrix of strategies for resolving new operational needs. These

tools are applicable to large and small transformational efforts. In addition, they appropriately support both the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment's (ACR) immediate conversion needs and the requirements of other units. The developed products were provided to the 3d ACR and will be available as a separate Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences Research Product.

TRANSFORMING EFFECTIVE ARMY UNITS: LESSONS LEARNED AND BEST PRACTICES

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TRANSFORMING EFFECTIVE ARMY UNITS: LESSONS LEARNED AND BEST PRACTICES

“If you don’t like change, you will like irrelevance even less.”

General Eric Shinseki
Former Army Chief of Staff

The Army defines transformation as “the process by which the current force is becoming the future force. It occurs as the Army incorporates new capabilities into its force structure and trains Soldiers to use them. The future force is what the Army continuously seeks to become. It will be strategically responsive and joint inter-dependent. It will be capable of precision maneuver and able to dominate adversaries and situations across the range of military operations envisioned in the future security environment. The future force will be lighter, more lethal and agile, and optimized for versatility. It will be capable of seamlessly transitioning among the different types of military operations” (Department of the Army, 2005).

One key element of Army transformation is the restructuring of the existing force to meet the characteristics of the future force. In order to achieve the lighter, responsive, and adaptive aspects required for addressing diverse operations, the Army has shifted away from a division-centric force to a brigade-centric force. The modular structure of these new brigades combines necessary combat and support capabilities that allows them greater independence and greater flexibility in employment. Army Transformation and restructuring intends to achieve 302 modular brigades (STAND-TO!, 2011, February 8).

In greater detail, transformation is a multi-faceted process of integrating new concepts, organizations, and techniques. Creating this new force and developing the requisite capabilities relies on an analytic approach that assesses the changes that will occur to doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) as part of transformation. The DOTMLPF problem-solving construct is applied early in the force development process in order to deliberately manage transformation and produce the DOTMLPF solutions necessary to provide relevant, ready, and dominant landpower to combatant commanders (Department of the Army, 2005).

Current Unit Transformation

In Fiscal Year 2012, the Army continued the modular transformation process by converting 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment (3d ACR) into a Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT). Stryker Brigade Combat Teams are designed and best suited to address the middle of the operational spectrum – Small Scale Contingencies. The substantial infantry composition of the SBCT permits the same deployability of an Infantry Brigade Combat Team and the capabilities to engage a lightly armored enemy. The Stryker vehicle, however, adds the benefit of increased mobility and network capabilities that improve situational awareness and command and control across the unit’s battlespace. With this mobility, network-centric capability, and Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance assets, the SBCT can be effectively utilized to conduct forced entry or early entry operations. It cannot, however, sustain force-on-force combat,

as it lacks the protected firepower of the Heavy Brigade Combat Team. Table 1 provides an illustration of larger changes to assets and organization that will occur when 3d ACR converts to an SBCT.

Table 1

Comparison of Assets between an ACR and a SBCT

	3d Armored Cavalry Regiment	3d Cavalry Regiment (SBCT)
Personnel:	~5,000	~4,200
11B:		~903
19D:	~434	~134
19K:	~126	~27
Armor Assets:	~123 M1 Abrams Tanks, ~158 M3 Bradley Fighting Vehicles	
Artillery Assets:	~18 155mm Howitzers, ~18 120mm	~18 155mm Howitzers, ~36 120mm, ~12 81mm, ~18 60mm
Aviation Assets:	~24 AH-64 Apache Helicopters, ~10 UH-60 Blackhawk Lift Helicopters, 2 UAS platoons	1 UAS platoon
Stryker Vehicles:	None	~307 Stryker Variants

Existing Issues

At the unit and installation level, transformation can be difficult and demanding. It can include re-organization of the unit, changes in senior leadership, large turnover of personnel, changes in the general composition of the unit, turning in existing equipment and gaining new equipment, and extensive training associated with new equipment and learning how the unit operates. When an installation must support unit transformation, it faces the challenge of understanding the requirements of the unit and the impact that the new unit will have on installation resources.

When the Fort Hood office of the U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences (ARI) discussed the conversion of 3d ACR with Fort Hood leaders, all parties recognized it as a significant, pending challenge for the unit, III Corps, and installation. Conversion could be better supported if the effects of unit transformation across the various DOTMLPF domains were better understood and the lessons learned associated with those domains were consolidated. Capturing these lessons learned and strategies would not only be useful to the 3d ACR, but could help facilitate the transformation of other units as the Army continues to adapt.

In addition to the DOTMLPF changes, the Army recognizes that the Army culture, and that of its units, must change with transformation. Changing unit culture is a substantial

challenge, but it is critical to establishing new ways to train and operate. Although culture is often considered an organizational issue, it is treated as a separate domain here because accepted organization domain in DOTMLPF does not include cultural issues. The Army notes that “a key measure of success is leaders’ ability to reorient peoples’ attitudes and actions. For Army leaders, these people include Soldiers, Army civilians, and families” (Department of the Army, 2005). With the large influence that culture can have facilitating transformation, research is needed to examine how to best inculcate the “new way of doing business” throughout the unit.

A better understanding of these methods would be essential to the 3d ACR’s conversion and the unit leadership was cognizant of the challenge that they would face. The Regiment has an established culture that takes pride in its 165-year history, the duties of the mounted rifleman, and the unique assets and strength that make it one of the most powerful units in the Army. Any changes, including the mission and composition provided above, will almost undoubtedly have an influence on the conversion to an SBCT.

Large-scale changes (like a conversion from an ACR to SBCT) are not the only kinds of “transformations” that units face. While the Army has restructured its broader organization to respond to the full spectrum of operations that it must conduct, lower-echelon units have also had to make changes to their unit structure in order to add greater flexibility and additional capabilities. However, these are not formal changes. As such, the units must take personnel away from their normal duties in order to fill a position or assignment that addresses an existing operational need. Thus, the unit is faced with determining how to achieve the new capability and continue its core operations through the task organization of existing personnel. Research is needed to understand the most effective methods and techniques for “transforming” lower-echelon units to accomplish additional requirements or address an operational need.

Research Purpose

The research had three specific tasks:

1. Using the DOTMLPF construct, identify and consolidate the challenges and lessons learned associated with brigade-level transformation. In addition, examine the processes or approaches that facilitate culture change and create the “mental shift” required to successfully train and prepare transforming units.
2. Identify the common operational needs that require units to transform their organization and personnel in order to appropriately address them. Given those new operational requirements, identify the most effective methods and techniques for selecting and training personnel to develop the needed capability within the unit.
3. Develop easy-to-use tools that convey recommendations, timelines, steps, and processes that support the planning and execution of transformation at the brigade, battalion, or company level.

The research was intended to produce lessons learned and best practices for transforming units across the relevant DOTMLPF domains and to share strategies for resolving operational requirements with limited personnel. The developed tools have specific applicability to the 3d ACR’s conversion, but have also been adapted to be applicable to the broader Army. The tools

should serve as useful resources for future units that undergo transformation or face the personnel and operational challenges of the current operating environment.

Research Task 1: Brigade-level Transformation Lessons Learned and Best Practices

Background

Research Framework. A conceptual framework was established to better focus the research task. While change within the Army is addressed across all of the DOTMLPF domains, some of those domains had less relevance to the research. It was recognized that attempting to identify challenges and lessons learned for changing Doctrine, Materiel, and Facilities would be less beneficial for units, as these domains and their issues are typically areas that units cannot affect. The broader Army has responsibility for them. In contrast, Organization, Training, Leadership and Education, and Personnel all involve the individuals who comprise the unit and are within their control to apply best practices derived from the research. Although not a DOTMLPF domain, culture is considered a “domain,” as it has a substantial influence on organizational change and the other four domains. The literature review and interviews were dedicated to exploring these areas.

In addition to constraining the domains of interest, the timeframe of interest was also re-conceptualized. As part of the Army Campaign Plan, the Army has transitioned to a cyclical readiness cycle using the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) Model. The model allows the Army to better generate, resource, and employ the new modular Army. The ARFORGEN includes three phases of increasing readiness: RESET, Train/Ready, and Available (U.S. Army War College, 2009). RESET primarily focuses on the exchange of equipment and personnel in order to constitute the unit. When this is finished, the unit can then focus on individual and collective training during the Train/Ready phase. When training readiness goals are achieved, the unit is then included in the available pool of forces for existing operations.

Units face their largest challenges during RESET and Train/Ready; therefore, it’s likely that most or all lessons learned and best practices will occur during these phases. While the Available phase is not germane to understanding the challenges of executing transformation, there is a period of time prior to returning to RESET or beginning transformation that does hold importance, as cultural and DOTMLPF changes are not necessarily constrained to beginning in conjunction with official transformation or the ARFORGEN process. This period of time was defined as “R-180” or the six months prior to RESET beginning. As a result, the research uses a transformation timeline of R-180, RESET, and Train/Ready to organize and understand the timing of the challenges and lessons learned.

Literature Review. A broad review of the literature was conducted to explore and understand Army transformation, its interdependency with DOTMLPF, continued challenges, and lessons learned. The literature review generated potential lessons learned, that were later verified through interviews with subject matter experts. A range of electronic data sources was identified and explored using a list of relevant search terms. Data sources consulted include: Army Knowledge On-line (AKO), SBCT Warfighter Forum (SWfF), Army Publishing Directorate (APD), Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), EBSCOhost (e.g., PsycINFO,

ERIC, and Military & Government Collection), ARI, Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC), Combined Arms Research Library (CARL) digital library, and Google web search.

In addition, the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Capability Manager - Stryker Brigade Combat Team (TCM-SBCT), the single point of contact for TRADOC activities that support SBCTs, was contacted directly to request information regarding challenges and lessons learned encountered during SBCT transformation. In total, 57 documents were identified for inclusion in this review.

Method

Interviews. The purpose of conducting interviews with subject matter experts (SME) was to verify the lessons learned identified in the literature review and to obtain a more detailed understanding of the transformation process for SBCTs. To help guide this effort, the following research questions were examined.

1. What are the major training challenges faced by units during the transformation process and how are they overcome? What are the lessons learned?
2. What are the major leadership and education issues faced by units during the transformation process and how are they overcome? What are the lessons learned?
3. What are the major personnel issues faced by units during the transformation process and how are they overcome? What are the lessons learned?
4. What are the major organizational challenges faced by units during the transformation process and how are they overcome? What are the lessons learned?
5. What are the cognitive processes needed for successful transformation?
6. What are the social processes needed for successful transformation?
7. What are the cultural processes needed for successful transformation?

Participants. A convenience sample of 21 individuals with SBCT transformation experience were chosen for interviews. This included 11 Army leaders (senior officers and senior Non-commissioned Officers (NCO)) from the 56th SBCT of the Pennsylvania Army National Guard, eight Army leaders from other active duty SBCT units at Joint Base Lewis-McChord (JBLM), and two civilian subject matter experts on transformation from the Program Manager (PM) Stryker and SWfF (see Table 2).

The 56th Brigade completed transformation in May 2008 making it the most recent unit to transform (versus stand up) into an SBCT. The eight leaders from active duty SBCTs included five members from the 2/2 SBCT (formerly the 5/2), two members from the 3/2 SBCT, and one member of the TRADOC forward cell that helped stand up 5/2 SBCT. The 2/2 was officially stood up on February 2009 and 3/2 was the first armored brigade to transform into an SBCT, which occurred in September 2003. Currently, these leaders and SMEs are assisting in the transformation of 1/1 AD, a Heavy Brigade Combat Team (HBCT), into an SBCT.

Table 2

Participant Characteristics

Source	JBLM	56 th SBCT	N
Brigade Leadership	0	1	1
Battalion Leadership	6	5	11
Brigade and Battalion Operations Staff	1	5	6
Other (i.e., PM Stryker, SWfF staff, TRADOC)	3*	0	3*
Total	10	11	21

Note: *Of these three participants, one was formally interviewed; the remaining two informally provided information related to SBCT transformation.

Interview procedure. A total of 16 interviews and two focus groups were conducted using a mixed method of qualitative and quantitative data collection. Interview data were collected using recording and note taking. Both focus groups were conducted over the phone with members of the 56th SBCT. Interviews with the 56th SBCT were done exclusively through phone interviews; all other interviews were done in-person at JBLM. Interviews primarily used a semi-structured approach (Wengraf, 2001); however, two interviews were unstructured.

56th SBCT phone interviews. The phone interviews were approximately 60 to 90 minutes in length. Prior to each recorded phone interview, participants received an email which included the agreed-upon time and date of the call, copies of the interview protocol (see Appendix B), Privacy Act Statement, Informed Consent Form, and a request that they review the materials and return a digitally signed Informed Consent Form before the day of the interview. Interviews began with the interviewer reading aloud the “Introduction and Research Purpose” followed by an explanation of the person’s rights under the Privacy Act Statement. The interview focused on 13 open-ended questions regarding challenges and lessons learned associated with the training (3), leadership and education (4), personnel (3), organizational (3) aspects of SBCT transformation. Following those questions, participants were asked 14 open-ended questions regarding the cognitive (5), social (5), and cultural (4) processes involved in SBCT transformation.

Finally, participants were asked to identify the top two or three biggest challenges they faced during transformation and rate them according to four different factors: the criticality of the challenge to successful transformation; the immediacy of need to address the challenge; the frequency of the challenge; and the applicability of the challenge across the unit. Ratings were made using a 7-point scale with response options ranging from 1 (low) to 7 (high).

In-person interviews at JBLM. The in-person interviews at JBLM were conducted in a similar fashion to the recorded phone interviews. However, prior to each interview session, participants were only emailed the interview protocol for review. The Privacy Act Statement and Informed Consent Form were provided at the beginning of each interview session and the Informed Consent Form was signed and returned at that time. In addition, instead of digitally recording each conversation, note-takers were used because the majority of the interviews took place in a secure location. At the end of each interview, participants were given a transformation

challenges rating sheet (see Appendix C) and instructed to write down their top two or three transformation challenges using the numbered spaces provided. They were then asked to rate those challenges using the ratings matrix that corresponded with that challenge. Each rating matrix consisted of seven vertical lines (i.e., 7-point scale with 1=Low and 7=High) overlaid on four horizontal lines (i.e., four different factors: the criticality of the challenge to successful transformation; the immediacy of need to address the challenge; the frequency of the challenge; and the applicability of the challenge across the unit.). Participants were asked to circle or mark the intersection that best reflected their rating for each factor. In-person interviews were approximately 60 to 90 minutes in length.

Informal discussions at JBLM. While at JBLM, two informal discussions were conducted with SMEs from SWfF and PM Stryker. These were accomplished using unstructured interviews to focus on their distinct areas of expertise. As such, no pre-determined questions were identified prior to each meeting. Instead, the interviewer asked probing questions during the interview that were based on topics brought up during their conversation. Notes were captured by two recorders and each session lasted approximately 60 to 90 minutes in length.

Analysis of Interview Data. Both quantitative and qualitative analyses were performed on the collected interview data.

Quantitative analysis. The top challenges to SBCT transformation and their associated ratings were drawn from 12 of the 18 interview/focus group sessions.¹ Each session provided two to three challenges for a total of 29 challenges. These were entered into an Excel database and analyzed using descriptive statistics (i.e., means, standard deviations) at the DOTMLPF level. Results were then incorporated into the qualitative analysis.

Qualitative analysis. The interview audio recordings were transcribed into individual transcripts. The pairs of raw notes from the in-person interviews were compared with the transcripts and integrated when necessary. The combined in-person interview and audio transcripts resulted in 16 individual transcripts. Each transcript was then read by the interviewer and transcriber for potential key topics (and subtopics) for each research question. The interviewer and transcriber compared and discussed their list of the potential topics until consensus on a final list of topics could be established.

This list of topics was then tested by performing a pilot test on a sample set of the data (i.e., one transcript), where three researchers coded the same sample, which was then followed by an accuracy check to establish inter-rater reliability. The three coded transcripts were compared for agreement in coding. If there was a discrepancy on how to best code a particular comment, the item was discussed until all three researchers reached agreement. Upon reaching full agreement, the list of key topics was finalized.

Each of the 15 transcripts (not including the one used during the pilot test) was assigned to three researchers for coding. These 15 transcripts were divided into three sets. Each set was then assigned a primary and secondary researcher. Each researcher was given 10 transcripts to

¹Due to time constraints, challenge ratings were not taken during six of the interviews.

code, with the overlap allowing for each transcript to be coded by two different people. The researchers then coded their interview transcripts at the session level to allow for topic counts across sessions, as well as to control for potential method problems resulting from analyzing interview and focus group data together. Following the same methodology used in the pilot test, individual transcripts were then compared for accuracy. Discrepancies were resolved through consensus (see Appendix D for final theme count).

Development of Final Set of Challenges and Lessons Learned. Results from the literature review and data collection were used to create a final set of challenges and lessons learned associated with Army transformation. This involved an iterative review process among the research team.

First iteration. Challenges and lessons learned from the literature review and data collection were consolidated and grouped into five different excel spreadsheets; each representing a different domain. Domains included: culture, training, personnel, leadership and education, and organization. Each spreadsheet was examined for duplicate and similar items. Those identified were either removed or combined. The remaining items were then further examined by adding a column for information about the phase(s) in which each challenge or lesson learned occurred in the ARFORGEN process (i.e., R-180, RESET, and Train/Ready) and a column for listing the references that support that challenge or lesson learned. A topic column was also added that allowed for each item to be further grouped by commonalities with other items in a domain. Spreadsheets were then reviewed for accuracy and clarity.

Second iteration. Challenges and lessons learned from each domain were re-evaluated in an effort to further consolidate and remove items. This was done to streamline and reduce the number of items in each list. Items that remained were again assessed for accuracy and clarity. In addition, lessons learned were re-worded to reflect a more instructional format (i.e., second person) and topic areas within each domain were re-evaluated and modified to better reflect item groupings. The remaining items from these efforts were then consolidated into a final base document that identified all challenges and lessons learned associated with SBCT transformation.

Third iteration. The base document for SBCT transformation was then evaluated in terms of applicability to other Army transformation efforts. This was done through consensus. Each topic or item was reviewed and assessed for generalizability. Those that appeared non-transferable were further evaluated for possible modification or re-wording. Topics or items that had low generalizability were omitted. The remaining items were then reviewed for accuracy and clarity and placed in the final list of challenges and lessons learned for Army transformation (see Appendix G).

Results

Culture Change. Culture change was identified as an overarching issue faced by units in transformation. Within this domain, the three topics that emerged from the literature review and data collection were *Develop the Mindset*, *Communicate the Change*, and *Manage the Change*.

Develop the mindset. Developing the right mindset is an essential aspect of a successful transformation. Without this shift, leaders and Soldiers will not truly grasp the capabilities of the new concept (U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 2003l). SBCT-specific examples include changing the way that Soldiers think about the transition from a tank to a troop carrier, developing the mindset of light infantry, and to stop thinking in terms of gunnery (i.e., heavy units) (U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 2003l). Sources indicated that leaders should be mindful of how the engrained unique culture of a particular installation may challenge transformation efforts. Senior leaders will also need to ensure that Soldiers adopt a mindset that supports transformation, well prior to the RESET phase (i.e., the turning in of old equipment and the receiving of new equipment) (Triscari, 2005).

Communicate the change. Critical to the transformation process is how leaders communicate change. Leaders must be ready to communicate the message of transformation to Soldiers within the unit, their families, other stakeholders, and the media (Center for Army Lessons Learned, 2004a; Triscari, 2005). To communicate to entities outside the unit, brigade leaders should use their Public Affairs Officer (PAO) to get the message of transformation out early. By using their unit's PAO to get the message out early, leaders can better manage the timing and accuracy of the message and help build unit pride and confidence in its readiness (Center for Army Lessons Learned, 2004a; Triscari, 2005). Data from the literature reviews and interviews widely address the importance of creating and communicating a vision for transformation and the new unit (Bass & Avolio, 1993; Kotter, 2000; Kucharek, 2007; Pape, 2009). Leaders should keep the vision of transformation consistent throughout the entire transformation. Ultimately, the vision and endstate should be engrained into the unit's identity. Sources described how the commander's philosophy can help facilitate the development of the unit identity and motivate subordinates towards transformation (Bass & Avolio, 1993; Kotter, 2000; Kucharek, 2007; Pape, 2009). As an example from one of the interviews, the commander's philosophy, "Living on amber" meant that Soldiers should be prepared for anything. Lessons learned also suggest that leaders should use every means possible (e.g., email and other technology) to communicate the vision to all individuals within the organization (Kotter, 2000; Kucharek, 2007). Leveraging technology such as blogs or emails can ensure widespread two-way communication regarding the transformation. It is also essential for leaders to communicate to Soldiers how things will be different going forward. Leaders need to distinguish the identity of the new organization from the old one. At the same time, transformation does not mean the complete dismissal of the unit's previous identity. On the contrary, leaders might leverage the things that will not change, such as the unit's lineage to build and facilitate the change process (Bass & Avolio, 1993; Bunker, 2008; Corley & Gioia, 2004; Triscari, 2005).

Manage the change. During transformation, leaders need to be cognizant of how they manage attitudes, introduce changes, and monitor and assess performance. Managing the change

may include managing resistant individuals by minimizing their role in the transformation or by building a core of leaders who are champions of the process (Bunker, 2008; Kotter, 2000; Triscari, 2005). Managing change can also involve the establishment of a unit based indoctrination course for new personnel; allowing for Soldiers to more fully understand their role in the unit and in the transformation process (Triscari, 2005; U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 2003l). Additional strategies mentioned by sources include modeling of positive attitudes by senior leaders along with their engagement in the transformation process (Corley & Gioia, 2004). At the same time, senior leaders must be flexible and be prepared for mistakes and reduced performance during transformation (Bunker, 2008; Jellison, 2006). Senior leaders must combat the instinct to rapidly force change and communicate the importance of quality over speed to junior leaders (Bunker, 2008; Corley & Gioia, 2004; Jellison, 2006; U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 2003b). Sources indicated that leaders should introduce changes in phases (Bunker, 2008; Corley & Gioia, 2004; Jellison, 2006; U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 2003b) as well as recognize important milestones (e.g., field training exercises, Combined Arms Live Fire Exercise, completion of fielding) (Bunker, 2008; Kotter, 2000). Recognizing those individuals who helped achieve progress to this point can have the beneficial effect of building pride and increasing morale within the unit (Bunker, 2008; Triscari, 2005). At the same time, senior leaders must monitor performance while providing feedback and emphasizing accountability (Bunker, 2008; Triscari, 2005). Additionally, sources mentioned that leaders should determine how transformation will impact unit heraldry (U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 2003c; U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 2003l). Ensuring that newly formed or reflagged units receive their colors and memorabilia in a timely fashion plays a key role in creating a professional atmosphere and building unit esprit de corps.

Personnel. The DOTMLPF domain of Personnel, or the availability of qualified people for various operations, was identified as an important area of concern for units going through transformation. Within this domain, two topics emerged from the literature review and data collection. These topics were *Manning* and *Management*.

Manning. Manning was seen as an important issue for senior leaders to consider during transformation. This included not only working closely with Human Resources Command to ensure leaders assigned at every level were experienced and capable (U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 2003d; U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 2003l), but also monitoring the timing and sequencing of these leaders so that they arrive before their Soldiers (Center for Army Lessons Learned, 2003b; Center for Army Lessons Learned, 2004f; Center for Army Lessons Learned, 2004h; U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 2003i). This will allow leaders the time needed to develop an effective infrastructure. In addition, senior leaders must think about the timing and sequencing of departures as well; making sure that existing leaders and Soldiers do not leave too soon. For example, a unit's current maintenance personnel should remain in place until after the equipment they maintain is turned in (U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 2003c; U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 2003i). Otherwise, the unit may experience problems with performing the work necessary to meet equipment turn-in standards. Senior leaders should also make certain that a Property Book Officer (PBO) is available during transformation to resolve and prevent issues concerning lateral transfers of equipment (Center for Army Lessons Learned, 2003a; U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 2003m).

Management. The turnover of unit personnel is a major challenge during transformation (U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 2003d; U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 2003g). As such, senior leaders need to take a proactive approach to managing this issue. Some examples of how this can be done include: develop a comprehensive list of sensitive and billeted positions to ensure adequate security clearances are obtained in a timely manner (Center for Army Lessons Learned, 2004g; U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 2003l); actively monitor and moderate personnel shortages in low-density Military Occupational Specialties (MOS) (Lockhart, 2008); and stabilize digital operators within staff sections to limit turbulence and maintain digital proficiency (U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 2003l).

Organization. The DOTMLPF domain of Organization, or how a unit organizes to fight, was identified as an important area of concern for units going through transformation. Within this domain, three topics emerged from the literature review and data collection. These topics were *Transformation Requirements*, *Logistics or Maintenance Requirements*, and *Operational Requirements*.

Transformation requirements. One of the primary challenges identified in the organization domain was the high level of complexity involved in trying to manage all of the different moving parts that occur during transformation (i.e., training, personnel, etc.) (Triscari, 2005; U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 2003j). As such, senior leaders need to determine whether an external entity, such as an Army Transition Team, will be designated to manage this synchronization (Triscari, 2005; U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 2003j). If not, senior leaders should consider creating a “transformation cell” internally using available brigade staff and consider whether transformation necessitates establishing “transformation cells” in subordinate units (Center for Army Lessons Learned, 2004g; U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 2003j; U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 2003l). A brigade transformation cell could consist of a dedicated plans officer and NCO and a dedicated operations officer and NCO. Senior leaders should also determine whether staff section proponentcy of different transformation events will facilitate management and efficiency of the process (U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 2003l). Finally, senior leaders should consider adding a PAO as a special staff officer assigned to the brigade (U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 2003l). This would allow the brigade to execute a focused communication strategy to personnel internal and external to the organization. It would also facilitate better understanding of the transformation, engender support, and build the unit culture.

Logistics or maintenance requirements. During transformation, a unit may become more reliant on installation and contractor support for its maintenance services and other requirements. As such, senior leaders need to proactively coordinate with the installation Directorate of Logistics (DOL) to facilitate management of brigade maintenance while in garrison (U.S. Army Training and Doctrine, 2003f). In addition, transforming units may also find that they lack a maintenance officer under their new Modified Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE), which can produce challenges with coordinating and scheduling maintenance service for vehicles within the brigade (U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 2003f). As a result, the responsibility for scheduling and tracking services will fall to the subordinate unit.

Operational requirements. Under the doctrine of decisive action, senior leaders need to ensure that their newly transformed unit is trained and prepared to task organize as needed while deployed (Lockhart, 2008). Specific to the SBCT, leaders must determine how the Brigade Support Battalion (BSB) will provide support. The BSB can be responsible for managing all aspects of support or it can provide specific elements to the battalions, but retain administrative control of them. In addition, leadership must establish how the separate companies will operate. They can remain as separate companies that report to brigade leadership or they can be linked to the battalions and report to their leadership. The outcome of these decisions may produce an organization that deviates from doctrine, but may better allow them to train as they would fight if deployed.

Leadership and Education. The DOTMLPF domain of Leadership and Education, or the methods used to prepare leaders to lead, was identified as important area of concern for units going through transformation. Within this domain, three topics emerged from the literature review and data collection. These topics were *Leader Orientation*, *Leader Training*, and *Unit Cohesion*.

Leader orientation. Leader orientation needs to be conducted with the unit being transformed as well as with those entities that fall outside of the unit that might be affected by the unit's transformation. Within the unit, senior leaders need to define and articulate the knowledge, skills, and abilities needed to be an effective leader in this new environment (U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 2003k) and they must ensure that subordinate leaders and their Soldiers are trained on unit specific doctrine (U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 2003l). Senior leaders must proactively identify the obstacles and issues (e.g., garrison policies, funds for training) facing junior leaders during transformation and find ways to minimize their effects (Triscari, 2005; U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 2003d). Outside of the unit, senior leaders need to conduct a leadership conference with post leadership to help engender support and to facilitate a better understanding of what can be expected during and after transformation (Center for Army Lessons Learned, 2004h). This should be done as early as possible in the transformation process, as it will help with the previous issue of identifying and minimizing obstacles.

Leader training. Although not mandatory for fielding of new systems, leader training is an essential aspect of a successful transformation. It is recommended that early manning of key leadership positions remain a high priority so that individual leader training can be scheduled early (Center for Army Lessons Learned, 2004d; Center for Army Lessons Learned, 2003d; Center for Army Lessons Learned, 2003e). This will ensure maximum participation in these classes and prevent leaders from missing other critical transformation related requirements that occur later in the process and are less flexible. In addition, senior leaders need to ensure that leader training orients the leaders toward the unit's organization, equipment, and doctrine for employment (U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 2003c; U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 2003l).

Unit cohesion. During transformation, it is important that senior leaders develop cohesion among and within their units. One method for increasing cohesion is by promoting the unit's lineage and past accomplishments and highlighting its new strengths and capabilities. In

addition, leaders can promote the unit's transformation and new strengths and capabilities to a broader installation and community audience in order to foster the unit's identity. This broad communication may help Soldiers to realize the significance of the transformation. Most importantly, leaders must take advantage of their collective training events. Training events provide the opportunity for all Soldiers to perform their new duties, understand how they rely on others within their unit, and gain a better understanding of how they will operate together as a new unit.

Training. The DOTMLPF domain of Training, or how a unit prepares to fight, was identified as an important area of concern for units going through transformation. Within this domain, three topics emerged from the literature review and data collection. These topics were *Planning*, *Execution*, and *Sustainment*.

Planning. Sources identified planning for training as an important issue for senior leaders to consider in transformation. Senior leaders should establish a comprehensive training strategy for unit transformation with unit, installation, and institution responsibilities clearly articulated (Triscari, 2005; U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 2003b; U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 2003l). Planners need to work to isolate and protect training events during transformation to ensure that they are not degraded by fielding actions and external taskings (U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 2003b). Example items to include in a comprehensive training strategy are the training of Soldiers on required prerequisites, turning in of old equipment prior to starting New Equipment Training (NET), the completion of NET training, and the use of Mobile Training Teams (MTT) (Center for Army Lessons Learned, 2004f; Center for Army Lessons Learned, 2004g; Center for Army Lessons Learned, 2003c; Lockhart, 2008; U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 2003c). Because leaders are constantly faced with competing demands for their time, it is important for senior leadership to place a clear emphasis on the completion of NET requirements (U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 2003c; U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 2003j). Steps can be taken to ensure NET completion by setting up administrative processes to track class attendance, seeking to prevent competing demands from drawing away leaders from attending, and communicating with unit training coordinators the extent that Unit Set Fielding will affect key leaders. If possible, senior leadership should also try to observe the certification exercise of a unit that is finishing transformation (Center for Army Lessons Learned, 2004e). This can be useful to leaders trying to formulate their own long-range training strategy when transforming.

Execution. Execution of training was a salient issue that emerged from the data collection and literature review. Sources provided a number of suggestions for the execution of training. Units should link their unit manning roster to the required NET classes as a means of identifying which classes they are required to attend (Center for Army Lessons Learned, 2003b; U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 2003l). The development of an automated tool, which crosswalks the unit Mission Essential Task List, identifies both critical and supporting tasks, identifies the tasks by section and position, and defines the Army standard for that unit was also suggested (U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 2004). Other suggestions include the establishment of weekly training meetings that confirm NET schedules, the enforcement of a training schedule lock-in policy (e.g., no changes inside of 5 weeks), and ensuring that low density systems training is conducted in small sessions so that unit support capabilities are not

impaired (Center for Army Lessons Learned, 2004g; U.S. Army Training and Doctrine, 2003l). This point is especially important when low density systems training conflicts with unit collective training requirements and needs. It is also recommended that senior leaders incorporate digital qualification standards for operators, sections, or systems into the unit reporting system to track digital readiness (U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 2004). Two potential challenges to training execution were identified in addition: delays in equipment fielding pushing back previously scheduled training and the fact that the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) for decision-making have changed (U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 2003e; U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 2003h). For the latter, senior leaders should involve key operators in developing TTP for using digital tools and equipment throughout the steps in the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP) and incorporate them into the Tactical Standard Operating Procedure (TACSOP) (U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 2003h).

Sustainment. The NET that occurs during the transformation process is a perishable skill that is easily lost over time (Center for Army Lessons Learned, 2004f; U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 2003a; U.S. Army Training and Doctrine, 2003b; U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 2003c; U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 2003l). Frequently, a substantial lag exists between when Soldiers are trained and when they receive their equipment. As a result, much of what is learned is lost. Senior leaders need to curtail this trend by developing sustainment training that provides retraining for personnel in need of skill reinforcement. They also need to adopt a training strategy that includes the identification of certain skills that Soldiers themselves can be responsible for sustaining through self-teaching (U.S. Army Training and Education Command, 2003b; U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 2003c; U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 2003l). One option may be to capture this perishable material on compact discs and have Soldiers review it during time spent performing support or administrative duties (e.g., Staff duty; Center for Army Lessons Learned, 2004c; U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 2003d; U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 2003l).

Frequency and Timing of Challenges and Lessons Learned. Tables 3 and 4 show how the challenges and lessons learned for each domain are arrayed across the three phases of interest. Information gathered from the literature review and interviews helped to identify the likely timing of the issues. Table 3 shows only the broad domains, while Table 4 provides additional detail regarding the quantity and timing of the topical lessons learned associated with the domains.

Table 3

Frequency of DOTMLPF Challenges and Lessons Learned Across Phases

Domain	R-180	RESET	Train/Ready
Culture	6	14	12
Personnel	2	9	2
Organization	0	7	5
Leadership & Education	0	7	2
Training	2	9	16

Table 4

Frequency of DOTMLPF Topical Challenges and Lessons Learned Across Phases

Domain	R-180	RESET	Train/Ready
Culture – Develop the Mindset	2	2	0
Culture – Communicate the Change	4	4	4
Culture – Manage the Change	0	8	8
Personnel – Manning	2	5	
Personnel – Management	0	4	2
Organization – Transformational Requirements	0	5	4
Organization – Logistics or Maintenance Requirements	0	2	0
Organization – Operational Requirements	0	0	1
Leadership & Education – Leader Orientation	0	5	0
Leadership & Education – Leader Training	0	1	0
Leadership & Education – Unit Cohesion	0	1	2
Training – Planning	1	6	3
Training – Execution	1	3	9
Training - Sustainment	0	0	4

Discussion

Analysis of the reviewed literature and the interviews produced a useful framework for identifying and understanding what aspects of culture and the Personnel, Organization, Leadership and Education, and Training domains prove challenging to change and unit transformation. In addition, the analysis provided information regarding when these issues may be expected during transformation (see Tables 3 and 4).

Developing a culture that is supportive of change is an ongoing process throughout transformation. However, Tables 3 and 4 illustrate that certain elements or topics regarding culture occur or have greater relevance at different periods of time during transformation. In comparison to the DOTMLPF domains, culture has a uniquely large importance prior to a unit executing transformation during their ARFORGEN cycle. Leaders of the existing unit or those who will be responsible for the unit's transformation must start early (R-180) in developing the appropriate mindset necessary for the change. They must be open-minded and willing to reflect on the Army's need to change and understand the improved operational capabilities that will be associated with the new unit. They must also begin to communicate their vision of the process and endstate to the Soldiers within the unit and to outside organizations. As the unit progresses through the process (RESET, Train/Ready), the leader must maintain the supportive culture. This includes building the unit's identity, removing obstacles to effective change, and managing the pace of transformation requirements.

Personnel issues, like many of the other domains, are largely faced when transformation officially occurs. However, there are some recommendations regarding manning that can be followed prior to RESET. In particular, the literature and interviews suggested making the effort to actively select the leadership that will constitute the new unit and get them into place prior to transformation beginning. Once the ARFORGEN cycle begins, manning goals will be achieved during RESET and personnel issues become management focused.

Appropriately, organizational challenges begin with the start of transformation. A majority of the organizational lessons learned focus on methods of organizing personnel to support and facilitate transformation. Immediate requirements focus on the logistical and maintenance challenges and the turn-in and receipt of equipment. Units must also determine how they plan to support the large responsibility of managing and monitoring all training requirements within the unit. Adopting the recommendations will help the largest domain, Training, be executed more smoothly.

Many of the elements of Leadership and Education occur at the very beginning of transformation. Essential to understanding all aspects of the unit's transformation, leaders and their subordinates must be oriented on the significant changes that are involved. Understanding the characteristics, doctrine, and standards of the new unit also assists in changing the culture. If the new unit is relatively distinct from others (e.g., SBCT), other organizations and/or the installation may also need this orientation in order to effectively interact with and support the transformation. Early in RESET is the opportunity to explore and resolve any challenges associated with external support. Leaders must also build the cohesiveness of the unit. When possible they should leverage the unit's lineage or unique capabilities as a key element that

makes the Soldiers distinct. As cohesion builds, the Train/Ready phase is a key period for strengthening it. Collective training events are essential to making Soldier understand how they work together as a new unit.

Leaders will face the largest amount of challenges within the Training domain. They can begin to plan early (R-180, RESET) for these issues, and it is imperative that they do so. Poor or insufficient preparation and/or coordination will have a detrimental effect on completing the training, completing the training to standard, and completing the training on time. The recommendations focus on strategies for maintaining the timeline, eliminating distracters, tracking attendance, and integrating technology into Army processes. Toward the end of the Train/Ready phase, leaders must determine how to sustain the training that Soldiers receive. With the technological advances associated with new equipment, the knowledge gained is perishable if not utilized.

Change Management Models. There are a variety of frameworks and processes in the literature and in business that are intended to facilitate change within an organization. John Kotter (2000) developed a framework that has been broadly received within the business world and has also received attention within military academia (e.g., Jeffress, 2003; Kucharek, 2007). Within Kotter's framework, there are eight stages involved in the change management process. They are:

1. Establishing a sense of urgency;
2. Creating the guiding coalition;
3. Developing a vision and strategy;
4. Communicating the change vision;
5. Empowering employees for broad-based action;
6. Generating short-term wins;
7. Consolidating gains and producing more change; and
8. Anchoring new approaches in the culture.

The essence of many of these stages found support from the interviews that were conducted with the Army leaders who had been involved in unit transformations. As such, the actions associated with these stages are often reflected in the lessons learned and recommendations regarding culture and the relevant DOTMLPF domains. As an example, one lesson learned that pertained to communicating change in order to foster a positive climate, directly instructs the leader to develop a vision that *motivates* Soldiers to take the necessary steps for transformation. This is similar to the actions necessary for stages 1 and 3 of Kotter's framework. In order to address "undercommunicating the vision" (Stage 4), the lessons learned emphasize using technological means and the PAO to disseminate the vision as part of communicating the change throughout all phases of transformation. Within the personnel manning lessons learned, it is recommended that leaders actively choose their subordinate leaders and with regard to managing cultural change, leaders are instructed to build a core of leaders who are champions of the transformation process and have the appropriate attitudes to manage change. These reflect stage 2. Final examples that illustrate the model and stage 5 include the lesson learned that the influence of leaders who do not support the commander's vision or transformation should be limited (managing change) and the lesson learned that

obstacles to transformation (e.g., outdated garrison policies) must be identified and addressed early in order to maintain momentum.

There is general agreement regarding the sequence in which the identified transformation challenges occur (Tables 3 and 4) and the order of Kotter's eight stages. This consistency adds validity to the included lessons learned and increases the utility of understanding when these issues can be encountered. The conceptual and temporal flow of these challenges and lessons learned, across the phases of transformation, allows for the development of tools that can assist units in forecasting the issues and establishing plans to address them.

Both the research focused on capturing lessons learned regarding transformation and the research focused on identifying best practices for resolving new operational requirements faced challenges that influenced the comprehensiveness of the work and the application of the findings. The number of leaders from whom information could be solicited posed one challenge. In addition, the scope of the research remained narrow, but needed to represent issues that were broadly applicable across the Army.

Research Limitations. Because the research had a very direct and immediate purpose of supporting the transformation of the 3d ACR into a Stryker brigade, much of the literature drew directly from resources that were specific to the SBCT concept. However, even outside of the SBCT literature, Triscari (2005) aptly notes that very little literature or resources exist that are exclusively focused on effectively transforming a unit. In the case of this research, the specific challenges, lessons learned and strategies for SBCTs had to be reviewed and generalized for broader application. The culture and change management literature, though, permitted the broader organizational development knowledge to be integrated into the research. These non-Army concepts were critical to identifying key aspects of culture and change that are applicable to any Army organization.

The characteristics of the leaders that participated in the research also have some implications. While the interviews with the 56th SBCT allowed information to be gathered from the most recent brigade to transform into a SBCT, the leaders themselves noted that the National Guard and the active Army would face some distinctly different challenges in some DOTMLPF domains. This was understood by the research team and the methodology was purposely designed to capture the broadly applicable lessons learned in order to limit these differences.

One characteristic that was applicable to both the 56th SBCT leaders and those at JBLM is the fact that many of them were key brigade or battalion leaders (commanders). As the senior leader of the unit, they had the broadest knowledge of the transformation process that occurred, but were not necessarily the individuals executing the actual transformation process. The opportunity to have spoken with staff officers may have provided additional details about the true challenges faced regarding personnel, organization, leadership, and training.

Research Task 2: Identify Strategies for New Operational Requirements

The purpose of this task was to examine the following research questions:

1. What are the common operational needs that require units to reassign or reorganize personnel in order to complete the mission?
2. How effective are Army leaders at meeting (these) new operational requirements without the provision of additional personnel?
3. What are the most and least effective strategies unit leaders use to *select* personnel for new operational requirements?
4. What are the most and least effective strategies unit leaders use to *train or prepare* personnel for new operational requirements?

In addition to addressing these research questions, this task aimed to develop strategies and best practices, based on the collected data, which will assist unit leaders in determining appropriate selection and training strategies when existing personnel must staff a new operational requirement.

Method

Participants. This task involved data collections with two samples of participants. The first sample was comprised of Trainer-Mentors (TM) at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), Fort Polk, Louisiana. The second sample included leaders within the 3d ACR and other subordinate units of III Corps at Fort Hood, Texas.

Fifteen TMs participated in the data collection held at Joint Readiness Training Center. Four sessions were held and included between two and five participants per session. Participants had served in their current position as a JRTC cadre member for an average of seven months at the time of the data collection (range of 2 weeks to 15 months). The sample sizes by rank for participants at JRTC are displayed in Table 5.

Twenty-seven unit leaders participated in the second data collection, which was held at Fort Hood. Fifteen of the leaders were from the 3d ACR, while the remaining 12 leaders were from signal, air defense artillery, field artillery, and medical units within III Corps. Participants had served in their current position for an average of 18 months at the time of the data collection (range of six weeks to five years). This cohort is identified in the following discussion as “Unit Leaders.” The sample sizes by rank for participants at Fort Hood are displayed in Table 5.

Table 5

Sample Size by Rank for Fort Hood and Fort Polk Data Collections

Rank	Fort Hood	JRTC	N
Major	3	1	4
Captain	9	7	16
Chief Warrant 2	1	0	1
Command Sergeant Major/Sergeant Major	3	0	3
First Sergeant	3	0	3
Sergeant First Class	3	7	10
Staff Sergeant	1	0	1
Sergeant	1	0	1
Rank not provided	3	0	3
Total	27	15	42

Procedure. Data collections with both samples involved a proctored questionnaire and a facilitated discussion of participants' responses in the style of a focus group. Focus groups lasted approximately two hours with a short break after one hour. All participants were provided with a Privacy Act Statement and an Informed Consent Statement before the session. None of the participants whom attended opted not to participate. Participants completed a phased, 16-item questionnaire and were asked to discuss their answers and provide additional detail. Two versions of the questionnaire were used so that items would best fit the participants' experiences and current roles (i.e., TM and Unit Leaders). Both questionnaires consisted of a series of items that gathered quantitative ratings and qualitative responses regarding new operational requirements that units face. Open-ended items were used to capture qualitative responses. Other items used a Likert scale to gauge unit or leader effectiveness or ability to execute appropriate selection and training strategies. The response options for rating effectiveness ranged from 1 (Very ineffective) to 5 (Very effective). The response options for rating ability or efficacy at selection and training ranged from 1 (Very poor) to 5 (Very good). In addition, a few items asked participants to "select all that apply" from a list of options.

Items in the TM questionnaire (see Appendix E) focused on the experience of units in meeting new operational requirements while deployed and during JRTC rotations. Similar items in the Unit Leader questionnaire (see Appendix F) focused on new operational requirements faced at the unit level.

The questionnaires were divided into multiple sections (TM, four sections; Unit Leader, two sections); each section consisted of three to eight items. After participants completed each section within the questionnaire, a short discussion was held where they were asked to share and discuss their answers. The questions posed during the focus group discussions were the same as the items on the questionnaire. Notes from the discussions were recorded manually.

Data Analysis.

Quantitative analysis. Participant questionnaire ratings were entered into an Excel spreadsheet and analyzed using descriptive statistics. In addition, two items on the questionnaire used a select all that apply response option format. For those items, the frequency of participants selecting a response option was calculated for each cohort.

The predominant response method for items in the questionnaires was qualitative open-ended comments. In some cases, participants were asked follow-up questions with 5-point Likert scale response options. These items were used to quantify the effectiveness or context of qualitative responses (e.g., how effective was the unit in meeting the requirement you described) rather than capture stand-alone attitudes or opinions.

Qualitative analysis. A desired outcome of the qualitative data analysis was to identify a list of new operational requirements that increase a unit's capability but require the use of existing personnel. Additionally, analysis of qualitative responses aimed to derive detail on best practices for meeting the new operational requirements, specifically on how to select or identify personnel and how to train or prepare those personnel to meet the new requirement. For most items, the qualitative analysis of responses consisted of coding a statement to a theme. Given the relatively small size of the participant sample and the diverse nature of the responses, less emphasis was placed on quantifying comments within a theme. Greater emphasis was placed on identifying a diverse list of new requirements and strategies relevant to the task.

Identify common operational requirements. The primary research question of this task involved determining the common operational needs that require units to reassign or reorganize personnel in order to complete the mission. To address this research question, responses to select items on the questionnaires were analyzed using a four step process.

Step I: Compile a raw list of responses from questionnaire data.

To compile a list of new operational requirements, participant responses to questionnaire items 1, 7, and 9 for TMs and items 1 and 8 for unit leaders were reviewed.

TM questionnaire.

- (Item 1) What are common operational needs that require units to re-organize or re-assign existing personnel in order to successfully complete the mission?
- (Item 7) What common operational needs (i.e., new requirements) are units challenged to meet while attending a Combat Training Center rotation?
- (Item 9) In your opinion, what critical operational needs (i.e., new requirements) must units be prepared for prior to deploying?

Unit Leader questionnaire.

- (Item 1) What are common operational needs that require units to re-organize or re-assign existing personnel in order to successfully complete the mission?
- (Item 8) Are there any operational needs that are critical enough to warrant a change to the unit's MTOE?

Responses to these items were recorded into two lists of potential new requirements, one for each cohort (TM, $n = 47$; Unit Leader, $n = 33$).

Step II: Screen list of responses for value and relevance to the task.

Entries in the two lists were then coded by two researchers for their relevance and value in meeting the task objectives. Responses deemed relevant and valuable to this research were those that aligned with the following definition: *a new operational need or capability that requires units to utilize existing manpower without the provision of additional personnel*. Entries deemed relevant and valuable to the task (based on the definition) were then separated from entries that were not. The two refined cohort lists were then comprised of 51 total operational needs (TM, $n = 31$; Unit Leader, $n = 20$) deemed relevant and valuable, though redundancy between the two cohort lists was not yet addressed. Entries deemed not relevant to the task were classified into one of three groups, including Task or Skill (e.g., drivers training), Other Requirement (e.g., mortar platoon), and Not Applicable (e.g., deployment). A total of 29 entries (TM, $n = 16$; Unit Leader, $n = 13$) were deemed neither relevant nor valuable and were set aside from further analyses.

Step III: Consolidate cohort responses into a single list.

The two lists with a total of 51 entries deemed relevant and valuable to the task were then consolidated into a single list to eliminate redundancy between cohorts. Entries with a high degree of similarity were combined into a single entry where deemed appropriate. For example, “gun truck security” and “convoy security” were combined into the new operational requirement of “escort duties.” The combined list consisted of a total of 27 unique entries.

Step IV: Assign grouping variable to new requirement entries.

Two researchers independently reviewed the list of 27 entries to identify commonalities or logical groupings of the requirements. Through an iterative process, similar to a *Q-sort*, five domains of new operational requirements were identified. Each of the domains represents a type of capability that a unit gains through the new operational requirement. Each of the 27 entries in the list was coded to one of the five exclusive domains. The domains and definitions include:

- Improve ISR Capability – Assets and functions that relate intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance activities;
- Broader/Improved Staff Capability – Additional requirements for personnel and staff roles that surface during deployed operations;
- Base Support Requirements – Static force protection and guard duty requirements that are common in deployed environments;
- Protection of Personnel or Assets – Active or passive action to prevent damage or injury; and
- Increased Force Capability – Other capabilities that enhance a unit’s operational reach in deployed environments.

The end state for this four-step process was 27 specific operational requirements grouped into five unique domains of common operational requirements.

Identify common selection and training strategies. Qualitative analysis of selection and training methods for new operational requirements aimed to identify the most and least effective methods for meeting new operational requirements.

To assess effective and ineffective personnel selection strategies, responses to TM and Unit Leader questionnaire items 3 and 4 were reviewed.

TM and Unit Leader questionnaires.

- (Item 3) Of the strategies in question 2, which are most commonly reported as *effective* methods for resourcing new operational requirements? And why?
- (Item 4) Of the strategies in question 2, which are most commonly reported as *ineffective* methods for resourcing new operational requirements? And why?

To assess effective and ineffective personnel training strategies, responses to Unit Leader questionnaire items 6 and 7 were reviewed.

Unit Leader questionnaire.

- (Item 6) Of the strategies in question 5, which are most commonly reported as *effective* methods for developing personnel to address new operational requirements? And why?
- (Item 7) Of the strategies in question 5, which are most commonly reported as *ineffective* methods for developing personnel to address new operational requirements? And why?

The frequencies of each of the strategies rated effective or ineffective were calculated. Themes and other key findings within the comments were identified, and are discussed in the results section of this report.

Analysis of critical incidents. Finally, participants were asked to describe a time when they either observed or participated in a situation where a unit reorganized or reassigned existing personnel to meet a new operational requirement. Participants were prompted to describe the new requirement that needed to be met, the strategies that unit leaders used to select or identify personnel to meet the need, the strategy used to prepare or train the personnel, and the overall effectiveness of the unit or leaders in meeting the new requirement through those methods.

The critical incidents that participants provided were valuable to this research for two reasons. First, this section of items was positioned last in the questionnaire; participants completed these items at the conclusion of the two hour sessions, after having put thought into conceptualizing new operational needs and various strategies for selection and training, and discussing them as a group. Second, this section of items in the questionnaire specifically captured participant experience in addressing a new requirement and the selection and training strategy that was used in that instance, as well as an assessment of the effectiveness of these strategies in meeting the need.

The qualitative portion of participant critical incidents consisted of responses to three questionnaire items. Responses to these items were reviewed by two researchers, who then coded the responses to appropriate domains or themes. A three-step process was used:

Step I:

Researchers coded the new requirement responses to one of the five domains (based on the list of new requirements established during initial analyses for this task). Responses that did not align with the five domains were coded as not relevant and filtered from additional analyses. Disagreement among ratings between researchers was addressed through discussion and consensus.

Step II:

Researchers then coded the selection strategies to one of five response options that were provided in the survey (Question 2), which included:

- Use of non-critical MOS personnel to fill the need;
- Select personnel with relevant knowledge or skills;
- Rotate available personnel to perform the duties;
- Have subordinate elements (e.g., company, platoon) each provide personnel; and
- Task a specific section, team or group with the responsibility.

In a few instances, the selection strategy response did not align with any of the five options. In those cases, additional options were created to fit the data. Any disagreement among ratings between researchers was addressed through discussion and consensus.

Step III:

Researchers then coded the training strategies to one of six response options that were provided in the survey (Question 5), which included:

- Unit-developed training or instruction;
- Mobile Training Teams;
- Use of a proficient leader or expert to mentor or develop other personnel;
- Attendance at a formal course (resident or distributed learning);
- Self-study or independent learning; and
- On-the-job trial and error (e.g., “wing it”).

In a few instances, the training strategy response did not align with any of the six options, and additional themes were created to fit the data. For example, “on-the-job training” was added as a theme. The theme, “unit-developed training or instruction,” was changed to “unit-based training” to better fit the data; though the reworded theme is not descriptive. The theme “Combat Training Center (CTC) rotation” was also added and used when coding the responses; however, this theme is interpreted with caution, as CTC rotations are intended to be validations and not

pure training events of unfamiliar tasks. Any disagreement among ratings between researchers was addressed through discussion and consensus.

Step IV:

In the final step, the coded responses from the critical incidents were used to create a matrix that linked specific operational requirements within the five domains to effective personnel selection and training strategies. This process was iterative, and in some cases more than one selection or training strategy aligned with an operational need domain. The resulting critical incident matrix then served as one source of data for the creation of the *Strategies Matrix for Resourcing New Operational Requirements* (see Appendix I).

Analysis of focus groups data. Focus group transcripts were reviewed to identify instances where participants discussed specific steps for resourcing a new requirement. These data were entered into three columns of a spreadsheet (i.e., requirement, selection method, and training method). Entries were then coded through a multi-step process in the same manner as the critical incidents to assign a new requirement domain, a selection strategy, and a training strategy.

Requirements that involved similar activities or tasks were collapsed into single entries in the list to reduce redundancy. However, not all requirements identified through this method were supported by sufficient data to be linked to a specific strategy for selection or training or both. The resulting focus group matrix then served as a second source of data for the creation of the *Strategies Matrix for Resourcing New Operational Requirements* (see Appendix I).

Results

Trainer-Mentor Assessment of Unit and Leader Effectiveness. Trainer-Mentors were asked to rate the preparedness of rotating units at the CTC to task organize their personnel to address operational needs. On a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 is “Very poor” and 5 is “Very good,” TM ratings for rotating units were fairly evenly split between “Neither good nor poor” and “Poor” at meeting new operational requirements ($M = 2.6$, $SD = .632$). Qualitative responses provide additional detail on the reasons why units are not generally viewed favorably regarding their preparation to task organize personnel at CTC. Key findings within TM comments include the following:

- Unit leaders lack a clear understanding of all of the requirements for troops-to-task, which leads to continual adjustments during rotations;
- Some units need to be prompted to create a troops-to-task list;
- Some young commanders and operations officers are not well prepared due to newness to their job;
- Some units intentionally man certain positions insufficiently in order to get maximum participation in training;
- Units do not plan for personnel shifting, and staffing new requirements becomes reactionary during a rotation;

- Units may fill positions to achieve troops-to-task objectives, but personnel are not always trained. Thus, CTC too often becomes a pure training event rather than a validation;
- Some personnel functions never get addressed by the unit during their CTC rotation; and
- Units that attend CTC without 100% manning struggle to meet traditional requirements and often end up “dual hatting” personnel to cover functions.

The ratings and comments by TMs indicate that unit leaders are generally not well prepared to resource new operational requirements that arise at the CTCs or during deployed operations. Thus, these findings indicate that there is a clear need to raise the awareness of unit leaders on the new operational requirements they may face and to help them understand and apply appropriate strategies for the selection and training of personnel that must be pulled out of hide to resource new requirements.

New Operational Requirements. A final list of 20 new operational needs that require units to reorganize or reassign personnel was developed through the four step process discussed in the Method section. Five domains of common operational needs were identified and serve as categories for organizing the common operational requirements. The requirements, grouped by domain, are presented in Table 6.

Common Strategies for Identifying or Selecting Personnel. Participants were presented with a list of five selection strategies and were asked to select the options that are commonly used to staff new operational requirements. Responses confirmed that these five strategies are often used by units in theater and during CTC rotations to identify or select personnel to staff new operational requirements. The five selection strategies, along with the frequency of selections by cohort, are presented in Table 7.

Most effective and ineffective selection strategies. Participants were further asked to identify the personnel selection strategies that are most commonly reported as effective or ineffective when resourcing new operational requirements, and to provide a brief explanation for their choices (see Table 8).

Table 6

Common Operational Needs that Require the Reassignment of Existing Personnel

Domain	New Operational Requirements
Improved Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance (ISR) Capability	Company Intelligence Support Team (COIST) Manning for ISR Assets (Aerostat, RAVEN, RAID) Fusion Cell
Base Support Requirements	Base Defense Operations Center (BDOC) Gate Guards, Tower Guards, Entry Control Point (ECP)
Protection of Personnel or Assets	Snipers or Designated Marksmen Personal Security Detachment (PSD) Quick Reaction Force (QRF) Escort Duties (for Convoys, Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT)/Stability Transition Team (STT), Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD), or Contractors) Route Clearance Teams; Route Recon
Increased Force Capability	Time Sensitive Targeting (TST)/Focused Tactical Force (FTF) Tactical Site Exploitation (TSE) Team, Sensitive Site Exploitation (SSE) Team
Broader/Improved Staff Capability	Tactical Operations Center (TOC) Personnel (Battle Captains, Runners, Rear Detachment Cadre Officer-in-Charge/Non-commissioned Officer-in-Charge (OIC/NCOIC) Liaison (LNO) positions (Foreign Security Forces, Airfield, VIP, etc.) Public Affairs Officer (PAO) at battalion/squadron Electronic Warfare Officer (EWO) at troop level S-3 Air; Air NCO Information Operations (IO), Civil-Military Operations (CMO) at troop/squadron level Brigade Special Troops Battalion Land Ownership Duties (Planning cell)

Table 7

Frequency of Selection Strategies Used to Prepare Personnel for New Requirements by Participant Cohort

	TM Frequency	Unit Leader Frequency	Total
Select personnel with relevant knowledge or skills	11 (73%)	24 (89%)	35 (83%)
Have subordinate elements (e.g., company, platoon, section) each provide personnel	10 (67%)	20 (74%)	30 (71%)
Use of non-critical MOS to fill the need	10 (67%)	17 (63%)	27 (64%)
Task a specific section, team or group with the responsibility	11 (73%)	15 (56%)	26 (62%)
Rotate available personnel to perform the duties	12 (80%)	11 (41%)	23 (55%)
	<i>n</i> = 15	<i>n</i> = 27	<i>N</i> = 42

Table 8

Frequency of Selection Strategies Rated Most and Least Effective in Identifying or Selecting Personnel for New Operational Requirements

	Identified as an Effective Strategy	Identified as an Ineffective Strategy
Select personnel with relevant knowledge or skills	24 (57%)	0 (0%)
Have subordinate elements (e.g., company, platoon, section) each provide personnel	7 (17%)	6 (14%)
Use of non-critical MOS to fill the need	7 (17%)	12 (29%)
Task a specific section, team or group with the responsibility	6 (14%)	9 (21%)
Rotate available personnel to perform the duties	2 (5%)	17 (40%)

Note: Percentages are based on the participant sample for these items (*N* = 42)

Qualitative responses provide additional detail on the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of using these strategies to identify or select personnel for new requirements. Each of the strategies is discussed below.

Select personnel with relevant knowledge or skills. Fifty-seven percent of participants identified this strategy as an effective method for staffing new requirements. No participants indicated that this strategy is ineffective. Participants noted that it is important to have Soldiers with the right knowledge base going into a new requirement, as training will then require less time and effort. Experience is seen as a key to success, and experienced Soldiers are seen as better able to apply their skills toward any operating environment. Selecting the right person for the job (i.e., with relevant knowledge or skills) is a logical choice when faced with a new requirement. However, new operational requirements vary in the degree to which they require specific knowledge or skills.

Participants recommend this strategy for resourcing personal security detachment (PSD), company intelligence support team (COIST), and detainment facility requirements, as these are seen as critical needs that require the right Soldiers in the right jobs. Specifically, comments recommend personnel with knowledge and skill in the following areas: combat arms (PSD); intelligence (COIST); law enforcement (detainment facility).

Have subordinate elements provide personnel. Seventeen percent of participants identified this strategy as an effective method for staffing new requirements while 14% indicated it is ineffective. An advantage of using this strategy is that personnel may be pulled from subordinate units without totally disabling that unit's mission effectiveness. In addition, building a diverse group in this way creates an opportunity for sharing new ideas on how to operate and may result in a team with broad experience.

A potential drawback to using this strategy is that when key personnel are taken out of subordinate units, it may weaken that unit's effectiveness. Thus, when given the choice, subordinate elements rarely "give up their best" and provide personnel whose loss will have minimal effect on the organization. This may place an added burden on the leader of the new group or team who must determine the strengths and weaknesses of these Soldiers and train them. Participants recommend that requirements such as PSD and COIST should not be resourced through this strategy. Specific recommendations on when to use this strategy were not provided.

Use personnel from non-critical MOS. Seventeen percent of participants identified this strategy as an effective method for staffing new requirements while 29% indicated it is ineffective. Comments suggest that use of non-critical MOS personnel is an effective way to physically fill a requirement, but not necessarily the most effective in terms of results. These Soldiers are often highly available due to their jobs not being used in country. Therefore, units are often willing to give up these Soldiers for taskings.

Drawbacks to using non-critical MOS personnel to resource new requirements include their potential lack of knowledge, experience, and training for certain operations. Participant comments indicate that personnel who do not have an adequate understanding of a task will

struggle to complete the task to standard. An example of a requirement or role a non-critical MOS Soldier could effectively fill is serving as the commander's driver.

Task a specific section, team, or group. Fourteen percent of participants identified this strategy as an effective method for staffing new requirements while 21% indicated it is ineffective. A key advantage to using this strategy is that it maintains continuity for the group tasked with the requirement. Operating then becomes a focused effort that allows the group to maintain responsibility and accountability of the task.

Potential drawbacks for tasking a specific section, team, or group with a new requirement are that the task may limit or prevent the group from performing a primary mission, if one exists. In essence, a new requirement may take a group "out of the fight." An example of a requirement or role a specific section or team could effectively perform is tasking a mortar platoon to serve as the PSD. In this case, the platoon (as a group) would have the relevant knowledge and skill to effectively perform the task.

Rotate available personnel to perform the duties. Only 5% of participants identified this strategy as an effective method for staffing new requirements while 40% indicated it is ineffective. The biggest concern with using this strategy is the loss of continuity when personnel are rotated in and out of a task. This method is seen as a bad idea due to the lack of command and control, cohesiveness, and individual ownership involved. Personnel who are "available" often do not have requisite knowledge and experience for the task they are assigned, which then requires time and resources to train them. These personnel continue to learn TTP during their "break-in" period though they rarely attain proficiency before they are rotated out. The knowledge base is then lost and training must begin again with new personnel. Handoffs between rotating personnel for new requirements are generally not seen as effective.

Comments suggest that rotating available personnel may be an effective strategy for duties that do not require a full time focus. Another advantage to using this method is that once personnel are established in a task, a rotation may breathe new life into the organization. For example, a combat arms platoon may be divided into two groups, one led by the platoon leader and the other by the platoon sergeant. These two teams could then rotate between tasks such as a PSD and entry control point.

Common Strategies for Training Personnel. Participants were presented with a list of six training strategies and were asked to select the options that units use to train and/or prepare personnel to perform new operational requirements. Responses generally confirmed that the six proposed training strategies are commonly used by units in theater and during CTC rotations though some strategies are employed more often than others. The six training strategies, along with the frequency of selections by cohort, are presented in Table 9.

Table 9

Frequency of Training Strategies Used to Prepare Personnel for New Requirements by Participant Cohort

	TM Frequency	Unit Leader Frequency	Total
On-the-job trial and error (e.g., “wing it”)	15 (100%)	23 (85%)	38 (90%)
Use of a proficient leader or expert to mentor or develop other personnel	12 (80%)	25 (93%)	37 (88%)
Unit-developed training or instruction	9 (60%)	21 (78%)	30 (71%)
Attendance at a formal course (resident or distributed learning)	9 (60%)	20 (74%)	29 (69%)
Mobile Training Teams	8 (53%)	17 (63%)	25 (60%)
Self-study or independent learning	6 (40%)	9 (33%)	15 (36%)
	<i>n</i> = 15	<i>n</i> = 27	<i>N</i> = 42

Most effective and ineffective training strategies. Unit leader participants were further asked to identify the training strategies that are most commonly reported as effective or ineffective when preparing personnel for new operational requirements, and to provide a brief explanation for their choices (see Table 10).

Table 10

Frequency of Training Strategies Rated Most and Least Effective in Training or Preparing Personnel for New Operational Requirements.

	Identified as an Effective Strategy	Identified as an Ineffective Strategy
Use of a proficient leader or expert to mentor or develop other personnel	16 (59%)	1 (4%)
Mobile Training Teams	11 (41%)	1 (4%)
Unit-developed training or instruction	6 (22%)	1 (4%)
Attendance at a formal course (resident or distributed learning)	6 (22%)	3 (11%)
On-the-job trial and error (e.g., “wing it”)	3 (11%)	15 (56%)
Self-study or independent learning	0 (0%)	9 (33%)

Note: Percentages are based on the participant sample for these items (Unit Leaders, *n* = 27)

Use of a proficient leader or expert mentor or develop other personnel. Fifty-nine percent of unit leaders identified this strategy as an effective method for training personnel, while only one participant of the 27 (4%) indicated it is ineffective. There are several advantages to using a proficient leader or expert to deliver training. This method capitalizes on the experience and knowledge base of leaders whom can provide the proper leadership and mentorship to the learners. A leader is able to assess the training needs of Soldiers and tailor the training as needed, which allows him/her to maximize training time. This method also allows for on-the-job learning and hands-on experience. A potential drawback for this training strategy is that a leader's knowledge of a subject matter may be limited to their personal experience. In some cases, a hybrid approach could be effectively employed. Training could be tailored to a team's specific needs through collaboration between a proficient leader, who knows his teams' strengths and weaknesses, and a mobile training team, whom can deliver the training to standard (as experts). Overall, comments highlight the importance of having a competent and experienced leader involved with any training strategy employed.

Mobile Training Teams. Forty-one percent of participants identified mobile training teams as a most effective training strategy while 4% rated it ineffective. One advantage of this method of training is that the MTTs are comprised of SMEs who can effectively train a unit to standard and provide the proper mentorship. The training can be tailored and can usually be delivered where it is needed while minimizing the impact on units and Soldiers (by keeping them on station). Mobile training teams inform units on the latest knowledge on what has been successful for other units, and provide insight on ways to perform effectively. This training method minimizes the impact on units and Soldiers by keeping them on station. A potential drawback of this training method is the availability of a MTT to conduct the training when needed. Some comments specifically recommended using MTTs to train personnel for COIST requirements.

Attendance at a formal course. Twenty-two percent of participants rated formal course attendance as an effective training strategy while 11% rated it as ineffective. An advantage to this training method is that an instructor provides the proper knowledge base and mentorship for learners to understand how to complete the mission. Courses are also effective in training the trainer, who can then train a unit. Potential drawbacks of formal course attendance are that some courses are not seen as very useful. Comments indicate the training must have an on-the-job or hands-on element to instill muscle memory, and a classroom setting alone is not effective in doing this. A specific recommendation in the comments was that leaders of a PSD should attend the personal security officer course and review CALL publications on the topic.

Unit-developed training or instruction. Twenty-two percent of participants identified unit-developed training or instruction as an effective strategy while 4% rated it as ineffective. Advantages to unit-developed training are that training can be tailored to the operational environment and to specific Soldiers' needs. It is usually easy to adjust training to keep it relevant locally, at little cost. The hands-on experience is valuable to the learner, and commanders are able to maintain oversight of the training. A potential disadvantage to use of this strategy is that training may be limited by the knowledge base of available leaders who conduct the training. No specific recommendations on when to use this strategy were provided in the comments.

On-the-job trial and error. Fifty-six percent of participants identified on-the-job trial and error (e.g. “winging it”) as an ineffective strategy while only 11% rated it effective. Of most concern is that this method of “winging it” when it comes to training is most frequently rated as occurring in units (90% of respondents) and also most frequently rated as ineffective in preparing personnel for new requirements (56% of participants).

While on-the-job learning is a frequently used method for training, it is poorly timed within this training strategy, as a lack of training or proficiency for some tasks can lead to critical and deadly errors. Comments indicate this training method is ineffective as it requires time for Soldiers to learn what right looks like and the break-in period can be a disadvantage to the unit. Work or tasks completed incorrectly may need to be redone by others who have the appropriate knowledge and experience. No specific recommendations were made in the comments on when to effectively use this training strategy. Worthy of note is that comments indicated “winging it is often applicable,” but “too often results in an undesired outcome.”

Self-study or independent learning. Thirty-three percent of participants identified self-study or independent learning as an ineffective strategy for training or preparing personnel for new requirements while no participants identified it as effective. These findings suggest that proactive training on the part of the unit to get personnel prepared for new requirements is necessary and that units should not leave training or preparation for a new requirement up to the personnel selected to staff that requirement (i.e., self-study or self-prepare). Comments indicate effective training requires an accountable instructor or leader so that certain gates are met; without this, there is risk of filling a position with an untrained Soldier. Further, when self-study is unsupervised, a Soldier will develop his/her own priorities, and learning can take longer than necessary with less assurance it is aligned with the commander’s intent for the task.

Discussion

Units face a broad range of new requirements when operating in deployed settings. To address these new operational requirements, units must utilize existing personnel to fill roles that do not usually exist in garrison or on formal MTOEs. Notably, TMs indicated that units completing a CTC rotation are generally not well prepared to task organize their personnel to address new operational requirements. Thus, research and tools to assist Army leaders in planning for new operational requirements is both warranted and valuable.

The results of questionnaire data and focus group discussions from this research provide perspective on the types of new operational requirements that pull Soldiers out of hide during deployments. Examples of new requirements identified in this research include staff positions in a tactical operations center (TOC) and in other functions; the protection of personnel and assets such as Forward Operating Bases (FOB), convoys, and other elements (e.g., PSDs); the collection and analysis of intelligence through surveillance and reconnaissance; and evidence gathering teams that engage in site exploitation.

Personnel Selection and Training Strategies for New Operational Requirements. The examination of effective and ineffective selection and training strategies indicated that several methods are used to resource new operational requirements. However, results suggest

that no single selection and training strategy is ideal for all new requirements. Rather, unit leaders must be decisive when applying selection and training strategies as the most effective methods depend on the type of new operational requirement being resourced. While some methods are favored much more than others, it is not practical or reasonable to apply a standard solution to select and train personnel for all new requirements.

A common and favored strategy for resourcing new operational requirements is selecting personnel with relevant knowledge or skills. Ideally, unit leaders want to place the right person in the job at the right time. Personnel with a base knowledge and experience in a task require less time to train and are more likely to have success in the task. Drawing individual personnel from subordinate elements can also be an effective method for staffing a new requirement. However, for critical needs, an effective way to use this method is to have subordinate units send candidates to be interviewed by senior leaders who then select the appropriate personnel for the task.

Some requirements can be effectively resourced by tasking a specific section, team, or group. However, for critical requirements it is recommended that the members of this group have the relevant knowledge or skills to perform the task in order to mitigate additional training needs. Rotating available personnel to perform a new requirement can be an ineffective strategy if the loss of continuity, accountability, and responsibility to the task is a detriment to mission accomplishment. Rather than rotate Soldiers one at a time into these positions which can cause a constant influx of new Soldiers to complete a task, it is recommended that specific sections or teams be rotated for duties they are knowledgeable or skilled in performing. Personnel in non-critical MOS are often the ones readily available to fill personnel shortages, though for many new requirements, these personnel often lack the requisite base knowledge and skills to be effective without extensive training.

A common and favored strategy for training personnel to staff new operational requirements is through the use of a proficient leader or expert to mentor or develop personnel. Also favored is the use of unit-developed training or instruction, which allows unit leaders to tailor training to the needs of their personnel and provide hands-on experience. Mobile Training Teams (MTT) consist of experts with extensive knowledge of the standard for completing tasks as well as insights and lessons learned from other units. Use of MTT minimizes the burden on the unit by bringing the training to nearly any desired location. Standardized training is also delivered through formal course attendance, which can effectively prepare personnel for new operational requirements. However, this method does not always provide a sufficient “hands-on” learning experience and can pull personnel “out of the fight” to complete.

Self-study or independent learning is not seen as an effective method for preparing personnel for new operational requirements. On-the-job trial and error is most frequently reported as a common training strategy, though it is also most frequently rated as the most ineffective method. Unit leaders should avoid resourcing a new requirement by allowing personnel to “wing it” without formal preparation, as this can lead to lost work time, mission failure, and fatal errors. Thus, proactive measures for preparing personnel to staff new operational requirements are needed to ensure effective mission accomplishment.

Strategies Matrix. The final list consists of 20 operational requirements with sufficient data regarding how to best select and train personnel to address them. The Strategies Matrix for New Operational Requirements, in Appendix I, reflects the linkages between the needs and the recommended means for resourcing them. The matrix is of value to Army leaders because it presents actionable recommendations. Leaders should consider the identified operational needs when developing their training plans and during actual collective training prior to deployment. Doing so can ensure that sufficient time and resources may be applied to the selection and training of personnel to fulfill these requirements. Proper preparation for deployment with regard to these requirements is important, as findings from JRTC TMs indicated that unit leaders are generally not well prepared to task organize their personnel to address the new operational requirements faced during CTC rotations and deployment.

Research Limitations. The research on new operational requirements involved a small number of participants from which to draw information. In addition, a large proportion of participants were leaders associated with maneuver units. Hence, the input that was provided and the resulting findings are primarily applicable to maneuver units that will face these common operational needs in deployed settings. This may not be a significant issue, though, as maneuver units are most likely to be involved in operations to produce capability challenges than non-maneuver elements.

The quality and utility of data provided in questionnaire responses, critical incidents, and the focus group discussion transcripts tended to vary. In some cases, an insufficient amount of data or level of detail was provided by participants, which in turn, limited the solution that could be derived for a requirement. In other words, some requirements were identified as common and important, but participants did not clearly articulate effective methods for selecting or training personnel.

Research Task 3: Development of Lessons Learned and Best Practices Tools

The prior tasks were intended to identify challenges and lessons learned associated with unit transformation, both large and small. The third research task was responsible for taking that information and turning it into tangible ways to better prepare for and facilitate organizational change. To be effective, the developed tools should give Army leaders the knowledge of expected challenges and offer solutions and strategies to address them. The Transformation Lessons Learned Matrix and Transformation Glide Path satisfy this requirement by identifying when DOTMLPF and cultural challenges commonly occur and providing recommendations supported by the literature and Army SMEs. While both tools also offer methods for addressing culture change, the Transformation “Smart Card” is an application of many of the suggested methods. In addition, leaders can be better prepared to utilize their personnel when they must resource an operational need, by understanding the common requirements that may be demanded of their units and strategies that will help support the re-organization of the unit.

Transformation Lessons Learned Matrix

The Transformation Lessons Learned Matrix displays, in a print format, the relevant DOTMLPF and culture domains and their associated lessons learned topics (rows) across the

three phases of R-180, RESET, and Train/Ready (columns). This matrix (see Appendix G) provides a very basic presentation of the sequence of the challenges and lessons learned. As a “low-technology” solution, the matrix can be easily printed and included in a binder and/or as an annex to an operations order or standard operating procedure (SOP).

The matrix may have high utility for brigade or battalion command and staff during the Military Decision-Making Process as they plan for transformation. In particular, the matrix may be useful during Mission Analysis when leaders and staff are attempting to *determine constraints* and *identify critical facts and assumptions*. In this respect the Lessons Learned matrix may truly allow leaders to “look forward” and better plan and prepare for the transformation process.

Use of Tool. The document is ordered by phases, “R-180,” “RESET,” and “Ready/Train” in order to be a sequential review of the challenges and lessons and allow for prioritization of developing or implementing strategies for addressing known challenges. Within each phase, the domains are also ordered in the expected sequence in which they occur. Culture is a paramount issue and different aspects can be expected to need attention immediately. Personnel issues follow, which is then followed by challenges with organizing those personnel. When these domains have begun to be addressed, leadership must also be considered. All of these domains lead to the execution of training. In addition, the topics of each domain are loosely arranged in the order in which they may be expected to occur. For example, issues with personnel manning must be resolved before personnel management occurs. In the left-hand corner of the document’s footer is the phase and domain(s) contained on that page. This allows a leader to navigate through the document to examine the phase and domain of interest.

Transformation Glide Path: Challenges and Lessons Learned

The Transformation Glide Path is a visual and interactive representation (in PowerPoint format) of the key challenges and lessons learned derived from a review of the literature and interviews conducted with Army leaders involved in past unit transformations. As such, it reflects the same information contained in the Lesson Learned matrix. In this format, however, leadership and/or staff can collectively navigate to the relevant topics of interest that can assist them with planning and preparing (i.e., MDMP) for transformation. This format may also be better suited for inclusion and distribution in online professional forums or the Army Training Network as a resource for all units.

Use of Tool. Similar to the Lessons Learned Matrix, the phases are presented in sequential order. Their associated domains and topics are also presented in the order that they could conceptually be expected to occur. The arrow-like representation of the domains conveys the sequence of the domains and emphasizes that culture, while not a DOTMLPF domain, is a critical element to successful transformation.

A leader is able to navigate through the Glide Path by two methods. They can simply click directly through the product or they can select only the phases or domains that are of interest. If they click directly through the document, the Glide Path sequentially moves them through the challenges and lessons learned of each phase and domain. Alternatively, the leader

can forgo a sequential review and navigate to their area of interest via the phase and domain buttons. This increases the flexibility and utility of the product.

Transformation “Smart Card”

The importance of influencing and changing the existing culture was evident in both the literature and the interviews that were conducted. Culture change was, in fact, the largest challenge that the interviewed Army leaders indicated would need to be overcome. Both leaders and Soldier can vary in terms of their comfort and capacity (Bunker, 2008) for change. Leaders must devote substantial attention to developing a supportive culture for transformation through constant communication of their vision for the process, the critical changes that will occur, and the endstate.

In support of 3d ACRs pending transformation, the research team received approval to develop a transformation “smart card” (see Appendix H). A smart card is a small foldable document that typically contains facts, processes, or TTPs to assist Soldiers in performing their duties. Examples of topics that may be explained in a smart card include Iraq culture and Improvised Explosive Device identification. The intent of the smart card is to make the information readily accessible and easy to review. The developed smart card is specific to the 3d ACR, but it provides an example of the types of information that the literature and interview suggest will assist in the transformation and may serve as a basic model for future units to adopt for their transformation.

Content of Smart Card. The smart card reflects a blend of content in order to reflect the 3d Cavalry Regiment’s mission, organization, capabilities, and commander’s vision, but also aspects of the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment’s culture. The cultural elements include the unit’s history and lineage to demonstrate the unit’s distinguished achievements. In addition, it includes an iconic cavalry image of “Old Bill” which represents the unit Soldiers during the Spanish-American War. Overlaying this image is the regiment’s accolade received during the Mexican War. The overall color scheme is intended to match that of the Regiment. The reverse side of the card contains an illustration of the regiment’s task organization and their conversion timeline. The task organization allows Soldiers to understand the special composition of the Cavalry Regiment (CR). The timeline allows them to understand the broad timeline and key events that will occur during conversion. The smart card should ensure that every Soldier has knowledge of the unit’s rich history and culture and understand the commander’s vision and intent for the new organization.

Strategies Matrix for New Operational Requirements.

Analysis of the participants’ critical incident information, questionnaire data and the focus group discussions led to the development of two matrices containing new operational requirements. Each matrix consisted of new operational requirements categorized into one of five domains, as well as strategies for selecting and training personnel. The strategies in each matrix included specific guidance from participants on how to effectively resource new requirements. The two matrices were then consolidated into a single matrix tool for use by Army

leaders in resourcing new requirements. The consolidated list, termed the *Strategies Matrix for New Operational Requirements*, is presented in Appendix I.

Use of Tool. A leader should start by identifying a domain and new operational requirement in the far left column. Then read left to right to determine an appropriate selection strategy(s) for identifying personnel and an appropriate training strategy(s) for preparing personnel for that requirement. To the immediate right of each strategy is specific guidance for resourcing that specific new operational requirement.

Conclusion

The completed research was successful in identifying relevant lessons learned and best practices associated with the Army's effort to transform to a brigade-centric organization and the ongoing transformations that are necessary for lower-echelons to adapt to new operational requirements. Using the lessons learned, the research team developed a framework of DOTMLPF and cultural recommendations across the transformation timeline that will support the 3d ACR's conversion and be applicable to other units that will face transformation. The tools that were developed provide easily understood methods for implementing change. Through their use, unit leaders can forecast what challenges will be faced, understand when to address them, and accordingly adopt the strategies that will help to facilitate transformation. When faced with a situation that requires a unit to internally develop a new capability, leaders will now have the knowledge of which selection and training strategies will best support their specific need. In addition, leaders can see how a "smart card" can be leveraged to help change their organization's culture when faced with the challenges of transformation. These are applied tools that, in the hands of Army leadership, advance unit capabilities and have the ability to have a significant effect on the Army's successful achievement of become the Future Force, ready for the full spectrum of operations that may lay ahead.

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Appendix A

Acronym List

ACR	Armored Cavalry Regiment
AKO	Army Knowledge Online
APD	Army Publishing Directorate
ARFORGEN	Army Force Generation
ARI	U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences
BDOC	Base Defense Operations Center
BSB	Brigade Support Battalion
BSTB	Brigade Special Troops Battalion
CALL	Center for Army Lessons Learned
CARL	Combined Arms Research Library
CMO	Civil-Military Operations/Officer
COIST	Company Intelligence Support Team
CR	Cavalry Regiment
CTC	Combat Training Center
DOL	Directorate of Logistics
DOTMLPF	Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Leadership and Education, Personnel, Facilities
DTIC	Defense Technical Information Center
ECP	Entry Control Point
EOD	Explosive Ordnance Disposal
EWO	Electronic Warfare Officer
FOB	Forward Operating Base
FTF	Focused Tactical Force
HBCT	Heavy Brigade Combat Team
IO	Information Operations
ISR	Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance
JBLM	Joint Base Lewis-McChord
JRTC	Joint Readiness Training Center

LNO	Liaison Officer
MDMP	Military Decision-Making Process
MOS	Military Occupational Specialty
MTOE	Modified Table of Organization and Equipment
MTT	Mobile Training Team
NCO	Non-commissioned Officer
NCOIC	Non-commissioned Officer-in-Charge
NET	New Equipment Training
OIC	Officer-in-Charge
PAO	Public Affairs Officer
PBO	Property Book Officer
PM	Program Manager
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team
PSD	Personal Security Detachment
QRF	Quick Reaction Force
SBCT	Stryker Brigade Combat Team
SME	Subject Matter Expert
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
SSE	Sensitive Site Exploitation
STT	Stability Transition Team
SWfF	Stryker Warfighter Forum
TACSOP	Tactical Standard Operating Procedure
TCM-SBCT	TRADOC Capabilities Manager - Stryker Brigade Combat Team
TM	Trainer-Mentor
TOC	Tactical Operations Center
TRADOC	Training and Doctrine Command
TSE	Tactical Site Exploitation
TST	Time Sensitive Targeting
TTP	Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures

Appendix B
Interview Protocol

56TH SBCT INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

Introduction and Research Purpose

Good morning/good afternoon and thank you for taking the time to participate in this interview. My name is _____. I am part of a research team that has been hired by the Army Research Institute (ARI) to help capture lessons learned and successful strategies from units that have effectively transformed into Stryker Brigade Combat Teams (SBCT). It is for this purpose that I am here today. The data that you provide will help improve the effectiveness and efficiency of future transformational efforts.

The interview session will take _____ to complete.

(Provide Privacy Act Statement & Informed Consent Form for them to complete)

Please note that responses to this interview will be used only for the specified purposes of this project. The reports prepared for this research will summarize findings across interviews and will not associate responses with a specific individual. We will not provide information that identifies you to anyone outside the research team. You can refuse to answer any questions that you do not want to answer and you may end the interview at any time.

Do you have any questions for me at this time either in terms of the content of our conversation or anything else?

Things to Consider

In considering your response to each question, I would ask that you think in terms of DOTMLPF; focusing specifically on lessons learned that address the organization, training, leadership & education, and personnel components of the framework. I would also ask that you limit your responses to only those lessons learned and successful strategies that you feel can be applied to future SBCT transformation efforts.

DOTMLPF Challenges

Training

1. What were the challenges to maintaining training readiness, and what techniques mitigated these challenges?
2. How were training aids, devices, displays, simulations, and simulators used, and were they sufficient, available, and relevant? *For example, the SBCT interactive CD for Stryker Company Commanders that was used during the Tactical Leaders Course (TLC).*
3. How did the planning, resourcing, and execution of training need to evolve as a result of the unit transformation? What were the second and third order effects to the changes in training (if any)?

Leadership & Education

4. What type of team building and/or combined arms training were the most effective for developing leaders?
5. What effect did transformation have on the unit cohesion that existed previously? What steps were taken to promote cohesion (if any)?
6. What were the challenges to acquiring required education and attending schools? For example, certain personnel not attending courses due to unit transformation duties. How did you alleviate these challenges?
7. When were most leadership challenges encountered?

Personnel

8. What were the challenges to maintaining personnel readiness, and what procedures did you use to mitigate these challenges?
9. What are the personnel management challenges for the diverse number of career fields and MOS found in the SBCT?
10. When were most personnel challenges encountered?

Organization

11. If you had the authority, what changes would you make to the SBCT organization?
12. Were there instances where you needed to task-organize personnel in order to address operational needs? What were they?
13. Were most organization-specific challenges encountered early in the transformation process or did they become known after significant changes had occurred? How did you address those challenges?

Cognitive, Social, and Cultural Issues

Some of the additional issues that we would like to address are the cognitive, social, and cultural issues that you encountered during transformation and their lessons learned.

Cognitive processes (e.g., different ways of learning and thinking during transformation)

14. With all of the changes that were taking place during transformation, how did the unit's way of thinking need to change with regard to performing its mission?
15. How did senior leaders communicate the changes associated with transformation and the intended endstate to subordinates?
16. What were the barriers to thinking about training and leadership and how were they overcome?
17. What were some of the lessons learned from trying to incorporate these new ways of learning into the transformation process?
18. How can these lessons learned be incorporated into future transformations?

Social processes (e.g., interactions within/outside the SBCT)

19. Did the training received during transformation prepare individuals/units to effectively interact within the SBCT?
20. What were some of the challenges encountered and how were they overcome?
21. How can these lessons learned be incorporated into future transformations?
22. How about your interaction with units and organizations outside of the SBCT (e.g., when supporting another unit not familiar with the SBCT's capabilities or mission)? What sorts of challenges have you encountered with trying to influence and teach these units about SBCTs?
23. How can these lessons learned be incorporated into future transformations?

Cultural processes (e.g., how do leaders change attitudes and actions around new ways of training or accomplishing the mission)

24. What were some of the cultural challenges (e.g., resistance, motivation) encountered during your transformation process? Explain.
25. How did these challenges effect your overall transformation?
26. How were these challenges overcome?
27. How can these lessons learned be incorporated into future transformations?

Appendix C

Transformation Challenges Rating Sheet

Transformation Challenges Rating Sheet

Challenges

1. _____

2. _____

3. _____

Ratings

Low							High
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
•						•	Critically
•						•	Immediacy of need
•						•	Frequency
•						•	Applicability across the unit

Low							High
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
•						•	Critically
•						•	Immediacy of need
•						•	Frequency
•						•	Applicability across the unit

Low							High
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
•						•	Critically
•						•	Immediacy of need
•						•	Frequency
•						•	Applicability across the unit

Appendix D

Qualitative Results: Theme Counts

Theme No.	Theme	Theme Count	% of Session
1. What were the challenges to maintaining training readiness, and what techniques mitigated these challenges?			
1	Training Challenges	2	13%
1.1	Identifying the right people for training requirements	2	13%
1.2	Getting people trained on material pre-requisites	2	13%
1.3	Getting leadership on the ground early to train (i.e., training the trainers)	5	31%
1.4	Time to train	8	50%
1.5	Training distracters such as tasking and appointment interfering with training	3	19%
1.6	Leverage digital systems	2	13%
1.7	Getting equipment to train on	6	38%
2. How were training aids, devices, displays, simulations, and simulators used, and were they sufficient, available, and relevant?			
2	TADDS	5	31%
2.1	SWfF	7	44%
2.2	BCTC	3	19%
2.3	Stryker Driver simulator	4	25%
2.4	VBS2	2	13%
2.5	Call for fire trainer	1	6%
2.6	Engagement simulator	2	13%
2.7	IED Simulator	1	6%
2.8	AFATDS (Advanced Field Artillery Technical Data System)	1	6%
3. How did the planning, resourcing, and execution of training need to evolve as a result of the unit transformation? What were the second and third order effects to the changes in training (if any)?			
3	None		0%
4. What type of team building and / or combined arms training were the most effective for developing leaders?			
4	Effective Methods for developing leaders	3	19%
4.1	Stryker leaders course	7	44%
4.2	Physical fitness/Sports events	2	13%
4.3	Mungadi training	2	13%
4.4	Confidence course	1	6%
4.5	Live fire exercises	7	44%
4.6	Senior leader course	5	31%
4.7	Off-site activity with senior leadership	6	38%
4.8	Collective training	9	56%
4.9	NET	2	13%
4.1.1	STAFFEX/CPX/MDMP	5	31%
5. What effect did transformation have on the unit cohesion that existed previously? What steps were taken to promote cohesion (if any)?			

Theme No.	Theme	Theme Count	% of Session
5.1	Being part of a Stryker Brigade Combat Team (i.e., promoting uniqueness)	8	50%
5.2	Embracing unit's lineage	2	13%
5.3	Physical Fitness Training	2	13%
5.4	Off-site activities with senior leadership	2	13%
5.5	Battle drill training / live fires	1	6%
5.6	Going collectively through NET	1	6%
5.7	Suffering together builds unit cohesion (blood, sweat, and tears)	1	6%
5.8	Transformation builds pride in the unit	2	13%
6. What were the challenges to acquiring required education and attending schools? How did you alleviate these challenges?			
6.1	TRADOC aligned with HRC	1	6%
6.2	Tracking school requirements	2	13%
6.3	Competing demands (getting people to school versus getting training done)	3	19%
6.4	No issues	4	25%
7. When were most leadership challenges encountered?			
7.1	At the start of transformation	8	50%
7.2	Leadership challenges are unpredictable	1	6%
7.3	At the end of transformation	1	6%
7.4	Challenges occur at different times	2	13%
8. What were the challenges to maintaining personnel readiness, and what procedures did you use to mitigate these challenges?			
8	Personnel challenges	2	13%
8.1	Personnel turnover	10	63%
8.2	Having the right cadre established	7	44%
8.3	Having the right grades at the beginning	2	13%
8.4	Nothing outside of normal Army problems	5	31%
9. What are the personnel management challenges for the diverse number of career fields and MOS found in the SBCT?			
9.1	No issues	3	19%
9.2	Career progression of low density MOS	3	19%
9.3	Allowing Soldiers to train to their MOS, but balancing that with tactical skills	2	13%
10. When were most personnel challenges encountered?			
10.1	At the beginning	7	44%
10.2	Every month	1	6%
10.3	During the middle of transformation	3	19%
10.4	At the end of transformation	4	25%
11. If you had the authority, what changes would you make to the SBCT organization?			
11	None		0%

Theme No.	Theme	Theme Count	% of Session
12. Were there instances where you needed to task-organize personnel in order to address operational needs? What were they?			
12	None		0%
13. Were most organization-specific challenges encountered early in the transformation process or did they become known after significant changes had occurred? How did you address those challenges?			
13.1	In the beginning stages of transformation	4	25%
13.2	Challenges occurred after transformation	2	13%
13.3	During the middle of transformation	1	6%
13.4	At the end of transformation	2	13%
14. With all of the changes that were taking place during transformation, how did the unit's way of thinking need to change with regard to performing its mission?			
14	Mindset change	11	69%
14.1	Heavy units need to stop thinking in terms of "gunnery"	2	13%
14.2	Stryker is not a fighting vehicle	1	6%
14.3	Melding the heavy and light mindsets	6	38%
14.4	Understanding the capabilities of the SBCT	8	50%
14.5	Manage expectations	3	19%
15. How did senior leaders communicate the changes associated with transformation and the intended endstate to subordinates?			
15.1	Commander's vision / philosophy	10	63%
15.2	Through the use of former Stryker leaders	3	19%
15.3	Leader events	2	13%
16. What were the barriers to thinking about training and leadership and how were they overcome?			
16.1	Senior leadership not understanding how an SBCT operates	3	19%
17. What were some of the lessons learned from trying to incorporate these new ways of learning into the transformation process?			
17	None		0%
18. How can these lessons learned be incorporated into future transformations?			
18.1	Keep senior leadership throughout transformation	1	6%
18.2	Provide access to former Stryker leaders	2	13%
19. Did the training received during transformation prepare individuals/units to effectively interact within the SBCT?			
19	None		0%
20. What were some of the challenges encountered and how were they overcome?			
20	None		0%
21. How can these lessons learned be incorporated into future transformations?			
21	None		0%
22. How about your interaction with units and organizations outside of the SBCT? What sort of challenges have you encountered with trying to influence and teach these units about SBCTs?			
22.1	"Us" versus "Them" mentality	3	19%

Theme No.	Theme	Theme Count	% of Session
22.2	Explain to senior leadership how to use the SBCT properly	7	44%
23. How can these lessons learned be incorporated into future transformations?			
23.1	Proactively educated people on SBCT capabilities	8	50%
24. What were some of the cultural challenges (e.g., resistance, motivation) encountered during your transformation process? Explain.			
24	Cultural challenges	6	38%
24.1	Heavy versus light mindset	4	25%
24.2	Getting people excited about transforming	3	19%
24.3	The way branches interact within Stryker units	2	13%
24.4	Regulation mentality	3	19%
25. How did these challenges effect your overall transformation?			
25	None		0%
26. How were these challenges overcome?			
26.1	Maintain attitude of flexibility	2	13%
27. How can these lessons learned be incorporated into future transformations?			
27.1	Re-assign CAV/AR to speed change	1	6%
27.2	Leadership needs to enforce culture shift	0	0%
27.3	Emphasize uniqueness of SBCT	0	0%
27.4	Use Stryker leader orientation to facilitate cultural shift	0	0%
27.5	Use Stryker university to facilitate cultural shift	1	6%
These are for stand-alone recommendations (i.e., no challenges associated with them).			
28.1	Training recommendations	7	44%
28.2	Leadership recommendations	6	38%
28.3	Personnel recommendations	5	31%
28.4	Organizational recommendations	2	13%
28.5	Cognitive recommendations	5	31%
28.6	Social recommendations	1	6%
28.7	Cultural recommendations	2	13%

Appendix E
Trainer-Mentor Questionnaire

NEW UNIT REQUIREMENTS QUESTIONNAIRE

Part 1. When completing this section, please consider the information that you have **received from units operating in theatre.**

-
1. What are the common operational needs that require units to re-organize or re-assign existing personnel in order to successfully complete the mission?

2. What strategies do units report using to identify or select appropriate personnel to staff these types of new requirements? (Circle all that apply)
- a. Used non-critical MOS to fill the need
 - b. Selected personnel with relevant knowledge or skills
 - c. Rotated available personnel to perform the duties
 - d. Had subordinate elements (e.g., company, platoon, section) each provide personnel
 - e. Tasked a specific section, team or group with the responsibility

Other methods (please describe):

3. Of the strategies in question 2 (above), which are most commonly reported as effective methods for resourcing new operational requirements? And why?

4. Of the strategies in question 2 (above), which are most commonly reported as ineffective methods for resourcing new operational requirements? And why?

5. What strategies do units report using to train and/or prepare their personnel to perform new duties? (Circle all that apply)
- a. Unit-developed training or instruction
 - b. Mobile Training Teams
 - c. A proficient leader or expert mentored or developed other personnel
 - d. Attendance at a formal course (resident or distributed learning)
 - e. Self-study or independent learning
 - f. On-the-job trial and error (e.g. "winged it")

Other methods (please describe):

NEW UNIT REQUIREMENTS QUESTIONNAIRE

Part 2. When completing this section, please consider **units and leaders you have observed during CTC rotations.**

6. In your opinion, how would you rate the preparedness or ability of rotating units at the CTC to task organize their personnel to address operational needs? (Circle)

Very Good	Good	Neither Good nor Poor	Poor	Very Poor
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Comments:

7. What common operational needs (i.e., new requirements) are units challenged to meet while attending a CTC rotation?

8. What strategies have you observed unit leaders using to identify or select appropriate personnel to staff new operational requirements at CTC? (Circle all that apply)

- a. Used non-critical MOS to fill the need
- b. Selected personnel with relevant knowledge or skills
- c. Rotated available personnel to perform the duties
- d. Had subordinate elements (e.g., company, platoon, section) each provide personnel
- e. Tasked a specific section, team or group with the responsibility

Other methods (please describe):

NEW UNIT REQUIREMENTS QUESTIONNAIRE

Part 3. When completing this section, please consider the **guidance that you provide to unit leaders during their rotation.**

9. In your opinion, what critical operational needs (i.e., new requirements) must units be prepared for prior to deploying?

10. In your opinion, what strategy(s) should units use to identify or select the appropriate personnel to staff new capabilities?

11. In your opinion, what strategy(s) or resources should units use to train or prepare personnel to staff new capabilities?

NEW UNIT REQUIREMENTS QUESTIONNAIRE

Part 4. For this section, think of a time when a unit was presented with a new operational need that required re-organization or re-assignment of existing personnel in order to successfully complete the mission (i.e., additional personnel were not available to fulfill this requirement). This could be a unit in which you served or one that you observed during a CTC rotation.

12. Specifically, what was the new requirement that the unit needed to meet?

13. For this situation, how would you rate the preparedness or ability of the unit's leaders to task organize personnel to address the operational need? (Circle)

Very Good	Good	Neither Good nor Poor	Poor	Very Poor
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Comments:

14. Specifically, how did the unit leaders identify or select appropriate personnel to staff the new requirement? What strategy(s) were used to make the determination?

15. Specifically, what strategy(s) or method(s) did the unit leaders use to train and/or prepare personnel to perform their new duties?

16. Overall, how effective was this unit in meeting the new operational requirement based on their selection and training of personnel? (Circle)

Very Effective	Effective	Neither Effective nor Ineffective	Ineffective	Very Ineffective
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Comments:

Appendix F

Unit Leader Questionnaire

Part 1. When completing this section, please consider both your experiences and your observations regarding operational needs. The objective is to think of as many operational needs that frequently or currently impact personnel management.

17. What are the common operational needs that require units to re-organize or re-assign existing personnel in order to successfully complete the mission?

18. What strategies do units use to identify or select appropriate personnel to staff these types of new requirements? (Circle all that apply)

- a. Used non-critical MOS to fill the need
- b. Selected personnel with relevant knowledge or skills
- c. Rotated available personnel to perform the duties
- d. Had subordinate elements (e.g., company, platoon, section) each provide personnel
- e. Tasked a specific section, team or group with the responsibility

Other methods (please describe):

19. Of the strategies in question 2 (above), which are most commonly reported as effective methods for resourcing new operational requirements? And why?

20. Of the strategies in question 2 (above), which are most commonly reported as ineffective methods for resourcing new operational requirements? And why?

Part 1. Continued

21. What strategies do units use to train and/or prepare their personnel to perform new duties?

(Circle all that apply)

- a. Unit-developed training or instruction
- b. Mobile Training Teams
- c. A proficient leader or expert mentored or developed other personnel
- d. Attendance at a formal course (resident or distributed learning)
- e. Self-study or independent learning
- f. On-the-job trial and error (e.g. “winged it”)

Other methods (please describe):

22. Of the strategies in question 5 (above), which are most commonly reported as effective methods for developing personnel to address new operational requirements ? And why ?

23. Of the strategies in question 5 (above), which are most commonly reported as ineffective methods for developing personnel to address new operational requirements ? And why ?

24. Are there any operational needs that are critical enough to warrant a change to the unit's MTOE ? If so, please explain :

Part 2. For this section, think of a time when a unit (yours or one that you observed) had to re-organize or re-assign personnel in order to address an operational need but was not provided additional manpower to do so.

25. Specifically, what was the new requirement that the unit needed to meet?

26. For this situation, how would you rate the preparedness of the unit's leaders to task organize personnel to address the operational need? (Circle)

Very Good	Good	Neither Good nor Poor	Poor	Very Poor
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Comments:

27. Specifically, how did the unit leaders identify or select appropriate personnel to staff the new requirement? What strategy(s) were used to make the determination?

28. Specifically, what strategy(s) or method(s) did the unit leaders use to train and/or prepare personnel to perform their new duties?

29. How effective was the selection method(s) used in assigning personnel to complete the new requirement? (Circle)

Very Effective	Effective	Neither Effective nor Ineffective	Ineffective	Very Ineffective
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30. How effective was the training method(s) used in preparing the personnel to complete the new requirement? (Circle)

Very Effective	Effective	Neither Effective nor Ineffective	Ineffective	Very Ineffective
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31. Overall, how effective was this unit in meeting the new operational requirement based on their selection and training of personnel? (Circle)

Very Effective	Effective	Neither Effective nor Ineffective	Ineffective	Very Ineffective
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32. In the future, if another unit was faced with meeting this same requirement without additional manpower, what should they know about selecting and training personnel to effectively meet the requirement?

Additional Comments:

Appendix G

Transformation Lessons Learned Matrix

PHASE	DOMAIN	TOPIC	CHALLENGE	LESSONS LEARNED
R-180 / Reset	Culture	Develop the Mindset	You must be open and willing to re-think what your unit's mission is. Maintaining a mindset that was appropriate for the former unit can be counterproductive to the transformation process and realizing the capabilities of the transformed unit.	
R-180 / Reset	Culture	Develop the Mindset	You will be faced with the challenge of ensuring that your Soldiers adopt a mindset that supports transformation. This must come prior to the unit turning in equipment, receiving the new equipment, and training on it. This mindset is necessary for building momentum and cohesion as the unit progresses into the Train/Ready phase.	
R-180 / Reset / Train/Ready	Culture	Communicate the Change		You should use your PAO to get the message of your unit's transformation and mission out to the media and other organizations early. This will allow you to manage the timing and accuracy of the message. Broadly communicating the change helps build unit pride and confidence in the readiness of the Army.
R-180 / Reset / Train/Ready	Culture	Communicate the Change		You are responsible for creating and communicating the vision for transformation and the new unit. That vision must motivate Soldiers to take the necessary steps for transformation. The endstate of transformation should be ingrained into the unit's identity.

PHASE	DOMAIN	TOPIC	CHALLENGE	LESSONS LEARNED
R-180 / Reset / Train/Ready	Culture	Communicate the Change		You should use every means possible to communicate the vision to every individual within the organization. Leverage technology to ensure two-way communication regarding the transformation.
R-180 / Reset / Train/Ready	Culture	Communicate the Change		It is essential that you clearly distinguish between the identity of the future organization and the identity of the past organization. Ensure that Soldiers understand what will be different going forward. Leverage the things that will not change, such as key aspects of culture, to build on and facilitate the change process.
Reset / Train/Ready	Culture	Manage Change	You may face leaders that display resistant or negative attitudes. These attitudes will slow the transformation process and will spread within their unit.	When possible, you should minimize the role of those leaders who initially exhibit an overwhelmed, entrenched, or negative attitude toward the transformation process.
Reset / Train Ready	Culture	Manage Change		You must give thorough consideration to how transformation will affect everyone and engage them in the process, but leverage those who are “on board.”
Reset / Train Ready	Culture	Manage Change		It is essential that you build a core of leaders who are champions of the transformation process. They must demonstrate comfort with and capacity for change.
Reset / Train Ready	Culture	Manage Change		Senior leaders must clearly model the attitudes and behaviors that will facilitate change. An attitude of flexibility will help in overcoming the challenges encountered during transformation.

PHASE	DOMAIN	TOPIC	CHALLENGE	LESSONS LEARNED
Reset / Train Ready	Culture	Manage Change		You must be prepared for and allow mistakes and reduced performance during transformation. Expect to be outside the “band of excellence.”
Reset / Train Ready	Culture	Manage Change		Ensure that you introduce changes in a phased or appropriately-paced manner in order to facilitate adjustment. Use the full breadth of the transformation timeline and re-assess the pace periodically. Counter the mindset of “Never say ‘No’” resident in Army culture. Ensure that leaders are realistically evaluating what can or cannot be done in a quality manner.
Train/Ready	Culture	Manage Change		You must continuously monitor and assess performance and emphasize accountability to keep individuals on track. Recognize milestones (e.g. FTX, CALFEX, completion of fielding) within the transformation process and those who have helped to achieve progress to that point.
Train/Ready	Culture	Manage Change		You should provide ongoing, positive and corrective, feedback regarding performance and enforce positive values within the unit. Recognize those Soldiers with a high comfort and capacity for change and display the unit's values.
Reset	Culture	Manage Change		You should consider establishing a unit-based indoctrination course for new personnel. This will ensure that all Soldiers fully understand their role in the unit and in the transformation process. Orientation can include values briefing, unit policy briefings, transformation briefings, unit history briefings, and leader's briefings.

PHASE	DOMAIN	TOPIC	CHALLENGE	LESSONS LEARNED
Reset	Culture	Manage Change		You must determine how transformation will impact unit heraldry. Ensuring that newly formed or reflagged units receive their colors and memorabilia in a timely fashion plays a key role in creating a professional atmosphere and building unit esprit de corps.
R-180 / Reset	Personnel	Manning		You must ensure that the key leaders that you receive are experienced and capable. Strong leadership will help to overcome the friction that invariably arises during the formation of a unit. Senior leaders should make every effort to ensure that the entire chain of command being assembled contains no leaders lacking in experience or with marginal performance records.
R-180 / Reset	Personnel	Manning		Your attention to the timing and sequencing of leaders, Soldiers, and equipment is imperative to the speed and success of the stand-up. If leaders are the first to arrive, they gain the time to establish schedules, programs and SOPs before the Soldiers arrive. The leaders can receive equipment in order to establish the unit, which allows Soldiers to fall in on existing infrastructure and equipment and begin training immediately.
Reset	Personnel	Manning	Failure to consider officer and enlisted promotions during the unit-manning period could result in either promotion stagnation, additional personnel turbulence, or both.	
Reset / Train/Ready	Personnel	Management	Turnover of unit personnel will challenge the personnel process. It will be problematic to establishing the training base and managing digitally qualified Soldiers.	

PHASE	DOMAIN	TOPIC	CHALLENGE	LESSONS LEARNED
Reset / Train/Ready	Personnel	Management		You should battle roster and stabilize the digital operators within the staff sections. This limits turbulence and helps to sustain digital proficiency within the sections.
Reset	Personnel	Management		You should ensure that adequate security clearances are obtained in a timely manner by establishing a comprehensive list of sensitive and billeted positions. This should not be left to the discretion of individual units.
Reset	Personnel	Management		You must be proactive in preventing shortages of personnel in low-density MOSSs.
Reset	Personnel	Manning		You should retain the brigade's maintenance personnel until the equipment they maintain is turned in or the unit will not be able to perform the work necessary to meet equipment turn-in standards.
Reset	Personnel	Manning		If not assigned a PBO, you should arrange to have one available to the unit during transformation. A diligent PBO can resolve and prevent numerous issues concerning current equipment and the lateral transfer of required SBCT equipment.
Reset / Train/Ready	Organization	Transformation Requirements	Transformation produces a high level of complexity to manage individual training requirements at all echelons and ensure that all personnel are battle rostered, properly notified, and monitored through training completion.	You must determine whether received orders or guidance designate external entities (Army Transition Team) to assume responsibility for unit transformation synchronization.

PHASE	DOMAIN	TOPIC	CHALLENGE	LESSONS LEARNED
Reset / Train/Ready	Organization	Transformation Requirements	Transformation produces a high level of complexity to manage individual training requirements at all echelons and ensure that all personnel are battle rostered, properly notified, and monitored through training completion.	You should consider dedicating brigade staff (S7) to serve as a “transformation cell” responsible for synchronizing equipment fielding and training. The cell can be staffed by a dedicated plans officer and NCO and dedicated operations officer and NCO.
Reset / Train/Ready	Organization	Transformation Requirements	Transformation produces a high level of complexity to manage individual training requirements at all echelons and ensure that all personnel are battle rostered, properly notified, and monitored through training completion.	You must determine whether transformation necessitates establishing “transformation cells” in subordinate units. The cell can be staffed by one dedicated officer and one to two NCOs.
Reset / Train/Ready	Organization	Transformation Requirements	Transformation produces a high level of complexity to manage individual training requirements at all echelons and ensure that all personnel are battle rostered, properly notified, and monitored through training completion.	You should determine whether staff section pronency of different transformation events will facilitate management and efficiency of the process.
Reset	Organization	Transformation Requirements		If not assigned, you should consider adding a PAO as a special staff officer assigned to the brigade. A PAO can execute a focused communication strategy regarding unit transformation to personnel internal and external to the unit. Consistent communication regarding ongoing changes will facilitate better understanding of the transformation, engender support, and build the unit culture.
Reset	Organization	Logistics or Maintenance Requirements	Your MTOE may not include a maintenance officer and will produce challenges for coordinating maintenance service schedules for the vehicles within the brigade. As a result, the responsibility for scheduling and tracking services rests on the subordinate units.	

PHASE	DOMAIN	TOPIC	CHALLENGE	LESSONS LEARNED
Reset	Organization	Logistics or Maintenance Requirements	Transformation may cause the brigade to become more dependent on installation and contractor support for its maintenance services and other requirements.	You must proactively coordinate with the installation Directorate of Logistics to facilitate managing of brigade maintenance while in garrison.
Train/Ready	Organization	Operational Requirements		You must ensure that units are trained and prepared to task organize and create ad-hoc teams when deployed.
Reset	Leadership & Education	Leader Orientation		You should ensure that all leaders and Soldiers are trained on unit-specific doctrine.
Reset	Leadership & Education	Leader Orientation		You should conduct a leadership conference with the post leadership. This conference should include a tour of at least the G1, G3, and G4 and installation support areas of responsibility.
Reset	Leadership & Education	Leader Orientation		You need to be aware of the obstacles and issues (e.g. garrison policies) facing junior leaders during transformation and find ways to minimize their effects.
Reset	Leadership & Education	Leader Orientation		You must define and affectively articulate to your subordinate leaders the knowledge, skills, and abilities required of a unit leader (i.e., the standards).
Reset	Leadership & Education	Leader Orientation		You must ensure that unit leadership attends an initial orientation and leader training course that orients them on the unit's organization, equipment, and doctrine for employment.

PHASE	DOMAIN	TOPIC	CHALLENGE	LESSONS LEARNED
Reset	Leadership & Education	Leader Training		You should ensure that early manning of key leadership positions during transformation remains a high priority and that you schedule a leader orientation or training course early in the process. This will allow for maximum leader participation and prevent leaders from missing other critical transformation related requirements that occur later and are less flexible.
Train/Ready	Leadership & Education	Unit Cohesion		You should take full advantage of any opportunities that may arise for conducting collective training and live fire exercises. These are effective team building events.
Reset / Train/Ready	Leadership & Education	Unit Cohesion		It is important that you promote the lineage and past accomplishments of the new unit. It will help foster cohesion during transformation.
R-180 / Reset	Training	Planning		You need to establish a single, comprehensive, fully resourced training strategy for unit transformation with unit, installation, and institution responsibilities clearly articulated.
Reset	Training	Planning		If possible, you should observe the CERTEX of a unit that has just completed transformation. This can be helpful when trying to formulate and refine a long-range training strategy for use during your own transformation.
Reset	Training	Planning		You must ensure that your planners work to isolate and protect critical training events during transformation to ensure that they are not degraded by fielding actions and external taskings.

PHASE	DOMAIN	TOPIC	CHALLENGE	LESSONS LEARNED
Reset	Training	Planning		You should make sure that your Soldiers are properly identified and trained on required pre-requisites before they attend NET.
Reset / Train/Ready	Training	Planning		You should use Mobile Training Teams as much as possible. These are often more effective and efficient than school house training in terms of flexible scheduling and number of Soldiers trained.
Reset / Train/Ready	Training	Planning		You should ensure that all of your old equipment is turn-in prior to starting NET. This will eliminate scheduling conflicts for personnel required to participate in both equipment turn-in and NET. If turn-in cannot be accomplished before NET, a contractor should be hired to receive and process equipment being turned in to free up personnel to participate fully in NET.
Train/Ready	Training	Planning	NET training is critical for units and individuals receiving new equipment. However, it is frequently missed by key leaders due to competing demands for their time. A decrease in key leader attendance at NET corresponds with a decrease in unit training proficiency.	You need to place a clear emphasis on the necessity of all leaders completing NET requirements. This entails seeking to prevent competing requirements from drawing away leaders from attending, and monitor training completion. In addition, you must ensure that your unit training coordinators understand the extent to which Unit Set Fielding training will affect key leaders and have them forewarn leaders of attendance requirements. They should also set up administrative processes to notify and track class attendance.
R-180 / Reset / Train/Ready	Training	Execution		You must explore and use the resources, tools, and lessons learned contained within forums like the Battle Command Knowledge System or the Warfighter forums. Leveraging what already exists with reduce both planning and execution of training.

PHASE	DOMAIN	TOPIC	CHALLENGE	LESSONS LEARNED
Reset / Train/Ready	Training	Execution		Units should link their UMR to the required NET classes as a means of identifying, by position, which classes they are required to attend.
Reset / Train/Ready	Training	Execution		You should develop and require the use of an automated tool which crosswalks the unit METL, identifies both critical and supporting tasks, identifies the tasks by section and position, and defines the Army standard for that unit.
Train/Ready	Training	Execution	Delays in equipment fielding once a schedule has been initiated tend to disrupt and push back previously scheduled training while the unit responds to changes in equipment issue. This will force the USF/NET process to expand and may require special coordination.	
Train/Ready	Training	Execution		You should establish weekly training meetings that confirm NET schedules. You also need to ensure that all changes to NET are disseminated two weeks out.
Train/Ready	Training	Execution		You should enforce a training schedule lock-in policy - no changes inside of 5 weeks.
Train/Ready	Training	Execution		Make sure that low density systems' training is conducted in small sessions so that unit support capabilities are not impaired. This is especially important when this type of training conflicts with unit collective training requirements/needs.
Train/Ready	Training	Execution		You should incorporate digital qualification standards for operators, sections, or systems into the unit reporting system to track digital readiness.

PHASE	DOMAIN	TOPIC	CHALLENGE	LESSONS LEARNED
Train/Ready	Training	Execution	The tools and procedures for implementing the MDMP have changed.	You must develop techniques and procedures for using digital tools and equipment throughout the steps in the MDMP process and incorporate them into the Tactical SOP. As key operators, NCOs and Soldiers within the staff sections should be involved in developing the procedures. This enhances the unit's capability to plan for future operations while executing current operations.
Train/Ready	Training	Sustainment	There is the potential for a substantial window of time to occur between receipt of equipment and NET where Soldiers can rapidly lose what they have learned.	
Train/Ready	Training	Sustainment		You should verify your class rosters for all digital training classes prior to the start date of the class. This will ensure that all slots are filled and gives the unit time to react to any issues that might arise.
Train/Ready	Training	Sustainment		You need to develop sustainment training to provide retraining for personnel in need of skill reinforcement.
Train/Ready	Training	Sustainment		Where possible, you should adopt a training strategy that includes the identification of certain skills that Soldiers themselves can be responsible for sustaining through self-teaching. Many of the digital skills Soldiers will be required to sustain can be captured on a CD and reviewed by the Soldier during time spent performing support/administrative duties.

Appendix H
Transformation “Smart Card”

3d CAVALRY REGIMENT



SMART CARD

COMMANDER'S VISION & INTENT

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-74th Colonel of The Regiment

AI-EE-YAH!

3d CAVALRY REGIMENT MISSION

The Cavalry Regiment is manned and equipped primarily to conduct operations in a small-scale contingency operation. However, conditions may develop that require added capabilities not resident within the Regiment. When the Cavalry Regiment participates in a major combat operation, it does so as a subordinate element of a division or corps. Its mobility and organic intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets make it invaluable to a division or corps commander in any major combat operation.



UNIT CAPABILITIES

A Stryker unit combines the deployability of an IBCT with the mobility of a HBCT.


- Three infantry squadrons for maneuver (vs. only two in the HBCT and IBCT).
- Infantry squadrons contain organic armor in their MGS platoons.
- In-theater mobility.
- Lower usage rate of class III supplies than the HBCT, with nearly the same mobility.
- Greater survivability than an IBCT.
- Ability to conduct forced entry or early entry operations.
- RS with organic HUMINT Soldiers.

**"BRAVE RIFLES!
VETERANS!
YOU HAVE BEEN
BAPTIZED IN
FIRE AND BLOOD
AND HAVE COME OUT
STEEL!"**


UNIT HISTORY & LINEAGE

- 165 Years of History.
- Participation in 10 Campaigns.
- Earned 40 campaign streamers.
- Regiment Awards:
 - Presidential Unit Citation
 - Belgian Croix de Guerre
 - Valorous Unit Award (OIF I)
 - Valorous Unit Award (OIF 04-06)
- Medal of Honor awarded to 23 Troopers.
- MAY1846: Constituted as the Regiment of Mounted Riflemen.
- 1847-1848: Participation in the Mexican War.
- 1852-1856: Participation in the Indian Wars.
- AUG1861: Re-designated as 3d U.S. Cavalry Regiment.
- 1861-1864: Participation in the American Civil War.
- 1866-1876: Continued participation in the Indian Wars.
- 1898: Participation In the Spanish-American War.
- 1899-1902: Participation in the Philippine-American War.
- 1917-1919: Participation in World War I.
- JAN1943: Reconstituted as 3d Cavalry Group (Mechanized).
- 1944-1945: Participation in World War II.
- NOV1948: Re-designated as 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment.
- 1991: Participation in the Persian Gulf War.
- 2000: Bosnian Peace-Keeping Mission, Stabilization Force 7.
- 2003-2008: Participation in Operation Iraqi Freedom. OIF I (2003-2004); OIF 04-06 (2005-2006); OIF 07-09 (2007-2008).
- 2010-2011: Participation in Operation New Dawn.
- NOV2011: Re-designated as 3d Cavalry Regiment.

TASK ORGANIZATION



CONVERSION TIMELINE



Appendix I

Strategies Matrix for New Operational Requirements

Domain	New Operational Requirement	Selection Strategy	Guidance on Selection of Personnel	Training Strategy	Guidance on Training of Personnel
Improved Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) Capability	Manning for ISR Assets (AeroStat, RAVEN, ScanEagle, RAID)	Select Personnel with Relevant Knowledge and Skills	RAVEN - Two technically proficient Soldiers per platoon, not in HQ	Attendance at a Formal Course	Personnel should receive formal training on ISR assets from a schoolhouse and/or mobile training team. Time should be allotted to send personnel to the appropriate schools.
		Have Subordinate Elements Each Provide Personnel		Mobile Training Teams	
	Company Intelligence Support Team (COIST)	Select Personnel with Relevant Knowledge and Skills	Senior leaders should survey the unit and make personnel selections based on criteria, including: security clearances, educational background, maturity, and work ethic.	Use of a Proficient Leader or Expert to Mentor or Develop Others	An experienced subject matter expert (such as an S-2 analyst) should develop and prepare other personnel to serve on the COIST.
			For Heavy Units, an experienced NCO can lead a COIST as a duty assignment.		
			For Light Units, the XO may be dual hatted with the role of leading a COIST.		
			Ideally, school trained 35-series S-2 analysts should serve in a COIST	Attendance at a Formal Course	Personnel should attend pre-rotational COIST training.
			A Fire Support Officer is often tasked with the COIST mission, but this is not ideal.		
	Fusion Cells	Select Personnel with Relevant Knowledge and Skills	Intel personnel should serve in the Fusion Cells	Attendance at a Formal Course	35-series school training

Domain	New Operational Requirement	Selection Strategy	Guidance on Selection of Personnel	Training Strategy	Guidance on Training of Personnel
Base Support Requirements	Base Defense Operations Center	Use of Non-Critical MOS to Fill the Need	Personnel in Low Density Non-Critical MOS may be selected for BDOC (cooks, parachute riggers, etc.) Assignment to BDOC may also be used as a disciplinary measure for personnel.	Use of a Proficient Leader or Expert to Mentor or Develop Others	Training should be provided to BDOC personnel by a proficient subject matter expert (SME).
		Task a Specific Section, Team, or Group with the Responsibility	A squad, section or platoon may be tasked with BDOC responsibilities.	Unit-Based Training	When possible, a unit in country may provide training to the replacing unit as part of the hand over.
	Gate Guard/Tower/Entry Control Point (ECP)	Task a Specific Section, Team, or Group with the Responsibility	It generally takes a platoon size element to pull a shift, depending on the size of the area being covered. For a battalion-sized FOB, rotate companies on FOB security. For a company-sized FOB, rotate platoons.	Unit-Based Training	Train at the unit or platoon level.
		Rotate Available Personnel to Perform the Duties	Put platoons on a task rotation basis whereby one platoon serves as gate guard for 2 weeks before switching out with another platoon and then conducting other operations.		When possible, training in country may be provided to the replacing unit by the unit being replaced as part of the hand off.
		Use of Non-Critical MOS to Fill the Need	Non-essential personnel may be selected as gate or tower guards. Also consider selecting experienced Soldiers whom are injured or restricted to base.		

Domain	New Operational Requirement	Selection Strategy	Guidance on Selection of Personnel	Training Strategy	Guidance on Training of Personnel
Protection of Personnel or Assets	Snipers/Designated Marksmen	Have Subordinate Elements Each Provide Personnel	Pull snipers from companies to create a battalion sniper team that can be tasked out for missions.	Attendance at a Formal Course	Personnel should attend designated marksmanship or sniper training. Training conducted by Mobile Training Teams may be available.
		Select Personnel with Relevant Knowledge or Skills	Select a competent and motivated E-5 and E-4 , whom are excellent marksmen, from each section.	Mobile Training Teams	
	Personal Security Detachment (PSD)	Have Subordinate Elements Provide Personnel - Then Select For Relevant Knowledge and Skills	To build a PSD from scratch: Subordinate elements should send Soldiers with combat experience to interview with senior leaders. The commander and CSM can then do evaluations based on their own criteria, conduct interviews and select the PSD from the pool of candidates. Selection of the PSD should be done 4 months prior to deployment.	Attendance at a Formal Course	Several different PSD schools exist (civilian and military). Personnel selected for the PSD should start attending courses 3 months prior to deployment at the latest.
		Task a Specific Section, Team, or Group with the Responsibility	To utilize an existing entity as PSD: Scout platoons are effective when tasked for PSD missions. Scout platoon Soldiers are fit and proficient marksmen. A platoon may be tasked to serve as PSD for the duration of their tour.	Unit-Based Training with a Proficient Leader or Expert	Once formed, the PSD should train as it's own element with guidance from an experienced subject matter expert (SME).

Domain	New Operational Requirement	Selection Strategy	Guidance on Selection of Personnel	Training Strategy	Guidance on Training of Personnel
Protection of Personnel or Assets		Rotate a Specific Section, team or Group to Perform the Duty	An alternative to tasking a specific team to serve as TST is to set up a rotation. Half of a scout platoon may serve as the PSD while the other half conducts Time Sensitive Targeting (TST). The Platoon Leader and Platoon Sergeant each lead one team. The teams then rotate between these roles to stay current and fresh.		
	Quick Reaction Force (QRF)	Task a Specific Section, Team, or Group with the Responsibility	A platoon sized element should be assigned as QRF. Personnel should be combat ready and not a combination of low-density non-critical MOS Soldiers. In the event of rescue mission in response to casualties, the QRF element must be at least as prepared as the unit that was hit.	Unit-Based Training with a Proficient Leader or Expert	Once identified, QRF platoons should train as it's own element with guidance from an experienced subject matter expert (SME). Training should be conducted leading up to and throughout a deployment.
		Rotate a Specific Section, team or Group to Perform the Duty	Put platoons on a task rotation basis whereby one platoon serves as QRF, then ECP, then has a rest day. Rotating platoons between QRF and Route Clearance is not advised as it may lead to burn out.		
	Escort Duties	Task a Specific Section, Team, or Group with the Responsibility	A platoon sized element should be tasked as gun truck platoon for a dedicated escort mission.	Unit-Based Training with a Proficient Leader or Expert	Once identified, the platoon should train as it's own element with guidance from an experienced subject matter expert (SME). Training should be conducted

Domain	New Operational Requirement	Selection Strategy	Guidance on Selection of Personnel	Training Strategy	Guidance on Training of Personnel
Protection of Personnel or Assets					leading up to and throughout a deployment.
	Route Clearance	Task a Specific Section, Team, or Group with the Responsibility	An company (infantry) should be selected to conduct route clearance. Platoons may rotate in this role, but rotation should not be between QRF and Route Clearance, as this can lead to burn out.	Unit-Based Training with a Proficient Leader or Expert	Once identified, the platoon should train as it's own element with guidance from an experienced subject matter expert (SME). Training should be conducted leading up to and throughout a deployment.

Domain	New Operational Requirement	Selection Strategy	Guidance on Selection of Personnel	Training Strategy	Guidance on Training of Personnel
Increased Force Capability	Time Sensitive Targeting (TST) Force	Task a Specific Section, Team, or Group with the Responsibility	A squadron may select one platoon to conduct TST full time and serve as the assault force.	Unit-Based Training with a Proficient Leader or Expert	The platoon should train as it's own element with guidance from an experienced subject matter expert (SME).
		Rotate a Specific Section, team or Group to Perform the Duty	An alternative to tasking a specific team to serve as TST is to set up a rotation. Half of a scout platoon may serve as the PSD while the other half conducts Time Sensitive Targeting (TST). The Platoon Leader and Platoon Sergeant each lead one team. The teams then rotate between these roles to stay current and fresh.		
	Tactical Site Exploitation (TSE) and Sensitive Site Exploitation (SSE)	Have Subordinate Elements Each Provide Personnel	Each platoon should provide personnel for TSE and SSE duties. Senior leaders should select a competent and motivated E-5 and E-4 from each section.	Use of a Proficient Leader or Expert to Mentor or Develop Other Personnel	A law enforcement professional (LEP) should train and prepare personnel to conduct TSE and SSE.
				Mobile Training Team	Training conducted by Mobile Training Teams, if available, should be use to prepare personnel to conduct TSE and SSE.

Domain	New Operational Requirement	Selection Strategy	Guidance on Selection of Personnel	Training Strategy	Guidance on Training of Personnel
Broader/Improved Staff Capability	TOC Personnel	Select Personnel with Relevant Knowledge or Skills	For TOC Key Positions (Battle Captains) select personnel with relevant knowledge or skills. Selecting extra personnel from the mortar platoon (Fire Support Officer) may be a worthy sacrifice to have a good TOC.	Use of a Proficient Leader or Expert to Mentor or Develop Other Personnel	Battalion S-3 should ensure personnel in key positions in the TOC can effectively fulfill their roles.
		Have Subordinate Elements Each Provide Personnel	For TOC Personnel (commo watch, runners, etc.) select early so that training can be conducted to develop proficiency. Do not select using "Hey you" method. Extra personnel from the mortar platoon may effectively staff a TOC. Positions such as radio operator should maintain continuity (e.g., assign the NBC guy), and selecting the right personnel is important as radio operators are commander's representatives.	Unit-Based Training	The TOC should train as an element so that personnel develop proficiency in their roles. Train early to avoid the need to learn through trial and error.
	Rear Detachment OIC/NCOIC	Select Personnel with Relevant Knowledge or Skills	Identify leaders with experience in relevant areas and the proper motivation to effectively lead the rear detachment.		
	LNO (Foreign Security Forces, Airfield, Brigade)	Select Personnel with Relevant Knowledge or Skills	LNO's should be hand picked by senior leaders. Individuals must have knowledge of the entire organization, must be well versed, and the more senior the better.		Specific job training is less important than having the requisite knowledge to fulfill the role.

Domain	New Operational Requirement	Selection Strategy	Guidance on Selection of Personnel	Training Strategy	Guidance on Training of Personnel
Broader/Improved Staff Capability	Public Affairs Officers (PAO) (at Battalion/Squadron)	Select Personnel with Relevant Knowledge or Skills	Identify an Officer/NCO with excellent writing ability and understanding of the Battalion/Squadron Commander's intent. Personnel may be drawn from S-1.		Specific job training is less important than having the requisite knowledge to fulfill the role.
	Electronic Warfare Officer (Troop Level)	Select Personnel with Relevant Knowledge or Skills	A skilled individual is needed for this role. Often a commo guy is selected.	Attendance at a Formal Course	Personnel should attend the EWO course (6 months).
	S-3 Air; Air NCO	Select Personnel with Relevant Knowledge or Skills	For S-3 Air: The Assistant S-3 may be dual hatted for this position. Individual should have planning expertise. A good candidate would be a CPT who has completed the career course and is awaiting a command.	Attendance at a Formal Course	Personnel should attend relevant courses, including battle staff.
			For Air NCO: An experienced individual who is a jump master.		
	Information Operations (IO), Civil-Military Operations (CMO) at Troop/Squadron Level	Select Personnel with Relevant Knowledge or Skills	At the squadron level, select personnel with prior deployment experience and appropriate educational background. At Troop level select the XO or Fire Support Officer	Use of a Proficient Leader or Expert to Mentor or Develop Other Personnel	Training should be conducted through a direct linkage with Brigade S9 and IO for classes.
	BSTB Land Ownership Duties (Planning Cell)	Select Personnel with Relevant Knowledge or Skills	The S-3 and an LT or CPT serving as planner. Other representatives should be pulled from the S-1 or S-4, dual hatted with their primary mission and serving as support.		

