

# The U.S. Army in Asia: Opportunities and Challenges

## Report of a Workshop of Experts

Joel Wuthnow  
Tamara Hemphill  
David Finkelstein  
Albert Willner

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Dr. Albert S. Willner, Director of the China Security Affairs Group, is available at 703-824-2883 and by email at [willnera@cna.org](mailto:willnera@cna.org). Ms. Tamara Hemphill, the CNA China Studies Program Manager and Workshop Project Director, is available at 703-824-2106 and by email at [hempfit@cna.org](mailto:hempfit@cna.org).

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Albert S. Willner, Ph.D.  
Director  
China Security Affairs Group  
CNA China Studies

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## Executive Summary

On April 25, 2013, CNA held a workshop to address the future of the U.S. Army in the Asia-Pacific region. Panelists considered the strategic, political-military, and operational factors that are creating both opportunities and challenges for the U.S. Army as it develops its plans for the region. Key points include:

**Land power will continue to be required to support U.S. national objectives in the Asia-Pacific region. The U.S. Army must be prepared to conduct operations in diverse and changing political-military environments, and across a wide range of traditional and non-traditional contingencies. The Army will also be expected to provide critical enabling capabilities to joint and combined endeavors.**

The U.S. Army must be prepared to confront a wide range of operational challenges and maintain a broad mix of capabilities that are adaptable to specific circumstances in order to meet these requirements. Whether playing a central role on the Korean Peninsula, or supporting operations in anti-access/area denial (A2AD) and non-traditional security environments, the U.S. Army will be required to play multiple roles in the region – as a service, a joint force enabler, in combined operations with regional forces, and as a partner in whole-of-government initiatives.

**The U.S. Army has a significant role to play in engagement with partners in the Asia-Pacific region, including supporting U.S. national security objectives by strengthening relationships, building partner capacity, and helping to shape the overall security environment.**

One recurrent theme to emerge from the workshop is that U.S. Army engagement activities will be critical in pursuing U.S. interests in the region. Combined training, professional military education, building partner capacity, and other activities not only help advance the interests of the United States, but are also increasingly in demand by partner states. Developing effective engagement plans will therefore require integrating the needs and concerns of host nations with U.S. interests and objectives.

**As the U.S. rebalances to Asia, U.S. Army Foreign Area Officers will provide valuable and sought-after regional military-political expertise to the Army as well as to the larger joint and interagency communities.**

The importance of U.S. Army Foreign Area Officers (FAOs) was a *leitmotif* across the workshop's panels. Most panelists addressed the importance of FAOs for peacetime engagement activities in the region. Others suggested the need for U.S. Army regional specialists in operational units. Participants were vocal in their suggestions for the FAO program and in their concerns about its future, emphasizing that this capability needs to be carefully preserved and managed.

**Several challenges have the potential to complicate or work against the U.S. Army's plans, programs, operations, and activities in the Asia-Pacific region.**

Panelists identified several key challenges, some inherent to the region, and some domestic or internal to the Army. These include smaller U.S. defense budgets, concerns about duplication of service capabilities, logistical and economic challenges of operating over long distances, limits on the potential for partnerships with some states, concerns about the ability to develop and retain regional expertise, and an uncertain future on the Korean Peninsula.

# The U.S. Army in Asia: Opportunities and Challenges

## Report of a Workshop of Experts

### Introduction

On April 25, 2013, CNA held a day-long workshop of experts titled, “The U.S. Army in Asia: Opportunities and Challenges.” The workshop took place against the backdrop of significant strategic change for the U.S. Army and the Asia-Pacific region, including: (1) an impending drawdown of U.S. forces from Southwest Asia, (2) the “rebalance” to the Asia-Pacific, (3) a constrained fiscal environment, (4) the rise of new powers in Asia, and (5) a complex mix of enduring and newly emerging security challenges.

The objective of this workshop was to address the opportunities and the challenges the U.S. Army should consider as it makes its plans to support larger strategic objectives in the region. This report highlights the key issues raised by panelists and participants.

The workshop brought together current and former senior military officers who provided Joint, Army, Navy, and Marine Corps perspectives; former senior civilian leaders of the Departments of Defense and State; and noted academics (see

Appendix A for speaker biographies). A select audience of current and former U.S. military officers, civilian U.S. government personnel, and foreign military attachés and diplomats from throughout Asia also provided valuable input in addressing the workshop’s key questions.

The workshop consisted of four panels, which focused on the following questions (see Appendix B for the full agenda):

- What does the emerging Asia-Pacific security environment look like and what are the implications for the U.S. Army?
- What operational dimensions does the U.S. Army need to prepare for in Asia?
- What political-military dimensions does the U.S. Army need to prepare for in Asia?
- What should be the U.S. Army’s role in Asia?

## Key Themes

**Land power will continue to be required to support U.S. national objectives in the Asia-Pacific region. The U.S. Army must be prepared to conduct operations in diverse and changing political-military environments, and across a wide range of traditional and non-traditional contingencies. The Army will also be expected to provide critical enabling capabilities to joint and combined endeavors.**

Panelists agreed that the U.S. Army will be required to play several important roles in supporting national objectives in the Asia-Pacific region and that it will need to factor these into future plans and programs.

- The Army will continue to play a central role on the Korean Peninsula.
- It will provide key enabling capabilities for the joint force in contingencies throughout the region.
- It will be expected to support operations in an anti-access/area denial (A2AD) environment.<sup>1</sup>
- It will grapple with non-traditional security missions and unconventional challenges such as foreign internal defense.

Surveying the strategic environment that the U.S. Army will face in the Asia-Pacific region, panelists described considerable political, economic, and military changes, as well as a wide range of traditional and non-traditional threats that will

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<sup>1</sup> This phrase refers to concerns that adversaries may seek to deny the U.S. military the ability to operate safely within the region in future conflicts. For further information, see: *Sustaining Global Leadership: Priorities for 21<sup>st</sup> Century Defense* (Washington: Department of Defense, 2012), p. 4.

complicate this planning. These features make the region “one of the most dynamic and volatile” in the world, according to The Honorable Michèle Flournoy, who served as Undersecretary of Defense for Policy from 2009 to 2012. This will require the Army to have a broad mix of capabilities that can be adapted to specific circumstances as it conducts its role as a joint, interagency, and combined actor.

### ***U.S. Army contributions in the region***

Panelists agreed that the U.S. Army will be instrumental in strengthening American capabilities for meeting security challenges and maintaining U.S. commitments in the Asia-Pacific region in areas ranging from deterrence on the Korean Peninsula, to counterterrorism efforts, to humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations.

***“The Army was, is, and always will be a contributor to the advancement of U.S. national security interests in the Asia-Pacific theater.”***

-Lieutenant Colonel Frank Hoffman,  
U.S. Marine Corps (ret.)

Panelists also agreed that the U.S. Army’s contributions to U.S. security objectives should be integrated into a broader joint and interagency approach to the region.

### The Asia-Pacific Region: Key Macro Trends

In his presentation, Dr. Michael J. Green, senior vice president at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, identified five macro trends affecting the political and security environment in Asia. These include the following:

- **Economic Interdependence:** The level of intra-regional trade is unprecedented, and the global economic center of gravity is gradually returning to Asia.
- **Nationalism:** Nationalist sentiment is exacerbating maritime disputes, and may be encouraging China to challenge U.S. military preeminence in the region.
- **Democratization:** There has been a “domino effect” of democratization in the region, accompanied by a spread of liberal democratic norms.
- **Proliferation:** North Korea remains a proliferation concern, and the use of civil nuclear energy in the region has become more widespread.
- **A Shifting Balance of Power:** China’s economy is on track to surpass the U.S. economy by 2050; other powers, such as South Korea, India, and Indonesia, are also rising.

Dr. Thomas X. Hammes, a senior research fellow at the National Defense University, said that when designing a strategic approach to Asia, U.S. national command authorities should emphasize “key enablers” provided by the U.S. Army to the joint force. These “key enablers” include command, control, communications, and logistical support capabilities.

Lieutenant General Robert Brown, commanding general of I Corps, similarly noted that the U.S. Army’s role in Asia should be part of a “whole-of-government approach.” Brown also cautioned that the U.S. Army, and I Corps in particular, should “not get ahead of everybody and [needs to] stay synchronized” with joint force efforts in the region.

Colonel (ret.) David Maxwell, who served as commander of the Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines from 2006 to 2007, argued that the U.S. Army should be “nested” within an interagency effort that coordinates the roles of the

military, State Department, and other actors in support of strategic objectives. He highlighted country teams as an important tool for integrating military and civilian efforts in the region.

### *Rapid political and economic changes*

Dr. David Finkelstein, director of China Studies at CNA, observed that the United States and its military will have to contend with rapid political and economic changes ongoing in the region, including the emergence of South and Southeast Asia as economic centers of gravity; the arrival of a strong and prosperous China; and the parallel growth of economic interdependence and security tensions throughout the region.

Participants cited other key attributes of the changing political-military environment, including: the emergence of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as a key multilateral institution; the rise of India; the upsurge of nationalism in several countries;

democratization in Indonesia; political change in Burma; changing dynamics in some U.S. alliances; and evolving security relations between the U.S. and others, such as Vietnam.

Given this dynamism and complexity, panelists agreed that the Army will have to maintain key political-military expertise in order to support operational planning. For example, participants pointed to the need for the Army to preserve and enhance the Foreign Area Officer program, which is discussed later in this report.

### ***Traditional threats: the Korean Peninsula and beyond***

Participants agreed that a conflict on the Korean Peninsula remains the most dangerous and consequential contingency in Asia. It is also a contingency in which the U.S. Army will play a central role, and would involve a range of evolving threats that require flexibility and adaptation on the part of the U.S. Army.

Dr. Michael O'Hanlon, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, argued that the U.S. Army will have to provide a "substantial" force to deter North Korea from acts of aggression. Lieutenant

General Duane Thiessen (USMC, ret.) pointed out that "high states of readiness and training for the North Korea threat is the best deterrent to prevent it [a conflict] from actually occurring."

If deterrence does not ultimately prevent a conflict, the U.S. Army must be prepared and ready to defeat North Korea. "We've got to win, and we've got to be ready...at the full end of the spectrum," maintained LTG Brown.

Major General (ret.) John Landry noted that Pyongyang remains capable of inflicting severe damage on South Korea, and is a concern as a potential proliferator of weapons of mass destruction. In addition, the collapse of the North Korean regime would present complex challenges for the U.S. military, and the U.S. Army in particular, potentially requiring stability operations and/or securing of nuclear materials. Participants also identified large-scale insurgency in the North following a regime collapse as another possible challenge the U.S. Army could face.

In addition to North Korea, the potential remains for conflict across the Taiwan Strait, despite the relative reduction in tensions between China and Taiwan in recent years. MG Landry suggested that

#### **The Korean Peninsula**

***"I think Korea, we would all agree, is the big threat. It will be conventional, but I think it will also be hybrid, and I think it has a huge potential for a component of an irregular threat, particularly after the North Korean People's Army is destroyed or if the regime collapses. I think the potential for internal resistance in North Korea is one that will make Iraq and Afghanistan pale in comparison."***

-Rear Admiral Robert Thomas;  
Chief of Staff for Strategic Plans and Policy,  
The Joint Staff

the U.S. Army may have a “critical” role to play in a potential conflict regarding Taiwan. This role could include providing air defense and other key capabilities to allies and friends in the event of a Taiwan contingency.

Panelists also discussed maritime challenges in the Asia-Pacific region, particularly in the Yellow, East China, and South China seas. Dr. Michael Green, senior vice president at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, attributed the recent increase in maritime incidents to nationalism in the region, as well as to China’s attempts to challenge “American preeminence” in the littoral regions surrounding the PRC.

Lieutenant General (ret.) John Sterling, deputy commander of the Army’s Training and Doctrine Command from 2010 to 2012, commented that operations in maritime areas could have land power dimensions for the U.S. Army to consider. These could potentially include requirements for the use of land-based attack helicopters and other assets in deterring potential aggression, defending U.S. and allied facilities, and helping to assuage the concerns of allies.

### ***Non-traditional security operations: insurgencies and internal resistance***

Colonel (ret.) David Maxwell, who commanded the Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines from 2006 to 2007, explained that some states in the Asia-Pacific region, including Indonesia and the Philippines, are facing insurgencies, terrorism, and other domestic threats to stability. He noted that special operations forces, including those of the U.S. Army, may be required to

“help our friends, partners, and allies” address “lawlessness, subversion, insurgency, and terrorism.” Training, in particular, could prove critical in foreign internal defense missions, panelists said.

Colonel (ret.) Maxwell also noted that U.S. and South Korean ground forces may face the challenge of internal resistance by the Korean People’s Army (KPA) if the North Korean regime were to collapse and U.S. forces move in, a situation that would have enormous implications for the Army on the Korean Peninsula.

According to participants, the U.S. Army can draw on two sets of recent lessons learned in order to effectively pursue foreign internal defense in Asia. One is the experiences of the Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines, which has closely cooperated with the Philippine government and populace in developing methods of countering insurgency and terrorism.

The other set is lessons in counterinsurgency operations that the U.S. Army has learned in Iraq and Afghanistan. These lessons, one panelist noted, may be helpful in assisting Asian partners in responding to internal threats. However, as another participant cautioned, it is important for the U.S. Army to be aware of the significant political, cultural, and geographical differences between the Middle East and the Asia-Pacific regions, as well as within individual countries.

LtCol (ret.) Hoffman encouraged the U.S. special operations community to weigh whether and how it should become involved in the “strategic” dimensions of foreign internal defense in Asia, such as in foreign military sales and “large-scale conventional training,” given competing

demands for its participation in counter-terrorism operations around the globe.

***Non-traditional security operations: natural disasters and pandemics***

The need for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) is another persistent challenge the U.S. military will face in Asia. Panelists highlighted the frequency and severity of natural disasters in the region, including tsunamis, earthquakes, wildfires, and mudslides. Professor Tom Christensen, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian & Pacific Affairs, described Southeast Asia, in particular, as “disaster central.”

Participants also pointed to significant medical security challenges in the region as a serious concern, recalling the problems caused by the highly pathogenic H5N1 virus (“avian flu”) and SARS (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome) pandemics.

U.S. Army logistics capabilities and expertise were highlighted by participants as being particularly instrumental in supporting and carrying out HA/DR operations over long distances. Panelists also noted that the U.S. Army provides communications and other capabilities to respond to emergencies in ways that many civilian agencies and other actors may be less capable of.

LTG Brown suggested that the U.S. Army may be required to operate from maritime platforms to provide logistical support for HA/DR operations throughout the region, as well as potential non-combatant evacuation operations.

Dr. Christensen pointed out that the involvement of the U.S. Army and other U.S. military forces in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations can generate “great political value” by fostering “trust and even affection among populations that might be quite suspicious of us otherwise.”

Christensen contended that the assistance provided by the United States after the 2004 Asian tsunami led to greater respect for the United States in parts of Southeast Asia, and facilitated U.S. counterinsurgency and other efforts in the region.

As with traditional threats, participants agreed that the U.S. Army will continue to be called on to participate in HA/DR operations and must be able to adapt to these non-traditional challenges. They agreed that the Army must carefully consider the capabilities it will need to conduct humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and noncombatant evacuation operations throughout Asia.

***Providing key enabling capabilities for the joint force throughout Asia***

Panelists concurred that the U.S. Army’s air and missile defense systems will play critical roles in joint force operations in the region.<sup>2</sup> Lieutenant Colonel (ret.) Frank Hoffman, a scholar at the National Defense University, argued that Southeast Asia may require missile and air defense support, but cautioned that domestic politics in some states might limit the potential for cooperation with the U.S.

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<sup>2</sup> For more details, see: Jim Thomas, “Why the U.S. Army Needs Missiles,” *Foreign Affairs*, May/June 2013. Available online, at: <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139119/jim-thomas/why-the-us-army-needs-missiles>

Army in some cases. One participant also noted that the Army has the capability to facilitate the integration of U.S. and partner air and missile defense capabilities into a more effective regional network.

In addition, LTG (ret.) Sterling asserted that the U.S. Army's command and control capabilities in support of the joint force, plus its ability to integrate allied data "into our joint command and control systems," is key to meeting U.S. military missions throughout the region. Likewise, panelists noted that the U.S. Army offers much of the "communications backbone" for U.S. forces in the region.

MG (ret.) Landry further noted that the U.S. Army has been developing capabilities that will be instrumental to joint commanders in maintaining space-based intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities in the event of a crisis.

The U.S. Army will also be required to provide additional capabilities in support of joint and combined operations in the region. According to panelists, such assets include:

- Combat arms advisors and trainers
- Civil Affairs units
- Military Police
- Special Operations Forces
- Engineer units
- Medical personnel
- Foreign Area Officers
- Explosive Ordnance Disposal units

### ***Supporting operations in an "anti-access/area-denial" environment***

Several panelists commented on the U.S. Army's role in operating in an "anti-access/area-denial" (A2/AD) environment in Asia.

LtCol (ret.) Hoffman argued that maritime and aerospace capabilities are not sufficient to address A2/AD challenges, and that in some cases, ground forces may be needed to operate in denied areas on the land. This will require the U.S. Army to be prepared to conduct force mobility and force protection operations, according to Hoffman.

Additionally, LTG Brown contended that, even in an "air/sea-based concept," the U.S. Army may have to handle the "human domain" on the land, which requires sufficient capabilities to effectively engage with leaders in allied and partner countries.

Finally, Dr. Larry Wortzel, a member of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, asserted that it will be important for the U.S. Army to encourage regional states, such as Vietnam and the Philippines, to build capacity in air defense, command and control, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities to respond to shared A2/AD challenges.

### ***Six tenets for the operational environment in Asia***

LtGen Duane Thiessen (USMC, Ret.), provided six cogent points about the operational environment in the Asia-Pacific region that bear presentation in their entirety on the following page.

### **Six Tenets for Future U.S. Forces Operations in the Asia Pacific**

-LtGen Duane Thiessen

1. The U.S. Army and all U.S. forces should be organized, prepared, and ready for very difficult conventional fights in Northeast Asia, specifically Taiwan and Korea. High states of readiness and training for the North Korean threat is the best deterrence to prevent it from actually occurring.
2. Elsewhere in the Asia Pacific, we should be organized and prepared for a rapid response of widely dispersed expeditionary forces that converge to any crisis and, if necessary, build a joint force in stride.
3. Additional main bases and additional numbers of permanent U.S. forces in the Pacific beyond the current agreements and structure is unlikely. We will have to do this from where we are with what we have.
4. In the Pacific, sustaining logistics is the dominant challenge to any operation. Very large oceans, huge distances, lack of infrastructure, and time make everything else secondary.
5. The U.S. must engage with, train with, and validate the forces of our allies, partners, and friends in the Pacific. We must develop the habitual relationships, the training, the techniques, the procedures to operate together, starting on day one.
6. U.S. forces must be willing to assume a supporting role early, supporting bilateral and multilateral efforts with a host country or a regional leader in charge.

**The U.S. Army has a significant role to play in engagement with partners in the Asia-Pacific region, including supporting U.S. national security objectives by strengthening relationships, building partner capacity, and helping to shape the overall security environment.**

One of the recurrent themes to emerge from the workshop is that U.S. Army engagement activities with regional armies will be critical in pursuing U.S. interests in the region. Combined training, professional military education, building partner capacity, and other activities not only help advance the interests of the United States, but are also increasingly in demand by partner states. In this regard, panelists noted that developing effective engagement plans will require the integration of host nation needs and concerns with U.S. interests and objectives.

Participants also suggested that the Army identify prospective opportunities for multilateral engagement—an emerging regional trend—in addition to bilateral activities.

#### ***U.S. Army engagement in the region advances U.S. interests***

According to Dr. Michael Green, U.S. Army engagement in the Asia-Pacific region helps the United States achieve multiple strategic ends, including dissuading potential adversaries, reassuring allies, and building ally and partner capacity.

Workshop participants identified four other ways in which U.S. Army engagement activities in Asia can further U.S. interests:

- Engagement helps the United States strengthen ties with allies and friends—an important component of the U.S. rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region.
- U.S. Army engagement activities are integral to other whole-of-government efforts aimed at establishing cooperative relations with emerging partners such as Vietnam and Indonesia and major powers such as China and India.
- Building relationships and capacity with select ground forces in the region will enhance the prospects for successful future operational cooperation and may help facilitate access to bases and other facilities.
- Engagement activities by the U.S. Army can also serve as a platform for modeling civil-military relations for states, such as Burma and Indonesia, that are undergoing significant political change and whose militaries are dominated by their ground forces.

***“The Army is going to be the key point of connectivity for our military with the Southeast Asian militaries.”***

—Mr. Ernest Z. Bower  
Senior Adviser,  
Center for Strategic and International Studies

Some participants suggested that the involvement of senior U.S. Army officers in engagement activities will be particularly important because ground

forces are the predominant military service for many states in the region. In this regard, the elevation of the U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC) to a four-star command is helpful.

However, one participant countered that the United States may instead wish to remind some regional countries of the importance of strengthening other elements in their militaries, and thus the U.S. military might sometimes choose to be represented by Navy or Air Force officers when engaging with a regional nation’s ground forces, “despite the fact that it might make some Army-dominated officer corps very uncomfortable.”

***The U.S. Army is an attractive partner for many militaries in Asia due to a demonstrated credibility as a fighting force***

Participants agreed that the U.S. Army’s demonstrated experience and proficiency in combat make it an attractive partner for other militaries in Asia.

Two panelists noted that the U.S. Army’s continued value to regional partners is dependent upon the U.S. Army maintaining its operational excellence. Dr. O’Hanlon, for instance, argued that “we need to always be the best warfighters if we’re going to be the best people for liaison, for foreign planning, for foreign training, for FID missions, for PME...if we’re going to have the credibility to do those things well and sustain this unbelievable alliance system that we have today around the world, we’re going to need to be the Army that everybody wants to be associated with.”

Echoing this point, LTG (ret.) Sterling said, “I had an Army chief of a Pacific nation come up to me and say that what gives

the U.S. Army...access to their militaries is our unequaled proficiency in war fighting skills, and without our demonstrated proficiency in ground combat skills, they are not very interested in engaging with us.”

According to Rear Admiral (ret.) Michael McDevitt, a senior fellow at CNA’s Center for Naval Analyses and former director of strategy, plans, and policy for U.S. Pacific Command, the U.S. Army and Marine Corps possess a “kind of nitty-gritty, decade-long combat experience” that could be leveraged in enhancing training and military education partnerships in Asia. This experience includes small unit intelligence on the battlefield, dealing with improvised explosive devices, battlefield medicine, and the use of dogs, which all contribute to troop survival.

Overall, there was consensus among participants that regional militaries seek engagement with the U.S. Army because it advances their own institutional agendas. In addition to enhancing war fighting skills, panelists listed the following ways in which engagement with the U.S. Army can assist regional militaries:

- Serving as a model for the development of the non-commissioned officer corps in select countries
- Refining the processes by which doctrine is developed
- Assisting in institution-building within host-nation militaries as well as providing a model of civil-military relations in a democratic society.

***In pursuing engagement, the U.S. Army must carefully consider the needs and concerns of partner states, and the opportunities these present for engagement***

Several participants underscored the need for the U.S. Army to consider the interests and priorities of host nations when developing its engagement plans, and to evaluate potential opportunities that meet both U.S. and partner objectives. Lieutenant General (ret.) Duane Thiessen, former commander of Marine Corps Forces Pacific, said that the best way to engage with host nations is to “empower those who are making the decisions to make the right decisions and do the right things...the opportunities there go way, way, way beyond our traditional way of thinking.”

Mr. Ernest Bower, senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, also emphasized that U.S. Army engagement plans should include an understanding of regional concerns. “You’ve got to understand what Asia needs and what Asia wants and then take and map what you can offer and what you want to offer in your strategy with theirs,” he said.

***The U.S. Army may increasingly conduct engagement activities in multilateral settings***

Participants discussed the extent to which future engagement might benefit from multilateral settings, including with organizations such as ASEAN and in trilateral endeavors between the United States, Japan, and South Korea.

In the context of military engagements in Southeast Asia, Rear Admiral Robert Thomas, chief of staff for strategic plans

and policy on the Joint Staff, highlighted the need to move cooperation “away from the cultural disposition for bilateral and...into multilateral forms.” For example, LTG Brown suggested that multilateral cooperation with militaries in the region might be a “more efficient way [for the Army] to work with our partners.”

However, other speakers identified potential constraints on multilateral cooperation. Addressing U.S. trilateral cooperation with Japan and South Korea, RADM (ret.) McDevitt argued that issues

of nationalism frequently cause politicians in these states to “clamp down” on closer military-to-military ties, even though uniformed leaders themselves often favor such engagements. Similarly, Dr. Wortzel argued that historical mistrust among states in both Northeast and Southeast Asia may limit the chances for multilateral cooperation.

These potential limitations should be taken into account as the U.S. Army decides how it will engage multilaterally in the region, panelists agreed.

### **As the U.S. rebalances to Asia, U.S. Army Foreign Area Officers will provide valuable and sought-after regional military-political expertise to the Army as well as to the larger joint and interagency communities**

The importance of U.S. Army Foreign Area Officers (FAO) was a *leitmotif* across panels, with participants underscoring the important roles FAOs will play in political-military assignments as well as in operational units.

Several participants offered suggestions for the FAO program and expressed concern for its future.

- One participant suggested that the U.S. Army take a close look at the mix of its Asia FAOs, with an eye toward ensuring that it is producing enough Southeast Asia and South Asia specialists.
- Another participant reminded workshop participants that Reserve FAOs need to be factored into the total mix. Reservists, it was pointed out, have the ability to develop long-term relationships that are essential in Asian culture because reservists often

have the opportunity for multiple in-country tours over many years, something the assignments system cannot always accommodate for Active Component officers.

- While many may think of FAOs as serving almost exclusively in political-military assignments, LTG Brown argued that operational units designated for missions in Asia (or elsewhere) can benefit greatly from the assignment of U.S. Army regional specialists. Citing an FAO he recently requested to serve on I Corps staff as an example, he said that the officer’s Japanese language skills and prior experience and relationships with Japan’s Northern Army will be assets in dealing with Japanese Ground Self Defense Force counterparts during the upcoming exercise Yama Sakura.

- Rear Admiral Robert Thomas, Chief of Staff for Strategic Plans and Policy (J5), The Joint Staff, endorsed the idea that Army FAOs need to bring their expertise to assignments dealing with operational issues and “not just be desk officers sitting in the Joint Staff doing great work.”
- Panelists expressed two notable concerns about the U.S. Army FAO program. One is that U.S. Army FAOs may not be professionally competitive within the U.S. Army system. Not enough senior FAOs may survive to O-6 and flag rank at the point in their careers when they can have the most impact with host nations and within our own system. A second concern is that in the current environment of

fiscal austerity, the U.S. Army may view the FAO program as an easy target for budget cuts.

***“One of the key force multipliers the Army really holds; the gold standard...is the Army Foreign Area Office program. We cannot let that atrophy in any way.”***

-Rear Admiral Robert Thomas;  
Chief of Staff for Strategic Plans and Policy,  
The Joint Staff

Overall, it was clear that workshop participants considered the FAO program not only an important asset to the U.S. Army, but also for supporting the larger joint community. There was consensus that it needs to be carefully preserved and managed.

### **Several challenges have the potential to complicate or work against the U.S. Army’s plans, programs, operations, and activities in the Asia-Pacific region.**

Panelists agreed that some of these challenges are inherent in the region, while others will be generated domestically or will be internal U.S. Army challenges.

Key challenges identified by panelists include:

- Smaller U.S. defense budgets
- Concerns about duplication of capabilities
- The logistical and economic challenges of operating over long distances
- Limits on the potential for partnerships with some states
- Inadequate incentives to develop and retain regional expertise

- An uncertain future on the Korean Peninsula

#### ***Smaller U.S. defense budgets***

Significant long-term reduction to the U.S. defense budget was an issue that all panelists agreed would place constraints on U.S. Army activities in Asia.

This challenge will cut across all the services, and panelists suggested that the services need to work together to find efficiencies. For example, RADM Thomas offered that, where feasible, the U.S. Army—along with the other services—should conduct more joint exercises, which may be more efficient than single service exercises. LTG Brown stated that holding more exercises with Asia-Pacific

militaries in the United States also has the potential to generate greater efficiencies.

Michèle Flournoy posited that the Department of Defense's ability to reduce overhead is related to having funds available for operations in Asia. She cited the need to reduce "unnecessary infrastructure" and seek acquisition reform. If those changes are not undertaken, Flournoy said, "we will see a much more constrained set of options going forward."

### ***Concerns about duplication of capabilities***

Related to the challenge of constrained budgets is the difficult issue of de-conflicting roles in Asia between the services.

During the workshop, two speakers voiced concerns that some U.S. Army activities in Asia may be duplicative with the U.S. Marine Corps. Dr. Hammes stated, for example, that conducting amphibious operations would duplicate U.S. Marine Corps skills and capabilities.

***The United States has "got to avoid the temptation to build another Marine Corps out of the U.S. Army in the Pacific."***

-Rear Admiral Robert Thomas;  
Chief of Staff for Strategic Plans and Policy,  
The Joint Staff

Addressing this issue, LTG Brown said that he is coordinating the efforts of I Corps with those of I Marine Expeditionary Force, "learning from each other," and determining how the U.S. Army and Marine Corps can best work together in a joint, interagency, and multinational environment.

### ***The logistical and economic challenges of operating over long distances***

Like the other services, the U.S. Army faces the "tyranny of distance" in the Asia-Pacific region. Participants expressed concern that the U.S. Army may lack adequate air and sea lift, as well as insufficient infrastructure, to carry out commitments within the Asia-Pacific region. In addition, speakers noted the high costs for all the services associated with operating over long distances, especially in the current fiscal environment.

However, LtCol (ret.) Hoffman pointed to two factors that may mitigate these concerns: (1) the Army's logistics management expertise is "probably second to none," and (2) while expensive, pre-positioning equipment in some parts of the region may be possible in order to overcome challenges related to distance.

### ***Limits on the potential for partnerships with some states***

Panelists argued that several factors may limit the willingness or ability of some states to partner with the U.S. Army, including domestic political pressures, resource constraints, and third-country concerns about the partnership.

First, political factors that may limit partnerships with the U.S. Army include an "ingrained skepticism" in some countries for the presence of foreign militaries in their communities, historical legacies, and the overall state of bilateral relations with the United States.

Second, resource challenges in areas such as partner human capital, funding, and technical capacity may also limit partnerships from a functional

perspective. Similarly, intra-bureaucratic frictions within some countries may complicate their ability to approve U.S. Army activities or assistance.

Third-country concerns may also limit the extent to which the U.S. Army can partner with some counterparts in the region. Some participants cited China's political and economic influence in the region as an example, with countries such as Vietnam, Myanmar, and Cambodia being very mindful of interests they have with both Beijing and Washington.

Understanding the complex dynamics at work, and the ability to identify limits as well as opportunities, will be key skill sets for U.S. Army planners.

### ***Inadequate incentives to develop and retain regional expertise***

Discussing the U.S. Army's need for greater regional expertise, Dr. Hammes argued that the U.S. Army personnel system metaphorically "hunts down and kills people who get regional expertise." In particular, Hammes suggested that the system discourages officers from developing "deep relationships" with counterparts, which he said are critical to developing closer military-to-military ties in Asia.

Dr. Green also stated that "the Army in particular is going to need to grow and nurture Foreign Area Officers and regional expertise." [See pp. 13-14 above for panelists' views on enhancing the FAO program.]

### ***An uncertain future on the Korean Peninsula***

In the near- and mid-term, the foundational role of the U.S. Army as a deterrent and warfighting force in Korea will continue to generate force structure requirements.

Over the horizon, however, lurks the question of what effect unification might have on U.S. forces on the peninsula. Some panelists suggested that justifying Army force structure in Northeast Asia, absent a threat from North Korea, could be challenging. As Dr. O'Hanlon argued, "If there's no obvious nemesis to point to as a plausible high-probability major ground threat, then the Army is going to have to face some fundamental questions."

Similarly, Dr. Christensen contended that U.S. leaders must consider whether South Korea would "want the Army to remain in Korea after unification."

Christensen also noted that the U.S. must think through "the political-military implications for Japan or China of [the U.S. military] either staying or leaving the Korean Peninsula."

Finally, LTG (ret.) John Sterling noted that peacetime engagement activities have not traditionally been used to justify force structure in the U.S. Army budgeting process. He suggested that the Army should consider identifying peacetime presence in the Asia-Pacific as a justification for force structure, noting that "now is the time to get after this very issue."

## **Appendix A: Biographies of Speakers**

### **Panel I: The Emerging Asia-Pacific Security Environment**

#### **Major General John R. Landry (U.S. Army, ret.)**

General Landry graduated from the United States Military Academy, West Point, New York, in 1962 with a Bachelor of Science degree in military engineering. He later earned a Master of Public Administration Degree from Harvard University. His military education includes graduation from the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and The National War College, Fort McNair, Washington, D.C.

He served in the United States Army for thirty two years. In his last assignment on active duty he served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Guard/Reserve Affairs, Office of the Secretary of Defense.

After retiring from active military service, he was appointed to the National Intelligence Council, where he served as National Intelligence Officer for Military Issues. In that position, he supported the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) as his principal adviser on issues concerning military developments worldwide, and led strategic analysis of military issues with agencies across the Intelligence Community. General Landry retired from federal service in November 2012.

#### **Dr. Michael Green**

Michael Jonathan Green is senior vice president for Asia and Japan Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), and an associate professor at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. He served on the staff of the National Security Council (NSC) from 2001 through 2005, first as director for Asian affairs, with responsibility for Japan, Korea, Australia, and New Zealand, and then as special assistant to the president for national security affairs and senior director for Asia, with responsibility for East Asia and South Asia.

Before joining the NSC staff, he was senior fellow for East Asian security at the Council on Foreign Relations; director of the Edwin O. Reischauer Center and the Foreign Policy Institute, and an assistant professor at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) at Johns Hopkins University; research staff member at the Institute for Defense Analyses; and senior adviser on Asia in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. He has also worked in Japan on the staff of a member of the National Diet.

Dr. Green received his master's and doctoral degrees from SAIS and did additional graduate and postgraduate research at Tokyo University and at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

### **Mr. Ernest Z. Bower**

Ernest Bower is senior adviser and Sumitro Chair for Southeast Asia Studies, and codirector of the Pacific Partners Initiative at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. He is recognized as a leading expert on Southeast Asia. He is president & CEO of BowerGroupAsia, a well-known business advisory firm he created and built. Before forming his company, he served for a decade as president of the US-ASEAN Business Council, the top private business group composed of America's leading companies in Southeast Asia. Over 20 years, he helped to establish and build the Council from the ground level, working with government and private-sector leaders from the United States and Southeast Asia.

Bower holds a bachelor's degree from Colgate University and studied Mandarin Chinese at Middlebury College's Sunderland School of Foreign Language.

### **Dr. Thomas X. Hammes**

In his thirty years in the Marine Corps, T. X. Hammes served at all levels in the operating forces, including command of an intelligence battalion, an infantry battalion, and the Chemical Biological Incident Response Force.

Hammes has a Master's in Historical Research and a Doctorate in Modern History from Oxford University. He is currently a Distinguished Research Fellow at the Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University and an Adjunct Professor at Georgetown University.

He is the author of "The Sling and the Stone: On War in the Twenty-First Century" and "Forgotten Warriors: The 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, the Corps Ethos, and the Korean War." He has written chapters in 12 books and over 100 articles and opinion pieces in the *Washington Post*, *New York Times*, *Jane's Defence Weekly*, and professional journals.

### **Dr. David Finkelstein**

David M. Finkelstein, a vice president at CNA, is the Director of CNA China Studies. He received his Ph.D. in Chinese history from Princeton University and studied Mandarin at Nankai University in Tianjin, China. A long-time student of Chinese and Asian affairs, he is widely published.

A retired U.S. Army officer, Dr. Finkelstein is a graduate of the United States Military Academy at West Point, the U.S. Army Command & General Staff College, and the Army War College. He held command and staff positions at the platoon, company, battalion, and major Army command levels. He also held significant China-related positions at the Pentagon as an advisor to the Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in addition to serving on the faculty at West Point, where he taught Chinese history.

## **Panel II: The Operational Dimensions**

### **Lieutenant General Robert Brown (U.S. Army)**

LTG Brown is currently the Commanding General, I Corps and Joint Base Lewis-McChord. He was commissioned into the Infantry in May 1981 after graduating from the United States Military Academy at West Point.

LTG Brown continued his studies at the National War College, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, D.C., from 2001 to 2002, where he received a Master's in National Security Strategy and graduated as Distinguished Honor Graduate.

In 2002, LTG Brown transitioned to Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Washington, where he served as the Commander, 1<sup>st</sup> Brigade (Stryker Brigade Combat Team), 25<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division, and deployed to Operation Iraqi Freedom 2004-2005, Iraq. In 2005, LTG Brown returned to Hawaii, where he served as the Executive Assistant to the Commander, United States Pacific Command, Director, J-7, Training and Exercises, United States Pacific Command. He was then assigned to the 25<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division as the Deputy Commanding General (Support), 2007-2009, where he deployed to Iraq for Operation Iraqi Freedom with Task Force Lightning from 2008-2009.

In 2010, LTG Brown transitioned to Germany, where he served as the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army Europe, and Deputy Commander, U.S. Army NATO. Upon completion, he moved to Fort Benning, Georgia, and commanded the Maneuver Center of Excellence at Fort Benning from 2010 to 2012.

### **Lieutenant General Duane Thiessen (U.S. Marine Corps, ret.)**

Lieutenant General Duane D. Thiessen was commissioned a Second Lieutenant in May 1974. His initial operational assignment was as an AV-8A Harrier Pilot, in which he completed numerous deployments to both the Mediterranean Sea and Okinawa.

Major Thiessen held several operational billets, completed Naval Command and Staff College in Newport, Rhode Island, and served as assistant to the AV-8B program manager in Naval Air Systems Command, Washington, D.C.

In June 1991, Lieutenant Colonel Thiessen reported to MCAS Cherry Point, North Carolina, where he assumed command of Marine Attack Training Squadron-203. After relinquishing command, he returned to Washington, D.C., to attend the National War College and was subsequently assigned as the Marine Requirements Officer in the Joint Strike Fighter Program office.

Brigadier General Thiessen assumed Command of 1st Marine Aircraft Wing in Okinawa, Japan in June of 2004 followed by two years as Commander, U.S. Marine Forces Korea and assistant Chief of Staff, U/C/J-5 United Nations Command, Combined Forces Command, and

United States Forces Korea. In 2007, Major General Thiessen returned to the United States, was promoted to Lieutenant General, and assumed the duties of Deputy Commandant for Programs and Resources, Headquarters United States Marine Corps.

Lieutenant General Thiessen took command of Marine Forces Pacific in September 2010.

### **Rear Admiral Robert Thomas (U.S. Navy)**

Rear Adm. Thomas assists the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, in executing his duties as principal adviser to the President and Secretary of Defense. Before rejoining the Joint Staff, Thomas commanded Submarine Group Seven in Yokosuka, Japan.

Thomas graduated from the University of California with a Bachelor of Science in Civil Engineering. He holds a Master of Science in National Security Studies from the National War College.

As a career submarine officer, Thomas has served on fast-attack submarines operating in both U.S. Pacific Command and U.S. Central Command theaters of operation. Ashore, Thomas served as flag aide to the deputy chief of naval operations (OP-07); program analyst in the Secretary of the Navy's Office of Program Appraisal; director of Operational Support (CNO N23); assistant deputy director for Politico-Military Affairs, Western Hemisphere, J5, on the Joint Staff; director, Plans and Policy (N5) for Naval Special Warfare Command; director, Strategy and Policy Division (OPNAV N51); and, most recently, Vice Director of Operations, J3, on the Joint Staff.

### **Colonel David Maxwell (U.S. Army, ret.)**

David S. Maxwell is the Associate Director of the Center for Security Studies and the Security Studies Program in the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. He is a 30-year veteran of the U.S. Army, and recently retired as a Special Forces Colonel. His final assignment was on the military faculty, teaching national security strategy at the National War College. He is a graduate of Miami University in Oxford, Ohio, and holds Masters of Military Arts and Science degrees from the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College and the School of Advanced Military Studies, and a Master of Science degree in National Security Studies from the National War College of the National Defense University. He is currently studying in the Doctorate of Liberal Studies program at Georgetown University.

### **Dr. Albert S. Willner**

Albert S. Willner, Ph.D., is the director of the China Security Affairs Group at CNA. Before joining CNA in 2009, he was an associate dean at Georgia Gwinnett College. From 2005-2007, he served as the U.S. Defense Attaché equivalent in Taiwan representing Department of Defense interests there. A retired Army colonel, he served in multiple positions as a rotary wing aviator, Asia-Pacific strategic planner, and military analyst. From 2000-2004,

he served at West Point, where he taught international relations, U.S. government, and Chinese politics. His research interests include Chinese foreign policy, Asia-Pacific regional security, and U.S.-China defense relations. He holds a Ph.D. in foreign affairs from the University of Virginia.

### **Panel III: The Political-Military Dimensions**

#### **HON Michèle Flournoy**

Michèle Flournoy is a Senior Advisor at the Boston Consulting Group. From 2009 to 2012, she served as the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the principal adviser to the Secretary of Defense in the formulation of national security and defense policy, oversight of military plans and operations, and in National Security Council deliberations. She led the development of DoD's FY2013 Strategic Guidance and represented the department in dozens of foreign engagements, in the media, and before Congress.

After the 2008 election, Ms. Flournoy co-led President Obama's transition team at DoD.

In January 2007, Ms. Flournoy co-founded the Center for a New American Security (CNAS), a non-partisan think tank dedicated to developing strong, pragmatic and principled national security policies, and served as CNAS' President.

In the mid-1990s, she served as Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Threat Reduction and Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy in the Clinton administration.

She earned her B.A. from Harvard University and her Masters in International Relations from Balliol College, Oxford University, where she was a Newton-Tatum Scholar.

#### **Dr. Larry Wortzel**

Dr. Larry M. Wortzel is a retired U.S. Army colonel who spent much of his 32-year military career in the Asia-Pacific region. He has traveled in China regularly since 1979 and he served two tours of duty there as a military attaché in the U.S. Embassy. Other assignments in the region include Thailand, South Korea, and Singapore. He also has had temporary duty assignments in Japan, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia and Vietnam. Other regional duty was at the U.S. Pacific Command. He was a strategist on the Army staff and directed the Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute.

After retiring from the Army in 1999, Wortzel was Asian studies director and vice president for foreign policy and defense studies at The Heritage Foundation. He is a commissioner on the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission and is president of Asia Strategies and Risks, LLC.

A graduate of the Armed Forces Staff College and the U.S. Army War College, Wortzel earned his M.A. and Ph.D. in political science from the University of Hawaii.

### **Dr. Thomas Christensen**

Thomas J. Christensen is the William P. Boswell Professor of World Politics of Peace and War and Director of the China and the World Program at Princeton University. From 2006-2008 he served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs with responsibility for relations with China, Taiwan, and Mongolia. His research and teaching focus on China's foreign relations, the international relations of East Asia, and international security.

### **Rear Admiral Michael McDevitt (U.S. Navy, ret.)**

Rear Admiral Michael McDevitt, US Navy (ret) is a Senior Fellow associated with CNA Strategic Studies, a division of the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA); a not-for-profit federally funded research center in Washington D.C. Over his 15 years at CNA, as both a Vice President and now as a Fellow, he has published a number of papers dealing with security issues in Asia.

During his navy career Rear Admiral McDevitt spent his operational time in the Pacific, including a two year assignment in Sasebo, Japan. He held four at-sea commands; including an aircraft carrier battle-group. He was the Director of the East Asia Policy office for the Secretary of Defense during the George H.W. Bush Administration. He also served for two years as the Director for Strategy, War Plans and Policy (J-5) for US CINCPAC. Rear Admiral McDevitt concluded his 34 year active duty career as the Commandant of the National War College in Washington DC.

He is a graduate of the University of Southern California, and has a Master's Degree in US Diplomatic History in East Asia for Georgetown University. McDevitt spent a year in residence at the US Naval War College as a member of the CNO's Strategic Studies Group. He is also a graduate of the National War College.

### **Dr. Alison Kaufman**

Alison Kaufman, Ph.D. is an Asia analyst at CNA, where she has worked on issues related to China's and Taiwan's military culture, Chinese foreign and security policy, and cross-Strait relations. Prior to joining CNA, she worked for the World Bank's China program and at China Radio International in Beijing. She has also worked as a subject matter expert on Chinese affairs for a well-known consultancy.

Kaufman studied Chinese at Capital Normal University in Beijing and at the International Chinese Language Program in Taipei. She received her B.A. in East Asian Studies from

Harvard University, and holds a Ph.D. in political science from the University of California, Berkeley, with a focus on Chinese political philosophy.

#### **Panel IV: The Future of the Army in Asia**

##### **Dr. Conrad Crane**

Dr. Conrad C. Crane is currently Chief of Historical Services for the Army Heritage and Education Center at Carlisle Barracks. For the previous ten years, he was Director of the US Army Military History Institute. Before accepting that position, Dr. Crane served with the Strategic Studies Institute at the US Army War College from September 2000 to January 2003, where he held the General Douglas MacArthur Chair of Research.

He joined SSI after his retirement from active military service, a 26-year military career that concluded with 9 years as Professor of History at the U.S. Military Academy. He holds a B.S. from USMA and an M.A. and Ph.D. from Stanford University. He is also a graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College and the U.S. Army War College. He has authored or edited books and monographs on the Civil War, World War I, World War II, Korea and Vietnam, and has written and lectured widely on airpower and landpower issues.

##### **Lieutenant General John Sterling (U.S. Army, ret.)**

John E. (Jack) Sterling completed a 36-year Army career as the Deputy Commander of the US Army's Training and Doctrine Command, responsible for individual training, leader development, doctrine, and future capabilities for the Army. Previously he served in Korea as the J3 for the Republic of Korea/United States Combined Forces Command, the United Nations Command, and US Forces Korea, responsible for operations of all US and Korean military forces on the peninsula.

Jack Sterling is a graduate of the United States Military Academy, and holds master's degrees from the University of Illinois (MSCE), the Army's Command and General Staff College—School of Advanced Military Studies, and the National War College.

##### **Lieutenant Colonel Frank Hoffman (U.S. Marine Corps, ret.)**

Frank G. Hoffman is currently a Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University. Prior to this appointment, he worked for 35 years with the Marines and Department of the Navy, last serving as Deputy Director of the Office of Program Appraisal from August 2009 to June 2011.

He has served on the staff of two Congressional Commissions including the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Services, and the U.S. National Security Commission/21st

Century (Hart-Rudman Commission). He also served on three Defense Science Boards, including the 2004 Defense Science Board for Post-Conflict Stability Operations.

Mr. Hoffman is a distinguished military graduate of the University of Pennsylvania (B.S. Economics, Wharton School, 1978), and George Mason University (M.Ed.). He graduated from the Naval War College (M.A. National Security Studies) with highest distinction in 1994. He is currently pursuing a doctorate at Kings College London.

### **Dr. Michael O'Hanlon**

Michael O'Hanlon is a senior fellow with the Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence and director of research for the Foreign Policy program at the Brookings Institution, where he specializes in U.S. defense strategy, the use of military force, and American foreign policy. He is a visiting lecturer at Princeton University, an adjunct professor at Johns Hopkins University, and a member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies.

O'Hanlon was an analyst at the Congressional Budget Office from 1989-1994. He also worked previously at the Institute for Defense Analyses.

His Ph.D. from Princeton is in public and international affairs; his bachelor's and master's degrees, also from Princeton, are in the physical sciences.

### **Dr. Thomas J. Bickford**

Thomas J. Bickford, Ph.D. is a senior research scientist at CNA and currently focuses on Chinese maritime strategy, Chinese national security policy, and China's relations with its neighbors. His previous work includes several articles and book chapters on Chinese civil-military relations, professional military education, and internal security. Before joining CNA, he was an associate professor at the University of Wisconsin-Oshkosh, where he taught international relations and Chinese politics. He is also a former associate director of the Wisconsin Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies.

Bickford has lived and studied in Taiwan and Hong Kong and has conducted extensive field research in China. He has a B.A. in East Asian studies from the University of Chicago, an M.S. in international studies from the London School of Economics, and a Ph.D. in political science from the University of California, Berkeley.

## **Appendix B: Workshop Agenda**

### **The U.S. Army in Asia: Opportunities and Challenges**

Residence Inn Arlington Pentagon City

Pentagon Ballroom

550 Army Navy Drive, Arlington, VA 22202

April 25, 2013

#### **0700-0800 Registration and Breakfast**

#### **0800-0815 Introductions**

#### **0815-1015 Panel I: The Emerging Asia-Pacific Security Environment**

Panel objective – *What does the emerging Asia-Pacific security environment look like and what are the implications for the U.S. Army?*

Key questions:

- What will the security environment look like?
- What U.S. strategic ends will the U.S. Army need to be ready to support?
- What roles are other armies playing in the region that may challenge or provide opportunities for the U.S. Army?

Moderator: Dr. David Finkelstein

Panelists:

- Major General (U.S. Army, ret.) John Landry, former National Intelligence Officer for Military Issues
- Dr. Michael Green, Associate Professor of International Relations, Georgetown University; and Asia and Japan Chair, Center for Strategic and International Studies
- Mr. Ernest Z. Bower, Senior Advisor for Southeast Asia Studies, Center for Strategic and International Studies
- Dr. Thomas X. Hammes, Senior Research Fellow, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University

#### **1015-1030 Break**

#### **1030-1230 Panel II: The Operational Dimensions**

Panel objective – *What are the operational dimensions that the U.S. Army needs to prepare for in Asia?*

Key questions:

- What traditional threats should the U.S. Army prepare to face in the region?
- What non-traditional security issues should the U.S. Army prepare to face in the region?
- What opportunities exist for the U.S. Army to operate as a joint partner in the region?

Moderator: Dr. Albert Willner

Panelists:

- Lieutenant General (U.S. Marine Corps, ret.) Duane Thiessen, former Commander, United States Marine Corps Forces, Pacific
- Rear Admiral Robert Thomas, Chief of Staff, Strategic Plans and Policy, Joint Staff
- Lieutenant General Robert Brown, Commanding General, I Corps, United States Army
- Colonel (U.S. Army, ret.) David Maxwell, associate director of the Center for Security Studies and the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University, and former commander of the Joint Special Operations Task Force - Philippines

### **1230-1315 Lunch**

### **1315-1515 Panel III: The Political-Military Dimensions**

Panel objective – *What are the political-military dimensions that the U.S. Army needs to prepare for in Asia?*

Key questions:

- What political-military concerns should be the primary focus for the U.S. Army?
- What opportunities exist for the U.S. Army to act as a combined partner and to leverage partnerships in the region?
- What U.S. Army engagements will advance U.S. strategic ends in Asia?

Moderator: Dr. Alison Kaufman

Panelists:

- HON Michèle Flournoy, co-founder of the Center for a New American Security, and former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
- Dr. Larry Wortzel, President, Asia Strategies and Risks, LLC, and Commissioner, U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission
- Dr. Thomas Christensen, Director, China and the World Program, Princeton University, and former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
- Rear Admiral (U.S. Navy, ret.) Michael McDevitt, senior fellow, CNA Strategic Studies

### **1515-1530 Break**

### **1530-1700 Panel IV: The Future of the Army in Asia**

Panel objective – *What does the U.S. Army need to be able to do in Asia?*

Key questions:

- What are the implications for joint planning?
- What are the implications for professional military education and training?

Moderator: Dr. Thomas Bickford

Panelists:

- Dr. Conrad Crane, Director, Chief of Historical Services and Support at United States Army Heritage and Education Center
- Lieutenant General (U.S. Army, ret.) John Sterling, former Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff, United States Army Training and Doctrine Command
- Lieutenant Colonel (U.S. Marine Corps, ret.) Frank Hoffman, Senior Research Fellow, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University
- Dr. Michael O'Hanlon, Senior Fellow, The Brookings Institution





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U.S. Army Col. Matthew McFarlane, the commander for the 4th Infantry Brigade Combat Team (Airborne), 25th Infantry Division, meets with Australian Brig. Gen. Shane Caughey, the commander for the Australian Army's 3rd Brigade, near Williamson Airfield at Shoalwater Bay Training Area, Australia, July 21, 2013, as part of Operation Talisman Saber 2013.

