The Responsibility to Protect: Intervention is Not Enough
Abstract
Officially adopted by the UN in 2005, the responsibility to protect did not make many international headlines until NATO's intervention in Libya in 2011. This monograph highlights the issues associated with precluding recurring violence after an R2P intervention when the international community does not remain committed to post-conflict consequence management. Case studies specifically dealing with Rwanda, Kosovo, and Libya examine the conditions that led, or did not lead, to intervention, the factors affecting the possibility of recurring violence, and how the level of commitment following an intervention contributed to lasting 'success.' The results of the research suggest that R2P interventions and post-conflict levels of commitment are driven by national interests, despite the rhetoric of R2P being an internationally accepted doctrine to protect populations in danger. The research also suggests that R2P interventions may worsen the structural conditions of a particular conflict if not followed through with a substantial effort by the international community to increase the likelihood of a lasting peace. The omission of the responsibility to rebuild from the original conception of R2P to the currently accepted three pillar model may have deemphasized the importance of post-conflict consequence management as part of an intervention. The key recommendation of this monograph emphasizes the necessity to commit adequate resources to facilitate post-conflict stability and development as an integral part of any R2P intervention.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- May 23, 2013
- Accession Number
- ADA587444
Entities
People
- Joshua J. Major
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College