


Rebalancing: The Cost of Shifting to the Pacific

by

Lieutenant Colonel Paul D. Baker
United States Marine Corps



United States Army War College
Class of 2013

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Lieutenant Colonel Paul D. Baker
United States Marine Corps

Dr. G.K. Cunningham
Department of Military Strategy, Planning, and Operations
Project Adviser

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U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

Abstract

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This paper examines the feasibility of support to key transportation nodes associated with the Marine Corps rebalancing efforts as directed by the President of the United States. The Marine Corps will be placing a rotational Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force of approximately 2,500 Marines in Darwin, Australia and a Marine Air Ground Task Force of approximately 5,000 Marines in the island of Guam. This paper will identify current shortfalls in transportation nodes on Guam. Those shortfalls have programmed fixes; however the coordination of both the upgrades and the movement of the Marine Air Ground Task Force from Okinawa, Japan are critical to a successful rebalancing operation.

Rebalancing: The Cost of Shifting to the Pacific

Marines are continuously deployed around the world near potential trouble spots where they can deter aggression, respond quickly, and resolve crises whenever called. The Corps' naval character and its strategically mobile presence enhance cultural and situational awareness of potential operating areas. This enhanced awareness enables Marines to work with friends and allies throughout each region, and is a cornerstone of the [Geographic Combatant Commander's] engagement plans.¹

—Marine Corps Operations,
Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1-0

For over a decade the Marine Corps has been focused on winning the nations wars. As a result of this focus the historically dominate Pacific has been placed on the back burner. This shift of military force came with a price. Both our hard and soft power has become less effective in the Pacific because of this draw down. In the past the Marine Corps as well as the rest of the Department of Defense have engaged in the northern half of United States Pacific Command's theater of operations. As the nation winds down combat actions in Iraq and Afghanistan it is time to reengage back to the Pacific. It is time to rebalance our force. This balance should manifest itself domestically and abroad, and across the Diplomatic, Informational, Military, and Economic (DIME) spectrum; if the United States wishes to remain a super power, balance must be achieved and maintained. Realizing this on his 2011 trip to Australia, President Obama, unveiled his then titled pacific pivot,² in an attempt to balance our DIME efforts to restore a more balanced global approach. As Deputy Secretary of Defense Ashton B. Carter stated the "time has come for us in the United States to look up, look around, an look out, to what the world will need next—to the security challenges that will define our future after Iraq and Afghanistan."³

While in Australia, President Obama highlighted some benefits of the increased presence in the Pacific. This change will “enhance our ability to train, exercise, and operate with allies and partners across the region, and that, in turn, will allow us to work with these nations to respond even faster to a range of challenges, including humanitarian crises and disaster relief, as well as promoting security cooperation across the region.”⁴ This strategic shift to the Southern half of the U.S. PACOM’s area of operations requires a fresh look and the infrastructure and cost to operate in this new environment. The concept behind the rebalance is not just a military concept. A renewed economic and diplomatic focus on the region will be coupled to assure our allies of our commitment to their sovereignty and unencumbered right to free trade. Secretary of State Clinton has established six priorities as the United States refocuses to the Pacific: reinforce bilateral alliances, deepen relations with emerging powers (China among others), reengage with multilateral regional institutions, expand commerce and investments, forge a large military presence, and advance democracy and human rights.⁵ In an effort to enhance these priorities the United States launched the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) to promote free trade with nine other countries: Australia, Brunei, Chili, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, and Vietnam.⁶

In an effort to meet this rebalancing requirement the United States Marine Corps has an obligation to have 22,000 Marines west of the International Date Line.⁷ With infrastructure limitations within 3rd Marine Regiment, there is not enough space for three infantry battalions to be stationed on Marine Corps Base Hawaii. Thus it make sense to place a battalion forward of the International Date Line on Camp Roberts, Darwin, Australia. The Australian Army can support the increased infrastructure requirements of

2,500 personnel that will make up the Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force and are currently training in amphibious operations to improve interoperability.⁸

In addition to Darwin the Marine Corps has been negotiating with the Government of Japan on basing options on the island of Okinawa. Over the last few decades both countries have been trying to work details that would facilitate the return of bases on the southern end of the island. Although, many proposals have come and gone over the years the main topic for change remains the movement of forces from Okinawa to Guam. Just what type and how many units will make the move is yet to be determined, but it is estimated that 5,000-8,000 Marines will be moving from Okinawa to Guam.⁹

Despite the current ambiguities, this SRP attempts to identify the lift, transport, and access requirements to support the Marine Corps units associated with the rebalancing initiative in the Australia and Guam. This task will not be a simple math formula that brings about an exact dollar cost answer to place into the budget cycle. There are literally thousands of variables that inject into this problem. Some of them will be listed below. However, time has already changed or refined this rebalancing concept and will continue to do so in the future. We must look at what kind of lift or transport will be required, and how often we plan to move these units.

The Marine Corps currently plans to station 5,000 to 8,000 Marines on Guam and to have 2,500 Marines forward deployed to Darwin, Australia. There is more to this planning than just finding seats on planes and berthing spaces on ships to calculate the cost of moving these units. To better analyze the cost of the rebalancing effort, we must consider what would cause a variation in the cost to transport. The types of missions

and capabilities needed to support those missions have large variations in what needs to be lifted, how securely that capability needs to travel, and how fast does that capability need to travel. First, consider the most likely mission set units will be assigned. Both the Naval Operating Concepts¹⁰ and the Marine Corps Operating Concepts¹¹ list the types of missions a Naval force may be assigned. First the Naval Operating Concepts cites five major interrelated missions: forward presence, maritime security, humanitarian assistance and disaster response, power projection, and deterrence.¹² All of these concepts could be types of missions assigned to both Marine Air-Ground Task Forces. Secondly, the Marine Corps Operating Concepts identified five tasks that could be assigned to both Marine Air Ground Task Forces: conducting military engagement, respond to crises, project power (soft or hard), conduct littoral maneuvers, and counter irregular threats.¹³ All these concepts not only project across the full spectrum of warfare, but they also have a large variety of specialized equipment and supplies that must be assembled with personnel to produce a capability that will be assigned to a mission. For instance, conducting military-to-military engagements with a country would require a smaller foot print and less security than attacking an irregular threat. With the military to military engagement the unit could fly commercially leased aircraft for a two-week mission. Whereas, attacking an irregular threat you may need amphibious shipping and a large logistics train to support a long duration kinetic fight. With these variations of lift in mind, we should start with a standardized starting point.

What can we use today to estimate the size of these units? What is the Table of Organization and Table of Equipment for these units? What are the size and weight of Marine Air Ground Task Force(s) and the number of Marines that are required to be

moved? For the answers to these questions, the Marine Corps relies on their Combat Development and Integration Division to provide rough data for planning purposes.¹⁴

This data, provided by the Combat Development and Integration Division, is based on a Marine Expeditionary Unit with an infantry battalion as its nucleus as a Ground Combat Element. The actual unit in Darwin, Australia most likely will be smaller due to the lack of ground combat element enablers (i.e. tank platoon, light armored reconnaissance platoon, and artillery battery). Current planning information estimates 2447 assigned personnel in the following categories: 307 command element; 1284 ground combat element; 588 air combat element; and 268 logistics combat element.¹⁵ This total number is extremely close to the planned 2,500 that the United States and Australia agreed to in 2011.¹⁶

The planning factor for the vehicle requirement is listed in square feet (sqft). The planning factor for vehicle breakout of the Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force-Darwin is as follows: command element 7,896 sqft; ground combat element 42,549 sqft; air combat element 5,671 sqft; and logistics combat element 24,028 sqft. A total of 80,144 sqft is the planned lift requirement for the vehicles in support of the Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force-Darwin.¹⁷

The category of cargo lift requirements brings with it the most variables. Depending on the size of unit deploying and the mission assigned from the full range of military operations, of these numbers could be halved or perhaps doubled. The planning factor for the cargo requirements is listed in cubic feet (cuft). The cargo breakout of the Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force-Darwin is as follows: command element 22,978 cuft; ground combat element 137,491 cuft; air combat

element 54,905 cuft; and logistic combat element 8,446 cuft. A total of 223,819 cuft is the planned lift requirement for all cargo in support of the Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force-Darwin.¹⁸

In addition to the personnel, vehicles, and cargo numbers listed above, we must also plan for the largest lift requirement, that is consumable items that support the entire Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force-Darwin. The most challenging and critical consumable is fuel. Traditionally a Marine Air-Ground Task Force does not transport fuel when it deploys unless they are transported on amphibious shipping. However, a Marine Air-Ground Task Force expects to consume over 1.2 million gallons of JP-5 in support of 15 days of combat operations, which equates to 8.16 million pounds of fuel.¹⁹

The total weight of this planning formula is indicated in short tons (st), or 2000-lbs increments. The total weight for the Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force is 9,799 st, or just over 19.5 million pounds. This doesn't include the myriad of armor or forces protection options that add both cubic feet and short tons. Furthermore, it does not take into account rotary-wing aircraft transportation requirements. This could range from 20 to 24 aircraft that would need lift to support Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force-Darwin in the full range of military operations.²⁰

Marine Corps units in Guam and Australia will likely have a combination of permanently assigned personnel and units attached in a rotational basis.²¹ The Marine Corps designated this rotational unit concept as the Unit Deployment Program.²² This program has been ignored for the last decade due to the operational tempo needed to support Operation Iraq Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom.²³ Now that the

Marine Corps is out of Iraq and drawing down in Afghanistan, the forces to support this program are again available for tasking. Because Marines have operated extensively in the Pacific in the past and in view of the new national strategy is focused on the region, the Unit Deployment Program has been rejuvenated. This deployment concept is no longer just an Okinawa program. The Marine Corps is also considering the feasibility of basing in the Philippines and South Korea in addition to Australia and Guam.²⁴

The Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force-Darwin will be a rotational force, thus the additional cost that needs to be captured will be incurred at least twice in a fiscal year. Every six or seven months, the Marine Corps will rotate an infantry battalion through the Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force. These evaluations will largely consist of commercial aircraft for personnel, as very little cargo as has been historically shipped with the Marine Corps' Unit Deployment Program.²⁵

The Marine Corps' Unit Deployment Program rotates Marine units from I Marine Expeditionary Force and II Marine Expeditionary Force as battalions, squadrons, companies, and batteries to Okinawa for a six-month deployment.²⁶ Arriving units fall in on sets of equipment which was forward-based and maintained on Okinawa. However, there will be some equipment rotation costs due to periodic depot level maintenance requirements. These equipment rotations require movement to either 3rd Marine Logistics Group's maintenance activity on Okinawa, Japan; or movement back to Albany, Georgia, for depot-level rebuild at Marine Corps Logistics Command. The Marine Corps will be responsible for funding these equipment transportation requirements.

The Marine Corps, has been executing this concept for many years. The first phase of the program started in October 1977.²⁷ As a result of this history, doctrine and standard operating procedures have been refined over the last few decades. The Marine Corps Order P 3000.15B “Manpower Unit Deployment Program (UDP) Standard Operating Procedures (SOP)” addresses many of the current issues with forward deployed rotational forces.²⁸ This document, along with the Department of the Navy’s Financial Management Policy Manual (NAVSO P-1000 with change 67) provides funding guidance for all possible funding requirements associated with forward-deployed rotational forces.²⁹

When the requirement or order is directed by the Joint Chief of Staff in support of training and readiness, the Geographic Combatant Commander is responsible for funding all modes of transportation.³⁰ When the JCS directs the deployment and/or redeployment of Marine Corps units in support of a contingency operation, the Geographic Combatant Commander’s Marine component (the Marine Corps Forces or MARFOR) will be responsible for funding all modes of transportation. When the movement of Marine Corps forces is ordered by the Commander of Marine Corps Forces, he will also pay for that movement.³¹ However, if the rotational movement of the Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force-Darwin is directed by the Commandant of the Marine Corps, and thus governed by the NAVSO, regulation as “the responsibility of the Commandant of the Marine Corps.”³²

These funding scenarios apply only to rotational forces. Transportation of permanently assigned personnel in both Australia and Guam is covered under the Joint Federal Travel Regulations.³³ The major funding concerns addressed in this paper

address the transportation associated with contingency or training missions assigned by the Geographic Combatant Commander or the Commander, Marine Forces Pacific (MARFORPAC). Now that the funding issues have been addressed, we must look at just what infrastructure support is offered at the two locations.

Darwin, Australia Study

The first air/sea nodal study analyzes Darwin Australia's air and sea port capability. The aerial port of debarkation that supports the Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force-Darwin is located on the Royal Australian Air Force Base Darwin. It is one of our main forward operating bases in the Northern Territory. Located slightly northeast of the city of Darwin, the runway is shared with Darwin International Airport.³⁴ This aerial port of debarkation supports Robertson Barracks, which Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force-Darwin will be stationed.

The airfield can operate 24 hours a day it accommodates all commercial and military aircraft in operation today. The airfield consists of two runways: The main runway is 3,354 meters long by 60 meters wide; the second runway is 1,524 meters long by 30 meters wide. Both runways have full-length parallel taxiways. The main runway is equipped with a Category 1 Instrument Landing System. A High Intensity Approach Lighting (HIAL) and a Precision Approach Path Indicator (PAPI) are available on both runways.³⁵ Because this airfield is shared with a commercial international airport, aviation fuel and airfield services are available. Use of these assets in support of military aircraft must be coordinated through the U.S. Embassy.

Travelling from the aerial port of debarkation to Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force-Darwin requires approximately twenty to twenty five minutes transit time from RAFF Darwin to Robertson Barracks. The Special Purpose Marine Air-

Ground Task Force-Darwin will have all required organic aerial port of debarkation enablers; it will contract any additional required support. The using unit is responsible for compiling with all customs and agricultural inspections requirements.

To better convey the benefits of the forward deployed Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force-Darwin, the following graph illuminates the tyranny of distance for a continental United States based force vice the forward deployed Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force-Darwin.³⁶

Table 1:Flight times from Darwin, Australia

Air Travel from Darwin, Australia to:	Time	Distance (kilometers)
West Coast CONUS	15 hrs 32 mins	12,721
Hawaii	10 hrs 54 mins	8,833
Okinawa, Japan	5 hrs 31 mins	4,300
Tokyo, Japan	6 hrs 51 mins	5,421
Seoul, South Korea	7 hrs 00mins	5,561
Manila, Philippines	4 hrs 12 mins	3,192
Singapore	4 hrs 23 mins	3,357

The aerial port of debarkation in support of Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force-Darwin is very close and supportable. As long as aircraft are available, there are no strategic issues that would affect the employment of Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force-Darwin in the U.S. PACOM theater of operations. However, very few operations under the full range of military operations can be executed with either commercial or military air alone. The Marine Corps after all is an amphibious force and focused on expeditionary power projection from the sea.

The sea port of debarkation is the Darwin Port Authority located just 30 miles from Camp Robertson. This port is a very active commercial port. It is the primary surface connector for the Northern Territory's commerce and trade.³⁷ Of note, almost

eighty-five percent of all exported goods departing the Port of Darwin are destined for China.³⁸

The port consists of three commercial wharves. The Iron Ore Wharf berth 1 can support almost any maritime preposition shipping we have in our inventory. With a zero tide maximum draft of 37.7 feet and a berth space up to 1,607 feet, this port has very few limitations for military or commercial shipping.³⁹ The port has excellent roll-on/roll-off (RO/RO) capabilities and five cranes to support container operations. This sea port of debarkation has no major operational limitations that would detract from the Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force-Darwin's ability to embark via surface craft in support of the full range of military operations.

The Darwin Port is geographically located in the southern portion of the Geographic Combatant Commander's area of operations and can support the full range of military operations in southwest Asia. The sail time from Darwin to the major ports in the first island chain vary from three to seven days. Sail time from Darwin to Hawaii will take approximately eleven days, and an additional five more days to the west coast.⁴⁰ The location of the Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force-Darwin will improve the Geographic Combatant Commander's abilities to build partnerships and will strengthen our alliances in the region.

Guam Study

The second air/sea nodal study analyzes the island of Guam's air/sea port capability. With no specific location of the Marine Air-Ground Task Force on Guam identified yet, the two possible aerial ports of debarkation are Anderson Air Force Base and A.B. Won Pat International Airport. Both airfields can operate 24-hours-a-day and accommodate all commercial and military aircraft in operation today.

Anderson Air Force Base has two runways: The main runway is 3,409 meters long by 61 meters wide; the second runway is 3,215 meters long by 61 meters wide: Both runways have full length parallel taxiways. The runways are equipped with a Category 1 Instrument Landing Systems, High Intensity Approach Lighting system, Runway End Identifier Lights, and a Precision Approach Path Indicator ensures twenty four hour operations are capable on this airfield.⁴¹ A.B. Won Pat International Airport also has two runways, both 3,052 meters long by 60 meters wide. Its redundant lighting systems also support 24-hour operations.

Using units must satisfy all other customs and agricultural requirements are still required and will be coordinated by the using unit.⁴² There are some additional agriculture inspection requirements due to the Nonindigenous Aquatic Nuisance Prevention and Control Act of 1990 that highlighted the problem Guam is having with the brown tree snake.⁴³

The distance between aerial port of debarkation and units will be no more than 20 miles. The specific location of the Marine Air-Ground Task Force or other Marine presence on Guam has not yet been determined. However, ground distance from any location on Guam to either aerial port of debarkation is not significant factor in the execution the mobilization and embarkation of the unit off island.⁴⁴



Figure 1: Island of Guam

Aerial port of debarkation enablers will be supported by the Marine Air-Ground Task Force's organic capabilities. The following chart depicts the air travel distance and time from Guam to many other likely destinations that the Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force may receive tasking or missions to support.⁴⁵

Table 2: Flight Times from Guam

Air Travel from Guam to:	Time	Distance (kilometers)
West Coast CONUS	12 hrs 06 mins	9,829
Hawaii	7 hrs 59 mins	6,380
Okinawa, Japan	3 hrs 06 mins	2,281
Tokyo, Japan	3 hrs 24 mins	2,523
Seoul, South Korea	4 hrs 13 mins	3,211
Manila, Philippines	3 hrs 28 mins	2,577
Singapore	6 hrs 00 mins	4,710

The aerial port of debarkation in support of Marine Corps units stationed on Guam should will be supportable with Marine Corps organic capabilities. As long as

aircraft are available, there are no strategic issues that would detour the employment of these units throughout U.S. PACOM theater of operations. However, as discussed in the earlier Darwin assessment, very few missions under the full range of military operations can be executed by aircraft alone. The Marine Corps has and will continue to provide power projection from the sea. This unique cross domain concept relies heavily on its ability to train and operate in an expeditionary environment; off piers, out of ports and around landing craft.

The sea port of debarkation is the Guam Port Authority located just 30 miles from Anderson AFB. This port is a very active commercial port. It is the only surface connector for the Guamanian economy and is responsible for ninety percent of Guam's imports.⁴⁶ The port currently consists of four commercial cargo berths. The last update to this facility was in 1969. Currently, berths Foxtrot 4, 5, and 6 have a depth of thirty two to thirty six feet⁴⁷ which will not allow the full spectrum of military or commercial shipping necessary to support the lift requirements list previous in this paper.⁴⁸

On 17 February 2009 the agreement between the governments of Japan and the United States concerning the relocation of III Marine Expeditionary Force from Okinawa to Guam was signed and identified a significant increase in Guam's port operations.⁴⁹ As a result of this agreement Guam's Port Authority developed a modernization plan to support the projected increase in surface transport requirements. The plan states that "demands for cargo movement during base construction, increased military population after construction and future organic growth in the region served by the Port [were] expected to put considerable demands on the port which it cannot support in its current condition and configuration."⁵⁰ Cargo volumes are projected to start increasing

significantly by 2012. So the port must immediately begin this facility modernization to provide the improvements needed to meet these projected demands in an environmentally acceptable manner.⁵¹ The plan called for the completion on this project by 2012. However, both the Marine Corps' movement to Guam and the port modernization have been indefinitely delayed. Neither currently have set hard dates for execution. Once this port has been updated, it will support all requirements that the Marine Corps can demand of it.

The Guam Port is geographically centered to support the Geographic Combatant Commander's full range of military operations in southwest Asia. The sail time from Guam to the major ports in the first island chain vary from three to four days. Sail time from Guam to Hawaii will take approximately eight days, and an additional five more days to the west coast.⁵² The location of the Marine Air-Ground Task Force on Guam will improve the Geographic Combatant Commander's abilities to build partnerships and strengthen our alliances in the region. With the planned modernization completed the sea port of debarkation will support all requirements that the Marine Corps should require of it for years to come.

This assessment has identified some shortfalls in the Guam port if the movement of Marines from Okinawa, Japan to Guam were to take place today. This move cannot happen until the infrastructure short falls have been addressed. This infrastructure built is not just the port modernization, but barracks, maintenance facilities, armories, and administrative facilities to support the 5,000 Marines and their dependents scheduled to move from Okinawa, Japan. To help bridge this gap until

Guam can be built up the following are possible initiatives could mitigate the shortfall, although their costs have not been determined.

The following recommendations could be utilized as individual actions or building blocks to enhance the theater wide rebalancing plan. Additionally this could help offset some of the cost and speed up the Department of Defense's support for the rebalancing effort. The cost of each will also need to further define to in order to obtain their fiscal feasibility.

Fund and build a three ship Amphibious Ready Group and station this capability within the U.S. PACOM's theater of operations. This will support the additional units supporting the new Pacific policy. Realizing U.S. Navy assets have organic operating costs associated with every deployment, there will not be much of a cost saving benefit. However, the operational impact far out ways any cost savings. To have an additional Amphibious Ready Group in the Pacific theater to support potential time critical movements may possibly mean the difference between mission success and mission failure. Another way of meeting this requirement faster would be to continually deploy an Amphibious Ready Group from Atlantic Fleet to Pacific Fleet until the new capability comes on line. This is a cost associated with our new policy.

Another surface mobility asset that could help augment the required support is the Joint High Speed Vessel. The Department of Defense has programmed the procurement of 10 Joint High Speed Vessels. The key to mobility success is to ensure that the new High Speed Vessel capability is assigned to U.S. PACOM to allow for flexible and responsive support to all units within the theater. This capability has a lower operating cost, a small civilian crew, and can support a wide variety of missions

assigned. This will help offset transportation cost of regional engagement. The operational priority for this capability needs to favor the Pacific fleet. The first ship, USNS Spearhead, was delivered to the Navy on 5 December 2012. The second of 10 ships, the USNS Choctaw County, was christened at the Austal Shipyard in Mobile Alabama on 15 September 2012. The USNS Choctaw County will operate out of Little Creek, Virginia, and is expected to begin conducting missions by the first quarter of fiscal year 2014.⁵³ This capability is critical to the rebalancing efforts. The current fielding plan calls for four to be assigned to U.S. PACOM. The first to arrive in FY-14 and the last is planned to be placed in to service in FY-17.⁵⁴

Conduct a cost analysis of leasing commercial high-speed ferry assets to support all U.S. Government requirements in theater. Historically, this has been the best course of action, however with the increases in the Navy's gray bottom assets this may no longer be the case. This may be the short term answer until the full military capability can be built, commissioned, and assigned to United States Pacific Fleet.

Continue to aggressively engage with the government of Japan to speed up the timeline on the movement of Marines from Okinawa to Guam. DOD and DOS as well as Congress have critical parts to play in this arrangement. They must all engage with the same message to ensure we receive the settlement that our government wishes.

A Way Ahead Across the Pacific

From a policy perspective it's in the best interest of the United States to ensure we look at all options as the whole of government changes its focus back to the Pacific. There are more options within the U.S. PACOM area of operations than just Australia and Guam. Although not in the scope of this paper it would be beneficial to look at the

Infrastructure and transportation nodes in places like Mainland Japan, Philippines, and South Korea. This could bolster some already very strong alliances in the theater, and maximize already existing U.S. infrastructure outside of the continental United States.

Rebalancing efforts need to broaden. With the drawdown of forces in support of Operation Enduring Freedom, we could place two Brigade Combat Teams and a Support Brigade back into South Korea. These forces could deploy in theater for six months at a time on a rotational basis like the Marine Corps does in its unit deployment program. They will not be permanently assigned to United States Forces Korea. Thus no increase in dependents or additional infrastructure required to execute this proposal. The key to this concept is that these Brigade Combat Teams will support USPACOM theater wide tasking requirements and will not solely focus on the Korean Theater of Operations (KTO).

The whole of our government needs to continuously analyze how the rebalancing policy is being perceived throughout the region. China should not be our only concern or focus in the theater. North Korea is a growing threat as it continues to develop its offensive military capabilities. We must also not forget to account for our allies and partners in the region: Do they perceive that our actions in their backyard are of utmost importance to our future partnership? We must make certain that the United States will be able to pursue its four enduring national interests highlighted in President Obama's National Security Strategy from May 2010:

Security: The security of the United States, its citizens, and U.S. allies and partners. Prosperity: A strong, innovative, and growing U.S. economy in an open international economic system that promotes opportunity and prosperity. Values: Respect for universal values at home and around the world. International Order: An international order advanced by U.S.

leadership that promotes peace, security, and opportunity through stronger cooperation to meet global challenges.⁵⁵

The Department of Defense must work within the whole-of-government approach to ensure the Commander in Chief's intent is being fulfilled.

Endnotes

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