


Aligning USAR Aviation Force Structure for DSCA

by

Lieutenant Colonel Guy D. Bass
United States Army



United States Army War College
Class of 2013

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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE				Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
The public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing the burden, to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.					
1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) xx-03-2013		2. REPORT TYPE STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT		3. DATES COVERED (From - To)	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Aligning USAR Aviation Force Structure for DSCA				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S) Lieutenant Colonel Guy D. Bass United States Army				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Colonel Harold M. Hinton Department of Distance Education				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) U.S. Army War College 122 Forbes Avenue Carlisle, PA 17013				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Distribution A: Approved for Public Release. Distribution is Unlimited.					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES Word Count: 4,756					
14. ABSTRACT Over the last decade, the Army has increased its reliance on reserve forces for contingency operations. In 2008, the United States Army Reserve (USAR) transitioned from a Strategic Reserve to an Operational Reserve. This, along with President Obama's current strategic guidance, emphasized the need for the Army Reserve to streamline its structure and concentrate on its core competencies. In line with these core competencies, the Army's strategic guidance calls for an increased emphasis on Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA), a mission that the Army Reserve is well suited to perform. This paper makes recommendations to realign Army Reserve Aviation assets to achieve efficiencies and better support both the President's and the Army's strategic guidance. It proposes that, Army Reserve Aviation should transform its two attack reconnaissance battalions (AH-64) to assault battalions (UH-60) in order to realign with the component's mission and meet its DSCA support requirements. This paper also proposes the addition of a Theater Aviation Brigade (TAB) headquarters to the USAR aviation force structure in order to allow for greater flexibility in the component's ability to conduct mission command.					
15. SUBJECT TERMS Force Management, Army Aviation					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UU	18. NUMBER OF PAGES 28	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT UU	b. ABSTRACT UU	c. THIS PAGE UU			19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include area code)

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

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Lieutenant Colonel Guy D. Bass
United States Army

Colonel Harold M. Hinton
Department of Distance Education
Project Adviser

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U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

Abstract

Title: Aligning USAR Aviation Force Structure for DSCA

Report Date: March 2013

Page Count: 28

Word Count: 4,756

Key Terms: Force Management, Army Aviation

Classification: Unclassified

Over the last decade, the Army has increased its reliance on reserve forces for contingency operations. In 2008, the United States Army Reserve (USAR) transitioned from a Strategic Reserve to an Operational Reserve. This, along with President Obama's current strategic guidance, emphasized the need for the Army Reserve to streamline its structure and concentrate on its core competencies. In line with these core competencies, the Army's strategic guidance calls for an increased emphasis on Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA), a mission that the Army Reserve is well suited to perform. This paper makes recommendations to realign Army Reserve Aviation assets to achieve efficiencies and better support both the President's and the Army's strategic guidance. It proposes that, Army Reserve Aviation should transform its two attack reconnaissance battalions (AH-64) to assault battalions (UH-60) in order to realign with the component's mission and meet its DSCA support requirements. This paper also proposes the addition of a Theater Aviation Brigade (TAB) headquarters to the USAR aviation force structure in order to allow for greater flexibility in the component's ability to conduct mission command.

Aligning USAR Aviation Force Structure for DSCA

The new environment for the United States Military is one of doing more with less under extremely volatile and uncertain conditions. Based on current defense fiscal realities, the Active Army, Army National Guard and Army Reserve must find ways to gain efficiencies while supporting the national defense strategy. A decline in defense spending will be the new normal for the near future. Although the defense budget will decline, the American people will not tolerate a reduction in homeland security. The Army Reserve, if properly organized, will be well prepared to assume greater responsibility in Homeland Defense.

This paper proposes realigning Army Reserve aviation to better support the President's strategic guidance concerning Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA). In order to define the problem and frame the operational environment, this paper reviews the current United States Army Reserve (USAR) aviation force structure and readiness. It also provides an analysis of cost, mission and aviation training requirements. Next, it reviews current laws associated with DSCA, as well as the advantages and disadvantages for practical USAR application of the recommended approach. The solution proposed enhances the core competencies of the Army Reserve and improves efficiencies across the Army.

Realigning aviation enablers will not only make USAR aviation more suited to support civil authorities, but will also improve Army Reserve efficiency and achieve cost savings. This supports the security imperative of "deficit reduction through a lower level of defense spending" outlined in the President's strategic vision for fiscal year 2012.¹ Secretary of Defense Panetta addressed his current defense strategy in a speech to the National Press Club on December 18, 2012. In this speech, Secretary Panetta said,

“We must make every dollar count, and we must continue to carefully manage the balance, sustaining current operations, being ready to respond to crisis and emerging threats, preparing for future operations, and investing in the capabilities of the future.”² Restructuring USAR aviation, as proposed in this paper, will allow the Army Reserve to better support this imperative.

The latest Quadrennial Defense Review, published in 2010, strongly suggested that the Department of Defense must continue to rebalance its policy, doctrine and capabilities to increase support of six key missions.³ Number one amongst these missions is to “Defend the United States and support civil authorities at home.”⁴ In the latest United States strategic defense guidance, President Barack Obama and Secretary of Defense Panetta warned that threats to the homeland may be highest when U.S. forces engage in conflict with a foreign adversary.⁵ Given the current operations in Afghanistan, this warning resonates with all concerned.

The Army Reserve is uniquely suited to support civil authorities in Homeland Defense. Congress initially resourced the Army Reserve to provide combat support and combat service support enablers to augment the Active Army.⁶ This trend continues today, as the Chief of the Army Reserve said, “We are committed to providing a trained, cost-effective, ready and relevant source of combat support and combat service support enablers necessary to negotiate tomorrow’s uncertain security challenges.”⁷ The Reserves’ combat support and combat service support capabilities fit well with the capabilities required of military forces during a natural disaster or other Homeland Defense missions. As an example, Army Reserve military police, engineer and medical units can provide critical additional capabilities to civilian first responders.

Army aviation utility and medical evacuation helicopters are key enablers during these DSCA missions. Currently, the preponderance of Army Reserve Aviation assets are structured for a general support or a medical evacuation mission. However, the Reserves have two AH-64 Apache battalions that provide no value to a DSCA mission. Substituting assault battalions for the Army Reserves' attack reconnaissance battalions would allow the USAR aviation to increase support to the component's core competencies, including DSCA and Geographic Combatant Command directed missions. This restructuring will allow the USAR to better align itself with the national strategic guidance both in the United States and abroad.

Current USAR Aviation Force Structure

The Army Reserve is comprised primarily of enablers or combat support and combat service support units that are capable of responding to contingencies. Based on their geographic location around the continental United States, Reserve forces can mobilize quickly to support civil authorities.

The Army Reserve's aviation structure is currently comprised of eight aviation battalions. Its aircraft inventory consists of 202 aircraft, including UH-60 A/L/M (Blackhawks), CH-47D (Chinooks), UC-35 and C-12 fixed-wing transport aircraft and AH-64D's (Apaches). Additionally, it has two headquarters elements, a Theater Aviation Brigade (TAB) and a Theater Aviation Command (TAC), commanded by a Brigadier General. Both the TAC and TAB headquarters provide mission command for multiple mission sets, however, their staffs are not organized to support AH-64 attack helicopter assets. According to the Headquarters, Department of the Army standardized Mission Essential Task List (METL) for both the TAC and TAB, these two headquarters

elements are specifically designed to provide mission command for medical evacuation, general support, and fixed wing units.⁸ Therefore, the army has not resourced the TAC or the TAB to provide mission command for attack reconnaissance battalions. The two attack reconnaissance battalions in the USAR are aligned with National Guard combat aviation brigades because the USAR does not possess the combat aviation brigades required to support these units. All other units in USAR aviation are organic to either the TAB or the TAC.

AH-64 Mission and Training Requirements

The AH-64 Apache is a valuable combat multiplier and versatile mission aircraft. However, the aircraft is designed primarily to identify and destroy multiple enemy targets simultaneously. In a DSCA mission, there is no need for this destructive capability. According to the attack reconnaissance battalion (AH-64) Modified Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE), the attack reconnaissance battalion is “well suited for employment across the entire spectrum of armed conflict.”⁹ It is most effective when employed as part of the combined arms team. The attack reconnaissance battalion concentrates aerial forces at critical times and places and extends the Division’s ability to strike from all directions.¹⁰ The mission of the AH-64 attack reconnaissance battalion is to “Conduct an attack, reconnaissance and security operation that complements other maneuver forces.”¹¹ This organization is clearly combat focused and is not aligned with the Army Reserves’ core competencies.

Additionally, the Army-directed training requirements for AH-64 crews are particularly challenging for Reserve Soldiers to maintain. The AH-64 has the most demanding flight hour minimum requirement of any aircraft in the Army inventory. Flight

Activity Category (FAC) 1 AH-64 pilots, whether in the Active Army, National Guard or Army Reserves, are required to fly a minimum of 140 hours in their assigned aircraft annually.¹² This high hour requirement exists because AH-64 pilots train not only how to fly their aircraft, but also how to operate the aircraft's sophisticated weapons systems. However, just meeting these minimums does not equal proficiency in the aircraft. With only 135 training days available for the average USAR AH-64 aviator, these minimums are difficult to maintain while also completing all other Army training requirements. In comparison, utility and cargo aircraft pilots are required to fly far fewer hours.

UH-60 Assault Battalion Mission and Training Requirements

The UH-60 Blackhawk is the most versatile utility aircraft in the Army's inventory and is an asset in high demand from Combatant Commanders. Blackhawk units perform a variety of missions for component, joint and coalition partners. These missions include aerial resupply, air movement or casualty evacuation missions. The stated assault battalion (UH-60) mission, according to an assault battalion (UH-60) MTOE, is to "perform air assault and air movement operations within the Division's area of operations."¹³ This mission is broad due to the UH-60's versatility. In addition to their role in combat operations, assault battalions are normally among the first aviation units mobilized in support of DSCA operations. UH-60 units are capable of performing a variety of mission tasks that are well suited to support civil authorities. These missions include casualty evacuation (CASEVAC), air movement, rescue hoist operations, firefighting (bambi bucket) and general support lift operations.

In contrast to the AH-64 requirements, utility and cargo helicopter pilots have far fewer flight hour requirements to maintain proficiency.¹⁴ Additionally, numerous mission

requests at home station require UH-60 support on a regular basis. As a result, UH-60 aviators have an easier time maintaining proficiency in their aircraft and its mission set than AH-64 aviators. When supporting DSCA operations, UH-60 crews are capable of performing the mission because the tasks they perform while supporting civil authorities are part of their core mission set. In fact, supporting most DSCA missions allows UH-60 crews to train on and gain proficiency in their Mission Essential Task List tasks.

The New Role of the Army Reserve in DSCA

As outlined in President Obama's latest military strategic guidance, "Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense," one primary mission of the United States Armed Forces is to "Defend the homeland and provide defense support to civil authorities (DSCA)."¹⁵ As a testament to importance of the Reserve Component in DSCA operations, the Secretary of the Army and the Army Chief of Staff, clearly articulated in their 2012 Strategic Planning Guidance that:

Army forces require the capability to support civil authorities within the homeland to mitigate the effects of manmade and natural disasters and provide recovery efforts from the results of attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies to citizens, vital assets, and critical infrastructure in support of unified action. The employment of military forces to conduct operations within the homeland is constrained by both law and policy. Special training of, and connectivity to, conventional forces and access to Reserve component forces for the homeland mission-set is required.¹⁶

This may not necessarily be new strategic guidance, however, defending the homeland and providing support to civil authorities rarely receives the level of attention it deserves from the Active Army. This guidance makes it clear that supporting civil authorities, when requested, is a Presidential priority. The 2012 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) expanded the Army Reserve's ability to support this strategy and further support civil authorities.

This role of the Army Reserve in DSCA changed as a result of the addition of section 12304b to Title 10, U.S. Code, Chapter 1209. This addition authorizes the service secretaries to involuntarily activate Title 10 Reserve component Soldiers to support a DSCA event.¹⁷ The law allows the Army Reserve to provide forces, activated on Title 10 orders, for up to 120 days. This call-up authority enables service secretaries to order up to 60,000 Reserve Component members to “provide assistance in response to a major disaster or emergency.”¹⁸ Before Congress passed this act, only three major statutory provisions existed that allowed the federal government to order Reservists involuntarily to active duty for an extended period.¹⁹ None of these laws allowed the Army Reserve to engage in DSCA response. Now, the Army can activate reservists via a Presidential Reserve Call-up (PRC), a Partial Mobilization or a Full Mobilization, depending on what provision is enacted.²⁰

Prior to this change, when a state governor or other civil leader requested assistance from the Federal Government, the Department of Defense (DOD) could only send active duty units, as it was unlawful to activate Title 10 Army Reserve Soldiers. The Army Reserve provided support to civil authorities by placing its Soldiers on Active Duty for Training orders. These orders were not ideal since they restricted the allowable benefits and support duration. There were numerous examples where the USAR supported natural disaster response using only Active Duty for Training orders for pay.

Integrating the Army Reserve into DSCA response is a natural progression of the USAR’s design and mission. The Army Reserve, like the Army National Guard, is comprised primarily of citizen Soldiers who are connected to their communities not only by their Army service, but also by their civilian occupations. In the event of an incident

or disaster at home, the National Guard is generally the military's first response force. While the National Guard and the Army Reserve operate in a Title 10 status when deployed in support of overseas contingency operations, this is not the case when supporting civil authorities. In a DSCA operation, the National Guard remains under the control of an affected state's governor, as a Title 32 force, while the Army Reserve operates as a federal response force under Title 10 of the U.S. Code.

In passing the 2012 National Defense Authorization Act, Congress did not attempt to limit the National Guard's Title 32 (state directed and controlled) first responder role. Nor did they intend to have the Army Reserve emulate the Army National Guard in its military first responder role. By virtue of its support capabilities, the Army Reserve can augment and complement the National Guard with utility and medical evacuation aircraft in its DSCA mission.

DSCA Support

The USAR currently supports civil authorities with an aviation task force assigned to Northern Command's Defense Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Response Force.²¹ These units work directly with their Active Army counterparts as the initial Title 10 response force for chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear or terrorist incidents.²² Once notified of a requirement, the 11th Theater Aviation Command provides a response force package consisting of UH-60 medical evacuation helicopters, CH-47 cargo helicopters and UH-60 utility helicopters.²³ This aviation response force is required to launch helicopters no later than 24 hours after notification in order to assist anywhere in the continental United States. Within 48 hours, 36 total aircraft and

associated mission command and maintenance support must be capable of providing full support in the incident area.²⁴

Army North tested and validated Army Reserve aviation as a Title 10 rapid deployment response force in support of civil authorities numerous times. The first validation occurred in August 2011 at Camp Atterbury, Indiana during initial Defense Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Response Force validation exercise Vibrant Response 12.²⁵ After successfully completing this initial validation, the reserve aviation task force assumed Defense Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Response Force duties on 1 Oct 2011. During the first year of this assignment to the Defense Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Response Force, Task Force Aviation conducted several smaller exercises focused on rapid deployment to different regions of the country, further validating the use of reserve forces in rapid reaction Homeland Defense missions.

The Transition

In order to remain efficient and relevant, the Army Reserve must continue to transform and adapt to the new strategic guidance. While it is clear that the Army Reserve is an operational reserve in contingency missions, the USAR is not organized to best support its core missions, including DSCA. The USAR would be better postured to support its core mission capabilities and the DSCA requirement if both attack reconnaissance battalions were converted to two UH-60 general support or assault battalions. Additionally, in order to provide effective mission command for this force structure change, the Army must activate and resource an additional theater aviation brigade within the 11th Theater Aviation Command.

Aviation general support and medical Evacuation assets support the USAR's core combat support and combat service support competencies and allow the USAR to be an enhanced force multiplier in DSCA and Homeland Defense operations. The AH-64 Apache, while a great asset in a combat environment, is a resource and training intensive airframe that provides little value to DSCA, combat support or combat service support missions. In contrast, the UH-60 Black Hawk is equipped for these roles. If called upon to support civil authorities in a disaster relief or a Homeland Defense situation, aircrews assigned to assault battalions or general support aviation battalions are able to execute any mission assigned to them. Additionally, during DSCA mission execution, assault battalion crews will gain valuable experience that they will be able to draw upon while supporting contingency operations abroad.

When called to support DSCA, a second Theater Aviation Battalion headquarters will also create a vital additional capability for the Army Reserves. The TAB's mission is complementary to the Army Reserve's core competencies because it is a combat support focused organization. According to FM 3-04.111, the theater aviation brigade "is structured to conduct assault or general support aviation missions in support of the theater and its subordinate commands."²⁶ This mission fits well with the Army Reserves' core competencies of combat support and combat service support.

The single TAB headquarters currently assigned to the Army Reserves significantly limits the component's flexibility to support varying mission sets. A second TAB headquarters would enhance the Army Reserve's ability to manage its medical evacuation and general support aviation assets. Additionally, it will increase the component's ability to coordinate with local authorities in the event of a DSCA mission

because of the additional mission command structure and the redundancy in the number and type of aircraft used. Adding an additional TAB headquarters to the Army Reserves' existing force structure would require additional funding for personnel, stationing and equipment. However, adding assets to the Reserve component, as opposed to the active army, would allow the army as a whole to enjoy a cost savings because of the USAR's reduced operating costs.

Advantages

Army Reserve aviation reorganization will increase the USAR's ability to support the National Security Strategy. It will align Army Reserve aviation with its core competencies, while also allowing the Army Reserve to better support DSCA, one of the Department of Defense's key missions, more effectively.²⁷

The first advantage of this change is that the addition of a theater aviation brigade headquarters will support the National Security Strategy and will add needed DSCA and mission command capability to the Army Reserves. Since one of the five mission essential tasks of a theater aviation brigade is to "conduct civil-military operations," adding a theater aviation brigade headquarters will improve the USAR's ability to support civilian authorities in the event of a domestic catastrophe.²⁸ This will also allow simultaneous support to multiple incident areas in the event of complex catastrophes in different locations.

The second advantage is that each theater aviation brigade could alternate as the Defense Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Response Force headquarters every two years allowing no turbulence or disruption of the unit's placement in the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model. This will allow the 11th

Theater Aviation Command to support both U.S. Northern Command and other Geographic Combatant Commands simultaneously.

Third, the transition from AH-64 equipped attack reconnaissance battalions to UH-60 assault battalions will allow all of the Army Reserves' aviation assets to be organic to an Army Reserve brigade level command. This will improve the command structure of Army Reserve aviation and allow all of the aviation battalions within the Army Reserve to train and conduct operations at home with their organic headquarters. Consolidating command structure will create efficiencies in mission command by giving units the ability to train with organic units to the Army Reserve. When deployed either at home or abroad, Army Reserve aviation assets would now be able to work with their "go to war" headquarters on a day-to-day basis resulting in a higher overall readiness posture.

This transition will also allow Army Reserve aviation to be more of a force multiplier for the Active Army Geographic Combatant Commands, as well as civil authorities. Over the past ten years, Army Reserve aviation general support and medical evacuation units have been in high demand, both in DSCA events and during overseas contingencies operations. During Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, the DOD routinely requested Army Reserve aviation to act as an operational reserve providing additional capability to the active component. Similarly, in DSCA events such as Hurricane Katrina, UH-60's and CH-47's were in high demand to provide support to casualty evacuation efforts, air movement, aerial resupply, as well as countless other missions. As another example of this high demand, instead of the prescribed five-year Army Force Generation cycle, the Army placed most of the Army

Reserve's cargo, lift and medical evacuation units on an abbreviated three and a half year deployment cycle.

A fifth advantage to this realignment is that the Army Reserves will be better postured to support existing DSCA mission requests. During any major DSCA event, U.S. Northern Command has preplanned mission requests for UH-60's to perform medical evacuation and search and rescue missions. UH-60 based units, already in the Army Reserve and stationed throughout the continental United States, support these mission sets. USAR aviation support facilities are already providing maintenance, administrative and training support to these USAR aviation units and have often provided similar support to other aircraft tasked to support the Homeland Defense or DSCA event.

Sixth, the Department of Defense rarely tasks the Army Reserve to provide its attack aviation assets. Only one of its two attack battalions, the 8-229th Attack Reconnaissance Battalion, deployed as a complete unit in support of a Geographic Combatant Command. The other USAR attack reconnaissance battalion was never able to mobilize and deploy as a complete unit due to manpower shortages arising from cross leveling to other theater units. Additionally, the Army Reserves rarely tasks attack aviation assets to provide support for other units in training exercises. General support aviation platforms are uniquely suited for supporting the training needs of Army Reserve ground forces and are constantly requested to support external training events. Due to the AH-64's demanding readiness requirements, attack reconnaissance battalions spend most of their training resources supporting internal training requirements. These requirements include aerial gunnery, a resource intensive annual requirement that

absorbs most of the battalion's budgeted training dollars. This leaves little training time to support external training requests from other units.

Cost Benefits

Citizen Soldiers maintain a high level of competency and provide needed capability to the armed forces at a tremendous cost savings. The USAR consumes only six percent of the Army's budget yet provides 20 percent of the total Army force structure.²⁹ According to the Reserve Forces Policy Board, the cost of Reserve Soldiers is far less than their Active Component counterparts.³⁰ The expected annual cost of an average Reserve Component Soldier in Fiscal Year 2013 is \$123,351, including benefits such as retirement, schooling and medical. This contrasts with annual cost of \$384,622 for an Active Component Soldier. When not activated, Reservists receive pay for 48 inactive duty training periods and 15 days of Extended Combat Training (ECT) during a typical fiscal year.³¹ Aviators may receive pay for up to 48 additional flight-training periods in order to meet their aviation requirements. In total, an Army Reserve aviator will likely get paid for just 111 days of training while an active duty aviator, who has the same proficiency and currency requirements, gets paid for 365 total days of training.

The conversion of AH-64's to UH-60's would also help the Army Reserve achieve economies of scale. Once converted, the Army Reserve would only have to support two of the Army's four modernized rotary wing airframes, the UH-60 and CH-47. Currently, the Army Reserves possess the smallest aviation force structure in the three components of the Army. Standardizing the airframes that the USAR operates will increase efficiency in both the material and human capital management core

enterprises. Utilizing aircraft that require the same parts and similarly trained Soldiers to maintain and operate them will naturally allow the USAR to achieve economies of scale. It will minimize the number and types of repair parts and equipment the Army Reserve is required to maintain in its inventory. Additionally, this transition will help the Army Reserve retain talented Soldiers. UH-60 tracked maintainers and aviators will have more promotion potential and advancement in the Reserves if there are more UH-60 senior leader positions available. This transformation will allow the Army Reserve to maximize its potential as a key provider of aviation general support and medical evacuation assets to the Active Army, as well as civil authorities at home.

The Army Reserve, using the Army's Force Generation rotational readiness model, is capable of providing support enablers to the operational force at nearly one-third less cost than maintaining the same capability in the Active Component.³² If the Army Reserve costs less overall to operate, then any addition of personnel, equipment or capability to Army Reserve aviation will also cost less than adding the same capability to the active force.

Disadvantages

There are inherent risks in any major organizational change. Some of the most notable risks in realignment are adapting to changes in training requirements and supporting the acquisition of aircraft. In this case, shifting from a combat arms focus to a support role could result in numerous resourcing issues. For instance, loss of personnel and overall aviation expertise could result from transitioning from the AH-64 to the UH-60. The Army Reserves currently does not possess a great deal of institutional experience in executing the assault battalion mission. Officers will have to attend the

UH-60 qualification course and would have to learn how to employ utility helicopters. NCO's will not only have to attend Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) producing schools to train on the UH-60 and its related support equipment, they will also require training and experience on the aircraft's mission. While the skill sets of most Soldiers currently assigned to the transitioning units are entirely transferable, Soldiers currently assigned to military occupational specialties, such as armament technicians, will be filling completely different roles in their newly transformed battalions. Due to the downsizing of the Active Army, this cost and manpower risk can be mitigated by recruiting trained Soldiers transitioning from the active service.

During the transition, there will be a lengthy gap in capability for Army Reserve Aviation. As AH-64 assets stand down and the Army Reserves begin to acquire UH-60s, there will be at least a two-year period where the Army Reserve can provide neither the capability of an AH-64 battalion nor the capability of a UH-60 battalion to augment the Active Army. Additionally, for up to a year after its MTOE effective date, the newly-transitioned UH-60 battalion will be in a reset status where it will have to complete numerous validation tasks to be a fully functional in order to provide full capabilities to the Department of Defense or civilian authorities.

After the transition is complete, the USAR will no longer support the attack reconnaissance mission set. The Army Reserve will also lose trained AH-64 specific pilots and maintainers. In addition, transferring the aircraft from the Army Reserves to another Army component could introduce an unforeseen training requirement for new AH-64 pilots, creating a temporary training backlog at the Army Aviation Center of Excellence.

Adding a second TAB to the Army Reserve will also require additional funding for training new skill sets or accessing experienced Soldiers into the new structure, which could be mitigated by accessing qualified Soldiers transitioning from the Active Army. The acquisition of a new brigade headquarters would require the Army Reserves to obtain additional facilities and equipment. Additional study should be done to determine the best method for realigning equipment and locating additional facilities.

The Way Ahead

This proposal may be perceived as an attempt to divert money, people and assets to the Army Reserve and away from the National Guard or Active Army. To the contrary, the Army must make every effort to conserve resources and maximize efficiencies. With DOD's declining budgets, the Army Reserve can be a cost-effective and efficient alternative to adding force structure to the Active Army or the state controlled National Guard.

Realignment and strengthening of the Army Reserve's capability to support DSCA missions could be viewed as "mission creep" toward the National Guard's first response Title 32 mission. The National Defense Authorization Act of 2012 in no way tries to limit or detract from the National Guard's Title 32 (state directed and controlled) role as a first responder in any natural disaster or homeland event, nor does it attempt make the Army Reserve more like the National Guard. Instead, it gives the Army Reserve added ability to augment and support both the National Guard and the Active Army during DSCA missions.

Army Reserve Aviation has already proven it can be a vital enabler to civil authorities. As one of the first Title 10 Task Forces to be certified by Northern Command

as in the Defense Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Response Force role, USAR aviation is already supporting the President's strategic guidance by prioritizing its mission of providing defense support to civil authorities. If allowed to assume the additional general support aviation and mission command assets that this paper recommends, the United States Army Reserve will be able to expand its role in Homeland Defense and disaster response. In doing so, it will not only better align itself President Obama's strategic guidance, but also better support the communities that its Citizen Soldiers live and work in on a daily basis.

Endnotes

¹ Barrack Obama, *Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense* (Washington DC: The White House, January 2012), 1.

² Leon Panetta, U.S. Secretary of Defense, "Remarks by Secretary Panetta at the National Press Club", *Federal Information & News Dispatch, Inc.* (Washington, D.C., 2012), in ProQuest (accessed January 2, 2013).

³ Robert M. Gates, *Quadrennial Defense Review* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, February 2010), 18.

⁴ Ibid., 17.

⁵ Barrack Obama, *Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership*, 1.

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