


Strategy Research Project

Enhancing the Efficiency of NATO Intelligence Under an ASG-I

by

Colonel Brian R. Foster
United States Army



United States Army War College
Class of 2013

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT: A

Approved for Public Release
Distribution is Unlimited

This manuscript is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree. The views expressed in this student academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

The U.S. Army War College is accredited by the Commission on Higher Education of the Middle States Association of Colleges and Schools, 3624 Market Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104, (215) 662-5606. The Commission on Higher Education is an institutional accrediting agency recognized by the U.S. Secretary of Education and the Council for Higher Education Accreditation.

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE				Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
The public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing the burden, to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.					
1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) xx-03-2013		2. REPORT TYPE STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT		3. DATES COVERED (From - To)	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Enhancing the Efficiency of NATO Intelligence Under an ASG-I				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S) Colonel Brian R. Foster United States Army				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Colonel Douglas V. Mastriano Department of Military Strategy, Planning, & Operations				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) U.S. Army War College 122 Forbes Avenue Carlisle, PA 17013				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Distribution A: Approved for Public Release. Distribution is Unlimited.					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES Word Count: 7,711					
14. ABSTRACT As part of North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO's) ongoing intelligence reforms, its member nations should create an Assistant Secretary General for Intelligence (ASG-I) to bridge the gap between competing civilian and military intelligence structures. The creation of an ASG-I would both enhance the efficiency of NATO Intelligence and improve its quality by providing unity of effort. NATO already has Assistant Secretary Generals (ASGs) for several departments. However, there is not one responsible for leading intelligence. Because of this lack of NATO intelligence oversight, the organization is hampered by duplication of effort and over tasking of intelligence analysis centers for similar products. Leadership of the intelligence effort is currently the responsibility of the Deputy Secretary General (DSG), who has a myriad of duties that do not allow for a comprehensive focus on intelligence. Therefore, NATO should create an ASG-I billet to oversee its intelligence personnel, systems, and structural enablers to "enhance intelligence sharing within NATO, [and] to better predict when crises might occur..." as directed in NATO's latest Strategic Concept for the Defense and Security of its Members (Lisbon, 2010).					
15. SUBJECT TERMS Reform, Consensus, Coalition, IMS, NAC, MC, IU, SHAPE					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UU	18. NUMBER OF PAGES 42	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT UU	b. ABSTRACT UU	c. THIS PAGE UU			19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include area code)

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

Enhancing the Efficiency of NATO Intelligence Under an ASG-I

by

Colonel Brian R. Foster
United States Army

Colonel Douglas V. Mastriano
Department of Military Strategy, Planning, & Operations
Project Adviser

This manuscript is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree. The U.S. Army War College is accredited by the Commission on Higher Education of the Middle States Association of Colleges and Schools, 3624 Market Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104, (215) 662-5606. The Commission on Higher Education is an institutional accrediting agency recognized by the U.S. Secretary of Education and the Council for Higher Education Accreditation.

The views expressed in this student academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

Abstract

Title: Enhancing the Efficiency of NATO Intelligence Under an ASG-I
Report Date: March 2013
Page Count: 42
Word Count: 7,711
Key Terms: Reform, Consensus, Coalition, IMS, NAC, MC, IU, SHAPE
Classification: Unclassified

As part of North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO's) ongoing intelligence reforms, its member nations should create an Assistant Secretary General for Intelligence (ASG-I) to bridge the gap between competing civilian and military intelligence structures. The creation of an ASG-I would both enhance the efficiency of NATO Intelligence and improve its quality by providing unity of effort. NATO already has Assistant Secretary Generals (ASGs) for several departments. However, there is not one responsible for leading intelligence. Because of this lack of NATO intelligence oversight, the organization is hampered by duplication of effort and over tasking of intelligence analysis centers for similar products. Leadership of the intelligence effort is currently the responsibility of the Deputy Secretary General (DSG), who has a myriad of duties that do not allow for a comprehensive focus on intelligence. Therefore, NATO should create an ASG-I billet to oversee its intelligence personnel, systems, and structural enablers to "enhance intelligence sharing within NATO, [and] to better predict when crises might occur..." as directed in NATO's latest Strategic Concept for the Defense and Security of its Members (Lisbon, 2010).

Enhancing the Efficiency of NATO Intelligence Under an ASG-I

For the NATO Headquarters, we welcomed progress towards a structure and organization which can best deliver informed timely advice for our consensual decision-making. We welcome the reform of intelligence support ... [The Secretary General's] review of personnel requirements will also be key in achieving demonstrable increased effectiveness, efficiency and savings.

—NATO Lisbon Summit Declaration
20 November 2010¹

As part of North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO's) ongoing intelligence reforms, its member nations should create an Assistant Secretary General for Intelligence (ASG-I) to bridge the gap between competing civilian and military intelligence structures.² The creation of an ASG-I would both enhance the efficiency of NATO Intelligence and improve its quality by providing unity of effort. NATO already has Assistant Secretary Generals (ASGs) for Operations, Defense Policy and Planning, Political Affairs and Security Policy, Defense Investment, Emerging Security Challenges, Public Diplomacy, and Executive Management.³ However, there is not one responsible for leading intelligence. Because of this lack of NATO intelligence oversight, the organization is hampered by duplication of effort and over tasking of intelligence analysis centers for similar products.

Leadership of the intelligence effort is currently the responsibility of the Deputy Secretary General (DSG), who has a myriad of duties that do not allow for a comprehensive focus on intelligence. Therefore, NATO should create an ASG-I billet to oversee its intelligence personnel, systems, and structural enablers to “enhance intelligence sharing within NATO, [and] to better predict when crises might occur...”⁴ as directed in NATO's latest Strategic Concept for the Defense and Security of its

Members (Lisbon, 2010). This thesis proposes the creation of an ASG-I that will provide NATO with the intelligence it requires to respond to the Alliance's need for timely and accurate assessments, as well as to better utilize its limited intelligence resources.

In 2008, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) released an unclassified version of a 1984 article in *Studies in Intelligence* that described NATO Intelligence as a contradiction in terms and stated that it was designed for dysfunction.⁵ The article identified that there is a lack of intelligence oversight in NATO. Since the writing of that article, NATO intelligence reform has made great strides to address this dysfunction. Diligent and laudable work by the NATO intelligence community has resulted in several reforms that came forth from the Prague Summit of 2002.⁶ However, the central question of who is in charge of NATO intelligence remains unanswered.

A key part of NATO's lack of intelligence unity of effort was summed up by a former Director of Intelligence of the International Military Staff (IMS) who stated that "Nations trump NATO," meaning that nations are ultimately in charge of Alliance affairs and policies for intelligence, not the Secretary General (SG).⁷ Yet, in a day of diminishing resources, evolving threats, and the rising need for timely and relevant intelligence, this current "nations trump NATO" approach towards intelligence is ineffective. It is imperative that NATO recognize and encourage nations to consider that the time has come for serious intelligence reform under the purview of an ASG-I. Former U.S. NATO Intelligence Board (NIB) member Letitia Long stated that "form follows function" indicating that if NATO nations conduct a rigorous study about its intelligence needs and they determine an ASG-I is required they would be more open to

establishing such a position.⁸ This paper will address the benefits of an ASG-I with an eye towards convincing skeptical nations.

Background on NATO Intelligence Structure Reform

At the 2002 Prague Summit, NATO called for increased intelligence sharing.⁹ As a result of this, NATO established the Terrorist Threat Intelligence Unit (TTIU) in 2003.¹⁰ The TTIU was an attempt by NATO Headquarters (HQ) to have civilian and military services work in a comprehensive way to address the intensified threat of terrorism that was brought to bear by the September 11, 2001 (9/11) attacks upon the United States (U.S.). When the TTIU began to publish its products, NATO nations saw the value of a comprehensive approach to NATO intelligence. The TTIU fell under the management of the NATO Office of Security (NOS), the office responsible for counterintelligence and security issues of NATO. It was co-directed by the Director of International Military Staff for Intelligence (IMS INT) and the NOS Director.¹¹ The TTIU became the foundation for the subsequent creation of Intelligence Unit (IU) in 2011, which focused on broader intelligence issues than terrorism.

Current NATO Intelligence Structure

At present, multiple intelligence components separately provide intelligence to member nations, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) and the Military Committee (MC). The two main providers of intelligence support to the NAC and the MC are the IU and International Military Staff – Intelligence (IMS INT). Both of these organizations are loosely aligned under the DSG's office when he convenes the Intelligence Steering Board (ISB).¹² The board only meets sporadically in response to specific issues and therefore does not provide sustained leadership for NATO intelligence. This section will briefly discuss the IU and IMS INT roles as well as those of several other entities that

influence the intelligence process and which provide intelligence to the NAC and the MC.¹³ The core legacy body that provides NATO with agreed¹⁴ and non-agreed intelligence is IMS INT. IMS INT has approximately 35 personnel, with 15 devoted to analysis/production (four of which are dual hatted with the IU), about 10 to policy issues, and five or so to front office duties and the rest to niche intelligence capabilities. Their mission, according to the NATO website is described as:

IMS INT provides day-to-day strategic intelligence support to the NATO Secretary General, the NAC, the MC, the Defense Policy and Planning Committee and other NATO bodies. It collates and assesses intelligence received from NATO member countries and commands. It also develops, maintains and implements basic intelligence policy, doctrine and documents.¹⁵

Although description of IMS INT's role makes it appear that its intelligence products are widely used across NATO, in reality, its primary client is limited to the MC and therefore lacks access to the wider audience described. Of note, IMS INT also exclusively handles the NATO Intelligence Warning System (NIWS) through its Warning Secretariat.¹⁶ The NIWS "provides warning of any developing instability, crisis, threats, risks, or concerns that could impact on security interests of the Alliance and monitors de-escalation of a crisis."¹⁷ After a warning problem is developed, NIWS monitors it on at a monthly basis or more as required.¹⁸ This is a critical function that can aid NATO in determining the likelihood of taking in action in a place such as Libya or Syria.

In reality, the main structure groomed to increasingly provide intelligence support is the IU. The IU provides intelligence support for the NAC and to a lesser extent the MC, mainly through written assessments and ad hoc briefings. The IU gets much of its intelligence from national civilian intelligence services which until recently mainly focused on providing NATO intelligence on counter intelligence and counter espionage

concerns, often in a bilateral fashion, rather than sharing the information widely among the allies.¹⁹

The IU has grown in size and falls under the DSG's control with oversight from the Secretary General's Office.²⁰ Originally, the IU comprised four permanent civilian positions (formerly TTIU), and 2-4 Voluntary National Contributions (VNCs), four designated IMS INT augmentees, and 1-3 interns. Now there are five permanent civilians, about 18 VNCs (the number changes frequently), four IMS augmentees (who split their time between IMS INT and the IU), and whatever number of interns that are available.²¹ To coordinate this new body's work with other intelligence producers throughout NATO the tasking authority and a program of work was coordinated through a revived Intelligence Steering Board (ISB). The board was chaired by the DSG. Its membership includes most of the intelligence producers at NATO HQ and those at the Strategic Commands.²²

NATO also established a civilian department called the Emerging Security Challenges (ESC) Division in 2010. The ESC was developed to examine "...terrorism, the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, cyber defence, and energy security."²³ The ESC includes a small analytical cell, the Strategic Analysis Capability (SAC) which "monitor[s] and anticipates international developments that could affect allied security."²⁴ The SAC provides assessments on these concerns for the SG and his Private Office. The ASG for ESC stated in an interview with Defense News that the SAC "will integrate the intelligence and analysis to keep the Secretary-General and NATO military authorities informed of potential crises so that NATO can organize political consultations where necessary."²⁵

The last entity at NATO HQ that provides current intelligence from open source intelligence and spot reports is the Situation Center (SITCEN). The SITCEN was chartered to provide “situational awareness ... [and is] responsible for receiving, exchanging and disseminating political, economic and military intelligence and information... 24 hours a day, seven days a week.”²⁶ Due to the nature, the SITCEN often disseminates non-vetted products which provide assumed intelligence without the benefit of intelligence analysis.

At Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) Headquarters, more than an hour’s drive from NATO HQ, two other entities (controlled by SHAPE) provide major contributions to the intelligence process at NATO. One of these organizations is firmly established; the other is developing. These are the NATO Intelligence Fusion Center (NIFC) and the Comprehensive Crisis and Operations Management Centre (CCOMC).

The NIFC became fully operational in December 2007 and is located in Molesworth, England and is:

...a military led, U.S.-sponsored MOU organization chartered by NATO's Military Committee. ... The NIFC comprises over 200 multinational military and civilian intelligence and support professionals from 26 of 28 NATO nations and one North Atlantic Council (NAC) approved non-NATO nation. The NIFC is directed by the Military Committee to significantly contribute to, but not replace, NATO Allied Command Operations (ACO) key intelligence activities. The NIFC remains outside national chains of command and NATO's permanent and crisis manning structures. The NATO IFC falls under the operational command of SACEUR through his Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Intelligence at SHAPE.²⁷

SHAPE created its CCOMC in early May of 2012. The CCOMC is an operations and intelligence center that NATO military leaders hoped would analyze developing

crisis situations and be “NATO’s Military Eye on the world.”²⁸ According to the NATO homepage, the CCOMC will:

...collaborate and cooperate in a joined up and integrated manner, bringing together military and civilian expertise, and connecting SHAPE Headquarters to the networked world. The current phase of Early Operating Capability will be followed by the Full Activation phase, scheduled mid-2013.²⁹

The CCOMC is too new to determine how the ASG-I and CCOMC could interact or perhaps benefit one another, but there is obvious profit in collaboration and the identification of clear lanes for who will provide intelligence support to the NAC and MC. Any suggestion that CCOMC could subsume NATO intelligence support should be viewed skeptically because of the need to be physically represented in working group meetings on a daily basis to remain synchronized with NATO HQ’s needs.

Defining the Problem

While challenges exist, reforms brought about by NATO summits over the past decade have greatly improved NATO’s intelligence process.³⁰ However, reform may stagnate without an intelligence professional leading the macro effort who can bridge the existing divide between civilian and military intelligence teams. Currently NATO Intelligence oversight is (by default) thrust upon NATO’s DSG who is typically a non-intelligence professional, whose responsibilities and accessibility are not adequate to the task of providing comprehensive intelligence oversight. A review of current and previous DSG biographies shows that each was a career diplomat. Although each was exposed to intelligence operations, none had any depth of experience in leading a civilian or military intelligence organization beyond the small intelligence cells that an embassy typically possesses.³¹ A future DSG with in-depth intelligence experience is likely to be an exception not the rule.³²

This reality forces the DSG into the role of a non-expert bureaucrat who must learn on the job. This function was forced because NATO nations decided the DSG was to head the ISB.³³ Given NATO's steady growth in operations and partnerships, the intelligence demands have increased commensurately making overall leadership of NATO Intelligence critical. This leadership requires an expert with life-long experience in both civilian and military intelligence organizations.³⁴

According to the NATO Handbook, the DSG "replaces the Secretary General in his absence ... and is the chairman of a number of senior committees, *ad hoc* groups and working groups."³⁵ These are demanding tasks that do not leave the DSG adequate time to focus on day to day intelligence activities at NATO HQ. According to a senior U.S. military officer at NATO HQs, the DSG's "focus is a mile wide and an inch deep as he is responsible for everything that goes to the NAC."³⁶ Several senior U.S. military officers with access to the MC were also of the opinion that intelligence is too important to leave to a non-intelligence professional without the time to devote to it.³⁷

As listed previously, there are multiple, often parallel, competing intelligence organization at NATO HQs. For example, the IU, the IMS INT and the SAC teams all have different leaders, do not adequately share information, and lack transparency within the NATO intelligence structure.³⁸ This hinders coordination of intelligence products meant to inform both the IS which is predominantly civilian, and the IMS which is predominantly military. This often leaves each with an unsynchronized, uncoordinated, and incomplete intelligence picture. This is despite the fact that both the IS and the IMS must both provide timely and accurate intelligence support to the NAC

and the MC, the primary bodies which carry out NATO's political and military objectives.³⁹

Such parallel intelligence efforts waste valuable time and needlessly drain away limited resources. One European Intelligence Analyst at NATO HQ estimated that three of its intelligence organizations (IMS INT, IU, SAC) work on 75% of the same topics with only slight variations in focus.⁴⁰ These redundant efforts also impact nations as they are asked for similar information, leading to donor fatigue from nations' providing multiple intelligence responses to differing organizations at NATO HQ on the same topic (although nuanced enough to create unnecessary extra work). In some instances nations are even refusing to answer requests for information due to the deluge of repetitive and similar requests.⁴¹

Such duplicative efforts have led to unhealthy competition and mistrust according to one former senior NATO intelligence official. One such example was illustrated by the SAC extracting information from both the IU and IMS INT, but then not sharing its draft or finished product with either organization.⁴² Such lack of coordination or transparency hinders collaboration and generates an unhelpful climate of mistrust among NATO intelligence producers. While overall intelligence products and processes have improved over the years, interviews and correspondence with current and former European and U.S. intelligence analysts confirm that such themes of suspicion, competition, and paranoia persist. These unhelpful tendencies must be overcome to provide NATO decision-makers with the best intelligence products possible.

Since the threat defined in NATO's Strategic Concept is complex, there is much ground to be covered and therefore little room for duplication of effort. NATO's

Strategic Concept describes the threat as: proliferation of WMD and ballistic missiles; terrorism, instability or conflict beyond NATO's borders; cyber attacks; threats to the energy supply and environmental and resource constraints.⁴³ Clear lanes marking who should cover each of these areas would reduce duplication of effort and better manage limited intelligence resources. Although there may be occasions for which redundant coverage is desired, but such instances should be an exception.

While some intelligence resources are being used redundantly, some technological resources are not being exploited enough. For example none of these agencies fully exploit NATO's common intelligence system Battlefield Information Collection and Exploitation System (BICES). BICES was designed to enhance intelligence collaboration and distributing of intelligence. The underuse of BICES inadvertently leads to the NAC and the MC receiving disjointed intelligence analyses. Compounding the problem is the fact that all these units are not co-located or even near each other. Physical separation, especially in a building such as NATO HQ tends to build an invisible barrier, no matter how unintentional.⁴⁴

The Solution

To coordinate these diverse and at times redundant organizations and interests, NATO should appoint an ASG-I, with a professional intelligence pedigree to oversee the various intelligence teams at NATO and to coordinate NATO's national intelligence contributions. The ASG-I must be empowered with the proper authorities to lead these various intelligence agencies and also must have the complete trust, confidence and backing by of the SG and the Chairman of the Military Committee (CMC) to make this work.⁴⁵

Potential ASG-I Structure

Based upon multiple interviews and experience at NATO⁴⁶, the optimal method of birthing the ASG-I would be to integrate the IU, SAC, and IMS INT positions to form the baseline ASG-I structure.⁴⁷ The IU and IMS INT should be integrated, working off the same information flow, fusing their products, and providing internally consistent policy and substance input to the IS and IMS.⁴⁸ Integrating the IU and IMS INT would allow for member nation civilian and military intelligence agencies to contribute to the overall assessments of NATO's threats.

While not integrating elements such as NATO's SITCEN or SHAPE's NIFC and CCOMC, one coordinated and combined intelligence organization in Brussels would be the best postured to liaise with these other structures. This use of existing (IU, IMS INT and SAC) billets would help to offset austerity measures enacted by NATO and ease concerns about adding another large bureaucratic organization that slows or dilutes intelligence analysis. NATO HQ will gravitate towards refining and fusing intelligence provided by nations. Yet, having one central clearing house at NATO HQ will help balance national intelligence contributions and ensure that the intelligence presented to the NAC and MC is comprehensive and consistent.

Combining the civilian (IU/SAC) and military (IMS-INT) intelligence efforts would work best if the right discussions were held with each nation's civilian and military elements, and if the ASG-I agrees to work with both in the reform process. Working with each nation is critical because individual national interests often are the main obstacles to NATO Intelligence Reform. The separation of a nation's military and civilian elements is frequently legislated to preserve their mutual independence in support of general domestic democratic practices. When nations are able to send both

civilian and military analysts to work in the IU, only then can it showcase how well this process can work.⁴⁹

Integrating the SAC into the IU as the civilian element of the ASG-I will eliminate redundancy between the two elements and will also solve some of the IU's personnel shortages. The IU could absorb the SACs production requirements in terms of providing special assessments to the SG's private office. The IU particularly excels at long-term written assessments that they already have in their annual work plan.

The position of the ASG-I would require a new billet and should be a nominative instead of a quota position, drawn from a quality intelligence contributing NATO country, such as the U.S., the United Kingdom or Canada. While the U.S. has access to the best and most prolific intelligence, a seasoned intelligence professional from any of the above countries who also possesses strong leadership and communication skills could serve well as an ASG-I. Opening up the position to competition ensures that countries will put forth their best candidates and will increase the overall talent pool and candidate quality.⁵⁰ Even if the U.S. would not offer a candidate, it would still have opportunity to influence the intelligence picture presented to NATO decision-makers. For example,

...the U.S. intelligence representative in the U.S. Mission who [at times] has direct access to the Secretary General, still contribute the lion's share of intelligence in every Working Group, still provide the most and best input to the intelligence briefings to the NAC and MC, and most important, still have the dominant influence on the NAC and MC agendas.⁵¹

Regardless of which nationality is selected, an ASG-I must have a professional intelligence background with significant stature and experience in both civilian and military intelligence matters given NATO's current slate of military operations, and the expectation that these will only increase over time given the scope of NATO's Strategic Concept.⁵² A highly desirable candidate would be an individual who was perhaps in

charge of a NATO nation's civilian or military intelligence organization and who would be able to work with nations foreign services (especially in cases which civilian and military organizations will not cooperate).⁵³ Rank and prestige are important and without the requisite credentials, an ASG-I could quickly become marginalized and ineffective at finessing these awkward situations.⁵⁴

If the ASG-I does end up being a U.S national, that person must not be beholden to anyone in the U.S. chain because this would be a NATO and not a U.S. billet. He must display objectivity in various forums and be careful not to use the position to showcase U.S. contributions or capabilities; otherwise, nations may not contribute their share of intelligence believing perhaps that the U.S. can do it without their input.⁵⁵

The ASG-I should have a military deputy (DASG-I) who is dual-hatted as the Director, IMS INT⁵⁶ (flag level). The Director, IMS INT (becoming the DASG-I) and his staff would still be assigned to the IMS, but would be report to the ASG-I. This would establish a unique relationship between IS and IMS staff for this position.⁵⁷ As culturally difficult as it might be to construct such an integrated arrangement, it is far preferable to having internal intelligence disconnects at NATO HQ, from both a policy and a substance perspective.⁵⁸ This deputy position should also be nominative. The DASG-I would attend MC meetings and be responsible for the day to day intelligence support for the CMC/DCMC and the Director General IMS (DGIMS). The DASG-I would supervise what IMS INT is doing now, but his work would be ultimately overseen by the ASG-I.

The ASG-I core team (IMS INT, IU, SAC) would harmonize intelligence efforts of the disparate intelligence agencies supporting NATO and be the focal point for coordination among the nations' intelligence agencies. This focal point for coordinating

with nations would alleviate the donor fatigue previously discussed. The ASG-I elements should be co-located or as physically near one another as possible. Having the IU, SAC and IMS INT as next-door neighbors, or in the same physical space, will promote synergy, avoid duplication of effort, and facilitate the coordination of intelligence products.⁵⁹ It must be noted that an ASG-I must continually solicit a diversity of perspectives. Coordination or synergy should not be mistaken as synonymous with consensus, which would be detrimental to the intelligence process. Divergent assessments and analysis should be included and highlighted in reports, not minimized or discarded for the sake of a unified assessment. The personal staffs of the ASG-I and his deputy would come from the IMS INT's and the IU's current staffs. Based upon new requirements, the level and number of the staff might need to increase by 1-2 personnel. This is a small price to pay for the intelligence collaboration and effectiveness.

Enablers

The success of an ASG-I hinges on two types of enablers: technological and organizational. Technological enablers are those which exploit technology which enhance the ASG-I's mission of coordinating and overseeing NATO's intelligence flow. The key technological enabler is the BICES system which is discussed below. The organizational enabler is concerned with the physical placement of the team.

NATO civilian and military entities should enhance the use of BICES, NATO's common system to share intelligence. At present, the military intelligence community within and supporting NATO uses BICES on an inconsistent basis, which inhibits the smooth and timely flow of intelligence. Many NATO nations do not have BICES in their capitals and would have to fund its acquisition.⁶⁰ An ASG-I should encourage and

reward use of BICES by showcasing the timely, accurate and predictive intelligence products found on the system. The ASG-I would also be at the appropriate level to develop a wider implementation of BICES.

For example, though the U.S. produces most of the intelligence releasable to NATO, it does not electronically feed most of its releasable material on BICES in a timely manner. A central point of contact such as the ASG-I would work towards a solution to get nation's intelligence onto BICES in a timely manner. A recently retired U.S. European Command J-6 said NATO must expand technologies such as BICES so they serve as bridges between how the U.S. and its NATO allies process information.⁶¹ The ASG-I could use BICES internally for collaboration especially with SHAPE and with the NIFC in the UK.

Another important use of BICES would be the creation of an ASG-I produced intelligence digest that showcases and fuses nations' intelligence and answers NATO's strategic intelligence requirements. Rather than NATO HQ intelligence analysts conducting independent analysis based on raw intelligence they could provide the NAC, MC and nations with a comprehensive assessment based on nations' timely input, providing fused but at times dissenting and alternative views.

For the ASG-I to enhance its oversight of NATO intelligence operations, its teams should be co-located. As the new NATO HQ is being constructed now, planning should be enacted for this to occur in the present and future HQ. Cooperation must improve and be encouraged amongst all these organizations and in some instances memoranda of understanding between organizations should be reviewed, updated or established where necessary.

Alternative View

An alternative view (beyond the status quo) to the integration proposed, is for the ASG-I structure to take the IU structure and turn it into the ASG-I and the IMS INT remaining a non-integrated independent entity providing direct support to the MC.⁶² This view was put forth by some people interviewed from the IMS, but is not considered ideal because it perpetuates too much separation to become effective. This also risks an internally inconsistent intelligence picture presented to the NAC and MC and does not go far enough in fully achieving intelligence reform.

While this alternative might give intelligence greater priority in NATO and would ensure the MC is fully supported, it might still inadvertently promote competition and redundancy in intelligence at NATO HQ. Furthermore, because the IU does not have that many permanent members, it might be unable under austerity measures to keep all the staff it does have intact. As stated earlier, the IU is largely staffed by VNCs. A core of these VNC billets or all of the permanent IU billets would have to be protected and retained to make the ASG-I work. It could be difficult to convince NATO and its nations to fund such manning on a permanent basis.⁶³ Such a proposal would not mitigate donor fatigue as it would still allow for multiple organizations to task the same nations with very similar requests for intelligence. Therefore this construct would not solve the underlying problems of mistrust and competition which have led to redundancy, and at worst, a disjointed intelligence view.

Existing Model for NATO ASG-I

Prior to 9/11, domestic U.S. intelligence agencies suffered from redundancy and stove piping, and were unable to “connect the dots” on intelligence threats, specifically those related to the homeland. To address these failures, the U.S. Intelligence Reform

Act of 2004 established the position of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI).⁶⁴ This legislation aimed to give the DNI even more extensive authorities than the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) had. The latter was dual hatted as the head of the U.S. Intelligence Community while leading the CIA. The DCI arguably had a role comparable to the NATO DSG in that he did not have the time to devote himself to shepherding the entire U.S. intelligence effort because his focus was on the CIA. For the DSG the situation is reversed, he does not have time to focus on intelligence because he is focused on NATO business. Given the DNI's broad responsibilities, he cannot, by statute, serve as the director of any single intelligence agency but must devote his energy to overseeing all U.S. national intelligence entities. In many respects his role could serve as a model for a NATO ASG-I where the person in charge of intelligence, has no other significant roles.

The DNI position "entails great leadership skills and the ability to forge consensus among senior intelligence leaders of some 16 separate and diverse agencies."⁶⁵ An ASG-I would face a similar challenge not only in synchronizing the different intelligence structures within NATO, but also between the civilian and military intelligence agencies of all 28 nations. A debate about the DNI's efficacy at agency coordination continues; however most criticisms are procedural or bureaucratic in nature. Most do not oppose the concept of the position.⁶⁶

The DNI often consults the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USDI) for defense related military intelligence. The USDI is dual hatted as a defense deputy to the DNI to provide input as the Director of Defense Intelligence to the DNI.⁶⁷ While this

relationship itself is still maturing it provides NATO an example of how the USDI and D-ASGI can have dual hats and serve both civilian and military interests.

That said, there are potential pitfalls that should be monitored with respect to an ASG-I's synchronization of NATO Intelligence. The ASG-I should be held accountable by nations to ensure that he does not become a restrictive filter which prevents diverse views from getting to NATO's leadership. For example, the NATO ASG-I should follow the DNI model for presenting National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) in which dissenting analyses are purposefully highlighted.

As part of the ISB, the DSG could convene an intelligence working group to study best practices from the DNI model. The U.S. and other nations steeped in intelligence capabilities should have input into building the ASG-I structure and in determining its roles and responsibilities. The Civilian or Military Intelligence Committees could also call for such a study.⁶⁸

Key Leader Competencies of an ASG-I

Once NATO's reformed intelligence organizational structure has been crafted along with the appropriate roles and missions for an ASG-I, NATO must identify the right candidate to be the first ASG-I. NATO should look for a candidate that has the following three strategic leader competencies: (1) envisioning the future, (2) developing relationships (multinational and multi-organizational) and (3) consensus building.⁶⁹ Each of these attributes is discussed in detail below.

Envisioning the Future (Vision)

Any NATO ASG-I would need to employ environmental scanning to create a "vision that is *aligned* with a best estimate of the future environment" to provide intelligence support to NATO.⁷⁰ In envisioning the future he must have access to and

use all of the resources from the different national-level intelligence agencies and organizations within and in support of NATO. The ASG-I's objective would be to synchronize these varying analyses to inform NATO's strategic goals and priorities. As uncertainty increases, NATO Intelligence teams must be structured and empowered to collaboratively monitor ongoing trends, forecast future scenarios, and consider potential wildcard events.⁷¹

A key role of an ASG-I would be to mitigate the two types of decision-makers' reactions to crises: denial and defensiveness. Denial is defined as the refusal to believe that certain potentials exist. Defensiveness is an opposite reaction from denial in which the leader takes a passive approach, hoping the crisis will abate without intervention.⁷² An intelligence professional must influence strategic leaders to recognize when they are in denial or defensiveness modes. Effective forecasting of wildcard scenarios and developing and monitoring of indicators associated with them, can aid in communicating their existence to decision-makers, when such situation exists. This in turn can prepare an organization to influence the response to a surprise.⁷³ With the DSG overseeing intelligence at NATO, it is more likely for denial and defensiveness to occur. However, an empowered ASG-I would have the access to communicate the gravity of a particular crisis to NATO senior bodies.

To mitigate decision-makers' potential to respond inadequately to a crisis, an ASG-I would first direct his intelligence organizations to scrutinize data and trends for unforeseen types of events before or while they are occurring. This is a daunting task. To offer NATO leaders a truly useful and comprehensive intelligence picture, an ASG-I would need to choreograph the intelligence gathering and analysis efforts of the 'stove-

piped,' and redundant NATO intelligence units, to maximize their intelligence gathering potential.

An ASG-I could better direct the current effort by eliminating redundant efforts and assigning NATO's limited internal intelligence analysis resources to monitor a broader spectrum of potential threats. An ASG-I would also have the professional insight to know which assets are best applied against which intelligence priorities. He would have to be familiar with each NATO member's national capabilities and contributions to the overall effort, as well as with the complex NATO structure itself.

Developing Relationships

To develop the relationships necessary to harmonize NATO's intelligence efforts, the ASG-I must be cross-culturally savvy enough to operate in a multicultural and multi-organizational environment. Leadership expert Angela Febbraro says that leaders in multinational environments "must be persuasive, not coercive and sensitive to national [and organizational] needs."⁷⁴ An ASG-I should strive to eliminate the potential for 'haves and have nots' in the NATO intelligence structure. For example, cliques among certain nations which share particular intelligence capabilities, have English as their first language (US, Canada, UK) or whose alliances pre-date NATO, must be avoided at NATO. Such cliques would alienate other members and cause unnecessary friction to the process.⁷⁵ It would be essential for the ASG-I to foster a sense of organizational inclusiveness and trust.

Leading a multinational organization is more demanding and difficult than leading a national one.⁷⁶ One such multinational leader is NATO's Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), Admiral James Stravridis, says that in such an environment that "walls don't work." According to the Atlantic Council the Admiral also said that, "...21st

Century security cannot be about walls, [and] that is must be about building bridges between people, organizations, and nations.”⁷⁷ This is exactly what the ASG-I must strive to do within the NATO intelligence apparatus. Strategic leaders must know how to operate in a multicultural environment to gain the full understanding and commitment of their subordinates and partners.

Trust is essential as a foundation for the ASG-I success. His responsibility for developing, earning, and maintaining trust, both horizontally and vertically, cannot be overstated. Trust is especially important in the intelligence business and more so in a multicultural environment. Contributors want certainty that their information will be acted on when appropriate, that it will be protected, and that they will get credit for their effort. If donor information is not used or is misused, trust will be diminished or irrevocably broken. Trust is key in finding what DNI James Clapper refers to as the “sweet spot”⁷⁸ that allows both the sharing and protecting of each nation’s intelligence.

A 2008 incident illustrates the critical role trust plays in a multinational intelligence organization such as NATO’s. The incident involved the Civilian Intelligence Committee (CIC). The CIC is a very high level committee that has overall responsibility for civilian intelligence issues at NATO. It convenes annually with representatives from each NATO country. The CIC focuses on espionage and terrorist threat issues to the Alliance. At its meetings, the head of the domestic intelligence service from each nation attends. The Chairman of the CIC rotates annually by nation.⁷⁹

In 2008, Hungary had its turn as CIC Chair and appointed an officer who spent several years in Moscow and was trained by the notorious former Soviet Intelligence Agency, the KGB. This appointment aggravated an already charged environment

where intelligence sharing was being hampered by the attempts of foreign intelligence agents to access NATO information, especially in light of NATO's expansion into Eastern Europe over the last decade.⁸⁰ In an environment in which former adversaries have now become allies, trust is paramount. In several NATO countries, the civilian and military intelligence structures have a deep mistrust of each other, thus, the HQ level intelligence structures and leaders must do everything they can to ameliorate suspicion, paranoia, and competition that currently exists between many civilian and military intelligence organizations. Someone in the position of an ASG-I would have been uniquely qualified to advise and positively influence the CIC regarding the impact of its leadership choice.

To foster trust and multicultural cooperation an ASG-I must build a heterogeneous team to lessen the potential for in and out groupings. Heterogeneous teams emphasize rules and practices that are inclusive rather than exclusive, and tend to be more open to ideas and inputs.⁸¹ Heterogeneous groups should include intelligence representatives from as many different countries as possible. It may also encourage a greater willingness by nations to contribute more intelligence, in the hope of demonstrating their value-added to the overall effort.

As the ASG-I builds bridges to support intelligence reform, it will be important for him to have a thorough understanding of the each agency and allies capabilities and weaknesses, and he must be attuned to each ally's and partner's political sensitivities.⁸² For instance, when NATO is deciding whether to intervene in a crisis such as those in Libya or Syria, an ASG-I must understand allied nations' past and present relationships with those states and their capabilities for contributing meaningful intelligence.

An empowered ASG-I would have access to the many organizations that enrich the tapestry of NATO intelligence and should build bridges to NATO partners.⁸³ Outreach to the latter occurs within the Intelligence Liaison Unit (ILU). The ILU engages with, NATO partner countries, and NATO Contact Point Embassy (CPE) information. The ILU provides liaison to partner countries to share and coordinate intelligence. The ILU officer falls under the IMS and coordinates with both the Diplomacy Division and the NATO Office of Security to ensure contacts and security are handled and coordinated appropriately.⁸⁴

One of the ILU's main missions is to coordinate with the NATO CPE network in development since the 1990s to:

...support the Alliance's partnership and public diplomacy activities in countries participating in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), Partnership for Peace (PfP), Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI). Following the review of NATO's partnerships policy in April 2011, the network of CPEs has also been extended to other partners across the globe.⁸⁵

Contacts with CPEs require high level coordination and finesse; nevertheless, it can be well worth the effort. For example, particular NATO CPE Defense Attaché's could send reports to the ASG-I to highlight events unfolding in a given region. Defense attaches are trained to report to their respective capitals and with permission could send reports to NATO.⁸⁶ It would necessitate someone at the ASG-I level or higher to encourage this share reporting initiative.

As NATO's regional security role continues to expand outside of Europe, access to CPEs information about potential crisis areas would be invaluable. For example, NATO Mediterranean Dialogue CPEs could have provided valuable intelligence for

NATO to use in considering whether to take action in Libya and to understand the potential second and third order effects of an intervention.

A Foreign Policy and Atlantic Council survey completed in May of 2012 forecast the likelihood of NATO continuing to operate outside of Europe and North America for the foreseeable future. The survey was administered to fifty-nine U.S. and European heads of state, ministers of defense, ministers of foreign affairs, intelligence officials, and current and former members of Congress. When asked if NATO should support operations outside of Europe and the U.S., a resounding fifty-six said yes. Over half of those surveyed also felt that NATO should continue assistance to Libya, reducing pirating off the Somali coast and send a peacekeeping force to support an Israeli/Palestinian peace agreement.⁸⁷ Such responses reinforce the expectation that NATO's intelligence requirements will continue to expand, as will the need for a leader to manage them.

Although challenges exist, there are positive signs in NATO intelligence reform. One such example where pooling and sharing of resources and the establishment of clear lanes in the road have worked successfully is the ongoing cooperation of IMS INT and NATO's Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Center which "is structurally embedded in the Emerging Security Challenges Division (ESC) and combines in its work the knowledge of National Experts as well as of personnel from the International Secretariat."⁸⁸

The WMD Center and the IMS INT share personnel who work in this center and the leadership of the Center and IMS INT are able to agree to a reasonable workload that supports both the MC and NAC with intelligence support. In the past, both the head

of the WMD Center and IMS INT have briefed a combined product to the MC and the NAC.⁸⁹ The IU also cooperates with the WMD Center by co-drafting certain briefings and making input to some assessments.⁹⁰ However, though the IU and IMS INT individually cooperate with the WMD Center, it often happens in a vacuum without one another knowing each other's' contributions. An ASG-I could ensure that this would not happen, by having all parties involved in the coordination and drafting process.

Consensus Building

While consensus building can be antithetical to the practice of good intelligence, it is central to the practice of leading a multinational organization of intelligence contributors, from a strategic leadership standpoint. According to leadership expert Stephen Gerras, consensus building is “based on effective reasoning, logic and negotiation which may take place over a long period of time.”⁹¹ NATO is a consensus driven organization.⁹² Like all strategic-level leaders at NATO, an ASG-I would spend a considerable amount of time consulting with leaders from other nations and their permanent representatives.

Consensus building is important for in the production of what is called NATO Agreed Intelligence (NAI). This is intelligence where all NATO members agree. Many of these NAI assessments are produced annually (or less frequent) and serve as a strategic baseline for the rest of NATO's intelligence. Such baselines include agreement of what the threat is and thereby inform the ASG-I's priorities. Coordinating NAI to obtain full endorsement is extremely challenging. It entails all 28 nations to agree to common intelligence protocols, and a chain of analysis and reporting (vice having multiple lines to the NAC, MC and SG). Given such coordination challenges an ASG-I could speed the process considerably.

In NATO's intelligence environment, an ASG-I would spend much of his time engaging other nations to ensure intelligence is contributed from each nation. In working with allies it is essential to build consensus, as peers do not respond to one another's orders.⁹³ Developing relationships takes time. As such, the NATO ASG-I would need to aggressively pursue a boundary spanning approach to develop them. Gerras notes "boundary spanning involves collaborating with others outside the team, scanning the environment, and negotiating resources for the team."⁹⁴ The ASG-I should boundary span to cultivate relationships that exploit allied intelligence niche capabilities such as HUMINT in a region that no one else has.

One example of leveraging a nation's intelligence support is illustrated by a recent visit of a senior NATO intelligence official to a new East European NATO member nation. During this visit, the NATO official was asked by the country's National Intelligence Chief to comment on his country's contribution to NATO intelligence. The NATO official candidly responded that the new ally was not in fact contributing intelligence to NATO, and followed up this revelation with a polite request that it begin doing so. Shortly thereafter, a small but steady niche stream of intelligence started to flow from that country.⁹⁵ An ASG-I would be in an excellent position to identify such gaps in intelligence contribution and address them early on to ensure NATO is exploiting all potential contributions to its intelligence picture.

Much of an ASG-I's power will rest on his level expertise and his referent authority gained from respect for his ability to operate effectively in a multinational environment.⁹⁶ At a more microcosmic level the ASG-I must apply relationship skills to his own team. It will be incumbent on an ASG-I to make his analysts feel they are part

of a heterogeneous, collaborative team that has a sense of loyalty to NATO's mission not just to their national capitals.

Conclusion

Dr. Paul Piller, a former senior Central Intelligence Agency official, reflected that “resources are limited; threats are not.”⁹⁷ Though NATO faces a limited resource environment, the threats with which it must concern itself continue to grow. It should therefore appoint an ASG-I now to lead an integrated intelligence structure at NATO that takes a strategic, macro-level approach to maximizing limited resources for maximum efficiency.

In these fiscally strained times, the ASG-I proposal is a more efficient use of NATO's existing resources. A net gain of man hours is realized by an ASG-I eliminating redundant efforts and assigning NATO's limited internal intelligence analysis resources to monitor a broader spectrum of potential threats. This use of existing (IU, IMS INT and SAC) billets would help to offset austerity measures enacted by NATO and ease concerns about adding another large bureaucratic organization that slows or dilutes intelligence analysis. The personal staffs of the ASG-I and his deputy would come from IMS INT and IU current staffs with only minimal increases. This is a small price to pay for increased intelligence collaboration and effectiveness.

This intelligence professional must also be able to envision and apportion assets against likely areas of concern. A frank and open working relationship is imperative between the ASG-I and the SG, the NAC and the MC to ensure NATO is getting the most comprehensive intelligence possible. Furthermore, a NATO ASG-I must excel at building multinational relationships based on trust. An ASG-I must promote organizational inclusiveness, not exclusiveness, to tear down existing walls.

The ASG-I requires NATO leadership and nations' trust and confidence to lead his team to answer the intelligence requirements for NATO. This support must also come from NATO's Intelligence Committees, both the CIC and the Military Intelligence Committee (formerly the NATO Intelligence Board). Whenever these committees meet,⁹⁸ the ASG-I must be engaged and able to champion NATO's intelligence needs, to include the needs of individual allies to help them contribute.

Only someone at an ASG level or higher would be capable of accomplishing a strategically-minded approach to reforming and properly coordinating NATO's current intelligence processes to maximize their overall effectiveness. Should NATO nations fail to demand that an ASG-I position be created they risk a greater failure in achieving intelligence ambitions set forth in their latest strategic concept.

Endnotes

¹ *Lisbon Summit Declaration*, paragraph 50, November 20, 2010, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_68828.htm?mode=pressrelease (accessed October 16, 2012).

² Karen Laino, SES, former Director of IMS INT, interview by author, York Pennsylvania, October 23, 2012.

³ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, "Principal officials," June 6, 2012, <http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/88033.htm> (accessed October 16, 2012).

⁴ *Active Engagement, Modern Defence: Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization*, November 19-20 November 2010, http://www.nato.int/strategic-concept/pdf/Strat_Concept_web_en.pdf (accessed October 16, 2012).

⁵ Edward B. Atkeson, "From the Archives-1984: Design for Dysfunction --- NATO Intelligence: A Contradiction in Terms," *Studies in Intelligence Volume 53, Number 1* (CIA: 2009) <https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol53no1/> (accessed October 16, 2012), 1.

⁶ Laino interview.

⁷ Laino interview.

⁸ Letitia A. Long, SES, Director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), telephone interview by author December 28, 2012. Ms. Long's comments reflect her personal thoughts based on her professional expertise and do not represent official NGA or DOD positions.

⁹ *Prague Summit Declaration*, November 21, 2002, <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/p02-127e.htm> (accessed October 16, 2012).

¹⁰ North Atlantic Treaty Organization Multimedia Library, "Intelligence Sharing in Combating Terrorism," May 9, 2012, <http://natolibguides.info/intelligence> (accessed October 16, 2012).

¹¹ Karen Laino, "The Transformation of the Intelligence Paradigm in NATO," in *Regional Security and Intelligence Cooperation in the Western Balkans and Global Asymmetric Threats*, ed. Stephen R. Di Rienzo, Damir Crncec, and Liliana Brozic (Ljubljana: Defensor d.o.o., 2011), 13-14.

¹² Laino interview.

¹³ Please note: the number of personnel indicated in each organization is an approximation of numbers from summer 2012.

¹⁴ Agreed intelligence is when all 28 nations agree on a product. These products are normally produced on an annual basis and not very timely. The military intelligence services share this intelligence through the IMS

¹⁵ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, "International Military Staff Working Mechanism," May 9, 2012, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_64557.htm (accessed October 16, 2012).

¹⁶ Laino interview.

¹⁷ John Kriendler, *NATO Intelligence and Early Warning*, (Oxford, UK: Conflict Studies Research Center, March 2006), 6.

¹⁸ Ibid, 6.

¹⁹ Karen Laino, "The Transformation of the Intelligence Paradigm in NATO," 13.

²⁰ Barbara Morrison, GS-15, DIA employee (retired), telephone interview by author, December 1, 2012.

²¹ Barbara Morrison, e-mail message to author, December 5, 2012.

²² Laino, "The Transformation of the Intelligence Paradigm in NATO," 14.

²³ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, "New NATO division to with Emerging Security Challenges," August 4, 2010, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_65107.htm (accessed on November 24, 2012).

²⁴ Ibid

²⁵ Jamie Shea, “Deputy Assistant Secretary-General of Emerging Security Challenges Division, NATO,” interview by Julian Hale, *Defense News*, Online Edition, December 20, 2010 <http://www.defensenews.com/article/20101220/DEFFEAT03/12200301/Jamie-Shea> (accessed October 16, 2012).

²⁶ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Situation Centre,” December 2, 2010, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_57954.htm (accessed October 16, 2012).

²⁷ NATO Intelligence Fusion Centre, “What is the NIFC?” <http://web.ifc.bices.org/about.htm> (accessed November 7, 2012).

²⁸ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “New integrated NATO center supports the Alliance with improved approach to emerging security challenges and crisis,” May 4, 2012, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_86912.htm (accessed November 7, 2012).

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Laino interview.

³¹ Links to biographies of Bisogniero and Vershbow
<http://www.nato.int/cv/secgen/bisogniero-e.htm>;
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/who_is_who_84342.htm

³² Multiple interviews.

³³ Laino interview.

³⁴ Morrison and Long interviews.

³⁵ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *NATO Handbook* (Brussels, Belgium: Public Diplomacy Division, 2006), 74.

³⁶ Interview by telephone with confidential source, U.S. military officer in the International Military Staff on December 5, 2012.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Common theme from multiple interviews and personally observed by the author in his role at NATO.

³⁹ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *NATO Handbook*, 77, 85.

⁴⁰ European Officer who is an intelligence analyst in the International Military Staff, telephone interview by author November 28, 2012.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Morrison interview.

⁴³ *Active Engagement, Modern Defence: Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization*, 10-13.

⁴⁴ Morrison interview.

⁴⁵ Morrison interview

⁴⁶ The author served in NATO HQ in IMS INT as an intelligence analyst from 2009-2012.

⁴⁷ Laino and Morrison interviews.

⁴⁸ Brigadier General John Adams, USA (Ret), e-mail message to author, December 9, 2012. BG Adams was the U.S. Deputy Military Representative to NATO in Brussels when he retired in 2007.

⁴⁹ Laino interview.

⁵⁰ BG Adams e-mail, December 9, 2012.

⁵¹ Brigadier General John Adams, USA (Ret), e-mail message to author, December 8, 2012.

⁵² Morrison and Long interviews.

⁵³ Laino interview.

⁵⁴ Morrison interview.

⁵⁵ Laino interview.

⁵⁶ BG Adams e-mail, December 9, 2012.

⁵⁷ There are no other instances where an IMS directorate reports to an ASG. However there is a very close relationship between ASG Ops and IMS Ops.

⁵⁸ BG Adams e-mail, December 9, 2012

⁵⁹ Morrison interview.

⁶⁰ Laino interview.

⁶¹ Rita Boland, "Building Bridges Between Allies, Old and New" in *Signal Magazine Online* (September 2010) <http://www.afcea.org/content/?q=node/2382> (accessed November 22, 2012)

⁶² European and U.S. telephone interviews with officers in the IMS, as previously noted.

⁶³ Morrison interview.

⁶⁴ Richard A. Best Jr., *Intelligence Reform After Five Years: The Role of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI)* (Washington, DC: U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, June 22, 2010), 2.

⁶⁵ Ibid, 1.

⁶⁶ Ibid, 11.

⁶⁷ Long interview.

⁶⁸ The civilian and military intelligence committees normally meet twice a year. Normally each nation has the head of their civilian or military intelligence agencies represent them at the respective meeting.

⁶⁹ Stephen J. Gerras, ed., *Strategic Leadership Primer*, 3rd ed. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: United States Army War College, 2010), 30-32.

⁷⁰ Ibid, 3.

⁷¹ Jay Ogilvy and Peter Schwartz, "Plotting your Scenarios," *Global Business Network*, (2004). http://www.gbn.com/articles/pdfs/gbn_Plotting%Scenarios%20new.pdf (accessed August 21, 2012), 14.

⁷² Peter Schwartz, "Inevitable Surprises," *Inevitable Surprises: Thinking Ahead in Time of Turbulence* (New York: Gotham Books, 2003), 8-9.

⁷³ Ibid, 13.

⁷⁴ Angela R. Febbraro, "Leadership and Command," in *RTO-TR-HFM-120-Multinational Military Operations and Intercultural Factors*, (Research and Technology Organization of NATO: November 2008), 3-4.

⁷⁵ Joseph Soeters et al., "Smooth and strained international military cooperation," in *Military Cooperation in Multinational Peace Operations: Managing cultural diversity and crisis response* (London: Routledge, 2008), 202.

⁷⁶ Angela R. Febbraro, "Leadership and Command," in *RTO-TR-HFM-120-Multinational Military Operations and Intercultural Factors*, (Research and Technology Organization of NATO: November 2008), 3-2.

⁷⁷ Jorge Benitez , *Video: How NATO's Supreme Commander thinks about global security*, July 24, 2012 <http://www.acus.org/natosource/video-how-natos-supreme-commander-thinks-about-global-security> (accessed November 22, 2012).

⁷⁸ Richard A. Best Jr., *Intelligence Information: Need-to-Know vs. Need-to-Share* (Washington, DC: U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, June 6, 2011), 1.

⁷⁹ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, "Civilian Intelligence Committee (CIC)," November 16, 2011, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_69278.htm (accessed November 22, 2012).

⁸⁰ Judy Dempsey, "New NATO intelligence chief was trained by KGB," *New York Times*, February 3, 2008.

⁸¹ Joseph Soeters et al., "Smooth and strained international military cooperation," 201.

⁸² Angela R. Febbraro, "Leadership and Command," 3-4.

⁸³ Laino interview.

⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁵ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, "NATO Contact Point Embassies," February, 21 2012, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49190.htm (accessed November 22, 2012).

⁸⁶ Colonel Branko Toman, Slovakian Air Force, former IMS INT production chief, e-mail message to author, December 5, 2012.

⁸⁷ "The FP Survey: The Future of NATO," *Foreign Policy Online*, May 14, 2012, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/05/14/expert_survey_the_future_of_nato (accessed November 22, 2012).

⁸⁸ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, "Weapons of Mass Destruction," June 12, 2012, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_50325.htm (accessed November 22, 2012).

⁸⁹ Laino interview.

⁹⁰ Morrison interview.

⁹¹ Gerras, *Strategic Leadership Primer*, 32

⁹² *NATO Handbook*, 33.

⁹³ Ibid, 32.

⁹⁴ Steven J. Gerras and Muff Clark, *Effective Team Leadership: A Competitive Advantage* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2008), 264-265.

⁹⁵ Morrison interview

⁹⁶ Gerras and Clark, *Effective Team Leadership: A Competitive Advantage*, 263.

⁹⁷ Paul R. Pillar, "Second-Guessing About Benghazi," *The National Interest Online*, October 1, 2012, <http://nationalinterest.org/blog/paul-pillar/second-guessing-about-benghazi-7543> (accessed October 16, 2012)

⁹⁸ These committees normally meet twice a year to cover key intelligence policy issues.

