


Strategy Research Project International Fellow

Developing and Implementing an Effective National Security Strategy for Croatia

by

Colonel Slobodan Kratochvil
Croatian Army



United States Army War College
Class of 2013

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Colonel Slobodan Kratochvil
Croatian Army

Colonel Gregory M. Martin
Department of Command, Leadership, and Management
Project Adviser

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U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

Abstract

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This essay begins with an analysis of the Homeland War, which the Republic of Croatia won without a published National Security Strategy (NSS), and asks whether a small country such as Croatia needs or does not need a NSS. The essay continues by analyzing the values of the present 2002 NSS and its application in today's changed security environment, continuing with the recommendation that the NSS should be updated. The additional key points for the new NSS development found that the outdated NSS, as hierarchically the highest security strategy, causes significant problems when developing, and especially implementing the subordinated strategies and documents. The final analysis identifies problems in the insufficient national security system and the lack of political want to efficiently deal with national security issues. The essay ends with several recommendations for enhancing the national security system through necessary changes in legislation and establishing a new permanent board of the National Security Council that is responsible for crafting Croatian national security strategy and policy.

Developing and Implementing an Effective National Security Strategy for Croatia

Our defense is not in armaments, nor in science, nor in going underground. Our defense is in law and order.

—Albert Einstein¹

The Republic of Croatia decided in 1991 to be an independent democratic state and adopted its first national security strategy (*NSS*) on March 19, 2002, after it became a Partnership for Peace member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In comparison with other transitional countries, the Republic of Croatia was late in adopting a *NSS*, and other security strategic strategies and documents, due to the demands of fighting the Homeland War which was fought on her territory from August 1990 to November 1995. Since 2002, when the Republic of Croatia adopted the first *NSS*, there have been many significant changes in the strategic environment and yet the *NSS* has not been updated. The Republic of Croatia tried to develop and implement a new *NSS* twice but failed each time.

Why is the Republic of Croatia struggling to develop and implement a new and effective *NSS*? Should it change its approach? If yes, what changes should be made? This essay examines the reasons why a new *NSS* is required and recommends which changes should occur in the current legislation in order to establish an efficient, integrated and comprehensive interagency planning system. The essay also explores the various factors underpinning the two unsuccessful attempts in developing a new *NSS*, and identifies the problems of developing and implementing subordinate strategies. Finally, the essay recommends the establishment of a new board that is part of the Croatian National Security Council with responsibility to craft the necessary

strategic documents required to guide Croatia's pursuit of her national interests using all the elements of national power (diplomatic, information, military and economic).

The Homeland War and the Beginning of National Security Strategy

The referendum for the Republic of Croatia independence occurred on May 19, 1991. The Croatian citizens decided with a 94% majority that the Republic of Croatia would be an independent state. On June 25, 1991, after the successful referendum, the Parliament of the Republic of Croatia began a disassociation process from other Former Yugoslav Republics. The Croat-Serbian relationship had become intolerable due to Serbian refusal to recognize Croatian independence.

This deterioration of the Serb and Croatian relationship allowed a local Serb insurgency, with strong support of the Former Yugoslav Army, to take root. The insurgency caused 6605 civilian casualties.² The young Croatian State did not have any option but to defend herself by fighting against Serbia in what Croatia calls the Homeland War. Even though war time was not ideal for developing strategic security documents, the President of the Republic of Croatia in accordance with article 89 of the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia,³ declared the first Defense Law on September 20, 1991.⁴ The Defense Law mandates specific tasks for citizens and all structures of the Croatian State in order to successfully fight against a much stronger enemy and build a modern national security structure. According to that legislation the Government of the Republic of Croatia had an obligation to:

- Suggest security and defense plans.
- Provides methodology and unique indicators for production of security, defense, and development plans.

- Develop a security and defense plan.
- Provide all necessary policies for full implementation of this law in the next six months from the day when this law will be valid.⁵

In practice, only the War Cabinet was established in accordance with Article 23 of the Defense Law.⁶ The Croatian government wished to have a modern and democratic security system but the demands of the Homeland War prevented that vision from happening. The international community, especially the European Union (EU), did not foresee, and was not prepared for, a collapse of the Former Yugoslavia and war in the Balkans. The international community's response to the crisis precluded the Republic of Croatia from organizing an effective defense against Serbian aggression and tacitly allowed the Former Yugoslavia to maintain status quo. The implementation of the international community policy started with United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 713, adopted on September 25, 1991.⁷ The UN Security Council decided to impose an arms embargo on the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia which mainly affected the unarmed Croatian State. This action was done under Chapter VII of the UN Charter which is entitled Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression. With that resolution the Republic of Croatia was put in a weak position because the embargo was applied to all former Yugoslav Republics, including Croatia.

The analysis of the situation at that time using the strategy model of ends, ways, and means, shows that the Republic of Croatia had an *NSS* and an end state in mind even though it was unpublished.⁸ The most important security strategic challenge for Croatia was to regain full control of the temporary occupying parts, and establish the

rule of law over the whole territory. This important goal of Croatian national interest is a perfect example of ends.

Even though Croatia wanted to solve the problem peacefully, the situation on the ground showed that the other side did not share the same vision. A defensive war was the only possible solution for Croatia. This situation unified all Croatian citizens in Croatia and abroad, and all the political parties used every available means including their lives to achieve all national goals which is obvious from the various political party leaders' speeches.

The following speeches are evidence of Croatian citizens' readiness to use all necessary means, including their lives, to accomplish the millennial dream: the Independent Croatian State. The first elected Croatian president and the leader of the majority party, the Croatian Democratic Union, Doctor Franjo Tudman said in his speech in front of thousands of refugees on March 16, 1991, in the Croatian capital city Zagreb, "if somebody will jeopardize, with arms, Croatian sovereignty, we will defend ourselves with all the weapons we have, and we will defend ourselves with all Croatian citizens, the power to subjugate the Croatian people does not exist."⁹

At that time the opposition parties and their leaders thought similarly and the Republic of Croatia was unified as never before. Doctor Vlado Gotovac, the president of the Croatian Social Liberal Party, in his speech on August 30, 1991, in the front of the former 5th Yugoslavia Army Area Command in Zagreb said "we do not have weapons, but we have power of dignity and power of our readiness to die if we cannot live like free humans beings."¹⁰ That speech among others, together with the Croatian citizens' wish for independence, essentially was the Croatian national security strategy.

Without a published *NSS*, but with political consensus of ends, ways and means Croatia successfully did two major offensives known as *Operation Flash* and *Operation Storm* in 1995. The Croatian military and police forces in *Operation Flash* liberated about 500 square kilometers of West Slavonia territory occupied by the Serbian aggressor in just 31 hours and established control over the highway Zagreb-Lipovac. *Operation Storm* liberated large Croatian regions along the border with Bosnia and Herzegovina, including the cities of Knin, which was center of the insurgency, Obrovac, Slunj, and Petrinja. Those operations not only brought peace to the Republic of Croatia but also changed the military power relationship in the region, which led to the Dayton Peace Agreement and peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina.¹¹

The next step in accomplishing the strategic national goal happened in 1998 with a peaceful reintegration of the Croatian Danube Region (East Slavonia, Baranja and West Sirmium) in the Croatian constitutional and legal order.¹² It was a great example of the successful implementation of Croatian “unpublished” *NSS* because the Republic of Croatia managed civilian control over the entire national territory without firing a single bullet and without human casualties or serious violations of humanitarian law. This event typified Sun Tzu’s aphorism that “to subdue without the enemy without fighting is the acme of military skill.”¹³ The Croatian reintegration also demonstrated how Croatia effectively used the ways of national soft power such as diplomacy, supported with military power, to realize its national goals.

These examples from Croatia’s history show that even a small country can win a war without a written *NSS*, but only if it has prominent leaders who use words to transform vision into strategic reality.¹⁴ The Croatian’s first elected president, Franjo

Tudman, was that prominent leader. Croatia used all benefits of that approach to win the Homeland War, but the peace that followed brought new challenges.

Developing the National Security Strategy Documents

Parallel with fighting the war, the Republic of Croatia developed a democratic political system, and amended important documents such as the Constitution with different kind of laws and policies. For example, in the amendments of the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia published in 2001, it is very clear that “the Parliament of the Republic of Croatia should deliver a *NSS* and National Defense Strategy (*NDS*), and exercise civil control of the Croatian Defense Force and security services.”¹⁵

The Constitutional changes also established a parliamentary government system and decreased the authority of the president in security policy issues. The government is responsible for appointing a working group and lead ministry in order to prepare strategies while the president’s function is to give consent. After amending the Constitution, significant changes occurred in the Defense Law as well. In accordance with the Defense Law the core national security strategic documents are the *NSS*, *NDS*, National Military Strategy (*NMS*) and Defense Plan.¹⁶ The government reports to the Parliament of the Republic of Croatia a Yearly Readiness Report of the Croatian Defense System.

The Defense Law prescribes development of a *Long Term Development Plan (LTDP)* and the *Armed Forces Using Plan (AFUP)*. The purpose of *LTDP* is to provide strategic guidance to the Croatian Armed Forces. The adoption of this document shows the Croatian parliament’s commitment to the implementation of defense reforms and obliges the government to provide necessary resources to achieve the objectives set forth in this plan. The *Armed Forces Using Plan* determines how to use the Armed

Forces not only in war but also in the whole spectrum of tasks supporting civilian authorities and populations. The Ministry of Defense is responsible to write the *LTDP* and the General Staff of the Croatian Armed Forces is responsible for the Armed Forces Using Plan. The Republic of Croatia has a *Strategic Defense Review* published for the first time in 2005 as a result of effective interagency collaboration.¹⁷ The development lasted two years. The Croatian *Strategic Defense Review* is very similar to the U.S. *Quadrennial Defense Review*, but there is not a timeline for when and how often it should be published.¹⁸ This essay recommends that the *Strategic Defense Review* be published on a quadrennial basis in order to stay relevant to the changing strategic environment. The Defense Law should prescribe the time line and responsibility.

The First Croatian NSS

All countries, regardless how big or small, want to protect their fundamental interests. That means that not only big, but also small and middle size countries should consider developing and implementing a grand strategy.¹⁹ The Parliament of the Republic of Croatia issued the very first *NSS* on March 19, 2002 by publishing it in the *National Papers* number 32/02 on March 28, 2002.²⁰

The same year the Parliament of the Republic of Croatia also issued the *NDS*²¹ and one year later the President of the Republic of Croatia issued the *NMS*²² which established the base for issue of subordinate security documents. At that time, from a general point of view, the *NSS* was applicable, but ten years later the political, economical, and security situation in the world and in Croatia, and her neighborhood is different while the *NSS* remains unchanged and irrelevant.

The present *NSS* is based on the regional security environment and assessment of security challenges. The previous example showed that the *NSS* can accomplish the

goal to enhance the security position of Croatia if it is based on a successful assessment. On the other hand, a wrong assessment could jeopardize national security. The *NSS* predicted that the security situation in the region would be more and more stable, and that the bilateral relationship with Serbia would develop into a respectful relationship based on democratic standards with mutual respect. The following examples show the shortcomings of the Croatian *NSS*, ten years after implementation, and call for the development a new *NSS*.

Shortcomings of the Current Croatian National Security Strategy

There are several factors that have changed the strategic environment and these changes have caused shortcomings in the existing 2002 Croatian *NSS*. These changes include: regional fragmentation, the reemergence of the Serbian threat, and persistent instability in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Regional Fragmentation

Regional relations have depended primarily on the relationship between Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia consisted of the Republic of Serbia with two provinces, Vojvodina and Kosovo, and the Republic of Monte Negro. The major issues between the two countries were: return of refugees, prisoners of war, missing people, and solving border disputes. The best way to solve these issues was through interstate communication and collaboration. The reconciliation process developed gradually but was disrupted due to Federal Republic of Yugoslavia fragmentation which started in 2006 and finished in 2008 with formation of three new states.

Two new states originated in 2006 when the Republic of Monte Negro claimed independence from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. That same year, instead of only

one state, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, two states existed, the Republic of Monte Negro and the Republic of Serbia. With both states Croatia shared borders and had border disputes. The other issues: return of refugees, prisoners of war and missing people problem are again at beginning because what was arranged with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Croatia is not valid any more.

The formation of a third state, Kosovo, and Serbian's refusal to recognize it caused more problems for Croatia. The Republic of Kosovo declared independence on February 17, 2008, but the Republic of Serbia, unlike other states, did not recognize the Republic of Kosovo as an independent state. The U.S., countries of the European Union (EU), and the region, including the Republic of Croatia faced serious riots recognizing the Republic of Kosovo.²³ The Serbian refusal to recognize Kosovo's independence jeopardized the security situation in the region. Because of the serious security situation on the ground, the Kosovo Force (KFOR) mission stayed with the current number of the troops and moved towards a smaller and more flexible troop presence when circumstances allowed and when the time was right.²⁴ Croatia, as a NATO member, is a part of the KFOR mission and that engagement adds additional challenges to the already difficult relationship with neighboring state Serbia.

The Reemergence of a Serbian Threat

The present NSS stated "the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, today the Republic of Serbia was the main factor of instability in the region for last ten years. But after Serbia conducted an election in 2000, it was no longer a security threat for the Republic of Croatia because a democratic government was elected."²⁵ However the present situation, after the last Serbian's presidential elections were held in 2012, when

Tomislav Nikolic was elected, shows that the political and security situation in the region is not as simple and predictable as the present *NSS* states.

After the election Tomislav Nikolic said, in an interview for German newspaper *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, that the project of the Greater Serbia (including part of Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina) is his “unfortunately unrealized dream.” This position was deemed unacceptable by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Croatia, Vesna Pusic.²⁶ The Serbian president Nikolic also denies the Srebrenica genocide. The U.S. State Government press statements clearly express that the Serbian president could not only stop the process of building trust and friendly relationships with Croatia, but could also destabilize the fragile security situation in the Bosnia and Herzegovina region.²⁷ Relationships in the region depend very much on the relationship between Croatia and Serbia. One year after the election in Serbia there was not any official conversation between Croatian and Serbian presidents or premiers. This situation is completely different than what the current *NSS* predicts. The present situation is unacceptable and not only is development of a new *NSS* needed, but also the strategic communication policy must be corrected.

Persistent Instability in Bosnia

The security situation in Bosnia has remained unsettled for over seventeen years. This situation was not resolved by the Dayton Peace Agreement and subsequent NATO military operations in the Balkans. The high level of corruption supported by organized crime groups in the region, particularly in Bosnia and Herzegovina, makes economic recovery remarkably difficult. The poor economic situation opens up opportunities for international terrorist organizations, particularly radical political Islamic organizations, to establish bases in the region in order to destabilize not only the region

but also the EU. A prime illustration is the terrorist attack which occurred on October 28, 2011, against the U.S. Embassy compound in the Bosnia and Herzegovina capital Sarajevo, when a man with a Kalashnikov rifle opened fire.²⁸ Later, the perpetrator was recognizing as a Wahhabian.²⁹

Croatia's Impending Membership in the European Union (EU)

Croatia is scheduled to join the EU on July 1, 2013, when all EU parliament members sign an accession contract. After that Croatia will be the 28th EU member. Like the membership in other international organizations the EU membership implies various obligations to include the contribution to European security. The Republic of Croatia will be responsible not only for her own borders but also for the EU borders towards the non-EU states such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Serbia, and the Republic of Monte Negro.

Besides this obligation, the EU has her own European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP)³⁰ as a part of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP),³¹ and expects that all member states will implement these policy elements in their respective *NSS*. This demonstrates one kind of European security vision for developing a member's *NSS*. Like the membership in NATO, the imminent Croatian EU membership will shape the security environment and the *NSS* should be developed accordingly. The Republic of Croatia should implement the EU recommendations but should also decide alone what her national strategic interests are.

The First Attempt to Develop and Implement a New *NSS*

The Government of the Republic of Croatia announced that Croatia needed a new *NSS* in its document, the Program of the Croatian Government in the mandate period from 2003 to 2007. However, nothing happened because there was insufficient

political support to start a *NSS* development process.³² It is obvious that the Croatian government recognized the need for the *NSS* change, but did not follow its own program.

In order to accomplish “the promise” the Government of the Republic of Croatia wanted to establish a working group composed of relevant representatives of the various Ministries and other state institutions and agencies. Six months after it was established, the working group should have prepared and presented to the Government of the Republic of Croatia a new *NSS*. The main problem was not setting a particular date for the establishment of the working group.

Croatian Prime Minister Ivo Sanader, after the National Security Council meeting on January 27th 2009 said the new *NSS* will be finished in June 2009.³³ The main coordinator of the working group was the Ministry of Defense (MOD). The new *NSS* will be the leading document for developing and implementing the *NDS* and the *NMS*, the same information mentioned in the previous letter to NATO, but now we had a date for establishing the working group, a timeline for accomplishing the task, and involvement and statements of two of the most important actors regarding the *NSS*, the President of the Republic of Croatia and the Prime Minister. In spite of the engagement of the President of the Republic of Croatia and the Prime Minister, in June 2009 the new *NSS* was not ready as envisioned.

The reason for the deadline extension was not MOD’s inability but the government’s delay of publishing the decision for establishment of the working group. The government published the decision on February 12, 2009, more than two weeks after the meeting of the National Security Council. However, the deadline mentioned not

only in the letter to NATO, but also in the Prime Minister's statement was extended until today. In conclusion, the main reason for failure to develop and implement a new *NSS* on time was the bureaucratic approach to such an important issue as national security.

On December 23, 2010, the Croatian Ministry of Defense (MOD) finally presented the draft of the new *NSS* for public debate.³⁴ The main presenter, the State Secretary of MOD Pjer Simunovic, said the *NSS* draft was accepted by the National Security Council on December 14, 2010. The National Security Council concluded that the *NSS* draft would be refer for thirty days of public debate. After public debate, the Croatian government will conduct the final debate and make necessary changes in accordance with the public debate suggestions. This new *NSS* still has not been published by the government.

The Croatian government has been reluctant to publish the revised *NSS* without public debate. Two public debates conducted in January 2011 produced some objections. One of the objections was to the general approach in dealing with the main security challenge which allowed everybody to agree with *NSS*.³⁵ Consequently, the development of all future subordinate documents based on a generic *NSS* will cause problems when implementing the *NDS* and the *NMS*. An equally important deficiency was the neglect of the necessary means for implementing the *NSS*.³⁶ Finally, the main objection was the date for publishing a new *NSS*, 2011 was the year before the parliament elections.

A newly elected parliament and government should have been able to develop and implement the *NSS* with its mandate. Clearly the Croatian politicians' statements showed that they did not take in to consideration political realities by wanting to publish

a new *NSS* before elections, and failed again. The *NSS* never came to the Croatian Parliament for adoption. It is very difficult to precisely define reasonable and explicable reasons for this failure by examining existing documents. One possible reason could be the political and cultural factors of decision making and the relationship between political, economic and military elites.³⁷

The Second Attempt to Develop and Implement a New *NSS*

After elections, the new Croatian Government, in its Program of the Croatian Government in mandate period from 2011 to 2015, did not plan to develop a new *NSS*. However, based on existing *NSS* and the government's vision, it planned to develop Croatian Armed Forces capabilities focused on the crisis response and peacekeeping operations. In order to be ready for implementation of the permanent defense budget cut the government will also analyze the *LTDP* 2006-2015.³⁸ The shaping of the Croatian Armed Forces based on the *NSS* and on subordinate strategies from 2002 was questionable and the Croatian Government again decided to act.

The Croatian Government recognized the need for a new *NSS*. The Croatian Government Vice President for Internal, External and European Policy conducted a meeting on January 17, 2012 with representatives of various ministries responsible for *NSS* development. At the meeting were assistants and deputies of the Ministry of European and Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Internal Affairs, MOD, and representatives of the Office of the President of the Republic of Croatia. All of them expressed satisfaction with the organization of the meeting. The most important decisions from the meeting were that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs would be responsible to coordinate the development of the *NSS*, not the MOD as was before; the

public debates would be conducted in the spring; the Croatian Parliament adoption would be in the summer.³⁹

Again all deadlines were extended. Only the draft of the *NSS*, named *Croatia in the Era of Rapid Change* from July 3, 2012, is available in the Ministries which participated in the *NSS* development.⁴⁰ The public debates for this most recent draft have not occurred yet. Actually, the public is largely unaware that the draft of the new *NSS* exists. It looks like the present political establishment does not want to make the same mistakes the previous political establishment did, when they put the *NSS* draft up for public debate before political consensus was reached. The newest version of the *NSS* draft is August 24, 2012 which means that the version for public debate and the parliament adaption is not ready.⁴¹

What is interesting in the latest draft of the *NSS* is that the last chapter ends with almost the same wording as the existing *NSS*, expressing a requirement to continuously monitor relevant trends in order to update and adjust the *NSS* in accordance with circumstances. Also, the new *NSS* draft suggests that the interdepartmental committee will report on a yearly basis to the Croatian Parliament about *NSS* implementation. In addition, the interdepartmental committee will monitor relevant trends which may jeopardize national security and act accordingly. The *NSS* will be published every ten years but with the possibility for developing a new *NSS* after five years if current estimates require it.⁴²

The *NSS* and Subordinate National Security Documents

Another compelling reason to update the Croatian *NSS* is because this document serves as the guide for subordinate strategic documents. The outdated security strategy document allows decisions to be made in accordance with the political elite's wishes,

but not in accordance with the existing security strategies and documents. This situation also allows that some subordinate documents could be changed, which is not acceptable if the subordinate document is supposed to support the higher level of strategy. The example is the new draft of the *Strategic Defense Review*, which begs the following questions: which strategy was the basis for the *Strategic Defense Review*, and which strategy will be supported?⁴³

In the 2005 *Strategic Defense Review* introduction, the President of Republic of Croatia mentioned that the *Strategic Defense Review* is a very important step in the implementation of existing *NSS* and *NDS*.⁴⁴ It is very difficult to imagine that the “new” *Strategic Defense Review* will support the “old” *NSS* and *NDS*.

These examples show that one of the main reasons for the state of the Croatian national security documentation is the lack of political consensus and the lack of political consideration regarding security issues. The problem may also be the psychological difficulty for political leaders to contemplate failure which can be an obstacle for upcoming elections. But the accurate and effective strategic security documents are too important for the country. The political consensus is necessary because political purpose dominates all levels of strategy.⁴⁵ All strategic security documents should be timely, objective and independent of any political influence.

The political consensus for various issues depends on the political interest, but national security is above that. This paper does not attempt to solve political relationships among Croatian political parties, but it does attempt to solve the present situation regarding national security issues. The problems are not readily addressed by legislation and modification to the legislation may be needed.

Recommendations

The national security system should be organized effectively and should be politically independent as much as possible. In order to establish the strategic guidance for further development of the national security system, and to avoid the present situation in the future, this essay recommends the following:

- Six months after the parliament elections the *NSS* should be presented to the Croatian Parliament for adoption. The timeline and the government responsibility for development should be documented in the Defense Law.
- The establishment of a permanent board that is part of the National Security Council and which is responsible for crafting Croatian national security strategy and policy. The continual estimation of the security environment, preparing the course of action, and developing recommendations for the Croatian President, the President of the Croatian Parliament, and the Prime Minister, will be one of the most important tasks of its new operational office.⁴⁶ If the national security threat changes significantly, the government should update the *NSS* regardless of the prescribed timeline. This change in the Defense Law is necessary to hold all accountable.
- Six months after adoption of the *NSS*, the *NDS* and the *NMS* should be updated. This timeline should also be in the Defense Law.
- The *Strategic Defense Review* should be presented to the Croatian government on a quadrennial basis. Also, the timeline should be in the Defense Law.
- The *Long Term Development Plan* and other subordinated documents should be updated accordingly on a quadrennial basis.

- The government should prepare a yearly report for the Croatian parliament about *NSS* implementation.
- The government should prepare the methodology for the *NSS* development keeping in mind that the strategy always consists of ends, ways, and means- and the focus is on how they interact synergistically with the strategic environment to produce the desired effect.⁴⁷
- The Committee for Interior Politics and National Security and the Committee for Defense of the Croatian parliament should have an active role in controlling *NSS* implementation. The committee's scope of work should be extended accordingly.

The frequency of publishing the security strategies and the other relevant documents submission follows the hierarchy logic of the *NSS*, *NDS*, *NMS* and the *Strategic Defense Review*. In the past, the policy makers failed to meet their own timetable, but with this recommended legislative change the improved of controlling mechanism will provide an efficient foundation for timely submission.

Just as strategy is subordinate to policy, lower levels of strategy and planning documents are subordinate to higher levels of strategy.⁴⁸ The recommendations will also establish the efficient synchronization of the timelines in order to maximize the influence of the higher strategic documents, ensuring that accurate subordinate strategies remain relevant.

The lack of an established methodology for developing the *NSS* has caused confusion among the members of the working group. Effective development of the *NSS* requires an integrated and comprehensive interdepartmental planning effort. The strategy development can benefit greatly from a healthy and robust competition of

ideas.⁴⁹ These recommendations for the *NSS* methodology will prevent future misunderstanding of the responsibilities among the stakeholders, and will enhance critical unity of effort.

Conclusion

It is evident that in the last ten years the Croatian security environment changed more than enough requiring new *NSS*. The Government of the Republic of Croatia recognized that, tried to develop a new *NSS*, but failed. This essay found that the biggest problems for the failure were the lack of security strategy legislation and political determination to deal with security issues. The recommendations will bring authority, responsibility and priority in Croatia's national security system. It would be ideal if the Republic of Croatia enters the EU in June 2013 with an effective *NSS* and a strong national security system.

Endnotes

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June 2009) 10, February 21-Belgrade, Serbia, Rioters broke into the US Embassy, setting a fire and causing extensive property damage. One Serbian protestor g=found dead inside the Embassy likely was killed by falling debris. Dozens of businesses (including three American businesses) also were targeted by rioters and looters, as were embassies of several other countries that had recognized Kosovo's independence. US mission personnel were ordered to depart as a result.

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