

Smaller but Expandable: Assessing Options to Regenerate the Army of 2020

by

Colonel James J. Gallivan
United States Army



United States Army War College
Class of 2013

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT: A

Approved for Public Release
Distribution is Unlimited

This manuscript is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree. The views expressed in this student academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

The U.S. Army War College is accredited by the Commission on Higher Education of the Middle States Association of Colleges and Schools, 3624 Market Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104, (215) 662-5606. The Commission on Higher Education is an institutional accrediting agency recognized by the U.S. Secretary of Education and the Council for Higher Education Accreditation.

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE				Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
The public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing the burden, to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.					
1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) xx-03-2013		2. REPORT TYPE STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT		3. DATES COVERED (From - To)	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Smaller but Expandable: Assessing Options to Regenerate the Army of 2020				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S) Colonel James J. Gallivan United States Army				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Professor Edward J. Filiberti Department of Command Leadership and Management				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) U.S. Army War College 122 Forbes Avenue Carlisle, PA 17013				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Distribution A: Approved for Public Release. Distribution is Unlimited.					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES Word Count: 7,911					
14. ABSTRACT This paper examines ways the Army can reduce the size of the existing force while preserving and developing the ability to expand the size of the force to meet future operational requirements. The paper focuses on the Modular Brigade Combat Teams (BCT) and evaluates emerging plans guiding the Army's Investment and Regeneration (I&R) efforts. The study begins by examining historic Army downsizing and expansion efforts and highlights the lessons learned. The study assesses the Army's current assumptions and BCT I&R plans that are in development. The study also provides force management options to complement the Army's ongoing program to expand the inventory of deployable Modular BCTs to meet wartime force requirements to include: developing multi-composition Modular BCTs; the use of cadre units to facilitate the growth of additional Modular BCTs; and establishing round-out Modular BCTs that can be rapidly brought to higher levels of readiness. The paper concludes with several recommendations to improve the Army's investment strategy to minimize risk and posture the Army of 2020 for successful expansion when the strategic environment dictates.					
15. SUBJECT TERMS Investment, Regeneration, Drawdown, Landpower					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UU	18. NUMBER OF PAGES 50	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT UU	b. ABSTRACT UU	c. THIS PAGE UU			19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include area code)

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

**Smaller but Expandable:
Assessing Options to Regenerate the Army of 2020**

by

Colonel James J. Gallivan
United States Army

Professor Edward J. Filiberti
Department of Command Leadership and Management
Project Adviser

This manuscript is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree. The U.S. Army War College is accredited by the Commission on Higher Education of the Middle States Association of Colleges and Schools, 3624 Market Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104, (215) 662-5606. The Commission on Higher Education is an institutional accrediting agency recognized by the U.S. Secretary of Education and the Council for Higher Education Accreditation.

The views expressed in this student academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

Abstract

Title: Smaller but Expandable:
Assessing Options to Regenerate the Army of 2020

Report Date: March 2013

Page Count: 50

Word Count: 7,911

Key Terms: Investment, Regeneration, Drawdown, Landpower

Classification: Unclassified

This paper examines ways the Army can reduce the size of the existing force while preserving and developing the ability to expand the size of the force to meet future operational requirements. The paper focuses on the Modular Brigade Combat Teams (BCT) and evaluates emerging plans guiding the Army's Investment and Regeneration (I&R) efforts. The study begins by examining historic Army downsizing and expansion efforts and highlights the lessons learned. The study assesses the Army's current assumptions and BCT I&R plans that are in development. The study also provides force management options to complement the Army's ongoing program to expand the inventory of deployable Modular BCTs to meet wartime force requirements to include: developing multi-composition Modular BCTs; the use of cadre units to facilitate the growth of additional Modular BCTs; and establishing round-out Modular BCTs that can be rapidly brought to higher levels of readiness. The paper concludes with several recommendations to improve the Army's investment strategy to minimize risk and posture the Army of 2020 for successful expansion when the strategic environment dictates.

Smaller but Expandable: Assessing Options to Regenerate the Army of 2020

Gratifying though this rate of progress is, we must still do more. Our real problem is not our strength today; it is rather the vital necessity of action today to ensure our strength tomorrow.¹

—President Dwight D. Eisenhower

The U.S. military is at a key point in time or “moment of transition.”² The January 2012 strategic guidance for the Department of Defense (DoD), *Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense*, describes the priorities, missions and changes that the DoD will undertake over the next decade as part of this transition.³ The guidance reflects the Administration’s appreciation for the complex and uncertain global security environment and the changing U.S. fiscal circumstances.⁴ Similar to President Eisenhower’s 1958 State of the Union Message, this guidance details the DoD reforms required over the coming years to “ensure our strength tomorrow.”⁵

Part of this reform addresses the future size and shape of the military. *Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense* identifies eight broad principles that guide the services with developing the joint force of 2020.⁶ The principles include maintaining a broad portfolio of military capabilities; being selective as to which investments to make now vice in the future; rebuilding readiness; and reducing costs. In discussing how the DoD will maintain future capabilities, the guidance states: “DoD will manage the force in ways that protect its ability to regenerate capabilities that might be needed to meet future, unforeseen demands, maintaining intellectual capital and rank structure that could be called upon to expand key elements of the force.”⁷ In concert with the DoD guidance, the Army is developing and refining its supporting strategies.

The Army communicated its approach towards Army 2020 to Congress and also to internal and external audiences through the Army's 2012 posture statement, *The Nation's Force of Decisive Action: A Statement on the Posture of the United States Army 2012*.⁸ Correspondingly, the Army's 2012 and 2013 strategic planning guidance documents expanded upon this approach.⁹ The posture statement describes a force that will build on the past decade of transformation and remain engaged abroad in support of obligations while emerging from budget reductions as a leaner but still very capable force in the coming years.¹⁰

Over the next five years, the Army will decrease its end-strength from a peak authorized strength of about 570,000 to 490,000 Active Army, 358,000 to 353,500 Army National Guard and 206,000 to 205,000 Army Reserve Soldiers as directed. Reducing our end strength over a deliberate ramp through the end of fiscal year 2017 allows the Army to . . . facilitate reversibility in an uncertain strategic environment.¹¹

An outcome of DoD and Army guidance was the concept of reversibility and expansibility: a plan to reduce the operating force in a way that preserves the Army's ability to expand select capabilities in the force to meet future, unforeseen demands.¹² Correspondingly, expansibility became a tenet of the Army's integrated plan for 2020. The terms 'reversible' and 'expandable' are contained in the most recent published DoD and Army strategic guidance documents.¹³ However, a few months after issuing the Army's posture statement, the Army adopted the terms 'Investment and Regeneration' to characterize proactive, measured efforts to reduce the force in a manner that preserves the ability to restore needed capabilities and capacity if needed for future requirements.¹⁴

Army Investment and Regeneration (I&R) applies to most of the operating force in four major categories: Modular Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs), support formations

(functional and multifunctional brigades), echelon above brigade enablers, and new capabilities. What the Army retains and develops in these four categories will form the basis of the requirements for regeneration. Consequently, I&R will impact both the operating and generating force and the overarching concept will affect both the active and reserve components.

The Army has already developed the BCT I&R framework in some detail to enable planning. This is a logical leading effort as the quantity and internal structure of BCTs in the force influences the requirements for the type and quantity of supporting enablers.¹⁵ Moreover, responding to DoD directives to reduce endstrength, the Army has already decided to reduce at least eight active BCTs from the force in the coming years as part of the integrated plan for Army 2020.¹⁶ To inform emerging BCT I&R efforts as well as the related force structure modifications across the operating force, this paper will focus on BCTs. The paper highlights observations from recent Army expansion efforts; examines existing assumptions guiding BCT I&R; and addresses the Army courses of action for BCT I&R that are still in development. Finally, the paper examines alternative BCT I&R options, and proposes recommendations in support of I&R as part of an integrated Army 2020 force structure design plan.

It is important to note that this paper is predicated on an Army proposal that reorganizes BCTs from the existing modular BCTs into fewer, but much more capable, versatile and agile organizations. The proposal includes the addition of a third maneuver battalion to BCTs. As a result of this reorganization, the Army's BCTs would be better suited to respond to future security challenges while remaining within the 490,000 active component authorized endstrength. A formal announcement of force structure

adjustments related to this proposal is expected between now and the end of Fiscal year 2013.¹⁷

Expansion in Recent Years¹⁸

Since the inception of the All-Volunteer Force the U.S. Military has undergone several reform initiatives. These initiatives focused on matching the Army structure with fiscal realities to best meet the demands of the strategic environment. For the decade following the end of the Cold War a series of DoD-wide efforts sought to reconfigure the military into a balanced, effective and affordable force. These reform efforts included the 1989-1990 Base Force, 1993 Bottom-Up Review, 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and 2001 QDR. As Eric Larsen illustrates in his chapter in *Post-Cold War Defense Reform*, the objectives of these reform initiatives have been: downsizing the force to an acceptable level of risk; modernizing the force to ensure that it retained a qualitative advantage; reshaping and transforming the force so that the military would remain without peer; and reforming defense practices.¹⁹ In the Base Force Review and Bottom-Up Review, the Army, as well as other services, significantly reduced their force structure.

Paradoxically, through all four reviews, the Army's scope of missions in support of the Nation's security strategies expanded to create the need for a more responsive, networked and expeditionary force.²⁰ These expanded roles drove increased tension between budget constraints and readiness requirements. In response, the 2001 force transformation effort attempted to improve the capabilities of a smaller force while meeting an increased range of strategic demands.²¹ The Army's role in DoD transformation, coupled with operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, eventually led to a modest, when compared to the force reductions during 1990-2000, expansion of the

force through the development of the Interim Force, Modular Conversion and the Grow the Army Initiative.²² The post Cold War Army reforms provide lessons applicable for the current reductions and for formulating a strategy for the subsequent regeneration of forces in response to emerging strategic demands.

Transformation - The Interim Force

In 1999, the Army unveiled a plan to transform from its Cold War organization into a lighter, more responsive force.²³ Comprehensive in scope, this plan had implications across all Doctrine, Organization, Training, Leadership and Education, Material, Personnel and Facilities (DOTLMPF) domains. Transformation focused on recapitalizing the Legacy Force; fielding the Interim Force; and developing the future Objective Force.²⁴ The transformation initial goal was to first field two Initial BCTs by 2003 and then an additional four to six Interim BCTs by 2008 as part of the Interim Force.²⁵ Both the initial BCTs and interim BCTs were termed Stryker BCTs (SBCT) when the Stryker was selected as the combat vehicle for those organizations. This Interim Force was intended to serve as an employable, developmental bridge towards the establishment of the Objective Force for the Army forces of 2030 (see Figure 1).




Figure 1. Army's Estimated Schedule for Transforming into the Objective Force²⁶

To help manage transformation, the Army embarked on a widespread strategic communications effort to disseminate the corresponding Transformation Campaign Plan. The plan functioned as a living document to integrate and synchronize all aspects of the transformation over time.²⁷ All transformation efforts were fully integrated into related planning, budgeting and modernization systems.²⁸ The initial SBCTs were used to develop new doctrine; the U.S. Army War College conducted wargaming and analysis of the new organization; and U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) embarked on an enduring program to capture observations from the initial SBCTs.²⁹ Thus, the Army made substantial progress with the fielding and subsequent employment of the Interim Force SBCTs as evidenced in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) as early as 2004. However, with the Objective Force the Army is still working to incorporate into formations the envisioned science and technology advances projected for these ultra-technology and fully networked brigades.³⁰

The emerging I&R concept should exploit the lessons learned from the Interim Force fielding across all the DOTMLPF domains. For instance, the Army identified its remaining SBCTs and their installations approximately four months later than anticipated which made efficient infrastructure planning and budgeting problematic.³¹ Moreover, combatant command planners did not fully understand the strengths and limitations of these new formations which also impaired effective planning for their employment.³² However, the Army did establish a requirements task force to keep combatant command staffs informed and address combatant commander concerns associated with the Interim Force development timelines and increased capabilities.³³ TRADOC (the lead coordinating agent for transformation) also established brigade coordination cells at the respective installations to manage the fielding of the SBCTs and coordinate with the major commands.³⁴

As the Army progressed in the early years of transformation, it also focused on improving the training and education of its Soldiers to meet new technical and technological challenges posed by the digital and networked force. Many of these same factors continue to affect the projected manning requirements for the expansion of the future modular force especially related to the availability of low density, highly skilled personnel.³⁵

Likewise, the Army had to balance funding for transformation with competing priorities within the Army and amongst the greater DoD.³⁶ Focusing on the Army's ability to invest in and field the Interim Force (SBCTs), a coordinated, integrated and iteratively synchronized campaign plan enabled the Army to realize its desired capability outcome.

Modular Conversion

In 2003, a few years after initiation of force transformation, the Army added the modularity initiative to its force structure plans. With Modular Conversion, the largest reorganization of the force since World War II, the Army shifted the operating force focus from the division to the modular brigade and increased the pool of available units for deployment.³⁷ This effort would ultimately grow the inventory of active and reserve BCTs to 73, 45 active and 28 Army National Guard (ARNG). Concurrently, the Army supported OIF and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) as well as the continued fielding of remaining SBCTs (Interim Force) while continuing to pursue Objective Force-related technologies prescribed within the Future Combat System (FCS) Program. Importantly, the FCS Program's original design, actually a system-of-systems, was also a brigade-based program that included 19 core systems (including the network) and 157 complementary systems. These systems exploited 53 critical technologies and required 34 million lines of software code all in a multifunctional FCS equipped organization termed a unit of action (UA). The Objective Force UA approximated the SBCT and modular Brigade Combat Team organizational design.³⁸ In many respects Modular Conversion postured the current force to transition into the Objective Force of 2030.

However, unlike the ongoing Army Transformation with clear distinctions between the Legacy, Interim and Objective Forces, modularity was envisioned as a series of rolling changes leading to a future modular-based force.³⁹ Although not facing the reductions in endstrength and budgetary constraints of today, the Army's modularity initiative has many parallels to I&R: "efforts to rebalance force structure and make investment decisions that will shape the Army of 2020 – all during time of war."⁴⁰

In the early years of modularity (2003-2005), the Army quickly reorganized two of its divisions (3rd Infantry Division and 101st Airborne Division) to establish the first series of modular BCTs. In parallel, TRADOC established a modularity task force to develop the long-term modular conversion concepts for the entire operating force.⁴¹ The Army extended the modularity effort to include its remaining active divisions and the BCTs in the ARNG through 2010 (see Figure 2). As BCT modularity progressed, the Army also conducted the modular reorganization of combat support and combat service support brigades across all three components of the Army.




Figure 2. Army Maneuver Forces Modular Conversion Sequences⁴²

Similar to developing the Interim Force SBCTs, the Army synchronized this initiative with a supporting campaign plan (Army Transformation Roadmap).⁴³ TRADOC conducted scenario-based analyses of the new modular BCT designs and collected lessons learned as BCTs executed conversions as well as from their combat employment in OIF and OEF.⁴⁴ Unlike the development of the Interim Force, the

modularity effort modified existing brigades with upgraded equipment and different manning structure while concurrently forming completely new brigades.⁴⁵

Due to the operational demands for BCTs in OIF/OEF and endstrength constraints, BCTs were limited to two maneuver battalions, a small reconnaissance squadron, a fires battalion, a sustainment battalion, a special troops battalion, and a robust brigade-level headquarters. The fundamental change was that modular BCTs were now permanently organized with combat support and combat service support capabilities that allowed semi-independent operations. Three standard designs defined the modular BCTs: heavy brigade combat teams, infantry brigade combat teams, and Stryker brigade combat teams (Interim Force BCTs).⁴⁶ However, the heavy and infantry BCTs contained only two, vice three, maneuver battalions, while the SBCTs and the projected FCS Brigades contained three.

Though guided by a campaign plan, the initial years of modularity were plagued with uncertainty and changing requirements. A 2005 U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) report to Congress describes a complex, costly and difficult trade-off between sourcing the modularity effort and fully resourcing the deployed fight with modern equipment and skilled, trained Soldiers:

The magnitude of achieving modularity, coupled with other major transformation initiatives, raises long-term affordability issues for DoD. Until the Army more fully defines the requirements and potential costs associated with modularity, DoD will not be well positioned to weigh competing priorities and make informed decisions. . .⁴⁷

I&R plans should continue to be informed by Modular Conversion lessons related to equipping the force, manning formations, the evolution of cost estimates, and validating desired force capabilities. During the first four years of modular conversion the Army was challenged to fully equip modular units in accordance with the

organizational design for the BCTs.⁴⁸ A key factor was the imperative to first resource deployed and deploying units.⁴⁹ However, the Army did establish a dynamic priority system for equipping all components to support changing readiness cycles and rotational deployments.⁵⁰ Nevertheless, the Army's support to operational commitments, coupled with modular conversion, was "outpacing the planned acquisition or funding for some equipment requirements."⁵¹ This friction amongst competing priorities will occur during future regeneration efforts. Even with comprehensive investment actions and a robust pool of stored equipment, invariably new equipment to counter emerging enemy capabilities will be required and developed for existing and regenerated combat forces.

In the early years of modularity, to ease the manning demand associated with ongoing operations and conversion, the Army had success with military-to-civilian conversions and securing the statutory authority to reduce active personnel support to the reserve component. In 2005, the Army converted approximately 8,000 military positions in the generating force to civilian positions.⁵² These military positions were mostly transferred to the operating force. Additionally, the Army also had the authority to move up to 1,500 active Soldiers from reserve component support to the operating force.⁵³ However, these measures were still insufficient to meet the total manpower demands for senior level Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs) and mid-grade officers. Consequently, newly converted BCTs were not fully manned with leaders at the required grade and skill level. Over the course of implementing modularity the shortage of available mid-grade officers and NCOs actually hindered the rapid growth of modular formations.⁵⁴ Paradoxically, the long-term manning for modularity actually depended upon reducing the overall active component endstrength from a temporary authorization

level while concurrently increasing the size of the operational combat force.⁵⁵ However, the success of increasing the available military manpower with the conversion of military positions to civilian positions within the generating force provides a viable option to source future I&R regeneration efforts provided that the Army replenishes the generating force.⁵⁶

The ability to fully understand and forecast funding requirements was a more significant obstacle during Modular Conversion than with the development of the Interim Force. With any new undertaking of this scope and complexity, accurate cost forecasting is problematic. In the early stages of modularity the Army cost estimate changed by 71% from the 2004 estimate of \$28 billion to the 2005 estimate of \$48 billion.⁵⁷ A 2005 GAO report asserted that part of the reason for the dramatic cost increase was a lack of an overall framework for tracking modularity obligations that differentiated modularity costs and expenditures from those normally associated with preparing units for deployment.⁵⁸ This convoluted cost accounting prevented accurate cost estimates associated with implementing modularity. Importantly, Modular Conversion was not limited to just BCTs and it included equipment procurement and facility construction on a scale that BCT I&R will likely not have to address.⁵⁹ Notwithstanding, the sources of the dramatic increases in modularity costs can still provide valuable insights in more accurately projecting costs for the proposed I&R concepts.⁶⁰ Significantly, I&R will likely be conducted in an environment of increasing fiscal constraints requiring greater accuracy for the Army's cost projections. A small scale experiment examining the regeneration of a BCT could provide insights into the

complexity and costs of the regeneration concept and also provide better estimates of needed investments in equipment and manpower.

Perhaps the most consistent criticism of modularity within the military and from external stakeholders has been the initial lack of rigor in validating the design of the modular BCTs. For instance, criticism focused on the new organizational designs of the infantry and armored brigades (formerly called ‘heavy’) and their comparative effectiveness across the range of employment options. The recurring comment in GAO reports has been: “Without performance metrics and a comprehensive testing plan, neither the Army or Congress will be able to assess the capabilities of and risks associated with the modular force as it is organized, staffed, and equipped.”⁶¹ Clearly, the Army’s immersion in OIF and OEF impaired comprehensive testing and evaluation. Additionally, a robust modular BCT organization would have been too resource intensive and may have delayed fielding more BCTs that were urgently needed for OIF/OEF rotational deployments.⁶² Fast, less expensive and good enough might be a key set of factors for future I&R efforts that support emerging contingency requirements. It is important to note that in recent years the Army has bolstered efforts to fully evaluate its modular BCTs, to include consideration for adding a third maneuver battalion to the Infantry Brigade Combat Teams (IBCTs) and Armored Brigade Combat Teams (ABCTs).⁶³

In addition to over ten years of continuous multi-component operations abroad, Modular Conversion served as another means of aligning active Army, Army National Guard and U.S. Army Reserve force structure as well as forced a closer integration of the operating and generating force activities within the Army. Correspondingly, the

Army's Total Force Policy, based on the DoD directive *Managing the Reserve Components as an Operational Force*, created a more consistent approach to readiness, training and operational employment across the "Total Force."⁶⁴

Grow the Army Initiative

In early 2008, the Army had four key initiatives underway: continuation of Modular Conversion; expanding the force (January 2007 decision to grow the Army by 74,200 personnel); resetting equipment; and restoring prepositioned stocks.⁶⁵ The 2007 Grow the Army Initiative included plans to build six additional active component modular BCTs as well as additional modular support units.⁶⁶ Ultimately, this plan would build on modularity and provide the Army with a total of 73 modular BCTs.⁶⁷

Similarly, the Grow the Army Initiative also demanded accurate cost forecasting and efficient manpower projections. As with Modular Conversion, GAO was critical of the process the Army used to develop the \$70.2 billion (FY2008-2013) cost estimate and concluded that "the Army has not developed a transparent and comprehensive funding plan."⁶⁸ For instance, the cost estimate did not account for the cost of additional health care and education support assistance (these funds, approximately \$2.5 billion, were accounted for in a different appropriation); the cost estimate did not fully account for all of the supporting civilian hires that accompany a growth in the force; and the initial estimate used standard, vice location specific, military construction estimates for unit builds.⁶⁹

Moreover, in October 2007 the Army adjusted its implementation timeline from a completion date of 2013 to 2010. This created a host of manning and equipping issues related to personnel recruiting and retention and the procurement of equipment much sooner than planned.⁷⁰ Nevertheless, by 2007 the Army had fully developed Modified

Tables of Organization and Equipment (MTOE), designated capability managers, and published doctrine for the modular BCTs.⁷¹ This framework has continually been refined and can inform future I&R efforts.

The Army still has three of its 2008 initiatives (continuation of Modular Conversion; resetting equipment; and restoring prepositioned stocks) ongoing. However, an important difference is that the Army now is involved in reducing the size of the force vice expanding the force. Regardless, the lessons from transformation of the Interim Force, Modular Conversion and the Grow the Army Initiative provide important insights for developing comprehensive Investment and Regeneration plans for Army 2020.

Assumptions Guiding the Downsize and Expansion

Three key strategic-level problems define the scope of I&R as well as the overall structure for Army 2020. First, is the extreme difficulty in predicting the future strategic and operational environment. Second, is that the response to emerging strategic threats will require both an immediate employment of ready forces and permit enough time for the Army to regenerate forces for long-term sustained operations.⁷² Third, that the Army retains the capabilities to meet both immediate response requirements and reverse its downsizing process between now and the point in time where its investment and regeneration measures have been fully implemented. In other words, it must retain a response and regeneration capability throughout the transition period with front-end investments in regeneration in-stride with the reduction of forces (see Figure 3).⁷³




Figure 3. Investment and Regeneration⁷⁴

Meeting these three force structure challenges mitigates risk and preserves strategic options for the Nation as the DoD reduces the size of the armed forces.⁷⁵ Correspondingly, there is a need for critical, creative thought to inform the journey to Army 2020: one based on an appreciation for the past decade's transformation and conversion lessons.

Assumptions - Brigade Combat Team Investment and Regeneration⁷⁶

Emerging Army planning reflects several key assumptions informing progress towards implementing Investment and Regeneration measures.⁷⁷ Assumptions for the overall program include: retaining a strong cadre of noncommissioned and mid-grade officers to form the core of potential new formations; continued investment in Army Special Operations Forces; ready and accessible reserve component forces; and that the Nation's industrial base will remain capable of expanding.⁷⁸ Specific to the BCT I&R effort, the Army planning includes the following assumptions:

- The decision to regenerate capabilities will be directed in response to an unforeseen requirement or change in the defense strategy post FY18.
- No new Divisional Headquarters will be generated; the (3) regenerated Infantry BCTs will be assigned one (1) each to three (3) existing Divisions.
- Army will identify up to 5k mid-grade officers/NCOs in the generating force to support BCT advance party (ADVON) assignment and enabler force manning.
- It will take 18 months from execution to earliest arrival date.
- Equipping shortfalls could be mitigated by utilizing equipment from the most recently reduced IBCTs; retain 3xIBCT sets for training and equipping.
- Available theater provided equipment and/or Army pre-positioned sets can be used to mitigate equipment shortfalls.
- Re-use Warm Bases from most recently reduced BCTs.
- Additional Active Component (AC) Endstrength may be required to expand beyond (3) IBCTs.
- Army will implement forward-funding strategies to execute initial regeneration; I&R overseas contingency operations funding will reimburse initial costs.⁷⁹

The initial course of action the Army is developing focuses on regeneration of IBCTs; this assumes that sufficient ABCTs and SBCTs exist in the POM (Program Objective Memorandum) 14-18 force to meet surge requirements between now and 2020. ABCTs and SBCTs are more expensive and more difficult to rapidly man and equip; this also makes ABCTs and SBCTs lucrative targets for cost savings. Thus, overall strategic risk is highly dependent on the accurate projection of operational and

strategic requirements for the capabilities provided by these heavy units. This assumption must continually be challenged based on how U.S. allied and partner militaries evolve their organic heavy force capabilities.

The BCT I&R assumptions rest on the premise that the Army will sustain, and adapt as necessary, the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model. With almost a decade of managing sustained operations using the ARFORGEN model, the Army has developed efficient practices that balance the frequency and duration of deployments for contingency operations (boots on the ground or (BOG) time) with time back at home station (Dwell time). The current ARFORGEN model objective states one year deployed for every two years at home for active component units and one year deployed for every five years at home for reserve component units: BOG:Dwell ratio of 1:2 and 1:5 respectively.⁸⁰ Following the initial response and conduct of operations to resolve and stabilize the crisis, the Army's goal would be to expand the force to achieve these objective BOG:Dwell ratios.

The challenge is to maintain enough units to be able to meet the surge demands and then have the strategic depth to rapidly expand the force to support sustained operations. This challenge can be overcome if the reserve component is sized to meet expected requirements; RC force structure (BCTs, enablers, etc.) must be sized to address ARFORGEN RC objective BOG:Dwell ratios as well as the sourcing of late deploying enablers for all components. Thus, regeneration can focus on the strategic requirements for forces beyond all component's existing force structure. As was experienced during OIF and OEF, the ARFORGEN model BOG:Dwell times and the

numbers of units were adjusted (Grow the Army Initiative) to meet strategic and operational requirements.

Importantly, the assumption that the Army will retain and identify upwards of 5,000 mid-grade leaders in the generating force illustrates the Army's appreciation for the lessons learned from Modular Conversion and the Grow the Army Initiative. This allows the generating force to anticipate and plan for the absence and substitution of mid-grade leaders during regeneration. This cadre of officers and NCOs will provide a pre-designated manpower pool that can lead and manage the manning, equipping and training of these new units throughout their transition.

Provided that BCT I&R is focused on IBCTs, the 18 month window to train, man and equip a BCT appears suitable based on the Army's experiences from the stand-up of new IBCTs during Modular Conversion. However, as observed with SBCTs during fielding of the Interim Force, the timeline would likely need to be lengthened for the establishment of SBCTs and ABCTs. Moreover, as the Army continues to field and equip units with highly technical and complex mission command and other weapon systems, the required training and equipping time may need to be extended. The Army could examine this assumption through a deliberate evaluation plan executed in-stride with units transitioning through existing ARFORGEN cycles.

Moreover, these assumptions are feasible for initial, baseline MTOE unit equipping requirements, but they are too limited when considering the lessons learned from modular conversion conducted concurrent with resourcing ongoing operations. As previously indicated, the conduct of complex contingency operations will invariably drive the procurement of new equipment and modified organizational requirements. These

requirements will likely not be completely met by existing equipment sets. However, the Army will likely exploit existing equipment stocks to the maximum extent possible.

Although there are extensive budget implications for keeping unused facilities warm, the unit basing assumption addresses the challenges experienced with Interim Force fielding and the Modular Conversion. It also takes advantage of recent construction in support of the Grow the Army Initiative which, unless deliberately retained for this purpose, would likely be converted for other uses. For the near and mid-term, the Army has the facilities and capacity to accommodate regenerated units. Moreover, ongoing mobilization studies will help inform the basing options associated with this assumption.

The assumption that “additional AC endstrength may be required to expand beyond (3) IBCTs” does not fully reflect the lessons from recent expansion efforts for the Army. This assumption is looking at generating more than three IBCTs when it must also, more broadly, consider the simultaneous need to generate the units that support BCTs. Generally, the creation of three 3,500 Soldier IBCTs also requires extensive additional manpower for the enablers to support these brigades; the problem is not just about expanding beyond three IBCTs, it is about having the enabling forces that are required to support the IBCTs that are generated. The manpower bill for expanding beyond three IBCTs could likely not be achieved by cross-leveling manpower internal to the active Army, but instead would require an increased reliance on the reserve component or a corresponding increase in endstrength.

With respect to the funding strategies assumptions, Modular Conversion and the Grow the Army Initiative highlight the need for the Army to maintain transparency with

Congress during an expansion. To provide accurate cost estimates, the Army should experiment with regenerating a BCT (and enablers) to refine the cost projections for the I&R plan and, where possible, should develop an acceptable funding strategy to meet the front-end costs with pre-designated bill-payers.

Considering the overarching assumptions in support of evolving plans for BCT I&R in light of the past decade's transformation initiatives, the Army has established a logical planning framework to guide the investment strategy. Nevertheless, the wide range of stakeholders must challenge and contribute to the iterative evaluation and refinement of these assumptions to ensure they remain suitable, feasible and acceptable throughout their implementation. I&R is an evolutionary process; it will change with experience and potentially survive well beyond Army 2020.

Experimentation with BCT regeneration will allow the Army to both refine the assumptions and improve cost estimates. Moreover, as the Army considers additional reduction in forces for both the active and the reserve component, it must continuously re-examine the I&R strategy as exigent circumstances drive changes in resourcing decisions and priorities.

BCT Investment and Regeneration Options in Development

The Army's emerging I&R efforts are already comprehensively integrated into the lines of effort in the integrated plan for Army 2020.⁸¹ Although I&R plans and courses of action will be refined over time, aspects of I&R are already being addressed in the TAA (Total Army Analysis) and POM builds for 2015-19 and 2016-2020 respectively. For BCT I&R, the Army has made extensive progress in developing and assessing potential IBCT courses of action.

The Army's base course of action regenerates a two-maneuver battalion IBCT to include enablers from 'existing' three-maneuver battalion IBCTs with a growth rate of generating one new two-maneuver battalion IBCT a year for three years.⁸² A parallel effort, also part of Army 2020, is the assessment to restore the third maneuver battalion to IBCTs and ABCTs.⁸³ The manpower required for establishing the third battalion could come from the deactivation of at least eight BCTs. This would result in most of the 'existing' BCTs having three maneuver battalions. These same battalions could then serve as the source for regenerating 2-maneuver-battalion BCTs when the strategic situation dictated. The outcome of this approach is to have highly capable 3-maneuver-battalion BCTs as part of the standing Army to rapidly respond to high-risk contingency operations. Then, if the strategic situation dictates, use those battalions to create additional, less-capable brigades to support long-duration lower-risk stability operations with enough forces to provide an acceptable BOG:Dwell ratio. Similar to the Modular Conversion: fast, less expensive and good enough might be a key set of factors for I&R efforts in support of future relatively low risk deployment requirements.

The Army is also developing branches to their base case IBCT course of action. The first is to regenerate two IBCTs in the first two years (one per year) and then regenerate an ABCT in the third year. The second branch is to regenerate three two-maneuver battalion IBCTs with enablers from existing three-maneuver battalion IBCTs in one year.⁸⁴ In support of the base and branch plans, the Army has conducted analyses across the DOTLMPF domains to develop a timeline that accounts for key training, manning and equipping requirements.⁸⁵ Significantly, the analysis incorporates many of the lessons learned from the past decade's transformation-related initiatives.

Also, detailed manning and equipping documents (such as modified tables of organization and equipment or MTOEs) are being developed to facilitate the integration of cadre personnel and efficient equipping of the BCTs.⁸⁶

Using insights gleaned from the analyses of the base case courses of action and the recent Total Army Analysis (TAA) 15-19, the force development community is exploring other courses of action. One such course of action centers on regenerating a three-maneuver battalion IBCT plus enablers, without cross-leveling battalions from existing BCTs, at a rate of one IBCT per year for three years.⁸⁷ This course of action provides unique manning and equipping challenges based upon the increased scope of the regeneration efforts.

Investment and Regeneration Opportunities

BCT I&R has made progress in scoping the many challenges in rapidly regenerating Army forces. However, I&R is a work-in-progress and many of the planning concepts have not been fully developed for the multitude of enablers or for the probable increases in the generating force. Clearly, the magnitude and duration of the I&R effort will depend upon the future operational and strategic environment with its attendant threats, opportunities and situational context.

Holistically Anticipate Future Demand⁸⁸

I&R should continue to consider the range of future military operations and their operational characteristics, and also challenge the assumptions that frame I&R plans and programs.⁸⁹ As General Dempsey stated in testimony to Congress: “we generally find that we don’t predict the future with any degree of accuracy.”⁹⁰ As requirements in the strategy or environment change, such as forward presence commitments or shaping and deterring options, contingency responses will have to be modified.

For BCT I&R to mitigate risk, the Army is using a series of contingency scenarios to examine potential future demand requirements.⁹¹ Moreover, force managers are already leveraging the work of the TAA 15-19 Capability Demand Analysis to consider future demands over multi-year scenarios that includes a range of military missions.⁹² In parallel, studies such as “U.S. Ground Force Capabilities through 2020” produced by the Center for Strategic and International Studies provide an objective assessment of the predicted range, scale and demand for future military ground operations.⁹³ These studies inform stakeholders and productively challenge existing contingency models. Ultimately, to anticipate demand, the I&R problem will also have to be considered holistically, as the generation of capability in any one category (BCTs, support formations, enabler formations or new capabilities) will often influence the demand or employment capacity in the other categories of capability.

Develop Stryker or Armored Brigade Combat Team Courses of Action

Subsequent phases of BCT I&R planning should consider alternative courses of action that emphasize SBCTs and ABCTs. The IBCT base course of action is a logical point of departure for BCT I&R. This base case enables rapid, parallel planning across the greater I&R effort. The IBCT course of action is informed by the demands for forces over the past decade of combat operations. In certain stages of OIF and OEF, ABCTs operated in a motorized or wheeled configuration based on the operating environment. Significantly though, ABCTs and Stryker formations still played pivotal roles in other stages of those operations.

Future analysis should examine the full range of requirements and risks and take into account how allied and partner militaries evolve.⁹⁴ The Center for Strategic and International Studies’ recent study asserts that U.S. military armored capabilities will

remain in demand and that this armored capability is becoming harder to resource from our allies' armies.⁹⁵ The study indicates that: "Partner nations' ground force capabilities are increasingly converging toward middleweight forces with regional, rather than global reach."⁹⁶ As the U.S. strengthens alliances and builds the capacity of partners, the Center for New American Security's Travis Sharp also cautions that many of the U.S.'s North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies started their reductions in defense spending while the U.S. Army was beginning the Grow the Army Initiative.⁹⁷ U.S. allies can and must be counted on, but in future contingencies, the U.S. Army will likely be the primary provider of armored formations. Retaining heavy and expensive formations in the face of growing budget constraints will be problematic but deserves continual, comprehensive assessment.

Examine a Total Force Course of Action: Multi-Component Brigade Combat Teams⁹⁸

The timing assumption guiding BCT I&R is very short with only "18 months from execution to earliest arrival date."⁹⁹ Timeliness is important but these regenerated BCTs will most likely replace or reinforce already deployed units after the initial crisis is stabilized. Consequently, they could feasibly be formed with resources drawn from all three components.

A multi-component BCT course of action should be developed and assessed using Training Support Brigades (TSB) as the core of the generated BCT headquarters. The Army presently has 16 TSBs organized under First Army's two division headquarters.¹⁰⁰ These TSBs are multi-component brigades with headquarters that are already garrisoned at the Army's mobilization training centers. TSBs work with ARNG and U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) units on a habitual basis and operate continuously with

the ARFORGEN process by supporting programs that assist units with training and readiness.

A TSB headquarters, with augmented personnel, could form the brigade headquarters and perform many of the BCT I&R ADVON functions. Active or ARNG BCTs could provide maneuver battalions and the fires battalion could come from ARNG fires brigades. The enablers and sustainment battalion could be sourced from all three components.¹⁰¹ This course of action could potentially save up to six months from the current 18-month timeline being developed to generate IBCTs.¹⁰² Of note, ongoing implementation of Army Total Force Policy is creating the conditions to enable rapid and comprehensive integration of active and reserve forces at the tactical level.¹⁰³

There are costs to such a course of action. Taking a TSB from the generating force at a time when the demand to assist other ARNG and USAR units with training, mobilization and deployment removes a key capability from the generating force when it is urgently required. However, the Army does have 16 of these brigades. Moreover, if BCT reorganization does not occur as proposed, the maneuver battalions for this option would likely have to be created anew, potentially using the TSB's training support battalions as cadre personnel.

Explore Options to Consolidate and Train ADVON Personnel: Cadre Units

The Army is committed to maintaining a cadre of mid-grade officers and NCOs in the generating force to transfer in support of the regeneration of BCTs and enabler formations.¹⁰⁴ This investment is being refined through ongoing grade plate reviews to potentially retain a limited number of personnel in the force at higher skill levels than may be required by those generating force positions so they can fill BCT positions when needed.¹⁰⁵ For warrant officers and NCOs in high-demand/low-density (HD/LD) Military

Occupational Specialties this is significant as the generating force generally cannot grow mid-level leaders and technical experts inside a one to three year timeline. Thus, the Army should develop options to designate select organizations as I&R cadre units and then assign a portion of the pre-designated mid-grade leaders into these formations to man the future regenerated BCTs.¹⁰⁶

Example organizations that could serve as standing I&R cadre formations are Training Support Brigades (mentioned above) and garrison headquarters. These organizations approximate brigade-level headquarters structure and are usually collocated where new BCTs will be formed.¹⁰⁷ With this option, force managers would likely have to modify the MTOEs to add authorizations to be able to augment the new BCTs with sufficient numbers of ADVON personnel. Such an investment could ease, and even accelerate, activities during regeneration.

Notwithstanding, there will be select personnel, based on career field, that are just too few in numbers to dedicate to a cadre unit or that could better maintain perishable skills at other duty locations. For these key personnel, alternative manning strategies will have to be developed or the Army will need to assume risk with soldiers at lower rank or skills levels. One such potential alternative manning strategy could center on increased reliance on a more adaptable and intensely managed Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) to selectively resource HD/LD personnel.¹⁰⁸ Selected personnel from the IRR could form a replacement pool in the “Strategic Individual Reserve.”¹⁰⁹

Establishing standing I&R cadre units would likely provide better cohesion and improve a cadre formation’s transition to an operational BCT, minimizing the risk for operational forces while accepting more risk for the generating mission . . . a likely

prudent tradeoff. This option could include the establishment of a brigade coordination cell that could be maintained in a partially-manned status to facilitate the future generation of a BCT. As discussed earlier, similar coordination cells were effective during the fielding of the Interim Force.¹¹⁰

Additionally, the leaders in these standing cadre formations could develop relationships with the division headquarters and collocated active BCTs that the newly organized BCT will ultimately deploy to combat. These I&R cadre organizations could participate in division exercises to cultivate an appreciation for how the potential higher headquarters will conduct mission command in a deployed environment. This consolidated core of cadre could also develop a training program that sustains key skills and staff competencies related to their BCT operational tasks. Ultimately, the capacity of the consolidated cadre could be monitored with a supporting I&R BCT readiness reporting system that could be incorporated into existing Army readiness reporting processes.

The consolidation of ADVON personnel into cadre units will clearly result in an immediate loss in capability when a TSB or part of a garrison command is pulled from its primary mission to regenerate a BCT. However, under the current plan, the generating force is already going to carry a large part of this ADVON burden and will already need to backfill these positions. Moreover, an expanded use of generating force cadre would likely increase the numbers of Department of the Army civilians or contractors required to backfill those positions.

Sustain Research into Alternatives in Support of Regeneration¹¹¹

As the Army assesses further cuts in force structure such as the reduction of the inventory of active BCTs (beyond the eight BCTs programmed), there is value in

reconsidering the round-out brigade concepts the Army employed in the 1980s. That concept could include the designation of round-up reserve component battalions as the third maneuver battalion for active component two-maneuver battalion BCTs. Moreover, there could be utility in returning to the Enhanced Separate Brigade concept employed in the 1990s to have select RC units manned and equipped at higher readiness levels to facilitate their rapid mobilization and deployment. Though both of these options are politically charged endeavors, these alternatives could mitigate risk to readiness in an increasingly austere fiscal environment.

The Army is already considering options to adapt the ARFORGEN model.¹¹² Options should include development of a combination cyclic and tiered readiness system. Such an approach would allow the Army to focus limited resources on the right formations at the required time. Formations scheduled for operations as a Deployment Expeditionary Force (DEF) could function under the current cyclic readiness model (ARFORGEN). While formations programmed for potential contingencies, Contingency Expeditionary Forces (CEF), could be resourced and managed through tiered readiness. A tiered readiness program, that includes unit ALOs (Authorized Level of Organization), would allow the Army, after fully resourcing DEF units, to manage limited remaining resources across the CEF force in a predictable manner.

Recommendations

The Army has already made significant strides with investment and regeneration planning in support of Army 2020. In particular, BCT I&R planning and assessments are already surfacing viable resource options. These options reflect a comprehensive appreciation for recent transformation and expansion initiatives. As the Secretary of the Army has stated: “The opportunity we have at this moment in time is to break with

historic trends whereby budget cuts led to diminished military might. . . unlike in years past, we've been given a real chance to 'get it right.'"¹¹³ In addition to the observations and opportunities outlined above, the following recommendations are provided in support of the dialogue informing the planning for Army 2020:

- Sustain the robust synchronization effort for I&R; synchronization was pivotal to fielding the Interim Force.¹¹⁴
- Plan and program for experimentation to regenerate and deploy a BCT; only by actually generating a BCT will the Army understand the complexity, capture the costs and refine the processes for manning, training, equipping and basing a new BCT.¹¹⁵
- Incorporate I&R BCTs into efforts to adapt the ARFORGEN model.¹¹⁶
- Leverage Army Total Force policy to accelerate active and reserve component integration in support of I&R.
- Specify I&R organizations in Compo 4; this could enable coordination and synergy among Compo 1, 2 and 3 force managers and integrators.¹¹⁷
- Encourage research into alternative expansion strategies in an effort to continue to mitigate risk.¹¹⁸
- Develop policy options to incentivize serving as I&R cadre members; perhaps such an assignment could be considered a broadening or key developmental assignment for mid-grade officers and NCOs.¹¹⁹
- Continue to acknowledge that the Army is in transition through an aggressive public and command information campaign to sustain action and dialogue in support of Army 2020.¹²⁰

Conclusion¹²¹

The looming fiscal crisis portends profound changes for the Army and provides compelling justification for Investment and Regeneration in support of Army 2020. The current DoD strategy accounts for the DoD's \$487 billion reduction in funding over the next decade.¹²² The strategy and reductions in spending are driving the Army plan to reduce the size of the force between now and 2017.¹²³ Importantly, the Army's plan for Army 2020 includes investments to retain the ability to rapidly regenerate forces to meet likely strategic requirements. There are immediate force structure trade-offs. For instance, resources committed now to regenerate forces in the future are generally not being used to resource current deployable force structure. Predicting the scope and duration of future conflicts is problematic so the Army's strategy for Investment and Regeneration is central to mitigating risk and preserving the Army's ability to meet its future obligations to the Nation.

This paper examined the force structure options under the current budget reductions. However, the DoD will likely have to make additional defense cuts in the future.¹²⁴ With further cuts, the Army's Investment and Regeneration efforts could become even more important and larger in scope. As Secretary McHugh has stated: "Reversibility is the *sine qua non* to ensuring that the Army can rapidly grow when our Nation calls."¹²⁵ The urgency to make investment and regeneration a sustainable part of the integrated plan for Army 2020 is palpable and deserves continued synchronization, experimentation, assessment and creative solutions to ensure the Army remains "the Nation's force of decisive action, ready today and prepared for tomorrow."¹²⁶

Endnotes

¹ Dwight D. Eisenhower, "Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union," Delivered in person before a joint session of the 85th Congress, <http://www.presidency.uscb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=11162> (accessed January 6, 2013).

² Leon E. Panetta, *Sustaining U.S. Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, January 2012), opening letter by President Barack Obama.

³ *Ibid.*, 1-3.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 1-6.

⁵ Dwight D. Eisenhower, "Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union."

⁶ Leon E. Panetta, *Sustaining U.S. Leadership*, 6-8.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 6.

⁸ John M. McHugh and Raymond T. Odierno, *The Nation's Force of Decisive Action: A Statement on the Posture of the United States Army 2012*, Posture Statement presented to the 112th Congress 2nd session. (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, 2012).

⁹ John M. McHugh and Raymond T. Odierno, *Army Strategic Planning Guidance 2012* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, April 2012); John M. McHugh and Raymond T. Odierno, *Army Strategic Planning Guidance 2013* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, February 2013).

¹⁰ "During this decade of conflict, we have dramatically transformed our Army, and we will continue to do so. We will emerge from the forthcoming budget reductions a leaner force, but one still full capable of and committed to meeting our obligations to the Nation, the American people and our Soldiers, Civilians and Family members. Although our Army will become smaller in the coming months and years, we will preserve the quality of our all-volunteer force." John M. McHugh and Raymond T. Odierno, *The Nation's Force of Decisive Action: A Statement on the Posture of the United States Army 2012*, Cover Letter.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 10.

¹² Daniel J. Egbert, Force Management Program Manager, Deputy Division Chief, ODCS, G-3/5/7, DAMO-FMF, electronic correspondence (Investment and Regeneration document) related to a telephone interview with the author on December 12, 2012; John M. McHugh and Raymond T. Odierno, *2012 Army Strategic Planning Guidance* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, April 19, 2012).

¹³ "Expansibility: Managing the force in ways that protect the Army's ability to regenerate capabilities that might be needed to meet future, unforeseen demands, maintaining intellectual capital, rank structure and other assets that could be called upon to expand key elements of the force. . .Reversibility: Structuring and pacing reductions in the Nation's ground forces in a way that preserves the ability to make a course change to surge, regenerate and mobilize the

capabilities needed for any contingency.” John M. McHugh and Raymond T. Odierno, *The Nation’s Force of Decisive Action: A Statement on the Posture of the United States Army 2012*, 7.

¹⁴ The Army associates Investment with Reversibility and defines this as: “Structuring and pacing reductions in the Nation’s ground forces in a way that preserves the ability to make a course change to surge, regenerate and mobilize the capabilities needed for any contingency. The Army associates Regeneration with Expansibility and defines this as: “Managing the force in ways that protect the Army’s ability to regenerate capabilities that might be needed to meet future, unforeseen demands, maintaining intellectual capital, rank structures and other assets that could be called upon to expand key elements of the force. This involves reexamining the mix of elements in the active and reserve components, maintaining a strong National Guard and Army Reserve, retaining a healthy cadre of experienced noncommissioned and midgrade officers, and preserving the health and viability of the Nation’s defense industrial base.” Daniel J. Egbert, Force Management Program Manager, Deputy Division Chief, ODCS, G-3/5/7, DAMO-FMF, “Army 2020 Investment and Regeneration Overview,” briefing slides provided electronically based on telephone interview with the author on November 13, 2012.

¹⁵ “As the Army’s active component reduces in size, the composition of combat support and combat service support enablers in the active and reserve components will be adjusted to give the Army the ability to conduct sustained operations, and to mitigate risk.” John M. McHugh and Raymond T. Odierno, *The Nation’s Force of Decisive Action: A Statement on the Posture of the United States Army 2012*, 10.

¹⁶ “The Army will optimize force structure to maintain reversibility, and achieve maximum operational strategic flexibility. Today we plan on reducing at least 8 active component Brigade Combat Teams (BCT): however, we continue to assess the design and mix of these modular formations based on lessons from the last ten years of combat while looking into the future. This analysis may lead to a decision to reorganize BCTs into more capable and robust formations, requiring further BCT reductions in order to increase overall versatility and agility for tomorrow’s security challenges.” *Ibid.*, 7.

¹⁷ Daniel J. Egbert, Force Management Program Manager, Deputy Division Chief, ODCS, G-3/5/7, DAMO-FMF, electronic correspondence related to a telephone interview with the author on March 4, 2013.

¹⁸ “For all their difficulties, the challenges that lie ahead are hardly new. Throughout history, and throughout our Army’s history, prolonged areas of conflict most often led to prolonged periods of declining military resources.” John M. McHugh, “Proud of Our Past, Confident on Our Future,” *Army Magazine* (October 2102): 18.

¹⁹ Eric V. Larson, “U.S. Defense Reform in a Decade of Change,” in *Post-Cold War Defense Reform*, ed. Istvan Gyarmati and Theodor Winkler (Dulles, VA: Brassey’s, 2002), 247.

²⁰ William M. Donnelly, *Transforming an Army at War: Designing the Modular Force, 1991-2005* (Washington DC: Center of Military History, 2007), 5-17.

²¹ Eric V. Larson, “U.S. Defense Reform in a Decade of Change,” 253.

²² Richard L. Kugler, "Case Study in Army Transformation: Creating Modular Forces," *Case Studies in National Security Transformation, Number 14* (Washington, DC: Center for Technology and National Security Policy, April 2008), 1-12.

²³ U.S. Government Accountability Office, *Military Transformation: Report to Congressional Committees* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, November 2001), 7.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 8.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 9.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 10.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 14.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 19.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 23.

³⁰ U.S. Government Accountability Office, *The Army's Future Combat Systems' Features, Risks, and Alternatives: Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, April 1, 2004), 1-2.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 31.

³² U.S. Government Accountability Office, *Military Transformation: Report to Congressional Committees* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, November 2001), 31; U.S. Government Accountability Office, *Military Transformation: Report to Congressional Committees* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, May 2002), 15.

³³ U.S. Government Accountability Office, *Military Transformation: Report to Congressional Committees* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, May 2002), 18.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 30.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 3.

³⁶ U.S. Government Accountability Office, *Military Transformation: Report to Congressional Committees* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, November 2001), 41.

³⁷ U.S. Government Accountability Office, *Force Structure: Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, March 16, 2005), 1.

³⁸ U.S. Government Accountability Office, *The Army's Future Combat Systems' Features, Risks, and Alternatives: Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, April 1, 2004), 1-2.

³⁹ William M. Donnelly, *Transforming an Army at War: Designing the Modular Force, 1991-2005*, 79.

⁴⁰ John M. McHugh and Raymond T. Odierno, *The Nation's Force of Decisive Action: A Statement on the Posture of the United States Army 2012*, 2.

⁴¹ William M. Donnelly, *Transforming an Army at War: Designing the Modular Force, 1991-2005*, 27-74.

⁴² U.S. Department of the Army, *2004 Army Transformation Roadmap* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, July 2004), 3-3.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ U.S. Government Accountability Office, *Force Structure: Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, March 16, 2005), 4.

⁴⁵ Ibid., 9.

⁴⁶ U.S. Government Accountability Office, *Force Structure: Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, April 4, 2006), 5.

⁴⁷ U.S. Government Accountability Office, *Force Structure: Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, March 16, 2005), 10.

⁴⁸ U.S. Government Accountability Office, *Force Structure: Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, April 4, 2006), 9.

⁴⁹ U.S. Government Accountability Office, *Force Structure: Report to Congressional Committees* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, September 2006), 11.

⁵⁰ U.S. Government Accountability Office, *Force Structure: Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, April 4, 2006), 9-14.

⁵¹ Ibid., 11.

⁵² Ibid., 15.

⁵³ Ibid., 15.

⁵⁴ "Emerging insights indicate that the Army will need 18-24 months to regenerate each IBCT/enabler slice. During the Army modular force initiative, a key factor that hindered rapid growth was the availability of mid/senior level NCOs and mid grade Officers. The Army plan mitigates this lesson learned by identifying up to 5K Mid-grade and Senior-level Officers and NCOs in the Generating Force to serve as Advance Notification (ADVON) fillers that will 'fall in'

on regenerated units to fill critical leadership, administrative, maintenance, and supply positions as the Army builds readiness in ARFORGEN. Synchronization of manning, equipping, training, stationing and sustaining solutions with ARFORGEN Aim Points will ensure units enter the Available Pool ready to deploy. The best, least costly way to enable AC expansion (regeneration capability) and mitigate stress on the force while IBCTs activate, man, equip and train is to utilize RC formations in the ARFORGEN cycle as part of an Operational Reserve.” Daniel J. Egbert, Force Management Program Manager, Deputy Division Chief, ODCS, G-3/5/7, DAMO-FMF, electronic correspondence (Investment and Regeneration document) related to a telephone interview with the author on December 12, 2012.

⁵⁵ U.S. Government Accountability Office, *Force Structure: Report to Congressional Committees* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, September 2006), 19.

⁵⁶ Thomas Donnelly, *The Military We Need: The Defense Requirements of the Bush Doctrine* (Washington D.C.:AEI Press, 2005), 57-74.

⁵⁷ U.S. Government Accountability Office, *Force Structure: Report to Congressional Committees* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, September 2005), 2-4.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 2-4.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 9.

⁶⁰ U.S. Government Accountability Office, *Force Structure: Report to Congressional Committees* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, September 2006), 4.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 6.

⁶² *Ibid.*, 5.

⁶³ The design of the future BCT is a decision point on one of the lines of effort in the Army 2020 Project Design Campaign Plan. The scope of effort for this decision point includes assessing the viability and size of BCT formations. Task Force Army 2020, “Community of Practice Teleconference,” briefing slides, Army Capabilities Integration Center, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Eustis, VA, September 11, 2012.

⁶⁴ John M. McHugh, Secretary of the Army, Army Directive 2012-08 (Army Total Force Policy), Washington DC, Department of the Army, September 04, 2012.

⁶⁵ U.S. Government Accountability Office, *Force Structure: Report to Congressional Committees* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, January 18, 2008), 1.

⁶⁶ U.S. Government Accountability Office, *Force Structure: Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, April 10, 2008), 4-7.

⁶⁷ U.S. Government Accountability Office, *Force Structure: Report to Congressional Committees* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, January 18, 2008), 3.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 2.

⁶⁹ Ibid., 4-6.

⁷⁰ Ibid., 4-6.

⁷¹ U.S. Government Accountability Office, *Force Structure: Report to Congressional Committees* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, November, 2008), 10-14.

⁷² “A leading indicator that regeneration is required is a strategic assessment that a surge of forces to meet a Phase III operations are likely and that a potential exists for a scenario that will require the Army to generate forces on a rotational basis (1:2/1:5) for more than 5 years (Army “tipping point”).” Daniel J. Egbert, Force Management Program Manager, Deputy Division Chief, ODCS, G-3/5/7, DAMO-FMF, electronic correspondence (Investment and Regeneration document) related to a telephone interview with the author on December 12, 2012.

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ Daniel J. Egbert, Force Management Program Manager, Deputy Division Chief, ODCS, G-3/5/7, DAMO-FMF, “Investment and Regeneration,” briefing slide provided electronically based on telephone interview with the author on March 4, 2013.

⁷⁵ “Declining defense budgets do not nullify our obligation to provide enough capacity and maintain a highly ready force that is sufficiently modernized to provide a leaner, adaptive, flexible and integrated force that offers the President a significant number of options along the spectrum of conflict.” John M. McHugh and Raymond T. Odierno, *The Nation’s Force of Decisive Action: A Statement on the Posture of the United States Army 2012*, 1.

⁷⁶ BCT I&R assumptions should be considered on top of overall force management assumptions. In support of force management efforts, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) conducts a Capabilities Needs Analysis (CNA); the most recent CNA was CNA 15-19. Capability gaps in the force, by warfighting function, are identified based on analysis against contingency scenarios and recommendations are provided to mitigate the identified risk to scenario-related mission accomplishment. In considering I&R for Army 2020, it is responsible to assume that the Army will at least accommodate the recommendations related to mitigating the extremely high risk capability gaps identified in this current CNA (23 of the 45 overarching required capabilities were assessed as extremely high risk). If the Army cannot, through DOTLMPF changes, address the mid-term extremely high risks to the Total Army, any additional force that is generated in the mid-term would likely also be postured for employment with some of these 23 extremely high risk factors. Robert W. Cone, “Capabilities Needs Analysis (CNA) FY 15-19” memorandum for Director of the Army Staff and Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7, Fort Eustis, VA, December 03, 2012.

⁷⁷ “Force management is concerned with determining, programming, training, and sustaining the Army’s units. . . Three key aspects: prescribing the numbers and types of units the Army will have in the future; designing the units that will be employed in future operations; programming the time-phased unit changes needed to transform the current force structure into the future force structure.” John C.F. Tillson, John R. Brinkerhoff, and Robert Magruder, *Total Army Analysis 2009 (TAA09) – A Critical Review* (Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analysis, 2003), S-1.

⁷⁸ “First, the Army must maintain a strong cadre of noncommissioned and mid-grade officers to form the core of new formations when needed. . . Second, we will make significant investments in Army Special Operations forces to increase their capabilities and provide the President with more options. . . Third, it will require ready and accessible Army National Guard and Army Reserve Forces. The Army’s reserve component has proven essential in contingency operations around the world. . . the Army National Guard and Army Reserve have evolved into indispensable parts of our operational force, and we will continue to rely on them to provide depth and versatility to meet complex demands of the future. . . The forth critical component of the Army’s ability to expand is the Nation’s industrial base. We rely on the industrial base to perform research and development and to design, produce and maintain our weapons systems, components and parts. It must be capable of rapidly expanding to meet a large demand.” John M. McHugh and Raymond T. Odierno, *The Nation’s Force of Decisive Action: A Statement on the Posture of the United States Army 2012*, 7.

⁷⁹ Daniel J. Egbert, Force Management Program Manager, Deputy Division Chief, ODCS, G-3/5/7, DAMO-FMF, “Army 2020 Investment and Regeneration Overview,” briefing slides provided electronically based on telephone interview with the author on November 13, 2012.

⁸⁰ The 1:2 and 1:5 ratios can also be converted to monthly time periods to adjust for other factors. Daniel J. Egbert, Force Management Program Manager, Deputy Division Chief, ODCS, G-3/5/7, DAMO-FMF, electronic correspondence (Investment and Regeneration document) related to a telephone interview with the author on December 12, 2012.

⁸¹ Task Force Army 2020, “Community of Practice Teleconference,” briefing slides, Army Capabilities Integration Center, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Eustis, VA, September 11, 2012.

⁸² Daniel J. Egbert, Force Management Program Manager, Deputy Division Chief, ODCS, G-3/5/7, DAMO-FMF, “Army 2020 Investment and Regeneration Overview,” briefing slides provided electronically based on telephone interview with the author on November 13, 2012.

⁸³ Ibid.

⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁵ “As our new national defense priorities drive us to a smaller Army, we must avoid the historical pattern of drawing down too fast or risk losing leadership and capabilities, making it much harder to expand again when needed. It is critical that the Army be able to rapidly expand to meet larger unexpected contingencies, and four components are key to that ability.” John M. McHugh and Raymond T. Odierno, *The Nation’s Force of Decisive Action: A Statement on the Posture of the United States Army 2012*, 7.

⁸⁶ Daniel J. Egbert, Force Management Program Manager, Deputy Division Chief, ODCS, G-3/5/7, DAMO-FMF, “Army 2020 Investment and Regeneration Overview,” briefing slides provided electronically based on telephone interview with the author on November 13, 2012.

⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁸ “An unpredictable and dynamic global security environment requires the Army, as a force in transition, to adjust and reduce size while remaining flexible, capable and ready to meet the

Nation's requirements and maintaining an ability to reverse course to readily expand if necessary." John M. McHugh and Raymond T. Odierno, *The Nation's Force of Decisive Action: A Statement on the Posture of the United States Army 2012*, 10.

⁸⁹ "With a leaner Army, we have to prioritize and remain capable of meeting a wide range of security requirements. We will reduce manpower in a manner that preserves our readiness and avoids any hollowing of the force. To satisfy this enduring requirement, we have three rheostats that must be continuously assessed and adjusted: end strength/force structure, readiness and modernization." Ibid., 10.

⁹⁰ Martin E. Dempsey, Testimony by Secretary Panetta and Gen. Dempsey Before the House Armed Services Committee, U.S. House of Representatives, October 13, 2011, <http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4905>, (accessed January 8, 2013).

⁹¹ Daniel J. Egbert, Force Management Program Manager, Deputy Division Chief, ODCS, G-3/5/7, DAMO-FMF, "Army 2020 Investment and Regeneration Overview," briefing slides provided electronically based on telephone interview with the author on November 13, 2012.

⁹² Ibid.

⁹³ Nathan Frier (primary author), "U.S. Ground Force Capabilities through 2020," *A Report of the CSIS New Defense Approaches Project*, (October 2011).

⁹⁴ "Today's global fiscal environment is driving defense budgets down for our partners and allies, as well as our Nation. Historically, defense spending has been cyclic with significant reductions following the end of major conflicts. The Army understands it cannot be immune to these fiscal realities and must be part of the solution. Our focus areas for the FY 12 budget demonstrate our concerted effort to establish clear priorities that give the Nation a ready and capable Army while being good stewards of resources." John M. McHugh and Raymond T. Odierno, *The Nation's Force of Decisive Action: A Statement on the Posture of the United States Army 2012*, 5.

⁹⁵ Nathan Frier (primary author), "U.S. Ground Force Capabilities through 2020," 14.

⁹⁶ Ibid., 14.

⁹⁷ Travis Sharp, "Over-promising and under-delivering? Ambitions and risks in US defense strategy," *International Affairs* 88, no. 5 (September 2012): 975-991.

⁹⁸ "For resourcing purposes, the POM force is apportioned among four components: the Active Army (COMPO 1), the Army National Guard (ARNG) (COMPO 2), the U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) (COMPO 3), and unresourced unit equivalents (COMPO 4)." U.S. Department of the Army, Total Army analysis (TAA), Army Regulation 71-11 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, December 29, 1995), 1.

⁹⁹ Daniel J. Egbert, Force Management Program Manager, Deputy Division Chief, ODCS, G-3/5/7, DAMO-FMF, "Army 2020 Investment and Regeneration Overview," briefing slides provided electronically based on telephone interview with the author on November 13, 2012.

¹⁰⁰ “First Army: Training for Today’s Requirements and Tomorrow’s Contingencies,” *First Army Training Brochure*, 2012-2014, http://www.first.army.mil/documents/pdf/2012-2014_First_Army_Brochure.pdf (accessed January 9, 2013).

¹⁰¹ “The Army will continue to rely on the reserve components to provide key enablers and operational depth. An operational reserve comprised of a discrete set of capabilities combined with an enhanced level of readiness will be essential. This force will consist of three elements; select combat formations prepared to respond to crisis; combat support and combat service support enablers employed early in support of operational plans; and forces aligned to support steady-state Combatant Commander requirements.” John M. McHugh and Raymond T. Odierno, *The Nation’s Force of Decisive Action: A Statement on the Posture of the United States Army 2012*, 10-11.

¹⁰² Daniel J. Egbert, Force Management Program Manager, Deputy Division Chief, ODCS, G-3/5/7, DAMO-FMF, “Army 2020 Investment and Regeneration Overview,” briefing slides provided electronically based on telephone interview with the author on November 13, 2012.

¹⁰³ John M. McHugh, Secretary of the Army, Army Directive 2012-08 (Army Total Force Policy), Washington DC, Department of the Army, September 4, 2012.

¹⁰⁴ Daniel J. Egbert, Force Management Program Manager, Deputy Division Chief, ODCS, G-3/5/7, DAMO-FMF, “Army 2020 Investment and Regeneration Overview,” briefing slides provided electronically based on telephone interview with the author on November 13, 2012.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶ If the permanent commitment of ADVON personnel into standing cadre units is not feasible, an interim option is to consolidate pre-designated ADVON personnel on a recurring basis for training related to their BCT regeneration duty positions.

¹⁰⁷ Daniel J. Egbert, Force Management Program Manager, Deputy Division Chief, ODCS, G-3/5/7, DAMO-FMF, “Army 2020 Investment and Regeneration Overview,” briefing slides provided electronically based on telephone interview with the author on November 13, 2012.

¹⁰⁸ Recommendation #88. Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, *Transforming the National Guard and Reserves into a 21st-Century Operational Force* (Arlington, VA: Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, January 2008), 344.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., 346.

¹¹⁰ U.S. Government Accountability Office, *Military Transformation: Report to Congressional Committees* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, May 2002), 18.

¹¹¹ “This involves reexamining the mix of elements in the active and reserve components, maintaining a strong National Guard and Army reserve, retaining a healthy cadre of experienced noncommissioned and midgrade officers, and preserving the health and viability of the Nation’s defense industrial base.” John M. McHugh and Raymond T. Odierno, *The Nation’s Force of Decisive Action: A Statement on the Posture of the United States Army 2012*, 7.

¹¹² Task Force Army 2020, “Community of Practice Teleconference,” briefing slides, Army Capabilities Integration Center, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Eustis, VA, September 11, 2012; U.S. Department of the Army, *Army Force Generation*, Army Regulation 525-29 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, March 14, 2011), 1-9.

¹¹³ John M. McHugh, “Proud of Our Past, Confident on Our Future,” *Army Magazine* (October 2102): 18.

¹¹⁴ “In short, we are not going to cut in a way that breaks the force. Rather, we are building using an investment approach so that we can rapidly expand if called upon to do so. TRADOC will execute the Army’s structural transition so that we end up with more capable and more tailorable forces than we have today.” Robert W. Cone, “TRADOC: Leading the Transition,” *Army Magazine* (October 2012): 87.

¹¹⁵ “Implementing the regional alignment of forces will be accompanied by a progressive readiness model. Adapting the Army Force Generation model to future operations, units will progress through a period of training, conduct their operational employment, and then undergo equipment and personnel reset. This model reduces the peaks and valleys between deployments, retaining higher personnel readiness during reset. Raymond T. Odierno, “Today’s Army: The Strength of Our Nation,” *Army Magazine* (October 2012): 30.

¹¹⁶ “The current army force generation model, known as ARFORGEN, has served us well in meeting the requirements for Iraq and Afghanistan; however, we will adapt if to ensure we meet future Combatant Commander requirements in the uncertain, complex strategic environment. We envision a progressive readiness model for most active and reserve component early deploying units which will align forces for Combatant Commanders.” John M. McHugh and Raymond T. Odierno, *The Nation’s Force of Decisive Action: A Statement on the Posture of the United States Army 2012*, 11.

¹¹⁷ “When the Army compares its requirements with its resources (as limited by multiple constraints), one of the ways it disposes of the imbalance is to assign units to Compo 4. Originally, Component 4 was intended to list ‘unmanned’ units for which a full equipment set was available and which could be activated and placed into operation rapidly upon mobilization. . . . for the past 20 years or so, Compo 4 has been a repository of units for which the Army has neither personnel nor equipment. . . . The Army should consider abolishing Compo 4 and change the way it approaches force management.” John C.F. Tillson, John R. Brinkerhoff, and Robert Magruder, *Total Army Analysis 2009 (TAA09) – A Critical Review* (Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analysis, 2003), 49-52.

¹¹⁸ “More recently, the end of the Cold War demonstrated our Nation’s need for agile, adaptable and decisive ground forces to conduct a wide range of operations. These numerous missions include Operations Provide Comfort in Iraq, Joint Task force Andrew in Florida, Operation Restore Hope in Somalia, Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti, Operation Joint endeavor in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Operations Joint guardian in Kosovo. What they have in common is that they were unforeseen, thus emphasizing our need to avoid the historical pattern of drawing down too fast.” John M. McHugh and Raymond T. Odierno, *The Nation’s Force of Decisive Action: A Statement on the Posture of the United States Army 2012*, 16-17.

¹¹⁹ “Maintaining this support, however, as well as our capability to expand the Army rapidly for future contingencies, suggests the need to reassign military personnel back to the

institutional Army.” Robert W. Cone, “TRADOC: Leading the Transition,” *Army Magazine* (October 2012): 82.

¹²⁰ “Mindful of fiscal constraints and in adherence with the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance, the Army is adapting for the future using three calibrated rheostats – force structure and end strength, readiness, and modernization – to ensure we maintain strategic landpower capabilities. Given that we are still engaged in conflict and aware of the uncertainty and complexity of the strategic environment, we must constantly assess and refine in these three critical areas.” Raymond T. Odierno, “Today’s Army: The Strength of Our Nation,” *Army Magazine* (October 2012): 27.

¹²¹ “While the Army’s new end-strength numbers allow it to support current defense priorities, it is imperative that the Army draw down end-strength levels in a smart and responsible manner. We believe that our new end-strength does that, and it provides us with the flexibility to retain the hard-won expertise it has gained over the last decade. To be sure, the Army has faced similar challenges before. After every major conflict since the Revolutionary War, the Army has faced pressure to decrease its end-strength. As recently as 2011 (pre-9/11), many believed a strategic shift was needed and that the future of modern warfare would be about missile defense, satellites and high-tech weaponry because no adversary would dare challenge America’s conventional forces. But whenever we have rushed to radically diminish the position of the Army, the result has always been the same: an excessive decline in effectiveness at a cost of blood and treasure.” John M. McHugh and Raymond T. Odierno, *The Nation’s Force of Decisive Action: A Statement on the Posture of the United States Army 2012*, 16.

¹²² Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., “Strategy in a time of austerity: why the pentagon should focus on assuring access,” *Foreign Affairs*, 91, no. 6 (November/December 2012): 58-60.

¹²³ “Indeed, as we build the Army of 2020, we are presently scheduled to decrease our active Army end strength from a recently authorized peak of about 570,000 to approximately 490,000 over the next five years.” John M. McHugh, “Proud of Our Past, Confident on Our Future,” *Army Magazine* (October 2102): 18.

¹²⁴ “In January 2013, the budgetary process known as “sequestration” is set to trigger another \$472 billion in total reductions over the same period. Congress may avoid sequestration by finding other ways to lower the federal deficit, but even if it does, additional major cuts in defense spending are likely to come eventually. And if history is any guide, most of the \$200 billion in ‘efficiency’ savings over the next five years that the Pentagon is currently counting on will fail to materialize.” Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., “Strategy in a time of austerity: why the pentagon should focus on assuring access,” *Foreign Affairs*, 91, no. 6 (November/December 2012): 58-60.

¹²⁵ John M. McHugh and Raymond T. Odierno, *The Nation’s Force of Decisive Action: A Statement on the Posture of the United States Army 2012*, 7.

¹²⁶ John M. McHugh and Raymond T. Odierno, 2012 Army Strategic Planning Guidance (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, April 19, 2012), 15.