


Strategy Research Project

Department of Defense Support to a Catastrophic Event

by

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United States Army



United States Army War College
Class of 2013

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Abstract

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The United States Geological Survey projects that a major earthquake will occur along the San Andreas Fault within the next 20 years. The worst case scenario is an earthquake registering 8.5 or higher on the Richter scale. An earthquake of that magnitude would ravage most of the western coastline and inland states and will be recorded as the worst natural disaster in the history of the United States (U.S.). The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Operations Planning Guide estimates that within 24 hours of the enormous earthquake, the initial fatality count would reach over 5,000 people. San Francisco, San Jose, Los Angeles, and Phoenix, AZ, four of the top ten populated cities in the United States, would experience considerable amount of damage to critical infrastructure. The Department of Homeland Security estimates that the initial responders would encounter an estimated 570 burning fires, 1.8 million homes without potable water and electricity and over 600,000 people are believed to be left homeless. The economic impact is compared with the more recent Hurricane Sandy and could double in cost with an early low estimate of \$120 billion.

Department of Defense Support to a Catastrophic Event

The United States Geological Survey projects that a major earthquake will occur along the San Andreas Fault within the next 20 years. The worst case scenario is an earthquake registering 8.5 or higher on the Richter scale. An earthquake of that magnitude would ravage most of the western coastline and inland states and will be recorded as the worst natural disaster in the history of the United States (U.S.).¹ The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Operations Planning Guide estimates that within 24 hours of the enormous earthquake, the initial fatality count would reach over 5,000 people. San Francisco, San Jose, Los Angeles, and Phoenix, AZ, four of the top ten populated cities in the United States, would experience considerable amount of damage to critical infrastructure. Emergency responders will encounter significant challenges with the lack of access to specific areas because of ruptured gas and pipelines, devastating fires, inoperable medical facilities, impassable bridges, highways and railroads and substantial damage to port facilities and airport runways. First line responders could be slow to respond and have limited or no access to communities that depend on highways for access. The Department of Homeland Security estimates that the initial responders would encounter an estimated 570 burning fires, 1.8 million homes without potable water and electricity and over 600,000 people are believed to be left homeless. The economic impact is compared with the more recent Hurricane Sandy and could double in cost with an early low estimate of \$120 billion.

For a natural disaster of this magnitude, the President of the United States is expected to declare a state of emergency for the states affected the most; Arizona, California, Nevada, and Oregon, and will direct the entire nation to assist where it can. The scenario places the epicenter occurring ten miles off the coast of San Francisco

with aftershocks occurring as far away as 500 miles from the epicenter. The Secretary of Defense issues deployment orders and authorizes Dual Status Commanders (DSC), under the command and control of their respected governors, for Arizona, California, Nevada and Oregon. National guard units from across the country would mobilize; reserve units activate and active duty units deploy. Overwhelming response efforts would pour in from states, government organizations (GO), non-government organizations (NGO) and internationally. The U.S. has proven that the National Response Framework partnership between the DHS and the Department of Defense (DOD) is properly structured to coordinate, train and respond to a severe natural disaster affecting a small portion of the U.S. while requiring responders to maximize federal and state regional resources for assistance. The U.S. must take steps now to close the gap to the existing response framework for an expected natural disaster that will exceed regional state and federal resources.

The nation's current emergency response system works well for small- to moderate-scale disasters; but the real challenge lies in preparing for an unprecedented catastrophic event where the human, infrastructure, and financial effects exceed current response and recovery capabilities. There are 45 states and territories throughout the United States (U.S.) that are considered moderate to high risk areas for earthquakes including the New Madrid fault line in central U.S.² The U.S. National Geological Survey cannot predict when and where the next earthquake will occur throughout the U.S., so it is important for the U.S. to plan and prepare ahead of time to reduce critical response time, employ the required assets to assist Americans in a time of need while protecting the nation from acts of aggression.

The U.S. will be most vulnerable to potential adversary threats immediately following a complex catastrophe. In a domestic complex catastrophe, with effects that would qualitatively and quantitatively exceed those experienced to date, the demand for defense support to civil authorities would be unprecedented. There is currently no pre-planned chain of command framework to respond to a complex catastrophes natural disaster. To correct this, DOD must close the gap by approving the creation of the civil response force Joint Task Force Complex Catastrophe (JTF-CC) under the command and control of United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM).

The DOD approved “complex catastrophe” as a new military term on February 19, 2013. The new definition will be added to the Joint Publication 1-02, “Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.” The complex catastrophe is defined as – “Any natural or man-made incident, including cyberspace attack, power grid failure, and terrorism, which results in cascading failures of multiple, interdependent, critical, life-sustaining infrastructure sectors and causes extraordinary levels of mass casualties, damage, or disruption severely affecting the population, environment, economy, public health, national morale, response efforts and/or government functions.”³ The complex catastrophe event has the potential to expose strategic consequences to the U.S. with consequence management, rapid response and national defense. The Department of Defense recognizes a gap within DOD response to civil authorities for an unprecedented natural disaster and is addressing this problem by creating the new terminology and assessing DOD policies, capabilities and resources to assist in response to a complex catastrophe.

The strategic decision to establish Joint Task Force Complex Catastrophe response structure will institute the ground work for immediate federal and state response resources and close a critical DOD response gap. A pre-planned JTF-CC will require well-trained and properly equipped military personnel to coordinate a comprehensive response campaign with federal and state resources prior to a complex catastrophe occurring. The JTF-CC will allow the pre-identified forces to focus their attention on the response mission while the remainder of DOD and DHS focuses their efforts on the national security strategy mission of defending the nation from any potential adversary threats during this critical period.

The following key stakeholders have a vested interest in improving support to civil authorities following a catastrophic event; The President, DHS, DOD, states and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). Their roles and responsibilities, along with unity of effort, will be crucial in establishing the JTF-CC.

President Obama outlined his vision and guidance for the DOD to protect our homeland during a domestic natural disaster within the National Security Strategy 2010. The Department of Defense will deter adversary aggression following a natural disaster by quickly allocating required response resources without leaving vulnerable gaps within the U.S. Northern Command and DHS homeland defense posture. The National Security Strategy states, “We will Strengthen our Security and Resilience at Home by Enhancing Security at Home, Effectively Manage Emergencies, Empowering Communities to Counter Radicalization, Improve Resilience Through Increased Public-Private Partnership and Engage with Communities and Citizens.”⁴ The National Security Strategy is the foundation for the nation’s response framework and provides

guidance to protect the nation's interest. The Stafford Act was created to cut through the "red tape" by authorizing the Federal government to assist state and local governments effected by natural disasters.

In accordance to the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Public Law 93-288) (Title 42 USC, Section 5121) of 1979, the President is authorized to provide financial and other assistance to State and local governments, private nonprofit organizations, and individuals to support response and recovery efforts following Presidential emergency or major disaster declarations.⁵ This Act authorizes the release of funds to support unforecasted domestic natural disaster response operations. This Act also authorizes DOD to identify federal forces to participate in JTF-CC domestic response operations.

The DHS, formed in November 2002, is primarily responsible for protecting the U.S. and U.S. territories. The DHS receives guidance from the President and publishes the National Response Framework (NRF), which outlines objectives for various federal agencies and the roles and responsibilities of other partners, it is an overarching strategy or guideline for the nation. The DHS coordinates directly with FEMA for Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA). Federal Emergency Management Agency is the primary federal responders to local and state authorities during national disasters. The FEMA Strategic Plan FY 2011-2014 describes FEMA "way ahead" as it links FEMA strategic focus with the NSS 2010 vision. In an effort to achieve the strategic direction outlined in the NSS, FEMA initiated four directives to achieve this goal. One of the directives is to build the nation's capacity to stabilize and recover from a catastrophic event. The JTF-CC and FEMA are considered the main efforts for domestic response

operations. To maximize efficiency and between the two responders, it is imperative that key leaders within FEMA understand the JTF-CC command relationship and key coordination responsibilities to respond to a catastrophic natural disaster in a timely manner. Unity of effort between these key stakeholders is critical to facilitate a rapid response to save lives and protect the U.S.

The Department of Defense recognizes that there are shortfalls with defense support to civil authorities in support of a complex catastrophe and tasked the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)) to work with the stakeholders to improve defense capabilities response. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy provides guidance to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), USNORTHCOM and the National Guard Bureau (NGB) to review existing policy and planning guidance, identify response gaps and submit recommended revisions.

When supporting civil authorities in a disaster response scenario where a reasonable level of civil order remains, the current policies and doctrine provide an adequate framework for commanders to plan and execute the mission. At the President's direction or in immediate response to a local emergency, active duty forces have executed a wide range of domestic missions throughout U.S. history: disaster relief operations, firefighting, restoration of civil order, military assistance to special events, border security operations, and support to civilian law enforcement, to name but a few. Active duty forces regularly conduct training exercise with local, state, federal, government and non-government organizations to ensure that the U.S. is organized, prepared and equipped to respond to any domestic catastrophe.

The Department of Defense captured lessons learned from two domestic natural disasters, Hurricane Katrina, 2005 and Hurricane Sandy, 2012, to modify current Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA) framework. The Department of Defense captured lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina, recommended and implemented policy changes to prepare for the next natural disaster. Regrettably, a unified response was missing among active duty, Title 10, forces and national guard, Title 32, forces during Hurricane Katrina. Since then, initiatives based in doctrine, statutes and formal recommendations were made to address unity of effort. These efforts proved to be successful during training exercises, support to major events and support provided during Hurricane Sandy. The unified response framework worked well for a level III disaster, however, a serious gap remains for a response framework to respond to a natural disaster to the magnitude of a catastrophic disaster. Future threats, manmade or natural, will require a unified response to protect the homeland, save lives and mitigate suffering.

It is imperative that the difference between Title 10 and Title 32 is explained because the American people do not understand that laws dictate which type of forces can be used for certain domestic missions. All active duty forces and activated reserves are federal forces operating under Title 10 authority. The national guard (NG) forces operate under one of the three following authorities, state active duty (state control, state pay), Title 32 (state control, federal pay), or Title 10 (federal control and federal pay).⁶ The Title 32 forces remain under the command and control of their respective governors. While governors are the commanders for their sovereign state and control their national guard, the President of the United States is also sovereign

under Article II Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution as the Commander in Chief of the U.S. Armed Forces.

The local and tribal governments are responsible for the initial response to natural disasters in their particular region. Local governments must request support from their governor if requirements exceeds the local capabilities. The respective governors can request for assistance from federal authorities or from other states. This standard, by law, concept of operations does not apply for the complex catastrophe scenario because of the anticipated individual states requirements for high demand resources. When there are multiple states affected by a natural disaster, with competing demands for certain types of federal and state capabilities and resources, there will be an overall requirement for an higher headquarters to establish a non-bias priority for resources and priority of support. The higher headquarters must determine the support order in which the states receives their critical assets and resources and the higher headquarters must be prepared to control the expected overwhelming inflow of critical assets and resources as they are received from throughout the nation. The establishment of the JTF-CC, in conjunction with the unity of effort with FEMA, will immediately establish the priority of support and priority of effort to the supported region.

Hurricane Katrina was the United States' most destructive hurricane ranking as the most expensive and fifth deadliest hurricane overall in history.⁷ Katrina caused over \$108 billion and claimed 1,833 lives.⁸ This category 3 hurricane crossed the Gulf of Mexico and caused massive destruction in Alabama, Louisiana, Florida and Mississippi. The local and state responders were incapable of effectively responding to the emergency and were quickly overwhelmed. Over 70,000 national guard and active duty

troops were deployed and operating within the region. The Chief of the National Guard Bureau (NGB) responded by exercising the Emergency Mutual Assistance Compact (EMAC) which allowed for one state's NG forces to provide aid to another state when requested. Over 50,000 Title 32 national guard troops were activated under the command and control of their respective governors through their national guard Adjutant General (TAG). The Adjutant General is the senior ranking military member of the state's national guard. The Adjutant General reports directly to their respective governor and serves in a supporting role to their state or federal agencies by providing assistance to U.S. civil authorities at the federal, state, tribal and local levels.⁹ The first back-up to local state authorities are the national guard resources.

President Bush declared a state of emergency for Katrina and DOD responded by deploying over 20,000 Title 10 federal troops under the command and control of a Joint Task Force Katrina Commander. Louisiana and Mississippi mobilized their national guard troops under the command and control of their respective TAG. The Title 10 and Title 32 commanders had command and control over their respective assigned units while operating within the same area of operation. Initially, there were no separate areas of operation identified for the Title 10 and Title 32 units to operate in. This caused duplication of efforts, delays, and in some cases, gaps in the critical support provided. This also created a chain of command problem for both the Title 10 and Title 32 troops.

Historically, unity of command worked when responding to natural disasters on a smaller scale because the majority of the disasters occurred in a centralized area. As natural disasters increased in size and the areas affected response operations exposed

gaps in the National Response Framework. The DHS and DOD were encountering Title 10 and Title 32 challenges and political challenges over which state received particular resources and the order that the resources were received. Following Katrina, DOD took the initiative to develop methods to improve DODs ability to support civil authorities and to resolve the chain of command and unity of effort disconnect between active duty and national guard response to a natural disaster. Policies were assessed and changed resulting in the creation of the Dual Status Command (DSC).

Secretary Robert Gates, former Secretary of Defense, and Secretary Janet Napolitano of Homeland Security, and the Council of Governors, consisting of 10 appointed state governors, signed the Joint Action Plan on 1 March, 2010 authorizing one commander to command both the national guard and reserves forces when they are mobilized to respond to domestic emergencies. The Joint Action Plan authorizes the DSC to operate in both the state and federal chain of commands without worrying about request for legal changes.

The Dual Status Commander is a single commander, which simultaneously controls both federal and national guard forces. The commander operates under Title 10 and Title 32 authority, and reports to the President, through CDRUSNORTHCOM and Secretary of Defense, and the governor for the state of the disaster. The Dual Status Commander is limited to responses within a single state. Any major disaster that involved areas of several states would require a separate DSC commander and command and control structure for each involved state.¹⁰

Hurricane Sandy struck the Northeast U.S. in October 2012 and ranks as the second most destructive hurricane in U.S. history causing damage in excess of \$68

billion and claiming 131 lives.¹¹ The Category 2 hurricane affected 24 states with most of the severe damage occurring in New Jersey and New York.

Over 7,400 national guard troops, from 12 states and the District of Columbia, were mobilized in response to Hurricane Sandy. President Obama declared states of emergency and the DOD deployed over 10,000 troops and authorized dual status commanders for New Jersey, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, New York, Maryland and Rhode Island in support of Sandy. This was the first time in history that the DSC had command and control over Title-10 and Title-32 troops in response to a natural disaster.

Major General Mike Swezey was appointed as the Dual Status Commander for New York, during Hurricane Sandy, and had command authority over both Title 10 and Title 32 troops assigned to his command. There were two different Deputy Coordinating Officers (DCO); one DCO to support Title 10 troops and one DCO to support Title 32 troops. New Jersey and the other states had a similar command structure on a smaller scale. The USNORTHCOM, commanded by General Charles Jacoby, is the combatant command assigned the responsibility of defending the United States. The USNORTHCOM conducts Homeland Defense and Civil Support operations within the assigned area of responsibility to defend, protect, and secure the United States and its interests.¹² The Department of Homeland Security receives their guidance from the President and coordinates directly with FEMA, USNORTHCOM and the dual status commander to provide critical support to the region. Figure 1 illustrates the major stakeholders; Dual Status Commander, U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) and Department for Homeland Security, responsible for the response to Hurricane Sandy.




Figure 1: Sandy Dual Status Command Structure

The overall DSC concept worked as designed. The Title 10 and Title 32 forces, along with state agencies, were able to work together under one Dual Status Commander to provide the required critical support to personnel and infrastructure. There were command authority incidents that exposed gaps during the recovery operations that had the potential to develop into significant issues. Active duty regional units from the Army, Air Force, Navy and Marines anticipated critical logistics requirements and prepared to provide medical, logistical, engineering, and heavy airlift support Title-10 capabilities to the region in the aftermath of Hurricane Sandy but were denied by the NY governor.

The Army offered to provide essential fuel tankers from Fort Drum, NY to transport needed petroleum to New York City and New Jersey to help mitigate the

significant fuel shortage crisis. The Dual Status Commander initially denied the help until President Obama directed New York and New Jersey to receive the petroleum from the Title-10 units. The Marines deployed the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) based at Camp Lejeune, N.C onboard the naval vessel, USS WASP, which was pre-positioned off the coast of New York and New Jersey. The command team from the 26th MEU came ashore to meet with the DSC and to offer their robust capabilities. The 26th MEU was not apart of the DSC chain of command and their critical assets were not initially used during Sandy recovery operations. The 26th MEU was eventually used in the recovery operations on Staten Island, NY and on the Barrier Islands, NJ. The Air Force conducted several sorties of equipment and personnel to include critical civilian engineering equipment to support the failed electrical grids. These assets were sent to different areas of New York and New Jersey due to conflicts with union labor agreements.

There were other valuable Army capabilities that were prepositioned at Fort Dix New Jersey and Fort Hamilton New York to support the response operation but were never used because they were not assigned to the DSC. The Navy deployed the USS San Antonio and the USS Carter Hall to the region but were not initially used in the recovery operations. Rear Admiral John Kirby, Navy's Chief of Information, stated "These ships have not been officially tasked to provide support. These decisions provide national and local decision makers maximum flexibility and options should there be a need for Navy support...if tasked."¹³

It is possible that the governors and TAGs made the initial decision to not employ the additional Title 10 assistance from fear of the public perception that the state could

not manage the crisis without receiving federal help. Most importantly, the Title 10 commanders were flexible and willing to preposition forces to be best postured to minimize the amount of time it will take these forces to reach the communities if tasked.

Following Hurricane Sandy, General Charles Jacoby, Commander USNORTHCOM, was interviewed and expressed his approval with the relief efforts and the unity of effort between the federal and state actors and the implementation of the DSC concept. "The Dual Status Command harnesses DOD support in a unified way and connects it intimately to the needs and power of our communities."¹⁴ In addition to the disaster relief efforts, the DSC command worked great for recent pre-planned events such as the Presidential Inauguration, 2013 and the National Boy Scout Jamboree, 2010. The DSC JTF that supported the national Boy Scout Jamboree was commanded by a Title 10 officer, this was the first time that a Title 10 commanded a DSC. The JTF consisted of 1,800 active duty, national guard and reserve Soldiers from 19 states.¹⁵ The DSC survived associated challenges that normally surfaced when federal forces and state forces simultaneously provide support to civil authorities.

The Department of Defense must establish the Joint Task Force Complex Catastrophe structure consisting of a combination of Title-10 and Title-32 troops from each state as subordinate commands to prepare for the possibility of a catastrophic event. The initial response time immediately following a catastrophic event will be critical, USNORTHCOM will be able to activate the pre-approved JTF-CC and not waste critical time configuring a new command structure to support the mission. Hurricane Katrina taught many lessons, but none more fundamental than the recognition that no

President of the United States can risk the perception of indifference or indecisiveness following a catastrophic event adversely affecting several states.

Active Duty units, from all services, within the homeland can be tasked to JTF-CC on a rotational basis. Leaders have the flexibility of selecting an active duty or national guard general officer to command the DSC JTF-CC. The USNORTHCOM is currently certifying general officers to serve as Dual Status Commanders. Every state has at least one general officer trained and certified for the DSC mission.¹⁶ At least 70 percent of the states have two or more certified officers. There are more than enough certified national guard officers to serve as a dual status commander if needed. Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD) and military service officials told Council of Governor's that it may be helpful to have an active duty federal dual-status commander for incidents affecting multiple states, such as a complex catastrophe. They stated that an active duty federal dual-status commander might have greater flexibility moving between multiple states and territories affected by an incident and might offer a broader, national perspective consistent with the Secretary of Defense's and the President's priorities.¹⁷ Figure 2 illustrates the number of certified Dual Status Commanders within the United States.




Figure 2: Number of Certified Dual-Status Commanders in the US as of June 2012

Department of Defense must capitalize from the synergy achieved from stakeholders during Hurricane Sandy and create the required pre-approved JTF to support to the homeland response operations for future catastrophic domestic events. The current DSC framework was created which allowed the stakeholders to capitalize on relationships, trust and partnerships developed over recent years to enhance a unified disaster response. This new structure will require a cultural change. Prior to September 11, 2001 there were limited opportunities for the active and national guard forces to work simultaneously during a time of war or in support of civil authorities. Because of the relationships built post September 11, 2001, those opportunities have

greatly increased. The "one weekend a month, two weeks a year" slogan is not relevant when nearly 28% of total US forces in Iraq and Afghanistan at the end of 2011 consisted of mobilized personnel of the National Guard and Reserve components.¹⁸ There are still cultural issues within the states and National Guard community concerning Title-10 troops operating within the homeland. These cultural concerns must be eliminated which will open doors for unimpeded support to the homeland following a catastrophic event. The stronger relationships and partnerships are before an incident occurs, the more effectiveness and unity for response operations will increase during and after an incident. A top down approach from leadership within DOD, the National Guard and state governors is necessary given the unpredictable nature of the next disaster. While synergy may exist among Title-10 and Title-32 members of the military in select states because of joint experiences or responding together to incidents, not all states share this experience.

This new set of realities and requirements have meant a wrenching set of changes for our military establishment that, until recently, was almost completely oriented toward winning the big battles in the big wars. Based on my experience at CIA, Texas A&M, and now the Department of Defense, the culture of any large organization takes a long time to change. The really tough part is preserving those elements of the culture that strengthen the institution and motivate the people in it, while shedding those elements of the culture that are barriers to progress and achieving the mission. All of the services must examine their cultures critically, if we are to have the capabilities relevant and necessary to overcome the most likely threats America will face in years to come.¹⁹

Former Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates, targeted a need for culture barrier change within the services in order for DOD to successfully advance. Federal and State leaders must be willing to support the homeland defense and support to the U.S. citizens as top priority over who has command authority of Title 10 and Title 32 forces. The DOD domestic operations are considered Defense Support of Civil Authorities

(DSCA). Defense Support to Civil Authorities activities are conducted in support of non-DOD lead department or agency. Federal military forces are always under military command, but during DSCA, they operate in support of civilian authorities.

The Dual Status Command initiative symbolizes the required cultural shift and flexibility that supports the former Secretary of Defense's, Leon Panetta, guidance for the new force to be agile, flexible, adaptable and technologically advanced to have an effective force to meet future threats.

The recommended JTF-CC command structure offers a streamlined dual status command relationship between Title 10 and Title 32 troops. All Title 10 and Title 32 troops assigned to JTF-CC are subcomponents to the JTF-CC Commander, who takes his or her commands directly from the USNORTHCOM commander. The President has command authority over DOD and the Secretary of Homeland Security and coordinates with the governors from each state affected by the San Andreas earthquake scenario. The JTF-CC will be commanded by either an active duty or national guard general officer. The JTF-CC will have two Deputy Coordinating Officers, one for Title 10 and one for Title 32 coordination efforts. Figure 3 illustrates the recommended Joint Task Force Complex Catastrophic command structure.




Figure 3: Complex Catastrophes Command Structure

Unity of effort and responsibilities can become more complicated for the military when Title 10 and Title 32 are expected to respond and operate together but under separate chains of command. This command structure combines federal and state troops under one unified commander. The dual status commander will have command and control over all assigned troops operating within the area of operations. This command structure eliminates any possibilities of delays with employing critical capabilities to needed communities.

Unity of Effort is one of the main prerequisites of successful performance at any level of command. It can be achieved through unity of command, dual status command or through cooperation. “when there is war against but one power there should be but one army, acting on one line, and led by one chief.”²⁰ Though the quote is referring to war, the concept remains the same when planning for a catastrophic event. When the

requirement exceeds the available resources, there should be one commander making the tough priority decisions. The catastrophic event will be larger than anything that we have encountered before in the U.S. and it is critical that the response efforts achieve unity of effort from all stakeholders.

The JTF-CC will encounter pushback during the development process. The governors are expected to provide the strongest opposition due to a history of state and federal strategic cooperation concerns over command and control authority. As a result, a political and operational friction has developed in the state-and federal support relationship, creating the potential for a less than optimal response when DOD provides DSCA. The governors will also pushback because the JTF-CC can be viewed as an additional layer added to the priority of support decision making process. The NGB will have reservations regarding the pre-planned JTF because of the implications that the NG is incapable of handling a catastrophic natural disaster within their state. The loss of power means the loss of money and also the loss of order of the presumed priority in the hierarchy of needs for the states.

If this change in policy is not implemented, the devastating destruction from the unprecedented complex catastrophe could potentially be a threat to our national security. The timeframe immediately following a complex catastrophe will be critical, response efforts could be delayed due to command and control uncertainties and limited resource distribution decisions can be delayed due to the lack of overall situation awareness.

DOD must adopt the JTF-CC response force concept and place the command under the command and control of USNORTHCOM to ensure that DOD has a robust

and reliable DSCA capacity that can rapidly and effectively respond to domestic complex catastrophic disasters.

Conclusion

While DOD has made progress in issuing and updating relevant policy to support their critical homeland defense and civil support missions, DOD still lacks the necessary framework to a catastrophic natural disaster. The prompt revision of these policies is essential to U.S. national security. Deciding to make the policy change now will allow critical stakeholders' planners' time to collaborate, communicate and work the significant details of the policy, which helps identify and resolve planning conflicts early in the process. The pre-planned JTF not only can improve efficiency and common understanding during routine, peacetime interaction among stakeholders, they can enhance support effectiveness during time-compressed operations associated with disaster relief operations. The initiative will make DOD support of civil authorities faster and more effective in delivering life-saving and life-sustaining requirements to the American people. It is time for America's leaders to close the gap in the U.S. catastrophic disaster response framework and to ensure that USNORTHCOM has the necessary capabilities—people, training, and equipment to assist and defend the U.S. homeland. We must continue to search for ways to eliminate barriers to speed, enhance cooperation with stakeholders and collaborate with state officials to advance understanding.

Endnotes

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