


Strategy Research Project

National Guard State Partnership Program: Building Partnership Capacity

by

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United States Army War College
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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

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Abstract

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The National Guard State Partnership Program provides an effective method to utilize the military instrument of national power to enable security and stability with our partner nations, thus furthering application of U.S. diplomatic, economic, and informational instruments of power. The SPP is a practical method for identifying, developing, and assessing a partner nation's military capability for countering terrorism and insurgency, deterring aggression, providing a stabilizing presence, and building humanitarian aid and disaster relief capacities. SPP supports U.S. armed forces primary missions as further illustrated in its historical background and purpose, identification of adversary frameworks and the U.S. strategic approach, SPP strategic alignment, and recommendations for assessing program justification.

National Guard State Partnership Program: Building Partnership Capacity

Building partnership capacity is a core element of everything we do, and everything we hope to accomplish. The defense strategic guidance affirmed clearly that alliances and partnerships are central to how we approach the current and future security environment.

—Kathleen Hicks¹

National civilian and military leaders often speak on the importance of securing vital national interests; however securing these interests is difficult and arduous, requiring expenditure of national resources. There are numerous methods of securing and protecting U.S. interests. Security of national interests requires a world where U.S. enduring interests: Security of the U.S., its citizens, and allies and partners; Strong, innovative and growing U.S. economy; Respect for universal values at home and around the world; an international order advanced by U.S. leadership able to saturate a global culture.² The National Guard State Partnership Program (SPP) is one program for securing vital national interests. The SPP is a feasible, acceptable, and supportable way of securing vital national interests. SPP is an effective method for utilizing the military instrument of national power to enable security and stability with our partner nations. Secure and stable partners allow further application of U.S. diplomatic, economic, and informational instruments of power. The SPP is a practical method for identifying, developing, and assessing a partner nation's military capability for countering terrorism and insurgency, deterring aggression, providing a stabilizing presence, and building humanitarian aid and disaster relief capacities.³ An examination of SPP historical background and purpose, identification of adversary frameworks and the U.S. strategic approach, SPP strategic alignment, and recommendations for

assessing program justification will show how the program supports U.S. national interests.⁴

SPP Background and Purpose

The SPP rose from the fall of the Iron Curtain in 1992. SPP was born out of an initial intent to engage key leaders from the former Soviet Union Baltic States on the development of their defense forces under civilian governmental control.⁵ Since initiated, the program has grown to over 65 country partnerships seeking to build relationships through military exchanges, leader mentoring, training exercises, and supporting security cooperation activities.⁶ All 50 states, 2 territories, and the District of Columbia participate in the SPP throughout the world. State partnerships exist within all six Global Combatant Commands (GCCs). This global reach establishes relationships and access with other countries through building partner capacity and furthering common interests. Over the past 20 years, SPP has expended relatively few resources and built partner capacity at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. The National Guard is uniquely suited for this role due to the mix of civilian and military skills found in the reserve component; interaction with local, state, and federal government organizations; and the stability to maintain long-lasting personal relationships.⁷ SPP's history, purpose, and noted accomplishments provide insights on why the program is an innovative means to achieve U.S. national policy and ensure U.S. global leadership.

Beginning and Growth of the State Partnership Program

From the start, the SPP's primary focus was to identify and build partnerships with common interests and enable cooperation. The U.S. government's desire to increase military contacts within the new states founded in central and eastern Europe and their need to increase military capabilities was the partnership connection.⁸ The

United States European Command (USEUCOM) was the lead agent in developing contact and establishing Joint Contact Team Program (JCTP) in 1992 from the active component.⁹ Senior defense officials soon decided that National Guard and Reserve personnel should take leading roles in the partnerships to abate Russian fears of U.S. expansion in the region.¹⁰

Lieutenant General John Conway, Chief of the National Guard Bureau (NGB), along with Brigadier General Thomas Lennon, head of the JCTP, visited the Baltic states in November 1992.¹¹ In 1993, New York established their SPP partnership with Estonia, Michigan partnered with Latvia, and Pennsylvania partnered with Lithuania. The SPP provided the funds and personnel to the engagement mission; some National Guard personnel had language and a heritage from the countries that provided greater cultural competence for these initial engagements.¹²

As of 2012, the original three partnerships have grown to 22 partnerships within USEUCOM. From this beginning, the other GCCs initiated partnerships. United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) has five partnerships, its first partnership established in 1995.¹³ United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) initiated four original partnerships in 1996 and currently has 22 partnerships.¹⁴ United States Pacific Command (USPACOM) started two partnerships in 2000 and currently has seven partnerships.¹⁵ United States Africa Command (USAFRICOM) has eight total partnerships with the first beginning in 2003 with New York-South Africa.¹⁶ United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) inherited a partnership established in 2005 under USSOUTHCOM when USNORTHCOM assumed responsibility for the Bahamas.

Growth over the last 20 years in SPP increased steadily to the current 65 partnerships in 2012. The criteria used to initiate and then maintain a partnership are:

- Displays a real desire for a U.S. relationship,
- Aligns with U.S. national interests and objectives,
- Force protection risks mitigations are acceptable,
- Minimal additional resources required for building a relationship,
- National Guard homeland defense and support to civil authority core competencies are integrated
- Minimum of three events per year are executed¹⁷

NGB and the GCC utilize the above criteria to initiate the relationship and ensure the partnership ways and means are supporting GCC ends. A central strength of the program is that it utilizes National Guard personnel on temporary orders to reduce both overall cost and overseas permanent basing. Partners typically have low threat levels in order to minimize force protection requirements and the costs associated with increased mitigation measures. Status of Forces Agreements (SOFA) and other treaties exist in approximately half of the partnerships.¹⁸ The GCC and NGB determine if the risk mitigations are acceptable in comparison to the strategic importance of the partnership objectives.

Purpose

The purpose of the SPP is to establish and maintain enduring relationships with partner nations toward strategic objectives supporting the National Security Strategy, National Military Strategy, Department of State and Combatant Command Theater

Security Cooperation guidance to promote national objectives, stability, security cooperation, and trust.¹⁹ The four key goals of the SPP are:

- Deter adversaries and regional conflict
- Response and recovery during attacks or man-made and natural disaster
- Support of partner defense innovation and institutions
- Support growth of partner in regional and international governmental organizations²⁰

Within these four goals, the SPP facilitates the development of a regional and global environment congruent with the U.S. national interests of security, prosperity, values, and international order.²¹ In addition, these goals facilitate a stable global environment that influences U.S. partners and potentially adversaries away from negative and disruptive approaches.

The first goal, to deter adversaries and regional conflict is supplementary to the second goal to respond and recover from attacks and disasters. The focus of the two goals are developing defense management capacity, training personnel with the capabilities to deter internal and external adversaries, and utilizing appropriate action when events occur. Interagency and civil military cooperation is critical to the development, sustainment, and execution of the capability.²² The National Guard core missions provide a unique capability and institutional knowledge to meet these two goals. At the federal, state, and local levels, the National Guard supports the land and air component missions, the homeland defense mission, and the support of civilian authorities and disaster relief missions. The National Guard capacity to mentor and train at the various levels with the partner is representative of the U.S. armed forces.

Interagency integration is standard practice at the local, state, and federal levels within the National Guard. These two goals provide the partner a core capacity for developing force sustainment and growth in the last two goals.

The third goal supports the partner nation's defense innovation and professional development with concern for the challenges faced in the global community today and in the future.²³ This goal enables the partner to strengthen and sustain capacity through development of institutions that establish and maintain standards. The foundation of standards directly supports interoperability with the U.S., regional partners, non-government organizations (NGO) and International Government Organizations (IGO). Every National Guard state has a Regional Training Institute that supports collective and individual development. The partner is able to utilize the National Guard knowledge of military schooling operations to develop their own institutions through exchanges and training programs. At the state level, the National Guard develops and submits annual budgets and requests to NGB for operational maintenance, equipping the force, and sustaining bases and armories. Through mentoring and engaging with key partner leaders, the SPP can assist the development of a sustainable partner defense management that understands how ways and means achieve the ends identified by civilian leadership.

The last goal seeks to facilitate partner involvement in regional and international organizations.²⁴ Development of regional and international military cooperation is within the capabilities of the National Guard. Most brigade size National Guard units reside in multiple states. Due to the nature of split-state force structure, the involved states develop relationships that ensure unity of effort and support across state boundaries.

Development of interstate training plans, resourcing responsibilities, and command authorities are similar to the skill sets required to operate in regional and international coalitions. These skills coupled with GCC support can build the necessary capacity to develop partner relationships with neighboring countries, to ensure unity of effort, interoperability, and mutual support. These four goals further protect U.S. interests and stature in the global community. Essential to the relationship and building strong partnerships is correctly identifying the threat and the environments the capability operates within to deter threats and respond to conflict.²⁵

Adversary and U.S. Strategic Frameworks

Since the end of the Cold War, adversaries continue to oppose U.S. national interests. Employing SPP requires an understanding of the threat strategic framework and objectives in order to identify the ways and means necessary to meet partner ends. Today two different strategic adversaries contradict democracy and human rights and oppose U.S. interests and values.²⁶ The first adversary framework arises from a resistance to modernity as seen in Al Qaeda. The second adversary framework is an innovation within the former and present communist regimes to profess the values of a world economy based on free trade. Other factors causing friction are a rise in resource demands, media access, and the global economy. In order to develop a U.S. strategic approach to secure national interests it is necessary to identify adversaries, their interests, influencers, and the terrain.

Adversary Framework

The two frameworks opposing U.S. interests are the anti-modernity and the free market authoritarian governments. The anti-modernity adversaries profess stringent values with an interest to maintain narrow cultural traditions and suppress

modernization and coexistence. These elements have demonstrated fascist methods of governing as demonstrated by the Taliban in Afghanistan. Typically, this organization thrives in failed and failing states as a base from which to export terrorism to states with opposing governance and values. Hezbollah is another example that operates both as a non-state actor and is a political party within Lebanon and other Middle East nations. Utilizing terrorism, this framework seeks to discredit the sovereign government in failing states and provide a culturally traditional form of governance. The SPP provides a method to build the capabilities within a partner nation to counter terrorism and insurgencies. SPP reduces instability through building humanitarian aid and disaster relief capabilities. Prolonged national instability from natural and man-made disasters is a breeding ground for terrorists and insurgencies. Stable governments responsive to the needs of the people are able to defend against the destabilizing nature of the anti-modernity framework.

The second adversary strategic framework originates from the post Cold War authoritarian governments. China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, Syria, and Venezuela are examples of this authoritarian form of government.²⁷ This axis of authoritarian governments seeks to legitimize their form of governments, undermine western values and interests, and be a unified front to oppose the U.S., our allies, and the United Nations.²⁸ These governments all hold national elections for their leaders providing the appearance of a democratic state. This alternative to liberal democracy threatens human rights values and international order, two U.S. interests. This is the most disruptive framework of the two since it adheres to open market trading practices and appeases their populations with economic prosperity. These governments utilize control

of the media to suppress dissent. The axis nations control the media through the judicial system or outright state ownership, therefore limiting free speech. The axis governments utilize their court system to sue or prosecute political opposition with charges ranging from slander to subversion. Second, these nations undermine international order supporting terrorist organizations, insurgencies in failing or failed states, and exporting weapons of mass destruction technology to rogue states. The basic tenants of the framework are nation before community then individual rights, consensus not conflict, and the basic unit of society is the family, and promotion of racial and religious harmony.²⁹ These basic principles coupled with a strong economic base promote a system of governance able to dictate economic policy for the good of the nation. One alternative is a possible bridging strategy slowly moving toward a liberal democracy over time. SPP provides security cooperation and capacity for regionally aligned states to deter opposition from axis states seeking regional hegemonic status. SPP facilitates military diplomacy with partners and can include axis states in regional exercises to develop understanding that potentially could lead to democratic reforms in the axis state over time.

Influence of Information and Media on Stability

Another dimension influencing people and governments is the constant flood of media. The human dimension or the physical, cognitive, and social aspects of humans, influence and are influenced by governments, media, and NGOs.³⁰ The media cycle and the increased significance of the human domain in reaching strategic ends require the development of ways and means that account for these variables.³¹ Recently a simple street vendor's humiliation resulted in self-immolation that led to revolutions sweeping through Arab nations via various media outlets.³² The power of information created the

cascade of events that destabilized or removed long-standing regimes in the Middle East. Through SPP activities, training and mentoring of media influences and the impacts of the population on operations develop an adaptive partner force. The development of HA/DR capacity with partners mitigates the risk of negative media; civilian populace disputes during a crisis, and supports the civilian control of the military.

Other Influences on Global Stability

There are opposing views among scholars on future global stability. Many scholars and leaders promote an era of declining conflict and the rise of a global community. Central to this view is a rise in liberal democratic governments and free trade practices promoted through the U.S. and our allies. The contrasting view points to a rising trend toward increasing violence, scattered across states transitioning from authoritarian regimes to governments that are more democratic. John Arquilla points to the impact of failed and failing states as an indicator for increased conflict in the coming century.³³ Both views are valid. History points to an initial increase in violence at the dawn of a democratic state based on institutions deviating from authoritarian regimes to governance held accountable by the people of the nation. The United States can provide leadership through the SPP and diplomacy to reduce the growing pains associated with the birth of democratic institutions and the development of a global community with human rights, rule of law, and free market systems as cornerstones. Indicators also point to the rise of democratic forms of government in the world as witnessed from the Arab spring and recent struggles in Africa.

U.S. Strategic Approach Proposition

The U.S. needs to return to an offshore balancing military strategy that reduces costs and still reassures allies and partners through the implementation of programs like

the SPP.³⁴ GCCs and Department of State (DOS), identify partner nations in key regions seeking democratic reforms to engage, mentor, and seed institutions with capabilities toward democracy, free trade, and human rights. These partners once identified participate in SPP and other security cooperation activities. The relationship focus is on the building of capacity supporting common interests that enable a military sensitive to its cultural and societal norms and avoids pressing potentially divisive U.S. values. This modified offshore balancing military strategy heavily relies on synchronization of U.S. diplomatic, informational, and economic instruments. In addition, synchronization of U.S., regional, and international organizations to empower global exchange forums that assist in developing innovative governments within these emerging states. This methodology requires a whole of government approach that incorporates international and regional institutions.³⁵ A U.S. strategy of consensus builder and coalition leader focused on a world where our interests and values can collaborate with the interests and values of sovereign states to reach our collective objectives.³⁶

Whole of Government Partnership

The SPP is one of many ways congruent with a modified offshore balancing strategy. The offshore balancing approach conserves resources through maintaining the military force offshore and domestically. The approach deploys the force to assist our partners with capacity building, military education, and interoperability. Through embracing a whole of government approach, the U.S. and our partners maintain continued U.S. leadership in the world. However, a moderated U.S. objective to promote liberal democracy as the way of democracy is required. The U.S. grew into our current form of democracy over roughly 300 years. It is not reasonable for a fledgling

democracy quickly to reach an equivalent level of maturity. Iterative mentorship that realizes the development of liberal democracy is challenging provides greater trust and builds upon common interests over time. Continued SPP development facilitates global institutional change that allows global stability growth, supportive of U.S. values and interests.

SPP Alignment with U.S. National Interests and Strategic Objectives

The SPP develops goals from the U.S. National Security Strategy, Department of Defense Strategic Guidance, Department of the Army Strategic Guidance and Department of State Strategic Guidance. One issue with SPP is the lack of uniform standards for measuring effectiveness, expenditures, and uniform reporting systems. GCCs, NGB, and the Department of Defense (DOD) are currently developing uniform standards for security cooperation assessment.³⁷ The real power of the program is the potential for enduring positive change between our partner nations and the U.S. SPP alignment with national interests and strategy ensures the program expending resources toward objectives that meet the GGC and country Chief of Mission ends while fulfilling the needs of the partner nation.

SPP Support of National Security Strategy

As written in the 2010 National Security Strategy, the SPP supports the enduring interests of the U.S through building partnerships, mutual respect, and leadership within an international order fostering individual human rights and democratic values.³⁸

Through military to military contact, SPP provides a conduit to demonstrate U.S. moral leadership with our partner nations.³⁹ This program incorporated with other institutions demonstrates a U.S. national resolve to strengthen regional and international bodies toward common interests.⁴⁰ U.S. leadership and promotion of an international order

requires that we also take the lead in international security. A strategy of building partner capacity and interoperability reduces the U.S. need to project and sustain large-scale military operations.⁴¹

In the future, the U.S. will continue to underwrite international security in order to preserve our national interests and values. Through building partnership capacity and regional institutions like the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the U.S. is able to reduce threats with smaller U.S. military deployments. The coordination of government agencies, GCCs, regional institutions, and the U.N. toward greater global capacity to resolve conflicts and disasters provides stability and reassures the global community. Through training exercises incorporating regional partners in conjunction with the GCC and other USG agencies, the SPP is able to develop partner operational readiness and Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HA/DR) capacities. A capacity to protect its citizens from external and internal threats, including disasters is a basic government requirement and expectation.⁴² The SPP, through a whole of government approach, has the capability to deliver the training and experience necessary for U.S. partners to sustain their national and regional security. These basic capacities enable stability and growth in emerging nations.

Department of Defense Strategic Guidance and Objectives

The 2012 Department of Defense Strategic guidance directly points to ways like SPP to support U.S. security interests. “Whenever possible, we will develop innovative, low cost, and small-footprint approaches to achieve our security objectives, relying on exercises, rotational presence, and advisory capabilities.”⁴³ This statement describes the methods utilized in the SPP to engage with the partnered nations. The objectives found further in the guidance outline the ten strategic objectives. The five primary

missions SPP directly supports are: “Counter Terrorism and Irregular Warfare, Deter and Defeat Aggression, Provide a Stabilizing Presence, Conduct Stability and Counterinsurgency Operations, and Conduct Humanitarian Disaster Relief.”⁴⁴ An additional mission, “Defend the Homeland and Provide Support to Civil Authorities,” supported by the National Guard affords additional opportunities to expand partner homeland defense capacity.⁴⁵ Training in HA/DR promote the interaction and subordination of the military to civilian leaders and builds trust between the populace and the military.

Department of State Strategic Guidance and Objectives

SPP supports Department of State priorities that include development of Humanitarian Assistance, man-made and natural Disaster Relief, and common interests and values. The 2007-2012 Strategic Plan lists both the DOD and the Department of Homeland Defense as critical partners in the implementation of DOS objectives.⁴⁶ Recent comments from the Honorable Secretary John Kerry promote the same goals to secure U.S. interests.⁴⁷ Within the seven DOS Strategic Goals, five include the DOD as a government partner. “Achieving Peace and Security, Investing in People, Promoting Economic Growth and Prosperity, Providing Humanitarian Assistance, and Promoting International Understanding,” are goals that SPP currently supports with oversight from the individual country Chiefs of Mission and the GCCs.⁴⁸ SPP incorporates these goals in some manner into every partner engagement. Further examination of the focus and resourcing by country is necessary under the current fiscal constraints and the rebalancing of efforts.

Results of Current Partnerships

Currently, measurement of program goals is a challenge in terms of objective evidence related to engagements, training conducted that supports GCC objectives, and assessing capacity increases among partner nations. Questions exist about the execution of SPP and its further implementation, despite overt praising statements by key U.S. civilian and military leaders, within the DOD and the DOS. Kathleen Hicks the undersecretary of defense for policy at an SPP conference celebrating the 20th anniversary recently stated, “The defense strategic guidance clearly affirmed that alliances and partnerships are central to how we approach the current and future security environment.”⁴⁹ The assessments are typically subjective based on the language of defense guidance interpretation, GCC objectives, and program goal interpretations. Underlying the tension of interpretation is the objective toward building relationships that further U.S. values of liberal democracy and military support of civilian leaders.

Congressional and Government Accounting Office reviews resulted in a DOD review of goals, performance metrics, and SPP financial reporting.⁵⁰ In surveys conducted by the Government Accounting Office and in interviews by the Congressional Research Service the benefits of SPP nest with U.S. Security Guidance and GCC objectives. The findings were that GCC building partner capacity and security cooperation objectives are being met.⁵¹ The GCCs, the National Guard, and partner Liaison Officers also cited advancement of human rights, public diplomacy, strengthening of regional security and interoperability increases due to the SPP.⁵² National Guard personnel also deployed as liaison teams with their partner nation in support of International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Operations in Afghanistan.

Linkage to current security and strategic guidance justifies further refinement and implementation of the SPP based on its cost, flexibility to meet partner needs and GCC objectives.

SPP Methods of Assessment to Ensure National Interests

In light of recent Congressional and Government Accounting Office reports, development of objective reporting mechanisms are needed to ensure focus on the relevant GCC Country Campaign Plan (CCP) and the national security strategy. In order to meet Congressional concerns four recommendations on assessing SPP requiring further development are:

- Initiating and prioritizing partnerships
- Determining capability needs
- Planning, execution, and training assessment
- Deployable and employable readiness

An additional reporting requirement is the second and third order of effects brought about through the partnership, the advancement of human rights, military subordination to civilian authority, and the rule of law. This reporting derived from assessments conducted by the embassy need inclusion in the overall assessment plan. The National Guard partner in coordination with the embassy, GCC, and partner prioritize and align partnership missions with objectives. Engagement with partner leaders, GCC and the Embassy Office of Defense Cooperation (ODC) within each assessment phase enables accurate and transparent reporting. These assessments enable an approach for the allocation of resources supporting continued SPP activities.

Initiating and Prioritizing Partnerships

First in the SPP assessment, is the partnership. The initial identification of how the partner nation aids the U.S. in securing national interests and their potential growth, as a partner is essential. The country demonstrates a desire to participate in the SPP. Second; the partner nation has the infrastructure or capacity to develop their armed forces capabilities that supports common national interests. Third, the supporting National Guard State has the core capabilities necessary to meet both the GCC and partner nation goals. Fourth, utilizing the CCP, Embassy ODC, partner nation, and the National Guard identify the specific capability objectives.⁵³ Lastly, the four partners assess the resolve of the partner to resource and sustain the program. Identification of the partner nation's participation resolve is critical. U.S. understanding of the partner nation's will to deploy and employ the capability in support of regional and international coalitions is a key partnership objective.⁵⁴ Another assessment requirement is the impact the security cooperation partnership will have on other regional partners and adversaries.⁵⁵ For example, security cooperation can cause negative responses from adversaries within the region. These assessments provide the information required for decisions on SPP partner establishment, resourcing levels, levels of engagement, building capability, and objectives.

Determining Capability Needs to Support Common Interests

The next step, capability needs, utilizes the same partnership team to determine capability requirements and how best to build it. Determining and developing methods of training on capabilities that support common national interests are the priority. Another consideration is the feasibility of the partner capacity to sustain the capability at some point in the future without U.S. assistance.⁵⁶ Mature SPP relationships will have

historical supporting data from previous assessments on partner capability needs. The capabilities vary depending on the partner nation infrastructure and projected utilization. Capabilities focused on security and stability enables a sustainable government to foster economic growth and human rights. An example of a common capability need is command and staffing functions at the battalion or brigade level. Command and control capability increases a partner nation's ability to support peacekeeping operations with the U.N. and regional coalitions. Missions through the U.N. and regional coalitions with U.N. backing provide additional capacity and institutional growth. HA/DR is a National Guard core competency, utilizing local, state, and national interagency planning and execution. These types of missions also provide opportunities to mentor military subordination to civilian leaders and the benefits of direct support to the nation's citizens in a time of crisis. The capability to provide relief in a time of crisis is one of the better methods to build trust with the populace in nations with questionable past military to citizen interaction.

Planning and Engagement

The actual development of a partner nation military force requires a security cooperation plan to enable partnership activity resources, focus, and planning guidance. Currently the SPP varies in development and execution of a comprehensive plan incorporating U.S. and partner nation governments.⁵⁷ Operational and capability importance determine the training priorities in conjunction with the partner nation's doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, and facilities to sustain the capacity.⁵⁸ Funding authorizations are numerous to support security cooperation and SPP. Presently there is no one authority for approval of SPP activities, depending on funding authorization the event requires the country embassy, NGB, and the GCC

approval. SPP planned activities and engagements require routing through all partners with program oversight for approval. The partnership team identifies security cooperation activities and matches the activities to supporting authorizations. The partnership team also considers inclusion of additional regional partners in exercises and training opportunities and the methods of activity implementation.⁵⁹ Execution incorporates an assessment of the activity effectiveness, resources, and reinforcement methods implemented by the partner.

Assessment

The assessment process affords opportunities to mentor and develop the report with the partner. Continual assessment of the partnership and progress toward objectives provides the necessary feedback to the Combatant Commander (CCDR) and Chief of Mission for further guidance and prioritization of effort. GCC involvement in the assessment process provides an external perspective of the security cooperation partnership. GCC guidance on engagement end state before assessment provides focus and measures of effectiveness that ensures the SPP is “doing the right things” and “not just doing things right.”⁶⁰ Appropriate funding of various partnerships necessitates accurate assessments of capability and partner commitment to building capacity. The viability and readiness of the partner nation to provide forces to deploy as part of International Government Organizations (IGO) and coalition missions is an essential function of the partnership.⁶¹ Partner increases in security and stability enables the partner government to further national policies regarding economic growth, rule of law, and human rights. The SPP relationship and evaluations of the partner nation’s capabilities and feasibility allows identification of suitable coalition missions when deployed.

Deployable/Employable Readiness

The ability to deploy and employ the partner nation's forces with the capabilities to secure their nation and support IGOs and coalitions is an essential partnership objective. The standard is the partner nation and U.S. common values and interests, allowing for growth, capacity, and regional influence to develop in the partner military force. The ultimate judge of partner nation common values and interests is the commitment and willingness to deploy forces in support of U.S. coalitions and IGO actions. Other potential actions demonstrating will are Status of Forces Agreements (SOFA). Until deployment occurs, the SPP metrics for assessing will to deploy and employ are limited to capability evaluations and partnership senior level engagements.

Second Order Affects of SPP

Additional goals of SPP through security cooperation and military exchanges are to incorporate respect for human rights, democratic governance, and military subordination to civilian leaders. The treatment, interrogation, and processing of detainees is one area of training to incorporate our values with our partner nations.⁶² Conducting training to demonstrate internationally-accepted methods and communicating to our partners why these methods are necessary and sustainable. Building partner capacity in the intelligence and detainee operations is one method of incorporating international conventions related to the treatment of detainees. Demonstrating the methods outlined by institutions such as the Geneva Convention is one way to demonstrate internationally accepted practices.

Another practice permeating developing nations is corruption. Opportunities to train partners on lawful contracting practices are available through the contracting of sustainment for U.S. personnel supporting the SPP activities. Nations where corruption

is an accepted practice, requires consistent engagement, time, and examples of how corruption impedes freedom in order to realize change. These changes do not typically occur overnight but require perspective changes and sometimes a generation before sustainable and real elimination of corruption occurs. Trusted relationships are capable of influencing this kind of cultural change. Military exchanges and consistent interactions provide another perspective toward change and needed support for illumination of culturally accepted corruption. As partners, the U.S. can assist in developing ways and means to eliminate corruption that increases overall freedoms and efficiencies within the partner nation. The National Guard within both our military training and our inherent civilian capabilities are well-suited to develop methods with our partners for identifying and reducing systemic corruption.

The aspects of SPP requiring further development are aligning the security cooperation efforts with strategic objectives, objective reporting of the progress and fiscal accounting of the program. Greater development of relationships with the National Guard, GCC, and the country embassy staff will increase the effectiveness and efficiency of SPP. Alignment of effort and funding with priorities focuses national treasure and manpower on strategic objectives. Long standing mature relationships should transition from capacity building and focus on interoperability and cooperation. Newer relationships require the focus of the capacity building effort. In addition, developing assessments of the effects SPP participation has on overall National Guard readiness will provide greater insight on another secondary affect of the program.

Conclusion

In conclusion, SPP supports national interests and the national security strategy in an era strained by budget uncertainties. The unprecedented global rise of democratic

values and the free flow of information provide the U.S. with opportunities to lead and mentor international institutions and our partner nations forward into a liberal democratic world that compliments U.S. national interests and values. The recent rise in democratic values and human rights requires leadership, mentorship, and security. The SPP provides an efficient method to identify, develop, and assess a partner's military capability through security cooperation activities. SPP is an efficient way to utilize the National Guard to support security and stability with our partner nations, therefore advancing the use of U.S. diplomatic, economic, and informational instruments of power. The SPP is capable of developing and mentoring partner military capacity in countering terrorism and insurgency, deterring aggression, stability operations, and HA/DR. The SPP objectives and purpose have changed little as seen in the program history and background. First, SPP history and background demonstrate a need for assisting budding democracies in building military capacity subservient to civilian leaders. Second, SPP provides a way for partners to deter and defeat aggression through the building of partner capacity. Third, SPP supports national vital interests and national security strategy guides the priorities and focus of the program. Lastly, continual assessment of the program throughout the process enables effective implementation of the program. With 65 partnerships, and more developing, the USG has a feasible, acceptable, and suitable method to enable human rights, rule of law, and democratic values alongside our partners and allies.

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