

THE APPLICATION OF USAID AND THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE IN A COMPREHENSIVE GOVERNMENT APPROACH

A Monograph

by

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ABSTRACT

THE APPLICATION OF USAID AND THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE IN A COMPREHENSIVE GOVERNMENT APPROACH by Dale Skoric, United States Agency for International Development, 55 pages

The foreign policy of the United States is built on the three Ds: development, diplomacy and defense (3Ds). The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) is the lead development agency; the Department of State (DOS) leads on diplomacy; and the Department of Defense (DOD) leads on defense issues. The 3D approach provides to the United States Government (USG) an opportunity to use a collective set of responses to tackle global security challenges. The 3D approach recognizes that to address the root causes of conflict, a wide range of skills, expertise, capabilities and resources are required, and that no single agency or department has them all. While DOD can stop violence and set conditions for security, USAID can ease the transition between conflict and long-term development, and DOS can build diplomatic relationships to create political engagement, negotiation and dialogue between conflicting groups seeking peace. Complicating the 3D approach is that over the last decade, DOD's budget and authorities to conduct international development programs have grown significantly. These multiple funding accounts and authorities of DOD to provide development assistance have overshadowed both symbolically and substantively USAID's development role overseas, which is counter to the 3D approach. In this regard, if the USG is to advance its national security interests around the world, the 3D approach must be more than a mantra. To address complex security challenges in a constrained budget environment, DOD and USAID need to ensure that their development programs are closely coordinated, mutually reinforcing, and not working in isolation of one another. With a wide variety of tools and resources at hand, DOD and USAID need to draw from each other's wealth of expertise and show that overseas development is not about meeting a military or civilian led objective, it is about unity of effort and collectively contributing to the national security goals of the United States. However, to date, no detailed assessment or evaluation has been done to suggest that a 3D approach is effective. In time of fiscal austerity, USAID and DOD need to ensure that their development resources are being spent in the most effective ways possible and do not run counter to one another. While the USG missions in Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrate that the nature of threats to the USG are becoming progressively more complex, USAID and DOD need to learn from lessons and experience to date, and institutionalize best practices if their relationship within the 3Ds is to be effective.

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INTRODUCTION

Development is a lot cheaper than sending soldiers.

—Defense Secretary Robert Gates¹

The 3D Approach

The foreign policy of the United States is built on the three Ds: development, diplomacy and defense (3Ds). The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) is the lead development agency; the Department of State (DOS) leads on diplomacy; and the Department of Defense (DOD) leads on defense issues. Over the last decade, the U.S. government (USG) has introduced a variety of strategies, directives, doctrines and policies to maximize the contributions of the 3Ds toward national security. As a result, the 3D approach provides to the USG an opportunity to use a collective set of responses to tackle global security challenges. The 3D approach recognizes that to address the root causes of conflict, a wide range of skills, expertise, capabilities and resources are required, and that no single agency or department has them all. While DOD can stop violence and set conditions for security, USAID can ease the transition between conflict and long-term development, and DOS can build diplomatic relationships to create political engagement, negotiation and dialogue between conflicting groups seeking peace.

In a 2008 testimony to Congress, retired General Anthony Zinni said that “All that our military instruments can do in conflict is to create the conditions that would allow the other tools of statecraft—especially our diplomatic and development tools—to be successful....For the United States to be an effective world leader, it must strategically balance all three aspects of its power—defense, diplomacy, and development.”² According to former Secretary of Defense

¹Jim Garamone, “Gates Calls Development Integral to Security,” *American Forces Press Service*, 28 September 2010, <http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=61052> (accessed 14 January 2013).

²Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *Strengthening National Security through Smart Power: A Military Perspective*, 110th Cong., 2nd Sess., 5 March 2008.

Robert Gates, the interagency national security system is “a hodgepodge of jury-rigged arrangements strained by a dated and complex patchwork of authorities, persistent shortfalls in resources, and unwieldy processes.”³ President Kennedy expressed the same concern back in 1961 when he said that the state of foreign assistance was “bureaucratically fragmented...diffused over a haphazard and irrational structure...based on a series of legislative measures...conceived at different times...many of them now inconsistent...unsuited for our present needs and purposes...Its weaknesses have begun to undermine confidence in our effort both here and abroad.”⁴ In an ideal world, DOD, DOS and USAID would be able to look across organizational capabilities and capacities and make decisions about where resources are required, and which tools should be used in which circumstances to advance the national security interests of the USG. This is not the case today.

Under the George W. Bush and Obama administrations there have been several efforts to reform and improve the 3D relationship. Complicating these efforts are overlapping responsibilities, conflicting authorities, and institutional objectives between the 3Ds. Moreover, the 3Ds have different missions, decision-making processes, cultures and practices. As a result, they often plan and deal with situations in different ways, which complicates coordination. While 3D coordination is a much sought after objective, problems continue to persist.

<http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-110shrg45518/pdf/CHRG-110shrg45518.pdf> (accessed 14 January 2013).

³Robert Gates, “Helping Others Defend Themselves,” *Foreign Affairs* (May/June 2010), <http://www.usnwc.edu/events/csf/documents/Helping%20Others%20Defend%20Themselves.pdf> (accessed 14 January 2013).

⁴John F. Kennedy, “Special Message to the Congress On Foreign Aid,” *The American Presidency Project*, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=8545> (accessed 14 January 2013).

While this monograph outlines progress to date to better coordinate and integrate 3D efforts, there remains plenty of criticism about the 3D approach. Some critics argue that the 3D approach is invoked as a prescription rather than a description, as though the chances of a mission's success go up with each 3D department or agency involved.⁵ Applying the 3D approach will remain a true challenge as friction is simply built into the interagency system, and each agency and department pushes their agenda to protect their equities, which makes it difficult to use the right resource for the right response.⁶ While the 2010 National Security Strategy calls upon diplomats, development experts, and DOD officials to work side by side to support a common agenda to shape a world of peace and dignity, the 3D missions are still seen as distinct, plans between DOD and USAID/DOS are developed separately, and DOD and USAID/DOS budgets are evaluated and appropriated in isolation. These arrangements prevent USG decision-makers from utilizing to their fullest potential the mutually reinforcing tools of the 3Ds, and often the choices as to which tools and elements to use in given situations are driven by where resources can be found, instead of by clear analyses and assessments and the most effective responses.⁷

During the last decade, DOD's budget and authorities to conduct a wide variety of economic tasks for stabilization and reconstruction (i.e. development activities) have grown significantly. As many of these tasks are similar to those authorized and funded by USAID, the lead USG development agency, lines between USAID and DOD development programs have

⁵House Committee on Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the House Armed Service Committee, *Interagency National Security Reform: The Road Ahead*, 9 June 2010, 4, http://democrats.armedservices.house.gov/index.cfm/files/serve?File_id=d01c58f4-b913-4936-a5f1-07802eb70f8d (accessed 13 January 2013).

⁶*Ibid.*

⁷U.S. Department of State and U.S. Agency of International Development, *Leading through Civilian Power: the First Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review—2010* (Independent Publishing Platform, 2012), 201, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/153108.pdf> (accessed 14 January 2013).

become blurred. This raises many questions as to whether DOD's development efforts are an efficient use of resources.⁸ As this monograph demonstrates, critics argue that the principles that guide development programs are overshadowed by the security and political goals of DOD. This has damaged the credibility of USG development assistance and increased perceptions that USG development assistance is being militarized, especially in Africa.

To address complex security challenges in a constrained budget environment, DOD and USAID need to ensure that their development programs are closely coordinated, mutually reinforcing, and not working in isolation of one another. With a wide variety of tools, they can find common ground and share tasks while still satisfying the respective needs of their agencies and departments. This joint planning will help continue to break the cultural divide and stereotypes and will allow USAID and DOD to draw from each other's wealth of expertise, and show that coordination in fragile states is not about meeting a military or civilian led objective, it is about unity of effort and collectively contributing to the national security goals.⁹ However, to date, no detailed assessment or evaluation has been done to suggest that a 3D approach is effective. In time of fiscal austerity, USAID and DOD need to ensure that their development resources are being spent in the most effective ways possible and do not run counter to one another. While the USG missions in Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrate that the nature of threats to the USG are becoming progressively more complex, USAID and DOD need to learn from lessons and experience to date, and institutionalize best practices if their relationship within the 3Ds is to be effective.

⁸U.S. Government Accountability Office, *Humanitarian and Development Assistance: Project Evaluations and Better Information Sharing Needed to Manage the Military's Efforts*, GAO-12-359 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, February 2012), Summary Page, <http://gao.gov/assets/590/588334.pdf> (accessed 14 January 2013).

⁹Brian Montgomery, "Defense, Diplomacy and Development Status, Challenges, and Best Practices" (Master's thesis, United States Army War College, 2012), 15, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA561488> (accessed 14 January 2013).

If the USG is to advance its national security interests around the world, especially in Africa, the 3D approach must be more than a mantra. As expressed by former DOD Secretary Gates, “it is time to move beyond the ideological debates and bureaucratic squabbles that have in the past characterized the issue of building partner capacity and move forward with a set of solutions that can address what will be a persistent and enduring challenge.”¹⁰ Changing the interagency planning and budgeting process to facilitate whole of government national security solutions, however, is outside the power of any individual executive agency. While some steps have already been taken, there are additional steps that DOD and USAID can take to better align the elements of American power, particularly in places where America’s success depends on the synchronization of a 3D approach. The continuous build-up of DOD development capabilities should not take away the important development role (or resources) of USAID, nor should USG development assistance be militarized. As noted in this monograph, DOD requires good partners such as USAID to deal with issues that they might not be able to do, such as promote economic development and address social issues.

This monograph outlines steps and future action to address concerns that DOD is militarizing USG development assistance. In addressing these concerns, one basic collaboration challenge between USAID and DOD in understanding each other’s development efforts is the use of terminology. In a 2012 GAO study, DOD officials said that they use the term humanitarian assistance to describe development assistance efforts so that DOD it is not perceived as performing development efforts that are outside its legislatively prescribed areas of responsibility.¹¹ Throughout this monograph DOD tasks for stabilization and reconstruction are referred to as development. While addressing the need for a robust USAID capability, this

¹⁰Gates, *Foreign Affairs* (May/June 2010), 4.

¹¹U.S. Government Accountability Office, *Humanitarian and Development Assistance: Project Evaluations and Better Information Sharing Needed to Manage the Military’s Effort*.

monograph does not provide an extensive discussion of the current USAID and DOD development budgets. In addition, this monograph does not focus on the role of DOS in the 3D relationship. As mentioned later in this monograph, DOS and USAID are taking steps to address bureaucratic, cultural, and structural issues to strengthen their relationship. To discuss these issues would divert from the emphasis of this monograph, which is on the USAID and DOD relationship within the 3D approach.

USAID BACKGROUND

Though established by President Kennedy in 1961, the origins of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) were planted shortly after World War II ended in 1945. Building on the success of the Marshall Plan, which helped rebuild Europe's economy and infrastructure after World War II, President Truman proposed an international development assistance program in his 1949 inaugural address.¹² Though various precursor organizations were established from 1950 to 1961 to support US aid abroad, the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, which still stands as law today, mandated the creation of USAID to promote long-term assistance for economic and social development overseas.¹³ When President Kennedy established USAID, he had a desire for a robust agency to stand behind US efforts to promote peace and prosperity, as he had fears of the consequences of inaction, and that a program of [development] assistance to the underdeveloped nations must continue because the Nation's interest and the cause of political freedom require it.¹⁴

¹²Harry S. Truman, *Truman's Inaugural Address*, 20 January 1949, HSTL, http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/50yr_archive/inagural20jan1949.htm (accessed 3 April 2013).

¹³United States Agency for International Development, *About USAID*, http://transition.usaid.gov/about_usaid/usaidthist.html (accessed 14 January 2013).

¹⁴*Ibid.*

In a 1961 speech, President Kennedy highlighted the importance of a USG program of assistance to underdeveloped nations must because the “Nation's interest and the cause of political freedom require it.”¹⁵ President Kennedy saw the 1960s as “the crucial ‘Decade of Development’—the period when many less-developed nations make the transition into self-sustained growth—the period in which an enlarged community of free, stable and self-reliant nations can reduce world tensions and insecurity.”¹⁶ He was concerned that if the US did not act, others might not as well. USAID has evolved since 1961, and fifty years later, it is one of the world’s largest development and humanitarian donor.¹⁷

The Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 1961 provides the policy framework and legal powers to implement USAID programs. By law, USAID is the principal US agency to extend development assistance to developing countries. Spending less than one percent of the total federal budget, USAID works in approximately 100 countries to promote economic prosperity, strengthen democracy and good governance, protect human rights, improve global health, advance food security and agriculture, improve environmental sustainability, further education, help societies prevent and recover from conflicts, and provide humanitarian assistance in the wake of natural and man-made disasters.¹⁸ USAID plays a critical role in USG efforts to stabilize countries, and works on the same problems as DOD using a different set of tools.¹⁹ By addressing the underlying causes of conflict and poverty, USAID aims to prevent conflict in the first place,

¹⁵John F. Kennedy, “Special Message to the Congress on Foreign Aid, 22 March 1961,” Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, http://www.jfkllink.com/speeches/jfk/publicpapers/1961/jfk90_61.html (accessed 14 January 2013).

¹⁶Ibid.

¹⁷Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Development Assistance Committee, Peer Reviews, <http://www.oecd.org/dac/peer-reviews/peerreviewsofdacmembers.htm> (accessed 3 April 2013).

¹⁸United States Agency for International Development, *Who We Are*, <http://www.usaid.gov/who-we-are> (accessed 14 January 2013).

¹⁹Ibid.

as this is “smarter, safer and less costly than sending in soldiers.” In addition, by expanding opportunity and reducing instability, USAID’s work helps keep America safe and energizes the global economy.²⁰ In his 2010 National Security Strategy, President Obama emphasized this point by saying, “Our armed forces will always be a cornerstone of our security....but our security also depends on development experts who can strengthen governance and support human dignity.”²¹

The number of USAID staff has dwindled significantly over the last fifty years, and has resulted in an agency that has neither the staffing nor training resources to robustly engage in stability operations in fragile states. During the Vietnam War era, there were about 10,000 USAID US direct hire employees. By the 1980s, USAID shrank to about 4,000 US direct hire employees. In 2008, the direct-hire staff had withered to a mere 2,000.²² In 2010, USAID embarked on an ambitious reform effort, USAID FORWARD.²³ This initiative changes the way USAID does business through its partnerships, with a big emphasis on innovation and results. USAID FORWARD has given USAID the opportunity to modernize and unleash its full potential to achieve high-impact development. This initiative is already showing results. In FY 2012 there

²⁰United States Agency for International Development, *Fiscal Year 2012 Agency Financial Report*, <http://transition.usaid.gov/performance/afr/afr12.pdf> (accessed 14 January 2013).

²¹The White House, *President Obama’s statement for the release of the 2010 National Security Strategy*, National Security Strategy (Washington, DC: 2010), 1-2, http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf (accessed 14 January 2013).

²²U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, *Smart Power: Rebalancing the Foreign Policy/National Security Toolkit*, 31 July 2008, <http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/AdamsTestimony073108.pdf?attempt=2> (accessed 14 January 2013).

²³United States Agency for International Development, *Results and Data*, <http://www.usaid.gov/results-and-date/progress-date/usaaid-forward> (accessed 14 January 2013).

were about 3,600 US direct-hire officers charged with spending close to \$23 billion in approximately 90 countries worldwide.²⁴

DOD BACKGROUND

Headquartered at the Pentagon in Washington, DC, the Department of Defense (DOD) coordinates and supervises US armed forces, which includes the Air Force, Army, Marine Corps and Navy, as well as several defense agencies. The distinction between the various services is extensive and is not discussed in this monograph. One of the largest employers in the world, DOD has over three million servicemen, servicewomen and civilian support staff. Of this amount, over 450,000 employees are overseas. The mission of DOD is to deter war and to protect the security of the United States.²⁵ In this regard, DOD has six geographic combatant commands (COCOMs) that operate in clearly delineated areas of operation and have a distinctive regional military focus. In addition, DOD has three functional COCOMs that operate world-wide to provide unique capabilities to geographic combatant commands and other services. Together, the geographic and functional commands provide the basic organizational structure through which US defense needs are addressed.

DOD has many different types of funding accounts. Like USAID, DOD conducts development programs overseas. Over the last decade, DOD's role in stabilization and reconstruction efforts has increased. With this increase, new DOD programs and budget authorities to fund these activities have emerged, including the Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP), the Task Force for Business and Stability Operations, and the Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund. In addition, in 2006 Congress created Sections 1206 and 1207 authorities. Section 1206 helps address DOD military priorities and urgent and emergent

²⁴United States Agency for International Development, *Fiscal Year 2012 Agency Financial Report*.

²⁵For further information about DOD, see <http://www.defense.gov/about/#mission>.

counterterrorism programs, whereas Section 1207 funding facilitates reconstruction, security, or stabilization assistance programs overseas. Section 1207 allows DOD to transfer up to \$100 million per fiscal year (FY) to DOS to support reconstruction, security, or stabilization programs with a goal of putting civilian experts (i.e. development) alongside DOD in stability operations. DOD also oversees the Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster and Civic Aid (OHDACA) program, and the Humanitarian and Civic Assistance Program (HCA). This highlights examples of various DOD programs similar in nature to USAID efforts, and thus coordination is critical for avoiding unnecessary overlap, wasted resources, and 3D fragmentation.

DOD BLURRING USAID'S DEVELOPMENT ROLE IN THE 3D APPROACH

A December 2006 report from the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations stated that the “increases of funding streams, self-assigned missions, and realigned authorities for the Secretary of Defense and the combatant commanders are placing new stresses on inter-agency coordination in the field.”²⁶ Many critics argue that DOD's expansion in development authorities and budget has come at the cost of USAID. This expansion has overshadowed both symbolically and substantively USAID's development role overseas. Critics argue that because of the constrained budget environment, DOD is likely to continue to institutionalize and retain development capabilities while USAID remains under-resourced. While the last two National Security Strategies affirmed the need for an integrated approach between DOD and USAID to support stabilization, reconstruction, governance and development programs in unstable countries to support US national security objectives, DOD's expanded development role should not divert USAID from its core mission. Rather, USAID and DOD need to work together as strategic

²⁶Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *Embassies as Command Posts in the Anti-Terror Campaign*, 109th Cong., 2nd sess., 2006, http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2006_rpt/embassies.pdf (accessed 14 January 2013).

partners in achieving development goals and to reevaluate mission portfolios through a lens of national security.

This is not to argue against the development capabilities that DOD has brought to the table over the last decade. The men and women of DOD have, and continue, to perform their duties with courage and skill. They have stepped up to the task, and under difficult circumstances, they have done an admirable job with unflagging bravery and devotion. At the same time, in many operations, USAID assistance (especially humanitarian) would not be as effective without the use of DOD assets. The same can be said for USAID staff that also work in dangerous environments, and for which the USG and vulnerable populations overseas rely only on their dedication and expertise to make the world a better place. While DOD does have a role to play in development, the use of DOD development funds should be closely coordinated with USAID to avoid project overlap and to ensure investments are sustainable. This takes into consideration that the benefits of DOD engagement in development activities have been questioned in a number of reports and studies. In a majority of these reports and studies, there is a recurring concern that the lines between USAID and DOD development programs are blurred.

InterAction, an organization with more than 190 member non-governmental organizations (NGOs) working globally alongside communities affected by war, famine, disaster and underlying poverty, recently argued that development programs traditionally undertaken and funded through USAID are migrating to DOD. InterAction argued that principles that guide development programs could be overshadowed by the security and political goals of DOD, which could damage the credibility of USG foreign aid assistance.²⁷ Some USG officials have said that DOD's development efforts can have "negative political effects, particularly in fragile

²⁷InterAction, *The U.S. Military's Expanding Role in Foreign Assistance*, http://www.interaction.org/sites/default/files/1/POLICY%20REPORTS/FOREIGN%20ASSISTANCE%20BRIEFING%20BOOK/Sec14_InterAction_Foreign_Assistance_Briefing_Book.pdf (accessed 14 January 2013).

communities where even small gestures, such as distributing soccer balls to a particular population, can be interpreted as exhibiting favoritism.”²⁸ Others have highlighted that DOD “development policies may become subordinated to a narrow, short-term security agenda at the expense of broader, longer-term diplomatic goals and institution-building efforts in the developing world.”²⁹

In Afghanistan, a number of NGOs have gone on record to say that more assistance is being channeled through military actors to “win the hearts and minds” of locals, while efforts to address the underlying causes of poverty are being sidelined, and that these DOD development projects aim to achieve fast results but are often poorly executed, inappropriate and do not have sufficient community involvement to make them sustainable.³⁰ For example, a Center for Strategic and International Studies case study in Panjshir, Afghanistan reported how DOD planned a program to bring American veterinarians to immunize and treat Panjshiri animals. The military explained that the goal of their project was not development, but to win local friends (i.e. hearts and minds) and push into areas they had not yet reached. This project undermined a USAID economic growth initiative to establish a private sector in veterinary services by training and equipping Afghan veterinary field units and creating an indigenous and sustainable service provider for veterinary needs.³¹ Moreover, a commander of the U.S 5th

²⁸U.S. Government Accountability Office, *Humanitarian and Development Assistance: Project Evaluations and Better Information Sharing Needed to Manage the Military's Efforts*.

²⁹The Center for Global Development, *The Pentagon and Global Development: Making Sense of the DoD's Expanding Role*, 1, http://www.cgdev.org/files/14814_file_PentagonandDevelopment.pdf (accessed 14 January 2013).

³⁰Oxfam International, Troicare, ActionAid, AfghanAid, Care, Christian Aid, Concern Worldwide, *Quick Impact, Quick Collapse: The Dangers of Militarized Aid in Afghanistan*, <http://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/quick-impact-quick-collapse-jan-2010.pdf> (accessed 14 January 2013).

³¹Amy Frumin, “Equipping USAID for Success: A Field Perspective,” *Center for Strategic and International Studies* (CSIS): 7-8.

Brigade, 2nd Infantry said from his experience in Iraq and Afghanistan that it is only appropriate for military units to develop goals to improve the quality of life for the local populace and promote good governance if these concepts improve access to the enemy. Otherwise, these goals are of little practical value as tactical or operational objectives.³²

In Africa, “some NGOs are reluctant to have their programs associated with the US military, as they believe this association can create mistrust among the people they are trying to assist.”³³ There are concerns that the increased use of DOD resources in development activities conveys signals in developing countries that military forces are more competent than civilian’s agencies for conducting development programs. During a December 2006 Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on the USG anti-terror campaign, Committee Chairman Senator Richard Lugar expressed concern that the increase of funding streams and realigned authorities for DOD are not only are placing stresses on inter-agency coordination in the field, but that there is evidence that some host countries are questioning the increasingly military component of America’s profile overseas in what appears to them as a new emphasis by the USG on military approaches to problems that are not seen as lending themselves to military solutions.³⁴ This same report also stated that USAID personnel often question “the purposes, quantity, and quality of the expanded military activities in-country,” and that “country teams in embassies with USAID

³²Rajiv Chandrasekaran, “Search and Destroy,” *Slate*, http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/foreigners/2012/06/the_war_in_afghanistan_andharry_tunnell_s_stryker_battalion.html (accessed 14 January 2013).

³³U.S. Department Of State, Office of Inspector General, *Report of Inspection: The Bureau of African Affairs*, ISP-I-09-63 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2009), 14, <http://oig.state.gov/documents/organization/127270.pdf> (accessed 14 January 2013).

³⁴Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *Embassies as Command Posts in the Anti-Terror Campaign*.

presence are far more capable of ensuring sufficient review of military humanitarian assistance projects than those that have no USAID office.”³⁵

A 2008 report by the American Academy of Diplomacy expressed concern that “DOD’s expanded policy responsibility for security assistance programs risks the additional atrophy of the civilian agencies’ ability to plan and conduct foreign policy and foreign assistance and raises serious concerns that such programs could conflict with broader US strategic and foreign policy interests.”³⁶ A 2009 assessment of USAID and DOS civil military cooperation in Asia and the Middle East showed that the military is not flexible in terms of objectives, policies and organizational structure, and that development activities should principally be done by development experts, not armed forces.³⁷ This assessment found that development professionals tend to be deliberative, seek consensus and want to pursue activities that have long term impact, whereas the military tends to be decisive, mobilizes funds and personnel quickly, and due to its hierarchical nature, does not support consensus-building or seek to achieve long-term assistance objectives.³⁸ In this same assessment, DOD officials said they wish to improve continuity and sustainability of their activities with development experts from USAID so that their development activities amount to more than “random acts of kindness” and fit into an overall strategic development plan for a country or region.³⁹

³⁵Ibid., 2, 10.

³⁶American Academy of Diplomacy, *A Foreign Affairs Budget for the Future*, (October 2008), 23-24, http://www.academyofdiplomacy.org/publications/FAB_report_2008.pdf (accessed 14 January 2013).

³⁷Sandra A. Scham, United States Agency for International Development, *USAID’s Role in Civil Military Relations in Asia and the Middle East* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2009), 6, 19, http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDACR565.pdf (accessed 14 January 2013).

³⁸Ibid., 19.

³⁹Ibid., 22.

A 2010 study by the Feinstein International Center found that the DOD use of development assistance to further military aims threatened to erode long-held principles of aid provision based on need, and that the idea that by delivering aid DOD can change people's perceptions about the US is premised on very simplistic assumption.⁴⁰ Moreover, in a 2012 report on DOD assistance to Africa, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) highlighted that DOD does not complete detailed plans to support its objectives; is not measuring long-term effects of activities; has difficulty applying funding sources to activities; has not fully integrated interagency perspectives early in activity planning or leveraged interagency staff for their expertise; and has made some cultural missteps due to not fully understanding local African customs. Until DOD addresses these weaknesses, it is not in a position to say that its development assistance efforts are achieving their goals with lasting, positive impacts.⁴¹ In the meantime, DOD continues to budget and program for new development projects overseas.

A 2012 report by the Kaiser Family Foundation indicated that "DoD is not a development agency [and that] this has led to some ambiguity and tension regarding the role of DoD in this area [with] DoD at times failing to give due consideration to the methods and principles that define successful....programs even as it has increased its attention to such activities."⁴² This report recommended that DOD improve coordination with other US government agencies and departments to promote more effective use of resources and ensure USG efforts in national

⁴⁰Mark Bradbury and Michael Kleinman, *Winning Hearts and Minds? Examining the Relationship between Aid and Security in Kenya*, (Feinstein International Center, Summerville, MA, April 2010), 5, 7, <http://eifc.eu/resources/library/WinningHearts.pdf> (accessed 14 January 2013).

⁴¹U.S. Government Accountability Office, *Improved Planning, Training, and Interagency Collaboration Could Strengthen DOD's Efforts in Africa*, GAO-10-794 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2010), summary page, <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10794.pdf> (accessed 14 January 2013).

⁴²Josh Michaud, Kellie Moss, and Jen Kates, *The U.S. Department of Defense and Global Health*, (The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, September 2012), 1, <http://www.kff.org/globalhealth/upload/8358.pdf> (accessed 14 January 2013).

security are not working at cross-purposes or duplicating one another. The report also recommends that DOD define benchmarks for success to determine how DOD activities contribute to its broader strategic goals. In a separate GAO report on DOD development and humanitarian assistance to Africa, the GAO found that DOD does not have information or costs of the full range of its humanitarian and development programs, nor has it completed ninety percent of the required one year post project evaluations to determine projects' effects. This same report found that some DOD activities overlap with those of USAID, which raises questions as to whether DOD's efforts are an efficient use of resources since USAID is the lead US development agency.⁴³ For example, in Uganda, DOD built a library but did not ensure staffing of a librarian or provide books and bookshelves. As a result, the library sat empty for a year before USAID renovated the structure as a war memorial and research center for victims of the Lord's Resistance Army insurgency in Uganda. In Kenya, DOD officials discovered a dilapidated school in Kenya with a placard noting that the school had been donated by DOD. However, the existence of the school was unknown to current DOD staff in the region, and its poor condition likely promoted unfavorable views of the US military.⁴⁴ The GAO also found that DOD COCOMs have achieved limited interagency participation in the development of their country or theater plans because DOD lacks guidance on how to integrate planning with non-DOD organizations. Furthermore, DOD practices inhibit the appropriate sharing of planning information with non-DOD organizations.

In the North Eastern and Coast provinces of Kenya, DOD is engaged with some "hearts and minds" projects in Muslim communities as part of a regional counterterrorism and

⁴³U.S. Government Accountability Office, *Humanitarian and Development Assistance: Project Evaluations and Better Information Sharing Needed to Manage the Military's Efforts*, 28th Cong., 1st sess, GAO-12-359, Washington, DC, February 2012, summary page, <http://gao.gov/assets/590/588334.pdf> (accessed 14 January 2013).

⁴⁴*Ibid.*, 23, 37.

stabilization strategy. A study by the Feinstein International Center shows that while the “hearts and minds” activities have allowed DOD to establish a limited presence in a region and among populations that have historically been considered a threat to the US government, the activities conducted by DOD have done nothing to tackle underlying conditions that may give rise to radicalization and violent extremism.⁴⁵ At the same time, concerns have been raised about the capacity of the DOD teams as they are not development professionals and have little, if any, previous experience implementing community development programs. While this presence enabled DOD to build connections and networks (which is important), it also left a perception with the local population that USG development assistance is linked to counterterrorism interests of the US, rather than their own well-being or security.⁴⁶ In turn, this could threaten future USAID development assistance in these provinces.

The benefits of DOD engagement in development activities have been questioned on a number of accounts. While it is understood that DOD will (and should) conduct “hearts and minds” activities in support of counter-insurgency operations, as well as to achieve tactical effects to improve force protection and stability, it is not clear if DOD should be conducting development activities outside of these realms, excluding military-to-military assistance, due to unintended consequences. The mere assumption that such activities will lead to increased support from the local population is an oversimplification.⁴⁷ An August 2009 inspection by DOD’s Office of Inspector General found that “the U.S. Military is stepping into a void created by a lack of

⁴⁵Bradbury and Kleinman, *Winning Hearts and Minds? Examining the Relationship between Aid and Security in Kenya*.

⁴⁶*Ibid.*, 72.

⁴⁷Robert Egnell, *Between Reluctance and Necessity: The Utility of Military Force in Humanitarian and Development Operations*, (The Norwegian Atlantic Committee, 2009), 28, http://www.atlanterhavskomiteen.no/files/atlanterhavskomiteen.no/Publikasjoner/Sikkerhetspolitisk_bibliotek/Arkiv/2009/sik.pol_1_09.pdf (accessed 14 January 2013).

resources for traditional development and public diplomacy.”⁴⁸ The Center for Global Development attributed DOD’s increased role in development to three factors: President Bush’s strategic focus on the global war on terror; the vacuum left by civilian agencies; and a chronic under-investment by the USG in non-military instruments of state-building.⁴⁹ This increased role has not gone unnoticed in the USG budget. DOD *Directive 3000.05* that assigned DOD its mandate to conduct stability operations indicates that stability operations are a core US military mission and that they shall be given priority comparable to combat operations and be explicitly addressed and integrated across all DoD activities. At the same time, it states “many stability operations tasks are best performed by indigenous, foreign, or U.S. civilian professionals. Nonetheless, U.S. military forces shall be prepared to perform all tasks necessary to establish or maintain order when civilians cannot do so.”⁵⁰

According to the Congressional Research Service (CRS), DOD’s perception of an appropriate non-combat role has evolved over time and now includes preventive, deterrent, and preemptive activities. While this approach requires interagency partnerships, over the years DOD has expanded its role in development activities and built its capacity to carry out such activities due to the absence of appropriate civilian agencies, such as USAID.⁵¹ Additional studies by the GAO and CRS show that USAID’s capacity for implementing foreign assistance has been

⁴⁸U.S. Department Of State, Office of Inspector General, *Report of Inspection: The Bureau of African Affairs*, 8.

⁴⁹The Center for Global Development, *The Pentagon and Global Development: Making Sense of the DoD’s Expanding Role*.

⁵⁰U.S. Department of Defense, *Directive 3000.05: Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2005), 2, http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/d3000_05.pdf (accessed 14 January 2013).

⁵¹“The Department of Defense Role in Foreign Assistance: Background, Major Issues, and Options for Congress,” *The DISAM Journal* (December 2008), 1, http://www.disam.dsca.mil/pubs/Indexes/Vol%2030_4/DoD%20Role%20in%20Foreign%20Assistance.pdf (accessed 14 January 2013).

diminishing, and the increased need for coordination with DOD among programs has added to this burden.⁵²

In a 2008 Committee on Foreign Relation hearing, Senator Joseph Biden noted that “For every \$19 we put into the military, barely \$1 goes toward civilian foreign assistance programs. This imbalance is producing a number of unintended consequences that are undermining our national security instead of advancing it.”⁵³ During a 2008 House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs hearing on Foreign Assistance Reform, Chairman Howard Berman expressed concern about DOD’s rapid encroachment into foreign assistance. He highlighted how DOD [development] activities should be carried out by USAID and DOS, and that “the military is overburdened and over-stretched and they must focus on the security threats facing our nation.” He further noted that “while the civilian agencies should coordinate their activities with the military to ensure coherency of effort, we should no longer rely on the military to be the diplomatic and development face of America around the world.”⁵⁴

A 2008 report by the American Academy of Diplomacy expressed concern that USAID’s staffing situation is dire and as a result a good portion of the nation’s critical work overseas does not get accomplished. As a result, by default, the work migrates to DOD that has staff and funding but not sufficient experience nor knowledge and as a result the militarization of foreign

⁵²The United States Agency for International Development, *Trends in U.S. Foreign Assistance Over the Past Decade* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2009), iv, http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADQ462.pdf (accessed 14 January 2013).

⁵³Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *Strengthening National Security Through Smart Power - A Military Perspective*, 110th Cong., 2nd sess., 2008, 5 March 2008, <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-110shrg45518/pdf/CHRG-110shrg45518.pdf> (accessed 14 January 2013).

⁵⁴House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Foreign Assistance Reform in the Next Administration: Challenges and Solutions*, 110th Cong., 2nd sess., 2008, H. Hrg. 110-206, 2, http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PCAAB836.pdf (accessed 14 January 2013).

assistance is accelerating.⁵⁵ This report also highlighted the striking trend during the past two decades of DOD's growing role in providing foreign assistance under its own statutory authorities.⁵⁶ DOD argued that they need these increased authorities and programs because parallel programs were "inadequately funded, insufficiently flexible, and not agile enough to respond to the new and rapidly evolving security threats and deployments the nation is experiencing [and] DOD....must fill this vacuum until civilian agencies are properly equipped to carry out these....assistance functions."⁵⁷ To one's surprise, three former USAID Administrators went on record with Congress to say that DOD's massive staff has assumed roles that should be performed by USAID and DOS, and that DOD's \$600 billion budget has eclipsed those of the civilian agencies.⁵⁸

A 2010 report by the International Feinstein Center reported that the DOD controls over twenty percent of USG assistance to Africa, and that "[development] efforts have been hampered by the fact that soldiers are not aid workers....there are several glaring problems with the process of delivering...development assistance that have implications for the ability of the US military to achieve its objectives."⁵⁹ Moreover, a 2010 legislative action message by the Friends Committee on National Legislation expressed concern that "over the past decade, Congress has provided DoD with multiple 'flexible funds' to respond to conflict situations in real time....and without

⁵⁵The American Academy of Diplomacy, "A Foreign Affairs Budget for the Future," 1, http://www.academyofdiplomacy.org/publications/FAB_report_2008.pdf (accessed January 14, 2013).

⁵⁶*Ibid.*, 22.

⁵⁷*Ibid.*, 23.

⁵⁸Brian Atwood, Peter McPherson, and Andrew Natsios, "Arrested Development: Making Foreign Aid a More Effective Tool," *Foreign Affairs* (December 2008): 1, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/64613/j-brian-atwood-m-peter-mcpherson-and-andrew-natsios/arrested-development> (accessed 15 January 2013).

⁵⁹Bradbury and Kleinman, *Winning Hearts and Minds? Examining the Relationship between Aid and Security in Kenya*.

rapid response funds available for civilian agencies to act, the military has been left to fund and direct many activities that should be civilian-led.” The legislative action message goes on to say that “Congress often criticizes civilian agencies for their slow response to crises, but instead of funding rapid response capabilities within....USAID they continue to disproportionately fund the military.”⁶⁰ An article published by the National Defense University recognized that “while the military is remarkable in its ability to adapt and adopt new capabilities, the requirements of stabilization and reconstruction are largely the political, governance, and economic skills that reside in the civilian arms of foreign policy.”⁶¹ During a 2011 Congressional testimony on Coordinating Africa Policy on Security, Counter Terrorism, Humanitarian Operations and Development, Congressman Christopher Smith said that the USG policy toward Africa has been primarily managed by USAID and DOS, and questions remain whether an expanded military presence by DOD will “overshadow the so-called ‘soft power’ of diplomacy and humanitarian and development assistance.”⁶² At this same testimony, a DOS representative said that the “large and growing AFRICOM presence and programming in Africa at times risks overwhelming the ‘soft power’ of USAID.... programs and personnel.”⁶³ In 2011, a DOS spokesperson said that “It is very unlikely that we are going to see a huge shift in resources from DOD to....USAID....It's

⁶⁰Friends Committee on National Legislation, *The Complex Crises Fund: Rapid Response Funding to Help Prevent Deadly Conflict* (March 2010), <http://www.nyscoc.org/complexcrisisfund.pdf> (accessed 15 January 2013).

⁶¹Renanah Miles, “The State Department, Usaid and the Flawed Mandate for Stabilization and Reconstruction,” National Defense University, *Prism* 3, no. 1: 45, http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/pdf/prism3-1/prism_37-46_miles.pdf (accessed 15 January 2013).

⁶²House Committee on Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health and Human Rights, *Coordinating Africa Policy on Security, Counter-Terrorism, Humanitarian Operations and Development*. Excerpts of Remarks by Chairman Chris Smith, 2011, 2, http://chrissmith.house.gov/uploadedfiles/2011_07_26_coordinating_africa_policy_on_security_counter_terrorism.pdf(accessed 14 January 2013).

⁶³*Ibid.*, 3.

the military that understands better than anyone that it has to be civilians in the lead.”⁶⁴ A 2012 report on the 3D approach found that “DoD’s increased use of soft power available through the conduct of development projects has helped perpetuate the trend of downsizing within....USAID.”⁶⁵ A 2012 GAO Annual Report to Congress indicates that DOD is conducting efforts similar to those of USAID, and that DOD has expanded these programs over the past several years.⁶⁶ For example, the fiscal year (FY) 2012 budget for USAID (and DOS) was a five percent decrease from FY 11 and a fourteen percent cut from FY 10, at a time when investments in diplomacy and development are critical in addressing national security interests.⁶⁷ During the period FY 2005 – 2010, DOD’s budget to conduct development assistance increased by 60 percent.⁶⁸ Critics argue that the development resource imbalance between DOD and USAID must be resolved in the USG budget, as DOD development programs overshadow those managed by USAID. The result is a focus on short-term military solutions as opposed to comprehensive programs that address the long-term root causes of poor governance, instability and extremism in

⁶⁴Anne-Marie Slaughter, “State Department to Planning to Propose Some Budget Increases, Some Cuts,” *Foreign Policy The Cable* (26 January 2011), http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/01/26/slaughter_state_department_planning_to_purpose_some_cuts (accessed 15 January 2013).

⁶⁵Brian Montgomery, “Defense, Diplomacy and Development: Status, Challenges, and Best Practices” (Master's thesis, United States Army War College, 2012), 14, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA561488> (accessed 14 January 2013).

⁶⁶U.S. Government Accountability Office, *2012 Annual Report: Opportunities to Reduce Duplication, Overlap and Fragmentation, Achieve Savings, and Enhance Revenue*, GAO-12-342SP (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2012), 45, <http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/588818.pdf> (accessed 15 January 2013).

⁶⁷Susan Johnson, “President's Update: Congress Passes 2012 International Affairs Budget How Did the FS Fare?” *American Foreign Service Association*, 2, http://www.afsa.org/Portals/0/update_121711.pdf (accessed 15 January 2013).

⁶⁸This 60% represent the OHDACA and HCA programs. U.S. Government Accountability Office, *Humanitarian and Development Assistance: Project Evaluations and Better Information Sharing Needed to Manage the Military's Efforts*.

countries at risk.⁶⁹ As USAID has the USG development mandate, critics argue that USAID staff, budget and resources be restored so that the trend of USG international development assistance being militarized is not institutionalized, and that DOD not be bogged down with yet another mandate.

Addressing USAID's Funding Gap

In a November 2007 speech, DOD Secretary Gates said that “We must focus our energies beyond the guns and steel of the military, beyond our brave soldiers, sailors, marines, and airmen. We must also focus our energies on the other elements of national power that will be so crucial in the coming years. That means rethinking the current balance between defense, diplomacy, and development.”⁷⁰ In March 2008, representing fifty-two retired generals and admirals, General Anthony Zinni and Admiral Leighton Smith testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in support of a budget increase for USAID. They told the committee that Congress must “strengthen the nonmilitary tools that are used around the world for global engagement.”⁷¹ During a speech in Manhattan, Kansas, DOD Secretary Gates said “if we are to meet the myriad challenges around the world in the coming decades...there is a need for a dramatic increase in spending on the civilian instruments of national security...diplomacy... foreign assistance...and development.”⁷² In a November 2012 press briefing about DOD's rebalance to the Asia-Pacific

⁶⁹The Center for Global Development, “The Pentagon and Global Development: Making Sense of the DoD's Expanding Role.

⁷⁰Donna Miles, “Gates Urges More Emphasis, Funding for All Aspects of National Power,” (Department of Defense, *American Forces Press Service*, November 2007), <http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=48226> (accessed 15 January 2013).

⁷¹Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *Strengthening National Security Through Smart Power: A Military Perspective*.

⁷²Robert M. Gates, Remarks as Delivered by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Landon Lecture, Kansas State University (U.S. Department of Defense, November 2007), <http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1199> (accessed 15 January 2013).

region, DOD Secretary Panetta said that “the rebalance cannot just be about moving more ships or aircraft or troops to the region...Ultimately, it has to be a whole-of-government approach...We need to continue diplomatic, economic and development assistance and engagement, and we need resourcing to ensure that this commitment is sustainable for the future.”⁷³

Unlike DOD, USAID does not have huge contracts with companies located throughout the United States. In addition, USAID is responsible for less than one percent of the USG federal budget and provides revenue to a limited group of organizations. Whereas DOD has a very large constituency that lobbies Congress for a robust defense budget, USAID has a small constituency towards international development assistance, which indirectly predisposes members of Congress to be critical of USAID. According to an article by the National Defense University Press, “foreign aid is an easy target for lawmakers, given the lack of a domestic constituency and the less tangible link to national security than the military institutions.”⁷⁴ This is a vicious cycle, and as a result, USAID remains under-funded which does not allow it to execute development programs to their potential, which, in turn, reinforces Congress’s lack of faith in USAID. While USAID is and should continue to make the case to the administration to bolster its staffing and budget, given the fiscal cliff environment adequate resourcing is unlikely to materialize any time soon.⁷⁵

USG Development Assistance being Militarized in Africa

In February 2007, President Bush directed DOD to establish the US Africa Combatant Command (AFRICOM) to help strengthen US security cooperation and bring peace and stability

⁷³U.S. Department of Defense, “Panetta: Rebalance to Asia-Pacific Region Shows Early Progress,” *American Forces Press Service* (November 2012), <http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=118518> (accessed 15 January 2013).

⁷⁴Renanah Miles, *The State Department, USAID and the Flawed Mandate for Stabilization and Reconstruction*, 42.

⁷⁵*Ibid.*, 42.

to Africa. The rhetoric of USG development assistance being militarized has substantially increased with the creation of AFRICOM. While the AFRICOM Commander's Intent indicates that AFRICOM better enables DOD to work with other elements of the USG to achieve a more stable environment where political and economic growth can take place, there remains much criticism about DOD's expanded role into the African development arena.⁷⁶

In a 2007 statement, President Bush said that "Africa Command will enhance our efforts to bring peace and security to the people of Africa and promote our common goals of development, health, education, democracy, and economic growth in Africa."⁷⁷ In the same year, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Africa Theresa Whelan stated that AFRICOM does not represent the militarization of US foreign policy in Africa. For Whelan, AFRICOM "will simply allow for the better synchronization and coordination of DoD efforts to help build security capacity in Africa with....USAID efforts to improve governance and development capacity and opportunities."⁷⁸ In a 2007 House Foreign Affairs Committee testimony, USAID expressed concern that "growing DOD presence in Africa has the potential of blurring the lines between diplomacy, defense, and development. As noted above, increasing levels of DOD development programming in Africa puts it in closer proximity to USAID programs. Some of these DOD activities include wells, schools, clinics, and veterinarian services, the same types of programs

⁷⁶U.S. Department of Defense, Africa Command, *U.S. Africa Command - Commander's Intent 2011* (U.S. AFRICOM Public Affairs, January 2011), <http://www.africom.mil/NEWSROOM/Article/7953/us-africa-command--commanders-intent-2011> (accessed 15 January 2013).

⁷⁷The White House, *President Bush Creates a Department of Defense Unified Combatant Command* (Office of the Press Secretary, February 2007), <http://merln.ndu.edu/archivepdf/ness/WH/20070206-3.pdf> (accessed 15 January 2013).

⁷⁸Theresa Whelan, *Why Africom? An American Perspective* (Pretoria, South Africa: Institute for Security Studies, August 2007), 8, <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?ots592=06339b-2726-928e-0216-1b3f15392dd8&lng=en&size582=10&id=99985> (accessed 15 January 2013).

and activities that USAID implement. As a result, this poses a challenge to USAID to preserve its development mandate with host governments and populations.⁷⁹

A 2010 report signed by a number of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) highlights that “Development projects implemented with military money or through military-dominated structures aim to achieve fast results but are often poorly executed, inappropriate and do not have sufficient community involvement to make them sustainable.”⁸⁰ This report also indicated that there is little evidence that military development activities are generating stability, and that in some instances these activities could put lives at risk as they are targeted by anti-government elements.⁸¹ A 2010 Center for Strategic and International Studies conference report expresses concern that AFRICOM could lead to a distortion of USG priorities and resource allocations in Africa, and that its role should be clearly defined.⁸² Others view the AFRICOM approach as downright dangerous, and that even military traditionalists are apt to view it with suspicion as a dangerous slide away from the military's core competencies and further evidence of the militarization of USG foreign policy and the devaluing of civilian capacity.⁸³

Initially, US embassies in Africa were bewildered by the early efforts of AFRICOM. According to a DOD Office of Inspector General Report, the first [AFRICOM] arrivals did not

⁷⁹United States Agency for International Development, *Testimony of Michael Hess* (August 2007), 3, http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDACCJ941.pdf (accessed 15 January 2013).

⁸⁰Oxfam International, Troicare, *Quick Impact, Quick Collapse: The Dangers of Militarized Aid in Afghanistan*, 1.

⁸¹*Ibid.*, 1.

⁸²Jennifer Cook and Richard Downie, *African Conflicts and U.S. Diplomacy*, The American Academy of Diplomacy and The Center for Strategic and International Studies (January 2010), 5-6, http://csis.org/files/publication/100115_Cooke_AfricanConflicts_Web.pdf (accessed 15 January 2013).

⁸³Rosa Brooks, “The Pivot to Africa,” *Foreign Policy* (August 2012): 1, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/08/16/the_pivot_to_africa?page=0,1 (accessed 15 January 2013).

appear to have an appreciation of an ambassador's authorities and responsibilities.⁸⁴ In addition, a GAO report found that DOS officials expressed early concerns that AFRICOM would become the lead for all USG activities in Africa, and that it could blur traditional boundaries among diplomacy, development, and defense, thereby militarizing USG foreign policy. In addition, NGOs expressed concern that AFRICOM could militarize US foreign aid, which would put their aid workers at greater risk if their activities are confused or associated with DOD military activities. This same report also found that some African countries had expressed apprehension that AFRICOM will be used as an opportunity to increase the number of DOD troops and military bases in Africa.⁸⁵

If AFRICOM is to prevent or counter threats to the United States from violent extremists in Africa, then it is essential that DOD development programs in Africa be based on thorough analyses and understanding of the root causes and drivers of conflict or extremism, as these vary greatly from one situation to another.⁸⁶ In addition, these programs should be independently evaluated to verify that the programs are effective. To address the challenges of good governance, rule of law and development, USAID must be at the table during DOD's development planning as it can provide the technical expertise needed for effective programming, as well as ensure that AFRICOM activities do not compete with, undermine, or overshadow USAID development objectives in Africa.

⁸⁴U.S. Department Of State, Office of Inspector General, *Report of Inspection: The Bureau of African Affairs*.

⁸⁵U.S. Government Accountability Office, *Preliminary Observations on the Progress and Challenges Associated with Establishing the U.S. Africa Command*, GAO-08-947T (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, July 2008), 14-15. <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08947t.pdf> (accessed 15 January 2013).

⁸⁶United States Agency for International Development, *Guide to the Drivers of Violent Extremism* (February 2009), Executive Summary, http://transition.usaid.gov/locations/sub-saharan_africa/publications/docs/guide_to_drivers_of_ve.pdf (accessed 15 January 2013).

As expressed earlier, without careful consideration between the USAID and the DOD, there is danger of uncoordinated and disjointed approaches to how the USG designs strategies and country plans to strengthen fragile states and decrease the likelihood of failed states in Africa. While some progress has been made, much work remains to be done to breakdown organization cultures and stereotypes if there is to be unity of effort between USAID and DOD to collectively advance USG national security interests in Africa. As noted by USAID's Administrator in a November 2011 speech, "Tight operational partnerships with the military come with controversy.....many worry this work signals a militarization of aid....These concerns all have merit. If we don't confront the development needs....we will be ignoring the plight of billions while putting our own security at risk."⁸⁷

BREAKING DOWN BARRIERS TO WORK TOWARDS A 3D APPROACH

During the course of 2001-2012 a variety of strategies, directives, doctrine and policies were introduced to try and maximize the contributions of the 3Ds toward national security, which require the attention of USAID and DOD. In outlining these below, one would think that USAID and DOD could overcome stove-piped processes, procedures and mechanisms to work towards a more integrated approach. However, despite such guidance, existing coordination and linkages are still insufficient and weak and the incentives to work across each other's boundaries are few.⁸⁸

⁸⁷Rajiv Shah, United States Agency for International Development, "Remarks to the Student Conference On U.S. Affairs at the U.S. Military Academy in West Point, New York" (November 2011), <http://www.usaid.gov/news-information/speeches/remarks-usaid-administrator-dr-rajiv-shah-student-conference-us-affairs-us> (accessed 15 January 2013).

⁸⁸U.S. Government Accountability Office, *Interagency Collaboration Practices and Challenges at DOD's Southern and Africa Commands*, GAO-10-962T (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, July 2010), Summary Page, <http://www.gao.gov/assets/130/125154.pdf> (accessed 15 January 2013).

The 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) stressed the need to “develop new concepts of deterrence, on the need for a capabilities-based strategy, and on the need to balance deliberately the different dimensions of risk...[that] will require enhanced inter-agency processes and capabilities to effectively defend the United States against attacks.”⁸⁹ The National Security Strategy of 2002 recognized that to preserve human dignity and USG strategic priorities to combat global terror, the USG must help strengthen Africa’s fragile states, help build indigenous capability to secure porous borders and deny havens for terrorists.⁹⁰ In November 2005, DOD issued Directive 3000.05 to provide guidance on DOD support for stability, security, transition, and reconstruction operations. This directive indicated that “stability operations are a core U.S. military mission and that they shall be given priority comparable to combat operations and be explicitly addressed and integrated across all DOD activities.”⁹¹ In December 2005, President Bush issued National Security Presidential Directive NSPD-44. The purpose of this directive was to put the Secretary of State as the lead coordinator to integrate interagency effort, including with DOD and USAID, to prepare, plan and conduct stabilization and reconstruction activities countries and regions at risk of, in, or in transition from conflict or civil strife.⁹² The National Security Strategy of 2006 recognized that while the 3Ds can reduce long-term threats to USG national security by helping to build stable, prosperous, and peaceful societies, improving the way the USG uses foreign assistance will make it more effective in strengthening responsible

⁸⁹Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2001), V-VI, <http://www.defense.gov/pubs/qdr2001/pdf> (accessed 15 January 2013).

⁹⁰The White House, *2002 National Security Strategy* (September 2002), 10-11, <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/ncc/2002> (accessed 15 January 2013).

⁹¹Department of Defense, *Instruction: Stability Operations* (16 September 2009), 1, <http://dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/300005p.pdf> (accessed 15 January 2013).

⁹²The White House, *National Security Presidential Directive/nspd-44: Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization* (7 December 2005), <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nsdp-44.html> (accessed 15 January 2013).

governments, responding to suffering, and improving people's lives. This strategy also recognized Africa as a high priority with growing geo-strategic importance.⁹³

The 2006 QDR stressed the importance of the 3Ds to become more adept at integrating their efforts into a unified strategy so that the USG can achieve true unity of effort, and that this effort "begins in the field with the development of shared perspectives and better understanding of each agency's role, missions and capabilities. This will complement better understanding and closer cooperation in Washington, and will extend to execution of complex operations."⁹⁴ The 2010 QDR highlighted that DOD is committed to improving unity of effort through a 3D approach and will closely cooperate within the 3D structure to better protect and advance America's interests. However, this QDR also recognized that "despite the recognition that our security is increasingly tied to building partner capacity, our security assistance tool kit has not kept pace....and that DOD will work with interagency partners to create new and more responsive mechanisms for security assistance."⁹⁵

In May 2010, President Obama released his first National Security Strategy, which builds upon the lessons learned from Afghanistan and Iraq and the research conducted for the 2010 QDR. It too institutes a 3D approach. In commenting on the release of the 2010 National Security Strategy, then DOS Secretary Clinton said "One of our goals....was to make the case that defense, diplomacy and development were not separate entities, either in substance or process, but that indeed they had to be viewed as part of an integrated whole and that the whole of

⁹³The White House, *The 2006 National Security Strategy* (March 2006), 33, 37, <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/2006/> (accessed 15 January 2013).

⁹⁴Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2006), 84-85, <http://www.defense.gov/qdr/report/report20060203.pdf> (accessed 15 January 2013).

⁹⁵Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report, February 2010*, xiv, http://www.defense.gov/qdr/images/QDR_as_of_12Feb10_1000.pdf (accessed 15 January 2013).

government then had to be enlisted in their pursuit.”⁹⁶ The 2010 National Security Strategy identifies poverty, underdevelopment and conflict in Africa as drivers of future security threats to the United States. As a result, USG policymakers are increasingly noting Africa’s growing strategic importance to US interests. These interests include the importance of Africa’s natural resources (particularly energy) mounting concern over violent extremist activities and other potential threats posed by under-governed spaces, humanitarian crises, armed conflicts, and other challenges, including the devastating effect of HIV/AIDS.⁹⁷

In September 2010, President Obama signed a Presidential Policy Directive on Global Development, the first of its kind by a US administration.⁹⁸ Along with diplomacy and defense, development was made a core pillar of American power and cornerstone of US national security. This directive reinforces development as vital to US national security interests, outlines a course for the 3Ds to reinforce one another in an integrated comprehensive approach to national security, and indicates that the USG will balance its civilian and military power to address conflict, instability and humanitarian crises, and will link investments to a long-term strategy so that program impacts and progress are measured.

In December 2010, DOS Secretary Clinton released the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR), a sweeping assessment of how USAID and DOS can become more efficient, accountable and effective to better advance national interests and pursue strategic

⁹⁶U.S. Department of State, *Secretary Clinton Remarks on the Obama Administration's National Security Strategy* (May 27, 2010), <http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm2010/05/142312.htm> (accessed 15 January 2013).

⁹⁷U.S. Congressional Research Services, *Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests and the Role of the U.S. Military in Africa* (22 July 2011), Summary Page, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL34003.pdf> (accessed 15 January 2013).

⁹⁸The White House, *Fact Sheet: U.S. Global Development Policy* (September 22, 2010), <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/09/22/fact-sheet-us-global-development-policy> (accessed 15 January 2013).

training and planning with DOD.⁹⁹ In this regard, the QDDR reaffirmed the plan to re-build USAID's staffing levels, and proposed pooled funding between USAID, DOS and DOD to facilitate the integration and cohesion of military and civilian power. The QDDR highlighted that “where our diplomacy, development, and defense work together to prevent state weakness or failure, we avert the need to commit overwhelming military resources.”¹⁰⁰ The QDDR also highlighted that “sensible and accountable investment in our diplomatic and development capabilities protects and advances the security and prosperity of the United States.”¹⁰¹ As noted by some analysts, the QDDR allows USAID and DOS to address bureaucratic, corporate cultural, and structural considerations by clarifying roles and responsibilities and articulating a strategic framework for developing and applying capacity.¹⁰²

Seldom do all national security solution reside within the power of just one USG agency or department. USAID and DOD still need to overcome stove-piped processes, procedures and mechanisms if development programs are to be integrated, efficient and effective. In this regard, there is no structured execution framework to ensure joint planning between USAID and DOD occurs, and the incentives to work across each other's boundaries are few. In fragile and failing states, USAID and DOD must analyze the problems together. Otherwise, they are just drawing protective curtains around their programs. With a wide variety of tools available between USAID and DOD, they can match capabilities to meet the tasks ahead. As USAID and DOD study the problems of conflict, political turmoil, disease, hunger and violence, they know the solutions are

⁹⁹U.S. Department of State, U.S. International Development Agency, *Leading through Civilian Power: The First Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review* (2010), <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/153108.pdf> (accessed 15 January 2013).

¹⁰⁰*Ibid.*,18.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*,18.

¹⁰²Renanah Miles, *The State Department, USAID and the Flawed Mandate for Stabilization and Reconstruction*.

not solely under the mandate of either DOD or USAID. In an ideal world, USAID and DOD would operate from an overarching joint strategic plan at the global, regional and country-level to ensure alignment of their efforts in support of national security interests. The challenge is that USAID and DOD country level planning processes are quite different from one another. In addition, in an environment where the federal budget is put together one year, passed by Congress in the next, and then implemented in the third with Congressional earmarks, this does not work well when dealing with the emerging and unforeseen threats in failed and failing states where country selectivity is crucial.

This monograph does not go into detail regarding the dizzying array of documents that guide USAID and DOD planning and execution, or their relationship.¹⁰³ However, to summarize, USAID planning begins at the host country level and focuses on a bottom-up approach with a five-year Country Development Cooperation Strategy (CDCS) process. The CDCS supports US foreign policy priorities and ensures strategic alignment with host-country development priorities to promote mutual accountability on achieving development results that have clear and measurable impacts. The CDCS is designed to synthesize the basic development challenges that a specific country faces, and within the context of those challenges, it lays out the USG objectives and approaches for achieving those objectives. To present an integrated, multi-sector development approach, the CDCS prioritizes two to three high level development objectives that the USG and its partners, along with the host nation, can affect and be held accountable for results.¹⁰⁴ This process includes close dialogue between USAID Washington and field staff so

¹⁰³Dr. Daniel A. Gilewitch, “Security Cooperation Strategic and Operational Guidance: Translating Strategy to Engagement,” *The Disam Journal of International Security Cooperation Management*, <http://www.disamjournal.org/articles/security-cooperation-strategic-and-operational-guidance-translating-strategy-to-engagement-773> (accessed 4 April 2013).

¹⁰⁴U.S. Agency for International Development, *Country Development Cooperation Strategy Guidance* (2012), 4, http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDACS300.pdf (accessed 15 January 2013).

that from a resource and policy perspectives the CDCS is grounded in realistic planning assumptions. The CDCS is flexible and can be used to incorporate programming at the country level from other sources, and is an ideal source document for helping to inform DOD development activities at the country level. In addition, on an annual basis, each USAID country team pulls together an Operational Plan to provide a comprehensive picture of how USAID resources will be used to support the objectives outlined in the CDCS.

DOD has institutionalized complex processes and support mechanisms that enable it to prepare, plan for and conduct military operations, which requires DOD to engage in different types of planning for different purposes.¹⁰⁵ Unlike USAID country level planning, DOD planning is based on a top-down approach, starting at the global, then at the regional and eventually country level. DOD's planning starts from the top at the White House with the National Security Strategy, then moves down to the National Defense Strategy (NDS), the Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF), the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), Theater Campaign Plans (TCPs), and finally Country Level Plans (CLPs). In simple terms, the NDS influences the GEF, which provides the parameters for COCOMs to develop TCPs, which influence direction for CLPs.¹⁰⁶ DOD country plans normally establish the concepts by which COCOM objectives for each country are to be achieved through integration of DOD's many funding authorities and associated funding streams. Country level planning is heavily influenced by resource allocation decisions that weigh priorities across all COCOMs. Making this more difficult is that in many

¹⁰⁵U.S. Agency for International Development, U.S. Department of State, U.S. Department of Defense, *3d Planning Guide: Diplomacy, Development, Defense* (September 2011), 26, https://community.apan.org/cfs-file.ashx/_key/telligent-evolution-components-attachments/13-7481-00-00-00-10-72-90/3D_5F00_Planning_5F00_Guide_5F00_15September2011.pdf (accessed 15 January 2013).

¹⁰⁶*Ibid.*, 27.

countries where USAID is present, DOD may be represented by a single individual, often with little preparation in the interagency process.

In summary, USAID and DOD planning perspectives and approaches are derived from their distinct missions, roles and legal authorities, which has led each to develop unique frameworks, processes, terminology and planning cultures, further complicating coordination and integration efforts.¹⁰⁷ Moreover, although a 3D approach is encouraged by USG senior leadership, strategy, doctrine and policy, there is little empirical data on the effectiveness of a 3D approach to operations (i.e. did DOD activities benefit from USAID integration and produce more value added compared to stand-alone activities (and vice versa for USAID))? In this regard, some analysts continue to question the very premise of whether a 3D approach leads to increased operational effectiveness.

For example, a Norwegian Atlantic Committee report on civil-military relations indicates that in Afghanistan, USAID did not channel assistance according to need, but rather concentrated its resources in provinces that were politically and militarily important to the USG. According to this study, the United Kingdom, Canada and other countries did the same, which meant a very large portion of development funding went to certain provinces. The Norwegian Atlantic Committee argues that this is not a 3D approach, but rather a “compartmentalized approach where each troop contributing country focuses a disproportionate amount of its efforts (diplomacy and development included) on its own province.” At the same time, projects were often picked because of their strategic importance to appease communities; not because they would be effective in development terms or because the needs were the most pressing in that area.¹⁰⁸ One

¹⁰⁷Ibid., 4.

¹⁰⁸Stephen Cornish and Marit Glad, *Civil-Military Relations: No Room for Humanitarianism in Comprehensive Approaches* (The Norwegian Atlantic Committee, 2008), 10, http://www.careinternational.org.uk/index.php?option=com_rokdownloads&view=file&Itemid=

needs to ask if the approach DOD and USAID took led to stability in troubled provinces, or, did this approach undermine poverty reduction and development aid effectiveness by being subordinated to wider strategic imperatives? To date, no detailed assessment or evaluation has been done to suggest that a 3D approach is effective. In time of fiscal austerity, USAID and DOD need to ensure that their development resources are being spent in the most effective ways possible and do not run counter to one another. While the USG missions in Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrate that the nature of threats to the USG are becoming progressively more complex, USAID and DOD need to learn from lessons and experience to date, and institutionalize best practices if their relationship within the 3Ds is to be effective.

Before the 1990s, USAID has been reluctant to expand work in civil-military relations because of legal concerns. However, because the post-Cold War world had brought the development community and the military into closer contact in less-developed countries, USAID had to rethink its efforts in civil-military relations.¹⁰⁹ Even before the 2006 QDR and National Security Strategy were released, USAID had already taken steps to raise its profile and coordination role with DOD by establishing its Office of Military Affairs (OMA) in 2005. Over the years, this office has grown in size. In February 2012, USAID replaced OMA with to the Office of Civilian Military Cooperation (CMC). This change better conveys the true purpose of the office, which is to improve communication, mutual understanding and cooperation between the USAID and DOD at the strategic and policy levels.

In 2008, to establish the foundation of cooperation in the areas of joint planning, assessment and evaluation, training and strategic communication with DOD, USAID released its

172&id=20:civil-military-relations-no-room-for-humanitarianism-in-comprehensive-approaches (accessed 15 January 2013).

¹⁰⁹Johanna Mendelson Forman and Claude Welch, *Civil-Military Relations: USAID's Role* (USAID through Associates in Rural Development, July 1998), 5, <http://transition.usaid.gov/policy/ads/200/200sbf.pdf> (accessed 15 January 2013).

Civilian Military Cooperation Policy.¹¹⁰ In implementing this policy, USAID staff was guided by the principles that cooperation with DOD would not divert resources away from USAID's development mission; that short term objectives were consistent with long terms goals; and USAID would maintain its long standing relationship and work with a variety of partners, especially the local population and host government. This policy also indicates that USAID will seek to influence the development dimensions of DOD strategic plans and implementation activities, and will place at the regional geographic combatant commands senior development advisors and collaborate closely at posts to improve coordination and communication. As part of this work, in April 2010, USAID issued for its staff a Civilian-Military Operations Guide. The purpose of this guide is to bring DOD and USAID staff closer together to coordinate and plan with the goal of implementing and producing more effective development programs and results. This guide helps USAID staff understand the different part of the military and different models for collaboration, and outlines the primary functions of CMC.

In addition, through memoranda of understanding (MOUs), over the last few years USAID has placed Senior Development Advisors (SDAs) in a number of DOD COCOMs overseas. Many of the COCOMs also benefit from the presence of a full-time USAID Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance representative, who is responsible for coordinating disaster relief operations. In return, DOD has assigned COCOM liaison officers to USAID's CMC office in Washington. These staff placements and assignments at USAID and the COCOMs help provide and address day-to-day coordination and management concerns and issues. While the SDA and LNO positions are valuable, they must be put in context, as they serve as the sole USAID and DOD links with the respective DOD COCOM and USAID respective bureaus.

¹¹⁰U.S. Agency for International Development, *Civilian-Military Cooperation Policy*, (July 2008), http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDACL777.pdf (accessed 15 January 2013).

In September 2011, USAID, DOS and DOD issued a 3D Planning Guide (pre-decisional working draft). This guide is a reference tool designed to “help planners understand the purpose of each agency’s plans, the processes that generate them, and, most importantly, to help identify opportunities for coordination among the three. It is a first step in building understanding and synchronizing plans to improve collaboration, coordination and unity of effort to achieve the coherence needed to preserve and advance US national interests.”¹¹¹ This guide is a clear indication that while efforts among the 3D organizations has improved, much remains to be done to ensure that collaboration is institutionalized and coordination occurs before difficulties arise at the country level.

Planning requirements still differ at the strategic, operational and tactical levels, further complicating theater and country level planning. In this regard, DOD’s 2012 *Theater Campaign Planning Planner’s Handbook* helps bring clarity to this issue by recommending to COCOMs that they take full advantage of all resources to coordinate their theater campaign and country level planning with USAID as early as possible, as this will save time and trouble later.¹¹² This handbook also requests that DOD Theater Campaign Planner planners read the *3D Planning Guide* to gain an understanding of USAID plans and planning processes to coordinate planning efforts, further strengthening opportunities for unity of effort.¹¹³ As part of this effort, USAID, DOS and DOD have also established a policy forum committed to a more formal process of sustained collaboration to strengthen and expand comprehensive planning efforts. Referred to as the 3D Planning Group (3DPG), this body is focused on creating greater shared understanding

¹¹¹U.S. Agency for International Development, U.S. Department of State, U.S. Department of Defense, *3d Planning Guide: Diplomacy, Development, Defense*.

¹¹²U.S. Department of Defense, *Theater Campaign Planning: Planner's Handbook February 2012* (February 2012), 2, [http://www.almc.army.mil/ALU_DOCS/Planners_Handbook_Master_final%20Draft%2002-22-12%20\(2\).pdf](http://www.almc.army.mil/ALU_DOCS/Planners_Handbook_Master_final%20Draft%2002-22-12%20(2).pdf) (accessed 15 January 2013).

¹¹³*Ibid.*, 28.

between the three organizations.¹¹⁴ In January 2013, CMC also launched a Civilian-Military Cooperation Steering Committee to oversee the revision of USAID's 2008 Civilian Military Cooperation Policy. The primary goal of the new policy is to address a wide range of issues in a civilian-military context to create a playbook on civilian-military cooperation to help USAID personnel engage with DoD counterparts. In addition, CMC has made great progress to issue guidance and conduct a number of trainings for USAID and DOD staff with the goal of institutionalizing an effective USAID and DOD relationship. For example, CMC has developed on-line and classroom training for USAID staff to enhance cooperation with DOD staff. CMC training material has also reached DOD staff and US embassy personnel, which has greatly enhanced coordination efforts. While progress is being made to coordinate and integrate USAID and DOD efforts within the 3D approach (where appropriate), USAID and DOD cooperation continues to vary from case to case. While the 3D Planning Guide has helped clarify many concerns and set in place the coordination that is required, the core competencies, roles, mission, capabilities, program planning and objectives remain different between USAID and DOD, which continue to complicate full unity of effort.

USAID, as noted earlier, is responsible for less than one percent of the USG federal budget and provides revenue to a limited group of organizations. Whereas DOD has a very large constituency that lobbies Congress for a robust defense budget, USAID has a small constituency towards international development assistance, which indirectly predisposes members of Congress to be critical of USAID. At the same time, given the lack of a domestic constituency and the less tangible link to national security than the military institution, the USAID budget is an easy target for Congress. While USAID has been able to bolster its staffing levels in recent years, given the fiscal environment adequate resourcing is unlikely to materialize any time soon.

¹¹⁴ U.S. Agency for International Development, U.S. Department of State, U.S. Department of Defense, *3d Planning Guide: Diplomacy, Development, Defense*.

To overcome the fragmentation of 3D planning and budgeting processes, Congress has taken small steps to fund innovative mechanisms to help facilitate joint planning and budgeting amongst the 3Ds, through a whole-of-government approach, to advance the national security interests of the United States. As noted earlier, DOD Section 1207 funding was set to expire in FY 2010, as it was never intended to remain permanently housed with DOD.¹¹⁵ Consequently, Congress established a new USAID account, the Complex Crises Fund, which replaced DOD's Section 1207 funding. While not new money within the USG budget, the Complex Crises Fund, funded at \$40 million in FY 2011 and again in FY 2012, with an FY 2013 request at \$50 million, is targeted to countries that demonstrate a high or escalating risk of conflict or instability, with 3D projects aimed to address and prevent root causes of conflict and instability.¹¹⁶ As requested in the 2010 QDDR, USAID and DOS also proposed pooled funding between USAID, DOS and DOD to facilitate the integration and cohesion of military and civilian power. Pooled funding would address many concerns expressed in this monograph, and help the 3Ds plan and implement comprehensive assistance programs based on the comparative advantages of each agency in a particular situation, taking advantage of the diverse expertise of USAID, DOD and DOD.¹¹⁷

As a result, in FY 2011 Congress established the Global Security Contingency Fund (GSCF), which responds to long-standing congressional concerns that the USG needs to address issues that have undermined 3D efforts abroad.¹¹⁸ Like the Complex Crisis Fund, the GSCF is not

¹¹⁵Friends Committee on National Legislation, *The Complex Crises Fund: Rapid Response Funding to Help Prevent Deadly Conflict*.

¹¹⁶U.S. Department of State, *Executive Budget Summary: Function 150 and Other International Programs* (2012), 87, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/183755.pdf> (accessed 15 January 2013).

¹¹⁷*Ibid.*, 204.

¹¹⁸Congressional Research Service, *Global Security Contingency Fund: Summary and Issue Overview* (August 2012), Summary Page, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42641.pdf> (accessed 15 January 2013).

funded with new money. Rather, Congress authorized DOS and DOD to transfer up to \$250 million from other existing accounts. The GSCF is a four year pilot administered by and funded by DOS and DOD. The GSCF provides resources for “training and other support to enable foreign military and security forces to conduct security and counterterrorism operations and participate in coalition operations, as well as for justice sector, rule of law, and stabilization programs.”¹¹⁹ While Congress placed the GSCF under the DOS budget, funding decisions are jointly made by the Secretaries of DOS and DOD, but with the DOS Secretary in the lead. Many see the creation of the GSCF as an important step forward for interagency cooperation on security assistance that will overcome the disadvantages of the current system of agency-centric budgets and efforts.¹²⁰ However, others see the GSCF as a problematic and unwarranted as it could undermine the integrity of DOD’s own missions by sacrificing some of the control and flexibility of programs provided through a DOD authority.¹²¹

This might already be happening. In April 2012, DOD presented Congress with an urgent request for new authority to train and equip security forces in places like Yemen and Kenya. DOS and Congress were puzzled about the request as DOS and DOD had just agreed to put into place the GSCF to fund such efforts. In a rare rebuke to a DOD admiral and his command, congressional and DOD officials, as well as deputy cabinet-level aides, rejected the request and asked DOD to go back to the drawing board. A report accompanying the military budget bill by the House of Representatives summed up the objections that Congress is “concerned that the

¹¹⁹Ibid., summary page.

¹²⁰Ibid.

¹²¹Ibid., 11.

proliferation of similar, overlapping and/or competing building partner capacity authorities creates unnecessary confusion and friction.”¹²²

In time of fiscal austerity, DOD and USAID need to ensure that their development resources are spent in the most effective ways possible and projects do not run counter to one another. To support a 3D approach, DOD and USAID must move from vertical structures and processes to transparent and horizontal planning and program integration at the strategic and tactical levels. As both the George W. Bush and Obama administrations have shown, there is considerable agreement on the need to improve coordination. However, overlapping responsibilities, conflicting authorities and institutional objectives, as well as decision-making cycles and different cultures between USAID and DOD, complicate such efforts. At the same time, USAID and DOD deal with problems in different ways, which raises questions of when coordination should take place. While not everything can be coordinated, USAID and DOD need to outline where coordination problems lie as well as develop a marketing strategy to ensure all staffs understand the benefits of when to coordinate to ensure efforts are mutually reinforcing and not reflecting their own organizational bias and culture. For example, the work of USAID, DOS and DOD provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) in Iraq and Afghanistan are an indication that future engagements between USAID and DOD to harness a whole of government approach will, and needs to, continue. For this reason, the relationship between USAID and DOD needs to be continuously refined and institutionalized to prepare for future operations. For this reason, to ensure effective partnering in the future USAID and DOD need to apply lessons learned from PRTs in Afghanistan and Iraq and humanitarian response efforts. To do this there needs to be a crosswalk between theory and practice. USAID and DOD do not need to learn the same lessons

¹²²Eric Schmitt, “Elite Military Forces Are Denied in Bid for Expansion,” *New York Times*, 4 June 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/05/world/special-ops-leader-seeks-new-authority-and-is-denied.html?pagewanted=all&_r=2& (accessed 15 January 2013).

again and again. Lessons that have been identified need to be learned and incorporated into policy and doctrine. As time progresses and needs change, the lessons learned will ensure that such guidance and training is further refined and aligned to achieve win-win synergies between USAID and DOD that further US international development and national security objectives.

In this regard, USAID and DOD should jointly commission a detailed assessment and evaluation to review DOD development programs in fifteen countries where USAID is present. This detailed assessment and evaluation would review the objective(s) of DOD development programs, how the objective(s) translated at the operational and tactical levels, and what funding mechanism was used to achieve the program objective(s). This detailed assessment and evaluation would assess the approaches DOD adopted in technical sectors, compare those to USAID objectives in the same country, and identify promising practices, innovations, lessons learned, strengths, weaknesses, and constraints to achieve a 3D approach with USAID. The overall goal would be to institutionalize the link between DOD and USAID development planning (when appropriate) to ensure USG development investments are spent appropriately, not militarized, and sustainable. The detailed assessment and evaluation would also make recommendations for future program directions in light of the legislative, organizational, policy, and development environment. USAID's Bureau for Policy, Planning and Learning could jointly work with DOD's Office of Secretary of Defense to identify funding, and draft and solicit a scope of work for the assessment and evaluation to be completed. The assessment and evaluation should be completed by the end of 2014 to inform the fiscal year 2016 congressional appropriation and authorization process. Until the detailed assessment and evaluation is complete, USAID and DOD should continue their efforts to understand each other's processes and language, and seek out common objectives and goals in order to leverage and maximize synergies at the strategic and tactical levels, but not undermine or compromise the mandate or independence of one another. In addition, Congress should amend legislation that support DOD's Overseas Humanitarian,

Disaster and Civic Aid program, and the Humanitarian and Civic Assistance Program, to take into account the roles and similar types of efforts performed by USAID. This would go a long way to address concerns that DOD's expansion in the development arena has come at the cost of USAID, and that this expansion has overshadowed both symbolically and substantively USAID's development role overseas.

CONCLUSION

I am absolutely convinced that you cannot solve the problem of....the spread of extremism through military means....we're going to have to use development.

—President Barak Obama ¹²³

As noted in this monograph, some critics argue that the 3D approach is leading to the militarization of USG development assistance as DOD development programs are centered around short-term investments to “win the hearts and minds” of locals, rather than focused on where development is needed the most (i.e. poverty reduction). Some argue that the 3D approach should mean a more balanced budget between the 3Ds that will help integrate development programs by bringing together the elements of national power to address key priorities in the USG national security strategy. The author recommends that a detailed assessment and evaluation be commissioned in fifteen countries to review the DOD and USAID relationship in the 3D approach. Until then, USAID and DOD should protect their unique missions and approaches, but take into consideration, through improved information sharing and joint planning, the roles and efforts performed by one another. This approach will ensure that unity of effort is not forced, and that each agency and department are not subsumed into the mission of another, which could undermine the independence that is required to carry out the unique tasks required of each agency or department. In order to avoid program overlap with USAID, Congress should review

¹²³CNN Politics.Com, “Obama: Troops Alone Cannot Win in Afghanistan,” (February 19, 2009), <http://cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/02/18/obama.afghanistan.canada/> (accessed 15 January 2013).

legislation that provides DOD authority to conduct development programs overseas. This would go a long way to address concerns that DOD's expansion in the development arena has come at the cost of USAID, and that this expansion has overshadowed both symbolically and substantively USAID's development role overseas. The USAID and DOD relationship within the 3D approach will only be successful once DOD and USAID understand the core competencies, roles, missions, and capabilities of one another. In the meantime, they should continue to leverage the unique skills, capabilities and resources of one another (when appropriate) at both the tactical and strategic levels to enhance USG international development and national security objectives.

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