


Strategy Research Project

Leveraging the Army Reserve for Security Force Assistance

by

Lieutenant Colonel Gregory Todd Jones
United States Army Reserve



United States Army War College
Class of 2013

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Abstract

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Globalization and the associated economic and security inter-dependence will continue to bring nations together as partners in maintaining the peace and stability to support our common interests. Building Partner Capability (BPC) of U.S. allies and security partners through Security Force Assistance (SFA) is one way to developing the integrated security networks that are integral to our National Security Strategy (NSS). The U.S. Army Reserve (AR) brings a unique capability that can be leveraged as a means to conduct SFA as part of BPC ends in support our national interests. It is the AR intent to provide operational depth and capability to the Geographic Combatant Commanders (GCC) by matching AR capability to theater security requirements, while maintaining strategic depth for our Army and nation. Success of the past decade has been a total force effort. We must institutionalize the “one team one fight mentality” and continue to leverage capability across components and services to support our national security priorities. A new operational force the AR is transformed, trained, and ready, with a wide breadth and depth of SFA capabilities, to continue supporting GCCs, national leaders, and national interests around the world.

Leveraging the Army Reserve for Security Force Assistance

Helping other countries better provide for their own security will be a key and enduring test of U.S. global leadership and a critical part of protecting U.S. security, as well. Improving the way the U.S. government executes this vital mission must be an important national priority.

—Robert M. Gates, Former Secretary of Defense¹

Globalization and the resulting economic and security inter-dependence over the past half century highlights the peace and stability that can be achieved when countries with like interests share in maintaining the security needed to achieve those interests. The first national interest in the U.S. 2010 National Security Strategy (NSS) is; “The security of the United States, its citizens, and U.S. allies and partners.”² Building Partner Capability (BPC) of U.S. allies and security partners through Security Force Assistance (SFA) is the means to developing the integrated security networks that are integral to this strategy. As the 2010 NSS states; “Our military will continue strengthening its capacity to partner with foreign counterparts, train and assist security forces, and pursue military-to-military ties with a broad range of governments.”³

SFA is an overarching term that encompasses a range of activities, as defined by the Department of Defense (DoD), aimed at developing the capacity and capability of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions.⁴ The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have highlighted the requirement to train Foreign Security Forces (FSF) during stability operations, and the importance of having SFA capabilities available within the Conventional Ground Forces (CGF) when combat operations transition to stability operations. As the Army evaluated lessons learned from Iraq and Afghanistan it determined SFA is a core capability that must be trained, maintained, and employed by conventional forces as part of full spectrum stability operations. This assessment is

based in part on the recent stability operation requirements in Iraq and Afghanistan, but also for the intrinsic value and importance of SFA as a tool of Geographic Combatant Command (GCC) shaping efforts in support of national security objectives.

The Reserve Component (RC) and the Army Reserve (AR) have played a significant role in the success of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. As GCCs continue to shape their environment through Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) plans, they have increasingly turned to the RC for support with their expanding SFA efforts. Additionally, as the Army internalizes how best to prepare for and support SFA around the world and across the spectrum of conflict the AR has also transformed and organized with specific capability to support these important missions. Moving forward into an era of increasing shaping efforts, SFA requirements, and diminishing resource, the Army must ask; what will be the RC role in these efforts? This research project will define SFA and cover a brief history of Army SFA efforts. However, its primary purpose will be to focus on AR capability in supporting future SFA missions, and explore ways for leveraging this capability in support of combatant commanders and national BPC strategies.

SFA offers many benefits in support of our national objectives and strategy. It is an important tool to assist underdeveloped or under governed nations in maintaining internal peace and stability. SFA is also a mechanism supporting several national lines of effort, like our national counterterrorism line of effort, by giving us access into otherwise inaccessible areas.⁵ It is an important tool for developing partner nation FSF capability, which in turn contributes to a broader security framework within a region. To better understand how the Army executes SFA to capitalize on these benefits, it helps

to first understand how SFA fits into the Army’s operational concept. From there we will be better able to identify and define what role the AR can play in supporting this concept through SFA.

The Army’s operational concept, called full spectrum operations, is the foundation on which the Army operates. It describes operations outside the United States as a continuous and simultaneous combination of offensive, defensive, and stability operations.⁶ The amount of effort or priority associated with each of these three distinct elements will depend on where the operation falls along the spectrum of conflict. For example, as Figure 1 illustrates, the emphasis associated with the element of stability operations will vary as an operation moves along the spectrum from pre-conflict, through conflict, to post-conflict operations.




Figure 1. Full Spectrum Operations & Joint Operational Planning Phases⁷

Relating full spectrum operations to the Joint Operational Planning phases defined in joint operations; pre-conflict operations may initially attempt to shape and deter during Phase 0 and Phase I respectively, then transition into Phase II and Phase III operations to seize and dominate during conflict, followed by Phase IV and Phase V operations that stabilize and transition during post-conflict resolution. The application of full spectrum operations and the effective transition between these elements and phases

requires careful assessment and planning. Unit preparation and training for each of these phases is also important for successful execution and transition of operations. Exemplified by our experience in Iraq; inadequate assessment, planning, preparation, and training for the post-conflict environment made the transition to Phase IV (stability operations) more difficult. Ultimately the goal of Army full spectrum operations is to employ these elements of land power as part of a joint unified action in support of U.S. interests in a region.

Stability operations are an integral part of full spectrum operations and are conducted in varying degrees across the spectrum of conflict. The primary purpose of stability operations is to set the condition for successful offensive and defensive operations, and eventually set the condition for successful transition to civil authority. Army Field Manual 3-07, *Stability Operations*, identifies the five primary Lines of Effort (LOEs), or tasks, that Army forces perform during stability operations. These stability tasks include; establish civil security, establish civil control, restore essential services, support governance, and support economic and infrastructure development.⁸ Stability operations embody a myriad of missions and activities that leverage military capability in concert with other interagency activities and elements of national power. As shown in Figure 2, Army stability tasks correspond closely to and support the Department of State (DoS) stability sector lines of effort associated with Security Sector Reform (SSR). SSR is defined as “the set of policies, plans, programs, and activities that a government undertakes to improve the way it provides safety, security, and justice.”⁹




Figure 2. Stability Tasks and Department of State Technical Sectors¹⁰

Stability operations are conducted to support a partner nation. However, if no legitimate government exists stability operations can support the efforts of a transitional civil or military authority.¹¹ Stability operations help set the conditions, for a whole of government approach, that enables the actions and activities of other governmental agencies and instruments of national power to succeed in achieving the broad goals of conflict resolution and transition.¹² Army Reserve soldiers often have a wide range of civilian occupational skills throughout their communities. Though civilian skills are not always tied to Army missions they can come in handy during stability operation across several stability task LOEs. Examining the stability tasks shown in Figure 2, this is one area where the Army could more effectively leverage AR soldier’s civilian acquired skills in supporting stability operations.

The DoD will normally take up a supporting role in Department of State SSR initiatives however, Department of Defense Directive (DoDD 3000.05) mandates that if the operating environment and associated security situation inhibits reform efforts by the host nation, DoS, or other civilian agencies, the DoD will take a leading role in such

efforts as the DoD did in Iraq and Afghanistan.¹³ Providing a secure environment is a foundational stability operations effort that enables other stability tasks and stability sector lines of effort to succeed. SFA supports both DoD and DoS security sector LOE and enables successful whole of government engagement by all agencies in what is termed a Joint, Inter-agency, Inter-governmental, and Multi-national (JIIM) environment.

As stated in the 2008 National Defense Strategy; “our strategy emphasizes building the capacities of a broad spectrum of partners as the basis for long-term security. We must also seek to strengthen the resiliency of the international system to deal with conflict when it occurs.”¹⁴ Army Field Manual 3-07.1 titled *Security Force Assistance* and published in May 2009, in response to growing need for SFA doctrine within the Army, defines SFA as, “the unified action to generate, employ and sustain local, host nation or regional security forces in support of a legitimate authority.”¹⁵ SFA is one of the many means by which we, as a nation, achieve the strategic end of BPC. Specifically it is the process used to develop foreign security forces, either military or police, to perform functions in support of their government, their people, and can contribute positively to the security framework of that region of the world. Though the Army brings significant SFA capability to the table, efforts are always part of a broader comprehensive approach that requires collaboration and coordination with actors across the JIIM environment, all of which have a role in establishing the security framework for the region. SFA is a term that, in recent years, has attempted to bring together in a comprehensive policy and coordinating manner the numerous activities associated with BPC; activities including Security Cooperation (SC), Security Assistance, Foreign Military Financing (FMF), Foreign Military Sales (FMS), International Military Education

and Training (IMET), foreign aid, Overseas Contingency Operations, and other governmental agency efforts.¹⁶ Though SFA activities can be performed any time across the spectrum of conflict, they are most commonly performed as part of shaping operations (Phase 0), stability operations (Phase IV), or transition (Phase V) efforts. SFA efforts will often continue long after military operations have ended and transitioned to civil authority as a means to reinforce stability, shape the security environment, provide a credible deterrence to any potential adversary, and promote ongoing relations with a host nation. The steady state operational characteristic of shaping operations lends itself to potential AR support that can augment and support SFA efforts during traditional reserve duty man-days using already appropriated funds. With appropriate planning and coordination reserve soldiers can be programmed to support efforts during specific time windows.

The DoD plays an integral role in the overall SFA effort primarily because DoD is the largest governmental agency with robust capability (means) and the most resources (ways) to conduct SFA missions. It maintains the capability to provide for its own security, and the interim security for the host nation, when the host nation government is unable to perform such internal functions. However, because SFA is a form of foreign assistance related to foreign affairs activities between the U.S. and other countries it generally falls under the purview of the DoS. SFA is one component of a broader whole of government effort under the responsibility of the U.S. diplomatic mission, also known as the country team. The country team coordinates all inter-agency activities, including SFA activities, in support of the host nation. This helps ensure DoD efforts are coordinated with other governmental or international agency efforts ensuring unity of

effort with regard to the host nation. The Army trains and equips foreign security forces during SFA operations under DoS Title 22 authority, except for specific examples like Iraq and Afghanistan when Congress granted authority to DoD.¹⁷ This was done initially due to the security environment and lack of central government. Depending on the size of the SFA mission within a country there may be a defense attaché (DATT) or Defense Coordination Organization as part of the country team to assist in managing the DoD and military support aspects of the SFA mission.

A GCC is responsible for command and control of forces within the Area of Responsibility (AOR) and view SFA as an essential effort in shaping the security framework within their AOR. Specific requirements can be driven by COCOM assessments, host nation requests, or ongoing relations and execution is coordinated with the country team to ensure unity of effort. The military services, through the various service commands, are responsible for organizing, training, and equipping forces in support of SFA missions. Since assistance can transcend various domains (air, land, sea, space, and cyberspace), SFA missions will often be joint endeavors, bringing together forces from various services working in concert with one another and with other inter-agency efforts to build a country's capability. Once in country, forces will report progress to the DATT, or country team, however, in most cases they remain under the command and control of the GCC for that AOR. These responsibilities require close coordination between DoD and DoS at every level; strategic, operational, and tactical to ensure unity of effort. The goal being to provide effective SFA, in support of a comprehensive security cooperation effort, aimed at achieving both DoD and DoS end state BPC objectives.

The U.S. Army has learned some tough lessons and had to reestablish capabilities over the last ten years in the realm of stability operations and SFA. The unfortunate reality is the Army has a long history of experience in training and assisting FSF.¹⁸ The historical lack of doctrine, however, highlights the dynamic and ever changing nature of SFA across both the full spectrum of military operations and the operational environment. It also illustrates the difficulty in documenting “doctrinal SFA” that can vary so widely from one country and operating environment to another. As the Army has worked to relearn, better understand, and document its most recent experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan it is also useful to examine and understand SFA from a historical perspective.

Though early on it wasn’t called SFA, activities involving our need and ability to train foreign forces goes back to the U.S. War of Independence. The Lend Lease program in World War II (WWII) increased the capability of the Soviet Union and other allied countries while, other SFA activities trained eight divisions of free French forces in Northern Africa and 30 divisions of Chinese forces to combat Axis forces during WWII.¹⁹ The Marshall Plan employed a whole of government BPC effort, employing all elements of national power, to stabilize and secure Europe and Asia Pacific following victory in WWII. In the 1950’s several Military Advisor Groups (MAGs) organized and equipped as embedded trainers and the U.S. began engaging in significant SFA efforts in both South Korea and Vietnam. In South Korea the Korean MAG with less than 300 advisors trained and reorganized over 20 divisions of Republic of Korea Army forces.²⁰

In Vietnam SFA efforts initiated by the Central Intelligence Agency with the establishment of Civil Irregular Defense Group incorporated capability from the U.S.

Special Forces and in 1963 was renamed the Military Assistance Command – Vietnam (MACV) with attempts to centralize command of Special Forces (SF) advisors.²¹ At its height in 1970, the MACV employed over 14,000 advisors training Vietnamese Army and security forces in support of their internal counterinsurgency effort.²² Vietnam represented the last large scale SFA effort by conventional Army forces, similar to what we have seen conducted over the past decade in Iraq and Afghanistan.

History over the last half century since Vietnam has shown the responsibility for small scale SFA activities such as advising, training, and assisting FSF has rested primarily with the U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) conducting Foreign Internal Defense missions.²³ Long lasting and ongoing SFA missions in the Philippines, Central America, and South America are examples of such SOF operations conducted in the last fifteen years. Due to the large variety and varying scale of SFA missions around the world, SOF is ideally structured and suited to perform these missions. SOF personnel have high levels of training, are capable of operating in austere environments, and are historically and culturally astute to the host nation and regional environment in which they are operating.

Other smaller scale SFA activities are also performed directly by the senior defense official or DATT as part of the DoS country team. After some initial growing pains, in 1965 the DATT system officially fell under the direction of the Defense Intelligence Agency. The objective of the attaché system was to first develop a network able to provide more timely and efficient intelligence information and second, provide a channel for communication and cooperation on DoD related interests.²⁴ Today the United States has over 170 embassies around the world whose defense attaché is the

primary conduit for SFA in support of host nation BPC efforts. The country team or DATT has several SFA programs it can turn to in support of BPC. These include the purchase of a specific military capability under the FMS program or, for poorer nations, assistance with equipment and training under a FMF and IMET programs.

Though small scale SFA has primarily been accomplished by SOF and DoS country team activities since Vietnam, conventional Army forces have also supported these activities through special programs or in some cases permanent SFA structures. For example, the ongoing security cooperation efforts in Saudi Arabia under the U.S. Military Training Mission and Saudi Arabian National Guard training mission are examples of permanent in country joint force structures supporting SFA activities. The Army Human Resources Command fills the Army personnel requirements of these structures, generally utilizing one year unaccompanied tours of AC personnel, during the normal assignment process. Often designated as lower priority fills due to competing personnel requirements, these structures are historically plagued by low manning levels. Since these missions are case funded it represents an opportunity to leverage RC capability in support of an important partner nation.

The State Partnership Program which partners state Army National Guard (ARNG) units with certain countries is another example SFA program that establishes a temporary training assistance capability on a routine basis through an established relationship. For example, in the Pacific Command (PACOM) AOR, six of the 36 nations within the AOR (Mongolia, Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand, Bangladesh, and Cambodia) are partnered respectively with National Guard states (Alaska, Hawaii,

Guam, Washington, Oregon, Idaho) for conducting exercise and training events in support of PACOM's TSC plan.²⁵

Larger scale SFA efforts conducted by conventional force Brigade Combat Teams (BCT) as part of full spectrum stability operations have not been the norm. However, high demand for SFA capability in post-conflict Iraq and Afghanistan have caused both national policy makers and Army leaders to reevaluate the role of the conventional Army with regard to stability operations and SFA missions. SFA has received more attention from conventional military forces primarily because it has been integral to the exit strategy for U.S. forces in both Iraq and Afghanistan. The addition of stability operations to the Army's core Mission Essential Task List indicates a clear recognition by the Army of the need for the softer skills associated with stability operations. This solidifies the importance of SFA among the ways and means DoD must plan for, train for, and employ in support of the national BPC ends. How will conventional forces, which have traditionally focused training efforts on core competencies associated with high intensity conflict, organize for and apportion limited training time to this new yet important mission? This also raises questions on how to effectively leverage the RC to support stability operations and SFA, in light of both the fiscal and time constraints placed on conventional Army AC forces.

The past ten years have forced the Army to reorganize itself structurally and doctrinally to conduct SFA. The conventional force BCT maintains a robust capability to conduct SFA across the spectrum of operations, and unlike other inter-agency or governmental groups, the BCT has the resources and training to provide for its own internal defense. It also has a robust sustainment capability and can transition quickly

as needed to combat operations. The Army has adapted to the new SFA mission requirements by reorganizing modular BCTs into Advise and Assist Brigade combat teams. Based on the reality that the Army can simply not afford dedicated SFA structure, it is anticipated the modular BCT will continue to perform future large scale SFA mission as needed. Since SFA is an important aspect of all GCC efforts to shape their environment through BPC, it is also anticipated that tailored CGF teams, from BCTs, will be more engaged in small scale SFA operations. An indication this is the direction the relationship between SFA and CGF is heading is the new initiative to regionally align modular BCTs with a specific GCC. Theoretically this enables the BCT to focus historical and cultural training toward their AOR and the countries they are affiliated with. Regional alignment is an important step in making the BCT more effective as trainers and advisors, enabling them to build better relations while conducting SFA missions. Depending on the mission and operating environment, the BCT may be augmented from the generating force or other units with additional advise and assist capability. This represents another opportunity commanders can leverage RC training base capability when organizing for specific SFA missions.

The Army has also expanded its capability at the Army Service Command (ASC) level by designating personnel and responsibilities within the staff for coordinating Army SFA efforts between command, country teams, GCCs, SOF elements, SC organizations, or other agencies involved in SFA missions.²⁶ It is the staff at the ASC level that will look for capabilities across the components AC, USAR, and ARNG for solutions to both BCT and independent SFA mission requirements.

The RC has proven itself invaluable to success of missions in Iraq and Afghanistan, at home, and around the world. In doing so it has truly transformed from the strategic reserve force of the 1980s to an operational reserve force of today. We use the term JIIM often to describe environments requiring a team effort. However, within our service we often gloss over the fact that this was also, and continues to be, a multiple component (multi-compo) effort involving AC, ARNG, and AR forces and capabilities. As the Army moves now to institutionalize SFA, and contends with the reality of a resource constrained environment, a multi-compo and JIIM approach that leverages already programmed resources and continues to leverage the capabilities across components is one feasible, and possibly critical, approach to sharing mission load and costs in support of national interests while minimizing additional cost.

The Army Fiscal Year 2012 budget supported a permanent end strength authorization of 1,110,600 soldiers among all three components. With 563,200 or almost 51% in the RC, including both the AR at 205,000 and the ARNG at 358,200, the total force and nation have relied heavily on the RC.²⁷ Based on the current force structure the RC is programmed with personnel and equipment to provide approximately 37% of the BCTs, 54% of the artillery above BCT, 62% of the sustainment above BCT, 69% of the ISR and C2 above BCT, and 88% of the Civil Affairs (CA) forces capabilities to the total force.²⁸ Current SFA global commitments have over 192,000 soldiers engaged on a routine basis in over 150 countries around the world.²⁹ Continuing efforts to shape our international environment will require that we institutionalize the investment made in the RC over the last decade, by sustaining predictable access to the RC, and ensuring we resource the RC to maintain its

capability to provide strategic flexibility and operational depth across the full spectrum of conflict.

The Army Reserve has transformed over the past decade from its legacy strategic reserve structure of the Cold War into an operational force consisting of 22 Operational and Functional (O&F) commands, four Training Commands, and four Regional Support Commands each with distinct capabilities and potential to support SFA across the spectrum of conflict.³⁰ The O&F commands are primarily Modified Table and Equipment (MTOE) units, functionally organized with specific structure, equipment, and capability in the medical, engineering, military police, aviation, signal, intelligence, and sustainment fields of operation. Many of these AR formations have recent operational experience combined with civilian acquired skills capable of supporting SFA efforts a number of different ways.

As an example, an Army Reserve engineer brigade command from the 412 Theater Engineer Command (412th TEC) provides command and control for a Joint Engineer Task Force in the PACOM AOR. The Task Force will supporting PACOMs TSC plan by constructing badly needed schools and improving road networks around the new schools in Thailand, Bangladesh, and Cambodia. Engineer capability potentially from all services and components rotate into designated areas until the mission is complete, receive real world construction training and experience, while increasing access to education for local children by building up critical infrastructure in partner nations identified above.³¹

The Army Reserve also contains a robust institutional training command and support command capability in its Table of Distribution and Allowance units. These

organizations support U.S. Army training base missions at home, are typically made up of senior officer and enlisted personnel with a wide breadth and depth of experience across components, and are ideally suited to support training missions in support of FSF abroad.

Another example; consider the 108th Initial Entry Training Command (108th Tng Cmd (IET)). The command is responsible for managing IET support to all seven Army Training Centers that teach Army BCT and Advance Individual Training to the Army's total force. The command consists of two divisional HQs, eight brigade HQs, and 54 battalion HQs responsible for managing over 2,500 qualified Drill Sergeants (DS), support staff, and associated missions. The command also manages a drill sergeant qualification school as part of the Total Army School System, to qualify the DS candidates within their formations. A highly trained and mature force, responsible for training, developing, and transforming America's youth into soldiers, it is certainly a capable and valuable resource to combatant commanders in supporting basic skills training of FSF.

Interestingly, I have a personal experience that highlights this unique capability when I joined a small team of senior AR personnel from the 98th Tng Div (IET) during a deployment to Riyadh, Saudi Arabia in 2009. Our mission, at the direction of the CENTCOM commander, was to establish a new Security Cooperation Organization (SCO) to advise and train a Saudi paramilitary facility security force under the kingdom's Ministry of Interior (MOI). The security force was responsible for the security and protection of the kingdom's critical infrastructure, which included all of its major energy production sites. Certain aspects of the mission, which required more technical skill,

included critical infrastructure site surveys and mission analysis to determine adequate troop to task recommendations. However, what the security force leadership initially wanted most was assistance establishing an institutional training base and associated training programs for rapidly growing and maintaining a capable security force. They wanted training base programs addressing basic soldier skills, small unit tactics, and leader training. This was a mission that was ideally suited for the leaders and DS qualified soldiers from an AR institutional training base structure. The 98th Tng Div (IET) provided the “means”, while CENTCOM funding support provided the “way”, to support the BPC “end” with strategic implications in a partner nation.

One obstacle in a budget constrained environment, in using AR soldiers for ongoing SFA missions, will always be the funding issue. How will the Army fund the costs associated with putting reserve soldiers on extended active duty orders? Are extended orders necessary or can short duration orders also support mission? These are good questions and ones that must be answered on a case by case basis.

However, I believe there is ample opportunity to leverage AR capability in a number of different ways, for short duration missions utilizing already appropriated funds. With proper coordination and mission support, a minimum of 45 man days per soldier could be leveraged from already appropriated funds using a combination of Inactive Duty Training (IDT), Annual Training (AT), and Additional Duty Training (ADT) days. Unit commanders would battle roster soldiers and approve orders based on mission requirements. In most cases the COCOM will need to resource travel costs for personnel into the AOR on separate individual or unit temporary duty orders, but the base pay and entitlements would be funded by the AR with already appropriated man-

day funds. In the same manner an AR soldier supports Continental United States based missions using programmed IDT, AT, and ADT funds, with proper management the AR could also support short duration SFA missions in support of COCOM commanders. Figure 3 illustrates the different type of reserve duty status and orders that can be used to support SFA. In most cases AR soldiers will use a combination of these for necessary preparation, training, and mission support.

Duty Type	Man Days	Notes	SFA Support
Inactive Duty Training (IDT) (Drills)	24 days	Can be batched and used in conjunction with TDY order	Short duration SFA
Annual Training (AT)	14 days	Based on mission and funding can be authorized up to 21 days	Short duration SFA
Additional Duty Training (ADT)	<= 179 days	Can be used to purchase man-days as funding is available.	Short - medium duration SFA
Mobilization (Mob) orders			
12301(a) – Full Mob	Unlimited	Service Sec Authority upon Presidential declaration	Long duration SFA
12302 – Partial Mob	<= 24 months	Service Sec Authority upon Presidential declaration	Long duration SFA
12304 – PRC Mob	<= 365 days	Presidential Authority	Long duration SFA
12304a – Disaster Response	<= 120 days	Sec Def Authority	Not for SFA -State request for federal assistance only
12304b –COCOM TSC Support	<= 365 days	Service Sec authority funded by COCOM	Long duration SFA

Figure 3. Army Reserve Duty Type and Orders for SFA Support³²

Exercise support is one example where short duration mission requirements could potentially leverage AR capability using already programmed funds at specific times, and would not require mobilization under an extended order. An exercise with a partner nation could leverage AR training command capability to support FSF basic skills training prior to the exercise. What we commonly refer to as gunnery AR trainers could support range training and small unit lanes training. Selected MTOE operational and functional command unit capabilities could similarly deploy to participate in the exercise.

There are times when COCOM commanders may not need to Mobilize (Mob) an AR soldier on extended orders, but would be willing to buy additional man-days for a specific capability. This would translate to an ADT order that can be up to 179 days in length. However, different pay systems between the AC and AR create some administrative difficulties associated with the AC funding AR soldier orders. Though not impossible, transferring funds between components from the AC to the AR is a cumbersome process. A process performed by a select few individuals and offices, requiring elevated levels of approval, and long lead times it becomes impractical for numerous short duration missions. These difficulties often prevent COCOMs from utilizing available AR capability. In a recent Bliss Hall lecture the commander of U.S. Special Operation Command highlighted this difficulty, commenting that he wished there was an easier way to “buy reserve man-days.”³³ Administrative mechanisms that make it easier for COCOMs to transfer available mission funds between components to buy man-days would provide commanders greater access and flexibility to leverage AR capability. Once funding has moved between components, moving funding among fund managers (FM) within the AR or allowing a unit access to a specific FM in support of missions is a bit easier.

There are times putting an AR soldier on orders may be cost prohibitive, in which case it is best to use AC soldiers and not incur the additional base pay and entitlement cost of an RC soldier. An example of this is if the mission is a long term effort and will require extended deployment orders. From a cost perspective, this is like putting an RC soldier back on active duty, in which case it may be best to use AC forces, if available, and not incur the additional cost associated with extended deployment orders.

There are times however, when there simply are no AC forces or capability available for the mission and the COCOM commander is willing to resource the cost to put RC soldiers on extended orders. There are also times when an SFA mission is case funded by the host nation through the FMS process. In this case, since support is funded by the host nation, funding is less of a consideration and the COCOM commander can look across all components for available capability to best accomplish the mission. Referencing again the 98th Tng Div (IET) mission to Saudi Arabia in 2009 provides a good example of both of these situations. The initial team of 13 senior officers and enlisted along with an advanced party of four from the CENTCOM “J” staff deployed initially under COCOM funded contingency operations orders and temporary duty orders until a Mob order was published. These initial orders allowed the team to get on the ground quickly while CENTCOM worked a Mob order authorization through the process, which took approximately four months. Once a Mob order was published soldiers were converted to individual Mob orders and Temporary Change of Station (TCS) orders were produced for active duty soldiers. The initial personnel cost for the group, represented by these orders, was resourced by CENTCOM and the U.S. as an investment to facilitate immediate U.S. engagement with regard to this mission. In essence, time was a factor, AC forces were engaged elsewhere and simply were not available and RC forces had the capability and resources through CENTCOM to execute mission. It was an investment by the U.S. that pales in comparison to both the tangible and intangible return on this investment. The tangible benefit associated with FMS cases contributing in 2012 to the largest proposed arms sale through FMS with any partner nation in US history at over 60 billion dollars.³⁴ The intangible benefit

gained in bolstering capability of a regional partner security force responsible for security of critical energy sites with strategic ties to both U.S. and world energy markets. After building initial trust with the host nation security force, meeting their initial needs, and establishing case funded agreements with MOI through the FMS process, future personnel costs were incorporated in the FMS case and funded by the host nation. A mission that started in 2009 with a small group of 13 RC soldiers has grown to a joint multicomponent organization of over 50, including an AC maritime security component. An SCO that is still growing, 100% of the Army requirements continue to be case funded and manned by AR personnel on one year plus deployment orders. This provides a good example, when we find solutions to funding challenges; RC forces become operationally accessible and can enhance SFA capabilities in support of COCOM theater security cooperation plans. Though this example is a benchmark for success we must also recognize it was made possible by available additional duty and contingency operations funds. As we move forward into a resource constrained environment, the flexibility afforded by these funds may not be available and, we will have to find other creative solutions to funding challenges.

Institutionalizing SFA across the Army while contending with the reality of limited resource will require an approach that leverages and maximizes already programmed resources and capabilities across components. One idea is the AR designates a “gateway” organization responsible for managing SFA support to the COCOMs. This limits the current administrative burden of funding transfers between components to one organization that can receive funds from the COCOMs as needed for man-days and then distribute the funds to units supporting missions. U.S. Army Reserve Command

(USARC) G3/5/7 could perform this function in coordination with G8, or based on other priorities could delegate this responsibility to an O&F command. For example, U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (USACAPOC) would be a good subordinate organization to assume this responsibility and function due to its close working relation to the SOF community and relevance to SFA missions. As the gateway they would reach across other O&F commands and training commands as needed for additional support and capability, and would be responsible for internal funding transfers between AR units to ensure it is available to units supporting missions. In essence USARC would mission and resource USACAPOC to support SFA, and USACAPOC would manage and source across the AR with tasking help as needed from USARC.

The AR functionally oriented structure does not lend itself to effective regional alignment like the AC concept. Therefore SFA is best managed based on specific mission requirements across COCOMs. The tradeoff for non-regional alignment is some training time will be needed for regional, country, and cultural train-up in preparation for specific missions. A good use for an AR soldier's IDT and AT days as needed. Data bases that effectively track civilian acquired and language skills can also assist in identifying soldiers with specific capability or regional experience. Like SOF, the AR could explore the idea of offering special incentives for soldiers who maintain and document special language and regional capabilities. Specific training and equipment associated with SFA would evolve as habitual support relationships develop with COCOMs and specific regions. Currently demand for SFA capability does not support a need for separate AR SFA structure; however, as discussed, there is a need

for improved processes and administrative support in managing the link between current AR capabilities and COCOM SFA requirements.

Globalization and the associated economic and security inter-dependence will continue to bring nations together as partners in maintaining the peace and stability to support our common interests. Building Partner Capability of U.S. allies and security partners through SFA is the means to developing the integrated security networks that are integral to our NSS. Through the Army's operational concept, the Army conducts SFA primarily through the full spectrum element of stability operations across the spectrum of conflict. SFA missions often fall under the oversight of a country team and are coordinated interagency efforts between DoS and DoD to achieve a common security capability objective. Both recent and historical experience with regard to SFA provide valuable insight in how the Army can best organize and train to perform this important task in support of a reemphasized core Army mission. This insight can also guide how the Army Reserve can best organize, manage, and eventually train to support these important security cooperation efforts in BPC.

SFA is an important way to enable the Army Reserve to remain "manned, equipped, trained, and employed as an operational force, fully integrated into the Total Army."³⁵ It is the Army Reserves intent to provide operational depth and capability to the GCCs by matching AR capability to theater security requirements, while maintaining strategic depth for our Army and nation.³⁶ This will secure the investment made over the last ten years transforming the AR into a well-trained operational reserve force and will sustain the leadership and experience gained. Remaining engaged in SFA will leverage the training value associated with real world missions while supporting GCC

theater security cooperation plans and national interests. SFA is an important way to BPC ends that support our national interests; the AR brings unique capability that can be leveraged as a means to support this end.

Success of the past decade has been a total force effort. As the Army continues to draw down forces in Afghanistan, and begins to rebalance to other COCOM AORs and back to core competencies, we must institutionalize the “one team one fight mentality” and continue to leverage capability across components and services to support our national security priorities. A new operational force the Reserve Component and the Army Reserves is transformed, trained, and ready, with a wide breadth and depth of SFA capabilities, to continue supporting our combatant commanders, national leaders, and national interests around the world.

Endnotes

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