

THE US NAVY'S ENGAGEMENT IN THE AFRICAN
LITTORAL ENVIRONMENT

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ADAM V. BELLIN, LIEUTENANT COMMANDER, US NAVY
B.M.E., Wartburg College, Waverly, Iowa, 1999
M.A., Norwich University, Northfield, Vermont, 2006

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
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THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

Name of Candidate: Lieutenant Commander Adam Bellin

Thesis Title: The US Navy's Engagement in the African Littoral Environment

Approved by:

_____, Thesis Committee Chair
Robert M. Brown, M.A.

_____, Member
Stephen D. Coats, Ph. D.

_____, Member
David W. Christie, M.A.

Accepted this 14th day of June 2013 by:

_____, Director, Graduate Degree Programs
Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D.

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ABSTRACT

THE US NAVY'S ENGAGEMENT IN THE AFRICAN LITTORAL ENVIRONMENT
by LCDR Adam V. Bellin, 105 pages.

The United States has begun a strategic shift towards the Asia-Pacific region. Given the Pacific's vast space, rich resources, economic opportunities and potential for conflict this shift is appropriate. Yet there is another large area of the world, rich in resources and economic opportunities, and possessing great potential for conflict: Africa. Situated astride several vital security and economic crossroads, the continent of Africa has the capacity to impact the interests of the United States, and much of the world. Given the tenuous nature of many of the governments of Africa, the support the US Navy provides to its African partners in the littoral region is of particular importance. Through policy, the US Navy enacts its support and those policies reflect the commitments of the nation and requirements of the combatant commander. This paper will explore the US Navy's policies on the littorals and USAFRICOM, the importance of the littorals, the threats facing naval forces in Africa, the engagement policies of USAFRICOM and the economic-security rationale for focusing on Africa. The littorals are a vital area of the world for many reasons. US Navy policy reflects this value, but the implementation of the policies are less than ideal.

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ACRONYMS

APS	African Partnership Station
CBO	Congressional Budget Office
CCDR	Combatant Commander (refers to the officer in command)
CG	Guided Missile Cruiser
CIC	Confronting Irregular Warfare Strategy
CNA	CNA's Center for Naval Analyses
CNO	Chief of Naval Operations
CCMD	Combatant Command (refers to the entire unified command)
CVN	Nuclear Aircraft Carrier
DDG	Guided Missile Destroyer
DoD	Department of Defense
DoS	Department of State
FDNF	Forward Deployed Naval Force
FFG	Guided Missile Frigate
GAO	United States Government Accountability Office
LCS	Littoral Combat Ship
NECC	Navy Expeditionary Combat Command
NECE	Navy Expeditionary Combat Enterprise
NOC 10	Naval Operations Concept 2010
NSS	National Security Strategy
NWP	Naval Warfare Publication
PC	Patrol, Coastal (Class of ship)
PHM	Patrol, Hydrofoil, Missile (Class of ship)

USAFRICOM United States Africa Command

WMD Weapon of Mass Destruction

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

It follows then as certain as that night succeeds the day, that without a decisive naval force we can do nothing definitive, and with it, everything honorable and glorious.¹

— President George Washington

Do what is “honorable and glorious;” Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines and Coastguardsmen strive to achieve this goal at some level when they volunteer to join the ranks of the US military. The practical and universal applications of those high principles, although attempted, are seldom reached in every action or reaction the US military undertakes. The US Navy has long been the face of US military might around the world, ensuring the flow of goods and securing the economic interests of the US.² Today the US Navy has a large fleet of technologically advanced ships, submarines and aircraft capable of influencing the far reaches of the globe. By this influence, commerce continues largely unencumbered and freedom of navigation is protected. The fleet is smaller by half than the one 25 years ago yet still has the capacity to project power at will.³

¹Naval History and Heritage Command, “Famous Navy Quotes: Who Said Them and When,” <http://www.history.navy.mil/trivia/trivia02.htm> (accessed 30 January 2013).

²US Department of the Navy, *Naval Operational Concept*, 2010, <http://www.navy.mil/maritime/noc/NOC2010.pdf> (accessed 24 April 2013), 25.

³Grace V Jean and Sandra I Erwin, “Navy’s Shipbuilding Strategy Remains Under Fire,” *National Defense Magazine*, February 2009, [http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/archive/2009/February/Pages/Navy%E2%80%99s Shipbuilding StrategyRemainsUnderFire.aspx](http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/archive/2009/February/Pages/Navy%E2%80%99s%20Shipbuilding%20StrategyRemainsUnderFire.aspx) (accessed 2 February 2013).

The US Navy provides combat power to the various combatant commanders (CCDRs) as required for their missions, as do all of the other services.⁴ Specifically focusing on United States Africa Command (USAFRICOM) reveals commitments in the littoral areas of the continent that are as valid as any other area of focus. While Africa has long been abused by outside forces and from indigenous struggles, it is poised to be a major factor in strategic planning in the future based on its overall economic and military potential as well as its physical location.⁵ One can easily find evidence of the continent's shaky political environment that could impact others, including the United States. Therefore, a closer look at US Navy engagements in Africa is appropriate.

USAFRICOM

USAFRICOM's mission statement summarizes how the command will support broader national objectives and to what end these actions will lead.

U.S. Africa Command protects and defends the national security interests of the United States by strengthening the defense capabilities of African states and regional organizations and, when directed, conducts military operations, in order to deter and defeat transnational threats and to provide a security environment conducive to good governance and development.⁶

⁴Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1.02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 15 March 2013), 45.

⁵John P. Banks et al., "Top Five Reasons Why Africa Should be a Priority for the United States," *Africa Growth Initiative at Brookings*, March 2013, <http://www.brookings.edu/research/reports/2013/04/africa-priority-united-states> (accessed 12 April 2013), 1.

⁶General Carter Ham, *US Army, Posture Statement of U.S. Africa Command* before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 113th Cong., 1st sess., 7 March 2013, 2.

USAFRICOM was conceived during the administration of President George W. Bush and became an independent combatant command (CCMD) on 01 October 2008.⁷ Creating USAFRICOM did not come without controversy.⁸ Questions swirled as to the real objective of the command.⁹ The anti-USAFRICOM website resistAFRICOM interprets the goals of USAFRICOM as “(1) to counter terrorism on African soil as part of the Global War on Terror, (2) to protect oil resources, recognizing that the US currently purchases approximately 24 percent of its oil from Africa, and (3) to counter China’s growing economic investment on the continent.”¹⁰ Whereas the US military may see USAFRICOM as simply another CCMD, some involved with African affairs take a vastly different view. The conduct of USAFRICOM and its subordinate components is therefore of relevance as the sway of public opinion can have drastic effects on policy decisions at the highest levels.

The US Navy, as part of its force generation role to USAFRICOM, has the responsibility to ensure the right forces are ready for employment in Africa for CCDR

⁷Commander, US Naval Forces Europe–US Naval Forces Africa and US Sixth Fleet, “About,” <http://www.naveur-navaf.navy.mil/about%20us.html> (accessed 25 November 2012).

⁸ResistAFRICOM, “About,” http://salsa.democracyinaction.org/o/1552/t/5734/content.jsp?content_KEY=3855 (accessed 7 April 2013); Shaun Benton, “Africa Opposed to U.S. Command Base-Lekota,” *Bua News*, 29 August 2007, <http://allafrica.com/stories/200708290848.html> (accessed 7 April 2013).

⁹Shabazz Saeed, “Africa continues to reject US Military command,” *FinalCall.com News*, 14 January 2008, http://www.finalcall.com/artman/publish/article_4289.shtml (accessed 26 April 2013).

¹⁰ResistAFRICOM, “Help Stop AFRICOM,” <http://salsa.democracyinaction.org/o/1552/t/5717/signUp.jsp?key=3094> (accessed 7 April 2013); ResistAFRICOM, “About,” <http://salsa.democracyinaction.org/o/1552/t/5717/signUp.jsp?key=3094> (accessed 7 April 2013)

missions. Yet the advantage to having a large, global naval force may be negated when faced with a force that can operate in areas denied to a large fleet and uses weapons and tactics of a very rudimentary nature. The unique threats of the littoral environment combined with the restrictive nature of the terrain serve to create an environment which cannot be influenced through blue water navy means and therefore require a different approach.

People

When reflecting on the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, Lieutenant General Fredrick Hodge, commanding general for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's Allied Land Command said "You need people to deal with people."¹¹ The same sentiment holds true of the African littoral environment. Generally speaking a littoral environment consists of the geographic area near the coast along the land and the water. For the purposes of this thesis, the Joint doctrine and the US Navy definition of the littoral environment will be used as a starting point for consideration, which includes landward and seaward portions. Of primary importance is that people inhabit littoral areas. The resources of Africa depart through the littorals and those living in the region. Hence, the impact of population shifts in Africa on the issues facing the US Navy is profound.

Population shifts from rural to urban centers are constantly occurring; however, in the coming years those shifts will mean more and more people will occupy the regions

¹¹Lieutenant General Frederick Hodges, US Army, "Address to Students" (Guest Speaker, Eisenhower Auditorium, Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 4 April 2013).

immediately adjacent to the coasts.¹² Increased number of people near, and who depend upon the coast for their livelihood will place greater pressure on finite resources. The multi-faceted economic impact of the coastal regions therefore will increase as the available labor pool bulges with the population. Combine this increased pressure with the low development level of most African states and the stage is set for an unpredictable future.

Shifts and bulges in population may not have a direct relationship with US naval interests, such as vessel construction or deployment schedules, but ignoring the changes presented, or failing to apply analytic rigor to the shifts may leave the US behind when reacting to future engagements.

Given the US commitment to the African continent and its people manifested by the establishment of USAFRICOM and the history of involvement with the US Navy and the importance of near shore areas the primary and secondary research questions are:

Primary Research Question

Do United States Navy policies on littoral environments indicate sufficient support to USAFRICOM?

Secondary Research Questions

1. What makes the littoral environment important?
2. What are the threats in the African littoral environment?
3. Do USAFRICOM's engagement policies focus on littoral environments?

¹²United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, *World Urbanization Prospects*, the 2011 Revision: Highlights (New York: United Nations, 2011), 18.

4. Are there compelling economic-security reasons for the US Navy to focus on Africa?

Consideration of the primary question will be done through an analysis of US Navy policy documents. This approach will allow for the relevant emphasis of littoral and Africa issues to be determined to a reasonable degree of clarity.

The impacts of demography in African littorals in relation to the US Navy are more profound than simple shifts in population centers. Population shifts are constantly occurring; however, in the next forty to fifty years those shifts will mean more and more people will occupy the regions immediately adjacent to the coasts and hence their collective impact will be greater.¹³

According to the *US Navy's Vision for Confronting Irregular Challenges*, (*Vision*) the US Navy characterizes the nature of the littoral threat as one that is irregular. It does not often require the same rigorous response a more traditional naval threat elicits.¹⁴ The littoral region around the African continent is of particular concern as it contains many failed and failing states, sits adjacent to many vital oceanic waterways, and contains natural economic outlets through ports and river networks. This thesis will combine a number of factors to highlight why Africa is an area of interest to the United States and the US Navy.

¹³Ibid., 3.

¹⁴US Department of the Navy, *The U.S. Navy's Vision for Confronting Irregular Challenges*, http://www.navy.mil/navydata/cno/CNO_SIGNED_NAVY_VISION_FOR_CONFRONTING_IRREGULAR_CHALLENGES_JANUARY_2010.pdf (accessed 26 April 2013), 4.

Since its inception, the US Navy has secured the seas for commerce, conducted combat operations, and supported humanitarian assistance efforts. After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the United States increasingly focused on other areas of the world that, though present during the Cold War, take an increasingly more prominent role in our foreign policy.¹⁵ The dynamic of the Cold War era-large equally matched ocean-going fleets-has largely disappeared. In its place have emerged myriad small threats that operate closer to the coasts in the littoral regions. The US Navy has committed itself to the freedom of the seas throughout its history. The littoral region as well must be highly emphasized if true freedom is to be maintained to the benefit of the US and its allies.

In order to ensure freedom of navigation and to influence events in certain areas of the world, the US Navy continues to participate in exercises and exchanges with other navies.¹⁶ These partnering efforts also serve to increase combat effectiveness of our allies, to influence the policies of governments and to maintain trade routes.¹⁷ Africa is and will continue to be a continent of vital importance to the world's collective economy due to its physical location and natural resources,¹⁸

¹⁵The White House, *National Security Strategy of the United States* (Washington, DC: The White House, December 1990), 6.

¹⁶US Department of the Navy, *Naval Operational Concept*, 37.

¹⁷David T. Gato, "United States Naval Diplomacy in the Third World" (Research Report, Air War College, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL, 1988), <http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a202074.pdf> (accessed 26 April 2013), 51.

¹⁸Banks, et al., "Top Five Reasons Why Africa Should be a Priority for the United States," 1.

Using pursuing shipbuilding strategies and strategic innovations, this thesis will explore whether or not the US Navy is sufficiently supporting USAFRICOM in its efforts in the littorals. A top down analysis of many of these documents should reveal if the US Navy is prepared and actively pursuing material and policies which will enable the US to continue to have unfettered access to economically vital areas and be positioned to execute strategic goals through partnering with other nations.

Definitions

To understand more fully the research within this thesis some basic contextual definitions are required. The US Navy is replete with specific terms and jargon, which present a foreign vocabulary to outsiders.

Amphibious Assault Ship (multipurpose) “A naval ship designed to embark, deploy, and land elements of a landing force in an assault by helicopters, landing craft, amphibious vehicles, and by combinations of these methods.”¹⁹ A general category of ship which include Amphibious Assault Ship-General Purpose (LHA), Amphibious Assault Ship-Multipurpose (LHD), Amphibious Transport Dock (LPD), Dock Landing Ship (LSD), and Amphibious Ship, Tank (LST).²⁰ These are ocean-going vessels with a relatively shallow draft to launch US Marines and other forces close to shore. Unlike the blue water navy, amphibious ships do not possess the advanced offensive weapons of the regular fleet. Rather, their combat power is the US Marines they place ashore.

¹⁹Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1.02, 15.

²⁰Ibid., 94-96.

Brown Water Navy “*brown water* refers to navigable rivers and their estuaries [sic].”²¹ Again, with no official definition, the brown water navy is the organizations and vessels within the United States Navy specifically designed to operate in waterways not accessible by Blue or Green Water Navy forces (Guided Missile Destroyer (DDG), Guided Missile Frigate (FFG), Guided Missile Cruiser (CG)). Typical of brown water forces are very small, shallow draft, armored vessels armed with crew-served weapons (40mm, 25mm, .50 cal, and others).

Blue Water Navy “*Blue water* refers to the open ocean [sic].”²² This quote is the extent of a definition in Navy or Joint publications. Through personal experience, a blue water navy is the organizations and vessels within a navy that operate most effectively in open ocean and is intended to counter a like naval force-on-force threat.

Geographic Combatant Commander A unified command under a single commander designated by the president with a continuing mission for a specific area.²³ In other words, the command charged with employing combat power in a specific region.

Green Water “*green water* refers to coastal waters, ports and harbors [sic].”²⁴ Again, there is no further official definition. Only professional military experience allows the author to suggest that a green water navy is one. It is generally made up of smaller ships, with shallow drafts, yet capable of ocean transit. These ships generally are designed to engage smaller threats and operate closer to the coast.

²¹US Department of the Navy, *Naval Operational Concept*, 8.

²²Ibid.

²³Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1.02, 45.

²⁴US Department of the Navy, *Naval Operational Concept*, 8.

Littoral “The *littoral* is comprised of two segments. The *seaward* portion is that area from the open ocean to the shore that must be controlled to support operations ashore. The *landward* portion is the area inland from the shore that can be supported and defended directly from the sea [sic].”²⁵ Additionally, the littorals are those regions of the world which restrict, either through depth, bottom topography, or through the adjacent land terrain, the operations of vessels with draft and maneuvering normally associated with only an ocean-going vessel, such as in harbors or river outlets.

Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) In order to place more combat power in the littoral region, the U.S. Navy designed and is building the Littoral Combat Ship—LCS—A ship classification used by the US Navy that refers to two different vessel designs to operate in shallow waters near coastlines. “A fast, agile, focused-mission platform designed for operation in near-shore environments yet capable of open-ocean operation.”²⁶ The LCS is anticipated to defeat irregular threats including mines, diesel submarines and small boats.

Policy As related to the primary research question, “policy” is those statements (implicit or implied), actions or inactions which have an impact upon the US Navy’s ability to provide support to USAFRICOM.

Limitations

This thesis will focus on the importance of the African littoral environment to the United States. Further, the paper will narrow that focus to the stated US national and US

²⁵Ibid.

²⁶US Department of the Navy, Fact File, “Littoral Combat Ship Class-LCS,” http://www.navy.mil/navydata/fact_display.asp?cid=4200&tid=1650&ct=4 (accessed 3 February 2013).

naval strategies as they relate to a naval littoral engagement in and around Africa. This area of the world is extremely diverse as any it has a relatively new combatant command, with a limited history, now focusing on the area. The intent is to determine if the US Navy has policies in place that support the importance of the littoral regions of Africa during steady-state engagement operations. Attempting to predict what could occur during hostilities and the response required is beyond the scope of this research. Finally, this thesis will primarily focus on efforts related to surface ships and efforts of naval forces working ashore vice air, submarine or other forces.

Delimitations

This paper will not address classified information related to the general subject. Therefore, some definitions and threat information will not be addressed in specific terms. This paper will not be a criticism of nor focus on the capabilities of the LCS as that subject is contentious as an acquisition strategy and is not relevant to the research question. However, no consideration of the US Navy's policies surrounding the littorals would be complete without inclusion of portions of the LCS debate, but only as those pieces relate to overall policy. This paper will not focus on the Horn of Africa Region as the issues there have been fenced and addressed by a separate Joint Task Force under USAFRICOM.

Assumptions

1. The United States will continue to confront adversaries in the littoral region. These adversaries will bring a variety of weapons to the fight including, but not limited to mines; diesel submarines; anti-ship cruise missiles; shore launched anti-ship cruise

missiles; rocket propelled grenades; vessel-borne improvised explosive devices; and; small and medium caliber firearms.

2. The United States Navy will continue to be a vital component to national security and as such will continue to be funded at levels required to meet operational challenges. Naval power is also a critical component of national economic security. As such, it will not be cut as to negate its ability to ensure economic and physical security.

3. The United States Navy will continue in its long-standing practices of peacetime or nation-building engagements through the practice of port visits and multi-national exercises which seek to improve cooperation with partner nations.

The US Navy has vast capabilities and supports CCDRs in many respects. Determining whether or not its support is sufficient to the African littoral environment will provide an analysis of where shortcomings may exist, and why they exist. Exploring background issues will assist in fully understanding the broad nature of the primary question. The next chapter, a literature review, looks beyond US government policy documents in an effort to discover other influences, which have a relationship with answering the research questions.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

In addition to the high-end capabilities the United States Navy brings-our aircraft carriers, our submarines, our cruisers, destroyers and those capabilities-the mission set is expanding into what I call the green water and the brown water. We're developing capabilities that relate to the challenges that we face here in the 21st century.²⁷

— Unattributed

The US Navy's role as the protector of the nation's coastline and economic interests throughout the world is a historical precedent from the US's beginnings as a nation.²⁸ The specific environment of the African littorals is a subset of the above functions. This literature review will bring varying viewpoints on US Navy policy into focus on the littoral environments. It will work to determine what makes the littorals important, identify the economic influences affecting policy, correlate USAFRICOM engagement policies and highlight the unique threats of the African littorals to support the primary research question.

Sources for this thesis primarily come from the Combined Arms Research Library's electronic databases, the research staff and the author's independent research. Primary to this effort are the objectives stated in US national level strategy documents and those departmental strategy documents, which support those objectives. Overall, the literature on this topic appears to indicate there is a focus by the US Navy on the littoral regions of Africa.

²⁷US Department of the Navy, "Quotes, Maritime Strategy," <http://www.navy.mil/navydata/leadership/quotes.asp?q=11&c=6> (accessed .4 February 2013).

²⁸US Department of the Navy, *Naval Operational Concept*, 25.

General Information

Several issues and background topics are fundamental to the research questions presented in this paper. These issues cannot simply be assumed away, but rather explored in a deliberate manner to ensure proper context and impact to the research and to the reader.

A review of the most recent *National Security Strategy (NSS)* from 2012 “Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense” clearly establishes the broad constructs under which all other DoD policy aligns.²⁹ The NSS document’s cover letters by President Barak Obama and Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta aligns broader national goals with fiscal constraints. The geographic areas mentioned in the cover letters are also in line with the President’s shift to the Asia-Pacific region, yet contain no further rationale for the shift.³⁰ The four main points of the strategy are security of the US, citizens, allies and partners; growth of the economy and maintenance of an open international economic system; respect for universal values; and an international order, which through the leadership of the US will promote peace and security, as well as promote global cooperation and opportunities to meet global challenges.³¹ President Obama states his intention to pivot his focus to the Asia-Pacific region, and he clearly states the US military’s involvement in Africa shall be a small

²⁹The White House, *National Security Strategy* (Washington, DC: The White House, May 2010).

³⁰*Ibid.*, Cover letters.

³¹*Ibid.*, 7.

footprint at low cost.³² The NSS describes Africa as a partner in achieving the strategic objectives, owing to the general trend towards a more Western mindset of governance and human rights.³³

The Congressional Research Service assessed the NSS's strategic guidance to the DoD and found some interesting points.³⁴ The review served to highlight a few omissions in the guidance as they relate to Africa. The document offered no mention in the review of Africa as it related to the Joint Force of 2020.³⁵ Other geographic regions were mentioned, such as Asia-Pacific, but the omission of Africa suggests what priority the area has, or at worst, an apathy towards the region at the highest levels. The assessment also asked some critical questions of an underlying theme of many national level strategic documents – partnerships. The report questions the goals of these partnership efforts as ill-defined and unmeasured.³⁶ Combining the two omissions, a picture of neglect and ineffective, albeit tangible, efforts begins to emerge.

Prior to the 2012 iteration of the NSS, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Michael Mullen produced his guidance to the services.³⁷ Admiral Mullen's direction included the continuing focus on building partner capacity to defeat a variety of

³²Ibid., 2-3.

³³Ibid., 3.

³⁴Catherine Dale and Pat Towell, *In Brief: Assessing DOD's New Strategic Guidance* (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 12 January 2012).

³⁵Ibid., 1.

³⁶Ibid., 7.

³⁷Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *The National Military Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2011).

threats from state and non-state actors and to promote stability.³⁸ Admiral Mullen highlights the impact of demographic change and urbanization on coastal areas as a source of tension and increased risk of humanitarian disasters as resources become scarcer.³⁹ The mix of platforms and mission sets to support stability and partnerships are called for, but not specified.⁴⁰ Admiral Mullen saw the need for further work by the services to support the CCDRs in all of their efforts, including USAFRICOM.⁴¹

Following the release of the most recent *NSS*, General Martin Dempsey released his guidance to the Joint Force in February 2012.⁴² The guidance covers all the aspects of the *NSS*, but places significant emphasis on the fiscal constraints which will be present while meeting those higher objectives.⁴³ Shifting policy from a war focus to a fiscal focus is analogous to the shift from Cold War policies to the multi-threat environment that followed.

Taking a historical view of policy is a 1988 paper by US Navy Commander David Gato. This historical perspective allows for a deeper understanding of where policies have evolved. Writing on the topic of the US Navy's involvement with the Third World while at the Air War College, Gato considered the area at a time when the threat of the

³⁸*Ibid.*, 12.

³⁹*Ibid.*, 2.

⁴⁰*Ibid.*, 19.

⁴¹*Ibid.*, 20.

⁴²Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Chairman's Strategic Direction to the Joint Force* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2012).

⁴³*Ibid.*, 6-8.

USSR was still very real for the US military.⁴⁴ Although an older work, the historical context of the US Navy's involvement with the Third World in a time of large defense budgets and a nearly 600-ship navy is a fascinating read to establish the long history of the US Navy's actions around the world, and specifically with the developing world.⁴⁵ After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the focus of the *NSS* and therefore other strategy documents began to significantly address areas of the world normally ignored in the Cold War.⁴⁶ This shift to smaller threats should mean a shift in shipbuilding and strategy.

Policies related to the US Navy

When considering sources to answer the research question, the choices of policy documents were self-evident. However, in order to explore the subject more deeply, one must look to sources from organizations outside of the US Navy and USAFRICOM to balance the mostly optimistic outlooks of the two principal subjects.

The US Navy has produced a few policy directives directing strategic priorities, investments and support to higher strategic goals. Overall, the theme of these documents projects an upbeat tone and reflects the US Navy's view of itself as a vital component of national security, diplomacy and support for the goals in the *NSS*. Starting broadly with the US Navy's overarching strategy document and then working more narrowly towards those which impact the littoral regions, an overview of the US Navy's policy will be obtained.

⁴⁴Gato, "United States Naval Diplomacy in the Third World."

⁴⁵*Ibid.*, 14.

⁴⁶The White House, *National Security Strategy of the United States*, 6.

Cooperative Strategy 2007 is the latest US Navy strategy document.⁴⁷ It delineates the US Navy's core mission areas: forward presence, deterrence, sea control, power projection, maritime security and humanitarian assistance and disaster response.⁴⁸ As this strategy is a national policy document, very little in the way of implementation or specifics are offered. Integration of assets and increases in domain awareness are highlighted as key aspects of any implementation effort.⁴⁹ Working from the general to specifics with policy begins to properly contextualize all further navy policy documents.

From time to time, the US Navy revises its overarching strategic implementation document, the *Naval Operational Concept*. The latest revision, released in 2010, supports a holistic maritime approach through the concurrent signatures of the Commandant of the US Marine Corps and the US Coast Guard.⁵⁰ A review of the *US Naval Operations Concept 2010 (NOC 10)* shows a strong commitment to partnering with other navies of the world to enhance effectiveness during operations.⁵¹ The *NOC 10* discusses a wide variety of topics applicable to several portions of this thesis.

The overall tone of the document is one of cooperation and expanding influence and engagement through creative means such as exercises and training assistance. The strategy presents several goals that the outcomes of the vision are intended to support:

⁴⁷US Department of the Navy, *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower*, October 2007, <http://www.navy.mil/maritime/Maritimestrategy.pdf> (accessed 24 April 2013).

⁴⁸*Ibid.*, 13-14.

⁴⁹*Ibid.*, 5.

⁵⁰US Department of the Navy, *Naval Operational Concept*.

⁵¹*Ibid.*, 9.

enhance and formalize interoperability, build partner capacity, improve our regional awareness and understanding of complex environments and challenges, achieve an improved understanding and ability to counter illicit and extremist actors, enhance and broaden the multi-mission capabilities and applications of today's force, identify necessary and distinct shifts in emphasis and investment to confront irregular challenges.⁵²

Specifically for Africa is the concept of the African Partnership Station (APS), which encompasses several efforts under one umbrella title. The APS concept is a venue for training and collaborative exchanges with African nations on all aspects of maritime security, from law enforcement to combat.⁵³ Each instance of APS is done with a specific country goal in mind, increasing the capacity of the nation to improve its maritime security situation.⁵⁴ The littoral environment is covered by the *NOC 10* from several angles.

From the perspective of surface shipbuilding, the *NOC 10* asserts the US Navy is rebalancing its force to address the littoral environment through a focus on brown and green water assets.⁵⁵ Of note is the assertion that the Patrol Coastal (PC) class of ship is a littoral platform.⁵⁶ Its subsequent analysis on a capabilities chart shows the PC able to

⁵²Ibid., 14.

⁵³Ibid., 40.

⁵⁴Ibid.

⁵⁵Ibid., 82.

⁵⁶Ibid., 89.

accomplish the same number of missions as larger surface combatants.⁵⁷ The littorals are highlighted as a strategic necessity in the same part of the *NOC 10* that relates to the strategic importance of freedom of navigation or sea control.⁵⁸ Finally, as a challenging environment, the littorals are held out as one full of irregular threats from weapons and the geography of the region.⁵⁹ The *NOC 10* is a broad document which provides much of the strategic direction to the US Navy. Implementation of the concept is found in other documents and actions.

Admiral Jonathan Greenert, Chief of Naval Operations, presented his *Naval Posture Statement* in March of 2012 to the US Congress.⁶⁰ In this testimony, Admiral Greenert highlighted three tenets of the Fleet: warfighting first, operate forward and be ready.⁶¹ Geographically, Admiral Greenert emphasized some important strategic locations in the world, one being the African continent and its role as a vital crossroads of the world's economies.⁶² He highlighted the US Navy's commitment to partnering with nations to fight piracy, train security forces and improve the US Navy's ability to respond to humanitarian or other crises. The global presence of the US Navy will continue to serve US strategic interests by allowing for the forward deployment of assets. Two

⁵⁷Ibid., 92.

⁵⁸Ibid., 53.

⁵⁹Ibid., 66.

⁶⁰Admiral Jonathan Greenert, US Navy, *FY 2013 Department of Navy Posture*, 112th Cong., 1st sess., March 2012, http://www.navy.mil/cno/120316_PS.pdf (accessed 26 April 2013).

⁶¹Ibid., 6.

⁶²Ibid., 4.

examples of this continued forward presence is the stationing of LCSs in Singapore and PCs in Bahrain.⁶³ Mentioned also in the statement is the need for small surface combatants, but in relation to the shift towards the Asia-Pacific region. The remainder of the Admiral's comments related to countering conventional naval and nation-state threats, such as ballistic missiles and high technology in cyberspace.

The following section covers other documents produced by or for the US Navy which demonstrate a strong desire to operate in the littoral environment to not only fight and win kinetically, but also to influence areas so that kinetic operations are not necessary. Regularly the US Navy's documents related to littoral conflict use the term irregular warfare to describe threats that could only originate or be an actual threat in a littoral region.

The January 2010 *US Navy Vision for Confronting Irregular Challenges (Vision)* covers the strategic rationale for focusing on areas along or near the coastlines of the world.⁶⁴ This succinct strategy clearly lays out the threat, the environment and the expected actions to counter the threats. The strategy has four primary outcomes: increased effectiveness in stabilizing and strengthening regions, enhanced regional awareness, increased regional partner capacity and expanded coordination and interoperability.⁶⁵ The US Navy's prominence in countering the irregular threat is

⁶³Ibid., 7.

⁶⁴US Department of the Navy, *The U.S. Navy's Vision for Confronting Irregular Challenges*.

⁶⁵Ibid., 3.

supported by over 75 percent of the world's population living near the coasts.⁶⁶ The emphasis for meeting the irregular challenge is through multi-mission platforms using a cooperative strategy to combat instability.⁶⁷ The strategy characterizes the environment as one of instability and insecurity, with terrorist and criminal organizations exploiting that environment in their favor. The strategy points to the proximity of these areas and activities to populated areas and coastlines and the relative position of US Navy as a primary driver in placing the US Navy as a principal in the irregular challenge fight.⁶⁸

The CNA's Center for Naval Analyses, a Washington, DC, based not-for-profit research firm, conducted an analysis of the US Navy's irregular warfare policy contained in the *Vision*.⁶⁹ The challenges include "regional instability, insurgency, crime, and violent extremism."⁷⁰ In this realm of operations, the US Navy has several advantages: global reach, access, persistence, scalability, rapid response multi-mission and cooperative relationships.⁷¹ The US Navy bases its irregular strategy around three mission areas: preventive security, building partner capacity and countering manifest threats. Although broad, these areas provide insight into what the US Navy intends to do

⁶⁶Ibid.

⁶⁷Ibid., 7.

⁶⁸Ibid., 6.

⁶⁹A. Fritz, A. Freedman, and P. Haussmann, *The Navy Role in Confronting Irregular Challenges; Implementing the Navy Vision for CIC* (Washington, DC: CNA Center for Naval Analyses, March 2011), <http://www.cna.org/sites/default/files/research/the%20navy%20role%20in%20confronting%20irregular%20challenges.pdf> (accessed 24 April 2013).

⁷⁰Ibid., 1.

⁷¹Ibid., 14.

regarding these threats. How these threats will be met by the US Navy was also examined by CNA Center for Naval Analyses and provided insight into how future forces could be employed. In a detailed breakdown of the various parts of confronting irregular challenges, the bulk of the work can be done by conventional forces, augmented by Naval Special Operations Forces.⁷²

Enacting portions of the *Vision* and other US Navy objectives is The Navy Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC), responsible for manning, training and equipping US Navy forces to operate in expeditionary missions. NECC centers its strategic efforts under an enterprise plan for the Navy Expeditionary Combat Enterprise (NECE) titled “NECE Strategic Plan 2012.”⁷³ This plan lays out how NECC will man, train and equip the US Navy’s expeditionary forces to meet the objectives of higher strategies. Total force, training, equipment, logistics, alignment and resource requirements management are priorities the NECE Strategy underscore the intent of NECC to provide the forces to execute missions.⁷⁴ NECC is not immune to budget mitigation efforts; in a February 2012 notice, the CNO directed the disestablishment of one of the riverine squadrons, thus reducing the total number of riverine units.⁷⁵

⁷²Ibid., 43-48.

⁷³US Department of the Navy, Navy Expeditionary Combat Command, *NECE Strategic Plan 2012*, [https://usff.portal.navy.mil/sites/NECC/Command/Strat_Plan_FINAL_ElectronicCopy30 NOV 11.pdf](https://usff.portal.navy.mil/sites/NECC/Command/Strat_Plan_FINAL_ElectronicCopy30%20NOV%2011.pdf) (accessed 24 April 2013).

⁷⁴Ibid., 8-13.

⁷⁵US Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations Notice, *Disestablishment of riverine Squadron Four Composite*, 15 February 2012, <http://doni.daps.dla.mil/Directives/05000%20General%20Management%20Security%20and%20Safety%20Services/05-400%20Organization%20and%20Functional%20Support%20Services/5400.2021.pdf> (accessed 16 May 2013).

Commander Michael E. Hutchens' monograph "Towards a Balanced Fleet: Options for a 21st Century Navy" examines US Navy strategy documents since 1970 and draws parallels with historical examples to determine the best path forward for the US Navy in terms of strategic approach and ship construction.⁷⁶ Hutchens explores the progression of US Navy strategies since the 1970's and finds abundant examples of how the US Navy has adapted to changes in strategic situations. The US Navy places great value in medium-sized, blue-water surface ships, capable of multiple missions, such as the DDG. In Hutchens' view, the correct approach in terms of strategic engagement and cost effectiveness for the US Navy is to balance the fleet with more medium surface combatants like the DDG, and increase the importance of the often overlooked amphibious, logistics and small combatants.⁷⁷

Focusing attention on the material side of the US Navy's policy for littoral environments, William Dunaway examines changes in US Naval strategy immediately following the collapse of the Soviet Union in a Tufts University thesis, "Gunboat Diplomacy." In his thesis, Dunaway explores the role of the Navy in shaping the world in a manner in line with US interests given the new power structure.⁷⁸ His analysis of actual uses of naval power suggest that the need for a large scale, blue-water, large platform based fleet is lopsided. Rather, the ability to respond rapidly and with great lethality to

⁷⁶Michael E. Hutchens, "Towards a Balanced Fleet: Options for a 21st Century Navy" (Monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2009).

⁷⁷Ibid., 45-46.

⁷⁸William M. Dunaway, *Gunboat Diplomacy in a New World Order: Strategic Considerations for U.S. Naval Intervention in the Twenty-First Century* (Medford, MA: Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, 1991), <http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a256442.pdf> (accessed 26 April 2013).

small crisis and other regional matters will become the predominant area in which the US Navy will be employed.⁷⁹ Dunaway's thesis is in line with the rapidly changing outlook of the time. One year prior the 1990 NSS points to the pivot point in paradigm towards regional and small-scale engagements and away from global nuclear war, but with the caveat that a credible large platform force is still necessary to ensure the aspect of deterrence.⁸⁰

The most recent long-range shipbuilding plan was delivered to the Congress by Deputy Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter in March 2012.⁸¹ Ensuring traceability to the NSS, the plan lays out how the US Navy's capital investments will meet those objectives in a responsible manner.⁸² The plan offers ship types and basic missions that these platforms will be expected to perform. This plan deals with large projects; smaller purchases such as riverine vessels are not included in this report.⁸³ However, the plan does identify the US Navy's priorities of conducting major naval operations in one theater, maintaining a forward presence, focus on the Asia-Pacific region, partner with

⁷⁹Ibid., 76.

⁸⁰The White House, *National Security Strategy of the United States*, 17.

⁸¹US Department of Defense, Office of the Deputy Secretary of Defense, *Annual Report to Congress on Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for FY2013*, 28 March 2012, http://www.wired.com/images_blogs/dangerroom/2012/03/navy-shipbuilding-fy2013.pdf (accessed 24 April 2013).

⁸²Ibid., 8.

⁸³Ibid., 15.

like-minded nations and seek low cost approaches.⁸⁴ From this abridged list, one can reasonably extract the importance of other projects.

The Congressional Research Service issued *Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress*, which provided a non-biased analysis of the US Navy's shipbuilding plan.⁸⁵ The US Navy stated a 500-ship fleet would meet all CCMD demands; however, this number does not take into account any fiscal constraints.⁸⁶ The report contains transcripts of congressional testimony by US Navy officials. The main point from all of these excerpts is unwillingness by US Navy officials to adjust their shipbuilding outlook in terms of the types of ships, rather to focusing on increasing the size of the fleet to meet CCMD demands.⁸⁷ This unwillingness to change is indicative of a broader culture within the US Navy of slow change. Within the report and the tables of types of ships to be built, only the LCS is specific to the littorals.⁸⁸

Many documents explored the degree of mismatch between the US Navy's stated goals and the surface vessels intended to carry out those functions. Considering these criticisms adds a critical review of the US Navy's stated intentions and the reality being put into action. An analysis done for *National Defense Magazine* by Grace V. Jean with

⁸⁴Ibid., 3.

⁸⁵Ronald O'Rourke, *Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and issues for Congress* (Washington, DC: U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, 26 July 2012).

⁸⁶Ibid., 12.

⁸⁷Ibid., 38-41.

⁸⁸Ibid., 12.

additional reporting by Sandra I. Erwin entitled “Navy’s Shipbuilding Strategy Remains under Fire” summarized the broad criticism of the US Navy’s shipbuilding strategy.⁸⁹ The article points to the vastly different cost figures used by the US Navy and the cost estimates produced by the Congressional Budget Office. The difference between the two is nearly double, making the mismatch astounding and calling into question the viability of the shipbuilding plan.⁹⁰

The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) researched options for the US Navy and the US Coast Guard’s shipbuilding plans in July 2009.⁹¹ The CBO does not make recommendations, but rather presents options. In this case the CBO did not find significant cost savings in any of the three alternatives explored, nor did the CBO find a rationale to deviate from the current shipbuilding plans of the US Coast Guard and the US Navy.⁹² The CBO did find there was potential for US Coast Guard and US Navy standardization and highlighted a broader desire to maximize the shipbuilding budgets of the United States in order to accomplish multiple goals.⁹³ The potential here is to advocate for a multi-mission platform capable of satisfying US Coast Guard and US Navy needs.⁹⁴ Considering the national level strategic objectives this apparent mismatch

⁸⁹Jean and Erwin, “Navy’s Shipbuilding Strategy Remains Under Fire.”

⁹⁰*Ibid.*

⁹¹Eric J. Labs, *Options for Combining the Navy’s and the Coast Guard’s Small Combatant Programs* (Washington, DC: Congressional Budget Office, July 2009), <http://www.cbo.gov/publication/20935> (accessed 26 April 2013).

⁹²*Ibid.*, 1-2.

⁹³*Ibid.*, 13-14.

⁹⁴*Ibid.*, 14.

of efforts becomes a critical review of US Navy's and the Coast Guard's separate ship-building efforts and the ability of the US Navy to meet CCDR requirements.

In January 2012 The Government Accountability Office reported on the shortfalls in the Navy's plan to build additional Arleigh Burke class destroyers.⁹⁵ Specifically the Navy does not address the threat of a technologically sophisticated attack, the cost benefit tradeoffs of various ship solutions available, and limited consideration of various shipboard radar systems.⁹⁶ The Navy's failure to fully consider the costs and benefits of various ship solutions indicates the path forward may require a reevaluation of the shipbuilding plan.⁹⁷ This report dealt with areas of concern around the Arleigh Burke class destroyer; however, the relevant information is in the extrapolation and relation to littoral efforts of the questions being raised at the basic level of required capabilities and thoughtful consideration of capabilities and missions.

Naval Academy instructor Kurt Albaugh opined on the direction of the US Navy's shipbuilding approach, and how that approach could best be changed to meet the threats of the world.⁹⁸ Comparing the modern fleet to the one the US possessed at its beginning as a nation, Albaugh finds the same disparity and two-point focus, namely one that sees only two types of ships; capital ships (carriers) and small combatants (frigates)-

⁹⁵US Government Accountability Office, *Arleigh Burke Destroyers: Additional Analysis and Oversight Required to Support the Navy's Future Surface Combatant Plans* (Washington, DC: US Government Accountability Office, 2012).

⁹⁶*Ibid.*, i.

⁹⁷*Ibid.*, 52.

⁹⁸Kurt Albaugh, "Six Frigates and the Future of Gunboat Diplomacy," *Small Wars Journal* (4 April 2011), <http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/six-frigates-and-the-future-of-gunboat-diplomacy> (accessed 26 April 2013).

paying little attention to anything else.⁹⁹ Albaugh argues what is needed is an innovative use of a ship type, much like at the US's beginnings, which will allow the US Navy to perform at many levels of war, in many theaters. His answer is in the middle of the road; the Guided Missile Destroyer or DDG. In his estimate, by incorporating some changes to the Flight III DDG, the US Navy would be able to operate and support the CCDRs better and in more environments if the DDG platform was accepted as the answer to many of the challenges faced by the US Navy and CCDRs.¹⁰⁰

Finding the right balance of ships to combat a variety of threats is the subject of an historical look at the mix of US Navy ships by Eric Kimura in an online 2005 *Proceedings* article.¹⁰¹ Kimura cautions against an aggressive pursuit of a small ship centered navy and uses as an example the disastrous performance of gunboats in the War of 1812 against a large traditional British fleet.¹⁰²

Balancing the fleet and constructing ships is a large undertaking which does not come without criticism. *The New York Times* took an interest in the US Navy's approach to shipbuilding in April 2008.¹⁰³ A very critical Philip Taubman explained many of the

⁹⁹Ibid., 2.

¹⁰⁰Ibid., 4.

¹⁰¹Eric Kimura, "A Gunboat Navy for the 21st Century," *Proceedings* 131, no. 7 (July 2005): 44-46, <http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/detail?sid=f3d305f0-6d6c-41b8-ad73-c101a752e2c1%40sessionmgr10&vid=1&hid=1&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWVvc3QtbGl2ZQ%3d%3d#db=aph&AN=17701702> (accessed 26 April 2013).

¹⁰²Ibid.

¹⁰³Philip Taubman, "Lesson on How Not to Build a Navy Ship," 25 April 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/25/us/25ship.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (accessed 26 April 2013).

process flaws of the Navy's acquisition strategy have led to large costs incurred due to change orders and the desire to use a civilian ship design and adapt it for military use.¹⁰⁴ Additionally, the US Navy's approach to acquisition is replete with inconsistent requirements and a prevailing attitude of allowing the prime contractor to have too much control over their programs.¹⁰⁵ Taubman states that the US Navy wanted the LCS capability quickly and inexpensively. The fear was a "David and Goliath" phenomenon where small and inexpensive threats could inflict significant damage on the fleet, like the USS COLE in 2000.¹⁰⁶ Taubman takes and expresses historical pulse of the US Navy in its disdain for small combat ships as any substantial component of a fleet.¹⁰⁷

The Undersecretary of the Navy, Robert O. Work, spoke at a 2012 National Defense Industry Association gathering where he offered absolute support of the LCS program, the ship's capabilities in the littorals, and by extension all of the US Navy policies behind the effort.¹⁰⁸ He stated it is the US Navy's desire to fully back the LCS program due to its cost savings and strategic value. He went on to say it is unrealistic to envision a naval strategy where "multi-billion dollar warships . . . do some of these engagement activities that LCS could do."¹⁰⁹ The Undersecretary answered many of the

¹⁰⁴Ibid.

¹⁰⁵Ibid.

¹⁰⁶Ibid.

¹⁰⁷Ibid.

¹⁰⁸"Navy Leaders Frustrated by Littoral Combat Ship Naysayers," *National Defense Magazine*, <http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/blog/Lists/Posts/Post.aspx?ID+759>(accessed 10 August 2012).

¹⁰⁹Ibid.

criticisms of the LCS program, explaining the broader operating environment envisioned for the ship, vice taking the vessel as a stand-alone capability platform. Through this statement, it is clear that the opinion of senior US Navy leadership is one which fully supports the current shipbuilding plan and its ability to meet CCDR's requirements and is in line with US Navy and national strategy.¹¹⁰

How the US Navy employs which ships it chooses to build is the subject of Michael Polidoro's Naval Post Graduate thesis exploring the alternative uses of the then current inventory of small combatant naval vessels, Patrol, Hydrofoil, Missile (PHM) and PC classes.¹¹¹ Polidoro advocates for the use of the PC class ships in low intensity operations and engagement with littoral partners during a period of shrinking military budgets.¹¹² Although this thesis is a case for a particular platform, the impetus for the thesis in the first place shows the slow-to-change nature of the naval service. Following Operation Earnest Will or the "Tanker War" of the late 1980s, the US Navy needed a vessel capable of escort missions at a lower cost than blue water assets. Simultaneously the US Navy Special Warfare Command was searching for a SEAL support vessel. In 1991 construction began on the PC class ship. A combination of several design initiatives it was intended to serve many purposes.¹¹³ Special Warfare Command soon found the PC

¹¹⁰Ibid.

¹¹¹Michael A Polidoro, "The Use of Patrol Craft in Low Intensity Conflict Operations: An Alternative Model for the Employment of the CYCLONE-Class (PC-1)" (Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 1995).

¹¹²Ibid., 77-79.

¹¹³Ibid., 71-74.

class did not meet its needs.¹¹⁴ Instead, the US Navy used the PC class ships in various roles, including those in the littoral regions.

Polidoro offers an historical perspective on the culture of the US Navy and its approach to engaging in environments of a small and confined nature. He lays out the negative attitude of the US Navy towards providing capabilities, which could operate or control littoral environments, either through coastal vessels or greater development of amphibious forces.¹¹⁵ Polidoro also comments on a roadblock within the US Navy to providing assets to operate in the littoral environment: culture. Major acquisitions are heavily influenced by the CNO, and he in turn is heavily influenced by the community from which he spent his career. Within the surface community, the CG and DDG is the pinnacle of vessels. Other ships, such as amphibious vessels or “luxury” vessels are relegated to secondary status.¹¹⁶

Polidoro’s assertions about the PC class of vessel did not stand up to a later thesis from the Naval Postgraduate School by Brian Christiansen, who used a model to compare the effectiveness of various ship designs against threats derived from unclassified sources.¹¹⁷ Four types of vessels-LCS, National Security Cutter, Sea Lance and PC-were placed in the model and compared against a representative littoral enemy combatant of

¹¹⁴Ibid., 83.

¹¹⁵Polidoro, “The Use of Patrol Craft in Low Intensity Conflict Operations,” 9.

¹¹⁶Ibid., 9-10.

¹¹⁷Brian J. Christiansen, “Littoral Combat Vessels: Analysis and Comparison of Designs” (Naval Post Graduate School, Monterey, CA, 2008).

Chinese origin, the Type 022 Houbei.¹¹⁸ The conclusion was that no present US ship design is ideal for missions in the littoral environment.¹¹⁹

Speaking in favor of the LCS platform as ideal for the littoral environment is Dan Schultz of Lockheed Martin who argues the LCS is the ideal ship type to meet the strategic and naval needs of the United States.¹²⁰ He makes his statement in defense of current US Navy shipbuilding policy in a rebuttal to an article by Lieutenant James Rushton published in *Proceedings Magazine* in 2008 which advocates for the US Navy to adopt a corvette type of ship common among other navies of the world and is general less expensive than the current LCS.¹²¹ The Schultz article provides an opinion from a defense contractor, the industry which is supported by US Navy policy and shipbuilding efforts.

The preceding overview of broad national and naval strategies and the comments and criticisms thereof have established an historical and contextual basis for analysis. Within the primary question are specific facets which will now be explored to more fully answer the primary question and provide the depth necessary for reaching any conclusion.

¹¹⁸Ibid., 21.

¹¹⁹Ibid., 51.

¹²⁰Dan Schultz, Response to James Rushton, "Fill the Middle Gap: Rediscover the Corvette," *Proceedings* 134, no 5 (2008).

¹²¹James Rushton, "Fill the Middle Gap: Rediscover the Corvette," *Proceedings* 134, no. 5 (2008), <http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2008-01/fill-middle-gap-rediscover-corvette> (accessed 26 April 2013), 86.

Littoral Environment

The littoral environment does not have a universal definition or factors; therefore civilian entities, the military and other groups have various definitions. For the military, what makes an environment important is what it contains and how it is influenced. The littorals do have in common several aspects which provide the basis for why this environment is important to a CCMD and to the US Navy. Naval Warfare Publication (NWP) 3-32 summarizes the importance of the littorals with a few data points: almost 80 percent of all countries border the sea, roughly 95 percent of the population lives within 600 miles of the sea and approximately 60 percent of politically significant cities are within 60 miles of the coast.¹²²

The importance of the littoral regions is closely related to the fourth secondary research question in this thesis, that of economic security interests. The littorals are that space between open ocean and land; as such they have unique topographical characteristics such as beaches, which require specialized equipment that the US Navy has currently in its amphibious fleet. The littorals have significant population factors such as density, diversity and human activity, which also contribute greatly to the effectiveness of operations, but appear to be harder to address through military technology.

In 2005 Gregory Treverton testified before the House of Representatives Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence on Emerging Threats. He placed these threats into nine categories: communications revolution, economic globalization, other technological revolutions, revolution in military affairs, identity politics “us versus

¹²²US Department of the Navy, US Navy Warfare Publication, *Maritime Operations at the Operational Level of War*, NWP 3-32, Chief of Naval Operations, 2008, 1-4.

them”, global demographics, environmental concerns, role of state and law, and US foreign policy.¹²³ Of these, Treverton’s analysis indicates that economic globalization, global demographics, environmental concerns, the role of state and law and US foreign policy constitute direct linkages between US policy and the African littoral environment. The flow of a globalized economy will positively and negatively affect the US as this trade may create a further divide among the haves and have-nots, thereby creating tension.¹²⁴ Global demographics will affect the US through migrations; also the creation of youth bulges in developing areas and overall urbanization of the world could change the US’s threat environment.¹²⁵ Water and food availability, in combination with other factors, will result in resource competition therefore resulting in conflict.¹²⁶ Non-state actors will influence the US and African littorals as these are areas where terrorist and criminal networks and Non-Governmental Organizations operate in close proximity, many in areas with little to no sovereign governments.¹²⁷

The concept of population shifts and migration to urban areas having a direct effect on US Navy policy may not be obvious, but the research shows a great deal to indicate its importance. Shifts in population are well documented in the United Nation’s

¹²³Gregory F. Treverton, RAND Corporation, *Emerging Threats to National Security* before the House of Representatives Permanent Select committee on Intelligence, 109th Cong. 1st sess., 5 February 2005, <http://www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/CT234.html> (accessed 26 April 2013), 2.

¹²⁴*Ibid.*, 3.

¹²⁵*Ibid.*, 4.

¹²⁶*Ibid.*, 11.

¹²⁷*Ibid.*, 5.

Population Division statistics archive. Specifically examined were those items related to urbanization, and growth of the developing world and the location of major population centers.¹²⁸ Adding further context to the UN data is the Human Developmental Index. This UN index measures and combines life expectancy, education, and income into a single score.¹²⁹ The higher the number, the more developed a nation is as a whole.

Related to urbanization, the United Nations' Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division released its 2011 revision to the World Urbanization Prospects, which reports on the trends of urbanization throughout the world.¹³⁰ Analyzing this data will allow for greater understanding of the trends occurring on the African continent. The report states that urbanization will be most prominent in developing areas of the world, including Africa.¹³¹ The move towards greater urbanization and knowing that most urban centers are located near the coast makes demographic shifts an issue with which the US Navy will have to contend with in all aspects of its future planning.

These shifts have implications for economic opportunity. Two economists from the Reserve Bank of Boston published "Seismic Shifts: The Economic Impact of Demographic Change, An Overview," is a summary of a conference hosted by the bank to explore the consequences of the shift in population growth towards the developing

¹²⁸United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, *Urban Population, Development and the Environment 2011*, http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/publications/pdf/urbanization/urban_wallchart_2011-web-smaller.pdf (accessed 27 March 2013).

¹²⁹United Nations, Human Development Report, "Human Development Index," <http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/hdi/> (accessed 26 April 2013).

¹³⁰United Nations, *World Urbanization Prospects*.

¹³¹*Ibid.*, 3.

world.¹³² Within the report are data related to the potential for violence when population groups collide, growth within poor nations and especially cities in Africa, where population growth is occurring.¹³³

Threats

This thesis is focused on threats found in the littoral environment surrounding the African continent; however, in order to describe these threats, a broader consideration of what is a threat will be taken to fully determine which threats exist in the African littoral environment.

The challenges of the African littoral environment are not limited to military issues. The impact of and threats presented by transnational organized crime cannot be overlooked in the security environment of the African littorals. The White House's *Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime* discusses the global threats, but also highlights those regions especially impacted by transnational organized crime.¹³⁴ Western Africa, and further Guinea-Bissau, are both mentioned for its increase in drug trafficking creating a complex problem for the security of the affected nations.

¹³²Jane S. Little and Robert Triest, "Seismic Shifts: The Economic Impact of Demographic Change. An Overview" (Research Conference Series #46, Boston, June 2001), <http://www.bos.frb.org/economic/conf/conf46/conf46a.pdf> (accessed 26 April 2013).

¹³³*Ibid.*, 7-9.

¹³⁴The White House, *Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime: Addressing Converging Threats to National Security*, (Washington, DC: The White House, July 2011), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/Strategy_to_Combat_Transnational_Organized_Crime_July_2011.pdf (accessed 26 April 2013).

In response to these criminal actions, the Department of State (DoS) has put in place a West Africa Citizen Security Initiative that hopes to combat transnational criminal threats in the region.¹³⁵ To date, this organization has been funded at the \$60M level. The goals of this effort are to combat organized crime and to improve security cooperation and address socio-economic issues.¹³⁶

Another example of a non-kinetic or non-military threat to the African littorals comes from the European Union's Institute for Security Studies, which published a report on the coming crisis of global governance entitled "Global Governance 2025: At a Critical Juncture."¹³⁷ Two of the non-kinetic threats are non-state actors and population shifts, which cause second and third order effects. Relevant to this thesis is the opinion that non-state actors will exert an increasing negative influence on governments and the states targeted by these non-state actors are the already the poorest and least stable.¹³⁸ The report emphasizes population shifts to more unstable areas as a threat for several reasons, but one which affects the economics of a broader region is resource scarcity. Further exacerbating this strain of resources will be a relatively young and unemployed

¹³⁵US Department of State, "The West Africa Cooperative Security Initiative," <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/166329.pdf> (accessed 26 April 2013).

¹³⁶*Ibid.*

¹³⁷United States' National Intelligence Council and European Union's Institute for Security Studies, "Global Governance 2025: At a Critical Juncture," September 2010, http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Global__Governance_2025.pdf (accessed 26 April 2013).

¹³⁸*Ibid.*, iv-v.

bulge in population. Already weak institutions in developing nations will have a hard time accommodating this influx of population.¹³⁹

Identifying the problems is one step in any process to find an answer; identifying potential options is another. In 2006, Colonel Thomas Dempsey, the Director of African Studies at the US Army War College, wrote “Counterterrorism in African Failed States: Challenges and Potential Solutions.”¹⁴⁰ His work explores the complex causes of terrorism in Africa, such as economics, population, poor governance, etc. Dempsey puts forth four broad options currently open to US forces: direct military action, security assistance, legal approaches, and finally broad efforts, which address the undercurrents of terrorism.¹⁴¹

William S. Lind, writing for a World Security Institute’s Center for Defense Information publication titled “America’s Defense Meltdown: Pentagon Reform for President Obama and the new Congress,” is critical of a wide variety of topics related to the US Navy.¹⁴² Of note are his views on the worldwide threats faced by the US Navy and the environments in which the US Navy will face these threats. Lind refers to the

¹³⁹Ibid., 57.

¹⁴⁰Thomas Dempsey, “Counterterrorism in African Failed States: Challenges and Potential Solutions,” Strategic Studies Institute, April 2006, <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=649> (accessed 26 April 2013).

¹⁴¹Ibid., 19.

¹⁴²Thomas Christie et al., *America's Defense Meltdown: Pentagon Reform for President Obama and the New Congress* (Washington, DC: Center for Defense Information, 2008), <http://www.it-aac.org/images/AmericasDefenseMeltdownFullText.pdf> (accessed 26 April 2013).

type of conflict most likely to occur in the future as fourth generation war or 4GW.¹⁴³ In this type of warfare, the threat comes from areas of failing or failed states or from non-state actors working outside of any type of government control. When these threat areas are combined with the littoral region, Lind finds that the role of the US Navy becomes one of a coastal and inland navy, able to control territory and limit the spread of the threat.¹⁴⁴

Lind goes on to say that the current alignment of US forces is designed to destroy a state and its military power. When and if that happens, the resulting lawless region will require controlling forces in some form. He points to Iraq as the example of how this strategy plays out.¹⁴⁵ The results, as he sees them, are an area left with little control and little infrastructure. The waterways of an area are then thrust back into prominence for trade, travel and military action.¹⁴⁶ The US Navy should be able to control these areas after a conflict, and before and during lower level operations. The environment of the littorals is “qualitatively different from naval warfare in blue water” in that there are a multitude of civilian ships, boats and aircraft operating in the same space as military forces.¹⁴⁷

From the viewpoint of a surface navy officer, Lieutenant Erich Schaller of the Naval War College discussed the threats to naval surface forces in the littoral regions of

¹⁴³Ibid., 121.

¹⁴⁴Ibid.

¹⁴⁵Ibid.

¹⁴⁶Ibid.

¹⁴⁷Ibid., 122.

the world from three specific threat options to achieve an anti-access objective: mines, anti-ship cruise missiles and diesel-electric submarines.¹⁴⁸ These three threat areas represent the three most dangerous and most available types of weapons. Looking at these threats in the littoral develops the strategy of anti-access campaigns against any major naval power. The relatively low cost means any nation, or even non-state actor, has the means to acquire these weapons and employ them in whatever manner they may choose.

Lieutenant Commander Daniel Uhls supports the concept of using a greater quantity of smaller vessels in his 2002 thesis from the US Army's Command and General Staff College.¹⁴⁹ He states the US Navy is very focused on Cold War concepts and shipbuilding strategies, which are not applicable to current threats in the littoral environment.¹⁵⁰

Threats in the maritime environment span a large spectrum of sophistication and employment methods. The littorals are addressed in non-specific terms stating that threats in these areas arise from both state and non-state actors. Portions of the world with weak

¹⁴⁸Erich U. Schaller, "Naval Surface Force Protection in the Long War: A Consideration of the Anti-Access Threat" (Research Project, Naval War College, Newport, RI, 2006), <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA463932> (accessed 26 April 2013).

¹⁴⁹Daniel B. Uhls, "Does the Fast Patrol Boat Have a Future in the Navy?" (Fort Leavenworth KS, 2002), <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA415966> (accessed 26 April 2013).

¹⁵⁰*Ibid.*, 88.

governments and law enforcement are prime areas from which threats arise.¹⁵¹ In

response to this broad area of threats, the US Navy established NECC in January 2006 to:

Organize, man, train, equip, and sustain NECC forces to execute combat, combat support, and combat service support missions across the spectrum of joint, combined, and multinational operations in the near-coast, inshore, and riverine environments to include confronting irregular challenges and other shaping missions that secure strategic access and global freedom of action.¹⁵²

USAFRICOM's Engagements

Narrowing the focus of the thesis to primarily the African continent yields a sizeable amount of work, focusing on the Horn of Africa region. Although not the focus of this thesis, it is important to understand the body of work associated with the African continent. The neighboring vital shipping lanes have encouraged a modern day revival of piracy for ransom.

The Congressional Research Service wrote in *Piracy off the Horn of Africa* about the reemergence of piracy and the threats imposed by this development.¹⁵³ The US Army's Training and Doctrine Command published a comprehensive assessment of the nations of the Horn of Africa region, their capabilities and each nation's challenges.¹⁵⁴ Through this document, a broad understanding of motivations in the region can be obtained and used to contextualize US policy statements and actions. The threats

¹⁵¹US Department of the Navy, *Naval Operational Concept*, 18.

¹⁵²US Department of the Navy, *NECE Strategic Plan 2012*, 2, 4.

¹⁵³Lauren Ploch, et al, *Piracy off the Horn of Africa* (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, April 2009), <http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/122938.pdf> (accessed 26 April 2013).

¹⁵⁴US Department of the Army, *Operational Environment Analysis: Horn of Africa* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: TRADOC Intelligence Support Activity, 2009).

discussed many times point to a naval answer or at least an area of naval interest in containing emerging threats.

General Carter Ham, then USAFRICOM's Commander, testified before the House Armed Services Committee in February 2012 and in March 2013 on his area of responsibility.¹⁵⁵ Of note were the many partnering activities that USAFRICOM engages in with various nations of Africa and other allies in African waters, including the US Navy's APS. Also of note were the threats identified by GEN Ham. Overall, 14 of the world's 20 failed states are in Africa. The continent also includes several areas of al-Qaida activity and many ungoverned or under governed regions.¹⁵⁶

The Commander, Naval Forces Europe-Africa, is responsible for providing USAFRICOM the means by which to execute the CCDR's policies. One of the largest programs under which this is accomplished is the Africa Partnership Station (APS), which is not a ship, or a station, but rather a concept under which various activities take place.¹⁵⁷ The goals of this effort support those overall goals of USAFRICOM through focusing on the maritime environment in cooperation and at the invitation of partner

¹⁵⁵General Carter Ham, US Army, *Posture Statement of U.S. Africa Command* before the House Armed Services Committee, 112th Cong., 2nd sess., February 29, 2012; Ham, *Posture Statement of U.S. Africa Command*, 113th Cong.

¹⁵⁶ Ham, *Posture Statement of U.S. Africa Command*, 112th Cong., 3.

¹⁵⁷ Commander, US Naval Forces Europe–US Naval Forces Africa and US Sixth Fleet, "About." <http://www.naveur-navaf.navy.mil/about%20us.html> (accessed 25 November 2012).

nations. Feedback from the APS program is mostly positive and the effort appears to be responding to partner requests in its efforts to continue to build capacity.¹⁵⁸

The Honorable Michael W. Coulter, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs, wrote in the US Naval Institute's *Proceedings* magazine in 2007 about the partnership of the US Navy and the Department of State.¹⁵⁹ Mr. Coulter's main emphasis is the benefit of DoS and US Navy cooperation is the building of relationships and capacity of partner nations. Africa is mentioned several times in connection with partnership efforts including the Global Fleet Station, the Gulf of Guinea Maritime Security Initiative.¹⁶⁰

From exercises and other engagement activities of USAFRICOM, one can develop a general idea of how the CCDR is approaching the littoral regions of Africa. A great incentive for this focus is current and potential economic impact of the littoral region on the US.

Economics

In a persuasive piece by the Africa Growth initiative at Brookings the authors mentioned the *Economist* magazine referring to Africa as hopeless in 2000. By 2013 the

¹⁵⁸Donna Miles, "Africa Partnership Station Promotes Security Cooperation," *American Forces Press Service*, 27 June 2012, <http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=116917> (accessed 17 May 2013).

¹⁵⁹The Honorable Michael W. Coulter, "State and Navy: Partnership in Diplomacy," *U.S. Naval Institute* (2007), <http://2001-2009.state.gov/documents/organization/88142.pdf> (accessed 12 December 2012).

¹⁶⁰*Ibid.*, 46.

sentiment was changed to positive terms such as rising, emerging and hopeful.¹⁶¹

However, attempting to analyze the entirety of economic ties between the US and the African continent would be a daunting research project on its own. As such, the research to support this question shall focus on those factors that could relate to the US Navy and will only go as deep as necessary to ensure there are indeed ties and other factors which are worth protecting.

Covering a variety of economic and security issues, the Brookings Institute released *Top Five Reasons Why Africa Should Be a Priority for the United States* in 2013. Topics range from the development of Africa as a major consumer market, with sub-Saharan Africa containing six of the fastest growing economies, to the advancement of peace and security engagement efforts, to Africa as an additional source of energy resources.¹⁶² These brief pieces bring a view of the integrated efforts of the US and the economic impact Africa can have on the US economy.

Adding some select numerical values to the assertions of Africa's economic impact, the US Census Bureau maintains several pieces of data related to US trade numbers with various regions and nations.¹⁶³ This quantitative data establishes the relative context of economic factors.

¹⁶¹Banks, et al, "Top Five Reasons Why Africa Should be a Priority for the United States," 1.

¹⁶²*Ibid.*, 15.

¹⁶³US Department of Commerce, US Census Bureau, "Trade in Goods with Asia," <http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c0016.html> (accessed 27 March 2013); US Department of Commerce, US Census Bureau, "Trade in Goods with Africa," <http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c0013.html> (accessed 27 March 2013).

Nigeria holds a special place in Africa due to its large population, immense natural resources (oil, coal, gems, and other minerals) and its chronic security and governance issues. An understanding of Nigeria's economic tribulation allows for a more concrete understanding of how policies of the US Navy and USAFRICOM affect those in the African littorals. The United States Institute of Peace issued a special report in June 2011 calling attention to the conflict in the Niger Delta.¹⁶⁴ Of interest to the US are the oil exports emanating from that region and the instability of the government. This area is of interest to the US Navy because river networks and harbors provide areas for extremists to operate dominate the region and recent conflicts have stopped around 500,000 barrels of oil per day from flowing out of the country.¹⁶⁵ As the oil exports move by water, the US Navy is a natural partner in any solution; however, this report focused on private and government investments in institutions. The report addresses the continued threat to stability caused by the poor security situation, lackadaisical rule of law, and generally poor governance.¹⁶⁶ The lack of government in the delta region is of concern as this lawlessness not only creates the conditions for a humanitarian crisis, but also allows terrorist and criminal groups to operate more freely, and thereby create risk.

Nigeria offers a window to the issues which much of Africa must deal with. The Air University at Maxwell Air Force Base issued an occasional paper series on Africa in

¹⁶⁴Chris Newsom, "Conflict in the Niger Delta: More Than a Local Affair," United States Institute of Peace, June 2011, http://www.usip.org/files/resources/Conflict_Niger_Delta.pdf (accessed 26 April 2013).

¹⁶⁵Ibid., 5.

¹⁶⁶Ibid., 15.

2011, which looked at the Nigeria of 2030 as a case study.¹⁶⁷ To forecast into the future, the authors conducted significant analysis of current issues: population pressures, economic security, military cooperation and governance.¹⁶⁸ Extrapolating the relevant issues to the greater region and US Navy, the authors provide a wealth of information which underpins the economic pressures of the rest of the region and legitimizes the involvement of outside actors, specifically the US Navy.

Within this one country example, the US and the US Navy have obvious compelling interests in security, governance and economic development. The ability to diversify the supply of oil alone provides sufficient reasoning for US involvement, as it is in the history of the US to protect its vital oil interests with military force, as demonstrated in Operation Earnest Will, also known as the “Tanker Wars” of the late 1980s.¹⁶⁹

Not every economic indicator has an obvious correlation to the US without layering in a consideration of other factors during analysis. An example of a hidden correlation was documented by the African Development Bank in a 2011 brief entitled “The impact of the US credit rating downgrade and European debt crisis on Africa.”¹⁷⁰

¹⁶⁷Col Christopher J. Kinnan et al., “Failed State 2030: Nigeria-A Case Study,” Center for Strategy and Technology, No. 67 (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL, February 2011), <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/cst/csat67.pdf> (accessed 26 April 2013).

¹⁶⁸Ibid., 26.

¹⁶⁹Polidoro, “The Use of Patrol Craft in Low Intensity Conflict Operations,” 71.

¹⁷⁰Vinaye Ancharaz, Africa Development Bank, *The Impact of the US Credit Rating Downgrade and European Debt Crisis on Africa*, 2011, <http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/brief%20impact%20of%20US-Eng.pdf> (accessed 26 April 2013).

The report documents the impact of the 2008-2009 financial crisis and debt crisis on African nations. A one percent Gross Domestic Product drop in Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development nations would result in a corresponding ten percent reduction in African export earnings.¹⁷¹ The brief concluded that given the state of most African governments, their ability to adapt to negative economic factors was very limited and would thereby increase the risk to the banking industry as it attempted to continue business operations.¹⁷²

This literature review has covered a wide array of topics relevant to the research questions. From broad-reaching national and departmental strategies to very specific studies and analysis of shipbuilding costs and benefits, the importance of the United States having a strong, global navy is firmly established in practice and tradition. The nature of the research questions does not limit its consideration to US Navy or USAFRICOM policy statements, but instead invites other points of view and sources to consider. The next chapter will present the methodology of the thesis. The methodology to analyze all of these pieces into a coherent answer begins with a systematic analysis, which takes into account the sometimes subjective nature of the research questions.

¹⁷¹Ibid., 1.

¹⁷²Ibid., 10.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Since 9-11 the mind set is totally different. We need to deploy, we need to live overseas, we need to be engaged. We can't just sit at home and tuck our tails in and hide.¹⁷³

— Rear Adm. James Kelly

This thesis evaluated the stated and implied policy objectives of the US Navy as they pertain to the African littoral regions in support of USAFRICOM. Within the study are the linkages to US national objectives which will provide a holistic view of what the US government values. The study focused on the policies of the US Navy, the activities of USAFRICOM, and what the US Navy is doing to support those activities. For each research question there was an aspect of subjectivity, which cannot be removed from the evaluation. The documents under review contain statements, intentions, strategies and figures. All of these data points are potentially subjective and must be considered as such. Attempting to pull objective data from these sources will provide quantitative data, but absent the model required to provide qualitative results.

To fully realize the importance of the African littoral region, the secondary research questions work to support the primary research question and form its foundation for legitimacy. Simply assuming away certain points, such as the economic reasons for involvement with Africa, would not serve to strengthen the argument, but only weaken any conclusions found due to a lack of foundational understanding. The secondary questions provide much of the context and broad tenor that is required in order to analyze

¹⁷³Naval and Marine Quotations, <http://www.kmaw.com/quotes.htm> (accessed 8 May 2013).

a subjective issue with many potentially biased, or at least open-ended pieces of documentation. Using primary and secondary sources, an analysis of the national objectives for the United States and the US Navy was conducted to establish the linkage between the documents and the relative importance of the littorals. Further refinement of that analysis will focus on the littoral regions of Africa. The needs of USAFRICOM will be derived to establish a demand signal. Next will be an analysis of documents relating to the positions that the US Navy is taking on providing what USAFRICOM needs to complete its mission. Balancing this analysis throughout will be consideration of criticism leveled against the US Navy's programs and responses to the environment and strategic objectives explored.

Do United States Navy policies on littoral environments indicate
sufficient support to USAFRICOM?

To answer this question the secondary research questions provide the foundation for asking the question in the first place. The questions imply the US Navy has policies regarding the littoral environment, and specifically policies related or applicable to USAFRICOM. To test this assertion this paper examined a significant volume of material, which provided or represented an accurate framing of the position of the US Navy on its relative value of the littoral environment. Within the question were nuances to what is stated and what was implied in US Navy policies as they relate to Africa and USAFRICOM. The prominence and amount of sections regarding littoral environments and of Africa in US Navy policy established the sufficiency of the policy commitment to USAFRICOM. The verbiage about the littorals and Africa established the relative importance of the environment and the continent. This thesis did not focus on tables of

data, but rather a qualitative analysis of documentation which will foster a holistic interpretation of the information presented. References to how Africa is and is not accounted for in policy help to paint the picture of where the US will seek to implement its strategic goals through the US Navy in the USAFRICOM area of responsibility.

Determining the subjective assessment of sufficient requires consideration of what is included and excluded in policy. The risk of presenting an overly biased analysis will be mitigated by following the progression of US Navy policy from one level to the next, the prominence of the littorals and other works related to the littorals and correlating those policies with concrete steps taken by the US Navy through shipbuilding and organizational changes. Thereby, sufficiency can be determined. Intentions of the CCDRs are expressed through the Theater Engagement Strategy. Owing to its classification, other avenues must be explored to attempt to draw out what the demands on the US Navy are, and if the US Navy is meeting the demands of USAFRICOM. Adding to what demands the CCDR places on the US Navy is the potential for a CCDR to not ask for a capability known not to exist in a service, thereby creating no demand for a service to fill.

Economic transactions, number of vessels transiting African coastal areas and sea-lanes, or the number of engagements by the US Navy with African nations could begin to objectively measure sufficiency through metrics. Yet these metrics could provide one type of answer, yet they would not provide a contextually relevant answer to the question. Rather these could only partially support a conclusion of relationships.

The secondary research questions serve two purposes. First, to directly contribute information that supports the primary research question. Second, to provide the

contextual basis and importance relative to the primary research question, thereby supporting the question as a necessity.

What makes the littoral environment important?

Answering this question is not as simple as looking up the term littoral in the nearest dictionary. Depending upon the viewpoint of the author, the littoral environment can vary vastly and therefore can change what makes the littoral important.

The research seeks to move beyond accepting the statements of the US Navy of what constitutes the littoral environment and that the littoral environment is important, as bias is inherent in a single viewpoint. A wide range of non-naval factors exists, which contribute to the importance of the littoral regions. The research will evaluate the depth of the US Navy's statements on the littorals for consideration of other factors beyond terrain. Such as population factors, economic potential, resources and human activity. The research will also examine sources outside of the US government, which address these other factors, which may or may not substantiate the importance of the littoral regions to the US, the US Navy and to USAFRICOM.

To appreciate the complex web which makes up our current way of life, government structure and economies, one must take into account the effect the world's population has on the basic structures of human existence. Continuing migration of the world's population and the demographic make up the population in littoral areas can have a profound influence on the resource needs of those same areas. The African littorals are one broad area where the age and location of the population will have such a profound effect to the way of life, government, and economics. Taken as a whole, understanding the movement of people in Africa could allow USAFRICOM and the US Navy to have a

greater understanding of what engagement needs are currently required, and those in the future.

What are the threats in the African littoral environment?

Considering why the littoral environment has any applicability to a naval force depends upon the threat level of the environment. Threats in the littoral environment will be defined by analyzing threats mentioned in works beyond US government sources. Due to the classification of certain documents, detailed discussions of specific naval threats are mostly avoided, and mentioned in general terms. Littoral threats extend beyond the limits of diesel submarines, mines and cruise missiles. Other threats include transnational criminal networks, piracy, hand-held weapons from shore or from small boats, maritime congestion, resource scarcity, and radicalization. An examination of documents, which address the wide range of threats during engagement operations including but not solely focused on the active kinetic threats of a major military operation, will provide a threat analysis of the African littoral environment. How these threats affect the US Navy will be based on the combination of the factors which will uncover the true extent of a given threat.

Do USAFRICOM's stated engagement policies focus on littoral environments?

Gaining an understanding of and analyzing USAFRICOM's engagement policy will facilitate an understanding of how the US Navy is required to assist in meeting CCDR goals. The littoral perspective is gained through a more nuanced reading of the policies, as most focus on nations, or functions that a nation should perform. Examples of USAFRICOM engagement policies developed in coordination with the US Navy and

other agencies will serve to provide current examples of activities. Using these examples the policies of engagement, the focus on the littorals will be determined from the nature of the engagement as assessed by the author. How USAFRICOM goes about enacting its policies is just as important as the policies themselves. There exist some critics of the USAFRICOM concept and what it was truly created to accomplish. Reviewing some of the material and providing an alternative viewpoint on USAFRICOM's overall operation will contextualize the efforts of USAFRICOM.

Are there compelling economic reasons for the US Navy to
focus on Africa?

Exploring the economic ties between the US and Africa will allow for an analysis of compelling economic reasons for the US Navy to focus any of its efforts on Africa. Economic data will be augmented with contextual research which will explore the position Africa has to US economic interest, and if the actions or inactions of the US Navy and USAFRICOM demonstrate a basis for increased naval focus on Africa. Analyzing the data for a value of African economic ties will establish a basis of an economic factor in the US Navy's support to USAFRICOM. Further analysis will identify the nature of what is provided establishes economic reasoning for the US Navy to focus on Africa. Considering deeper issues beyond ledgers will ensure any discussion on economics takes into account stability, government practices, area threats, future potential, and population trends, which affect economic development or sustainment. As with the entire thesis, discerning the impact of associations and what is not said may be subjective; however a reasonable person should not discount these connections lightly.

Each question will be considered individually and as part of the primary research question. Working through the primary and secondary research questions will undoubtedly lead to areas of crossover in material. Making the necessary connection between research areas and synthesizing them into a complete picture through the analysis chapter should reveal a more complete answer to the primary research question.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

We are moving out in the green and brown water areas and because many operations are looking as an extension of what we talked about in the last few years in terms of the littoral, many operations are focused in the shallows.¹⁷⁴

— Unattributed

Taking the stated methodology and using it to analyze a mostly subjective series of issues is a risk, yet one the author is willing to take to further the discussion of a marginalized area of naval policy. The author's position on this subject has been shaped by the policies reviewed, by other analysis of policy, and by data found outside US government sources. This wide field of input allows for a more complete contextual understanding of the factors, which affect US Navy policy, and therefore provides the necessary information to answer the questions. To answer the primary research question, the secondary questions are first considered to answer background issues and ensure the proper context is established for the primary question. Although they appear distinct, the secondary questions have many linkages, which make separate analysis a challenge; yet together the secondary questions further the more complete answer of the primary question.

Navy Commander Michael Hutchens analyzed US Navy strategy over the last 40 years and he brought out what he sees as the four mainstay missions of the US Navy: Sea

¹⁷⁴Remarks at the NDIA Expeditionary Warfare Conference, Panama City, FL, 26 October 2005, <http://www.navy.mil/navydata/leadership/quotes.asp?q=11&c=6> (accessed 4 February 2013).

Control, Power Projection, Presence and Deterrence.¹⁷⁵ In one form or another, these missions have remained constant throughout the time period examined by Hutchens. Two notable additions happened in 2007 when Maritime Security and Humanitarian Assistance-Disaster Response were also included.¹⁷⁶ In 2010's *Naval Operations Concept*, the two new missions have risen to the second and third spots on the overall list.¹⁷⁷ Through these mainstay missions the US Navy must support national strategic objectives and meet the needs of the CCDRs. Working through each question will answer if the policies of the US Navy do support USAFRICOM in the littorals, and if that support is sufficient.

Are there compelling economic reasons for the
US Navy to focus on Africa?

Economic security issues reach beyond balance sheet calculations and enter into the murky world of multiple influences. What any military force can provide to the economy of a nation is in itself multifaceted. There is the direct influx of money due to US service personnel being in the area and requiring support or spending personal money. There is the secondary effect of improving the security situation, which provides a more stable market for economic activity to take place. Then the most significant engagement payoff is the improvement in the security situation to the local or national government stemming from the official activities of the US military force. Paramount to

¹⁷⁵Hutchens, "Towards a Balanced Fleet: Options for a 21st Century Navy," 9.

¹⁷⁶*Ibid.*

¹⁷⁷US Department of the Navy, *Naval Operational Concept*, vii.

economic-security considerations for Africa is the level of trade with the US, and what is the future potential of more trade in quantity and variety.

Although numbers do not tell the whole story of economics, they do help in contextualizing the relative importance of the issue. As of January 2013, the US exported \$2,461.2M to Africa, and imported \$5,096.1M.¹⁷⁸ Compare this to Asia where the figures are \$37,508.1M exported and \$80,652.5M imported.¹⁷⁹ Simply by looking at a few figures the conclusion might be drawn that Africa is eighteen times less important to US economic interests than Asia. What the numbers do not show is the potential for growth in raw numbers and in importance based on other factors, such as population factors, which will make the African littorals even more important for economics and security in the near future, and therefore an area of greater focus for USAFRIOM as it seeks to fulfill US policy objective.

One of the single greatest complexities of the African littorals is people; more specifically the increase in the number of people and their respective ages. The youth bulge issue discussed in the Nigeria case study from the US Air War College is the issue that has the greatest secondary effects on the littorals and economies of Africa and the US.¹⁸⁰ The excess population of young, military age persons directly affects the security situation of a nation or a region where there are limited employment opportunities and

¹⁷⁸US Department of Commerce, US Census Bureau, "Trade in Goods with Africa," <http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c0013.html> (accessed 27 March 2013).

¹⁷⁹US Department of Commerce, US Census Bureau, "Trade in Goods with Asia," <http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c0016.html> (accessed 27 March 2013).

¹⁸⁰Kinnan et al., "Failed State 2030."

food staple scarcities, such as exist in Nigeria by creating a willing pool of people susceptible to radicalization or criminalization.¹⁸¹ Keeping the youth bulge employed, fed, housed and away from radicalization in Nigeria, and other African states, has a direct impact on regional security and has the potential to contribute to violent extremist groups or criminal enterprises.¹⁸² The authors of the brief theorize that violent and criminal groups will recruit the increasing urbanized youth bulge.¹⁸³ The author assessed that this increase will only serve to threaten economic development in the area and consequently contribute to the weakness of government institutions.

Africa's potential to have great economic influence is based upon its rich resources, strategic location between the large economies of the East and the West, its large, and its young population. Holding Africa back is its lack of overall infrastructure development, poor governance and low human development. Seen as a whole, these factors clearly point to a need for engagement, which will foster good governance and stewardship of the environment. The key to all of this influence is the littoral environment, which provides the location for the growing urban population and the physical locations for the trade, which in turn will increase the Africa's influence. Whether the engagement is from the US Navy or other nations may be irrelevant to a given nation in Africa seeking assistance or trading partners. The US Navy has increased its activity in the area in response to several factors, but nonetheless, there has been an increase, which can have more than one effect. USAFRICOM has taken note of the

¹⁸¹Ibid., 82.

¹⁸²Ibid., 25-26.

¹⁸³Ibid., 78.

significance of Africa on the US and world economy, citing it as an area of growing importance to the free flow of commerce.¹⁸⁴

Based on the evidence thus far, preserving the ability of a nation to maintain its economic viability will be one of the greatest factors in promoting stability in any nation. Eighty percent of the world's gross domestic products are generated from urban areas.¹⁸⁵ The data would indicate that a focus on programs designed to directly stabilize urban areas, most located near the coasts, would have the greatest pay-off as those investments would then reduce the impact of the youth bulge on economic and security matters.

Supporting this line of thinking are the US Navy's actions in 2005, including maritime patrols around the Gulf of Guinea to improve the security situation and in order to implementation of a 10 year initiative called Gulf of Guinea Guard. This effort is envisioned to eventually include other gulf nations and US allies.¹⁸⁶ By this and other deployments of US Naval forces in 2006, and 2007 it is clear in the authors' view that the US Navy is satisfying national and CCMD objectives through its deployment of forces to secure vital littoral areas of Africa.

The engagement of the US Navy in the Gulf of Guinea had a clear economic impact. Other engagements have other objectives; to analyze the engagements of US forces in Africa are a host of other activities which can provide insight into what and how USAFRICOM is engaging with its partners to achieve its goals.

¹⁸⁴Ham, *Posture Statement of U.S. Africa Command*, 113th Cong., 5.

¹⁸⁵United Nations *World Urbanization Prospects*, 15.

¹⁸⁶Kinnan et al., "Failed State 2030," 57.

Do USAFRICOM's stated engagement policies focus on
littoral environments?

Owing to the classified nature of theater engagement strategies, delineating engagement policies was accomplished through analyzing other documents and activities of USAFRICOM. Through this review, and staying mindful of the broader implications of each action, a picture of the engagement strategy towards the littorals can be derived. Those activities which directly engaged African navies are the most direct form of engagement, followed closely by those activities which seek to build general government institution capacity.

Each year the commander of USAFRICOM presents to Congress the command's posture statement. The most recent statement places countering terrorism as the DoD's highest priority mission in Africa.¹⁸⁷ USAFRICOM focuses on five functional areas: countering violent extremist organizations; strengthening maritime security and countering illicit trafficking; strengthening defense capabilities; maintaining strategic posture; and preparing for and responding to crises.¹⁸⁸ The maritime and littoral environment touches each of the five focus areas; therefore a focus on the littorals would seem to the author to be inherent in the commander's focus areas.

In fiscal year 2012, USAFRICOM planned 14 major joint exercises. Of these, four focused in whole or part on peacekeeping, three focused on increasing medical capabilities, two on maritime security, and the remainder on logistics, Special Forces or

¹⁸⁷Ham, *Posture Statement of U.S. Africa Command*, 113th Cong., 6.

¹⁸⁸*Ibid.*, 6-7.

communications.¹⁸⁹ What is notable here is the lack of major combat focused exercises, which indicates either the focus of USAFRICOM is on building various aspects of partner nations' militaries or the lack of major combat exercises factors into greater diplomatic maneuvers.

Not always included within these major exercises, but a major source of engagement for the US Navy, is the APS. This enduring series of activities adapts its focus to meet the needs of partner nations and the objectives of the USAFRICOM.¹⁹⁰ Having one umbrella effort to organize maritime engagement is, in the author's view, an advantage of unity of effort, which will support the accomplishment of CCDR goals more efficiently. Similar to the APS is the more specific African Maritime Law Enforcement Partnership which involves US Coast Guard assets to help accomplish the mission.¹⁹¹

Thomas Dempsey's 2006 report from the US Army War College points to the necessity of engaging with partners prior to hostilities in order to strengthen government institutions.¹⁹² Dempsey's examples of these are Pan Sahel Initiative, Trans-Sahel Counterterrorism Initiative and the East Africa Counterterrorism Initiative, as well as Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa.¹⁹³ Through these focused engagement initiatives the US government is striving to establish stability through the local governments.

¹⁸⁹Commander, US Africa Command, "What we do," Exercises, <http://www.USAFRICOM.mil/what-we-do/exercises> (accessed 29 March 2013).

¹⁹⁰Commander, US Naval Forces Africa, "About African Partnership Station," <http://www.c6f.navy.mil/about%20us.html> (accessed 25 November 2012).

¹⁹¹Ham, *Posture Statement of U.S. Africa Command*, 113th Cong., 12-13.

¹⁹²Dempsey, "Counterterrorism in African Failed States," 19.

¹⁹³*Ibid.*, 22.

The key phrases in all of the tangential documentation regarding USAFRICOM's activities with African partners are engagement and capacity building. These two phrases are loaded with potential, as the law enforcement program illustrate. The Honorable Michael Coulter wrote about this potential in 2007 when he described many of these relationships in Africa.¹⁹⁴ The US Navy's Seabees and others, under the APS umbrella, act on these phrases on a consistent basis.¹⁹⁵ Taken all together, although not major combat exercises, the actions being taken by USAFRICOM towards the littoral environment appear to be ones with obtainable goals and a focus on building relationships over all else.

What are the threats in the African
littoral environment?

Threats to forces during engagement operations are just as wide ranging, but may be harder to identify due to the non-kinetic nature of threats during sustained engagement operations. Population pressures, resource scarcity, criminal activity as well as mines, submarines and missiles all combine to make the littoral environment of Africa one where threats are ever-present, and cannot always be countered with weapons systems. Focusing on engagement operations, those threats that are not normally considered in kinetic operations will have a greater impact on what is assessed as a threat and its implication to the sufficiency of US Navy policy.

¹⁹⁴The Honorable Michael W. Coulter, "State and Navy: Partnership in Diplomacy," *U.S. Naval Institute* (2007), 44-48, <http://2001-2009.state.gov/documents/organization/88142.pdf> (accessed 12 December 2012), 48.

¹⁹⁵Commander, US Naval Forces Africa, "African Partnership Station," http://www.c6f.navy.mil/article_161.html (accessed 26 April 2013).

Population shifts to urban environments may not immediately appear to be a matter of concern for the US Navy.¹⁹⁶ Yet when one considers the economic output of urban areas, the location of most urban areas near the coast, the youth bulge across Africa and the presence of non-state and criminal actors in those areas, the threat becomes apparent in its potential to support future conflicts.¹⁹⁷ The countermeasure to these less-than-lethal threats is one relying on engagement and development of industry and governance rather than kinetic means.

Littoral nations must contend with several challenges including drug and arms trafficking, piracy, illegal fisheries and others.¹⁹⁸ Take the example of fisheries. Although not a military threat, these criminal activities erode the stability of the nations afflicted. Fisheries play a particularly important role in job creation and food production.¹⁹⁹ Threatening the fisheries industry adds pressure to the populations of the littorals and increases resource strain, thereby setting the stage for further destabilization. Criminal organizations, for which the US government has a separate strategy, continue to take advantage of ungoverned maritime spaces.²⁰⁰ These spaces could in turn be exploited by extremist organizations, feeding from the bulge in the population. For example, the

¹⁹⁶Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *The National Military Strategy of the United States of America*, 2.

¹⁹⁷United Nations, *World Urbanization Prospects*, 15; Kinnan et al., “Failed State 2030,” 78.

¹⁹⁸Ham, *Posture Statement of U.S. Africa Command*, 113th Cong., 12.

¹⁹⁹*Ibid.*; US Department of the Navy US Navy Warfare Publication, NWP 3-32, 1-4.

²⁰⁰Ham, *Posture Statement of U.S. Africa Command*, 113th Cong., 12; The White House, *Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime*.

uncontrolled nature of Guinea-Bissau's borders and littoral regions, combined with that nation's poor government institutions law enforcement actions, creates an environment for criminal activity and affects other nations in the region.²⁰¹ In addition to the destabilizing nature of these criminal activities, "the U.S. government has found reasons to link the narcotics trade and money laundering networks to Hizballah-based [*sic*] terrorist groups."²⁰²

Beyond the threats posed by population pressures and criminal elements, there are kinetic weapons employed in both regular and irregular manners in the littoral regions of Africa. The low cost and simplicity to operate make these weapons available to rogue and failing states, as well as non-state actors and criminal elements.²⁰³ These threats are not new, but received scant attention during the Cold War. Dunaway presents President H. W. Bush's speech at the Aspen Institute in 1990 as the pivot point from Cold War footing to a focus on Third World adversaries.²⁰⁴ Dunaway highlights at the outset of the change of outlook the known threats of mines, submarines, missiles and the terrorists who employ them.²⁰⁵ The *NOC 10*, and authors David Gato, and William Dunaway repeatedly

²⁰¹Ham, *Posture Statement of U.S. Africa Command*, 113th Cong., 10.

²⁰²*Ibid.*

²⁰³US Department of the Navy. *Naval Operational Concept*, 18.

²⁰⁴Dunaway, *Gunboat Diplomacy in a New World Order*, 22-23.

²⁰⁵*Ibid.*, 76.

mention the threat of mines, missiles and submarines.²⁰⁶ The *NOC 10* adds swarming small boats, but all assert these means could be employed by state and non-state actors.²⁰⁷

Lieutenant Schaller, while at the Naval War College, lays out three broad categories of threats, which are readily available and can be used to deny access to littoral regions: mines, anti-ship cruise missiles and diesel-electric submarines.²⁰⁸ Mines present a danger known to navies for decades.²⁰⁹ The variety of type, low cost, placement options and deployment options makes the mine a formidable threat. The anti-ship cruise missile is capable of being launched from a variety of platforms, land, sea and air. Used in unconventional ways, the complexity of the threat increases. An example given by LT Schaller was that of a commercial vessel being covertly equipped to launch cruise missiles.²¹⁰ Much like the persistent threat of vehicle borne improvised explosive device, this example demonstrates how complex the littoral environment's threats become taking into account all avenues of approach within the littoral environment. The diesel-electric submarine threat, although a more advanced threat from sustainment and training aspects, nevertheless represents a relatively inexpensive threat capable of use by a wide variety of

²⁰⁶Gato, "United States Naval Diplomacy in the Third World," 20; Dunaway, *Gunboat Diplomacy in a New World Order*, 24; US Department of the Navy, *Naval Operational Concept*, 53.

²⁰⁷US Department of the Navy, *Naval Operational Concept*, 53.

²⁰⁸Schaller, "Naval Surface Force Protection in the Long War," 3.

²⁰⁹*Ibid.*

²¹⁰*Ibid.*, 14.

adversaries. Existing US Navy doctrine, and the ships designed to employ that doctrine, are more suited towards the open ocean, with its ample maneuver space and depth.²¹¹

Where the US Navy should add capability in order combat these threats is suggested by Daniel Uhls. He states the US Navy's reliance on high end tactics is not applicable to the threats laid out before it globally.²¹² He advocates the US Navy focus itself on purchasing more of all types of ships, including smaller patrol boat types, to be in more places such as coastal and inland waters.²¹³

After reviewing the many articles covering threats in general and specific to the littorals, a picture emerges of an environment, which is as complicated as any other scenario faced by the US military. Based upon the needs of the African littorals, the capabilities of the US Navy and the critiques of the US Navy's efforts, there appears to be a mismatch of policy and hardware which would allow it to more effectively conduct engagements in the littorals of Africa.

What makes the littoral environment important?

The importance of the littoral environment is due primarily to what is contained therein: people, commerce, and outlets for goods. The overall impact of the littoral regions of the world, and those specifically of Africa, is an aggregation of who lives there and the activities those people are engaged in. The physical make-up of the littorals

²¹¹Uhls, "Does the Fast Patrol Boat Have a Future in the Navy," 88.

²¹²Ibid.

²¹³Ibid., 87.

affects how nations achieve influence and engagement; the targets of the engagement remain constant.

The US Navy's definition bears repeating: "The *littoral* is comprised of two segments. The *seaward* portion is that area from the open ocean to the shore that must be controlled to support operations ashore. The *landward* portion is the area inland from the shore that can be supported and defended directly from the sea [*sic*]." ²¹⁴ This definition sounds straightforward, yet within it are the implied tasks of controlling sea space and moving power in various forms across the transition point between water and land. What are not contained in this definition are the challenges of the environment with which the US Navy must contend during peacetime engagement operations. For combat operations, the US Navy and the US Marine Corps have established methods to accomplish just such a mission. However, based upon a the review of all the factors of the littoral environment, what makes the littorals even more important than their topography and the obstacles they present in conflict operations is what is present in the littorals the remainder of the time--people. Admiral Mullen recognized this factor in his guidance to the Joint Force; yet it is mentioned as a factor, not as a facet requiring consideration of the Joint Force, which may then require changes to policy or training. ²¹⁵

The littoral regions of Africa are important due to the growing population found there, the potential for economic opportunity and the potential for radicalization and or criminalization. The vast majority of the world's population lives within a few hundred

²¹⁴US Department of the Navy, *Naval Operational Concept*, 8.

²¹⁵Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *The National Military Strategy of the United States of America*, 2.

miles of the oceans.²¹⁶ As such, the pressures which build when populations rise, especially in cities, according to Little and Triest, may lead to violent clashes.²¹⁷

World populations are shifting to urban environments and many of those urban environments are located near the coast, thereby increasing the density of many coastal areas.²¹⁸ Of the 63 most populous cities, 72 percent are located on or near a coastline.²¹⁹ The greatest growth will be in less developed regions of the world's urban areas.²²⁰ The United Nation's World Urbanization Prospects states that Africa will see an increase of .9 billion people to its urban population by 2050. The real significance here to naval strategists is that most of Africa's urban centers, much like the rest of the world, are located on or near the coast.

Population shifts are only one factor of the overall impact of a nation, region or continent. The level of development of those people, and their economic impact give the simple numbers of demography greater meaning and significance. Of the 58 sovereign nations recognized by the United Nations in Africa, 37, or 64 percent are considered by the most recent UN Human Development Report to be Very Low Development.²²¹ As a

²¹⁶US Department of the Navy, *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower*, 7.

²¹⁷Little and Triest, "Seismic Shifts," 7.

²¹⁸United Nations, *World Urbanization Prospects*, 1.

²¹⁹*Ibid.*, 18.

²²⁰*Ibid.*, 3.

²²¹United Nations, United Nations Statistics Division, "Composition of macro geographical (continental) regions, geographical sub-regions, and selected economic and other groupings," <http://unstats.un.org/unsd/methods/m49/m49regin.htm#africa> (accessed 26 April 2013); United Nations, "Summary, Human Development Report," United

point of reference, the top nation on the most recent Human Development Index is Norway, with a score of .955. The United States ranks number three with a score of .937. Iraq is ranked 131; Afghanistan is 175 on the list. The highest African nation is the island nation of Seychelles, with a score of .806, ranked 46th on the overall list. Of all of the nations in Africa, only the Seychelles is ranked in the Very High Human Development sections, four nations, or seven percent are ranked as High Human Development.²²² These numbers imply the continent as a whole struggles to meet the basic needs of the people who live there and governments and their policies producing lackluster results. Stated another way, Africa is rife with people who want and desperately need to improve their situation by any means possible.

Where people live, and what activities they engage in are basic and understood parts of life. The cumulative effect of these locations and activities places or removes pressures on a many systems and interactions. Africa's population continues to urbanize, causing 75 percent of African nations to report dissatisfaction with their population's distribution.²²³ The friction caused by the distribution of populations creates a potential for violence or criminal activity. Cities are centered around waterways and economic hubs, which provide 80 percent of gross domestic product.²²⁴ As Africa grows, more

Nations Development Programme, http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR2013_EN_Summary.pdf (accessed 26 April 2013).

²²²United Nations, "Summary, Human Development Report," 16-18.

²²³United Nations, *World Urbanization Prospects*, 15.

²²⁴*Ibid.*

trade means increased importance of sea lanes, and therefore more value for freedom of navigation.

Based upon the shifts in population, the multitude of affects the population shift brings with it, and the economic potential created, the littorals are much more than a beach where the US Navy lands US Marines. The littoral environment presents a complex area to perform engagement operations due to its physical and demographic make-up. Yet it is this very make-up and potential for instability, which begs proactive engagement by the US Navy and other forces.

Do United States Navy policies on littoral environments indicate
sufficient support to USAFRICOM?

General Raymond Odierno, Chief of Staff of the US Army, stated that the CCDRs believe the mission in front of them is phase 0, or engagement focused. USAFRICOM specifically was mentioned as a combatant command where small footprint and low cost efforts are going to be the norm.²²⁵ The *Cooperative Strategy for the 21st Century*, the *Naval Operations Concept 2010*, the *Navy Expeditionary Combat Enterprise Strategic Plan* and the *Confronting Irregular Challenges*, and Admiral Greenert's statement, combine to form the policy basis for the US Navy commitment to the littorals of Africa and USAFRICOM. With the direction of the National Security Strategy, and the policy of the CCDR and USAFRICOM specifically, the US Navy policies must be adaptable in accomplishing their portion of the overall mission.²²⁶

²²⁵General Raymond Odierno, US Army, "Address to Student" (Guest Speaker, Eisenhower Auditorium, Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 10 April 2013).

²²⁶*Ibid.*

Having now considered background and contextual questions, the primary research question is appropriately framed in a world where population pressures, non-kinetic threats, economic pressures and existing efforts intertwine in the African littorals. Policies are both written and implied. Sufficiency is subjective, demand is based on the demands of the CCDR and the overall environment. Analyzing written policies for indicators, prominence and context provides an understanding of official positions. Considering next other analysis and criticisms of those policies allows for a deeper understanding of implied standpoints and policies, which may equally affect the support the US Navy provides to USAFRICOM and the African littorals.

The US Navy policies comply with the broad goals of the *NSS*. However, the first mention of Africa found in the *NSS* is related to a desire to increase security partnering for the purposes of “sharing the costs and global responsibilities of global leadership.”²²⁷ This small paragraph does not connect the strategic importance of Africa’s location in the world with other parts of the document, which discuss the importance of keeping global commons open and free, specifically the ocean commons. The strategy does emphasize the importance of addressing non-state actors as well as operating in various domains common to other DoD strategies, such as cyberspace, weapons of mass destruction and so on.

The US Navy’s most recent strategy document, the *NOC 10*, outlines the many of the same broad maritime objectives the US Navy has had for over 40 years: forward

²²⁷US Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, *Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense* (Washington DC, January 2012), http://www.defense.gov/news/defense_strategic_guidance.pdf (accessed 26 April 2013), 3.

presence, maritime security, humanitarian assistance and disaster response, sea control, power projection and deterrence.²²⁸

Admiral Greenert further expanded on the principles in the *NOC 10*, as stated in his testimony to Congress. The US Navy has three main investment priorities, which in turn directly affect what the US Navy will develop materially, thereby establishing policy priorities through investment priorities.²²⁹

Priority 1-Remain ready to meet current challenges, today.

Priority 2-Build a relevant and capable future force.

Priority 3-Enable and support our Sailors, Navy Civilians and their families.²³⁰

The first priority intends to ensure the readiness of the US Navy, prioritized to Asia-Pacific region and the Middle East in its role to provide presence in those areas. Even with the decommissioning of some surface assets, Admiral Greenert states that the ability to maintain a fleet of a smaller size at a higher state of readiness will provide more effective options to CCDRs.²³¹ The second investment priority is future focused. The items listed include ship types like the LCS, but also emphasize heavily larger, multi-mission vessels and the associated advanced technology. The third priority listed, dealing with enabling and supporting US Navy personnel, is not relevant to the topic of this thesis.

²²⁸US Department of the Navy, *Naval Operational Concept*, contents.

²²⁹Greenert, *FY 2013 Department of Navy Posture*, 8.

²³⁰*Ibid.*, 8-14.

²³¹*Ibid.*, 9.

Meeting the future needs of the combatant commanders, while taking into account the strategic shift to the Asia-Pacific region will involve the incorporation of more small combatants as well as fully embracing the concept of a Forward Deployed Naval Force.²³² Countering one of the most significant threats in the littoral environment, mines, will be left in the future to the LCS and its anti-mine mission package. The threat of weapons of mass destruction will be combated again through the reliance on forward deployed forces, and those forces interdicting weapons of mass destruction in strategic crossroads.²³³

Supporting Admiral Greenert's first priority of remaining ready for current challenges; a further focus on the specific objectives of the *US Navy's Vision for Confronting Irregular Challenges (Vision)*. This allows for an understanding of how the US Navy anticipates meeting non-traditional threats. The *Vision's* objectives are to enhance and formalize interoperability; build partner capacity; improve our regional awareness and understanding of complex environments and challenges; achieve an improved understanding and ability to counter illicit and extremist actors, enhance and broaden the multi-mission capabilities and applications of today's force, and identify necessary and distinct shifts in emphasis and investment to confront irregular challenges.²³⁴ Although written prior to the latest NSS, the goals stated in the *Vision's* objectives align and are there to guide overall use of US Navy's time and resources.

²³²Ibid., 17-18.

²³³Ibid., 20.

²³⁴US Department of the Navy, *The U.S. Navy's Vision for Confronting Irregular Challenges*, 6.

There are three supporting implementation objectives in the strategy. The objectives are broad and implementing any portion would be challenging due to a lack of specificity. Two sub-objectives are relevant to the African littorals and the Navy's support thereof. "Integrate and coordinate efforts with the U.S. Marine Corps and U.S. Coast Guard in support of the imperatives and approaches in the Maritime Strategy."²³⁵ On the surface of the *Vision* we find the US Navy having developed a focus on the irregular threat, mostly found in the littorals. What is to be done is easier said than determining how a given task will be done.

The CNA Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) report analyzed the *Vision* and determined the US Navy would primarily rely on conventional forces vice special operators to meet irregular challenges. The first of three axioms given by CNA is "It is preferable to prevent wars than to fight them."²³⁶ The conventional forces include everything from the aircraft carrier to ballistic missile submarines showing again the US Navy's preference towards higher end platforms even in fiscally constrained times.²³⁷ If this is the case, then the focus of combating irregular challenges is done through US military power, and yet the CNA analysis and the strategy itself extol the desire to enable partner nations to build the capacity to fight irregular challenges themselves. Once the analysis turns to material matters, the notion of engagement seems to disappear. The *Vision's* goals and the employment methods do not match.

²³⁵Ibid., 7.

²³⁶Fritz, Freedman, and Haussmann, 17.

²³⁷Ibid., 54-56.

Considering the maritime domain provides over 90 percent of the world's flow of information, people, goods and services that enable economic prosperity, the importance of the maritime domain to all economies is readily apparent.²³⁸ Irregular threats in the maritime domain interrupt the flow of commerce and enhance the flow of illicit materiel such as information, weapons and money. These actions left unchecked can contribute to the destabilization of a region and lead to insurgency, crime, terrorism or radical ideology.²³⁹ The US Navy is taking action through some Africa-specific partnership building and procurement activities. For example, the Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa and counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden are specific to the Eastern African littoral threat of piracy. The US Navy promotes economic stability by reducing the potential for smuggling and other black market operations through the training and equipping of partner nation's maritime forces in the Gulf of Guinea.²⁴⁰

Implementing Admiral Greenert's first priority is in part The Navy Expeditionary Combat Enterprise's (NECE) strategy. The NECE strategy identifies 33 specific implementation steps and who is in charge of each step, which are required to meet each of its six strategic goals. Some examples of these implementation steps are refining irregular training, updating weapons systems, and standardizing business procedures.²⁴¹ In this way, with the proper resourcing applied, the US Navy appears prepared to meet, or

²³⁸US Department of the Navy, *The U.S. Navy's Vision for Confronting Irregular Challenges*, 6.

²³⁹*Ibid.*

²⁴⁰US Department of the Navy, *Naval Operational Concept*, 31.

²⁴¹US Department of the Navy, *NECE Strategic Plan 2012*, 9-11.

has the basic structure to meet the needs of USAFRICOM and other CCDRs. Budgetary pressures are not addressed head-on, but undoubtedly will have some effect on NECC.

Supporting Admiral Greenert's second priority of building a relevant future force requires a view from the material perspective. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) in 2009 suggested there were alternatives to the shipbuilding strategies of the US Navy and the US Coast Guard, alternatives that could satisfy national objectives and save money.²⁴² The re-statement of the intent to accomplish what is directed in the *NOC 10* while not addressing the CBO's recommendations appears at odds with meeting the needs of the combatant commanders. The second sub-objective states: "Provide combatant commanders with applicable naval capabilities to support critical mission requirements outside the scope of US Navy core mission areas."²⁴³ The US Navy's shipbuilding plan calls only for the construction of LCSs and no other vessels to combat an irregular threat. Any other shipbuilding is of such a low level that it does not enter this level of reports.

According to the CBO the US Navy will not be able to meet its obligations to USAFRICOM or any other CCMD no matter what they are as the US Navy's shipbuilding strategy will be unable to maintain fleet numbers required to meet the CCDR's requirements.²⁴⁴ The CBO reports that the US Navy will require nearly double the funds to execute its shipbuilding strategy. With this drastic mismatch of funds, the US

²⁴²O'Rourke, *Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans*.

²⁴³US Department of the Navy, *The U.S. Navy's Vision for Confronting Irregular Challenges*, 7.

²⁴⁴O'Rourke, *Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans*, 12.

Navy appears to be stating that it has no intention of fulfilling its shipbuilding obligations. Or, as critics such as William Lind have suggested, it is an organizational level of ignorance as to the management of shipbuilding programs.²⁴⁵ The intended workhorses of the fleet are over budget and their total end strength has been reduced to save money. How then will the US Navy fulfill its commitments to the combatant commanders, and specifically to USAFRICOM? Without a different approach the US Navy may find itself struggling to meet basic demands, much less those of a more specific nature in USAFRICOM which support broader national level objectives. It is apparent to the author that if the CBO had options to consider for the report, then therein lies the proof that the maritime services have options for approaching the needs of combatant commanders in a fiscally responsible, mission oriented manner.

Many authors opined on the virtues of smaller ships and their overlooked capabilities. Often discussed was the PC class of ship. Although the effectiveness of the PC class proved to be less than perfect by a later model, the concept brought forth by Polidoro is one of using the existing inventory in new roles for different reasons than originally intended to overcome the mismatch in US Navy shipbuilding and strategic directions.²⁴⁶ Although engagement of many smaller nations in the littoral regions is a stated priority in several US Navy documents, the disappearance and limited use of the PC class of ships demonstrates a lack of creativity in Polidoro's view in the employment

²⁴⁵Christie et al., *America's Defense Meltdown*, 122.

²⁴⁶Polidoro, "The Use of Patrol Craft in Low Intensity Conflict Operations," 83-84, 93-94; Christiansen, "Littoral Combat Vessels."

of existing vessels to accomplish strategic objectives.²⁴⁷ Polidoro's outlay of missions for the PC class are not as specific to the class of ship as the thesis states, but rather he has done an excellent job of describing the missions of a littoral force, be that a PC, a riverine boat or other asset.

The Christiansen model comparing various US ships against a representative foreign ship, found that no currently available small craft of the US Navy is suitable against a simulated Chinese missile boat threat.²⁴⁸ His model, however, could be applied to compare more types of ships to determine if an existing vessel performs better, or equal but at lower cost if new capabilities are determined. This quantitative analysis method is a cost effective and simple way to begin a process of analyzing systems necessary to create a more effective littoral ship which may address unasked for requirements by the CCDRs.

The insights into the US Navy culture regarding shipbuilding priorities mentioned by Lind and further explored by Polidoro have a significant impact on how the US Navy supports the requirements of the CCDRs.²⁴⁹ If the US Navy give pride of place those platforms with significance to the current Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), then how will the US Navy ever effectively respond to CCMD needs? This implied policy of focus on the CNO's community and then the top end of the list of that community only creates a force unable to adapt to changing situations.

²⁴⁷ Polidoro, "The Use of Patrol Craft in Low Intensity Conflict Operations," 93-95.

²⁴⁸ Christiansen, "Littoral Combat Vessels," 51-53.

²⁴⁹ Christie et al., *America's Defense Meltdown*, 119; Polidoro, "The Use of Patrol Craft in Low Intensity Conflict Operations," 9.

The PC offers an important view into US Navy culture and implied policies which directly applies to the littoral environment. Polidoro points out the case of smuggling in Haiti in 1994. Regular US Navy blue water assets were unable to interdict the smugglers, but the PC class, because of its ability to effectively operate in the littorals, was able to stop most of the smuggling operations and deny the littorals to undesirable activities.²⁵⁰ Polidoro assesses two original primary missions for the PC class ship: coastal patrol and Interdiction and Naval Special Warfare Operations.²⁵¹ Both are rooted in littoral operations, and thus have a particular bearing on the African littoral environment and the US Navy's engagement therein.

The two current LCS platforms are much larger than the PC class ship, but each have weapons systems which enable greater survivability to many of the missile, mine and submarine threats of a littoral environment. A larger ship with more sophisticated weapons systems fits within the culture of the US Navy's acquisitions towards higher end, multi-mission platforms. When viewed through a mission mindset, the mismatch of naval platforms to the littorals becomes more evident, even if not explicitly stated in shipbuilding policy. The shortfalls of the US Navy shipbuilding plans compound the issue, as fewer resources will be available to meet CCMD requirements, such as the reduction in riverine squadrons.²⁵² The absence of other significant procurement examples demonstrates the secondary nature of the irregular threat's impact on US Navy

²⁵⁰Ibid., 77.

²⁵¹Ibid.

²⁵²US Department of the Navy, *Disestablishment of riverine Squadron Four Composite*.

acquisition policy. The willingness of the US Navy to attempt to counter the irregular threat, mostly in the littoral regions, appears at odds with organizational and acquisition changes and reductions being undertaken.

Criticism of the LCS platform is not universal, and considering the changes in the strategic environment in the last twenty years from a Cold War footing to one focused on the elimination of smaller threats, the corresponding change in strategic focus appears to indicate a reasonable response in policy. Michael Hutchens supports the US Navy's practical application of policy in its efforts to increase its fleet of DDGs and LCS platforms in order to provide presence and ballistic missile protection.²⁵³ He further recommends increases in amphibious ships and a reintegration of logistics ships into the regular fleet as these are vital in projecting power ashore and providing each ship with greater self-protection.²⁵⁴ The disconnect in the affirmation of existing US Navy shipbuilding policy is the required capabilities which Hutchens emphasizes and then aligns with amphibious missions, "nation building, security assistance, peacekeeping, counter-narcotics, counter-terrorism, counter-insurgency, and crisis response."²⁵⁵ Yet many of these missions seem out of place for vessels designed to project US Marines ashore. This imbalance of capabilities to ship type indicates to the author that although the US Navy is building ships to address needs, those ships may not be able to meet all the needs of the CCDRs in littoral regions in the manner the CCDR may prefer to conduct engagement operations.

²⁵³Hutchens, "Towards a Balanced Fleet: Options for a 21st Century Navy," 44.

²⁵⁴*Ibid.*, 46.

²⁵⁵*Ibid.*, 15.

Having now analyzed an abundance of documents related to the US Navy's littoral policies as they relate to USAFRICOM, the author finds that the US Navy does have sufficient policies in place to address the littoral environments including those in Africa. This assessment is based on the obvious attention paid to the littorals in the *NOC 10*, the presence of a separate strategy on irregular threats, the detailed analysis of the same policy and the establishment of NECC. Based upon the mismatch of shipbuilding strategies, academic analysis and wide ranging criticism, it is also apparent to this author from the analysis is the lack of implementation to support the policies.

This broad reaching analysis of economics, threats, engagements, and the littorals have all fed into contextualizing the primary research question of sufficient US Navy policy towards African littorals. Through the analysis of each of the secondary questions the need for the policies of the US Navy was presented, as well as the threats faced in engagement operations, and the drivers of the policies. Observing and evaluating the contemporary actions of USAFRICOM allowed for an establishment of a current state from which to balance US Navy policies. Finally, this analysis covered various US Navy policies documents, implementation documents and criticism so as to determine the sufficiency of the policies. Chapter 5 will draw the conclusions of each of the secondary research questions from the analysis then use those combined answers to answer the primary research question.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS

The primary purpose of forward-deployed naval forces is to protect American power from the sea to influence events ashore in the littoral regions of the world across the operational spectrum of peace, crisis, and war.²⁵⁶

— Admiral Jay L. Johnson

Considering a subjective topic carries the risk of perception bias and non-repeatability. Accepting this risk and working to bring in a multitude of viewpoints is the best way to counter any perceived bias and deliver a thesis in an objective manner. Through the presentation of chapter 2 and with the analysis of chapter 4 the merging of seemingly disparate topics creates a clear picture that the US Navy has a strong commitment to the African littorals and to USAFRICOM on paper. This commitment by the US Navy, however, lacks full implementation of its own policies to conduct engagement operations in the littorals of Africa.

An examination of compelling economic-security factors such as current trade, population migration, population age, and resource diversity, demonstrates conditions which will make Africa a major part of the future economic fabric of the US. These economic factors provide the rationale for the US Navy to focus on Africa and USAFRICOM. Creating stability through engagement with African partner nations and increasing economic opportunities will help nations cope with the youth bulge of many African nations. In this area of economic growth, military engagement can greatly assist the economic and the security situation of a nation. From this research, it is assessed that

²⁵⁶US Department of the Navy, *Naval Operational Concept*, 24.

without the institutions of government functioning properly, legitimate economic activity is secondary to illegitimate markets and criminal activities. A link exists between the bulge in youth population and security risks, owing to the lack of economic opportunities. As found in the analysis, the US Navy can have an impact in stopping this spiraling trend towards economic and security instability through its engagement with partner nations throughout the African littorals.

The classified nature of the theater engagement strategy meant an exploration of the publicly available exercises and engagements would be the only way to assess the engagements of USAFRICOM in the littorals. The pending naval engagement strategy may further address the littorals. Through an examination of the testimony by the commander of USAFRICOM, overarching programs such as APS, establishment of Joint Task Forces to address specific areas, and exercises, there is documentation to show sufficient littoral engagement by USAFRICOM.

Primarily considering the threats during engagement operations revealed several non-kinetic threats, which will affect operations more meaningfully on a day-to-day basis than any kinetic weapon available to nations or non-state actors. Although there is always the potential for low cost weapons, such as mines, missiles and diesel submarines, the real threat during engagement operation are the impediments to the mission. The threat posed by fragile or failing governments and their institutions poses a greater threat to national and regional stability than the presence of mines, submarines or anti-ship cruise missiles.

The littorals, specifically with respect to Africa, are an environment which is vital due to its status as a transportation hub for goods and services, economic activity and the

location where much of the world's population resides. For the US Navy, the littoral environment is one where a technological advantage is useful only to a certain extent. The human element of Sailors on vessels, interacting with their surroundings is what distinguishes littoral operations from blue water naval activities.

Although the littorals are defined, it is reasonable to conclude what the US Navy conceives of the littorals as the sea, air and land spaces where a ship of the line (FFG, DDG, CG) cannot freely navigate and where the threats faced are not those of an opposing fleet, but rather an irregular one. The irregular threat is composed of small arms, mines, shore launched anti-ship missiles, diesel submarines and criminal elements and the people supporting those threats and those affected by the support or reaction to the threat. To have a direct effect on these areas, the platforms required must be capable of operating in a congested sea space.

Based upon the review of policies and other related documents, the US Navy does have policies which indicate sufficient support to USAFRICOM and the littorals, based on the attention paid to the subjects in the *NOC 10*, the *Vision*, the development of the *Vision* and the establishment of NECC. Yet this positive answer is qualified by the valid criticisms of the implementation of these policies by congressional agencies, academics and defense industry journalists. The US Navy does support USAFRICOM in many ways, through the participation in engagement and joint exercises. What is not certain is what demands are not being asked for by USAFRICOM due to the lack of further capability of the US Navy. The US Navy has prioritized the capabilities necessary to littoral engagement to a lower priority, based upon shipbuilding strategies, current budget mitigation actions, and an historical preference for large surface ships to meet all needs.

A spiraling logic can be found where a CDR does not ask for a capability and a service does not provide a capability because it is not being asked for. Would the CDR ask for more or different capabilities if the US Navy could provide them? The answer is an unknown unknowable.

The analysis demonstrated no other ship platform of significance has been proposed since Polidoro's thesis was written, it is logical to conclude a gap remains in the material and policies of the US Navy in combating a littoral enemy based on Admiral Mullen's statements and the lack of further development of a littoral capable ship. By extension, a gap also exists in what the US Navy is providing to CCMDs to support engagement operations in the littorals. Although the policy to support the African littorals is in place, the implantation of the policy is lacking substance due to the reduction in NECC and the limited shipbuilding resources focused on the littorals.

In spite of the potential gaps in material, it is apparent from the research of the *NOC 10*, the *Vision* and NECC that the US Navy does have sufficient policies which address the needs of USAFRICOM and the African littorals through activities like APS and joint exercises. Where there is room for criticism is in the implementation of that policy, potential capacity and material employed. The economic importance of Africa is not yet fully realized, but engagement by USAFRICOM is present which appears to be pragmatically building partner nation capacity. Threats are present, but have not advanced to a point which would warrant drastic changes in material development, but rather through engagement by USAFRICOM these non-kinetic may be further mitigated as the nations of Africa build their own capacity.

Additional Research Areas

As with any exploration of a topic, tangents and additional questions inevitably arise. Many such questions arose during research for this thesis, and could prove valuable if researched further. What are the full implications of Chinese development and investment efforts in Africa? Should the US Navy alter its training for Sailors and Officers for littoral engagement and warfare? What is the best naval surface platform for littoral engagement and operations?

These questions and others will ensure naval strategists and thinkers continue to challenge, examine and explore alternative and validate claims. Without this academic curiosity, the US Navy will cease to improve and adapt to new threats and contemporary operational situation.

GLOSSARY

Blue Water Navy. The organizations and vessels within the US Navy who operate most effectively in the open ocean and were originally intended to counter a Soviet style threat.

Brown Water Navy. The organizations and vessels within the United States Navy specifically designed to operate in waterways not accessible by Blue Water Navy forces (DDG, FFG, CG etc). Typical of these forces are small, armored vessels armed with crew-served weapons (40mm, 25mm, .50 cal, etc).

Combatant Command. A unified command with broad mission areas under a single commander. Also known as CCMD.²⁵⁷

Combatant Commander. The person in charge of a combatant command. Also known as a CCCR.²⁵⁸

Guided Missile Cruiser (CG): A large surface combatant designed to defeat multiple threats. CGs carry the AEGIS weapons system which provides anti-air defense. The CG displaces 9,000 tons and is manned by 30 Officers and 300 Sailors.²⁵⁹

Guided Missile Destroyer (DDG): A mid-sized surface combatant designed to defeat the threat of Soviet mass missile barrages. These ships carry the AEGIS weapons system which combines a phased array radar system with targeting and various missiles to provide anti-air cover. The DDG is a multi-mission platform capable of performing anti-surface warfare and anti-submarine warfare. The DDG displaces 8200 to 9400 tons depending upon the variant, and draft approximately 31 feet. DDGs are crewed by 276 Officers and Sailors²⁶⁰.

Guided Missile Frigate (FFG): A small surface combatant designed for anti-submarine warfare, this single-mission ship is crewed by 17 Officers and 198 Enlisted and displaces approximately 4200 tons. FFGs have two hanger bays and can support the SH-60 LAMPS helicopter. The inventory of these vessels is being reduced as the platform ages and there are no future plans to build more FFGs. The ships no

²⁵⁷Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1.02, 45.

²⁵⁸Ibid.

²⁵⁹US Department of the Navy, Fact File, "Cruisers-CG," http://www.navy.mil/navydata/fact_display.asp?cid=4200&tid=800&ct=4 (accessed 3 February 2013).

²⁶⁰US Department of the Navy, Fact File, "Destroyers-DDG," http://ipv6.navy.mil/navydata/fact_display.asp?cid=4200&tid=900&ct=4 (accessed 3 February 2013).

longer have the ability to fire guided missiles, but the designation as an FFG remains²⁶¹.

Irregular Warfare. Warfare where a less powerful adversary uses unconventional capabilities to disrupt a larger more organized force.²⁶²

Littoral Combat Ship. A ship classification used by the US Navy that refers to two different designs of vessels designed to operate in shallow waters near coastlines. The LCS is either 378 or 419 feet long. Each variant is designed to be operated by a small crew with specific surface, mine hunting or submarine warfare mission packages brought onboard.²⁶³

Littoral Region. “The littoral comprises two segments of operational environment: 1. Seaward: the area from the open ocean to the shore, which must be controlled to support operations ashore. 2. Landward: the area inland from the shore that can be supported and defended directly from the sea.”²⁶⁴

Medium and Large surface combatant ship. Consist of vessels with long range and multiple weapons capabilities such as guided missiles, ballistic missile defense and anti-submarine weapons and sensors. The DDG and CG are examples of these types of ships.

Small surface combatant ship – Consisting of vessels of limited range and weapons capabilities such as the FFG, PHM, or PC.

Strategy. The set of ideas which direct the employment of national power in a coordinated manner to achieve national and theater goals and objective.²⁶⁵

²⁶¹US Department of the Navy, Fact File, “Frigate-FFG,” http://www.navy.mil/navydata/fact_display.asp?cid=4200&tid=1300&ct=4 (accessed 3 February 2013).

²⁶²Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1.02, x.

²⁶³US Department of the Navy, Fact File, “Littoral Combat Ship Class-LCS.”

²⁶⁴Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1.02, 169.

²⁶⁵*Ibid.*, 268.

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