SECURITY COOPERATION: AN OLD PRACTICE FOR NEW TIMES

A Monograph

by

MAJ Nicholas R. Simontis
U.S. Army

School of Advanced Military Studies
United States Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

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This monograph addresses the current security cooperation structures within the context of recent strategic guidance. This guidance calls for a whole-of-government approach to build partner capacity. Much of the current security cooperation structure, organization, and funding authorities developed over the course of the Cold War, however, and focused on building the defense capability of allies and security partners against the threat of Soviet expansion. The current strategic environment, in contrast to the Cold War era, includes threats from transnational and subnational actors. Terrorism and insurgency have moved from the periphery to the forefront of security concerns. This monograph examines two case studies at the geographic combatant command level to evaluate their organizational structure and interagency processes within this new context. The monograph then examines the new DOD funding authority, Section 1206, to determine its utility as a model for future security cooperation funding initiatives. This monograph finds that the requirements for Department of State and Department of Defense collaboration under Section 1206 foster the type of interagency cooperation advocated in recent strategic guidance.

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Name of Candidate: MAJ Nicholas R. Simontis

Monograph Title: Security Cooperation: An Old Practice for New Times

Approved by:

_____, Monograph Director
Nathan W. Toronto, Ph.D.

_____, Seminar Leader
Michael J. Lawson, COL, FA

_____, Director, School of Advanced Military Studies
Thomas C. Graves, COL, IN

Accepted this 23rd day of May 2013 by:

_____, Director, Graduate Degree Programs
Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D.

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ABSTRACT

SECURITY COOPERATION: AN OLD PRACTICE FOR NEW TIMES, by MAJ Nicholas R. Simontis, 43 pages.

This monograph addresses the current security cooperation structures within the context of recent strategic guidance. This guidance calls for a whole-of-government approach to build partner capacity. Much of the current security cooperation structure, organization, and funding authorities developed over the course of the Cold War, however, and focused on building the defense capability of allies and security partners against the threat of Soviet expansion. The current strategic environment, in contrast to the Cold War era, includes threats from transnational and subnational actors. Terrorism and insurgency have moved from the periphery to the forefront of security concerns. This monograph examines two case studies at the geographic combatant command level to evaluate their organizational structure and interagency processes within this new context. The monograph then examines the new DOD funding authority, Section 1206, to determine its utility as a model for future security cooperation funding initiatives. This monograph finds that the requirements for Department of State and Department of Defense collaboration under Section 1206 foster the type of interagency cooperation advocated in recent strategic guidance.

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ACRONYMS

AFRICOM	U.S. Africa Command
CJTF-HOA	Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa
DOD	Department of Defense
DOS	Department of State
DSCA	Defense Security Cooperation Agency
FMAA	Foreign Military Assistance Act
FMF	Foreign Military Financing
FMS	Foreign Military Sales
GAO	Government Accountability Office
IMET	International Military Education and Training
NDS	National Defense Strategy
NSS	National Security Strategy
NMS	National Military Strategy
OEF-TS	Operation Enduring Freedom Trans-Sahara
QDR	Quadrennial Defense Review
QDDR	Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review
SOUTHCOM	U.S. Southern Command
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

INTRODUCTION

The global security environment has changed dramatically over the past decade. The attacks of September 11, 2001 serve as a watershed of sorts in terms of defining U.S. allies, and perhaps more important, U.S. adversaries. During the Cold War and its aftermath, the United States viewed the security environment largely through the prism of conventional warfare. The various agencies that make up the security apparatus of the United States focused their attention on powerful nation-states that posed a threat through the size of their military forces or the quantity of missiles at their disposal. That focus changed dramatically as the towers of the World Trade Center collapsed, entombing thousands of victims.

In an instant, the threat posed by non-state actors moved from the periphery to the forefront of national security concerns, adding layers of complexity to the security environment. Sub-national and transnational groups operating in networks and focused on insurgency, terrorism, criminal enterprise, religious extremism, ethnic nationalism, or some subset of these activities, have the ability to operate beyond normal political and diplomatic controls. Moreover, these groups are sophisticated, motivated, well financed, difficult to locate, and, thus, difficult to isolate. Traditional means of deterrence have little effect on them. As Lieutenant General William Wallace famously noted, "The enemy we're fighting is a bit different than the one we war-gamed against…. We knew they were here, but we did not know how they would fight."[1]

How we deal with our adversaries is changing in response to these developments in the security environment. How we deal with our international allies and partners also should change. For many years, the term "security cooperation" referred to efforts by the Department of Defense (DOD) to promote U.S. security interests through the interaction with and development of

[1]Jim Dwyer, "A Nation at War: In the Field—V Corps Commander; A Gulf Commander Sees a Longer Road," *The New York Times,* 28 March 2003.

friendly and allied security capabilities.[2] This definition is evolving, however, as illustrated by recent strategic documents and statements by the President and Secretary of Defense.[3] The term as used recently includes synchronized efforts by the whole-of-government to build the security capacity of U.S. friends and allies, including the development of economic and political capabilities. The most recent strategic guidance calls for increased emphasis on an interagency and interorganizational approach to building partner capacity and capability, focused on promoting stability and preventing conflict before it begins, all within a framework that emphasizes governance and rule of law. Put another way, recent strategic guidance advocates a whole-of-government approach as the means for translating national security objectives into the outcome of increased partner capacity. This change represents recognition that a wide variety of skill sets is necessary to address these changes in the security environment. Unfortunately, this change presents challenges for current security cooperation practices.

The current structure of security cooperation, that is, the infrastructure of government agencies that participate in security cooperation activities, does not readily support this new guidance. The current security cooperation organization originated in the aftermath of World War II, and continued to evolve through the Cold War. Although the Department of State (DOS) has responsibility for planning and executing security cooperation, the system primarily addresses the military component of security in terms of equipment and training. The DOD, under the auspices of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) executes these portions of U.S. Security cooperation endeavors, which constitute the preponderance of efforts, both in terms of labor and

[2]Department of Defense, *Joint Publication 1-02, Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, 2010 (as amended through 15 September 2011)), 301.

[3]For examples see: Office of the President, *National Security Strategy,* (Washington, DC: The White House, 2010), 11-16; Robert M. Gates, "Helping Others Help Themselves," *Foreign Affairs,* Vol. 89, No. 3 (May/June 2010): 2-6.

fund allocation. Furthermore, the DOD's share has grown considerably in the past five years as Congress significantly increased funding authorities in order to facilitate stabilization in Iraq and Afghanistan.[4] The key issue, then, is how to shift the emphasis from the Department of Defense to efforts shared among Defense, State, USAID, and other agencies as needed.

The key question this monograph addresses is how the federal government can reorganize its security cooperation structures to better support the evolving strategic guidance that emphasizes building partner capacity through a whole-of-government approach. This paper proposes that the federal government can reorganize security cooperation using the Global Train and Equip Program under Section 1206 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 (Section 1206) as a framework for promoting interagency cooperation between the Departments of State and Defense to build partner capacity. To develop this proposal, this paper will begin with a description and an assessment of the current security cooperation structure, and then look at two case studies, examining cooperation between DOD and DOS with respect to building partner capacity. This paper will then describe the development and implementation of Section 1206. This funding authority, intended to deal with counterterrorism contingencies, requires the concurrence of both the Department of Defense and the Department of State in the selection and execution of programs to build partner capacity, particularly in unstable regions. Finally, this monograph will examine how the structure of Section 1206 can be expanded and applied to security cooperation to bring its practice more in line with emerging strategic guidance.

This topic is particularly relevant for military professionals concerned with operational art. Security cooperation is a clear expression of operational art, translating national and regional security goals into actions synchronized over time and space to build partner capacity in support

[4]Gordon Adams and Rebecca Williams, *A New Way Forward: Rebalancing Security Assistance Programs and Authorities* (Washington, DC: The Henry L. Stimson Center, 2011), 6-7, 11-12.

of those goals. This effort embodies the Army's doctrinal role in unified action.[5] Moreover, security cooperation represents a very visible example of operational art practiced during times of peace and conflict, as will be described in the following section.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE SECURITY COOPERATION STRUCTURE

The concept of security cooperation in the U.S. originated during the American Revolution and was a key to the success of the early colonists in that war. Since that time, the term has evolved and expanded into its present form. In order to appreciate the present meaning and associated complexity of security cooperation, it is important to understand how the concept and structures that form it developed into their present form.

Origins of U.S. Security Cooperation

The first recorded security cooperation actions undertaken in the U.S. were the diplomatic missions to France conducted by Silas Deane and Benjamin Franklin in 1775 and 1776.[6] The goal of these missions was to secure French support to defeat the British. The French responded with military and materiel support, which ultimately tilted the scales in favor of the colonists. By the end of the Revolutionary War, the U.S. received over $9 million in foreign aid from European countries.[7] Although the U.S. was the recipient of this assistance, it nevertheless represented a relationship established with foreign powers in support of U.S. security interests,

[5]Department of the Army, *Army Doctrine Publication 3-0, Unified Land Operations* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2011), iii, 6.

[6]George C. Herring, *From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations since 1776* (NY: Oxford University Press, 2008), 15-20.

[7]Herring, *From Colony to Superpower*, 21.

which is the essence of security cooperation. In this instance, France was building U.S. capability. The U.S. would return the favor in years to come.

Evolution of Security Cooperation

As the United States grew physically and economically, so did its security interests. Prior to actual entry into World War I, the U.S. limited its aid to Europe to relief assistance, financial credits and loans in an effort to maintain neutrality. The U.S. took a decidedly more active role with the outbreak of World War II, beginning with the repeal of the Neutrality Act in 1939.[8] With the neutrality question put to rest, the U.S. began shipping military equipment to its allies. Over the course of World War II, the U.S. provided 37,000 tanks, 43,000 aircraft, 792,000 trucks, and 1.8 million rifles. The value of these supplies was in excess of $40 billion (in 1940s dollars).[9] While U.S. efforts during the war focused on military equipment for our allies, after the war the U.S. focused on building the capacity of its allies.

In the aftermath of World War II, Europe's industrial base was largely in ruins, it was unable to feed itself, and demobilizing armies resulted in massive unemployment. The U.S. recognized that under these conditions, Europe was vulnerable to influence from the Soviet Union. The U.S. sought to rebuild Europe's economies through the Marshall Plan. From 1948 to 1952, the U.S. provided $13 billion in economic assistance to Europe, Greece, and Turkey.[10] While not solely responsible for Europe's recovery from the war, the plan did significantly aid European economies, and markedly assisted Germany's reintegration into Europe. More

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[8]Walter A. McDougall, *Promised Land, Crusader State: The American Encounter with the World Since 1776* (NY: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1997), 150.

[9]Allan R. Millett and Peter Maslowski, *For the Common Defense: A Military History of the United States of America* (NY: The Free Press, 1984), 409-411.

[10]Herring, *From Colony to Superpower*, 619-622.

importantly, the Marshall Plan significantly strengthened economic ties between the U.S. and Europe, which served to reinforce the military ties forged during the war. The tenets of the Marshall Plan would reemerge in legislation nearly ten years after its conclusion.

In 1961, the U.S. Congress passed the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA). The act restructured the foreign assistance programs in existence at that time, separating military from non-military assistance programs, and established the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) to administer the non-military assistance programs.[11] Additionally, the act provided that the Secretary of State "shall be responsible for the continuous supervision and general direction of economic assistance, military assistance, and military education and training programs."[12] Although the intent of this law was to simplify security cooperation organization and clarify responsibilities within the DOS, its effect in years to come would be the opposite.

The Defense Reform Initiative established the term security cooperation in 1997, and reorganized many international assistance programs administered by the DOD under the Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA). In 1998, DOD redesignated the DSAA as the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA).[13] Although many U.S. government agencies share roles in security cooperation, the net effect of the legislative acts described above is that DOS and DOD share the two key roles.

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[11]Rumu Sarkar, "Rethinking the Interagency Role in Preventing Conflict in Dealing with Failing or Failed States," *The Col. Arthur D. Simons Center for the Study of Interagency Cooperation*, Interagency Paper No. 9W (2012): 7.

[12]22 U.S.C. 2382; Foreign Assistance Act, Section 622(c). Available at http://transition.usaid.gov/policy/ads/faa.pdf, accessed 10 October 2012.

[13]Gregory W. Sutton and Kenneth W. Martin, *The Management of Security Assistance* (Wright-Patterson AFB, OH: Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management, 2007), 1-1.

Current Security Cooperation Structure

While security cooperation is a shared effort between DOD and DOS, DOD has, by a significant margin, the preponderance of personnel and organizational structure that comprise the security cooperation infrastructure. DOD defines security cooperation as "all DOD interactions with foreign defense and security establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific US security interests, develop allied and friendly military and security capabilities for internal and external defense and multinational operations, and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to the HN [host nation]."[14] It is important to note that the DOD definition includes developmental and humanitarian assistance activities focused on enhancing foreign governments' abilities to care for their people. The goal of all these activities is to reduce or eliminate factors leading to a crisis or conflict that requires U.S. intervention.[15] Security assistance activities are a subset of security cooperation and deal principally with foreign military financing (FMF), foreign military sales (FMS), and international military education and training (IMET) activities. The Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Policy has overall responsibility for the execution of DOD's security cooperation activities, which DSCA administers.

The geographic combatant commands (GCC) form the regional level of DOD security cooperation, and are responsible for planning, executing, and administering security cooperation activities within their respective regional areas. These activities typically include military-to-military engagements, training exercises, and humanitarian assistance when so directed.

The DOS defines security cooperation along the lines of the DOD definition, but often refers to it under the umbrella of foreign assistance. The Assistant Secretary of State for Political-

[14]Department of Defense. *Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations (*Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, 2011) V-10.

[15]Ibid.

Military affairs is responsible for the DOS slice of security cooperation and the Bureau for Political-Military Affairs serves as the primary link with DOD. Their mission statement provides a useful illustration of their definition of security cooperation: "Political-Military Affairs integrates diplomacy and defense, and forges strong international partnerships to meet shared security challenges."[16]

DOS has no organization for security cooperation at the regional level comparable to the GCC. The next level for DOS is the country level, the locations of U.S. Missions or Embassies abroad. Led by the Ambassador or Chief of Mission, each mission is responsible for supervising and coordinating all U.S. programs in foreign countries. Each mission staff has a Security Assistance Office with a small staff of DOD personnel who work in coordination with the embassy staff to execute security cooperation activities.

Challenges

Since the passage of the FAA in 1961, the Secretary of State has exercised leadership for foreign assistance, including military assistance programs such as FMF and IMET. The DOD, on the other hand, is responsible for implementation of these programs, generally under DSCA.[17] This structure appears straightforward on its face, however each agency has a large and complicated bureaucracy, with separate planning, budgeting, and programming processes, and each agency answers to a different Cabinet member. Furthermore, the security cooperation structure as it currently exists developed in the context of the Cold War between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, thus the focus of most programs was the strengthening foreign military capabilities,

[16]U.S. Department of State. "Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PM)." Accessed 10 October 2012, http://www.state.gov/t/pm/index.htm.

[17]Nina M. Serafino, *Security Assistance Reform: "Section 1206" Background and Issues for Congress* (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, 2012), 2.

and to prevent insecurity which might lead to undue Soviet influence. As stated, DOS authorizes and funds most programs, while the DOD supplies the manpower and expertise for execution.[18] Adding to this complexity, DOS and DOD programs fall under the administration of different legal authorities. DOS program typically fall under Title 22, U.S. Code, while DOD programs fall under Title 10 U.S. Code. The laws are very restrictive, authorizing the specific activities each agency can perform under the umbrella of security cooperation. Organizationally, the differences in the sources and purposes for Title 10 and Title 22 funds has led to "distinct cultures in the security cooperation structures that deal with each, which results in stove piped approaches to working with foreign countries."[19]

This characteristic affects planning. Since DOS has no equivalent to the GCC, DOS and DOD coordination at that level tends to be irregular and ad hoc in nature. This is a critical issue since a significant portion of DOD security cooperation plans are developed at the GCC level.[20] Moreover, while DOD charges COCOMs with planning and executing security cooperation within their respective areas, there are many governmental and nongovernmental agencies operating within their regions that are also involved in security cooperation or similar engagement activities, but are outside of the influence of the COCOMs. Add the activities of adjacent COCOMs to this and there are many opportunities for duplication of effort or working at cross-purposes.[21]

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[18]Adams and Williams, *A New Way Forward*, 11.

[19]Terence K. Kelly, Jefferson P. Marquis, Cathryn Quantic Thurston, Jennifer D. P. Moroney, and Charlotte Lynch, *Security Cooperation Organization in the Country Teams: Options for Success* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Arroyo Center, 2010), xii.

[20]Ibid.

[21]Gregory J. Dyekman, *Security Cooperation: A Key to the Challenges of the 21st Century* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2007) , 9.

A final challenged posed by the size, structure, complexity, and disparate funding sources and programs is the measurement of performance. The nature of security cooperation is subjective, thus it is difficult to assess and gauge performance. Most assessments conducted to date are merely tallies of outputs: dollars spent, aircraft delivered, or number of joint exercises conducted, to name just a few. There is no systematic method of assessment in place at any level. There are a number of academic and governmental studies available that examine this issue, and many proposals recommended, but neither the DOS nor DOD has adopted any comprehensive assessment framework.[22]

The result of the manner in which the security cooperation structure developed is that the system is slow, cumbersome, inefficient, and unresponsive. Addressing this very topic, former Defense Secretary Robert Gates observed that "while building a partner's overall governance and security capacity is a shared responsibility across multiple agencies and departments of the U.S. national security apparatus…the interagency tool kit is still a hodgepodge of jury-rigged arrangements constrained by a dated and complex patchwork of authorities, persistent shortfalls in resources, and unwieldy processes."[23]

In summary, a useful way to describe security cooperation is the sum of the efforts of the U.S. government to develop relationships with friends and allies that enhance security and further U.S. national interests. This function began with the founding of the United States and has been instrumental in U.S. foreign policy ever since. The major players in security cooperation are the Department of State and the Department of Defense. While the two agencies have many similar

[22]Dyekman, *Security Cooperation,* 8. For an example of assessment model recommendations, see Jeffrey E. Marshall, *Skin in the Game: Partnership in Establishing and Maintaining Global Security and Stability* (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2011).

[23]Gates, "Helping Others Defend Themselves," 4.

goals with respect to security cooperation, the methods available to each are quite different and governed by legislative actions that are quite restrictive in the activities they permit for each agency. Many of the current security cooperation organization processes and funding streams evolved during the Cold War. As a result, they focus primarily on military sales, military training, and military education. The system, as it currently exists, is complex, difficult to navigate, and unresponsive. As an example, in late 2007, a Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense forwarded a request to train and deploy a 30-man Hungarian Operational Mentor and Liaison Team to work with the Afghan Army. The coordination and processing between DOS, DOD, Congress, and the Hungarian Ministry of Defense took sixteen months.[24] This example is typical. Bearing this in mind, consider the strategic guidance, which governs security cooperation activities and more importantly, gives future direction to security cooperation.

STRATEGIC GUIDANCE

There are a host of publications that provide strategic guidance informing security cooperation. The National Security Strategy (NSS), signed by the President, serves as the foundational security document for the executive branch. On the DOD side, the NSS feeds into the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) published by the Secretary of Defense, and the National Military Strategy (NMS), published by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. On the DOS side, the NSS feeds into the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Defense Review published by the Secretary of State. This document provides guidance to the DOS and USAID on a broad range of State Department functions including security cooperation. The strategic guidance this group of documents provides is translated into a wide range of operational guidance and planning documents within the DOD and DOS. These documents clearly recognize that Cold War security

[24]Marshall, *Skin in the Game,* 27.

cooperation practices focused on building military capability through the transfer or sale of defense articles are insufficient in today's environment. Present day threats require a much broader approach that addresses underlying causes of instability, and empowers strategic partners. The key pieces of strategic guidance addressing this new approach follow.

National Security Strategy (NSS) 2011

The NSS frames the debate, describing the changes in the strategic environment in the two decades since the end of the Cold War. Recognizing this change, the document calls for expansive engagement to reinforce existing partnerships and develop new partnerships in key areas.[25] The document goes on to describe an interagency approach, utilizing varied instruments of national power in tandem to achieve these goals:

> Successful engagement will depend upon the effective use and integration of different elements of American power. Our diplomacy and development capabilities must help prevent conflict, spur economic growth, strengthen weak and failing states, lift people out of poverty, combat climate change and epidemic disease, and strengthen institutions of democratic governance. Our military will continue strengthening its capacity to partner with foreign counterparts, train and assist security forces, and pursue military-to-military ties with a broad range of governments. We will continue to foster economic and financial transactions to advance our shared prosperity. And our intelligence and law enforcement agencies must cooperate effectively with foreign governments to anticipate events, respond to crises, and provide safety and security.[26]

National Defense Strategy (NDS) 2008

The NDS echoes the NSS and similarly describes the post-Cold War strategic environment. Interestingly, while the document focuses on Defense Department agencies, it points out the necessity of integrating military and non-military capabilities when and where

[25]*National Security Strategy*, 1.

[26]*National Security Strategy*, 11.

necessary to counter threats. Put another way, the document emphasizes an interagency approach to strengthen U.S. allies and partners:

> We will assist other countries in improving their capabilities through security cooperation… We must also work with longstanding friends and allies to transform their capabilities. Key to transformation is training, education and, where appropriate, the transfer of defense articles to build partner capacity. We must work to develop new ways of operating across the full spectrum of warfare. Our partnerships must be capable of applying military and non-military power when and where needed – a prerequisite against an adaptable transnational enemy.[27]

National Military Strategy (NMS) 2011

The Joint Chiefs of Staff publish the NMS as strategic guidance for the joint forces. The document discusses security cooperation seven times, all within an interagency framework that emphasizes diplomatic and economic development efforts alongside military efforts to develop the security capacity of U.S. partners. This document also points out the utility of developing partner capability in order to prevent conflict and crises:

> The Joint Force, Combatant Commanders, and Service Chiefs shall actively partner with other U.S. Government agencies to pursue theater security cooperation to increase collective security skills with a wider range of partners. We seek to facilitate interagency and enable international interoperability before crises occur.[28]

The strategic documents listed above are published by their various agencies on a recurring basis. The DOD published two additional documents in January 2012 that accompany the above documents.

[27]Department of Defense, *National Defense Strategy* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2008), 15-16.

[28]Joint Chiefs of Staff, *National Military Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2011), 15.

Defense Strategic Guidance (2012)

In January 2012, the Defense Department published defense strategic guidance; however, in a break with precedent, the both the President and the Secretary of Defense signed the document. These documents, like those above, emphasize the need to promote engagement with U.S. allies and partners, however these documents point out that an interagency approach has the additional benefit of facilitating a smaller footprint for military forces:

> Building partnership capacity elsewhere in the world also remains important for sharing the costs and responsibilities of global leadership. Across the globe we will seek to be the security partner of choice, pursuing new partnerships with a growing number of nations —including those in Africa and Latin America — whose interests and viewpoints are merging into a common vision of freedom, stability, and prosperity. Whenever possible, we will develop innovative, low-cost, and small-footprint approaches to achieve our security objectives, relying on exercises, rotational presence, and advisory capabilities.[29]

Defense Budget Priorities (2012)

The Department of Defense published a companion document detailing defense budget priorities that align with the Defense Strategic guidance. The document focuses on setting priorities within the DOD given current fiscal constraints, but also includes security cooperation direction reinforcing the guidance contained in the Defense Strategic Guidance.

> Across the globe we will seek to be the security partner of choice, pursuing new partnerships with a growing number of nations including those in Africa and Latin America. Whenever possible, we will develop innovative, low-cost, and small-footprint approaches to achieve our security objectives, relying on exercises, rotational presence, and advisory capabilities.[30]

The document's emphasis on a small footprint approach indicates a lower profile role for military forces involved in security cooperation activities.

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[29]Department of Defense, *Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense* (Washington, DC: 2012), 3.

[30]Department of Defense, *Defense Budget Priorities and Choices* (Washington, DC: 2012), 6.

Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) (2010)

The State Department publishes the QDDR to provide strategic guidance for the Department of State and USAID. This guidance complements the strategic documents discussed above, but from a different perspective. While the DOD strategic documents recognize that much of the expertise necessary for an interagency approach to security cooperation and building partnership capacity resides outside of the DOD, the QDDR recognizes the unique ability of DOD agencies to pursue these goals in non-permissive environments. Furthermore, the QDDR points out that addressing the root causes of instability to facilitate building partner capacity often requires efforts with host nation civilian agencies in addition to efforts that strengthen host nation militaries. In other words, this guidance calls for a multi-tiered approach with a goal of strengthening governmental institutions, which, in turn, enhances the security capacity of partner nations.

> Addressing the root causes of conflict demands a wide range of skills, expertise, and capabilities. While State and USAID have many of these, no single agency of the U.S. government has them all. Every federal agency has contributions to make to what must be a whole-of- government endeavor. The Department of Defense is uniquely positioned to stop violence, create conditions of security, and build the military capacity of foreign nations…The United States must move from the rhetoric of multiagency response to its reality. The Department of Defense has long recognized the need for interagency response to violent conflict. In fact, many of the Combatant Commands have representatives of more than a dozen agencies at their headquarters. While that interagency support for military responses is critical, addressing the root causes of violence requires a civilian equivalent: an integrated, interagency framework for preventing and responding to crisis and conflict that marshals all the civilian capabilities of the U.S. government.[31]

The strategic security guidance contained in these documents is clear. The aim of U.S. Security Cooperation pursuant to national security policy is a whole-of-government approach with a goal of building partner capacity. Although building partner capacity for defense is a key

[31]Department of State, *Leading through Civilian Power: The First Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review* (Washington, DC: Department of State, 2010), 138, 153.

tenet of these documents, it is not limited to defense. The partner capacity referred to in these documents is far more expansive and includes institutions such as governance and provision of basic services, rule of law, economic development, public health, and promotion of democratic ideals. The underlying justification is that, in light of the current global security environment, U.S. security is enhanced by partners who are defensible internally as well as externally, in order to minimize the threat from transnational and subnational actors, and promote stability. Governments who are not able to provide for the good of their citizens, the reasoning goes, can serve as breeding grounds for insurgencies, terrorist or criminal groups, and other sources of instability, thereby adding to overall insecurity.

A further idea woven into these documents is that combatting these transnational and subnational threats is beyond the capability of any single nation. Countering them requires a concerted synchronized effort by groups of nations in partnership with one another; partnerships that go beyond purely mutual military benefit, strengthening economic and political ties. Put another way, strengthening individual partners internally through a whole-of-government approach that addresses a range of concerns results in a stronger strategic partnership for all. Building the security capacity of a partner nation to fend off external threats is good. Building the overall capacity of a partner nation, including strengthening political and economic institutions along with defense institutions, helps the partner nation fend off internal and external threats, which is better. The emphasis then is on an indirect approach – helping others help themselves. This begs the question, how does the current security cooperation structure square with the current strategic guidance?

The two lead agencies for security cooperation are DOD and DOS. State has the overall lead for security cooperation direction and implementation while defense assists with planning and implementation. Both agencies are responsible for coordination with each other and with other government agencies as required. As already covered, however, both agencies are largely

constrained by separate legislative actions, Title 10 for Defense and Title 22 for State. These separate pieces of legislation which govern the separate programs of each have, over time, resulted in separate bureaucracies and processes, which hamper coordination and, as already noted, result in stove piped approaches. On its face, there is a disconnect between the current structure and the guidance described above. This disconnect calls for a closer examination through case studies to better describe and understand the problem, and illuminate how Section 1206 may provide a workable solution.

CASE STUDIES

In order to examine security cooperation structures in light of the current strategic guidance, this paper will examine two cases, United States Africa Command and United States Southern Command. These two COCOMs provide useful case study subjects for several reasons. To begin with, both COCOMs face similar operational environments. AFRICOM and SOUTHCOM both deal with subnational and transnational threats which current strategic documents hold as the most likely near and midterm threat to the U.S. Secondly, bother regions have significant natural resources, but demonstrate wide variances in the stability and effectiveness of the governments and economies within their regions, and both regions have sizable ungoverned spaces. Thirdly, neither COCOM is actively engaged in any ongoing military actions beyond training-related exercises, and both commands focus on security cooperation. Finally, both COCOMs are similar in size and structure, and focus on an interagency process, but SOUTHCOM is forty-five years older. The difference in institutional maturity thus makes for an interesting comparison.

AFRICOM

United States Africa Command (AFRICOM), the newest geographic command, began operations in October 2007, becoming fully operational in October 2008. The creation of

AFRICOM occurred largely in recognition of the growing strategic importance of Africa to U.S. interests. Those interests extend from natural resources, particularly energy resources, concern over violent extremist activities, ungoverned spaces, piracy, narcotics trafficking, humanitarian crises, and violent conflict.[32] The command has its headquarters in Stuttgart, Germany, and is responsible to the Secretary of Defense for military relations with African nations, the African Union, and African regional security organizations. AFRICOM's stated mission "protects and defends the national security interests of the United States by strengthening the defense capabilities of African states and regional organizations and, when directed, conducts military operations, in order to deter and defeat transnational threats and to provide a security environment conducive to good governance and development."[33]

The command is responsible for all DOD operations and security cooperation activities and relations with 54 countries on the continent of Africa, its island nations, and the surrounding waters. There are approximately 2,000 personnel assigned to AFRICOM, including military, civilian employees, and contractors. The structure of AFRICOM is unique in two important areas.

To begin with, the primary concern of AFRICOM is on engagement, not war fighting. Since its inception, the command has focused on conflict prevention and building partner capacity, as opposed to building or maintaining war-fighting capability. Secondly, the command's organization has a uniquely interagency design. The organization has two co-equal deputy commanders, a Lieutenant General who serves as the Deputy to the Commander for Military Operations and a senior Foreign Service Officer (Lieutenant General equivalent) who serves as the Deputy to the Commander for Civil-Military Affairs. Ambassador Chris Dell, who currently

[32]Lauren Ploch, *Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests and the Role of the U.S. Military in Africa* (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2011), i.

[33]U.S. AFRICOM Public Affairs Office, "FACT SHEET: United Stated Africa Command," http://www.africom.mil/getArticle.asp?art=1644, accessed 3 October 2012.

holds the position, arrived in September 2012. He is responsible for the command's programs associated with humanitarian assistance, disaster response, security sector reform, Peace Support Operations, and partner capacity building.[34] Additionally, AFRICOM has three additional Senior Foreign Service Officers, and more than 30 personnel from over ten U.S. government agencies and departments, including Homeland Security, USAID, and State.[35]

AFRICOM's Area of Responsibility presents a unique strategic environment. The region holds six of the world's fastest growing economies over the past ten years, but also contains fourteen of the world's twenty weakest states. Many of these states lack the capacity to address even the most fundamental provision of basic services or security. The continent is home to the terrorist organizations al-Qaida Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), which has recently merged with al-Shabaab, and Boko Haram. The region has a wealth of natural resources and holds some of the largest oil reserves found outside the Middle East.[36] Accordingly, AFRICOM has three main priorities as the focus of its security cooperation activities: countering violent extremist organizations, countering piracy and illicit trafficking, and partnering to strengthen defense capabilities. AFRICOM administers or participates in a number of large programs that address these priorities.

AFRICOM is responsible for two combined joint task forces within its AOR, Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) and Operation Enduring Freedom Trans-Sahara (OEF-TS). CJTF-HOA serves as a forward operating base for AFRICOM in Djibouti. OEF-TS

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[34]U.S. AFRICOM Public Affairs Office, "Christopher William Dell," http://www.africom.mil/dell.asp, accessed 3 October 2012.

[35]U.S. AFRICOM Public Affairs Office, "FACT SHEET: United Stated Africa Command," http://www.africom.mil/getArticle.asp?art=1644, accessed 3 October 2012.

[36]Carter Ham, "Posture Statement of U.S. Africa Command," http://www.africom.mil/research.asp, accessed 3 October 2012.

represents the DOD component of the Trans Sahara Counter Terrorism Partnership Program, a DOS-led initiative composed of the U.S. and ten African nations including Algeria, Burkino Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, and Tunisia. The goal of the initiative is to counter the spread of extremist ideology and combat terrorism in the Trans Sahara region of Africa.[37] The initiative draws on experience from a variety of U.S. government agencies including DOS, USAID, and DOD, and focuses on building partner capacity by developing military operational and logistical capability; promoting information sharing; conducting ombined, joint and multinational exercises; humanitarian assistance; and supporting infrastructure development.[38]

AFRICOM also conducts a series of major combined joint exercises annually including "Exercise Flintlock," "Exercise Natural Fire," "Exercise MEDFLAG," and "Africa Endeavor." The objective of these exercises is building operational capacity in African partner nations, developing their command and control systems, and enhancing their ability to respond to security crises, natural disasters, and medical emergencies.

The majority of security cooperation exercises, in addition to these large-scale exercises, take the form of small team training and advising activities conducted by Army, Navy, Air Force, and Special Operations components. These teams focus on building the security capabilities of partners within Africa. They emphasize personal relationships maintained over time to establish long-term institutional relationships. The recently announced regional alignment of Army units will augment these programs. Under regional alignment, U.S. Army Forces Command designates army brigade combat teams to plan for employment and participate in exercises in specific

[37]U.S. AFRICOM Public Affairs Office, "FACT SHEET: Operation Enduring Freedom-Trans Sahara," http://www.africom.mil/fetchBinary.asp?pdfID=20100526130828, accessed 5 October 2012.

[38]Ibid.

geographic regions. This allows the brigades to focus on the specific requirements within those regions and to tailor cultural and language training accordingly to facilitate engagements within their regions.[39] As this program matures, AFRICOM, in coordination with U.S. Forces Command will plan and coordinate partnership activities in accordance with these regional alignments.

In addition to these major exercises, AFRICOM facilitates more traditional security cooperation initiatives such as FMF, IMET, and FMS. In fiscal year 2012, AFRICOM administered $515 million in security cooperation programs under Title 10 and Title 22. These programs included Combatting Terrorism Fellowships, military-to-military engagements, military HIV/AIDS programs, as well as air and maritime sector development. Military equipment financing, military education, narcotics and law enforcement programs accounted for another $3.3 billion, although this amount comes from DOS under Title 22 and is administered through DSCA and AFRICOM's Office of Security Cooperation.[40] There is a wide variety of additional funding sources AFRICOM draws upon, but their number and complexity have consequences.

Determining funding sources and understanding the guidelines that govern their application requires significant expertise and experience. Navy and Air Force officials at AFRICOM complained that staffs spend substantial amounts of time to determine which funds can be applied to which activities, and officials at all levels stated that properly applying funds to security cooperation activities was not well understood.[41] The short duration of many funds also affects planning and mapping out long term goals. Army and special operations personnel at

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[39]Charles W. Hooper, "Going Farther by Going Together: Building Partner Capacity in Africa," *Joint Force Quarterly*, No. 67 (4th Quarter 2010), 10, 13.

[40]Hooper, "Going Farther," 10.

[41]Government Accountability Office, "Improved Planning, Training, and Interagency Collaboration Could Strengthen DOD's Efforts in Africa," *GAO 10-794* (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, 2009), 24.

AFRICOM stated that a lack of sustainable funding sources creates a short-term approach to activities and results in sporadic engagements instead of long-term relationships.[42] General William "Kip" Ward commented on this in testimony before the House Armed Service Committee:

> The breadth and scope of U.S. Africa Command's programs and activities in Africa are significant and growing. Our ability to sustain forward progress toward our long-term goals in Africa is dependent on several factors that enable our efforts. Some, such as limits on authorities, present us with challenges where we seek assistance. Sustaining our long-term security cooperation programs and activities in Africa requires flexible, multi-year authorities. Existing authorities are designed to support the conduct of individual short-term activities or long-term programs, but do not support the transition from the former to the latter. They are also insufficiently responsive to changing conditions, such as when train and equip efforts initiated in response to emergent threats highlight the need for long-term capacity building.[43]

The administrative requirements for funding complicate long-term planning. The process for submitting funding proposals for the next fiscal year must often begin before applications from the previous year are processed. Furthermore, the periods for applying funds often do not align, resulting in disjointed training events.[44] For example, the command may draw upon two separate fund sources to provide a piece of equipment and training that improve security capability. One fund source may cover the equipment and delivery to the user location, but the second fund source, which covers training the recipients, may fall within a different time frame, creating a frustrating delay between delivery and subsequent training on the equipment for employment.

To summarize, AFRICOM is the newest geographic combatant command with responsibility for security cooperation activities in an area of the world with great potential, but

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[42]Ibid, 26.

[43]U.S. AFRICOM Public Affairs Office, "AFRICOM POSTURE STATEMENT: Ward Reports Annual Testimony to Congress," http://www.africom.mil/getArticle.asp?art=4133&lang=0, accessed 5 October 2012.

[44]GAO "Improved Planning, Training," 27.

significant instability. The 2,000 personnel assigned to AFRICOM participate in a wide range of security cooperation activities ranging from major exercises to training and advising at the team level in many of the 54 countries that make up AFRICOM's area of responsibility. These activities range from building security capability to infrastructure development and from professional education to humanitarian assistance. Since its inception, AFRICOM is often cited by DOD as exemplifying a whole-of-government approach, but how successful has it been?

A recent Government Accountability Office (GAO) Report found deficiencies in strategic planning, measuring effects, and interagency cooperation at AFRICOM. The GAO determined that while AFRICOM has developed broad plans, including a theater strategy and campaign plan, it still lacks detailed plans to support its overall objectives. Furthermore, AFRICOM has delayed the completion dates for these detailed plans for up to two years. This has led to differing priorities among AFRICOM's subordinate component commands.[45] Along with the lack of completed plans, the command is not assessing its capacity building activities. The command is conducting a wide range of activities; however, there is little ongoing evaluation, thus no means of gauging the effectiveness of AFRICOM's security cooperation efforts.[46] These factors, coupled with the complexity of various funding sources, and a lack of institutional knowledge regarding funding sources and associated requirements, complicate effective planning for security cooperation within the command.

Finally, while AFRICOM has interagency representation within its senior organizational structure, overall representation is approximately 30 personnel out of the 2,000 personnel that make up AFRICOM, or less than two percent. The GAO report determined that the command is not involving interagency personnel in the early stages of planning, particularly setting agenda,

[45]GAO "Improved Planning, Training," 4.

[46]GAO, "Improved Planning, Training,"18.

and does not make effective use of the expertise available from interagency personnel.[47] Given these points, the focus AFRICOM is clearly on building capacity, but there is significant room for improvement. The command incorporates an interagency structure, but lacks mature interagency processes. Moreover, a lack of interagency personnel hampers these interagency processes. Bearing these characteristics in mind, U.S. Southern Command provides a useful comparison to determine if these characteristics are unique to AFRICOM, or if there are other factors in play.

SOUTHCOM

U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) is responsible for operations, contingency planning, and security cooperation within the area encompassing Central America, South America, and the Caribbean, excluding U.S. possessions, commonwealths, and territories within the Caribbean. In addition to these responsibilities, the command ensures the defense of the Panama Canal and the surrounding area.[48] The missions and focus of SOUTHCOM include conducting full spectrum military operations, supporting whole-of-government efforts to enhance regional security and cooperation, crisis response planning, and persistent engagement.[49]

Strategically, SOUTHCOM's region is similar to that of AFRICOM in many respects. The area is rich in natural resources; however, persistent challenges in the region include poverty, widespread crime, illicit narcotics trafficking, corruption, and weak states. The region has a landmass far larger than that of the United States, containing 32 sovereign nations with a wide variance of institutional robustness and maturity. The region has widespread poverty, a lack of

[47]GAO, "Improved Planning, Training,"31.

[48]"About Us," U.S. Southern Command, accessed 14 October 2012, http://www.southcom.mil/aboutus/Pages/About-Us.aspx.

[49]U.S. Southern Command, "Command Strategy 2020," http://www.southcom.mil/aboutus/Documents/Command_Strategy_2020.pdf, accessed 14 October, 2012.

developed infrastructure, terrorism, organized crime, and insurgent groups such as Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) and Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) in Peru.[50] In short, SOUTHCOM and AFRICOM confront many of the same issues within their respective areas.

SOUTHCOM's organization is similar to that of AFRICOM, although it has fewer personnel. There are approximately 1,200 military and civilian personnel assigned to its headquarters in Miami, Florida.[51] SOUTHCOM has a civilian deputy commander, currently Ambassador Carmen Martinez. She holds the rank of Minister Counselor at State, and serves as the command's primary liaison with DOS and with the U.S. embassies located in SOUTHCOM's area of responsibility. In addition to the civilian deputy commander, there are twenty interagency representatives assigned within SOUTHCOM, and the headquarters created a partnering directorate responsible for identifying opportunities and recommending interagency representation within the command.[52]

SOUTHCOM has three key strategic objectives it uses to guide planning and operations, countering illicit trafficking, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, and peacekeeping operations. The command views military-to-military engagements, interagency coordination and cooperation, joint and combined operations and training, and strategic communications as critical

[50]U.S. Southern Command, "SOUTHCOM Posture Statement," http://www.southcom.mil/newsroom/Documents/SOUTHCOM_2012_Posture_Statement.pdf, accessed 14 October 2012.

[51]GlobalSecurity.org, "US Southern Command," http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/dod/southcom.htm, accessed 12 October 2012.

[52]Government Accountability Office, "Interagency Collaboration Practices and Challenges at DOD's Southern and Africa Commands," *GAO 10-962T (*Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, 2010), 4.

enablers to accomplish these objectives.[53] Accordingly, the command participates in a wide range of activities to promote these goals, in addition to ongoing FMF, FMS, and IMET activities.

Several of these major exercises are "Tradewinds," "Fuerzas Aliadas PANAMAX," "UNITAS," and "Fuerzas Comando." Tradewinds is a multinational exercise that provides a framework to train on countering transnational threats. PANAMAX focuses on defense of the Panama Canal and the surrounding area, and has the added goal of fostering interoperability between the civilian and military forces with security responsibilities in this area. UNITAS has the unique distinction of being the longest-running multinational naval exercise in the world, with component exercises conducted in the Atlantic and the Pacific oceans. Fuerzas Comando is a regional multinational special forces exercise focused on counterterrorism.[54] While these exercises center primarily on security forces, SOUTHCOM also participates in several humanitarian and disaster relief exercises that have significant interagency involvement.

Two such exercises are "Beyond the Horizon" and "New Horizon." These exercises generally last several months, targeting underdeveloped rural regions, providing construction and medical assistance. The exercises involve uniformed military personnel as well as representatives from State, USAID, and other nongovernmental organizations. In fiscal year 2011, the exercises provided medical treatment to over 100,000 people in 19 countries within SOUTHCOM's AOR.[55] The command sponsors numerous smaller-scale exercises as well, generally conducted by rotating reserve forces and interagency personnel.

In summary, SOUTHCOM is older and organizationally smaller than AFRICOM, but has responsibility for a region that is very similar to that of AFRICOM in terms of the security

[53]U.S. Southern Command, "Command Strategy 2020," 5-9.

[54]U.S. Southern Command, "Posture Statement," 14-22.

[55]U.S. Southern Command, "Posture Statement," 18-22.

challenges present. SOUTHCOM's mission, vision, and strategic objectives all focus on enhancing U.S. security interests through partner engagement and activities that build partner capacity through a whole-of-government approach. Unlike AFRICOM, however, SOUTHCOM has achieved much more success in its whole-of-government approach.

To begin with, a recent GAO study determined that SOUTHCOM's organizational structure and programs display successful interagency planning, coordination, and execution. Furthermore, SOUTHCOM incorporates a "number of key practices that enhance and sustain collaboration with interagency and other stakeholders toward achieving security and stability in the region."[56] Some of these key practices include working with interagency partners to develop SOUTHCOM's Theater Campaign Plan and its Command Strategy 2020. Planners actively sought interagency input throughout the process of developing these two key documents that serve as the foundation documents for all of SOUTHCOM's activities. The command has expended considerable effort to develop interagency processes that solicit input from all key interagency representatives within SOUTHCOM. For example, the Departments of Commerce, State, Treasury, Homeland Security, Transportation, Justice, Energy, along with USAID all provided input to the Command Strategy during a three-day conference.[57] The process does not stop there, however.

SOUTHCOM builds on these activities in subsequent planning efforts by using these key documents to drive later detailed planning. Specifically, planning groups within SOUTHCOM use the objectives contained in the Theater Campaign Plan and the Command Strategy to

[56]Government Accountability Office, "U.S. Southern Command Demonstrates Interagency Collaboration, but Its Haiti Disaster Response Revealed Challenges Conducting a Large Military Operation," *GAO-10-801,* (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, 2010), 6.

[57]GAO, "U.S. Southern Command Demonstrates Interagency Collaboration," 7-8.

determine collaboratively which agencies bring the best capabilities to leverage in pursuit of these objectives.[58] SOUTHCOM then takes it a step further and seeks out other stakeholders, including private organizations and nongovernmental organizations that can provide unique capabilities to address security and humanitarian concerns within the AOR. However, it is important to note that these key relationships that SOUTHCOM integrates took years to establish and develop. This does not suggest that the age of command influences interagency processes; however, it does indicate that the relationships necessary for successful integration of stakeholders in the interagency process develop over time and with constant effort and command focus to foster institutional practices that promote an interagency perspective.

In addition to these relationships and processes, another key to the command's interagency success is the unique organizational structures that focus on improving interagency coordination. As already mentioned, the command established a Partnering Directorate with a full-time staff of sixteen with the specific goal of coordination and outreach with interagency partners, international partners, NGOs, and private organizations.[59] In other words, SOUTHCOM is constantly recruiting new partners while working to maintain relationships with existing partners. Furthermore, the directorate identifies capability gaps within the organization and within specific missions or operations that could be filled by an interagency or other non-DOD partner, and makes recommendations to the command accordingly. This practice is unique; all geographic commands experience shortages of interagency personnel – there simply are not enough to go around. SOUTHCOM takes the initiative to recruit interagency personnel or find other personnel with the requisite skill sets that help it accomplish its missions. SOUTHCOM refers to these

[58]Ibid, 9-10.

[59]Ibid, 14.

efforts as seeking "whole-of-society solutions."[60] Explaining this term, SOUTHCOM official Lisa Samson stated that at SOUTHCOM, domestic partners form a "fourth D" to the traditional "3 Ds" [defense, diplomacy, and development] of security cooperation efforts in the region. The command seeks out regional stakeholders from academia, volunteer organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and private businesses, to provide additional experience and capabilities to address issues within the region.[61] This practice has the added benefit of allowing the command to link into existing business and non-governmental networks with whom it might not otherwise interact.

Another unique development is that SOUTHCOM actively promotes information sharing among its various partner agencies. The command has established databases to collect lessons learned from exercises and missions, and hosts frequent conferences to promote information sharing.[62] The database and conferences have the added benefit of quickly identifying duplication of efforts, or identifying complementary activities.

SOUTHCOM emphasizes interagency coordination with the goal of building partner capacity throughout its organizational structure. The command actively seeks input from a wide variety of sources within and outside of government to guide planning, and establish meaningful objectives. The planning process captures this information and translates it into detailed operational level plans. Having considered the whole-of-government approach in building partner cooperation at the COCOM level, several conclusions are apparent.

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[60]Donna Miles, "Southcom Promotes 'Whole-of-Society Solutions,'" *American Forces Press Service*, 14 June 2012, http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=116742, accessed 10 October 2012.

[61]Ibid.

[62]GAO, "U.S. Southern Command Demonstrates Interagency Collaboration," 17.

AFRICOM and SOUTHCOM Compared

As described above, both AFRICOM and SOUTHCOM are making concerted efforts to promote a whole-of-government approach and facilitate interagency processes within their headquarters, and both commands emphasize a supporting role in U.S. government security cooperation activities within their respective areas. Observers tend to view SOUTHCOM as more successful overall in their whole-of-government approach for several reasons.

In the first place, SOUTHCOM is the older command of the two, thus its administrative and institutional processes are more mature. Furthermore, under DOD authorization, SOUTHCOM reorganized its existing organizational structure in 2008 specifically to facilitate interagency collaboration.[63] AFRICOM, on the other hand, was just standing up at that time.

Secondly, although interagency representatives in both commands constitute a fraction of total personnel assigned, both commands actively seek interagency input during planning. SOUTHCOM takes it to another level, however, with their "whole-of-society" approach, seeking out regional stakeholders in addition to assigned personnel to obtain even greater diversity of input and leverage other capabilities and resources outside of those normally available to a COCOM. To further this activity, SOUTHCOM has instituted a partnering directorate to solicit new partners, from academics to entrepreneurs, to assist with regional efforts to build partner capacity. Moreover, SOUTHCOM maintains an organizational flexibility that promotes an interagency process. One observer notes, "SOUTHCOM embraced not just civilian oversight of its plans and actions but detailed involvement of civilians in the very development of its policies. At the same time, it demonstrated its commitment by reducing its own staff, relocating those

[63]GAO, "U.S. Southern Command Demonstrates Interagency Collaboration," 6.

officers to other agencies and departments of the government, lending their knowledge and expertise to pre- and post-conflict nation development."[64]

Thirdly, the focus on a whole-of-government approach and interagency input has resulted in the development of overarching theater strategies in both commands; however, operational plans that translate theater capacity building goals into action plans and measurable objectives are largely incomplete in AFRICOM. One likely reason for this is the relative newness of AFRICOM. Establishing relationships and translating strategy into plans for an area encompassing 52 countries is clearly an enormous undertaking. The recent collapse of Libya undoubtedly interrupted this process as well, as AFRICOM worked to plan and synchronize the U.S. and U.N. responses. SOUTHCOM confronted a similar major event with the earthquake in Haiti during 2010, however the command is much farther along in terms of operational plans for security cooperation, again largely due to its organizational maturity.

Still, both commands participate in a wide range of security cooperation activities that run the spectrum from major joint and multinational exercises to humanitarian assistance and development activities, to small team engagements and training. The overall objective of these activities is to build partner capacity; helping our security partners to help themselves. The AFRICOM case study points out that the command has experienced challenges applying the numerous and varying sources of funding. It is important to note, however that this issue is not unique to AFRICOM or any of the COCOMs, for that matter. Admiral Mullen, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, pointed this out in 2011:

> Our engagement across the globe would be greatly enhanced by wholesale reform of security sector assistance. Our security assistance is designed for another era: authorities are inflexible, resources are insufficient, and processes are too cumbersome for addressing today's security challenges. The laws and regulations surrounding security

[64]Jan Schwarzenberg, "Where are the JIACGs today?" *Interagency Journal,* Vol. 2 (Summer, 2011), 27.

assistance are one of the major barriers to better and more substantial partnerships.[65]

The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review put it similarly:

> Despite the recognition that our security is increasingly tied to building partner capacity, our security assistance tool kit has not kept pace. America's security assistance efforts remain constrained by a complex patchwork of authorities, persistent shortfalls in resources, unwieldy processes, and a limited ability to sustain long-term efforts.[66]

Thus, the complexity of funding sources and authorities is a recognized problem. The differing pots of money available and the varying constraints attached to the funds complicate planning in several ways. To begin with, once agencies agree on a specific capacity building activity, they must research which funding sources apply and what limitations each fund has. Many activities often require several funding sources due to limitations on when and how the funds are applied. Additionally, each fund generally has its own reporting requirements. If a project requires three separate funds, there are three separate sets of accompanying reporting requirements. The complexity of current funding requirements and their accompanying bureaucratic requirements with separate approval chains serve to complicate and stifle interagency cooperation. Section 1206 funds may provide a workable near-term solution and serve as a model for streamlining future funding due to some of its unique features, not the least of which is the requirement for concurrence for the use of funds by both DOD and DOS. This requirement has the effect of mandating interagency collaboration between DOD and DOS; they work together because they must in order to satisfy funding requirements.

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[65]Michael Mullen, "CJCS Guidance for 2011," http://www.jcs.mil//content/files/2011-01/011011165132_CJCS_Annual_Guidance_2011.pdf, accessed 20 October 2012.

[66]Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report,* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense: 2010), xiv.

SECTION 1206

For over 50 years, the U.S. provided security assistance to the military and paramilitary forces of foreign countries, primarily in the form of Foreign Military Financing, Foreign Military Sales, and International Military Education and Training. These programs trace their roots to of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, and the Arms Control Export Act of 1972. These acts formalized the process, resulting in the provision of over $200 billion in security assistance. Title 22 (DOS) funding has provided the bulk of this assistance, supplemented by some Title 10 (DOD) programs targeting specific countries.[67] Under statutory authority, the State department has the lead for planning, budgeting, and ensuring that assistance rendered under these programs aligns with U.S. foreign policy, while DOD has responsibility for implementing the programs, typically through DSCA, and country teams in coordination with the COCOMs. As the global security environment changed after 9/11, however, two issues with these traditional forms of security assistance surfaced.

After 9/11, terrorism moved to the top of security concerns. The DOD considered defeat of terrorist organizations in the countries where they train and prepare to be a priority. Furthermore, confronting these groups requires the assistance of security forces within those countries. The first issue facing DOD was that many of these countries lacked the capacity and the capability to take the lead in such operations. The second issue is that DOD felt that existing security assistance programs under DOS were too cumbersome and slow to deal with these emerging threats.[68] Accordingly, DOD proposed a new funding authority. The following section describes the development of 1206 funding and details the requirements of the act that foster interagency cooperation.

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[67]Adams and Williams, *A New Way Forward*, 11.

[68]Serafino, *Security Assistance Reform*, 3.

1206 Background

In 2004, Secretary of Defense Gates proposed the creation of pooled funds to Secretary of State Clinton, a program modeled on a similar process used by the United Kingdom. DOS and DOD would contribute to these pooled funds for the purposes of security capacity building, stabilization, and conflict prevention. In Gates' view, these funds would be the first step taken in an effort to modernize U.S. efforts at building partner capacity.[69]

After discussions between the DOD and DOS, DOD sent a proposal to Congress in 2005. The proposal became a part of the fiscal year 2006 National Defense Authorization Act, included as Section 1206 of the Act. Since that time, many refer to these funds as "Section 1206 funds" or simply "1206 funds." The law has gone through several iterative legislative modifications during the past several years. Most notably, congress authorized the Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, to conduct programs under Section 1206. This represents the first major DOD authority used for building the capacity for foreign military forces. The specified programs are:

> 1. Enable foreign military and maritime forces and to perform counterterrorism operations.
>
> 2. To enable foreign military forces to participate in or support stability operations in which U.S. forces participate.[70]

Section 1206 authorizes the Secretary of Defense to spend up to $350 million per year for the purposes listed above. DOD and DOS adopted an interagency process to implement the program. On the DOD side, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations, Low

[69]Gates, *Helping Others*, 4-5.

[70]Serafino, *Security Assistance Reform*, 1, 33-38.

Intensity Conflict, and Interdependent Capabilities has the overall lead for the program and coordinates with the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs on the DOS side.[71]

While relatively narrow in scope, Section 1206 has several features worth noting. As stated, DOD, for the first time, has the lead for use of the funds. This allows DOD to take advantage of its greater planning and personnel resources. Additionally, it allows program implementation in unstable or high-risk environments, and provides for input from the COCOM commanders. The COCOMs, in collaboration with DOS Chief of Missions, have a significant role in designing, coordinating, recommending, and implementing Section 1206 proposals.[72] Finally, the requirement for State Department concurrence provides a mechanism to insure interagency coordination.

1206 Implementation

During fiscal years 2006 through 2009, the Section 1206 program provided $985 million dollars in counterterrorism training and equipment to 53 countries. 82 percent of the funds addressed specific terrorist threats in countries identified by U.S. Intelligence as priorities for counterterrorism efforts. The types of assistance provided thus far range from radar, communications equipment, and weapons to boats, trucks and aircraft.[73] The process for establishing programs is straightforward.

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[71]Government Accountability Office, "DOD and State Need to Improve Sustainment Planning and Monitoring and Evaluation for Section 1206 and 1207 Assistance Programs," *GAO 10-431* (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, 2010), 7-8.

[72]U.S. Department of Defense and U.S. Department of State Inspectors General, "Interagency Evaluation of the Section 1206 Global Train and Equip Program," *DOD Report No. IE-2009-007, DOS Report No. ISP-I-09-69* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2009), 37.

[73]GAO, "DOD and State Need to Improve," 3, 11.

To begin the cycle, DOD and DOS solicit recommendations annually. Interagency boards with DOD and DOS representation consider collaborative recommendations from COCOM commanders and the relevant Chief of Mission. The boards review the proposals and select projects to recommend to the Secretaries of State and Defense for approval. Projects approved by both Secretaries are then ready for implementation after completion of any required congressional notifications.

The major advantage of projects implemented under Section 1206 is that they are particularly useful to address emergent issues. Once approved, plans are often executed within a year. Other security assistance programs such as FMF can take up to three years to plan and implement.[74]

Assessment

The Section 1206 program has fared well in several evaluations conducted since its inception. The Government Accountability Office and the Inspectors General of the Department of Defense and the Department of State conducted the two most recent reviews. Both studies conducted interviews with DOD and DOS officials at all levels within those agencies, both in Washington, DC, and in the field at multiple locations. The IG report evaluated program effectiveness in building capacity for counterterrorist and stability or military operations and efficiency with regard to project selection, execution, implementation, results, and sustainment. The report found:

> The synergy achieved by combining the geographical perspectives and resources of country teams (country) and combatant commands (regional) in Section 1206 project planning and implementation is a unique strength of this type of security assistance. The Under Secretary of Defense (Policy), in coordination with the Department of State, has developed a well-structured project selection process that includes vetting procedures…. Generally, the Section 1206 projects evaluated were effective in building partner nation

[74]Ibid, 4.

> capacity for counterterrorist and military or stability operations, and helped those nations increase control over their borders and ungoverned spaces and counter terrorism. Section 1206 leverages the expertise of both Departments of Defense and State. As such, Section 1206 is an excellent tool for providing corollary benefits to the Chiefs of Mission including facilitating bilateral discussions and other diplomatic efforts.[75]

This evaluation thus determined that Section 1206 does foster interagency cooperation and does provide a vehicle for effectively building partner capacity. In fact, the report refers to the 1206 program as a "model of interagency cooperation to achieve common goals."[76] A key facet of the program is that it combines the differing perspectives of DOS and DOD. State focuses on the country and the relations between the host government and the U.S. DOD, represented by the COCOM, has a regional perspective. As both bodies must work together throughout all phases of a 1206 project, these perspectives help shape a shared successful outcome.[77] The evaluation did point out several areas for improvement to the program including improving methods to prioritize projects and establishing standards to measure the performance of projects in terms of program goals and objectives. Overall, though, the program functions as intended.

The GAO study reached similar conclusions, noting that the Section 1206 program is distinct from other programs, is generally consistent with U.S. strategic counterterrorism priorities, and often implemented programs much faster than possible under other traditional programs such as FMF or FMS.[78] The study noted the dual-key decision-making process, in

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[75]Departments of Defense and State Inspectors General, "Interagency Evaluation of the Section 1206," ii,iii.

[76]Ibid.

[77]Ibid, 43-44.

[78]GAO, "DOD and State Need to Improve," 3-4.

particular, that incorporates DOS and DOD input throughout the 1206 process and, in particular, "defining common outcomes and joint strategies for achieving them."[79]

CONCLUSION

This monograph has examined the current state of security cooperation within the context of new strategic guidance. In the course of this examination, this paper has briefly traced security cooperation practices and structures, from their formalization in the wake of World War II, through their development during the Cold War. Throughout the Cold War period, security cooperation efforts focused largely on building partner military capacity and forging defensive alliances as a hedge against Soviet expansion and aggression. Security cooperation during this era centered on the delivery of major end items and weapons systems for use in defense against external threats, supporting U.S. interests. The events surrounding 9/11 brought a different perspective, however.

In the wake of the September 11th attacks, the subsequent operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the growing threat from terrorist groups and other sub-national actors, the focus shifted to helping U.S. partners and allies to defend themselves from internal and external threats. This new focus requires a revised approach to building partner capacity. Recent strategic guidance captures this revised approach. Put simply, it is utilizing a whole-of-government approach to assist U.S. security partners to develop their capability to resist these internal and external threats. This paper examined the cases of SOUTHCOM and AFRICOM in order to determine how their respective organizations support this guidance. Both commands are unique in their interagency design. AFRICOM was stood up on an interagency approach and SOUTHCOM was reorganized to facilitate an interagency approach. Assessments indicate there

[79]Ibid, 21-22.

is good interagency collaboration ongoing in both organizations, but there is room for improvement.

To begin with, both organizations have less than two percent interagency representation within their organizations. Much of this simply reflects the reality of the size of DOD in comparison to other agencies. DOS, USAID, and the Departments of Justice, Homeland Security, and Commerce have only a fraction of the personnel assigned to DOD. This organizational reality is likely to remain at least in the near term, but it is, nevertheless, a significant constraint. SOUTHCOM has devised several unique initiatives to work around this limitation, seeking expertise from other areas to assist in their security cooperation efforts. In short, they are facilitating an interagency approach by casting a wider net. The bottom line is that DOD lacks expertise in some of the key areas targeted for capacity building, such as economic development, public health, governance, and improved rule of law. SOUTHCOM has found a workable solution to this issue.

A second key identified by the case studies is that experience counts. A whole-of-government approach requires interagency processes that actively solicit input from all players. Well-developed regional plans that draw on a broad range of interagency expertise serve as the springboard for effective operational plans that translate regional objectives into effective programs to build partnership capacity. Again, SOUTHCOM fared better in this area as the more mature organization. While the COCOMs appear to be well on their way to an interagency approach, funding streams and authorities remain a persistent challenge.

The current system of traditional security assistance rendered under Title 22 and Title 10 is complicated and unwieldy. Moreover, as this paper and many other studies point out, the system is slow, does not lend itself to interagency cooperation, and is unresponsive to emergent needs. Section 1206, introduced in 2006 as a vehicle to build counterterrorism capacity, provides a useful model. Although DOD has the lead for these funds, their very design and legal

requirements mandate a collaborative approach that evaluators have found effective. To date, DOD has provided nearly $1 billion worth of training and equipment under this authority. Unfortunately, this program is not permanent. The fact that it is subject to renewal by Congress every year restricts long-range planning under this program and injects an aspect of uncertainty in that U.S. partners cannot be sure which programs will continue from year to year.

Security cooperation is the essence of operational art, translating national and regional security goals into actions synchronized over time and space to build partner capacity. The current system works, but adopting the effective interagency practices instituted by SOUTHCOM, and streamlining legislative authorities using 1206 as a model can bring marked improvement to the current system.

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