Generation of Combat Power by Insurgents: An Historical Analysis
Abstract
Is there commonality in how insurgent and counterinsurgent forces develop combat power? Elements of Combat Power remain an essential element of operational doctrine through the USADRP 3-0, "Unified Land Operations." If the Elements of Combat Power are essential to a military force, then they may be equally important to insurgent forces. Case studies of the insurgencies in Dhofar, Oman (1962-1976), and Post-911 Afghanistan (2001-Present) are analyzed to determine whether insurgent forces develop combat power in a similar manner to the U.S. Army. The Elements of Combat Power used to conduct this research are Leadership, Information, Movement and Maneuver, Intelligence, Fires, Sustainment, and Protection. The analysis demonstrates that insurgents generate combat power in ways that do not violate the principles outlined in USADRP 3-0. The analysis also demonstrates that counterinsurgent forces may conduct a Center of Gravity Analysis using the insurgent military force as the CoG and the Elements of Combat Power as the Critical Capabilities.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jun 13, 2013
- Accession Number
- ADA589723
Entities
People
- Michel D. Dinesman
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College