

REINTEGRATION OF FORMER COMBATANTS IN SRI LANKA

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General Studies

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ABSTRACT

REINTEGRATION OF FORMER COMBATANTS IN SRI LANKA, by MAJ Ruwan Ehelepola, 85 pages.

With the complete defeat of LTTE in May 2009, the Sri Lankan government commenced rehabilitation and reintegration of 11,664 former combatants to the society. To succeed, the government developed a unique process to reintegrate ex-combatants to the society. Since each conflict differs from another, the question was raised as to how successful was the Sri Lankan process in reintegrating ex-combatants to the society. It became evident that only a holistic comparison between various reintegration processes would assist in understanding the success-failure of the Sri Lankan process. Therefore, the researcher selected three reintegration processes conducted in Saudi Arabia, Burundi and Sierra Leon and conducted a comparative case study analysis using a evaluating criteria developed by International Labor Organization and cross-case synthesis technique to assess success or failure. According to the analysis the Sri Lankan process obtained 27 points, the Saudi Arabian process obtained 26 points, the Burundian process obtained 13 points and the Sierra Leon process obtained 25 points. This validated the fact that the Sri Lankan process has achieved the ILO evaluation criteria and it was a comparatives success. In addition, it brought about similarities and differences, leading to identify lessons learned from the Sri Lankan process for future application

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ACRONYMS

BCGR	Bureau of the Commissioner General of Rehabilitation
CGR	Commissioner General of Rehabilitation
DDR	Disarmament Demobilization and Re-integration
ES	Executive Secretariat
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
GTZ	German Agency for Technical Corporation
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDP	Internally Displaced Personnel
IGAS	Income Generating Activities Support
IGO	International Governmental Organization(s)
ILO	International Labor Organization
IOM	International Organization for Migration
LTTE	Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
MDG	Millennium Development Goals
MDRP	Multi-country Demobilization and Re-integration Program
NCDDR	National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilization and Re-integration
NGO	Non Governmental Organization(s)
NLF	National Liberation Front
PARC	Protective Accommodation and Rehabilitation Centre
PPO	Provincial Program Office
PRAC	Prevention, Rehabilitation and post-Release Care

RUF	Revolutionary United Front
SLBC	Sri Lanka Broadcasting Cooperation
UNAMISL	United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USD	United States Dollar(s)

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Reintegration of former combatants to the society is a critical task of a post conflict scenario. According to the United Nations, “reintegration is the process by which ex-combatants acquire civilian status and gain sustainable employment and income. Reintegration is essentially a social and economic process with an open time frame, primarily taking place in communities at the local level. It is part of the general development of a country and a national responsibility, and often necessitates long-term external assistance.”¹ The former combatants should also enjoy equal human rights as other civilians do, as they too are part of the society. Therefore, the major challenge is to reintegrate former combatants, many of whom are used to making a living through violence, back into society. This was evident in the unique reintegration model developed in Sri Lanka to reintegrate former cadres of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE) to the society.

The Sri Lanka Army was responsible for the initiation, design, development and implementation of the rehabilitation of ex-combatants process. According to Major General Sudantha Ranasinghe, the former Commissioner General of the Bureau of Rehabilitation;² “For those of us who undertook the challenge, they were not ex-

¹Ministry of Disaster Management and Human Rights, *National Framework Proposal for Reintegration of Ex-combatants into Civilian Life in Sri Lanka*, http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/@emp_ent/@ifp_crisis/documents/publication/wcms_116478.pdf (accessed September 8, 2012).

²Ministry of Defense Sri Lanka, “Rehabilitation of Ex Combatants The Sri Lankan Model,” http://www.defence.lk/new.asp?fname=text_of_maj_gen_s_ranasinghe (accessed September 8, 2012).

combatants any longer but were beneficiaries, child soldiers became our children.” The Sri Lankan process was developed in accordance with the culture and ethics, norms and values, and religious sentiments, particularly of the Tamil speaking people of North and East. The outcome focused on transforming the mindset of the ex-combatants of a ruthless terrorist group to peace-loving and harmonious citizens. The concept also focused on safeguarding the human rights of the rehabilitees, victims of terrorism and international obligations of the state. In addition, it ensured those rehabilitees contribute towards sustainable peace, reconciliation, and social cohesion while creating revitalized economic prospects for future employability.³

Background

The Democratic Socialist Republic is an island nation with a recorded history of over 2500 years. It is a multi-ethnic society. The ethnic breakdown of the population is as follows, Sinhalese 74 percent, Tamils 18 percent, Muslims 7 percent and others 1 percent. Buddhism is the major religion accounting for 70 percent of the population, whilst the remainders are 16 percent Hindus, 7 percent Islam, 6 percent Christians and 1 percent of various other faiths.⁴ Sri Lanka was a sovereign nation until 1815 when it became a British colony. Prior to that, it was under the influence of Portuguese and Dutch who occupied certain parts of the country. Upon receiving Independence from the British

³Ibid.

⁴US Department of State, “Background Note: Sri Lanka,” April 2011, <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5249.htm> (accessed September 8, 2012).

in 1948, Sri Lanka adopted a democratic governing system similar to the British system with certain amendments.⁵

The British adopted a divide and rule policy, creating division among different ethnic groups giving them an extra means to rule the people, but adverse after effects of this system came to prominence in the post-Independence era.⁶ Sinhalese are the majority ethnic group in all nine provinces of the country except in the North and Eastern provinces where Tamils are the pre-dominant ethnicity.⁷ However, the Tamil minority complained about not having enough prominence in the society. They were pronouncing for more devolution of political and administrative power. Certain shortsighted political decisions made by the Sinhala politicians assisted in complicating the situation further. For example, in 1956, the government declared “Sinhala” as the official language, further alienating the remaining communities.⁸ While discussions were going on with prominent Sinhalese and Tamil leaders, youth militant groups with a radical militant leadership were rapidly developing in the North and East provinces. These youth believed that the only resolution for this problem was an armed struggle that would create a separate land for Tamils. In 1975, a radical youth named Velupillai Prabakaran raised an armed organization named “Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam” (LTTE), which became the

⁵History of Sri Lanka, “Colonial History of Sri Lanka,” http://readtiger.com/wkp/en/Colonial_history_of_Sri_Lanka (accessed October 8, 2012).

⁶Nira Wickramasinghe, *Sri Lanka in the Modern Age: A History of Contested Identities* (Hawaii: University of Hawaii Press, 2006), 27-33.

⁷US Department of State.

⁸Encyclopedia of Nations, “Sri Lanka–History,” <http://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/Asia-and-Oceania/Sri-Lanka-HISTORY.html> (accessed October 8, 2012).

dominant military group in the North and East.⁹ In addition, the pro-western stance adopted by the government after 1977 created a rift with neighboring India. This prompted India to support the growth of LTTE, providing training in Tamil Nadu.¹⁰

In 2007, the United States Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), categorized LTTE as one of the most ruthless terrorist organizations of the world and recognized LTTE as a ruthless known terrorist group to have an Air wing, Sea wing and a substantial ground force to challenge the Sri Lankan military.¹¹ The LTTE perfected the idea of suicide bombing,¹² conducting hundreds of attacks notably assassinating a President of Sri Lanka and a Prime Minister of India. The simmering violence ignited in July 1983 when the LTTE ambushed and killed 13 Sinhalese soldiers in Jaffna.¹³ Ethnic violence erupted due to this incident and many Tamils fled the country. This incident was the major turning point in the conflict.

During the next three decades, the LTTE would unleash ruthless acts of terrorism that include mass killings of innocent civilians, attacks on places of worship and key

⁹Ministry of Defense Sri Lanka, "The LTTE in Brief," <http://www.defence.lk/paps/LTTEinbrief.pdf> (accessed October 8, 2012).

¹⁰Rohan Gunaratna, *Indian Intervention in Sri Lanka: The Role of India's Intelligence Agencies* (Colombo: South Asian Network on Conflict Research, 1993), 1-18.

¹¹Federal Bureau of Investigation, "Taming the Tamil Tigers," http://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2008/january/tamil_tigers011008 (accessed September 8, 2012).

¹²Mia Bloom, "What the Tigers Taught Al-Qaeda," *Washington Post*, May 24, 2009, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2009-05-24/opinions/36908404_1_female-suicide-bomber-terrorist-groups-ltte (accessed April 8, 2013).

¹³Edgar O'Ballance, *The Cyanide War: Tamil Insurrection in Sri Lanka, 1973-88* (London: Brassey's, 1989), 21.

infrastructure, assassinations of key political and military leaders.¹⁴ There were many peace initiatives however, LTTE settled for nothing less than of a separate state. When His Excellency, Mahinda Rajapaksa was elected to the office as the president in 2005, the country was under an ineffective peace treaty facilitated by the Norwegians. In July 2006, LTTE captured “Mavil Aru” a vast reservoir in the Eastern province. The closure of the sluice gates created havoc for the people living in the area. Mavil Aru is the waterway that provides water to some regions of eastern Sri Lanka. Closure of the sluice gates affected the water supply to thousands of families in government controlled areas, leading into a human catastrophe.¹⁵ The government had no other alternative other than using military power to crush the LTTE. The Humanitarian operation, launched to liberate the people of the North and East from the LTTE control culminated on 18 May 2009 with the complete defeat of LTTE, ending the three decades of conflict and suffering.¹⁶

The termination of three decades of conflict generated many challenges. The government had to cater to an estimated 295,000 Internally Displaced Personnel (IDP's). The first step was the establishment and handling of reception centers that received the displaced civilians. Then administration of those who arrived at the reception centers, the establishment and management of secure relief villages for the internally displaced persons followed by the implementation of a master plan for the reconstruction of the

¹⁴Ministry of Defense Sri Lanka, “The LTTE in Brief.”

¹⁵Ministry of Defense, *Humanitarian Operation Factual Analysis July 2006-May 2009*, July 2011, slembassyusa.org/.../Sri-Lankan-Humanitarian-Operation-Factual-Analysis (accessed September 15, 2012), 44.

¹⁶*Ibid.*, 3.

Northern Province and the return and resettlement of the IDPs to their own homes. Another key factor was the rehabilitation and reintegration of the 11,664 ex-combatants of the LTTE who were either captured or surrendered during the final stage of the conflict.¹⁷

Importance of the Study

The reintegration of former combatants becomes a prime requirement of a government at the termination of a conflict. With the complete defeat of LTTE in May 2009, the Sri Lankan government commenced rehabilitation and reintegration of 11,664 former combatants to the society. To succeed, the government developed a unique process to reintegrate ex-combatants to the society. However, there is no accepted method to gauge the success or the failure of this process. Since each conflict differs from one another, a holistic comparison between various reintegration processes would assist in this regard to understand the success-failure of the Sri Lankan process. In addition, it would enhance the knowledge base and help academics greatly in conducting research on similar studies in the future.

Research Question

It is evident that there is no accepted method to gauge the success of a reintegration process. This creates a need to conduct a comparative research. Conducting a comparison between the reintegration processes adopted by a few other countries, which are identified in the following scope paragraph with the Sri Lankan process, will help to gauge the success-failure of it. In addition, this would highlight important facets

¹⁷Ministry of Defense, “Rehabilitation of Ex Combatants.”

of the Sri Lankan process that could be implemented for future reintegration process. Therefore, the primary question arises: How successful was the Sri Lankan process in reintegrating ex-combatants to the society? In accordance with the primary question the following secondary questions were developed. What aspects of the Sri Lankan reintegration process are common with the comparative processes examined? What aspects of the Sri Lankan reintegration process did not work in the comparative processes examined? These questions would assist in conducting a holistic comparison between the reintegration processes adopted by Sri Lanka and other selected reintegration processes of the study.

Scope

In order to answer the identified research questions, the research needs to focus on a few other reintegration processes. Therefore, the researcher selects three reintegration processes conducted in Saudi Arabia, Burundi and Sierra Leon. Selections of above models were based on:

1. Availability of literature written on selected processes.
2. Similarities in conflict, socio and economic dimension prevail in Burundi and Sierra Leon that would facilitate a holistic comparison.
3. Similarity in de- radicalization process conducted in Saudi Arabian process.
4. Literature identifies Saudi Arabian and the Sierra Leon models as a comparative success and Burundi as a failure. This enables a more realistic comparison of the Sri Lankan process.

Limitations

Reintegration is a detailed process and it covers a vast subject area. Although this research covers four different reintegration processes, it has several limitations. Firstly, the scope of reintegration focuses on every aspect that occurs after the demobilization of an ex-combatant to the actions taken after reintegrating him to the society. Due to this vast magnitude, the researcher focuses this research mainly to the actual rehabilitation part of the reintegration process but not actions afterwards.

Secondly, this is an individual research; therefore, the researcher limits the research only to the available materials acquired by him on the selected topic. Thirdly, there is no universally accepted tool to conduct a case study between different reintegration processes. Therefore, the researcher used a tool published by the International Labor Organization (ILO), a well-acknowledged international organization to conduct a comparison between four selected reintegration models. Further, in order to conduct a realistic analysis the researcher would only address selected aspects of the said tool that is applicable to all concerned reintegration processes.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

There is a vast amount of literature addressing the conduct of different reintegration processes adopted in Sri Lanka, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leon and Burundi. However, there was little literature that made comparisons between different processes. Therefore, literature review for the thesis requires an analysis of the reintegration processes adopted by Sri Lanka, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leon and Burundi. This would assist to understand the different approaches used by those countries in reintegrating ex-combatants to the society. Therefore, the literature review will be conducted in following four areas, which would lay the foundation for subsequent study:

1. The Sri Lankan reintegration process.
2. The Saudi Arabian reintegration process.
3. The Burundian reintegration process.
4. The Sierra Leon reintegration process.
5. Analysis process.

The Sri Lankan Reintegration Process

The National Framework Proposal for reintegration of ex-combatants into civil life in Sri Lanka elaborates the framework of the reintegration process. The Sri Lankan reintegration process for ex-combatants was a product of a systematic and well-anticipated procedure. A national steering committee commenced formulation of the reintegration policy in March 2009, a couple of months ahead of the termination of the conflict on May 19, 2009. The policy document developed was “The National

Framework Proposal for Reintegration of Ex-combatants into Civilian Life in Sri Lanka.”¹⁸ It focused in achieving three basic goals: “Firstly, to safeguard the human rights of ex-combatants, including the responsibility to protect and assist them in accordance with the Constitution of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka and the State's international obligations. Secondly, contribute towards sustainable peace, reconciliation and social cohesion through reintegration of ex-combatants in the society. Thirdly, to increase the employability of ex-combatants, minimize their risk of socioeconomic marginalization and create opportunities for economic revitalization in post-war Sri Lanka.”¹⁹ The steering committee was assisted by the representatives of national and international organizations including, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the International Organization for Migration (IOM), International Labor Organization (ILO), the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the UN Resident Coordinator's Office in Sri Lanka, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).²⁰ In order to achieve the above-mentioned goals the below mentioned set of principals evolved:

1. Safeguards to Protect the Rights and Security of Rehabilitees, Victims, and the Community.
2. Equality of Assistance.
3. Gender Equity and Responsiveness.

¹⁸Ministry of Disaster Management and Human Rights, 1.

¹⁹Ibid.

²⁰Ibid., 2.

4. Confidentiality of Data and Prevention of Stigmatization.

5. Adopting a Demand-driven Approach on Socio Economic Rehabilitation.

The national framework went to action after three months ending the conflict. Initially the 11,664 ex-combatants, including 594 child soldiers sorted into various categories.²¹ This aligned with the guidance given in the National Framework Proposal of Sri Lanka that identified four categories. They are the former combatants of the LTTE who were captured and or arrested, the LTTE activists who surrendered prior to the conclusion of hostilities, members of non LTTE paramilitary groups who were already normalized (most of them broke from the LTTE and are now working with the government), and the last category, host communities affected by the conflict.²²

The new national framework proposal functioned under the newly formed Bureau of the Commissioner General of Rehabilitation (BCGR), which came under the purview of the Ministry of Rehabilitation and Prison Reforms in Sri Lanka. A serving General Officer was appointed as the head of this new organization. The organization was empowered as the competent authority with a mandate to carry out the task of the reintegration process in post war Sri Lanka. The mission statement “to disengage, de-radicalize, rehabilitate and reintegrate the misguided men, women and children, who were radicalized by the protracted armed conflict, into the community following a center and community based comprehensive rehabilitation process to be useful citizens and

²¹Ministry of Defense, “Rehabilitation of Ex Combatants.”

²²Ministry of Disaster Management and Human Rights, 3.

productive members to the country”²³ amplifies the task. The bureau was responsible to coordinate with all relevant local and international agencies over its funding and administration. The reintegration of ex-combatants’ process was launched in nine Proactive Accommodation and Rehabilitation Centers (PARC) in the country. The unique rehabilitation model designed by the Sri Lanka Army focused on six main pillars that would drive the rehabilitation process. They are as follows:

1. Spiritual, Religious and Cultural Rehabilitation.
2. Educational Rehabilitation.
3. Vocational and Livelihood Rehabilitation.
4. Social, Community and Family Rehabilitation.
5. Psychological and Creative Therapies Rehabilitation.
6. Sports and Extracurricular Activities.²⁴

The government spent around 2.5 billion Sri Lankan rupees (approximately 200 million USD) and provided necessary resources to make this a success.²⁵ Due to the full commitment made in conceiving, designing, developing and implementing a very successful rehabilitation model, over 11,500 ex-combatants have been reintegrated into the society within just three years.

²³Ministry of Rehabilitation and Prison Reforms, “Commissioner General of Rehabilitation,” [http:// www.bcgr.gov.lk](http://www.bcgr.gov.lk) (accessed September 12, 2012).

²⁴Ministry of Defense, “Rehabilitation of Ex Combatants.”

²⁵Ministry of Defense Sri Lanka, “Rehabilitated Former Combatants Get Livelihood Loans,” <http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Sri+Lanka+%3A+Rehabilitated+former+combatants+get+livelihood+loans.-a0297485244> (accessed September 12, 2012).

A comprehensive presentation delivered at the annual Defense Seminar - 2012, organized by the Sri Lanka Army, explains the conduct of the reintegration process in detail. According to the presentation a systematic separation of ex-combatants from normal Internal Displaced Personnel (IDPs) was conducted and the identified personnel were accommodated at 24 Protective Accommodation and Rehabilitation Centers.²⁶ At these centers, a comprehensive individual study on all ex-combatants was conducted by the intelligence agencies. This was followed-up, with a dynamic psychosocial and socio economic profiling in liaison with profiling experts such as Clinical psychologists, Psychiatrists, Medical Officers and Counselors. This process was focused to identify following:²⁷

1. Psycho social profiling.
 - a. Age (To determine child soldiers).
 - b. Gender/Marital Status.
 - c. Level of radicalization.
2. Socio economic profiling.
 - a. Professional skills and level of education.
 - b. Talents and past experience.

This process immensely assisted in identifying profiles, levels of radicalization, talents and experiences of individuals. In accordance with the findings of the profiling, rehabilitees were guided to undergo Educational, Vocational and Skills Development

²⁶Ministry of Defense, “Rehabilitation of Ex Combatants.”

²⁷Ibid.

programs, along with Development of Mental Tranquility, Spiritual Enhancement and Expansion of Moral Values, to prepare them to rejoin the community.²⁸

According to the presentation, 594 child combatants including 231 girls voluntarily surrendered to the security forces for rehabilitation.²⁹ Out of these numbers, majority opted to continue with the formal school education. They were transferred to a leading school in Colombo, where they underwent formal education for one year, prior to reintegration. Balance of the girls underwent vocational training at Technical College - Vavuniya, under the Vocational Training Authority.³⁰ In order to enhance the education levels of the ex-combatants, The Bureau of Commissioner General Rehabilitation, with the assistance from the Education Department, conducted an accelerated “Catch-up Education Programs,” especially for personnel who opted to appear for national examinations.³¹

The archives of The Bureau of Commissioner General Rehabilitation, provides insights of the actual conduct of the reintegration process. The rehabilitation programs conducted by the Bureau of the Commissioner General of Rehabilitation have targeted three categories of rehabilitees. They are child rehabilitees, adult female rehabilitees and adult male rehabilitees. Rehabilitation programs for child ex-combatants includes: formal school education programs, vocational training programs, aesthetics and drama therapy programs, spiritual development programs and sports activities. It also included

²⁸Ibid.

²⁹Ibid.

³⁰Ibid.

³¹Ibid.

educational visits, friendship visits to other parts of the country, and innovative and creative literary child radio programs in collaboration with the Sri Lanka Broadcasting Cooperation (SLBC).³²

Programs initiated targeting the adult female ex-combatants were based on educational, vocational spiritual and miscellaneous programs. Educational programs included: classes for General Certificate of Education (Ordinary Level) and General Certificate of Education (Advanced Level) examinations and language training. Vocational training included typing and shorthand for clerical work, diploma in nursery management, tailoring programs, sewing machine operator training, and bridal dressing programs. Spiritual programs included; yoga exercises and Buddhist meditation programs. In addition, aesthetics and drama therapy programs, lecturing and conducting training workshops in a variety of settings and special abilities in pre-marital, marital, family planning counseling and career-related issues and sports activities were conducted.³³

Accordingly, the rehabilitation programs conducted for adult male ex-combatants include educational, vocational, spiritual and miscellaneous programs. Educational consist of; classes for General Certificate of Education (Ordinary Level) and General Certificate of Education (Advanced Level) examinations and language training (Sinhala and English). Vocational consist of; typing, shorthand, plumbing, aluminum work, house wiring, Juki sewing machine operation, leather work, electrical work, carpentry, masonry,

³²Bureau of the Commissioner General of Rehabilitation, “Ongoing Activity,” <http://www.bcgr.gov.lk/ongoing.php> Ministry of Defense (accessed November 8, 2012).

³³Ibid.

welding, heavy machinery training (dozers and earth movers), driving, tailoring programs, three-wheel and two-wheel repairing programs and agriculture. Spiritual programs based on yoga exercises and meditation programs. Miscellaneous programs include; aesthetics and drama therapy programs, lecturing and conducting training workshops counseling and positive values cultivation programs, sports activities, modeling courses, certificate programs on psychosocial counseling and outboard motorboat courses for fishing.³⁴

In addition, marriages amongst rehabilitated adult male and female ex-combatants were conducted. The concept of "Peace Village" was established, to facilitate, reunification of married ex-combatants, who were undergoing rehabilitation separately at different Centers. Initially 53 couples, who had the privilege of being the members of the "First Mass Marriage Ceremony" of Sri Lanka, were housed in this village, with a plot of land for cultivation.³⁵ In addition, friendship visits and goodwill exchange visits (such as sports or cultural programs) were organized to other parts of the country to build trust between two ethnic communities have also been included in order to increase harmony between two communities.

The Saudi Arabian Reintegration Process

The case of Saudi Arabia is of interest for several reasons. The reintegration process was focused on de- radicalization of extremists who took violence in to their hands. In addition, the soft strategy used to reintegrate them to the society was unique

³⁴Ibid.

³⁵Ministry of Defense, "Rehabilitation of Ex Combatants."

and considered a success.³⁶ A thesis paper written on the Saudi Arabian reintegration process by Mada Kalapuge Lakshan Anuruddhika De Silva, identifies the soft strategy was designed to fight the ideological and intellectual justifications for fierce extremism. The chief objective behind the soft strategy was to engage and fight ideology, which corrupted interpretations of Islam that deviated from the official Saudi interpretation of Islam. The drift toward this soft strategy largely came from the recognition that traditional methods of security and coercion are not enough to combat violent extremism.³⁷

In 2003, Saudi Arabia experienced a wave of terrorist attacks. According to the Los Angeles Times, there have been many terrorist attacks across the Kingdom, some aimed at Western targets, killing around 150 people.³⁸ According to a case study conducted by Leila Ezzarqui, on the "De-radicalization and rehabilitation program of Saudi Arabia" terrorism is not new to Saudi Arabia. However, the attacks of May 2003 revealed a new form of terrorism that jeopardized the internal stability of the Kingdom. In turn, the Saudi government's response entailed a far-reaching reorganization of key government agencies to adapt to the new challenge exhibited by Islamic terrorism. The strategic framework articulated by Saudis ranged from intelligence to security, education,

³⁶Mada Kalapuge Lakshan Anuruddhika De Silva, "Re-integration of Former Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam Combatants into Civilian Society in Post-War Sri Lanka (Master's Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2010), <http://www.hSDL.org/?view&did=720328> (accessed November 8, 2012), 33.

³⁷*Ibid.*

³⁸Jeffrey Fleishman, "Rehabbing Militants in Saudi Arabia-A Government Center Aims to Turn Accused Terrorists Away from Radicalism," *Los Angeles Times*, December 21, 2007, <http://articles.latimes.com/2007/dec/21/world/fg-rehab21> (accessed September 12, 2012).

religion, financing and media. Saudi authorities were resolved to confront the threat in order to bring it to a level where it no longer endangered national stability. The “3Ms formula” articulated by the Saudi authorities to pursue the “Men, the Money and the Mindset” constituted the core of their strategic framework.³⁹

The author also identifies that terrorism has played a major part in changing ideologies of the Saudi people. Fifteen of the nineteen hijackers ultimately responsible for the September 11, 2001 attacks were from Saudi Arabia. In addition, Al-Qaeda has received large amounts of funding from charities in Saudi Arabia and the mastermind of the worst terrorist attack on the United States in its history, Osama bin Laden, was from Saudi Arabia. The study further elaborates that Saudi Arabia has also allowed the country's vast oil wealth to be used in part to spread “Wahhabis” ideology through the establishment of fundamentalist mosques and schools, called madrassas.⁴⁰

According to Christopher Boucek, who wrote on “Saudi Arabia’s Soft Counterterrorism Strategy: Prevention, Rehabilitation and Aftercare,” Saudi Arabia launched the de-radicalization and reintegration process in 2004. The Saudi government launched a campaign using a soft strategy to counter the existing threat. The soft strategy adopted to fight the extreme ideology became a success in reintegration of former combatants.

³⁹Leila Ezzarqui, “De-Radicalization and Rehabilitation Program: The Case Study of Saudi Arabia” (Master’s Thesis, Georgetown University, 2010), <https://repository.library.georgetown.edu/pdfpreview/bitstream/handle/10822/553485/ezzarquiLeila.pdf?sequence=> (accessed November 12, 2012), 17.

⁴⁰Ibid., 2.

The Interior ministry of Saudi Arabia, the principle government agency responsible for the public security in the Kingdom, was responsible for the design and funding of the program.⁴¹ The process was focused to fight an ideology that the Saudi government considered deviant and corrupted from the real principles of Islam. The Saudi Arabian model includes three programs: prevention, rehabilitation and post release care. They understood that traditional methods to curb radicalization and terrorism sprouting from the identification of violent extremism were not practical.⁴²

One important aspect of the Saudi model as identified by Rob Wenger, who wrote on success and failures of counter terrorist issues, was the reintegration of detainees at Guantanamo Bay prison. They were brought back to Saudi Arabia and they went through a process that indoctrinated them from extreme ideologies. Some suspected this would only enhance the breeding of extremists further; however, it became a successful model. The process also oversaw social needs of the participants and the family members. This includes providing financial assistance and social support for the dependents despite their relative is under custody for involving in terrorism acts.⁴³ This was a positive move of reintegrating ex-combatants as it guaranteed economic stability, a prime requirement of a reintegration model.

⁴¹Christopher Boucek, "Saudi Arabia's 'Soft' Counterterrorism Strategy: Prevention, Rehabilitation, and Aftercare," *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, 2008, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/cp97_boucek_saudi_final.pdf (September 12, 2008), 4.

⁴²*Ibid.*, 23.

⁴³Rob Wagner, "Rehabilitation and De-radicalization: Saudi Arabia's Counterterrorism Successes and Failures," *Peace and Conflict Monitor* (July 2010), http://www.monitor.upeace.org/innerpg.cfm?id_article=735 (accessed September 22, 2012).

The process highlighted on soft measures like motivation classes, indoctrination of religious believers and recreation. These were aimed to convince people with extremist mindsets that Islam is a religion of peace and that it does not condone the use of terror in any circumstances. In addition, it formed a comprehensive economic assistance program to the detainees and their family members. The soft strategy of the Saudi Arabian government to de-radicalize and rehabilitate the combatants yielded very positive results. To date, repetition and rates of re arrest are extremely low and the Saudi Arabian reintegration model has been recognized as a considerable success.

The Burundian Reintegration Process

According to Antony Otieno Ongayo who wrote on “Migration in Burundi: History, Current Trends and Future Prospects, the civil conflict in Burundi started in mid-1960, after it gained independence from colonial powers. Many conflicts occurred between Tutsis, Hutus, and other ethnic groups time to time making Burundi a very unstable country in the region. Ethnic conflicts occurred in 1965, 1972, 1988, and 1991 were few examples to reiterate the instability in Burundi.⁴⁴ Hostilities began in 1993, when Melchior Ndadaye a Hutu, who became the first democratically elected president in Burundi, was assassinated. The violent conflicts originated due to the incident lasted over a decade until it finally came to an official end in 2005, when Pierre Nkurunziza elected as the President.

⁴⁴Sonja Fransen and Antony Otieno Ongayo, “Migration in Burundi: History, Current Trends and Future Prospects,” Maastricht Graduate School of Governance, February 2010, http://mgsog.merit.unu.edu/ISacademie/docs/CR_burundi.pdf (accessed December 10, 2012), 15-18.

A study conducted by Michael Gilligan, Eric Mvukiyehe, and Cyrus Samii, on “Reintegrating rebels into civilian life: Quasi-experimental evidence from Burundi” identifies that the rebel groups in Burundi ultimately reached a ceasefire agreement in 2008, and it has generally remained in effect ever since.⁴⁵ The Burundian reintegration program was implemented under National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (NCDDR). The framework designed was focused on targeted community based assistance, opportunities for self-employment, live hood projects and income generating self-development project.⁴⁶ Because of the process, around 25,000 ex-combatants were reintegrated into the Burundian civilian society by 2008. However, due to continuous disturbances because of internal conflicts, the reintegration process lacked progressiveness.

A case study conducted by Pyt Douma and Jean Marie Gasana on Reintegration in Burundi: “Between happy cows and lost investments” identifies that the reintegration of ex-combatants started in Burundi from the end of 2004 onwards, largely financed by the Multi-country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP).⁴⁷ The World Bank on behalf of the contributing donor countries supervised the process. The Burundian government in order to implement the process established the NCDDR. An

⁴⁵Michael Gilligan, Eric Mvukiyehe, and Cyrus Samii, “Reintegrating rebels into civilian life: Quasi-experimental evidence from Burundi,” http://andrewgelman.com/2010/08/reintegrating_r/.. (accessed September 22, 2012), 16-18.

⁴⁶Ibid., 10.

⁴⁷Pyt Douma and Jean Marie Gasana, “Reintegration in Burundi: Between happy cows and lost investments” (Case study, Conflict Research Unite of the Netherlands Institute of International Relations, October 2008), http://www.clingendael.nl/publications/2009/20090318_cru_reintegration_burundi_specker.pdf (accessed October 12, 2012), 5-6.

Executive Secretariat, (ES) was established under the NCDDR, divided into a demobilization unit and a reintegration unit. The ES was responsible for implementation of the national Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) program.

The reintegration process was divided into two segments, each consisting of a transitory period of 18 months, during which the ex-combatants were provided quarters and given their salaries. This followed a five-option reintegration package for the ex-combatants to choose. The five options included the following:

1. Re-employment.
2. of skills development/vocational training.
3. Reception of entrepreneurial support, training and funds for already established credible businesses (Economic Reintegration Support).
4. Reception of an income generating support by participating in certain activities (Income Generating Activities Support-IGAS) to start a self-employment opportunity, cash for public work programs and livelihood support.
5. Reception of formal school education.⁴⁸

Majority of the ex-combatants opted for the Income Generating Activities Support category. Since the process had been very lengthy, it led to a one-year gap between the process of demobilization and reintegration into the society.

The study identifies a few problems with the process Firstly, political issues hampered the process especially during the second phase of the process and as a result, a number of police officers and soldiers still have had to be demobilized. Secondly, there was lack of collaboration between the implementing agencies and the national

⁴⁸Ibid.

mechanism. The national mechanism that guaranteed local ownership of the project, did not implement it accordingly. In addition, it was incapable of running the program as planned.⁴⁹ Thirdly, there was a delay for about 15 months to originate the process. This resulted in gaining only US\$20 million out of the US\$41.8 million earmarked for Burundi MDRP program, hindering the process badly.⁵⁰ In addition, the focus of the reintegration program was the individual ex-combatant, not the host community. This approach had far-reaching consequences for the prospects for real reintegration, because ex-combatants remained a separate social category regarded by other war-affected groups as privileged, and this forced them to cling on to their identity as war veterans, thus hindering acceptance by host communities.

According to a report released by the UNHCR Global Appeal on “2012 UNHCR country operations profile-Burundi” even as of now in 2012, some 38,500 Burundian ex-combatants awaits reintegration.⁵¹ This indicates that the reintegration process had not delivered the expected results even though it has been in effect for a considerable period. The Burundian reintegration model failed to deliver due to lack of resources, corruption and mismanagement of the available resources. In addition, lack of coordination between the NCDDR, the national mechanism and the Non-Government Organizations (NGOs) contributed to its failure.

⁴⁹Ibid., 7.

⁵⁰Ibid., 8.

⁵¹UNHCR, “2012 UNHCR Country Operations Profile-Burundi,” <http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/page?page=49e45c056> (accessed September 22, 2012).

The Sierra Leon Reintegration Process

Sierra Leone is situated in the West Coast of Africa. A former British colony, Sierra Leone gained its independence and became a sovereign state on April 27, 1961. The country is ethnically diverse, comprising of 20 native African tribes.⁵² The Civil War began under complex circumstances that involved both internal and external factors. The precious mineral resources that the country is widely known for, contributed immensely to worsen the conflict. The rebel forces known as the Revolutionary United Front (RUF). They claimed to have taken up arms against the corruption and injustices of the then All Peoples Congress government, the longest governing party of Sierra Leone since the end of British colonial rule.⁵³ In addition, the Low Ranking Military Officers (AFRC) also became involved as a second rebel faction to the RUF.

A case study conducted by Christiana Solomon and Jeremy Ginifer on the DDR in West Africa, identifies that the violent conflict in Sierra Leone eventually broke out in 1991. Majority of the combatants involved were uneducated and unemployed youth that were part of the marginalized rural populations in the country. As the formal military authority collapsed the RUF, consisting of armed militia leaders established a destructive regime in areas they controlled and privatized the strategic resources.⁵⁴ The conflict led

⁵²Fodeba Daboh, Sahr Fatoma, and Michael Kuch, "Disarmament, Demobilization Rehabilitation and Reintegration (DDRR): A Case Study of Liberia, Sierra Leone, and South Sudan," *New York Science Journal* 3, no. 6 (2010), http://www.sciencepub.net/newyork/ny0306/02_2369_ny0306_6_19.pdf (accessed October 12, 2013), 11-12.

⁵³*Ibid.*, 11.

⁵⁴Christiana Soloman and Jeremy Ginifer, "Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration in Sierra Leone," July, 2008, [http:// www.operationspaix.net/](http://www.operationspaix.net/)

to the complete paralysis of vital state institutions. As a result of the decade long war between, 1991 and 2001, Sierra Leone became one of the world's poorest and socially fragmented states. It was estimated that at least one million people were displaced internally and externally.⁵⁵

In January 2002, the Government of Sierra Leone declared that the decade long war was officially over. The establishment of the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) instigated the DDR process. The international community showered it with praise for a successful DDR program that paved the way for a stable post war political order. An official with the World Bank characterized the US \$ 36.5 million project as “the best practice example throughout the world of a successful disarmament, demobilization, reintegration program.”⁵⁶ However, for a country long embroiled in a conflict it was just the start of a long process.

The reintegration aspect of the DDR program aimed at facilitating ex-combatants' return into civilian political, social and economic life. It focused to provide ex-combatants with vocational skills training and formal education opportunities that would enable them to engage in sustainable employment and livelihoods. It also gave them access to micro enterprise schemes and tools for various trades like farming. The reintegration program was a success. Altogether 63,545 former combatants were reintegrated into the society. This included 6,845 former child soldiers. However, more

DATA//DOCUMENT/4024~v~Disarmament_Demobilisation_and_Reintegration_in_Sierra_Leone.pdf (accessed September 22, 2012), 7.

⁵⁵Ibid.

⁵⁶Ibid., 5.

than 9,000 former combatants did not complete the entire program.⁵⁷ In other words, about 12.5 per cent did not make it to the reintegration phase. This was due to lack of funding, persistence of local partners and a climate of insecurity that prevailed in the country.

Jeremy Ginifer in a separate study on “Sierra Leone - Building the Road to Recovery” identifies that the integration process was under the National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (NCDDR) that was a government entity. Another major actor involved in the process was the German Agency for Technical Corporation (GTZ). The NCDDR program mainly focused on Economic and Social reintegration of the ex-combatants. This involves reintegration for child soldiers, and special programs for the disabled and for women.⁵⁸ The set goals of the program was “to help ex-combatants become productive members of their communities; to provide them with marketable skills and access to micro enterprise schemes; and to support social acceptance through information dissemination measures, social reconciliation, and sensitization processes. They have also sought to support sensitization by public education on the role of ex-combatants in a post-conflict society.”⁵⁹

The GTZ’s reintegration concern does not only include ex-combatants. Its activities extend “to all sectors of communities in Sierra Leone, including residents and

⁵⁷Ibid., 14.

⁵⁸Jeremy Ginifer, “Reintegration of Ex-Combatants,” in *Sierra Leone-Building the Road to Recovery*, ed. Mark Malan, Sarah Meek, Thokozani Thusi, Jeremy Ginifer, and Patrick Coker, Monograph No. 80, March 2003, <http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/monographs/No80/Chap2.html> (accessed September 22, 2012), 41.

⁵⁹Ibid.

internally displaced persons (IDPs), women, children, and individuals who have contracted HIV/AIDS. It also has a strong engagement in rural areas and communities. Through its technical staff and program staff it supports local NGOs in reintegration activities, such as peace-building, training and education, rehabilitation, and economic empowerment.”⁶⁰

According to a fact sheet published by the United Nations on the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, the majority of the over 6,800 demobilized child soldiers were reunited with their families. Some 3,000 were absorbed into the community educational programs run by UNICEF.⁶¹ Therefore, Sierra Leone’s model for demobilizing and reintegrating child soldiers is widely considered as success.

It also elaborates that more than 12,000 ex-fighters opted for formal education and was placed in schools, colleges and even at the local university.⁶² Their course fees were paid for and they were given a living allowance for between one to three years, depending on when they registered with the program. In addition, demobilized combatants were given financial assistance to find employment in the fields of carpentry and masonry. The remaining ex-combatants found jobs in farming and other activities. However, the report finds that many ex-combatants remain unemployed unless the economy generates more jobs and the presence of former fighters roaming the streets will continue to be one of the Government’s major challenges for the future. However, “the

⁶⁰Ibid., 42.

⁶¹United Nations, Fact Sheet 1, *Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration*. December 2005, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unamsil/factsheet1_DDR.pdf (accessed December 10, 2012), 1

⁶²Ibid., 2.

Sierra Leone's DDR process is widely regarded as a success story, and elements of the Sierra Leone 'model' are being replicated in neighboring Liberia, in Burundi, and now as far away as Haiti.”⁶³

Analysis Model

The researcher intends to use a tool published by the International Labor Organization (ILO), a well-acknowledged international organization, to evaluate the selected reintegration models. This tool sets out a checklist to examine different reintegration processes. The said tool is elaborated as below:⁶⁴

Tool 6: Checklist for successful integration

1. Ex-combatants

- a. Eighty percent of the target group is working or is in school.
- b. Civic, political, economic and social rights are restored and rule of law re-established.
- c. No incidences of violence are reported in which ex-combatants are the perpetrators.
- d. No recruitment is occurring.
- e. There are no reports on ex-combatants fighting in neighboring countries.
- f. There are no reports of increased child labor.

⁶³Soloman and Ginifer, 2.

⁶⁴International Labor Office Geneva, *Socio-Economic Reintegration of Ex-Combatants* (Geneva: International Labour Office, 2010), http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/@ed_emp/documents/instructionalmaterial/wcms_141276.pdf (accessed December 10, 2012), 131.

- g. There are no reports of increased in gender-based violence.
- h. Ex-combatants are citizens and, as is the case of their compatriots, their needs are in the national development plans, policy frameworks and bi- and multi-lateral cooperation programs and of the UN system.
- i. Ex-combatants and receiving communities co-exist peacefully and share both the economic and social resources (with no greater mutual conflict than that within the existing communities)
- j. All ex-combatant groups fully participate in community development activities.
- k. Ex-combatants are fully integrated and are net contributors to the economic and social development of their communities and the country at large.
- l. The “ex-combatant” label is erased and the population is treated as one.
- m. Ex-combatants have capacity and platform to translate their skills and resources acquired in the DDR program to support the development of their communities.

2. National and local capacity and policies

- a. The national capacity is strengthen to rationalize and prioritize resource allocation and the coordination of various programs (UN, IFIs, bi-laterals, and NGOs) leading from recovery to long –term development plans.
- b. Regional department have the capacity to plan, implement and coordinate, as well as to provide services to the whole population; ex-combatants are included in regional development plans.

- c. There are enhanced food security, improved and more diverse livelihoods and reduce vulnerabilities to social, economic and climate shocks.
- d. There is an increased speed on transition from emergency and recovery to the development phase.
- e. The country is on track to achieve MDGs (Millennium Development Goals)
- f. Gender-responsive community development process applies to the legal, political and socio-economic development of areas of return.
- g. There is an absence of discrimination in areas such as gainful employment and participation in institutions.
- h. There is improved social and economic infrastructure (school, health, water supplies and roads) and expanded market access and trade.
- i. Boys and girls have a voice in society and have improved access to education and employment opportunities.

The above checklist helps to have a generally understanding of success or failure of the different reintegration models considered in this research. However, it lacks focus on specified areas of comparison. Therefore, another tool published by the same organization to gauge the success or failure will be used to conduct analysis. The said tool focuses on; Relevance and strategic lift, Validity of Design, Project progress and effectiveness, Efficiency of resource use, Effectiveness of management, Impact orientation and sustainability of the reintegration process is elaborated in the next chapter.

John W. Creswell, in his book “Qualitative inquiry and research design: choosing among five approaches” identifies several methods to conduct analysis.⁶⁵ As this is a comparative case study, the researcher intends to use the “cross-case synthesis method”, one of the four methods explained in conducting comparative case study analysis.

Hershey H. Friedman, Ph.D. and Taiwo Amoo, PhD in a study on “Rating the Rating Scales”, they identify that rating scales are used quite frequently in research and examines issues involved in creating a relatively unbiased rating scale. The study identifies that generally rating scales should balance with an equal number of favorable and unfavorable response choices. The study further indicates, “There is no single number of points for a rating scale that is appropriate for all situations. In general, however, it suggests the use of five to nine points.”⁶⁶

⁶⁵John W. Creswell, *Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design: Choosing Among Five Approaches* (California: Sage Publications, 2007), 163.

⁶⁶Hershey H. Friedman and Taiwo Amoo, “Rating the Rating Scales,” *Journal of Marketing Management* 9, no. 3 (Winter 1999), <http://academic.brooklyn.cuny.edu/economic/friedman/rateratingscales.htm> (accessed 22 March, 2013): 114-123.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The research methodology adopted for this thesis is the qualitative methodology with a case study research design. The research is based on a comparative case study analysis between the reintegration processes of Sri Lanka, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leon and Burundi. A holistic comparison between the above processes would assist to highlight the success or failure of the Sri Lankan process. This would also highlight lessons learned that could become important for the future application.

However, as stated earlier the researcher could not identify a universal tool available to conduct a holistic comparison. Therefore, the research conducted is based on printed and web-based information available on the subject/selected reintegration models. In addition, the author intends to use a tool published by the International Labor Organization (ILO), a well-acknowledged international organization, to evaluate the selected reintegration processes.

This tool focuses on;⁶⁷ Relevance and strategic lift, Validity of Design, Project progress and effectiveness, Efficiency of resource use, Effectiveness of management, Impact orientation and sustainability. The amount of effort put in to answer different questions posted under above mentioned areas by the four reintegration models would assist to determine the success or failure of each process. This gives the researcher to conduct a focused analysis between different models and conduct a holistic comparison. The ingredients of the said tool are as given below:

⁶⁷International Labor Office Geneva, 132-133.

	Table 1. Checklist for Monitoring and Evaluation
Criteria	Sample questions
Relevance and Strategic fit	• Has the program addressed a relevant need of national priority in reconstruction and development processes? How was it established? • How well has the program aligned with and supported the priorities of the country (for example, i-PRSPs, CAPs, UNDAFs)? • Did stakeholders take ownership of the program concept and approach since the design phase? Have local needs been taken into consideration in program activities? • Do education, training and employment measures for ex-combatants relate to local employment demands?
Validity of design	• Have program design and approach shown to be logical, coherent and realistic to achieve the planned outcomes? • How well has the program complemented other construction and development efforts in the country? • Have there been examples of duplications of efforts or contradictory practices? Do integration program managers, donors, international agencies and relevant local and national authorities know of each other's initiatives, needs, capacities and responsibilities? • What linkages among the different agencies, partners and local target groups exist? • Are there any discrepancies among standards of work, cost, benefits to ex-combatants and the local population, as well as beneficiaries of other reconstruction programs (for IDPs, returnees and so on)?
Project progress and effectiveness	• Has the program achieved its planned objectives or made sufficient progress towards them? • Have quality and quantity of outputs been satisfactory? • How have program results contributed to an overall national reconstruction and development strategy? • How have stakeholders been involved in program implementation? • Has the program been appropriately responsive to changing partner priorities, as well as political and institutional changes in the program environment? • What, if any, alternative strategies would have been more effective? • How many and what percentage of teachers and vocational training instructors have been trained? • What materials have been developed and used for training? • How many demobilized combatants have been trained? • What percentage of trainees have found and/or created income-generating activities by using skills gained from the training? • How many ex-combatants have, and what percentage of those who participated the DDR program, has started income –generating activities? • What type of services (including training, BDS, microfinance, employment services) has been provided to how many ex-combatants?
Efficiency of resource use	• Have resources been allocated strategically? • Have they been used efficiently? Have activities supporting strategy been cost effective? Do results justify expenses? • Have program funds been delivered timely?

Effectiveness of management	• Have management capacities been adequate? • Has program governance facilitated achievement of results and efficient delivery? • Has program received adequate technical support from partner organizations and agencies? • Has the program systematically monitored its results? • Has choice of partners been strategic in implementing the strategy? • Has cooperation with partners such as NCDDR and line ministries been efficient?
Impact orientation and sustainability	• How has program made significant contribution to broader and longer-term development impact? • What has been the impact of the DDR program on the economy at the “macro -, meso -, and micro – level?” • What have been the immediate and long-term effects of the DDR program on groups, other than ex-combatants in community? • What is the impact of the DDR program on the relationship between the beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries of the program? • What are the realistic long-term effects of the program on employment creation in the country? • Have program approach and its results been up-scaled or replicated by other initiatives, or are they likely to be? • Are there any unintended positive or negative side effects? How has the program strategy been adjusted in reaction? • Have results and benefits of program been durable or are they likely to be? • How effective has the exit strategy of program been? Has program been gradually and effectively handed over to national partners, such as line ministries? • How effectively has the program built national ownership and capacity of people and institutions? • Has program successfully built or strengthened an enabling environment for reintegration of ex-combatants, as well as broader and longer-term employment creation in the country?

Source: International Labor Office Geneva, *Socio-Economic Reintegration of Ex-Combatants* (Geneva: International Labour Office, 2010), http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/@ed_emp/documents/instructionalmaterial/wcms_141276.pdf (accessed December 10, 2012), Tool 7, 132-133.

The researcher endeavors to incorporate realistic, impartial information on the subject matter to give the study a neutral and complete outlook. In order to achieve that, the researcher would select only the certain aspects under the ILO evaluation criteria that are commonly addressed in all reintegration processes and conduct a holistic comparison.

The outcome of the analysis would answer the primary question; how successful was the Sri Lankan process in reintegrating ex-combatants to the society?

Once the analysis of the reintegration process according to the ILO evaluation criteria is complete, the researcher adopts the cross-case synthesis technique.⁶⁸ This would determine how successful the Sri Lankan model in comparison to other evaluated reintegration processes. In addition, this would determine similarities and differences among cases, which answers both secondary questions of the study.

⁶⁸Creswell, 163.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

Relevance and Strategic Fit

This evaluation criteria measures how relevant was the reintegration process and the amount of strategic lift it obtained from the respective government. It elaborates on the ownership of the process and how well prominent stakeholders like UN, IGOs and NGOs were integrated to make the process a success. In addition, it focuses on education and training, especially vocational training provided for the ex-combatants that addressed the local employment demand.

Reintegration of ex-combatants was a top priority of the Sri Lankan government. The National Framework proposal, emerged even before the end of the conflict indicates how important reintegration was in a post conflict Sri Lanka. In addition, the personal involvement of the President illustrates the strategic prominence it obtained. Addressing the Presidential Committee on Development and Reconciliation, the President said, “After the successful conclusion of the ‘Humanitarian Mission-1,’ to liberate civilians held hostage by a terrorist outfit, it’s time to launch ‘Humanitarian Mission-2,’ to get them back on track with their normal lives.”⁶⁹ Establishing a high power steering committee and a separate Bureau for Rehabilitation under the Ministry of Rehabilitation indicates the strategic lift given by the government of Sri Lanka towards the reintegration process.⁷⁰ Representation made by prominent IGO, and NGO’s such as UNDP, UNICEF,

⁶⁹Ministry of Disaster Management and Human Rights, 1.

⁷⁰De Silva, 6.

IOM, ILO, FAO, USAID and ICRC in that steering committee validates the importance of the involving different stakeholders thus keeping the ownership of the process with the Sri Lankan government.⁷¹

The Sri Lankan reintegration model was developed on six pillars namely; spiritual, religious and cultural, psychological and sports, educational, vocational and social aspects. This was very much relevant to rehabilitate former LTTE cadres who were brain washed by terrorist ideology. Therefore, educational, cultural and spiritual programs conducted immensely assisted their recovery. Vocational training targeted areas like plumbing, carpentry, masonry, welding, heavy machinery training, driving, tailoring, aluminum work, shorthand and computer literacy.⁷² These trades directly linked to the vast amount of development projects that were ongoing in the war ravaged North and Eastern part of the country in post conflict Sri Lanka. Therefore, vocational training given in this area of expertise assisted them to find suitable jobs upon completion of the rehabilitation program.

Another relevant area of the Sri Lankan model was the well-coordinated school education program. Majority of the child soldiers and others who preferred to continue education were given an opportunity to study further and recent results indicate that majority of them even qualified for university education.⁷³ In addition, ex- combatants who had special skills were given an opportunity to display their abilities at the highest

⁷¹Ibid., 7.

⁷²Ibid., 13.

⁷³Business Today of Sri Lanka, “IDPs, Resettlement, Rehabilitation and Reintegration Of Combatants,” July 2011, <http://www.businesstoday.lk/article.php?article=3488> (accessed January 22, 2013).

level. Few ex-combatants who excelled in rifle shooting were inducted to the national pool and were chosen to represent the country at the South Asian sports competition.⁷⁴

The Saudi Arabian model also had the influence of its top strategic institutions of the country. The program directly functioned under the patronage of Interior Ministry of Saudi Arabia. In addition, several other government institutions namely Ministries of Islamic Affairs, Da'wah, Endowment, Education and Guidance; Culture and Information; Higher Education and Social Affairs were integrated.⁷⁵ This indicates that Saudi government took this as a matter of high strategic importance. However, there was no evidence that they did have the coordination with IGO or NGOs facilitating the process. The reason may be that it was more of an Islamic De radicalization process; hence the government wanted the full ownership over the process.

The reintegration process was relevant as it addressed religious extremism prevails in the kingdom. The Saudi government's focus was more on education, religious, financing and media.⁷⁶ The education programs focused on eradicating the religious extremism thereby facilitating reintegration to the society. A unique feature identified in Saudi model was the enormous amount of financial assistance provided to the families of the rehabilitees.⁷⁷ This can be identified as a very positive contributor that assisted

⁷⁴Ministry of Defense Sri Lanka, "Rehabilitated ex-LTTE Cadres Selected to National Shooter Pool," http://www.priu.gov.lk/news_update/Current_Affairs/ca201210/20121023rehabilitated_ex_ltte_cadres.htm (accessed January 22, 2013).

⁷⁵De Silva, 30.

⁷⁶Ibid., 38.

⁷⁷Christopher Boucek, "The Saudi Process of Repatriating and Reintegrating Guantanamo Returnees," *CTC Sentinel* 1, no. 1 (2007), <http://www.ctc.usma.edu/>

immensely to the success of the model. However, the financial burden it requires may be too much for other countries considered in this research.

The Burundian reintegration process was initiated under the patronage of the Burundian government. However, during that time stability did not completely prevail in Burundi, as some armed groups did not initially sign the ceasefire agreement.⁷⁸ This challenged the ownership of the Burundian government. The National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (NCDDR) was the primary government organization and had the support of prominent IGO and NGOs.⁷⁹ However, studies identify that lack of coordination between the NCDDR, the national mechanism and the prominent IGO and NGO's was one of the main factors for the failure of the program.⁸⁰ In addition, the corruption levels of the government officials and the lack of resources managed through the government mechanism contributed negatively. It is evident that the political corruption prevailed at Burundi hindered the strategic lift of the Burundian government towards the reintegration process.⁸¹

The Burundian process focused on achieving re-employment, vocational training, entrepreneurial support, reception of formal school education and self-employment opportunity. Due to the financial aid provided, majority of them opted for self-

posts/the-saudi-process-of-repatriating-and-reintegrating-guantanamo-returnees (accessed October 22, 2012), 10-11.

⁷⁸Fransen and Ongayo, 15-18.

⁷⁹De Silva, 49.

⁸⁰Ibid., 60.

⁸¹Ibid.

employment opportunities over vocational training. This created long-term unemployment issues as most of them would spend the given grant and struggle to make a stable living. As they did not have proper vocational training, it had a direct effect on rise of unemployment in the country. In addition, the process was painstaking and lengthy.⁸² This contributed to individuals not getting a chance to select the correct employment category, thereby jeopardizing the outcome of the process.

The Sierra Leon reintegration process was originated under the government patronage. The National Commission for Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration (NCDDR) was the chief government entity. The German Agency for Technical Cooperation (GTZ) and World Bank were two other key IGO/NGOs that assisted the process.⁸³ Prominent UN organizations like UNICEF, also contributed much to look after a total of 6800 child soldiers indicates that the Sierra Leon government was able to have the ownership of the process but integrate prominent stakeholders to effective functioning of the process.

The community based approach of the process made it appropriate for the existing situation of the country. Major goals of the program were based on providing ex-combatants with marketable skills, support social acceptance, social reconciliation and sensitization. The process focused on different social groups that include ex-combatants, war affected people, child soldiers and women, therefore the focus was much more community based than just focusing on ex-combatants.⁸⁴ The process facilitated more

⁸²Ibid.

⁸³Ginifer, 42.

⁸⁴Ibid., 41.

than 12000 ex-combatants to opt for formal education that includes university education. In addition, financial assistance was given to some ex-combatants who opted for self-employment. However, that became an issue once given grants were spent and they lacked proper vocational training leading to the rise of unemployment rate in the country.

Validity of Design

This identifies the design and approach of the reintegration process. It examines the integration of national, international agencies and effective management of those stakeholders throughout the process. In addition, it focuses on quality of work, realistic achievement of the planned outcomes and how well the reintegration program has complemented reconstruction and development activities of the country.⁸⁵

The Sri Lankan process had the government ownership and integration of international and local NGO's. The most important factor of the process was that the prominence given to the Sri Lanka Army in conducting and managing the reintegration process. The Bureau of the Commissioner General of Rehabilitation was set and a serving General officer was appointed to carry out the given mandate.⁸⁶ In addition, substantial amount of military personnel were employed to the nine rehabilitation centers set up in the country.⁸⁷ This is a unique feature of the Sri Lankan process in comparison to others. This atmosphere encouraged closer relationship with the military and ex-combatants and assisted immensely towards confidence building between two communities.

⁸⁵International Labor Office Geneva, 132.

⁸⁶De Silva, 9.

⁸⁷Ibid.

The National Steering Committee that oversaw the formulation of the reintegration mechanism included key government officials.⁸⁸ They set up necessary framework for all governmental and non-governmental stakeholders for effective implementation of the process and periodically evaluated the progress. The reintegration design focused on six pillars⁸⁹ that addressed the issues of ex-combatants. Key areas like education and spiritual rehabilitation were important to de-radicalize ex-combatants who were brainwashed by the LTTE. This was supported by sports and psychological activities. Once they were de-radicalized, social and cultural education was imparted. Finally, vocational training aimed at finding suitable employment completed the process. Identification of suitable avenues of employment assisted them to find jobs once released from the rehabilitation centers. However, the major problem was that many ex-combatants had minimal education levels that focused to train them only in selected vocational areas. This created competition among them to find suitable employment as only a selected amount of job opportunities was available.

The Saudi Arabian process completely focused on de-radicalization of Islamic extremists. The Saudi government had the complete ownership of the process, however not many other IGO's or NGO's got integrated into the process.⁹⁰ The important aspect of the Saudi design was the soft strategy they used. Even the convicted former terrorists who were in the Guantanamo Bay prison were identified as ordinary humans and were

⁸⁸Ibid., 6.

⁸⁹Ministry of Defense, "Rehabilitation of Ex Combatants."

⁹⁰Boucek, "Saudi Arabia's 'Soft' Counterterrorism Strategy," 4.

treated accordingly.⁹¹ Some critics of this process emphasis the fact that due to the soft strategy they used even against convicted terrorists, this may boost the morale of the terrorists. However, the soft strategy that focused on education, religion, financial and media aid wonders for the Saudi authorities and reports indicate that not many have reverted back to terrorism.⁹²

In many ways, the Saudi government was able to achieve the planned outcome of the process. However, certain actions they incorporated, including giving financial aid to relatives of the rehabilitee requires a lot of wealth and the Saudi government compensated the lack of donors from international organization by funding the process itself. However, certain recent events⁹³ that have taken place in Saudi Arabia indicates that Islam extremism still prevails in the country and it is too early to judge whether the soft strategy have been successful or not.

The Burundian reintegration design was a well-constructed one. It focused on community-based assistance, self-employment opportunities, livelihood projects and income generation and skill development training. The NCDDR structure that had an executive secretariat (ES) that was responsible for planning, implementation and supervision of the overall process was supported by the Provincial Program Officers (PPO's) decentralized working arm of the process.⁹⁴ However, the problem lies with lack of coordination between the government led NCDDR and the large number of prominent

⁹¹Ibid.

⁹²De Silva, 18.

⁹³Ibid., 30.

⁹⁴Ibid., 49.

NGO's that included WFP, ONUB, and the WB. In addition, the corruption levels within the organization were high. These hindered effective management of the process, coordination between stakeholders and realistic achievement of the stipulated goals.⁹⁵ This emphasizes the fact, that not only a valid design but also a sound implementation is vital for success of a process. Further, the process did not address the real requirement of the ex-combatants due to resource constraints and ineffective management. This deprived a realistic achievement of the expected outcome of the process.

The Sierra Leon reintegration reprocess had a sound design to reintegrate ex-combatants. The process focused on providing ex-combatants with marketable skills, support social acceptance, social reconciliation and sensitization. The capacity development approach they used had three pillars namely: local level, district level and national level programs.⁹⁶ The effective coordination conducted between these three segments assisted it to be successful.

Effectiveness and coverage were two areas that the process was used to achieve the expected outcome of the process.⁹⁷ Integration of IGO's and NGO's especially to generate necessary funds was a positive achievement of the Sierra Leon process. In addition, community-based approach also assisted it to become a success. However, the

⁹⁵Ibid., 81.

⁹⁶Ginifer, 41.

⁹⁷Federal Ministry for Economic Corporation and Development, "Ex-Post Evaluation 2010-Brief Report: Cooperation Project; Reintegration of Ex-Combatants in Sierra Leone," <http://www.oecd.org/countries/sierraleone/48885033.pdf> (accessed March 12, 2013), 4.

research conducted identifies that the process “failed to document a systematic monitoring process including, for example, an assessment of gender-specific issues or market demand at community level and the up-scaling process to national level. In other words, a quantitative assessment of the project is very restricted.”⁹⁸

Project Progress and Effectiveness

This criterion represents many aspects of the reintegration process. However, due to the lack of available information on certain reintegration models, few selected areas that address all models are considered. Therefore, the emphasis is on whether the process achieved its planned objectives and its contribution towards national reconciliation and development. In addition, it focuses on effectiveness of the training methods used targeting employment opportunities of ex-combatants.

The main goals of the Sri Lankan process were three fold. “Firstly, to safeguard the human rights of ex-combatants, including the responsibility to protect and assist them in accordance with the Constitution of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka and the State's international obligations. Secondly, contribute towards sustainable peace, reconciliation and social cohesion through reintegration of ex-combatants in the society. Thirdly, to increase the employability of ex-combatants, minimize their risk of socioeconomic marginalization and create opportunities for economic revitalization in post-war Sri Lanka.”⁹⁹

⁹⁸Ibid., 5.

⁹⁹Ministry of Disaster Management and Human Rights, 1.

In brief, it focused on the protection of ex-combatants, attaining a sustainable peace through reconciliation and reintegration of ex-combatants and socio-economic development. It was evident that ex-combatants were safe in rehabilitation centers and the reintegration model, based on six pillars, contributed hugely towards reconciliation process.¹⁰⁰ Employment of military personnel in the reintegration process assisted immensely towards the reconciliation process. Vocational training and education provided during the process enhanced the capacity of individuals and assisted them to find self-employment at the end of the program.

The training methods used in the Sri Lankan process was unique and effective. All ex-combatants went through the training process. Even 594 child soldiers were given adequate facilities to continue their higher education.¹⁰¹ It is relevant to note that versatility of vocational training program gave ex-combatants a more realistic chance of obtaining suitable employment. However, not all got adequate employment opportunities upon completion of the rehabilitation process. As a result, the Civil Defense Force enlisted around 3500 ex-combatants and provided them employment in agriculture sector.¹⁰² This initiative not only provided them employment but increase economic

¹⁰⁰Ministry of Defense, “Rehabilitation of Ex Combatants.”

¹⁰¹Sri Lanka Army, Defence Seminar 2012, “Rehabilitation of Ex-combatants-Maj Gen S Ranasinghe” (Sri Lankan Military Speaker’s Scripts, August 2012), <http://www.defseminar.lk/content/Documents/Maj%20Gen%20S%20Ranasinghe.pdf> (accessed March 12, 2013), 5-11.

¹⁰²S. Thillainathan, “Rehabilitation of Ex-LTTE Cadres, not Highlighted in Geneva,” *The Sunday Observer*, March 2013, <http://www.sundayobserver.lk/2013/03/17/sec03.asp> (accessed March 12, 2013).

productivity in the war ravaged North and East part of the counter. However, how long could the government mediate in this regard is a query for the future.

The main objective of the Saudi Arabian process was to engage and fight extreme ideology that corrupted interpretation of Islam and preventing violence that created through extreme radicalization. It reveals that out of 19 hijackers in the 9/11 attacks were Saudi Arabian nationalists and more than 300 casualties were reported due to extremist activities in Saudi Arabia during 18-month period starting from 2003.¹⁰³ Considering above factors at the start of the process, it is evident that the Saudi Arabian government has made great strides towards effectively curbing the spread of extremist ideology in the country.¹⁰⁴

Their training module was completely focused towards indoctrination of religious beliefs, recreation and motivation classes. Inclusion of western educated psychologists, social scientists, doctors, psychiatrics and scientists who had a greater understanding about terrorism greatly assisted towards a successful de radicalization process.¹⁰⁵ This highlights the commitment of the Saudi government and effective utilization of a logical training process towards achieving the final objective. In addition, it greatly assisted towards the national reconciliation but not much towards economic prosperity as a huge amount of funds was utilized to conduct the program.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰³De Silva, 42.

¹⁰⁴Ibid., 29.

¹⁰⁵Boucek, "Saudi Arabia's 'Soft' Counterterrorism Strategy," 9-22.

¹⁰⁶Ibid.

The main objectives of the Burundian reintegration process focused on providing self-employment, livelihood projects and skill development training for the ex-combatants. Though it provided skill developed training and given grants to individuals to start self-employment projects, as a whole it failed to achieve its planned objectives. First, it failed to reintegrate and train the total ex-combatants. It is estimated that in 2012, 38,500 ex-combatants are still waiting to begin the reintegration process.¹⁰⁷ This clearly indicates that the process has failed to provide its objective to a large proportionate of the former combatants.

In addition, many who opted for self-employment opportunities have spent the given grant and not found long-term employment. This has further aggravated the fragile economy prevail in the country. The training program primarily focused on vocational training. However, lack of coordination between the National mechanism (NCDDR) and provincial officers, it has hampered its designed outcome.

The main objectives of the in Sierra Leon reintegration process were to provide ex-combatants with vocational skills training, formal education programs and engage them in sustainable employment and livelihoods.

Though over 63,545 completed the reintegration about 9,000, (12.5 percent) never made it.¹⁰⁸ This means that a considerable proportionate of the ex-combatants never got a chance to go through the process. In addition, vocational training focused only for six months that prevented ex-combatants to provide sufficient, in depth training focused to

¹⁰⁷UNHCR.

¹⁰⁸Soloman and Ginifer, 14.

be competitive in the labor market. Further, trainers for vocational training were difficult to find and had to be qualified before training.

Efficiency of Resource Use

This criterion recognizes how efficient the use of available resources was during the conduct of the reintegration process. Resource allocation at the strategic level is vital for the effective conduct of the process. In addition, timely funds generated either by government or other stakeholders has a direct bearing on the uninterrupted continuation of programs targeting the ex-combatants. It also focuses on whether allocated resources were well managed in order to achieve the outcome of the respective reintegration process.

The Sri Lankan government allocated many state resources towards the implementation of the reintegration process. Being a third world developing country faced with three decades of terrorism, it was not an easy task for the government to allocate vast amount of funds and other resources. However, involving military and other government institutions eased that burden substantially.¹⁰⁹ Most of the rehabilitation centers were co-located in already established government institutions. Therefore, it reduced the use of substantial amount of funds. As it was the priority of the highest echelons of the government, a wholehearted approach from the government institutions to support reintegration process was observed. Even the child soldiers were admitted to government schools avoiding additional financial/resource burden. Overall, it is obvious that involvement of government machinery assisted in efficient management of resources

¹⁰⁹De Silva, 9-10.

and funds. Integration of qualified military personnel, doctors, teachers, experts of vocational training employed at the government organizations reduced the additional cost that may have occurred in the conduct of the process.¹¹⁰

The government continues to fund the reintegration process despite current economic hardships. Recently it was announced that the government has increased the allocation for reintegration from 300 million to 500 million Sri Lankan rupees (USD236,000 to 393,600), indicating its commitment on funding.¹¹¹ In addition, a loan scheme has been introduced to provide the ex-combatants with a grant of 250000 rupees (USD 2000) through state banks to rehabilitated cadres for self-employment purposes.¹¹² This is a timely need for most of the rehabilitated cadres as many lack funds to start any form of self-employment projects after undergoing vocational training. However, the question is whether they could generate enough income to repay the loan, as it is not a grant given to them.

It is pertinent to note because necessary funds were allocated at appropriate times, no undue delays were observed in the Sri Lankan process. The lack of delays contributed to the efficient use of fiscal resources. However, more funding from non-governmental stakeholders could have taken the financial burden away from the government. Overall,

¹¹⁰Ibid., 11-13

¹¹¹One World South Asia.

¹¹²One World South Asia, "Sri Lanka Allocates More Funds for Ex-Rebels' Rehabilitation," January 17, 2013, <http://southasia.oneworld.net/news/rehabilitation-of-ex-ltte-cadres-sl-raises-fund-allocation#.UWWT8-so7IU> (accessed March 22, 2013).

the government has spent over 2.5 billion rupees (USD 2,000,000) towards the rehabilitation process of ex-combatants.¹¹³

The Saudi Arabian process elaborates the importance of having adequate resources; especially monetary assistance which enhances the outcome of the reintegration process. It is apparent that being a wealthy country of the world it had vast amounts of wealth to spend on the reintegration process. It was said that the facilities ex-combatants were given was no less than a luxurious resort and they had vast amount of indoor and outdoor recreation facilities.¹¹⁴ This indicates that the Saudi government was allocating adequate resources at the strategic level for the effective functioning of the process.

In order to accommodate ex-combatants unlike in Sri Lanka, the Saudi government constructed “care rehabilitation centers” in Riyadh, Jeddah Damam and Qassim. These large structures could accommodate up to 3000 people.¹¹⁵ In addition, the government distributed a grant to the close family members of the ex-combatant. The financial assistance continued even after the completion of the process. On successful completion of the process individuals were given a house, car, job and necessary financial assistance required. This indicates that the Saudi process received adequate resources and greatly contributed towards the success of the process as it delivered funds when it was required, unlike Burundi.

¹¹³News.LK, “Low Interest Loans to Rehabilitated Ex-LTTE Cadres,” October 24, 2012, <http://news.lk/news/sri-lanka/3492-low-interest-loans-to-rehabilitated-ex-ltte-cadres> (accessed March 22, 2013).

¹¹⁴De Silva, 43.

¹¹⁵Ibid.

Burundi is a relatively poor African country that has fewer resources. The civil war too contributed at large towards the underdevelopment of the country. Due to this factor, the Burundian government could not allocate enough resources and funds for the reintegration process. The government had to depend heavily on the NGO's and IGO's to get necessary funds. In addition, lack of efficient distribution of allocated funds even hampered the process further. It is important to note that out of \$ 41.8 million appropriated for the Burundian reintegration process by the MDRP only \$20 million was distributed.¹¹⁶ It is obvious that the lack of a proper mechanism to distribute funds and the large level of corruption in the country, adversely affected the program.

In addition, sufficient funds did not generate to cater for the requirement and time. Many of the ex-combatants who opted for "Income Generating Activities Support" (IGAS) that gave monetary assistance had to wait a considerable amount of time to get necessary funds.¹¹⁷ This created problems and resulted in tarnishing the trust of ex-combatants of the process. It is evident that lack of efficiency of resource and funds management in Burundian reintegration process was at very low level. This was also the case in Sierra Leon.

The Sierra Leon process also had to depend on donors as the country was virtually coming out of a long fought internal conflict. As it was the case in Burundi, the national government was unable to allocate resources or provide sufficient funding for the conduct of the reintegration process. The process extensively funded by the World Bank for an

¹¹⁶Ibid., 56.

¹¹⁷Ibid., 57.

amount of \$ 36.5 million indicates the contribution of non-government stakeholders.¹¹⁸ However, that allocation was not only for reintegration but for the complete DDR which includes Demoralization and Disarmament. It is revealed that high proportionate of the funds were given to Disarmament and Demobilization phases of the DDR, leaving too little for the reintegration process.¹¹⁹

Misrepresentation of the program's priorities by contributors (donors) was seen as one of the challenges of the DDR program. Resource allocations as well as some donors not following through on most of the pledges made can be looked as an impediment in achieving the objectives of the process. Due to this in June 2002, the process nearly came to a standstill as the funds pledged by the International donors did not come in time to facilitate nearly 20,000 ex-combatants waiting to go through the NCDDR process.¹²⁰

In terms of efficiency, resources were efficiently managed in the project and synergies were generated by engaging implementing partners, applying lessons learned in former post-crisis programs in the region and thanks to the specific multi-stakeholder approach at community level.¹²¹ It is evident that other than the lack of funds generating at given times, the Sierra Leon process had an efficient resource management system that contributed at large towards the success.

¹¹⁸Soloman and Ginifer, 5.

¹¹⁹Daboh, Fatoma, and Kuch, 13.

¹²⁰Ibid.

¹²¹Federal Ministry for Economic Corporation and Development, 5.

Effectiveness of Management

Managing post conflict programs like reintegration is a challenging task. It is important to understand specific expectations of different stakeholders (ex-combatants, local authorities, implementing agencies, NGO's and IGO's) in order to make the integration process a success. Key areas identified under these criteria are, whether management capacities have been adequate, have the process systematically monitored its results and has the cooperation with collaborates such as NCDDR and line ministries been efficient.

A systematic management was driving the Sri Lankan process. "The National Framework Proposal" provided the mechanism for the process and it was managed at the highest level by the high-powered national steering committee.¹²² Under the guidance of the national steering committee, newly formed organization called "Bureau of the Commissioner General of Rehabilitation" (BCGR) was formed as the competent authority to carry out reintegration of ex-combatants in Sri Lanka. The bureau coordinates with all relevant local and international agencies over administration and financial matters.¹²³ Under the BGCR, initially there were nine rehabilitation centers, called as Protective Accommodation and Rehabilitation Centers (PARCs) that was extended to 24 during latter stages. The centers were sheltered only with 500 people for the close monitoring and identification of individual behavior to assess their level of de-radicalization. The BGCR was the equivalent of NCDDR in the Sri Lankan process and

¹²²De Silva, 6.

¹²³Ibid., 7.

was formed under the preview of Ministry of Rehabilitation and Prison Reforms.¹²⁴

Therefore, it had a sound mechanism to deal with government and non-government stakeholders during the conduct of the process. Linkage between the National steering Committee, the BCGR and PARCs made it easy to systematically monitor the outcome of the process and address any short comings constructively.

The Saudi Arabian process had a centralized management system as they were dealing it as an internal matter. Designing and funding of the process was the responsibility of the Saudi Arabian Interior Ministry.¹²⁵ As the reintegration was mainly focused on the de radicalization of extreme religious sentiments that contributed to terrorists acts, it seems logical to have the process under the Interior Ministry, which is also responsible for the public security of the country. The ministry also oversaw the implementing of Prevention, Rehabilitation and After Care (PRAC) strategy. In addition, it oversaw rehabilitation programs and had a close coordination with the anti-radicalization section.¹²⁶ Overall, it is visible that due to the centralized control and management of the Saudi process through the interior Ministry it was easy to monitor the progress.

The Burundian process was implemented under the NCDDR. An Executive Secretariat (ES) that was responsible for planning, implementing and supervising the program assisted the NCDDR. The ES was also responsible for the coordination with external stakeholders of the process. The Executive Secretariat was further decentralized

¹²⁴Ibid.

¹²⁵Ibid., 36.

¹²⁶Ibid., 35.

and was supported by Provincial Program Officers (PPO), which were established in different locations of the country to suite the requirement of ex-combatants.¹²⁷ Though it had a sound establishment to manage the process there were critical issues in terms of coordination between the implementing agencies and NCDDR, the national mechanism. Problems arose in areas of ownership, political stability, time consuming, ill planning and mismanagement of the program.¹²⁸ This contributed negatively towards achieving the designed outcome of the process. This highlights the fact that not only a sound process but also an effective implementation is required to achieve success.

The Sierra Leon process was also functioned under the government entity, the NCDDR. It was assisted by the German Agency for Technical Cooperation (GTZ). Whilst NCDDR focus on reintegrating ex-combatants only the GTZ activities includes residents, IDPs and AIDS victims other than the ex-combatants.¹²⁹ This relationship provided positive results. The NCDDR at national level was responsible for multi stakeholder coordination and its district level officers had coordination with regional NGOs to implement projects identified. This indicates that there was a sound cooperation between NCDDR and its partners at different levels.

¹²⁷De Silva, 49.

¹²⁸A. Carames and E. Sanz, “Burundi: PNDDR, 2004–2008-DDR 2009: Analysis of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) Programs in the World During 2008,” *Bellaterra: School for a Culture of Peace*, 2009, <http://www.scribd.com/doc/69222731/DDR-2009-Analysis-of-the-World-s-Disarmament-Demobilization-and-Reintegration-DDR-Programs-in-2008> (accessed March 22, 2013), 31-38.

¹²⁹Ginifer, 41-42.

Impact Orientation and Sustainability

Impact orientation and sustainability criteria focus on the economic impact of the reintegration process, whether it has successfully built or strengthen an enabling environment for reintegration of ex-combatants. In addition, it focuses on whether any unintended positive or negative side effects have been associated during the conduct of the process.

The Sri Lankan reintegration process has assisted enormously in the reconciliation process of the country. It has greatly assisted in changing the attitude of the ex-combatants on the military and the legitimate government of Sri Lanka. Many beneficiaries of the process have spoken positively about the reintegration process as a whole.¹³⁰ According to the commissioner General of BCGR, many of the ex-combatants are employed and are part of the sustainable economic development achieved by Sri Lanka after the post conflict era. One of the positive side effects achieved is the integration of military personnel at large to the conduct of the process.¹³¹ This facilitated confidence building between the military and ex-combatants once fought against each other and helped reconciliation between Tamil and Sinhala ethnic groups.

The Saudi Arabian process too has assisted heavily towards stability of the country. Curbing the extreme fundamentalist ideology spreading in the country has affected positively towards the stability and assisted the counter terrorist campaign in the kingdom. However, one of the negative side effects of the process is the soft strategy

¹³⁰Ranil Wijepala, "Rehabilitation, Resettlement of ex-LTTEers, a Success," *The Sunday Observer*, 2011, <http://www.sundayobserver.lk/2011/10/09/fea01.asp> (accessed March 23, 2013).

¹³¹*Ibid.*

used in the process. Some fear that it may not withstand in long term against the hardline extremist activities.¹³² Despite that, the Saudi process is widely acknowledged as a success that contributed towards the economic prosperity and stability of Saudi Arabia.

The Burundian reintegration process has contributed towards the stability of the country. However, lack of continuation at crucial junctures had hindered its success. In addition, the corruption levels, ill planning and lack of resources contributed negatively towards the realistic achievement of the stipulated goals.¹³³ Due to these malpractices, those who were returned to the society could not sustain longer and became poor again, causing more issues for the economic stability of the country. One of the negative side effects of the process is that lack of efficient use of resources including monetary assistance that has adversely affected the whole process leading it to a failure.

The Sierra Leon reintegration process has contributed positively towards long-term peace and stability of the country. It is evident that it contributed effectively to the economic prosperity of the country especially in the field of agriculture.¹³⁴ The project objectives were in line with national policy approaches and achieved in close cooperation with the national structures. One of the positive side effects of the process was the development of combine economic and social aspects at local level that had contributed to long-term peace effects and enhanced local co- existence in the country.¹³⁵

¹³²De Silva, 33-34.

¹³³Ibid., 81.

¹³⁴Federal Ministry for Economic Corporation and Development, 4.

¹³⁵Ibid.

Summery Analysis and Comparison

In order to conduct a comparative analysis between the different reintegration processes studied, the researcher adopts the cross-case synthesis technique.¹³⁶ In this method, a word table is created to display data from individual cases according to a uniform framework.¹³⁷ In this instance, summary outcome of the different reintegration processes researched are display as data. The ILO checklist for monitoring and evaluation of reintegration process serves as the “uniform framework.”

Going a step further, the researcher based on the results of above analysis incorporates a rating system based on an analytical study conducted “Rating the rating scales” that includes a numerical value.¹³⁸ The study identifies that generally rating scales should balance with an equal number of favorable and unfavorable response choices.¹³⁹ Therefore, the researcher use balanced rating system in this analysis for the unbiased measure of different reintegration processes. The study further indicates, “There is no single number of points for a rating scale that is appropriate for all situations. In general, however, it suggests the use of five to nine points.”¹⁴⁰ Accordingly, the researcher use under mentioned rating scale with an appropriate point system for the conduct of the analysis.

¹³⁶Creswell, 163.

¹³⁷Ibid.

¹³⁸Friedman and Amoo.

¹³⁹Ibid.

¹⁴⁰Ibid.

1. Very Good -5 points.
2. Good - 4 points.
3. Average - 3 points.
4. Poor- 2 points.
5. Very Poor- 1 Points.

Based on above, analysis of the reintegration processes against the six evaluation criteria is conducted in the following manner:

1. Identify the summary analysis of the each evaluation criteria.
2. The summary analysis is measured and a suitable rating and points awarded according to the balanced rating scale. Each criterion will start with minimum rating / points. During the analysis, points are proportionately added for meeting the stipulated standards identified in the ILO tool. At the same time points are deducted for not meeting the standards of the same ILO tool.
3. This would indicate whether the respective reintegration process has achieved the desired results of the ILO evaluation criteria.

Final accumulation of points will determine how successful was the relevant reintegration process fared according to the ILO evaluation criteria. More points accumulated determine more success of the process. The summary analysis of the reintegration processes as below:

Table 2. The Summary Analysis of the Sri Lankan Process			
SRL No	Evaluation Criteria	Summary analysis	Overall rating
1	Relevance and strategic fit	• Government ownership • Strategic support at the highest level • Integration of prominent stakeholders • Education, training supported local employment demand • Process identified as a national priority	Very Good-5
2	Validity of design	• Integration of IGO/NGO at planning level but lacked at implementation • Contributed development activities • A logical and coherent design • Use of military personnel to foster reconciliation	Good-4
3	Project progress and effective ness	• Process achieved high percentage of the objectives • Positive contribution towards national reconciliation • Adequate vocational training provided but lack of employment opportunities • Government mediation to mitigate employment crisis	Good-4
4	Efficiency of resource use	• Allocation of resources at the strategic level • Efficient use of available resources • Timely funds delivered • Country lacked resources/funds after a civil war but it was mitigated by the intervention of government institutions	Good-4
5	Effectiveness of management	• BCGR played the role of NCDDR. • Decentralized management • Systematic monitoring of the process • Adequate coordination between the BCGR and other stakeholders	Very Good-5
6	Impact orientation and sustainability	• Greatly assisted to change attitudes of ex-combatants • Involving of military personnel have given positive results • Positively assisted towards stability and national reconciliation	Very Good-5
7	Total		27

Source: Created by the author based on the analysis process.

Table 3. The Summary Analysis of the Saudi Arabian Process			
SRL No	Evaluation Criteria	Summary analysis	Overall rating
1	Relevance and strategic fit	• Government ownership • Strategic support at the highest level • Integration of prominent government stakeholders, lack of NGOs/IGOs • Education, training supports the national de radicalization plan • Process identified as a national priority	Good-4
2	Validity of design	• Lack of integration of the IGO/NGOs • A logical and coherent design that validates ex-combatant requirements • Use of soft strategy against extremist terrorists	Good-4
3	Project progress and effectiveness	• Process achieved high percentage of the objectives • Positive contribution towards national reconciliation • Sufficient monetary allocations	Very Good5
4	Efficiency of resource use	• Allocation of resources at the strategic level • Timely funds delivered • Vast amount of funds allocated not only for ex-combatants but for the welfare of family members	Very Good-5
5	Effectiveness of management	• Centrally managed by the Saudi Government • Systematic monitoring of the process but lacked transparency • Acceptable coordination with other stakeholders	Good-4
6	Impact orientation and sustainability	• Contributed to the stability of Saudi Arabia • Long term sustainability of the soft strategy is in doubt • Positively assisted towards economic prosperity	Good-4
7	Total		26

Source: Created by the author based on the analysis process.

Table 4. The Summary Analysis of the Burundian Process			
SRL No	Evaluation Criteria	Summary analysis of the Burundian Process	Overall rating
1	Relevance and strategic fit	• Government ownership, however lack of stability in the country • Lack of coordination between the NDDCR and NGOs/IGOs • Education, training barely supports the employment demand. (Many opted for self-employment)	Poor- 2
2	Validity of design	• Integration of the IGO/NGOs • A logical and coherent design but poor execution • Resource constraints hindered effective implementation	Average-3
3	Project progress and effective ness	• Process failed to deliver excepted results. A large proportionate of ex-combatants still await reintegration • Contributed barely towards national reconciliation • Lack of employment opportunities	Poor-2
4	Efficiency of resource use	• Substantial funding from NGO/IGOs • Lack of government resources, heavily dependent on NGOs/IGOs • Funds not delivered to cater timely requirements • Corruption and malpractices observed	Poor- 2
5	Effectiveness of management	• Decentralized system, poorly managed • Lack of systematic monitoring of the process • Lack of coordination with other stakeholders	Very poor-1
6	Impact orientation and sustainability	• Assisted towards the stability of Burundi • Failure in implementation due to corruption, lack of coordination and malpractices • Negatively contributed towards economic prosperity	Average-3
7	Total		13

Source: Created by the author based on the analysis process.

Table 5. The Summary Analysis of the Sierra Leon Process			
SRL No	Evaluation Criteria	Summary analysis	Overall rating
1	Relevance and strategic fit	• Government ownership • Integration of prominent stakeholders • Education, training marginally supported local employment demand • Process identified as a national priority	Very Good- 5
2	Validity of design	• Integration of IGO/NGOs • A logical and coherent design that validates ex-combatant requirements • Successfully implemented aiming not only ex-combatants but affected populace as well	Very Good- 5
3	Project progress and effective ness	• Process achieved high percentage of the objectives • Substantial proportionate (12 percent) was not reintegrated - Adequate vocational training provided but lack of employment opportunities	Average-3
4	Efficiency of resource use	• Efficient management of resources • Lack of government resources, heavily dependent on NGO/IGOs • Funds not delivered to cater timely requirements	Average-3
5	Effectiveness of management	• Decentralized management • Systematic monitoring of the process through NDDCR and GTZ • Adequate coordination between the NCCDR and other stakeholders	Good-4
6	Impact orientation and sustainability	• Assisted towards stability of the country • Positively contributed towards economic prosperity • Positively assisted towards peace and national reconciliation	Very Good-5
7	Total		25

Source: Created by the author based on the analysis process.

The primary research question of this study was; how successful was the Sri Lankan process in reintegrating ex-combatants to the society? According to the above conducted analysis the Sri Lankan process obtains 27 points, the Saudi Arabian process obtains 26 points, the Burundian process obtains 13 points and the Sierra Leon process obtains 25 points. This validates the fact that the Sri Lankan process has achieved most of the ILO evaluation criteria. Therefore, it is evident than The Sri Lankan reintegration process was a success. In addition, performing slightly better than the Saudi Arabian and Sierra Leon processes that are generally identified as successful reintegration processes as highlighted in the literature review, further endorses the fact that Sri Lankan reintegration process is a comparative success. However, as indicated in limitations, this is an individual research based on available resources. In addition, only certain facts under ILO criteria that represented all reintegration processes were selected to conduct the analysis. Therefore, this research could facilitate as a base study for individuals interested in conducting future research on reintegration of ex-combatants to the society.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusions

Today the DDR process is considered as a crucial phase in the transition from conflict to peace. In that, one of the important aspects of post-conflict stability is the reintegration process of former combatants. With the complete defeat of LTTE in May 2009, the Sri Lankan government commenced rehabilitation and reintegration of 11,664 former combatants to the society. To succeed, the government developed a unique process to reintegrate ex-combatants to the society. However, there is no accepted method to gauge the success or the failure of reintegration process. Therefore, the question arises as to how successful was the Sri Lankan process in reintegrating ex-combatants to the society. Since each conflict differs from one another, a holistic comparison between various reintegration processes would assist in this regard to understand the success-failure of the Sri Lankan process.

In order to answer the identified research questions, the study focused on a few other reintegration processes. Therefore, the researcher selected three reintegration processes conducted in Saudi Arabia, Burundi and Sierra Leon and conducted a comparative case study between these processes and the Sri Lankan process. During the conduct of the literature review, the researcher found a tool published by the ILO, a well-acknowledged international organization, to evaluate reintegration models. This tool sets out a checklist to examine success or failure of integration processes. In order to conduct a comparative analysis between the different reintegration processes studied, the researcher adopted the cross-case synthesis technique. In addition, the researcher

incorporated a rating system that included a numerical value to gauge the success of failure of the respective process.

During the conduct of analysis, the reintegration in Sri Lanka, Saudi Arabia, Burundi, and Sierra Leon have provided with examples of both successes and failures in the global effort to transform militants into productive civilians. On the one hand, Sri Lankan, Saudi Arabian and Sierra Leon processes were able to provide the world examples of a mostly successful reintegration process. Contrary, the Burundian example provided how challenging the reintegration process could be, if not implemented correctly.

The primary research question of this study was; how successful was the Sri Lankan process in reintegrating ex-combatants to the society? According to the above conducted analysis the Sri Lankan process, obtained highest points closely followed by the Saudi Arabian process and the Sierra Leon process. This validated the fact that the Sri Lankan process was a success as it has achieved most of the ILO evaluation criteria. In addition, performing better than the Saudi Arabian and Sierra Leon processes that are generally identified as successful reintegration processes, further endorses the fact that Sri Lankan reintegration process is a comparative success.

Recommendations

In accordance with the primary question, one of the secondary questions was; what aspects of the Sri Lankan reintegration process are common with the comparative processes examined? These aspects could serve as possible practices for future reintegration processes.

The main aspects of the Sri Lankan process that are common to others are as below:

1. Government ownership of the reintegration process.
2. Identification of the process as a priority.
3. Integration of prominent stakeholders.(Government/NGO/IGOs)
4. Education, training that supports local employment demand.
5. A logical and coherent design that validates ex-combatant requirements.
6. Allocation of resources at the strategic level.
7. Efficient use of resources.
8. Decentralized management.
9. Systematic monitoring of the process.
10. Adequate coordination between the government element (NCDDR or BCGR)

and other stakeholders.

Other secondary question was; what aspects of the Sri Lankan reintegration process did not work in the comparative processes examined? In another term, they are the aspects that did work in the Sri Lankan process but did not work in other processes. These are lessons learnt of the Sri Lankan process that could be valuable for implementation of a reintegration of ex-combatants in future. Some of the key aspects are as below:

1. Use of military personnel in the reintegration process facilitates reconciliation.
2. Intervention of government institutions could effectively mitigate issues related to lack of resources/funds.

3. Finding suitable employment for ex-combatants is one of the biggest challenges of the process. The Sri Lankan government mediated to mitigate employment crisis by employing a large number in the government sector.

4. Involving of military personnel have greatly assisted to change attitudes of ex-combatants towards military personnel.

5. Successful implementation facilitates stability and national reconciliation.

6. Allocation of timely funds enhances productivity and continuity.

7. The unique Sri Lankan process consisting of six pillars addressed many problems of reintegration.

8. A dedicated reintegration process that suits the cultural and religious values, customs and traditions, and aspirations of the ex-combatants is ideal for success.

9. As the PARC's were sheltered only with 500 ex-combatants, it assisted close monitoring and identification of individuals.

10. In addition, above segregation allowed intelligence agencies and others to do their identification without any difficulties.

Closing Remarks

This was an individual research based on available resources therefore; it limits the research to those findings. In addition, only certain facts under ILO criteria that represented all reintegration processes were selected to conduct the analysis. Therefore, the researcher believes that findings of this research could facilitate as a base study for individuals interested in conducting future research on reintegration of ex-combatants to the society.

In closing, it could be stated that each reintegration process is unique since each conflict differs from one another. In addition, the political, social and economic backgrounds of a country influence the conduct of successful reintegration process. However, it is important to identify success or failure of reintegration processes as it would enhance the knowledge base and assist future reintegration processes. In this regard, it could be stated that the Sri Lankan reintegration process is a comparative success and lessons learned from that would become important for the reintegration of former combatants in future.

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