THE NEPALESE ARMY IN INTERNAL PEACE AND SECURITY

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
General Studies

by

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Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
2013-01

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

1. REPORT DATE *(DD-MM-YYYY)* 14-06-2013	2. REPORT TYPE Master's Thesis	3. DATES COVERED *(From - To)* AUG 2012 – JUNE 2013
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE The Nepalese Army in Internal Peace and Security		**5a. CONTRACT NUMBER**
		5b. GRANT NUMBER
		5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER
6. AUTHOR(S) Major Suraj Gurung		**5d. PROJECT NUMBER**
		5e. TASK NUMBER
		5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) U.S. Army Command and General Staff College ATTN: ATZL-SWD-GD Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2301		**8. PERFORMING ORG REPORT NUMBER**
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)		**10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)**
		11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)
12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited		
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES		

14. ABSTRACT

It is difficult or even impossible to build up the peace and security of a nation without addressing the economic, social and political problems prevailing within a society. Nepal, because of its weakness in legitimacy and capacity to manage these aforementioned problems, is facing many internal security threats due to extreme poverty, broad societal discrimination, and an unsystematic political system. The Government of Nepal (GoN) has many a time mobilized the Nepalese Army (NA) to manage and mitigate the internal problems but fails to prescribe definite roles and responsibilities due to lack of a clear and viable national security strategy. Therefore, possible roles for the NA must be determined when it is mobilized in Nepal's internal security environment.

The research identifies that the NA has been conducting infrastructure development, wild life and nature conservation, assistance to civil authority, and disaster management through rescue and relief operations. The research recommends that the NA continue stability operations and maintain its credibility, trust of the population and accountability to the democratic government. By analyzing the NA's capability, organizational structure, economic tools and political neutrality, the research concludes that its mobilization to improve Nepal's internal security environment is feasible, acceptable and suitable.

15. SUBJECT TERMS

National Security, Internal Security Threats, Poverty, Societal Discrimination, Political Instability, Inclusiveness, Stability Operations.

16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT (U)	**b. ABSTRACT** (U)	**c. THIS PAGE** (U)	(U)	94	**19b. PHONE NUMBER** *(include area code)*

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not
necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or
any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing
statement.)

ABSTRACT

THE NEPALESE ARMY IN INTERNAL PEACE AND SECURITY, by Suraj Gurung, 94 pages.

It is difficult or even impossible to build up the peace and security of a nation without addressing the economic, social and political problems prevailing within a society. Nepal, because of its weakness in legitimacy and capacity to manage these aforementioned problems, is facing many internal security threats due to extreme poverty, broad societal discrimination, and an unsystematic political system. The Government of Nepal (GoN) has many a time mobilized the Nepalese Army (NA) to manage and mitigate the internal problems but fails to prescribe definite roles and responsibilities due to lack of a clear and viable national security strategy. Therefore, possible roles for the NA must be determined when it is mobilized in Nepal's internal security environment.

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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ACRONYMS

CA	Constitution Assembly
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Accord
CPN-M	Communist Party Nepal-Maoist
CPN-UML	Communist Party Nepal-United Marxist Leninist
DPR	Directorate of Public Relations
ESAF	El Salvador Armed Forces
FM	Field Manual
FMLN	Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GoES	Government of El Salvador
GoN	Government of Nepal
ICON	Interim Constitution of Nepal
ISDP	Integrated Security and Development Program
NA	Nepalese Army
NP	Nepalese Police
PAF	Philippines Armed Forces
U.S.	United States
UN	United Nations

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

> Establishing security involves domestic security, secure borders, and relatively accommodating neighbors. Of the three factors in achieving stabilization and reconstruction, domestic security is the most important and often the most difficult to achieve.
>
> —James Stephenson,
> *Losing the Golden Hour: An Insider's View of Iraq's Reconstruction*

Problem Statement

Developing nations are likely to face more internal security problems than those faced by developed ones, because the governments of developing nations tend to have weaker legitimacy and less capacity to manage these internal abnormalities. Nepal is no exception, as the national authority has not been able to manage its internal problems arising from poverty, societal discrimination and political instability. As a result, Nepal's national security has been threatened by internal factors more than from external actors.

Despite this fact, the primary task of the NA remains facing external threats as mandated by paragraph 4, sub para 1 of the NA Act-2007. The NA has been repeatedly mobilized to mitigate and settle internal security threats. However, the GoN lacks a clear and viable national strategy that prescribes a role for the NA when it is mobilized in response to threats against Nepal's internal peace and security. Therefore, it is of great necessity to determine the possible roles for the NA in Nepal's internal security environment.

This thesis will endeavor to answer the primary question: What are the possible roles of the NA regarding building internal peace and security for Nepal? In order to conduct a viable analysis and come to practical conclusions, the problem set has been narrowed; thus, the following secondary questions will be addressed:

1. What are the internal security threats, which have emerged due to poverty, societal discrimination and political instability in Nepal?

2. What is the role of the NA in addressing these internal security threats?

3. Are the breaches to peace and internal threats to national security of Nepal solvable by the NA?

Assumptions

The thesis assumes that the cordial relationship of Nepal with its neighbors, India and China, will continue to be harmonious in the future. The available data for the research will be analyzed primarily focusing on the threats from within the Nepalese territory rather than from external actors. Finally, this thesis, as it is addressing issues relevant to the transitional period in Nepalese history, assumes that internal threats to Nepal's national security remain unchanged during the conduct of the research.

Definitions

National Interest. Often referred to by the French expression *raison d'état* or reason of state, national interest encompasses the goal or the goals of a country's desired end state in particular circumstances. National interest is a key for formulating and conceptualizing national security strategy, identifying the nation's goals and ambitions. It

can be defined as, "A physical or non-physical condition of a nation's desired end states within the strategic environment based on the policymakers' understanding of what best serves national well-being, which are normally things to be protected, things to be promoted, or things to be created" (Bartholomees 2012, 56).

National Security. Arnold Wolfers explains the ambiguity in defining national security in his essay, "National Security as an Ambiguous Symbol." He writes, "the term 'national security' may not mean the same thing to everybody and may not have a precise meaning at all, which makes its definition a contested concept" (Wolfers 1962, 147). Barry Buzan, a British scholar, describes national security as a weakly conceptualized ambiguous concept, which is due to the practitioners of state policy having compelling reasons for maintaining its symbolic ambiguity (Buzan 1983, 4). The concept of national security used after World War II covered mostly military definitions until the end of the Cold War. In the post-Cold War era, nonmilitary threats seemingly overshadowed the significance of military threats and hence became part of the definition of national security. Varieties of definitions of national security by various authors have contributed to the ambiguity of this concept. For this thesis, Indian author-Prabhakaran Paleri's definition will be the basis of examining national security. He defines national security as, "The measurable state of the capability of a nation to overcome the multi-dimensional threats to the apparent well-being of its people and its survival as a nation-state at any given time, by balancing all instruments of state policy" (Paleri 2008, 57).

National Stability. National stability is constituted from equilibrium in a society that does not suffer security threats to the degree that those threats endanger national security. National stability, however, should not be confused with national security:

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"National security is the instrument used to achieve stability, and stability is the precondition for national security" (Al-Moshat 1985, 32).

Threats. Threats are the activities or events that tend to endanger the lives of a nation's citizens, and confine or restrict the national policy of that nation, leaving few policy choices for the government with which to deal with that event or those activities (Ullman 1983, 19). Threats can be categorized as external or internal. External threats are created by the factors outside of the geographical boundaries of a nation whereas internal threats emerge within those national boundaries.

<div align="center">Scope</div>

Security itself is a vague concept. Nation states, per such things as their achieved level of development, status as an international actor, desired interests and perceived threats, define and conceptualize security. The nature and types of threat for developed nations and those for developing nations are different. The general definitions of national security and the terms associated with it, as defined in the earlier paragraphs, will be the basis for examining the internal threats to Nepal's national security. Data pertaining to poverty, societal discrimination and political instability, particularly after 1990,[1] are analyzed for this thesis. The events and issues surrounding the mobilization of the NA to respond to threats created by these problems are examined, rather than analyzing the roles and responsibilities of the Army in its entirety.

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[1]Since 1990, when the then king Birendra Bir Bikram Shahdev accepted constitutional reforms and established a multi-party parliament, Nepal has been governed according to a democratic constitution.

<u>Limitations</u>

As discussed in the earlier paragraphs, the GoN has not clearly defined the roles and responsibilities of the NA regarding Nepal's internal security environment, which will limit the scope of this research. On the other hand, due to little interest in the subject, few books and articles have been published in Nepal that define an understanding of internal security issues in Nepalese society. Therefore, international writers' literature is reviewed for acquiring a conceptual base of security issues.

<u>Delimitations</u>

Internal threats to the national security of a nation can be initiated and further aggravated by the direct or indirect support of another nation to those threats. This reality cannot be ignored in case of Nepal, which is bounded by two big neighboring countries, India and China, with an open border system with the former. Similarly, aggression by these countries also remains a threat to the national security of Nepal. However, comparing the capability of the NA with the militaries of India and China, the chances of the NA engaging in conventional war against the neighbors remain minimal. Therefore, with the assumption of a continuation of cordial relation with its neighbors, this thesis does not focus on the role of the NA against the external threats.

The study examines issues and threats with regard to poverty, societal discrimination and political instability, and analyzes the impact of these threats on the internal peace and security of Nepal. Although, some relevant issues such as the changing dynamics of internal security threats globally and the mobilization of friendly foreign armies in internal security environments are considered in this analysis of the military's

role in Nepal's internal security environment, a detailed study of security threats outside Nepal is not included.

Significance

Inherent economic, social and political problems within Nepal are emerging as immediate threats to the nation. The intensity of these threats to internal peace and security is continuously rising in Nepal. These looming security threats within Nepalese society are more lethal and dangerous than current external threats. The change in Nepal's political regimes, from monarchy to multi-party democracy has not, in itself, offered a tangible solution for stabilizing the government, nor for bettering the economic condition of society, or preventing discrimination within Nepalese society. Basically, problems in these aforementioned areas were major factors that led the Nepalese to experience a decade-long insurgency, which was a remarkable threat to the national security of Nepal. The insurgency, which took the lives of more than 14,000 people was initiated by the Communist Party Nepal-Maoist (CPN-M),[2] and lasted from 1996 until 2006.

The NA has always been a reliable and impartial institution, which has remained at the forefront for infrastructural development such as the building of roads and tracks, and wildlife and nature conservation in Nepal. In addition, the NA was instrumental in setting the conditions for a negotiated settlement of the aforementioned insurgency in

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[2]CPN-M was founded by the Chairman, Puspa Kamal Dahal in 1994. Ironically, this party became the ruling party after the Constitution Assembly (CA) election held in 2008. It is now known as the Unified CPN-M because the hardliner faction led by Mohan Baidya split to form another party that took the party's name, CPN-M.

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Nepal. However, the NA had to mobilize in a foggy environment, due to the GoN's failure to clearly outline roles and responsibilities for the Army.

Nepal's national security strategy, at present, has to focus on prescribing viable solutions for countering emerging internal threats by employing the security forces of Nepal, including the NA. This thesis focuses on the possible roles of the NA in the context of internal threats that have a serious impact on the national security of Nepal. As a relevant study promoting the understanding of the scope of internal threats, it can provide a basis for recommending appropriate national security policies. Thus, this research may be of interest to the policy makers, military leaders and readers to identify the role of national armies in building and maintaining internal peace and security.

<u>Background</u>

Nepal is a small mountainous country in South Asia, with a total area of 147,181 square kilometers, surrounded by India from the east, south and west, and by China from the north. The country, almost rectangular in shape, stretches 885 km in average length along an east-west axis and 193 km along a north-south axis. Geographically, the country is divided into three parts—*Himal* (mountainous region), *Pahad* (hilly region) and *Tarai* (southern plains), respectively from north to south. Nepal, administratively, is divided into five development regions—Eastern, Central, Western, Mid-Western and Far Western. The capital of the country, Kathmandu, lies in the Central Development region. The Mid-Western and Far Western development regions are comparatively less developed than the other three regions.

The country derives its name Nepal from the Sanskrit word *Nipalaya*, which means at the foot of the mountain. The history of Nepal, as a nation state, is generally

traced back to 1768 when Great King Prithvi Narayan Shah[3] completed the conquest of

the Kathmandu Valley (Baral 2012, 5). King Prithvi Narayan Shah, after the unification

of Nepal, continued an expansion campaign towards the east and west, into territories that

were governed then by the East India Company. After his death, his descendants

continued a campaign that resulted in expanding Greater Nepal up to Tista in the east and

Kangra in the west. During that campaign, the NA had to fight with British forces for two

years, from 1814-1816, which is known as the Anglo-Nepal War. The length of the war

and the resulting overstretch of the NA compelled the GoN to sign the Sugauli Treaty,[4]

which confined Nepal to its present boundaries. See figure 1 for the map of Nepal as

shaped by the treaty of Sugauli.

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[3]King Prithvi Narayan Shah (1723- 1775) was the ruler of Gorkha, one of the small kingdoms in Western Nepal. He is the first king of the unified Nepal who annexed the scattered principalities to the kingdom of Gorkha and established Kathmandu, then Nepal Valley, as the capital.

[4]The Sugauli Treaty was signed on 2 December 1815 and ratified on 4 March 1816, between the British East India Company and Nepal. As a result of the Treaty, about one-third of the Nepalese territory was lost, including Sikkim, Kumaon and Garhwal, which are in India at present.

Figure 1.   Map of Nepal as Shaped by the Treaty of Sugauli

Source: Ram Kumar Shrestha, *The Anglo-Nepal War 1814-1816*, 28 December 2011, http://completenepal.wordpress.com/tag/bhimsen-thapa/ (accessed 2 October 2012).

The NA also fought a Chinese-backed Tibetan force in 1791 in the Battle of Betrawati. During these periods, Nepal's national security strategy was based on meeting external threats. King Prithvi Narayan Shah stressed this fact in his famous book, *Divya Upadesh*,[5] which states, "Nepal is a yam between two rocks; maintain a treaty of friendship with the emperor of China, also keep a treaty of friendship with the emperor of the southern sea" (Stiller 1989, 42). The strategy the king generated during his campaign

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[5]*Divya Upadesh* or the "Divine Counsel" is a poetic piece that highlights the axioms of King Prithvi Narayan Shah. The book is famous in Nepal as it illustrates the principles and rules of the great king.

for the unification of Nepalese territory has been passed down to the present as national policy, without amendment or modification. The national security policy the king promulgated was predicated upon external security threats to Nepalese sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Nearing the middle of the 19th century, Nepal faced increasing political instability, and in 1846, Jung Bahadur Rana[6] seized the opportunity to establish the Rana oligarchy. The Ranas became the de facto rulers of Nepal for 104 years, isolating the country from the rest of the world. Though the Rana rulers recognized the importance of the industrial revolution in Europe and identified the necessity of maintaining good relations with European countries, especially with the British, they did not frame a detailed national security policy, suitable for the country. The Ranas administered the country with a government comparatively more stable than the earlier Shah rulers, and the other fundamentals of economic, social and political structure remained relatively unchanged (Whelpton 1990, xvi).

Nepal has faced a lot of internal turmoil since having been established as a nation state, ruled by the Shah Kings and the Rana prime ministers at various stages, but these governments failed to frame a holistic security policy, which is indispensable for governing a nation state. In February1951, King Tribhuvan Bir Bikram Shah, with the support of the people, succeeded in regaining power by overthrowing the Rana regime. Between 1951 to 1960, a coalition government under a constitutional monarchy governed Nepal (Whelpton 2005, 86-88). In December 1960, King Mahendra dissolved the

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[6]Jung Bahadur Rana (1816-1877) was the founder of Rana dynasty, who rose to the power after a *Kot Massacre*, where he and his brothers killed around 40 members of the Nepalese palace court on 15 September 1846.

coalition government and imposed direct royal rule, which ended the multi-party democratic system and introduced the Panchayat[7] system. The Panchayat system promulgated a loose security doctrine called *Rastriya Mulnity,* a national guidance initiated by King Mahendra, which focused on the economic and political aspects of the country but was not effective because of the inherent problems of illiteracy, poverty, and nepotism that were deeply rooted in Nepalese society.

The mass movement of 1990 brought about the end of the Panchayati system after which Nepal developed a multi-party democracy, with the king as a ceremonial figure. The post-1990 era made the people politically aware, but they remained unversed in other things like the economy, infrastructure, and science and technology, all of which can be key for developing a nation. Nepal, since adopting a multi-party democratic system in 1990, has been experiencing numerous internal problems centering around political upheaval that have had counterproductive consequences. The Shangri-La in the lap of the Himalayas has become insecure because of abject poverty, cultural clashes and unstable government. The violent insurgency of the recent past ended after the signing of a Comprehensive Peace Accord (CPA)[8] but internal instability still remains as an inherent part of Nepalese society.

After the Maoist insurgency, new violence took shape in the southern plains and in some areas of eastern Nepal based on the principle of self-governing autonomous

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[7]Panchayat is an assembly of five members that forms a party-less administering body. The members are appointed by the head of the nation but should be chosen, accepted and trusted by the people.

[8]The CPA was signed between the CPN-M and government of Nepal on 21 November 2006 that ended the decade long Maoist insurgency and gave access to CPN-M to take part in the government.

regions, which was propagated by the CPN-M during the insurgency. Ethnic groups of these areas have demanded separate autonomous regions within Nepal. Taking advantage of the fluid situation, the *Madhesis* (inhabitants of southern region of Nepal) have gone further, demanding secession. Former Defense Minister Sharad Singh Bhandari, who is a senior leader of the *Madhesi Janadhikar Forum-Loktantrik* Party, made a controversial statement concerning the possible secession of 22 districts of *Madhes* (southern plains) if the people in these districts perceived that they were being discriminated against (Kharel 2011). While there has been much discussion concerning this issue among politicians, intellectuals and the public, both for and against the statement, the bottom line is that Nepal is facing, not only security challenges, but also the threat of losing sovereignty and territorial integrity in certain areas.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

Literature for this thesis focuses on national security and in particular, the economic, social and political problems pertaining to the internal security of Nepal. It also includes literature that focuses on the mobilization of national armies for maintaining internal peace and stability. It includes books, journals, articles, theses and dissertations written by both Nepalese and non-Nepalese writers. Similarly, the web sites of the GoN, the NA, international and national governmental organizations, political parties, and reports of the GoN, various seminars, workshops and interactions programs about national security issues have also been referred to.

For ease of analysis, the literature examined is divided into two groups. The first group, encompassing national security and internal security threats, facilitates an understanding of how the integration of the economic, social and political aspects of a society fit into the overall concept of national security. It also discusses events and issues related to poverty, societal discrimination and political instability, as well as the impact of these issues on security. The second group is literature on stability operations in internal peace and security environments. It outlines the mobilization of foreign armies within their own countries and abroad in situations similar to that of Nepal in order to compare and contrast the employment of the NA, and to acquire concepts of best practices.

<u>National Security and Internal Security Threats</u>

The concept of national security defined as maintaining a stable nation state can be traced back to the Peace of Westphalia, wherein the concept of a sovereign state became the basis for a new international order of nation states (MacFarlane and Khong 2006, 346). The Peace of Westphalia signed on 30 January 1648 between the Spanish and Dutch brought a new system of political order to Europe, ending approximately eighty years of war between Spain and the Dutch, including the German phase, usually known as the Thirty Years War. A number of countries received territories or confirmed their sovereignty over territories under the terms of the peace settlement. As a result, the concept of a nation-state, which could control its domestic affairs free from external interference, was initiated. In order to attain power and maintain survival, nation-states developed the idea of national security.

Walter Lippmann, an American writer and reporter, who was one of the first to introduce the concept of the Cold War, writes this about national security, "A nation has security when it does not have to sacrifice its legitimate interests to avoid war, and is able, if challenged, to maintain them by war" (Berkowitz and Bock 1972, 40). Similarly, Charles S. Maier, professor of European and international history, defines national security as the capacity to control those domestic and foreign conditions that the public opinion of a given community believes necessary to enjoy its own self-determination or autonomy, prosperity, and well-being (Buzan 1983, 216-17). The aforementioned definitions of national security take it as a pre-condition that a nation will possess a balanced state apparatus, relations with the external world remain balanced and the internal situation remains cool and calm. These definitions of national security were

adopted as core concepts in national and international affairs, particularly by the western

countries in the Cold War era. During this period, the term national security was deeply

prioritized as war prevention through demonstrations of military might. Karna Bahadur

Thapa, in his dissertation, *National Security of Nepal 1990-2000: A study of Concept,*

Vulnerabilities and Threats, submitted to Tribhuvan University, Nepal, in 2002, explains

that in the period immediately following World War II, three schools of thought seem to

have prevailed regarding national security. Thapa explains these schools of thought as

follows:

> The first might have emerged as a by-product of the scarcely healed wounds of
> war. The second sprang from the ideological division of the globe into its
> opposing cold war proponents. The third could be seen as the child of post-
> colonialism, influenced by the issues arising from the bitter relics of imperialism
> (K. Thapa 2002, 25).

However, national security does not have a universally accepted single definition

because the concept of security itself is a vague topic. Arnold Wolfers defines security in

both an objective and subjective sense: "Security, in an objective sense, measures the

absence of threats to acquired values, in a subjective sense, the absence of fear that such

values will be attacked" (Wolfers 1962, 150). An ambiguity always arises regarding the

concept of security as an element of national interest. In the article, "Naxalism: The

Gravest Threat to Indian Security" published in *Pratiyogita Darpan* in 2006, S.K. Mishra

points out that the easy answer for the aforementioned ambiguity may be equating the

security of territorial integrity and sovereignty with national interest, but this answer is

not sufficient in its conceptual entirety. This is so because sovereignty can be threatened,

limited or surrendered through treaties, agreements, accords or the domination of small

states by powerful ones without a loss of territorial integrity (Mishra 2006, 60).

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Therefore, either sovereignty without full territorial integrity or territorial integrity without full sovereignty is not sufficient for a nation to maintain its security. Another ambiguity regarding the concept of security is whether it is an absolute value or not. Richard H. Ullman argues that security is not an absolute value in the way that was observed by the 17th-century philosopher Thomas Hobbes (Ullman 1983, 16). For Hobbes, security was an absolute value because in the Hobbesian world, the state is the primary provider of security and citizens are bound to pay back to the state, even with the sacrifice of their lives if the situation arises, in order to return the obligation conferred upon citizens by the state's provision of security. The modern concept of security in liberal democratic societies is not an absolute value because security is balanced by liberty in such societies. As Ullman explains, "In virtually, every society, individuals and groups seek security against the state, just as they ask the state to protect them against harm from other states" (Ullman 1983, 16). Ullman thus also explains that the nature of the security threats from which a society has to be protected are basically two—against the state that potentially presents internal threats and against other state as potential external threats.

Research on national security that has been done in the post-Cold War era covers a broadened concept of national security, going beyond military affairs to include economic security, environmental security, ethnic security, etcetera within the realm of national security. In Joseph J. Romm's *Defining National Security: The Nonmilitary Aspects*, 1993, the author focuses his study of national security on nonmilitary threats that have arisen in the aftermath of the Cold War. The study describes the decline of military security in importance relative to the issues of economic, energy and environmental

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security. The term national security tends to be employed indiscriminately by political

leaders to justify pet policies, but the current debate should instead focus on a sensible

national political agenda, which takes into account environmental security, energy

security and economic security (Romm 1993, 82). Romm has concluded that the

objective of national security is to sustain freedom from foreign dictation and also the

improvement of living standards in an environmentally sustainable fashion (Romm 1993,

85).

In his book, *National Security, Imperatives and Challenges*, 2008, Prabhakaran

Paleri defines national security as:

> The measurable state of the capability of a nation to overcome the multi-
> dimensional threats to the apparent well-being of its people and its survival as a
> nation-state at any given time, by balancing all instruments of state policy through
> governance, that can be indexed by computation, empirically or otherwise, and is
> extendable to global security by variables external to it. (Paleri 2008, 57)

The book discusses national security as a condition that includes not only the traditional

emphasis on military strength with its supporting hardware but also encompasses all

major elements affecting the development of a free nation state, which are mainly

economic, demographic, ethnic and environmental security. Economic security is related

to a nation's economic strength, which, on the one hand, provides the military with funds,

materiel, and personnel, and on the other hand enables a nation to fund national social

programs, savings and investments. Demographic security relates to population growth,

human immigration and trafficking that can affect the stability of a nation and create

socio-economic issues if unplanned and uncontrolled. Similarly, ethnic disturbances have

negative effects on national security because they threaten the integrity of a nation-state.

Finally, environmental security is becoming an indispensable element of national security

because degradation of the environment affects the quality of life in a state and also brings instability due to disputes over the limited resources available.

Another Indian author, Navnitt Gandhi, also recognizes a need to redefine the traditional concept of national security. In her book, *National Security: Emerging Dimensions and Threats*, she states the perception that the scope of national security has undergone a paradigm shift because the context against which the policy makers seek to establish national security is undergoing chaotic alteration. This scope has expanded from merely considering the defense of territory to identifying other areas of conflict within nations that can explode into threats to national security. The increase in the complexity of global problems and their repercussions for the people around the globe has not only multiplied threats but also made those threats multi-dimensional. Within a country, threats are no longer simply military in nature. The threats can be to a nation's economy, ecosystem, or social harmony and may result in political turmoil or other disturbances. Gandhi recommends that readers devise a bold and actionable strategy in order to sustain national security in the face of the aforementioned threats, but also admonishes that care should be taken to make the strategy adaptable to a changing environment. There can be no firm and final system of national security and neither can there be a complete cure for insecurity. Therefore, assessments and evaluations of national security strategies, in view of these changing environments, is inevitable and should result in the formulation of flexible and actionable approaches for the strategies to succeed. This book is written from an Indian point of view and does not mention any issues related to Nepal's internal security, but the need for Nepal to come up with its own flexible and actionable national security strategy is clear.

Few Nepalese writers have written books about the national security of Nepal and even fewer have focused their studies on the internal threats to Nepal's national security. In his book *National Security*, Jitendra Dhoj Khand describes national security as an amalgamation of national power, national interest, and the foreign and defense policies of Nepal. He identifies numerous security problems that Nepal, as a land-locked country, is facing, such as trade, transit, open borders, refugees, political and socio- economic threats, unemployment, and health issues. Amongst the above-mentioned threats to security, only trade, transit and an open border are primarily external issues. Other problems are primarily internal and can lead to threats of great intensity within Nepalese society.

Pyar Jung Thapa, in his Strategy Research Project, "Security Challenges to the Small States in the New World Order: Options for Nepal," submitted as a research project in the U.S. Army War College, in 1997, considers Nepal one of the most vulnerable states and backs his claim up with a broader analysis of states vulnerable to internal conflict. See figure 2 for his analysis of vulnerability to internal conflict. P. Thapa, Chief of Army Staff of the NA from 2003 until 2006, explains that large, less-developed country and small, more-developed country is somewhat vulnerable to internal conflicts, while large, more-developed country is the least vulnerable and small, less-developed country is the most vulnerable to internal conflicts. He categorizes Nepal as a small country, explaining: "A small state is a nation which cannot wage total war in defense of her sovereignty because of weakness in any of the elements of national power: geography, population size, and economic strength" (P. Thapa 1997, 3). He further describes the causes of internal conflicts as the result of "the manipulation of ethnic,

social or religious divisions; poverty and or underdevelopment; crime; corruption, or bad government and decisions; environmental decay; and population pressure" (P. Thapa 1997, 5). Thapa makes clear that internal issues such as an unbalanced economy, and animosity and clashes between the various ethnic groups of a nation, in particular, can pose threats to that nation.

Figure 2.   Vulnerability to Internal Conflict

Source: Pyar J. Thapa, "Security Challenges to the Small States in the New World Order: Options for Nepal" (Research Project, U.S. Army War College, 2012), 5.

Books written about the Nepalese Maoist insurgency generally conclude that the event posed the gravest threat to the national security of Nepal since the standoff against the British East India Company during the Anglo-Nepal War. These books highlight the economic disparity prevailing in Nepalese society as the major cause for the insurgency. In their book, *A Kingdom under Siege*, 2003, Deepak Thapa and Bandita Sijapati provide a clear picture of the rapid growth and survival of the Maoist insurgency resulting from the economic disorder of the country brought on by Nepal's unsuccessful development

endeavors. Deepak Thapa, a Nepalese writer and editor, and Bandita Sijapati, then a

Ph.D. student at the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse

University, New York, have written extensively about the Maoist movement in various

Nepali and international publications. In their writing, they reveal that Nepal has always

experienced an uneven distribution of income and wealth; the urban elites have enjoyed

opportunities and developing facilities while the rural inhabitants have remained largely

dormant (Thapa and Sijapati 2003, 59-60). All forms of economic power are concentrated

in Kathmandu and urban hubs with the rural areas left to subsistence economies. Thus,

"this situation has formed an economic heterogeneity in the Nepalese society and has

created a gulf between 'haves' and 'have nots', which is increasing day by day" (Thapa

and Sijapati 2003, 61). Li Onesto, in *Dispatches from the People's War in Nepal*, 2005,

also finds economic disparity within Nepal as a driving factor influencing those involved

with the Maoist movement. Onesto was the first foreign journalist to stay for almost three

months with the Maoist rebels during the spring of 1999 in rural areas of Nepal such as

Rolpa and Rukum, which were their core areas during the insurgency. She interviewed

and photographed Maoist guerilla fighters, villagers in areas under Maoist control, and

relatives of those killed by government forces during her stay. All who were interviewed

revealed that the failure of the GoN to address economic hardship, poverty and

deprivation in rural communities forced them to take part in the armed struggle in order

to fight against these conspicuous inequities (Onesto 2005, 57). The Maoist ideology of

equal treatment for all convinced the impoverished population that there was an

alternative to the economically flawed system, which they wanted to overthrow.

Nepal considers itself as a secular and culturally harmonious country. However, the reluctance of Nepalese society to make changes in cultural practices is nurturing societal discrimination, which, like economic inequity, leads to social instability. In his thesis, "Culture and Internal Security of Nepal," Bhumi Bhakta Baral argues that Nepalese culture still follows the discriminatory practices based on caste, gender, and ethnicity. Despite the series of political transformations the country has undergone, promises about cultural changes made before the transformations have not been kept. All regimes who have ruled Nepal have instead, supported discriminatory practices in order to establish themselves as a ruling class and the minorities as a class to be ruled.

Nepalese society is mainly dominated by Bahun and Chhetri (Thapa and Sijapati 2003, 61). These were the dominant castes beginning with the Shah Kings and Rana rulers, who created an environment for them to remain in Kathmandu, the capital of Nepal. It has been in the interest of the aforementioned castes to develop Kathmandu valley as the center of Nepal by focusing advancement efforts of the GoN in and around the valley only. As a result, other parts of Nepal, especially the rural areas, have limited access to the state apparatus, while minority groups such as the *Dalit* (untouchable caste that includes sub-castes such as Kami, Damai and Sarki), *Madhesi* (people of Tarai origin), and *Janjati* (members of indigenous ethnic groups such as Gurung, Tamang and Magar) have a negligible presence in or impact upon the state's decision-making.

In May 2003, Nepal's Department for International Development, prepared a report of an assessment of social change in conflict-affected areas of Nepal, based on fieldwork conducted in five districts located in mid-western and central Nepal. The fieldwork was carried out in 19 different communities within those five districts, out of

which 12 communities were controlled by either security forces or Maoists, and the remaining seven were in buffer areas. The report was based on discussions held by the assessment team with members of the local population, human rights activists, chief district officers, local development officers, police, army officers and other government officials, victims of the conflict, farmers, students, teachers, civil society actors and local Maoist leaders (Tamang et al. 2003). The report identified the social exclusion of the majority of the people from state affairs as a major cause for the conflict in Nepal. The strategy that the Maoist used to fuel their movement was the right to self-determination for *Dalits* and indigenous ethnic groups, and the championing of ethnic and regional autonomy in rural areas that are excluded from equitable national development. The report, however, pointed out that members of untouchable caste and indigenous ethnic groups who actively participated in the insurgency had neither assumed high leadership positions nor found their livelihood significantly changed since the insurgency ended. Therefore, the grievances of the population towards the government can easily be exploited and can be used as an organizing tool against the government's weaknesses, regardless of whether or not the exploiting party addresses the issues of the exploited.

Nepal experienced more upheavals in the political arena after 1990 when it started practicing democracy. In his dissertation, "National Security of Nepal 1990-2000: A Study of Concept, Vulnerabilities and Threats," submitted to Tribhuvan University, Nepal, in 2002, Karna Bahadur Thapa argues that the reason for political instability after the restoration of democracy was the ineffectiveness of democratic leadership. The issues that contributed to this ineffectiveness were firstly, the new leadership failed to recognize the genuine problems of Nepalese society as it changed from a monarchy to democracy.

Secondly, political leaders of the democratic government, who had assumed that fighting for democratic rights was easy, were ill prepared to govern the country. Finally, the new leaders followed the same old tactics of the Panchayat politician, supporting the discriminatory practices, to build themselves up as an elite ruling class while consigning the common population as a class to be ruled (K. Thapa 2003, 133). Gordon Stuart, a Research Fellow at the University of Lancaster, United Kingdom, and a Research Associate at the Center for Defense and International Security Studies, published an article "Evaluating Nepal's Integrated Security and Development Policy: Development, Democracy, and Counterinsurgency" in *Asian Survey* in 2005. The article covers the complex relationship between democracy, development and security policies in Nepal and concludes that the failure of democracy is due to the grievances of the Nepalese population, which were never dealt with by the democratic government. Gordon portrays the failure of Nepalese democratic government as follows:

> The democratic government failed to effectively address a wide range of interlinked issues: extreme poverty, high inflation, increasing unemployment, a perception that disparities of wealth were being accentuated (especially along the rural/urban division) by semi-feudal, exploitative, and caste-based political and economic relations, extensive corruption (particularly among the Kathmandu elite), and a general economic malaise. (Gordon 2005, 583)

Weak democracy has inculcated an unhealthy culture of garnering political favor from those in power to accomplish individual interests. Political favoritism has become so common that it is excessively practiced even by bureaucrats, police and teachers for their promotion and postings to places of their own choosing. This has made corruption a common activity, thus, leading the state towards becoming a failed state.

Stability Operations in Internal Peace and Security

U.S. Department of Defense Joint Publication 3-0 defines stability operations as "military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the U.S. in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment and to provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief" (Department of Defense 2011, V-4). U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-07, *Stability Operations*, explains army doctrine and is a practical guidebook for stability operations. Even though, the FM addresses military stability operations conducted by the U.S. military in accordance with reconstruction and stabilization efforts of the U.S. Government, it also describes fundamental principles and roles for military forces to establish a safe and secure environment, which can be used as guidance by other militaries of the world. The stability operations framework identifies a safe and secure environment, established rule of law, social well-being, stable governance and a sustainable economy as the end state conditions for stability operations (Headquarters, Department of the Army 2008, 1-16). The military, in order to achieve these conditions, has to conduct five stability tasks: establish civil security, establish civil control, restore essential services, support to government, and support to economic and infrastructure development (Headquarters, Department of the Army 2008, 2-9). These primary tasks have numbers of subordinate tasks and are executed as an integrated cohesive effort. However, the FM emphasizes that stability operations require an abundance of resources due to its nature and likelihood of being a lengthy effort, which necessitates maintenance of a balance between long-term success and short-term gains. A country like Nepal that has a weak government and an army with limited capability is in

danger of achieving short-term gains but then being unable to sustain long-term success in stability operations. It is important, therefore, for the NA to get military assistance from an advanced organization, such as the U.S. military, through the consent of GoN and the U.S. Government. In this way, the NA may play an effective role in stabilizing internal peace and security in Nepal.

U.S. military assistance might include military aid programs offering equipment and spare parts, financial assistance to foreign nations partnered with the U.S., as well as the training, advising and support not only in using the equipment provided through military aid, but also in professionalizing the assisted force (Batson 2011,7). The case of El Salvador where the national military, i.e. the El Salvador Armed Forces (ESAF), successfully stabilized its internal conflicts with the support of the U.S. military is an identical example of a country successfully dealing with problems similar to Nepal's own. The literature concerning El Salvador also notes the importance of foreign support for a government that does not have adequate capabilities to stabilize an internal situation on its own. El Salvador, the smallest country in South America, faced a civil conflict from 1980 until 1992. The Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN), a Marxist revolutionary movement waged an insurgency against the Government of El Salvador (GoES), mainly for two reasons—economic disparity between the poor and the rich, and political oppression by the oligarchy using its military institution (Herrera 2008, 7). The *Report of the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America,* published on 10 January 1984, goes further stating, "the tortured history of Central America [El Salvador] is such that neither the military nor the political nor the economic nor the social aspects of the crisis can be considered independently of the others (Kissinger 1984, 4).

The complex situation of El Salvador was thus similar to that of Nepal with the presence of interconnected and similar internal threats.

In the initial phase of the conflict, the ESAF had numerous deficiencies in its command and control, intelligence, logistics system, and tactical mobility that hindered its combat effectiveness in achieving a significant success (Paul, Clarke, and Grill 2010, 38). The ESAF gradually gained the competencies to fight against the insurgents of the FMLN with the flow of U.S. military and economic aid, which consisted of arms, military trainers, and reform and civic action programs. The American foreign policy of stemming communist victories on the American continent enabled the GoES to receive abundance of assistance from the U.S. Government. In May 1984, President Ronald Reagan stated:

> We Americans should be proud of what we are trying to do in Central America, and proud of what, together with our friends, we can do in Central America, to support democracy, human rights, and economic growth, while preserving peace so close to home. Let us show the world that we want no hostile, communist colonies here in the Americas: South, Central, or North. (U.S. State and Defense Department 1985, 1)

The Reagan administration increased emergency aid and foreign military sales credits for new equipment and supplies for the ESAF. By 1982, military assistance to El Salvador reached 82 million U.S. dollars and for the next four years, the ESAF received an average of 100 million U.S. dollars annually as U.S. military assistance (Herrera 2008, 22). This overwhelming U.S. support was instrumental for GoES to initiate attempts at reformation, especially of its political system. A free and fair election held in 1984 elected José Napoleón Duarte as a president whose favoring of human rights and stand against corruption increased legitimacy of the GoES in comparison to that of the FMLN. Thus, the increasing legitimacy of the GoES and the growing competence of the ESAF

augmented by U.S. assistance, gradually eroded the popular support of the FMLN and compelled them to come to a negotiated settlement. The civil war of more than a decade formally ended on 16 January 1992 with the signing of Chapultepec Peace Accords by the representatives of the GoES, the FMLN, and political parties, with observers from the Roman Catholic Church and United Nations (UN) in Mexico City, Mexico.

Due to low interest in the subject, little literature has been written about the NA, and so there is insufficient information to draw a clear understanding of the roles of the NA in Nepal's internal security environment. Even the Nepalese Constitution lacks articles and clauses to prescribe the roles for the NA in this environment. Although, Article 44 of the Interim Constitution of Nepal (ICON)-2007 includes clauses regarding the NA, it mentions only the structural base for the army. The five clauses of the article recognize the NA as an institution in Nepal, mention the development of its democratic structure and national and inclusive character, and mandate that training be imparted to army in accordance with the norms and values of democracy and human rights. The book, *The Nepalese Army: A Force with History, Ready for Tomorrow*, published in 2008 by the Directorate of Public Relations (DPR) of the NA, gives some insight into non-military tasks that the NA has been conducting for the development and well-being of Nepal and the Nepalese people. The NA has been, for instance, constructing roads in areas considered insecure for civilian agencies, conserving wild life and the environment, and reacting to natural calamities. Kul Chandra Gautam, a former Assistant Secretary-General of the UN, argues that the roles for the NA in Nepal's internal security environment must be prescribed because the likelihood of mobilizing the NA against foreign aggression is rare. In his essay, "The Rehabilitation and Integration of Maoist

Combatants as part of Nepal's Security Sector Reform," he suggests the following roles

for the NA in Nepal's internal security environment: helping the police to keep internal

law and order, providing VIP security, protecting sensitive installations and suppressing

internal rebellions (Gautam 2009, 99). This list of activities that the NA has been

performing and can undertake could be documented as the roles for the NA in internal

security environment.

Another country whose military has been involved in internal security struggles

has been the Philippines. In *A Success Story of Philippine Counterinsurgency: A Study of*

Bohol, Ernesto C Torres Jr. provides an insight about the roles and responsibilities of the

Philippines Armed Forces (PAF), as a part of the Philippines government in defeating the

communist insurgency in the Bohol province of Philippines. The Bohol model that was

originally initiated in 2001, advocates the strategy of building legitimacy among the

population of Bohol, a province in the central Philippines, through the combined effort of

the government and the PAF. It is important to include the local political leaders in the

overall plan of the government and to make the local leaders realize that it is they who

had to take the lead in counterinsurgency efforts in their area. This was the point that the

PAF conceptualized in the case of Bohol, where the governor took the lead while the

military and the police played a support role in the overall effort to defeat insurgency in

Bohol. The PAF identified the gaps that were potential threats for nurturing the

insurgency, and continued and sustained community development initiatives within the

governmental framework to fill those gaps, which included the construction of basic

social infrastructure.

The mobilization of the Jamaican defense forces for neutralizing the armed gangs in Jamaica also provides a picture of the military operating in internal security environment. In S*ecuring Failed Inner-City Communities: The Military's Role*, Oral O'B. Khan advocates the competency of armed forces over local law enforcement forces for managing violence created by internal threats [armed gangs in Jamaica]. However, the author clarifies that the authority to confirm the necessity of the use of force and the military's compliance with the national laws is vested in the hands of the government. The mobilization of the military for use in internal security environments should come as a political decision. The political leaders have to understand that the contribution of the military to internal security environment is feasible, acceptable and suitable. It is feasible due to the array of support it can avail to supplement the efforts of governmental civil agencies, acceptable due to the protection it can provide to the domestic lives and property, and suitable due to the potentials of success it offers (Khan 1997, 14). The government must prescribe the roles and responsibilities of the military within the tolerable limits of liberal democracy in order to ensure that its efforts in curtailing internal threats still comply with the national laws. The military, on the other hand, should understand that its objective in the internal security environment is to implement the political solutions to internal threats while maintaining its credibility and the trust of the population. The military must remain an organization supplemental to the civilian authority in the internal security environment rather than act as a replacement for civilian agencies. A scan of the available literature provides possible roles and responsibilities for the military in internal security environments, many of which can be recommended as roles for the NA in addressing Nepal's internal threats.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Research Design

This chapter describes the research design, which is adopted for the thesis. It outlines the methodology, techniques and tools, which are applied for answering the primary and secondary research questions. The research design of this study is descriptive and explanatory. The nature of the problem restricts the methodology to the descriptive and analytical methods, because the research focuses on creating a detailed picture of Nepal's internal security threats by describing and analyzing documents, concepts and views that are already available. The research process started with the collection of relevant data, which were analyzed and assessed to compose a coherent picture of the problem, and finally were compared with the views and findings of other researchers in order to draw conclusions about the possible roles of the NA in Nepal's internal security environment. The researcher, in order to relate the national security of Nepal and the security threats to the possible roles of the NA in Nepal's internal security environment, analyzed the impact of internal threats, and events for which the NA was mobilized. Major economic, social and political problems, with specific reference to poverty, societal discrimination and political instability, were examined. The reason for doing so is to answer the question, have the problems that have evolved within Nepalese society due to these three factors created serious threats to the country's internal security and is the NA capable of solving these issues.

<center>Nature and Sources of Data</center>

Studying the dynamics of internal security threats arising from economic, social and political problems and how they affect the security environment requires a qualitative analysis. Both the qualitative and quantitative data used in this study are from secondary sources and are collected from published books, journals, articles, theses and dissertations, and online sources. The qualitative data is used to describe the threat to Nepal's national security and the responses of the GoN through the NA. The capability, training status and political affiliation of the NA are analyzed through qualitative data in order to assess the suitability of its mobilization in the Nepalese internal security environment. Similarly, the quantitative data such as economic growth rate, human development indices and societal structure are used to analyze the degree to which weaknesses in these areas pose a threat to Nepal's national security and how the NA's development efforts, inclusiveness in the Army, etcetera represent possible roles for the Army.

<center>Organization of the Study</center>

The primary question of the research is What are the possible roles of the NA in building internal peace and security of Nepal? To form a basis for the analysis of the study, the terms—national security, national interest, national stability and threats were defined. These terms are used to describe and analyze certain sets of problems in Nepalese society, and to examine possible roles for the NA in mitigating those problems.

To arrive at the conclusion related to the primary question, three secondary questions were framed, which are as follows:

1. What are the internal security threats, which have emerged due to poverty, societal discrimination and political instability in Nepal?

2. What is the role of the NA in addressing these internal security threats?

3. Are the breaches to peace and internal threats to national security of Nepal solvable by the NA?

To answer these questions the research will be organized as illustrated below.

Internal Security Threats

This section describes the relationship between the internal problems and national security. It explores and analyzes the existing poverty, societal discrimination and political instability in Nepal. Qualitative data is analyzed to identify these problems as potential threats to the national security. Similarly, quantitative data is used to examine the degree of threat posed by the problems. It describes the impacts of these threats to Nepal's internal security environment.

Mobilization of the NA in the Internal Security Environment

This section describes past mobilizations of the NA in response to security threats within Nepal. It also examines the tasks and mandates assigned to the NA during those mobilizations in the context of Nepal's national security interests and objectives. In order to recommend possible and acceptable roles that the NA can play in building internal peace and security, the primary tasks prescribed by the U.S. Army's doctrine of stability operations are also referred to. This section, thus, frames the roles that the NA has performed and can possibly undertake in the future in responding to the security threats in Nepal's internal security environment.

Implications for Military Involvement in Response
to Internal Threats

This section evaluates the feasibility, acceptability and suitability of the NA's

involvement in response to the internal security threats, and gauges the likely level of

success by comparing its competencies with the threat environment. The feasibility of the

NA addressing problems in the internal security environment is judged according to its

capability to supplement the efforts of governmental civil agencies. The acceptability of

such a role is evaluated based on the level of protection it is perceived to provide to the

domestic lives and property. Finally, the suitability of such a role is assessed based on the

chances of success it can offer to mitigate internal threats.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

This chapter presents the findings of the research on Nepal's internal security environment and the challenges this environment contains. It shows the ambiguity for the NA to undertake definite roles and responsibilities when it is mobilized in the internal security environment due to the lack of clear guidance from the GoN. It identifies the factors within Nepalese society that pose serious threats to the national security of Nepal. It then conducts an analysis of the accumulated information and data with the aim of answering the research questions of the thesis.

The chapter is organized into three sections in order to assist in the analysis of the primary and secondary questions. These sections are internal security threats, mobilization of the NA in the internal security environment, and implications for military involvement in response to internal threats.

Internal Security Threats

National security is no longer bounded by the secure sovereignty and territorial integrity of a nation, but also depends upon the security of a socio-political and economic aspect of the country in question. It might be said it is difficult or even impossible to build up security without addressing the economic, social and political problems prevailing within a society. The international conference on the relationship between disarmament and development, which was held from 24 August to 11 September 1987 at the UN General Assembly in New York, adopted a definition of security, which includes non-military aspects. Its final document, adopted by consensus of the representatives

from the 150 participating countries, states that security, which has become an overriding priority for all nations, incorporates political, economic, social, humanitarian and human rights, and ecological aspects (Gandhi 2010, 40-41).

An underdeveloped country like Nepal has more internal security threats in comparison to external threats. Out of several internal security threats, poverty, broad societal discrimination, and an unstructured, fluctuating and unsystematic political system have turned Nepal into an insecure, fragile and weak state. Moreover, the incapacity of the ruling political actors to cope with the multiple challenges of Nepalese society has posed a barrier to good governance and has resulted in numerous cycles of violence within the country in the past few decades.

Poverty

Nepal is one of the poorest and underdeveloped countries in the world. Nepalese per capita income is 562 U.S. dollars a year and the number of people living under the international poverty line, which is 1.25 U.S. dollar per day, is around 30.8 percent of the total population (Baral 2011, 4). Moreover, the gap between poor and rich people in Nepal is widening, which is to say that poor people are getting poorer and rich people are getting richer. Narayan Manandhar, an expert in Nepalese governance, argues that despite a report published by the Nepal Living Standard Measurement Survey, which shows a decline in the proportion of people living below the poverty line from 42 percent in 1995/96 to around 31 percent in 2003/04, the economic inequality among Nepalese people is actually increasing. The Gini-coefficient that measures economic inequality from a scale of 0 percent that is perfectly equal to 100 percent that is perfectly unequal,

indicated the inequality between rich and poor in Nepal to be 32.2 percent in 1995/96,

41.4 percent in 2003/04 and 32.84 percent 2010/11 (Manandhar 2012).

The fragile economic condition of the Nepalese society can be attributed to an

agriculture-based economy without substantial contribution from the industrial sector. Li

Onesto sketches the dearth of economic opportunity of Nepal as:

> Today, with a history of extreme dependence on India, Nepal has almost no
> industry. Like many poor African countries, Nepal remains under the dominance
> of the world market but has not been the object of the large-scale sweatshop-style
> investment that has marked globalization in many other Third World countries.
> (Onesto 2005, 3)

The World Bank report, 2010, shows Nepal's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) to be 15.7

billion U.S. dollars, with 3.5 percent economic growth. The growth rate of Nepalese GDP

has remained low and highly inconsistent because the country lacks a base for sustained

growth of output at a satisfactory rate. See figure 3 for the Nepalese GDP growth rate in

percent from 1999 to 2011. Nepalese GDP experienced an average growth rate of less

than 2 percent during the decade-long Maoist insurgency. In 2002, the GDP shrank by

0.6 percent due to the escalation of the insurgency, after a Maoist attack on an Army

barracks on 23 November 2001. The post-conflict growth rate, after 2006, shows a

positive and gradual improvement, with an average growth rate of almost 4.5 percent.

However, in most cases, only the urban areas have benefitted from the economic

opportunities of the positive growth rate in the Nepalese GDP. The uneven distribution of

the economic opportunities between the urban and the rural areas has resulted in the rural

areas' failure to keep pace with the economic transformation. This further aggravates the

poverty level of the country as most of the Nepalese population lives in rural areas,

surviving through subsistence farming, and only 17 percent of the total population resides

in urban areas (Baral 2011, 4).

Figure 3. GDP Growth Rate of Nepal

Source: Central Intelligence Agency World Factbook, "GDP Real Growth-Nepal," 1
January 2011, http://www.indexmundi.com/g/g.aspx?c=np&v=66 (accessed 24
November 2012).

There has been a long history of poverty in Nepalese society. Thapa and Sijapati

blame the Panchayat regime for the extreme level of poverty in Nepal. They have

especially focused on the Panchayat regime because during that era, in the 1960s and

1970s, most of the developing countries, including India and China, were benefitting

from the advent of globalization by implementing favorable economic policies that led them to their current status as booming economies. Nepal, on the other hand, instead of capitalizing on economic opportunities, remained sunken in domestic political games that further aggravated poverty among the poor. Thapa and Sijapati write as follows:

> In the late 1960s and early 1970s the problems of absolute poverty had become unbearable for many Nepalese as sustaining the *Panchayat* regime took precedence over all other values and objectives, corruption became institutionalized, and the duality in Nepalese society became sharper since only a small coalition of privileged classes and groups derived benefits from the system. (Thapa and Sijapati 2004, 55)

Due to the weak economic conditions, Nepalese society is unable to control the problem of increasing unemployment, which is becoming a challenge in Nepal. The primitive agriculture system, the minimal presence of industries, and a lack of employment generating organizations, all contribute to Nepal having a high unemployment rate. As of 1 January 2011, World Fact Book shows the unemployment rate of Nepal to be 48 percent. The minimal opportunity for employment within the country has forced many Nepalese people, especially young men and women, to go abroad in order to make a living. Onesto explains, "there are 26 million people in Nepal; and it is estimated as many as seven million work in India and around 100,000 work in the Gulf countries, including Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and United Arab Emirates" (Onesto 2005, 49).

The Human Development Indices, 2011, show Nepal at the 157th position. See table 1 for the Human Development Index of the South Asian countries in comparison to the developed countries. With a score of just 0.301, Nepal is categorized as among those countries with "low human development". Among the South Asian countries, Nepal lies at the seventh position, with only Afghanistan behind it.

Table 1. Human Development Index-2011			
Rank	Country	HDI	Remarks
1	Norway	0.89	Very high human development
2	Australia	0.856	" "
3	Netherlands	0.846	" "
4	United States	0.771	" "
97	Sri Lanka	0.579	Medium human development
101	China	0.534	" "
109	Maldives	0.495	" "
134	India	0.392	" "
141	Bhutan	0.37	" "
145	Pakistan	0.366	Low Human Development
146	Bangladesh	0.363	" "
157	Nepal	0.301	" "
172	Afghanistan	0.29	" "
187	DRC	0.172	" "

Source: UN Development Programme, "Human Development Index-2011 Rankings," 2 November 2011, http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/ (accessed 2 December 2012).

Nepal's poverty, hunger, huge rate of unemployment and economic inequality are characteristics of its state of economic underdevelopment. There are many examples of underdeveloped countries relying on developed nations for economic and technical support. Due to the assistance received, these underdeveloped countries are then obliged to accept interference of the supporting nations in their internal matters. This raises the possibility of conflict among several groups of the population, who are either in favor of

or against that interference. This situation applies to Nepalese society and if such conflict occurs, it will escalate the internal threat to the national security of Nepal.

Societal Discrimination

Nepal, despite of its small size, is ethnically and culturally very diverse. King Prithvi Narayan Shah, the founder of Nepal, is quoted in the *Divya Upadesh* saying, "*Nepal char varna chattis jaat ko sajha phulbari ho,*" which means, Nepal is a common garden for people of four castes and 36 sub castes. These four castes were *Brahmins* (priests, scholars and educators), *Chhetris* (soldiers, governors and kings), *Vaishya* (merchants, farmers and cattle-herders) and *Sudra* (laborers, artisans and service providers). The Ranas went further in the hierarchical division of the caste system through the promulgation of the Civil Code in 1854 to impose untouchability-status to some of the ethnic groups. The four caste hierarchies were: (1) *Tagaddhari* (group of the wearers of the Holy Cord), (2) *Matawali* (group of the alcohol-drinkers, both non-enslavable and enslavable), (3) *Pani nachalne choi chhito halnu naparne* (water unacceptable but no purification required, if touched or touchable low castes), and (4) *Pani nachlne choi chito halnu parne* (water unacceptable and purification required, if touched, or untouchable low sub castes) (Pandey et al. 2006, 17). Thapa and Sijapati illustrate how this kind of ill practice affected Nepalese society: "the codification of the social do's and don'ts in the Civil Code of 1854 led to the inferior placement of ethnic groups in the social hierarchy by law, and raised the status of the Hindu upper caste" (Thapa and Sijapati 2004, 75).

The new Civil Code of 1963 made necessary amendments for social relation that supported non-discrimination and eliminated untouchability. The constitution of the

Kingdom of Nepal-1990 guaranteed the right to equality and considered practices of

untouchability illegal (Pandey et al. 2006, 18). However, despite the law declaring

societal discrimination as illegal act, it still occurs widely in Nepalese society.

There are around 30 major ethnic groups and 100 different languages with their

own territorial base and unique cultures in Nepal (Onesto 2005, 184). See table 2 for the

population of major caste and ethnic groups in Nepal.

Table 2. Population by Caste/Ethnicity (As of 2011)	
Caste/Ethnic Group	Percent
Chhetri	16.6
Bahun	12.2
Magar	7.1
Tharu	6.6
Tamang	5.8
Newar	5.0
Kami	4.8
Musalman	4.4
Yadav	4.0
Rai	2.3

Source: National Planning Commission Secretariat, *National Population and Housing Census 2011* (Kathmandu, Nepal: GoN, National Planning Commission Secretariat, 2012), 4.

Chhetris and Bahuns, the majority in the population, have been dominant in

Nepalese society since the time of the unification of Nepal. The Shah and Rana rulers

were Chhetris, and Bahuns were their mentors. Even today, these two castes are dominant

in Nepalese politics and the bureaucracy. Thapa and Sijapati illustrate the dominance of these two castes in Nepalese society with the following data:

> In the two elected *Panchayat* legislatures (of the 1980s), the share of *Bahuns* and *Chhetris* was 50 percent. This proportion increased to 55, 63, and 63 percent respectively in the 1991, 1994, and 1999 parliaments. Most strikingly, only one *Dalit* was elected as a Member of Parliament in these three elections. The imbalance has been even more striking in the bureaucracy. Between 1983 and 1985, 69 percent of those who passed the civil service examination were Bahuns and Chhetris. This figure rose to 81 percent in 1992/93; and by 2001 it stood at 98 percent. (Thapa and Sijapati 2004, 77)

While the Chhetris and Bahuns have a dominant position in the Nepalese society, *Newars* have been influential in Nepalese civil services as they were the inhabitants of Kathmandu valley even before King Prithvi Narayan Shah conquered it to establish it as a capital of unified Nepal. Ethnic groups like *Gurung*, *Magar*, *Tamang* and *Rai* are considered as having a robust physique and are behaviorally loyal, and make up a substantial number of the recruits to Gurkha regiments in India and Great Britain. Therefore, they have a negligible presence in the state apparatus. *Tharu*, *Muslim* and *Yadav* have always been considered as *Madhesis* (people of southern Tarai of Nepal) and have been discouraged to take part in the state apparatus in comparison to *Pahade* (people of hilly areas). Therefore, they struggle to gain a presence in the civil services and to form a part of national decision-making body. The *Dalit* or *Kami* face the most discrimination, as they constitute what is considered the untouchable caste. Their members are still not allowed to enter the houses of the higher castes and are even prevented from entering some religious places. Baral states, "People in the villages would not even give milk to the *Dalits* because of the belief that [thereafter] blood would come instead of milk leading to the death of the buffalo and cow" (Baral 2012, 13).

Nepali is not the first language of the majority of the Nepalese population. The Nepali language was the native tongue of the Shah rulers, which was known as *Khas Kura* and later transformed into the national language of Nepal (Baral 2012, 32). There are around 100 other languages that are spoken in Nepal and the fact remains that the majority of the population of Tarai and the high hills finds it difficult to understand Nepali even today. See table 3 for the 10 major languages that are spoken in relation to the percentage of the total population of Nepal.

Table 3. Languages in Relation to the Total Population (As of 2011)	
Language	Percent
Nepali	44.6
Maithali	11.7
Bhojpuri	6.0
Tharu	5.8
Tamang	5.1
Newari	3.2
Bajjika	3.0
Magar	3.0
Doteli	3.0
Urdu	2.6

Source: National Planning Commission Secretariat, *National Population and Housing Census 2011* (Kathmandu, Nepal: GoN, National Planning Commission Secretariat, 2012), 4.

The issue here is neither an objection to Nepali as a national language nor discrimination against languages other than Nepali by the government. The problem is the practice in Nepalese society of considering other-language speaking castes as inferior to the Nepali speaking castes. Language is not only the medium of communication for an ethnic group; it is a carrier of religion and culture of that particular ethnic group. The value that the Nepali language carries for the Nepali speakers in the population is the same as the other languages carry for other castes and ethnic groups. Because of the emphasis on the Nepali language, the languages, religions and cultures of various ethnic groups are treated as being less significant.

The GoN itself is reluctant to promote diverse cultures and languages as it continues to declare Nepal a Hindu country. The cow, *simrik* (vermilion), *danphe* (lophophorus), and *laliguras* (rhododendron) which are typical symbols of the Hindu religion are still considered as the national symbols of Nepal. The rulers of Nepal focused on practicing the Hindu religion. This left other religions and the ethnic groups associated with them discriminated against socially by the state.

Political Instability

Politics is always on the center of a country, because it has to guide all other aspects including economic and social aspects of the country. However, political instability has been a common feature of Nepal and is becoming a major problem that is causing a serious threat to its national security. The excessive turmoil in Nepalese politics was experienced particularly after 1990 with the restoration of democratic practices in the country. Misinterpretation of democracy led to a situation where politics was used as a means for grabbing undue power and fulfilling individual interests, both by the

politicians and people in Nepal. Even the Nepalese bureaucracy, which is regarded as the

permanent governing body and the backbone of the country, was highly influenced by the

various political parties to the extent that bureaucrats were more interested to fulfilling

party interests than the national interest. Rajan Bhattarai, a chairperson of the Nepal

Institute for Policy Studies and a Ph.D. candidate at the School of International Studies at

the Jawaharlal Nehru University in New Delhi, argues that it is because of the political

instability that Nepal faced a decade-long insurgency. He writes:

> The democratic transition in 1990 generated enormous political consciousness
> and social awareness among the Nepalese people. Freedom of speech, the right to
> organize and the flourishing of the media have all played a significant role in
> empowering the general public. Problems like political instability, the failure to
> maintain law and order, social discrimination, disparities in development, the lack
> of inclusiveness, the failure of institutional delivery and the inefficient governing
> system have generated enormous interest. The failure of successive governments
> to address these problems in past decades played an instrumental role in allowing
> hard left forces like the Maoists and terrorist and criminal groups to consolidate
> and expand their strength and activities. This caused armed conflict over the last
> ten years, which led the country to a state of chaos, instability and violence.
> (Bhattarai 2009, 26-27)

One of the misfortunes of post-1990 Nepal has been the unstable politics at the

center, which saw eighteen changes of government from 1990 up to the time of this thesis

(spring of 2013). See table 4 for the lists of different governments and their duration

during this period. Clause 3 of Article 45 of the Constitution of Nepal-1990 states that the

term of the House of Representatives, which are elected through a general election, shall

be five years. Therefore, there should have been five general elections conducted within

the period of 1990 until the current date and five successive governments should have

governed Nepal. Altogether, during this period, general elections were held in 1991, 1994

and 1999, and a CA election was held in 2008. It is an irony that the Nepalese political

parties are misusing their authority to form a government on a rotational basis without

going to a national election. Chandra D. Bhatta, an expert on Nepalese civil society and a

Research Fellow on Social Development (Civic Service in Nepal) at the George Warren

Brown School of Social Work, Washington University in St. Louis, U.S., comments,

"[Nepalese] political parties are in the habit of destabilizing state security actors for their

own vested interests" (Bhatta 2009, 180).

S. No	Name of Prime minister	Term Start	Term End	Political Party
Table 4.	Lists of Governments (1990 until Spring of 2013)			
1	Krishna Prasad Bhattarai	19 Apr 90	26 May 91	Nepali Congress
2	Girija Prasad Koirala	26 May 91	30 Nov 94	Nepali Congress
3	Man Mohan Adhikari	30 Nov 94	12 Sep 95	CPN-UML
4	Sher Bahadur Deuba	12 Sep 95	12 Mar 97	Nepali Congress
5	Lokendra Bahadur Chand	12 Mar 97	7 Oct 97	Rastriya Prajatantra
6	Surya Bahadur Thapa	7 Oct 97	15 Apr 98	Rastriya Prajatantra
7	Girija Prasad Koirala	15 Apr 98	31 May 99	Nepali Congress
8	Krishna Prasad Bhattarai	31 May 99	22 Mar 00	Nepali Congress
9	Girija Prasad Koirala	22 Mar 00	26 Jul 01	Nepali Congress
10	Sher Bahadur Deuba	26 Jul 01	4 Oct 02	Nepali Congress
11	Lokendra Bahadur Chand	11 Oct 02	5 Jun 03	Rastriya Prajatantra
12	Surya Bahadur Thapa	5 Jun 03	3 Jun 04	Rastriya Prajatantra
13	Sher Bahadur Deuba	3 Jun 04	1 Feb 05	Nepali Congress
14	Girija Prasad Koirala	25 Apr 06	18 Aug 08	Nepali Congress
15	Pushpa Kamal Dahal	18 Aug 08	25 May 09	CPN-M
16	Madhav Kumar Nepal	25 May 09	3 Feb 11	CPN-UML
17	Jhala Nath Khanal	3 Feb 11	29 Aug 11	CPN-UML
18	Dr. Babu Ram Bhattarai	29 Aug 11	current	CPN-M

Source: We All Nepali, "First to Current Prime Ministers of Nepal," http://www.weall
nepali.com/about-nepal/prime-ministers-of-nepal (accessed 12 January 2013).

Split and merger has been a common characteristic of most of the Nepalese major political parties. The Maoist party, which became the largest party of Nepal after the CA election in 2008, split up into the United CPN-M and CPN-M. The United CPN-M is the incumbent ruling party and CPN-M is the hardliner faction of the Maoists, who have been threatening to initiate another People's War because the United CPN-M has supposedly deviated from socialist ideology. Similarly, the Nepali Congress, the oldest party of Nepal and the leading party in the mass movement of 1990, split up in 2002 when Sher Bahadur Deuba[9] formed a splinter group named the Nepali Congress-Democratic. The two parties reunified in 2007, just prior to the CA election. The tradition of split and merger is also common within the Communist Party Nepal-United Marxist Leninist (CPN-UML). In 1998, a faction led by Bamadev Gautam[10] split up from the root party and named his party the Communist Party Nepal-Marxist Leninist. Both the main and the splinter group of these communist parties got defeated in the parliamentary election of 1999, which compelled them to reunite in 2002.

The fragile political environment of Nepal has led to a contentious issue in a sensitive matter of state restructuring. The State Restructuring Commission of Nepal, which was formed on 23 November 2011, submitted two reports to the GoN, with one suggesting the establishment of 11 provinces while the other proposed having six provinces. See figure 4 for the two different models of the proposed provincial structure.

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[9]Sher Bahadur Deuba is a senior leader and current second man of the Nepali Congress party. He has served three times as the Nepalese Prime Minister, from 1995 to 1997, 2001 to 2002, and 2 June 2004 until 1 February 2005.

[10]Bamdev Gautam is a senior leader and current vice-chairman of the CPN-UML. He became the deputy prime minister two times, in February 1997 and August 2008.

Figure 4.   Two Different Models of the Proposed Provincial Structure

Source: Bhadra Sharma and Pranab Kharel, "State Restructuring: SRC Fails to Offer a Way Out," *The Kathmandu Post*, 31 January 2012, http://www.ekantipur.com/the-kathmandu-post/2012/01/31/top-story/state-restructuring-src-fails-to-offer-a-way-out/231036.html (accessed 12 January 2013).

The members of the panel failed to reach a consensus among themselves because they represented different political parties. The majority faction suggested 11 provinces whereas the minority faction of the commission suggested six. Fundamentally, the two maps have a huge difference in both structure and guiding ideology. The map suggested by the majority is based on the identity of the inhabitants in those areas of Nepal whereas the other map is based on economic viability. The main report recommended that the GoN adopt the 11-province structure because it provides priority rights to dominant

ethnic groups at the local level. The majority group advocated that solving problems should rest with either the center or a province depending on where the problem originated. The minority group wanted the power to be vested with the center and problems solved centrally. Even though, the majority group proposed the map of the 11-province model, it puts forward the divisive demand made by many Madhesi leaders *ek Madhes ek pradesh*, which means whole Madhes, a single state. Even with the best of intentions for necessary insertion, this model seems to be a disaster, considering internal geo-political dynamics. Similarly, the six-province model provides an ingenious approach to the Madhesi demand by geographically separating the two Madhesi provinces. Furthermore, this map also gives the other remaining four states some access to the Indian border. At a glance, this map seems to be more democratic as it has taken into consideration long-term geographical realities of Nepal in its drafting. However, people have raised voices that Nepal should not be divided into various states considering its geographical size and underdeveloped status. Therefore, adoption of any of these models could bring unforeseen internal threats in the form of civil disturbances, riots, demonstrations and strikes.

Another issue contributing to, or at least indicating a degree of, political instability is that Nepal's CA, which was formed after the constitutional election held on 10 April 2008, was dissolved on 28 May 2012, having failed to reach a result. The assembly had been extended two years past its original mandate, but still had been unable to come to a successful conclusion. The CA neither promulgated a new constitution nor oversaw a constitutional election that was proposed on 22 November 2012. The mistrust among the political parties, fuelled by an assumption that the party dominating the

government was going to gain an undue political advantage during the election, led to a formation of an Interim-election government on 14 March 2013. Chief Justice Khila Raj Regmi chairs the government and assures that the election will be held on 21 June 2013, but analysts are still skeptical the election will go on the scheduled timeframe because of the protest by some of the minor political parties.

Mobilization of the NA in the Internal Security Environment

Different governments, through the Shah and Rana rulers until the democratic government, have mobilized the NA many times in order to maintain the national security objectives of Nepal pertaining to internal security threats. The national security objectives of Nepal are driven by the core values that the Nepalese possess. The survival of the nation as a sovereign and democratic entity, national unity, prosperity, equality, freedom, social and religious tolerance, and an honorable place in the international community are the values of the Nepalese people (Khand 2009, 172).

National Security Objectives

Nepal's national security objectives establish the nation's strategic requirement to be maintained by the state. Article 34 of ICON-2007 mentions the following as the national objectives of Nepal:

> 1. To promote conditions of welfare based on the principles of an open society, by establishing a just system in all aspects of national life, including economic, social and political life, while at the same time protecting the lives, property, equality and liberty of the people.
>
> 2. To maintain conditions suitable to the enjoyment of the benefits of democracy through maximum participation of the people in the governance of the country by the means of self-governance and to promote general welfare by making provisions for the protection and promotion of human rights, by maintaining tranquility and order in the society.

3. To build a prosperous and advanced Nepal by institutionalizing the democracy achieved as a result of the struggle of the Nepali people and by creating an environment where its benefits can be enjoyed.

4. To transform the national economy into an independent and self-reliant system by preventing the available resources and means of the country from being concentrated within a limited section of society, by making arrangements for equitable distribution of economic gains based in social justice, by making such provisions as will prevent economic exploitation as well as economic disparity of any caste, sex, tribe, origin or individuals, and by giving preferential treatment and encouragement to national enterprises, both private and public.

5. To establish and develop, on the foundation of justice and morality, a healthy social life, by eliminating all types of economic and social inequalities and by establishing harmony amongst the diverse castes, tribes, religions, languages, races, groups and communities. (GoN 2007, 14-15)

The NA, as the largest and most resourced organization of Nepal, has been performing

various activities, such as safeguarding the ecology and environment, and constructing

roads and other infrastructures, etcetera that have contributed to the GoN achieve many

of these objectives. Even in the absence of prescribed roles and responsibilities, the NA

has been performing various internal duties, which are discussed in the following

paragraphs.

Aid to Civil Authority

This is an important role that the NA has been performing in times of need, as is

the norm of a national army in other parts of the world as well. When civil disorder grows

and the situation becomes unmanageable by the civil authority, the Army is called upon

to aid civil authority in restoring normalcy in accordance with the national law.

Throughout history, whenever the NA has been called upon to assist the civil authority, it

has fulfilled the assigned task commendably, adopting the international principles of

employment of minimum necessary force. There has been no local-level or national-level

election, with the exception of the CA election, in which the NA was not deployed as an additional aid to the civil authority to create an environment for a free and fair election (Rana 2009, 82).

Disaster Management and Rescue Operations

During the monsoons, Nepal faces numerous landslides blocking highways or sweeping away villages. Similarly, various parts of the country suffer from forest fires during the summer or epidemics of cholera or dysentery, all of which demand emergency attention. The NA has been assisting the GoN in these above-mentioned cases by carrying out rescue and relief operations and providing medical aid for those who need it. The NA also operates its aviation wing to transport the relief aid and material to inaccessible parts of the country and carries out casualty evacuation operations to save the lives of affected people.

Infrastructure Development

The NA's involvement in infrastructure development is also worth mentioning, especially in the construction of pilot roads and tracks in difficult and inaccessible areas. It began doing so by constructing the 105 kilometers long Kanti Rajpath pilot track in 1959 (Rana 2009, 82). Since then, the NA has completed works on 19 pilot roads and tracks spanning a length of more than 1500 kilometers. See table 5 for the list of roads constructed by the NA.

S.N	Roads	Length (kilometers)
	Table 5. Roads Constructed by the NA	
1	Kanti Rajpath	105
2	Kharipati–Nagarkot	20
3	Trishuli–Somdang	105
4	Katari–Okhaldhunga	88
5	Hile–Leghuwaghat	28
6	Salyan–Musikot	86
7	Surkhet–Jumla	232
8	Baglung–Beni–Jomsong	91
9	Drabya Shah Marga	45
10	Satdobato–Niwel–Balua	37
11	Gorkha–Mankamana	39
12	Gorkha–Aarughat–Orkhet	45
13	Besi Sahar–Chaame	65
14	Chhinchu–Jajarkot	107
15	Jajarkot–Dolpa	112
16	Devsthal–Chourjahari	31
17	Musikot–Burtibang	145
18	Nagma–Gamgadhi	91
19	Nijgadh–Kathmandu	81.8

Source: Directorate of Public Relations, The NA, *The Nepalese Army: A Force with History, Ready for Tomorrow* (Kathmandu: DPR, the NA, 2008), 57.

The NA's Mobilization During the Maoist Insurgency

The Maoist insurgency that the Nepalese society experienced for a decade from

1996 to 2006 was a remarkable threat to the national security of Nepal. After the Maoist

attack on an army barracks in Dang, Mid-Western Nepal, on 23 November 2001, then

King Gyanendra declared a state of emergency as per clause 1 of Article 115[11] of the

1990-Constitution and the NA assumed responsibility for internal security. Human rights

activists argue that even though the king's intention was to quell the insurgency, the step

that he took was against the laws of human rights. Michael Hutt, a Reader in Nepali and

Himalayan Studies at the School of Oriental and African Studies in the University of

London, writes:

> The king invoked clause 1 of Article 115 of the 1990-Constitution to suspend sub-clauses (a), (b) and (d) of clause 2 of Article 12, which guarantee freedom of thought and expression, peaceful assembly, and movement, respectively; sub-clause 1 of Article 13, which outlaws censorship of reading material, and Articles 15, 16, 17, 22 and 23, which provide rights against preventive detention, to information, to property, to privacy, and to constitutional remedy, respectively. (Hutt 2004, 11)

Unfortunately, the roles of the NA in this regard became controversial, as it had to

monitor and execute the aforementioned clauses, which were integral tasks during the

state of emergency. Retired Brigadier Ranadhoj Limbu states that the Nepalese civil war

was the most frustrating and thankless job that the NA had ever undertaken:

> After the king, influenced by his self-serving advisors, took over the political power, the NA ironically seemed to be fighting not only the insurgents but also all the major political parties, the media, academia, national and international human rights organizations and the international community. (Limbu 2010)

On the other hand, there was a question of the battle-worthiness of the NA prior to

its mobilization against the insurgents. Thapa and Sijapati doubt the operational readiness

of NA stating that, "the NA's role had been limited to providing the pageantry in honor

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[11]Clause 1 of Article 115 stated that if a grave crisis arises in regard to the sovereignty or integrity of the Kingdom of Nepal or the security of any part thereof, whether by war, external aggression, armed rebellion or extreme economic disarray, His Majesty may, by proclamation, declare or order a State of Emergency in respect of the whole of the Kingdom of Nepal or of any specified part thereof.

of the royalty in Kathmandu and the last time it saw any real action was in the 1974

skirmishes against the Tibetan Khampa[12] guerillas" (Thapa and Sijapati 2004, 136).

Nonetheless, the NA was instrumental in safeguarding the possible capturing of

state power by the Maoists. In the absence of the NA, nothing could have prevented the

Maoists from capturing the state apparatus with their brute force. Hence, "the NA

accomplished its fundamental mission of compelling the Maoist insurgents to renounce

their strategic military aim, thereby paving the way for a relatively more peaceful and

manageable change in Nepal" (Limbu 2010).

During the insurgency, the NA involved itself in cordon and search, and search

and destroy operations, along with the shows of force through patrolling in the Maoist-

affected areas, especially in the west and mid-west regions of Nepal. NA operations

against the Maoists were successful, not only in curbing the growth of the Maoists, but

also in creating favorable environment for the Nepalese Police (NP) to operate in the

Maoist-dominated areas. As Saubhagya Shah, an Assistant Professor of Anthropology,

and Program Coordinator for Conflict, Peace and Development Studies at Tribhuvan

University, Nepal, writes, "during its first year of deployment, the Army not only

checked the further growth of the Maoist military but also reoccupied some of the

positions earlier vacated by the police" (Shah 2004, 214). Similarly, the NA also assisted

in forming rural militia groups, which were termed Rural Volunteer Security Groups and

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[12]The Tibetan Khampa guerillas used Nepalese soil and operated from a secret base in Mustang, northwest Nepal, to engage in guerilla warfare against the Chinese forces. The NA mobilized nine infantry units against them due to immense diplomatic pressure from China and the international community. The Khampas were given an ultimatum to either disarm themselves and surrender, or face attack. The Khampa commander, General Wangdi, agreed to surrender but eventually fled the camp. He was later killed by the NA forces in far western Nepal, while trying to loot a NP post.

Village Defense Forces, to compensate for the lack of its effective presence in all the rural areas of Nepal, which ensured that these groups could retain control of the countryside (Stuart 2005, 594).

<p style="text-align:center">The NA in Integrated Security and Development Program</p>

The NA was mobilized for an Integrated Security and Development Program (ISDP) before it was actively engaged against the Maoists. The ISDP was a strategy formulated by the GoN in August 2001 to initiate security and development simultaneously in the Gorkha district of western Nepal. It was initiated as an experimental development project in that district with a plan to expand it later to other Maoist-affected areas. According to this strategy, the NA would provide a secure environment to establish a government presence in rural areas, and the governmental agencies would conduct development activities to improve the livelihood of people in those areas. Stuart asserts that the Nepalese ISDP was widely borrowed from Britain's Malaya Campaign, "it [ISDP] is a conventional security program designed to help demobilize and reintegrate Maoist militia members, which was employed within a 'hearts and minds' process by the British during the Malayan Emergency, 1948–60" (Stuart 2005, 594).

The ISDP framework, depending on the capability of the government and the military, incorporated a vast range of development programs such as work on road and bridge networks, small scale irrigation, electrification, forestry, health, education, agricultural development, food self-sufficiency, micro-credit, and income generation. However, due to the limited resources that the GoN and the NA had, the initial stage of the ISDP was largely focused on road construction.

The ISDP could not be implemented in the way it was planned due to the limited budget of the GoN, the lack of unity of effort between the GoN and the opposition political parties, and the obstruction to the NA development efforts by the Maoists. The collapse of the tourist industry due to the intensification of Maoist activities and the reluctance of international donors to provide economic aid to the GoN in order to protest the human rights abuses that were happening in Nepal from both the government and the Maoist side, compelled the GoN to shrink its budget for the ISDP (Stuart 2005, 594). Similarly, the then opposition party, CPN-UML, did not support the government's effort to quell the Maoist insurgency, because the party believed that the program was largely an army-initiated framework, which was adopted by the government without prior consultation to them (Subba 2010, 84). The main obstruction for the ISDP came from the Maoist side that began targeting infrastructure built by the NA and started abducting and killing government officials affiliated with the ISDP (Stuart 2005, 594). However, although short in time, the ISDP showed the NA's endeavor to conduct development works in order to increase a trust between the Army and the local population.

Stability Tasks for the NA

U.S. Army FM 3-07 prescribes the primary stability tasks as establish civil security, establish civil control, restore essential services, support to governance, and support to economic and infrastructure development. These tasks, since they are framed for the U.S. military for stabilizing a fragile state,[13] may not be identical to the roles to be

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[13]A fragile state is a country that suffers from institutional weaknesses serious enough to threaten the stability of the central government (Headquarters, Department of the Army 2008, 1-10).

performed by the NA within Nepal. Nepal possesses an established rule of law, which while not completely effective, is sufficient to legitimize the functioning of the judicial system according to international norms. Hence, the NA will not be performing the task of establishing civil control. However, the other four tasks are not being accomplished very well in Nepal. It is in these areas that the NA can make a significant contribution to the nation. Given the present insecurity in Nepalese society created due to poverty, societal discrimination and political disturbances, the NA can help establish civil security, restore essential services, support governance, and support economic and infrastructure development.

The task of establishing civil security encompasses protection of key civilian personnel and the security of critical infrastructure including religious and cultural sites. One major reason for the limited success of the ISDP was the GoN's inability to protect the civilians who were part of the program, and the infrastructure that was built during the program. The GoN can improve its development effort by tasking the NA to provide security for the men and material involved in that effort.

The task of restoring essential services involves a broader focus on humanitarian issues and social well-being. The NA has long been dedicated to this task, as indicated by its continuous efforts in humanitarian demining, which culminated when Nepal became free of landmines on 22 June 2011 (UNICEF 2011). Similarly, the NA has often provided for the immediate humanitarian needs of the Nepali population through disaster relief and rescue missions.

A support to governance task encompasses the army's role in supporting elections. The NA has supported the GoN to enable the holding of free and fair elections.

The NA is still capable of providing security to ensure transparency and the broad participation of the local populace in elections.

The final task prescribed by FM 3-07 is support to economic and infrastructure development. The possible roles for the NA under this task are protecting natural resources and the environment, and restoring transportation and telecommunications infrastructure. The NA has been conducting the aforementioned roles, which are keys for successful stability operations, for a long time. However, due to the negligible focus of the GoN on these tasks, the effort of the army has been less effective than it could have been. Therefore, the GoN should prioritize these tasks as indispensable for stability operations and frame them as prescribed roles for the NA.

<u>Implications for Military Involvement in Response</u>
<u>to Internal Threats</u>

Though overall efforts to support economic and infrastructure development have been less effective, comparatively the NA is at the forefront of the environmental protection and wildlife conservation that takes place in Nepal. However, in order to draw conclusions about the feasibility, acceptability and suitability of the NA's mobilization in Nepal's internal security environment, its capability to counter the internal threats and probability of achieving success have to be assessed. The organizational structure, training, economic ability, experience in UN peacekeeping mission and apolitical nature of the NA are analyzed to assist the aforementioned assessment.

Capability

The NA is the largest organization within the security forces of Nepal, with its formations, units and sub-units deployed throughout the country. There are five

regionally aligned combat divisions, one in each development regions and one in

Kathmandu. See figure 5 for the deployment of the various combat divisions of the NA.

Figure 5.   Deployment of the NA

Source: Directorate of Public Relations, The NA, *The Nepalese Army: A Force with History, Ready for Tomorrow* (Kathmandu: DPR, the NA, 2008).

Each combat division has combat brigades, combat support units and combat

service support units that makes it an indigenous reaction force capable of supporting the

population within its area of responsibility during natural calamities, environmental

degradation, and development efforts, as well as, to a certain extent, supporting law and

order efforts. The deployment of combat brigades and battalions in specific zones and

districts respectively within the five development regions has enabled the NA to have a

close relationship with the concerned civil authorities and the population in all areas of Nepal.

During the Maoist insurgency, the NA was instrumental in actuating both lethal and non-lethal operations against the insurgents, which set the conditions for a negotiated peace between the CPN-M and the government. The GoN had mobilized the NP in the initial stage of the Maoist insurgency assessing it as a limited law and order problem rather than as a product of much deeper socio-economic and political disorder (Stuart 2005, 593). A series of operations launched by the NP in 1996 through 1997, codenamed Operation Romeo and Operation Kilo Sierra Two were ineffective because of the limited training that the police had to counter the insurgents and police atrocities towards the civilian population during the execution of the operations. The civilian population considered the NP a worse threat than the Maoist insurgents due to NP actions characterized by abuses of civilians, including thefts of food and private property, beatings, torture, and extra-judicial killings of those suspected of sympathizing with the Maoists (Stuart 2005, 593). As a result, the NP, even though they were able to establish limited government authority in some areas, failed to control the local population. In that situation, the NA started training the NP on counterinsurgency with an emphasis on "winning hearts and minds" (Subba 2010, 30). The concept of winning hearts and minds was mostly borrowed from the lessons of the Malaya insurgency experiences, which the NA had been focusing on for the training of its officers and non-commissioned officers in the NA's Jungle Warfare School (Subba 2010, 30).

However, some units of the NA failed to execute its own principles of winning hearts and minds in the initial year of NA counterinsurgency operations when it was actively mobilized against the Maoists. Thapa and Sijapati write:

> As for the [Royal] NA, it told Amnesty International that its mission was to 'disarm and defeat' the Maoists. Amnesty reported: "The definition of what constitutes a 'Maoist', according to army commanders interviewed by Amnesty International, includes civilians who give shelter, food, or, money to the armed Maoists. The fact that much of this 'assistance' is given under threat from the Maoists was not fully recognized. . . . In this context, killings of 'Maoists' in 'encounters' with the security forces are reported on a daily basis compared to very few reports of Maoists injured or arrested, suggesting at least some units within the security forces have operated a policy of deliberately killing Maoist suspects instead of arresting them." (Thapa and Sijapati 2004, 8)

A serious drawback of the army during its initial mobilization came from the minimal knowledge of the human rights issues. As the army began its expansion of manpower from a total strength of about 50,000 in 2001 to nearly 90,000 by 2003, the standard of training for the huge numbers of cadets and recruits enrolled during that period was not effective. Moreover, since that expansion was implemented in order to maintain a 24-hour presence in the difficult terrain of Nepal, the training syllabus focused more on combat operations, while aspects of human rights were rarely taught. Stuart touches on this deficiency when discussing NA professionalism during the insurgency, "The NA's concept of military professionalism needs to reflect the compatibility of security and human rights agendas" (Stuart 2005, 597). Another problem, noted by the NA Research and Development Wing, is the NA failed to derive lessons from the failure of the NP in countering the insurgents and from the NA's own successful operations against the Khampa guerillas.

However, the capability of the NA to conduct effective stability operations was improved by the external support from friendly foreign countries, especially from the

U.S. In 2003, the U.S. provided 5,000 U.S.-made M-16 rifles, followed by a military assistance totaling almost 17 million U.S. dollars for military procurement and training in 2004 (Thapa and Sijapati 2004, 190). Similarly, the U.S. government designated the CPN-M as a terrorist group in November 2003 and imposed Executive Order 13224 that blocked the Maoist assets in the U.S. or those held by U.S. persons wherever located and also barred transactions or dealings with the organization (Thapa and Sijapati 2004, 191).

A decade of insurgency in Nepal proved that a continued military action to stabilize a deteriorated situation caused by inherent socio-economic conditions is a costly, lengthy and at times a tragic solution. The Nepalese defense budget experienced an increase of approximately seven-fold from slightly over 1 billion Rupees in 1990/91 to over 7 billion Rupees in 2002/03 (Thapa and Sijapati 2004, 147). The insurgency campaign became almost unsustainable for the GoN as the cost of deploying security forces during the most intense fighting was at least 100,000 U.S. dollars per day, which is a shocking figure for a country where per capita annual income is around 200 U.S. dollars.

The NA is the most abundantly resourced institution of Nepal. Its welfare fund contained 21.75 billion Rupees (271 million U.S. dollars) as of the end of fiscal year 2011/12. This fund, based on annual interest rates of 6.5 to over 9 percent from deposits held in Nepalese commercial banks, receives more than a billion Rupees in interest payment alone (Ekantipur 2012). Therefore, the NA has the potential to initiate projects like small-scale industries, investments in health and education, etcetera, in order to improve the dire economic situation of the country. This would generate economic opportunities for the population and complement the limited budget available to the

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government. It would also ultimately mitigate the deep-rooted economic severity in the Nepalese society.

The NA's capability to conduct stability tasks has also been enhanced through its peacekeeping mission in the international arena. For the projection of Nepal's foreign policy based on the world peace and harmony and its firm belief and commitment to the UN, the NA has been making direct contributions since 1958 (Rana 2009, 80). The UN recognizes Nepal as the sixth largest troop contributing-country with a total of 92,775 personnel of various ranks having rendered peacekeeping services so far in 37 different conflict ravaged nations (DPR 2012). As of 23 December 2012, the NA had units deployed in 11 different missions across the globe. See table 6 for the NA's current participation in UN missions.

Table 6. The NA's Current Participation in UN Missions						
S.N	Missions	Country	Contingent	Military Observers	Staff Officers	Total
1	UNIFIL	Lebanon	999	-	19	1018
2	UNGU-II	Iraq	67	-	-	67
3	UNISFA	Sudan	-	3	2	5
4	MONUSCO	Congo	1024	20	4	1048
5	UNMIL	Liberia	15	2	3	20
6	MINUSTAH	Haiti	349	-	12	361
7	UNMISS	South Sudan	850	4	10	864
8	UNAMID	Sudan	335	15	14	364
9	UNOCI	Ivory Coast	-	3	1	4
10	UNTSO	Israel	-	3	-	3
11	MINURSO	Morocco	-	3	1	4
Total			3639	53	66	3758

Inclusiveness in the NA

Clause 4 of Article 144 of ICON-2007 states that the NA's democratic structure and national and inclusive character will be developed in the process of its democratization. The clause further states that Madhesi, Dalits, indigenous ethnic groups, women, and people from backward regions will be enlisted in the NA in order to give the Army a national character and make it inclusive. The current caste and ethnic status of the NA reflects a homogeneous Nepalese society that demonstrates equality and equity of all castes and genders. See table 7 for the status of caste and ethnic Inclusion in the NA. Chhetris seem to dominate the total representation in the army because the recruitment process is voluntary and entails competitive enrollment process. It would also be a violation of the right of citizens who do not wish to join the army if they are forced to enroll in the proportion as per the demographic makeup of the country. An inspiring data set, reflecting the inclusive character of the army, is the representation of Kami, Damai and Sarki, who are considered untouchables or Dalit in the Nepalese society and who have negligible presence in other national sectors of the country. This caste is included in the army at a percentage almost equal to its percentage within the total population. Moreover, the NA was the only institution in Nepal that had a system of reservation for five different ethnic groups—Magar, Gurung, Tamang, Kirant/Limbu, and Madhesis, even before the GoN had a policy on inclusion in the state organs (DPR 2008, 69). The NA also ensures that all castes and ethnic groups, religions and regions are given equal opportunity both for enrollment in the army and career development for those who are already enrolled.

		Table 7. Status of Caste and Ethnic Inclusion in the NA			
S.N	Caste/Ethnic Groups	Population (2001 Census)	Percent of Total Population	Representation in the NA	Percent of Total Representation in the NA
1	Chhetri	3,593,496	15.80	37,762	41.85
2	Brahmin	2,896,477	12.74	8,979	9.95
3	Magar	1,622,421	7.14	8,696	9.63
4	Tamang	1,282,304	5.64	5,397	5.98
5	Newar	1,245,232	5.48	5,981	6.62
6	Tharu/Rajbansi	1,533,879	6.75	4,765	5.28
7	Kami	895,954	3.94	2,435	2.69
8	Rai	635,151	2.79	2,562	2.83
9	Gurung	543,571	2.39	3,053	3.38
10	Damai	390,305	1.72	1,909	2.11
11	Limbu	359,379	1.58	952	1.05
12	Thakuri	334,120	1.47	3,358	3.72
13	Sarki	318,989	1.40	943	1.04
14	Gharti/Bhujel	117,568	0.52	645	0.71
15	Sanyasi	199,127	0.88	924	1.02
16	Kumal	99,389	0.44	461	0.51
17	Thakali/Sherpa	167,585	0.68	139	0.15
18	Dusad/Paswan	158,525	0.70	34	0.03
19	Teli	304,536	1.34	14	0.01
20	Hajam/Thakur	98,169	0.43	437	0.48
21	Muslim	971,056	4.27	26	0.02
22	Mechhe	3,763	0.02	47	0.05
23	Raji	2,399	0.02	12	0.01
24	Majhi	72,614	0.31	305	0.33
25	Darai	14,859	0.07	142	0.15
26	Danuwar	53,229	0.23	116	0.12
27	Jirel	5,316	0.02	61	0.06
28	Thami	22,999	0.10	62	0.06
29	Chepang	52,237	0.23	25	0.02
30	Pahari	11,505	0.05	24	0.02
	Total			90,226	100

Source: Directorate of Public Relations, The NA, *The Nepalese Army: A Force with History, Ready for Tomorrow* (Kathmandu: DPR, the NA, 2008), 70.

Apolitical Nature of the NA

The constitutions of Nepal, from the Interim GoN Act 1951 to the Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal 1990, enforced an NA accountable to the palace rather than the government. Through these constitutional laws, the Nepalese monarchs retained the privilege of being the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces and used the army to stage royal coups during political crises where the army was tasked with arresting politicians, carrying out surveillance, strictly controlling the media and guarding the royal palace (Kumar 2009, 140). The King continued to be the Supreme Commander of the NA even after the restoration of democracy in 1990 and exercised his authority to make final decisions on military affairs even though the army was controlled, operated and mobilized by the government (Wagle 2009, 78). Dr. Krishna Hachhethu, academic coordinator of Centre for Nepal and Asian Studies, Tribhuvan University, Nepal, points out this complex relation between democratic government, the King and the NA was one of the reasons the elected government of 1990 was unwilling to mobilize the NA in the initial stage of the Maoist insurgency. He writes:

> The elected government was hesitant to mobilize the NA [against the Maoists] for three main reasons. First, there was the legacy of history: King Mahendra had used the army to stage a coup in 1960 against the then Nepali Congress government and multi-party system. Second, the 1990 Constitution had a separate provision for mobilizing the army: the National Defense Council, consisting of the prime minister, defense minister and Chief of army staff, can recommend it, but the king takes the final decision. Third, there are some other ambiguous clauses in the Constitution relating to the dissolution of parliament and the declaration of an emergency on which palace can maneuver against the elected government. (Hachhethu 2004, 69)

Despite being accused as "royalist", the NA demonstrated its neutrality in internal political affairs by not attempting to intervene in the political transition of 2006 that led to the abolition of the monarchy in Nepal (Gautam 2009, 98). The NA's apolitical nature

further germinated after the promulgation of the ICON-2007 with assurances the army would of abide by the multi-party democracy, rule of law, human rights and the civil supremacy (Wagle 2009, 79). The NA also declared that it would be accountable to the government, the parliament and the people, after the title of the Supreme Commander of the army was transferred from the defunct monarchy to the elected president. General Rookmangud Katawal, the Chief of Army Staff of the NA during the period of political transformation in 2006, identified the Nepalese people as the Army's source of strength, which replaced the then core value of the Army that had been *"raj bhakti nai hamro sakti"* or loyalty to the King is our invincible power (Kumar 2009, 154). The NA demonstrated its acquiescence to the principles of civil supremacy and its accountability to the democratic government by amending the Military Act-2007, which removed the power of the king to operate and use the Army and vested that authority in the executive branch of the GoN.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The concept of national security has not remained fixed because of the vagueness of the concept of security itself and the changing nature of threats to national security. The concept, which evolved when the Peace of Westphalia ushered in a new international order for sovereign states, focused largely on the military hardware and armaments system until the Cold War era and prioritized war prevention through demonstrations of military power. However, due to the proliferation of unconventional, and even non-military threats, in the post-Cold War era the concept of national security goes beyond military affairs to cover a an array that includes not just security, but economic, demographic, ethnic and environmental issues as well. No longer related to the traditional emphasis of military strength built against conventional threats associated with sovereignty and territorial integrity, national security thus encompasses the security of socio-economic and political entities against unconventional threats that emerge within the borders of a nation. In short, it has become difficult or even impossible to build up peace and security without addressing the economic, social and political problems prevailing within a society.

Moreover, the likelihood and intensity of security problems varies from one country to another because of the difference in their capabilities to diagnose and manage those problems. Developing nations have a limited capability to address the security problems due to their weak government institutions, which makes them more vulnerable to security threats in comparison to the developed nations. In this context, Nepal, because of its inherent weakness in legitimacy and capacity to manage internal abnormalities,

especially those originating from poverty, societal discrimination and political instability, is facing a variety of internal security threats.

The purpose of this research was to answer the question, have the problems that have evolved within Nepalese society created serious threats to the country's internal security and is the NA capable of solving these issues. This research analyzed events and issues related to poverty, societal discrimination and political instability that prevail within Nepalese society, identifying internal security threats caused by these factors as well as the impact the resulting threats have on the national security of Nepal. The research also identified that the GoN has mobilized the NA to manage internal problems without prescribing definite roles and responsibilities due to the lack of a clear and viable national security strategy. Further, the research reviewed the tasks and mandates that the NA has undertaken when mobilized, and examined the doctrinal tasks and responsibilities prescribed by U.S. military doctrine in the stability of internal security areas in order to recommend possible roles for the NA in promoting Nepal's internal security. Finally, the research analyzed the capability, organizational structure, economic tools and political neutrality of the NA in order to assess the feasibility, acceptability and suitability of its mobilization to manage internal security threats. This chapter includes the conclusions of the research as well as recommendations for the GoN, the NA and for further research.

Conclusions

Out of several internal security threats that Nepal is facing, extreme poverty, broad societal discrimination, and the GoN's unstructured, fluctuating and unsystematic political system have turned the country into an insecure, fragile and weak state. Moreover, the intensity of these threats to internal peace and security continue to rise in

Nepal. Hence, the primary threats to the national security of Nepal seem to be internal rather than external. Specifically, the threats posed by poverty, societal discrimination and political instability are the main threats to the internal peace and security of Nepalese society.

Nepal is one of the poorest countries in the world. An agrarian-based economy without any substantial contribution from the industrial sector has resulted in an economy so weak that almost 30.8 percent of the total population lives under the international poverty line. The widening gap between the rich and poor and the difference in economic development between urban and rural areas are severe economic problems in Nepal. The rural areas are unable to keep pace with the economic transformation of the urban areas because of the uneven distribution of the economic opportunities. The minimal presence of employment-generating organizations and industries in Nepal has resulted in a high rate of unemployment, which is becoming a challenge to the GoN. The fragile economic status of the country resulting in a low human development condition is emerging as an immediate threat to the national security of Nepal.

Societal discrimination in Nepalese society, like poverty, is also posing a threat to the internal peace and security of Nepal. Nepalese society, which considers itself to be religiously secular and culturally harmonious, still follows discriminatory practices based on religion, caste, ethnicity and gender. The rulers and political leaders who promised anti-discriminatory reforms at various times and periods of political transformations have, instead, supported traditional discriminatory practices. The hierarchical division of the caste system in Nepalese society has nourished the ill practices of discrimination because it categorizes some of the ethnic groups as untouchables. The higher castes such

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as Bahuns and Chhetris have always ruled Nepal, whereas ethnic groups of lower castes such as Dalits and Janjatis have been considered as classes to be ruled. As well, the emphasis given to the Nepali language and the Hindu culture privileges those, while the languages, religions and cultures of various other ethnic groups are gradually languish. The grievances experienced by minorities and indigenous groups who are discriminated against by the government encourage such groups to support revolution in order to achieve their basic human rights. This situation creates a serious threat to the internal security of Nepal.

Political instability is another key problem in Nepalese society, posing a threat by weakening the GoN's ability to govern the country as well as preventing a weakened government from instituting policies to better the economic conditions of the country and prevent societal discrimination. Since the adoption of a multi-party democratic system in 1990, Nepalese politicians and citizens have misinterpreted democracy as a way to grab undue power and fulfill individual interests. This has produced an unhealthy environment in which many try to garner political favor from those in power and has stimulated corruption by those desiring to conserve their political power. Currently every political party and individuals affiliated with those parties seek to acquire political power for self-enrichment. In doing so, they have created political turmoil that has had counterproductive consequences for the GoN's capability to counter internal security threats. One of the biggest threats of political instability is that the sensitive issue of state restructuring has become a contentious topic due to mistrust and misunderstanding between the political parties. Nepal has been experiencing civil disturbances, riots, and strikes which have been organized as demonstrations either in support of or counter to the

various proposed models of state restructuring, or as protests against the government's inability to hold the CA election according to the proposed timeline.

Abject poverty, cultural clashes and an unstable government were the major factors that created an environment for the initiation of the Maoist insurgency, which is considered to have posed the gravest threat to the national security of Nepal since it faced the British in the Anglo-Nepal War. The Maoists exploited the grievances of the rural population caused by their dire economic condition, organized the oppressed ethnic and indigenous groups, and took advantage of the GoN's limited reach in rural areas to revolt against the government. The GoN mobilized the NA following the failure of the NP to curtail the Maoist insurgency where the Army was instrumental in setting the conditions for a negotiated settlement between the government and the Maoists. The NA has also been mobilized during other instances like infrastructural development, wild life and nature conservation, and assistance to civil authority, but due to the absence of a viable national security policy that outlines the Army's roles and responsibilities to manage the contemporary internal security threats, the Army has had to operate in a foggy environment.

There are arrays of tasks that the NA undertook and has been undertaking during its mobilizations in the internal security environment. The Army has been a supplemental force to the civil authority to restore unmanageable situations back to normalcy. It has successfully assisted them to create an environment for free and fair elections in the past. It has been effective in managing situations of destruction and devastation caused by disasters through rescue and relief operations and the provision of medical aid. Construction of pilot roads and tracks by the NA in rural areas has assisted in the

economic development of those areas. The NA's development efforts during the ISDP, which was initiated by the GoN prior to the deployment of the Army against the Maoists, exhibited its endeavor to enhance trust between the Army and the population. The maintenance and development of trust between the NA and a population became a positive effort to influence them about the social equality that the Army perceives. Apart from the aforementioned non-lethal tasks that the Army conducted, it also engaged in lethal tasks such as cordon and search, search and destroy operation, patrolling, etcetera to prevent the Maoists from capturing the state apparatus. It was during the undertaking of these lethal tasks that the roles of the NA became controversial because some of the units failed to abide by the norms of international human rights.

The NA can make a significant contribution to the government's effort to manage the internal abnormalities by undertaking the tasks prescribed by U.S. Army FM 3-07. Given the GoN's sufficiency to legitimize the functioning of a national judicial system and establish the rule of law, excluding the task of establishing civil control, the NA can assist the government in establishing civil security, restoring essential services, supporting governance, and supporting economic and infrastructure development. In doing so, the NA should be vigilant about the need to maintain a balance between long-term success and short-term gains through the economic utilization of resources. This will mitigate the possible risk of being unable to sustain long-term success even after achieving short-term gains. Military assistance from advanced foreign militaries, such as the U.S. military assistance to ESAF for normalizing the FMLN movement, will be an added advantage to the GoN and the NA in effectively stabilizing internal peace and security in Nepal.

The mobilization of the NA in the internal security environment is feasible, acceptable and suitable because of the NA's resourceful capability, viable economic ability, societal-balanced organizational structure, and neutral political affiliation. The deployment pattern of the NA's formations, units and sub-units enables it to become an indigenous reaction force capable of availing both men and materials for supporting the population during natural calamities, environmental degradation, and development efforts and to some extent, in maintaining law and order. Amongst the Nepalese security forces, the NA was the pioneer that emphasized on "winning hearts and minds" in its training and operations, which is a key in influencing the population in counter-insurgency operations within the internal security environment. The NA has the capability to support the GoN's effort to mitigate economic hardship of the population by creating economic opportunities through the initiation of income generating projects. The experience that NA personnel have gained as UN peacekeepers is also an added merit for stability operations. The NA demonstrates equality and equity for all castes and genders through the reflection of a homogenous Nepalese society in its caste and ethnic composition. It also ensures the impartiality that the NA would consider during its mobilization in the societies of any caste. Finally, the NA has been demonstrating its compliance to the principles of civil supremacy and its accountability to the democratic government by staying neutral in internal political affairs and operating under civilian control.

Recommendations for the GoN

This research provides two recommendations for the GoN. First, this research concluded that there is no viable national security policy, which addresses the emerging internal threats in Nepalese society. Further, the roles and responsibilities of the NA in

the internal security environment are not prescribed because of the reluctance of the government to identify contemporary internal threats. The GoN is therefore unable to recognize the necessity of amending and modifying the national security policy that was based upon external threats to Nepal. The GoN should assess and evaluate the current national security policy in relation to the emerging internal threats in order to devise an actionable strategy for mitigating these threats. In doing so, care should be taken to formulate practical and flexible approaches that would make the strategy adaptable to the changing security environment and ultimately lead to its success. The government should take into account the necessity of a collective effort and joint actions by all sectors of the nation in countering internal threats effectively. The NA, as the largest security force of Nepal, has the potential to lead the government's effort in curtailing internal threats in the aforementioned situation. It will be beneficial for the government to prescribe the roles and responsibilities of the NA within the tolerable limits of liberal democracy in order to ensure that the government's efforts in countering internal threats are successful.

This research also identified the risk of being unable to sustain long-term success after achieving short-term gains in the NA's stability operations because of the scarcity of the resources that the GoN and the Army possess. Therefore, the second recommendation for the GoN is to seek support from the friendly foreign countries and their military organizations in providing necessary military assistance for the NA that would enhance the Army's capability to operate against internal threats effectively in order to accomplish the government's effort of stabilizing internal peace and security in Nepal.

Recommendations for the NA

This research also provides two recommendations for the NA. First, the research identified that the NA is one of the elements of the Nepalese security force rather than the only actor or the replacer of civilian agencies in combating internal threats. Therefore, the NA should be clear that its mobilization in internal security environment must come as a political decision, which, on the one hand legitimizes its operations and on the other hand provides the probability of success as it achieves the coordinated effort of the government and the civil authority. In the absence of prescribed roles and responsibilities in the changing security environment, the NA should continue with the development activities of the nation, safeguarding the economic infrastructures, preserving the social harmony within the organization and setting an example for the Nepalese society and focusing towards the enhancement of civil-military relations. The NA should understand that its objective in the internal security environment is to implement the political solutions to internal threats while maintaining its credibility, trust of the population and accountability to the democratic government.

The NA faces charges for acts of human rights violations during its mobilization against the Maoists, is criticized for not being effective in providing security in some part of the country against internal threats, and is challenged to maintain a socially inclusive structure and an accountable civil-military relationship. These problems call for doctrinal changes, structural modifications, revisions and reforms in training, and enhancement of overall performance of personnel and leadership. Therefore, the second recommendation for the NA is that it should assess and evaluate its current mobilizations and those of the past, derive the lessons learned, and use those assessments to produce new doctrines,

policies and training manuals in order to meet the basic requirements to be mobilized in a changed security environment.

<center>Recommendation for Further Research</center>

The NA is increasing involvement in the internal security environment of Nepal, which emphasizes non-military tasks, creates the risk of the NA losing focus on its principal task of conducting lethal operations. Similarly, in the process of the NA's democratization, the emphasis placed on establishing the national character in the Army by making it inclusive reflects the naiveté of policymakers, as they tend to place undue importance on social values in an institution in which priority should have been given to professional enhancement. This course of action may have negative consequences on the military effectiveness of the NA as Samuel P. Huntington, in his book, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*, explains, "Military institutions which reflect only social values may be incapable of performing effectively their military function" (Huntington 1957, 3). Therefore, further research should investigate the effects of both the NA's involvement in managing internal threats and the emphasis placed on social values in the organizational structure of the Army upon the NA's professionalism.

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