

# Strategy Research Project

## Maintaining An Operational Reserve: A Strategy For Employment

by

Lieutenant Colonel Douglas A. Paul  
Army National Guard



United States Army War College  
Class of 2013

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

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Lieutenant Colonel Douglas A. Paul  
Army National Guard

Dr. William J. Flavin  
Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute  
Project Adviser

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U.S. Army War College  
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013



## **Abstract**

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The US has long relied on a strategic reserve as part of its military design for both efficiency and effectiveness to fight a national war. The nation activates the strategic reserve in times of national crisis and only as a last resort. After over a decade of combat operations, however, there is a desire by the US Department of Defense (DOD) to maintain an operational reserve that can augment and lead global missions in continued support of US interests as demonstrated in recent contingency operations. An operational reserve is one that is resourced, trained, ready, and is used on a continual basis. With contingency operation deployments declining and austerity measures impacting the military, how can the nation continue to use our Reserve forces on a continual basis to maintain them as an operational reserve? The intent of this paper is to provide approaches for use of the Reserves on a continuing basis in order to meet the intent of DOD senior leaders; better enable DOD organizations and missions; and maintain a viable reserve force for the nation in conflict and peace.



## **Maintaining An Operational Reserve: A Strategy For Employment**

To attain this mean, we have laid it down as a necessity that a good national reserves be prepared for the army; which will be less expensive in peace and will insure the defense of the country in war.<sup>1</sup>

— Antoine-Henri Jomini

### **Background and Intent**

The US has long relied on a strategic reserve as part of its military design for both efficiency and effectiveness to fight a national war. The nation activates the strategic reserve in times of national crisis and only as a last resort. After over a decade of combat operations, however, there is a desire by the US Department of Defense (DOD) to maintain an operational reserve<sup>2</sup> that can augment and lead global missions in continued support of US interests as demonstrated in recent contingency operations.

National Guard Bureau (NGB) Chief, LTG Ingram, defines an operational reserve as one that provides "operational capabilities and strategic depth to meet US defense and homeland security requirements in support of Combatant Commanders."<sup>3</sup> He further states that an operational reserve is one that is "resourced, trained, ready, and is used on a continual basis."<sup>4</sup> Resourced, trained, and ready are factors of readiness regardless of maintaining a strategic or operational force. Critical to an operational reserve is thus utilization of the reserve force on a continual basis. With contingency operation deployments declining and austerity measures impacting the military, how can the nation continue to use our Reserve forces on a continual basis to maintain them as an operational reserve?

The intent of this paper is to provide approaches for use of the Reserves on a continuing basis in order to meet the intent of DOD senior leaders; better enable DOD organizations and missions; and maintain a viable reserve force for the nation in conflict

and peace. Though concepts are applicable to the Joint Reserve Force, focus applies to the use of National Guard Special Forces (NG SF)<sup>5</sup> as an archetype for the greater Reserves. It argues against the traditional view of operational reserves of simply more funding for the same type of people, equipment, and capabilities as the active component and leverages the uniqueness of Reserve capabilities especially as they apply to the National Guard and NG SF.

The 2011 National Military Strategy (NMS) states that the US will, “carefully review legacy personnel systems, particularly whether we have the appropriate balance between uniformed, civilian, contract professionals, and active and reserve components.”<sup>6</sup> It further states the Reserve component is “essential (to our national strategy) as it provides strategic and operational depth to the Joint Force.”<sup>7</sup> The NMS concludes with “preserving it (the Reserves) as an accessible, operational force also requires sustained attention.”<sup>8</sup> The US military, across all services, has rightfully made significant progress in the readiness of the Reserve component and this will, and should, “remain a key focus area”<sup>9</sup> for the Joint Forces going forward. The Joint Chiefs of Staff acknowledge that the missions the US is undertaking are growing more diverse as the military works more with their civilian counterparts. In turn, the “skills and experiences of our reserve and National Guard forces have become ever more relevant.”<sup>10</sup> To capitalize on the progress made over the last decade of combat deployments, the US must continue to utilize the Reserve component in an “operational capacity as a trained, equipped, ready, and available force for routine, predictable deployments.”<sup>11</sup>

The current Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), General Martin Dempsey, noted that the Army is reshaping 20% of the forces for 2020, but that there will be an increase in Special Operations Forces (SOF); Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR); and Cyber Operations (Cyber).<sup>12</sup> Likewise, Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) General Raymond Odierno illustrated his three major initiatives for the Army going forward: Defense Support to Civilian Authorities (DSCA), SOF-Conventional Forces integration, and Operational Reserves.<sup>13</sup> These strategic considerations when combined with the NMS clearly value an initiative of an operational reserve and special operations forces (SOF). Elements in the Reserve SOF, especially NG SF, are thus uniquely qualified to meet a majority of the required capabilities directed by US senior leaders.

#### Directives

Three recent strategic directives shape the argument for employment of NG SF as an operational reserve and support the CJCS and CSA intents: the Army Total Force Policy (SEP 2012); the approval of a Theater Special Operations Command - North (TSOC-N) (DEC 2012); and the 2012 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA).

On 4 September 2012, Secretary of the Army John McHugh signed an historic milestone, the Army Total Force Policy.<sup>14</sup> Emboldening the visions of the strategic leaders listed above, the policy integrates the Army's active and Reserve components and represents the realization of the Total Force Concept. The Army Total Force Policy is critical for two reasons. First, it aligns the Army with Secretary of Defense Directive 1200.17<sup>15</sup>, which requires the military services to manage their reserve components as an "operational force." It is also important because it establishes policy for the integration of the Army's active and Reserve component as a total force. The Army

Total Force Policy will help ensure the nation benefits from the experiences gained in the last decade of war as prescribed in the 2011 NMS. The policy also provides for a more uniform set of policies and procedures to govern the total Army: active-duty, reserve, and National Guard.<sup>16</sup> It will facilitate better integration of these three component forces and a more balanced total force.

On 31 December 2012, the CJCS signed memorandum OSD 012496-12 officially creating a Theater Special Operations Command - North (TSOC-N) in support of the United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM)<sup>17</sup>. While there is a TSOC currently supporting each of the Geographic Combatant Commanders (GCC), USNORTHCOM has a unique area of responsibility (AOR) in that the AOR includes operations in the contiguous US and along its borders. Military operations within the US are subject to laws and uses not limited in overseas operations. A TSOC-N mission will naturally include use of SOF within the US borders, an ideal use of NG SF for a leading component of TSOC-N.

Lastly, the 2012 NDAA<sup>18</sup> provides additional Reserve activation authorities under US Code (USC) Title 10 to allow the DOD to activate up to 60,000 Reserves for 365 days, if budgeted, involuntarily. USC Title 10 now includes sub-sections 12304A for Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA) and 12304B for non-named operations outside the contiguous US (OCONUS) Reserve activations<sup>19</sup>.

With a directive created to maintain an operational reserve as part of a total force and a command established to focus on use of SOF within the US, NG SF is uniquely positioned to fulfill both objectives by conducting missions that leverage their attributes

while operating in both a US Code (USC) Title 10 and USC Title 32 status.

### National Guard Special Forces Key Attributes

National Guard SF, and many Reserve members, brings unique attributes to missions and the Total Force. Two key attributes are longevity and civilian expertise. National Guard SF personnel tend to be older and remain on SF detachments for longer periods of time. It is not unusual to find an NG SF Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO) remain on the same detachment for 10-15 years.<sup>20</sup> With that longevity, NG SF can provide persistent engagement on missions with their respective partner nations (PN) not only with the same SF unit, but also with the same SF individuals. This meets a critical concern of the US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) commander with regards to persistent engagement and the importance of building relationships.<sup>21</sup> By returning to the same PNs, NG SF soldiers can build enduring relationships, not "one-time" relationships, with their PN counterparts. These persistent relationships are what USSOCOM desires to build trust and work "by, with, and through" international partners before hostilities commence. The longevity of NG SF personnel in these missions enhances global USSOCOM shaping operations.

The 2010 RAND study on NG SF<sup>22</sup> assessed that civilian skills held were either equal to their active duty counterparts, if aligned to a military occupational specialty (MOS), or not necessarily mission pertinent if not aligned with an MOS. The study equated skills such as LE and medicine to military police and army medic MOS' while largely ignoring skills in finance, banking, and program management due to the inability to classify those skills into MOS'. RAND concluded, "Both women in the ARNG Special Forces Groups and civilian skills of the members, while important, do not appear to hold

the additional potential benefits that USASOC<sup>23</sup> may have hoped for."<sup>24</sup> Firstly, the very few female billets currently in NG SF are at the non-operational Group (Brigade) echelon. Secondly, in this view of reserve civilian skills, RAND underestimates the applicability of specialized civilian skills in those same occupational domains. A NG SF NCO who is a Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) or Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) special agent will likely have much more practical expertise in drug enforcement activities or warrant-based operations than military police or active component SOF. Likewise, a civilian physician assistant (PA) who works trauma care in a major city will have much more experience on certain types of wounds or conditions than an Army medic. Yet, the study listed these types of personnel simply as LE or medical personnel without deriving the true uniqueness of their expertise within their profession as compared to a military MOS. The argument of uniqueness is familiar to SOF as it is the same argument USSOCOM uses when comparing SOF to conventional forces. What makes SOF "special"? - specially selected, specially trained, and provided special equipment by the military just as civilian experts are specially selected and trained for their civilian specialized functions. Furthermore, these types of specialized civilian skills found in the NG SF community are not merely serendipity. The same type of individual who sought to do more in the military by joining SOF generally also seeks to equally excel in the civilian sectors by joining elite niches within their respective professions. William Donovan founded the forerunner to Special Forces with this civilian uniqueness consideration.<sup>25</sup> In identifying forces for missions, USSOCOM should greater consider relative expertise and persistent engagement as decision factors for force application.

## Capabilities-based Missions

National Guard SF should have specific tailored mission sets that allow for the best use of NG SF based on individual and unit capabilities while providing USSOCOM the most viable force for a given mission. The missions below allow for continuous use of NG SF while maximizing their civilian capabilities and leveraging legal use statuses. The missions further enable USSOCOM with a needed capability, to operate within the homeland in a lawful and reduced risk capacity, and to best allocate unique SOF capabilities to meet global mission requirements. These missions employ the use of NG SF and meet the training requirements outlined in Army Training and Evaluation Programs (ARTEP) and Mission Training Plans (MTP) ensuring NG SF are trained to the operational standard.

### Title 32 Missions

Current doctrine for Special Forces "fails to anticipate or even contemplate the use of Special Forces in domestic operations. This lack of strategic vision is apparently reinforced by a leadership emphasis that is focused solely on the use of Special Forces in the overseas combat operations."<sup>26</sup> To be fair, this focus is largely due to legal ramifications and the public perception of active duty forces operating in the homeland.<sup>27</sup> Consideration of using NG SF as part of USSOCOM domestic doctrine can correct this supposed failure. While deployed on combat rotations, DOD "federalizes" NG SF to active duty under USC Title 10 authority for the active US military. Title 10 regulates the use of the active component forces, the Title 10 reserve forces, and federalized National Guard.<sup>28</sup> Likewise, USC Title 32 regulates the use of the NG when not federalized. Title 32<sup>29</sup> allows for the maintenance of the National Guard to operate within the borders of the US. Active component forces are almost

always subject to the posse comitatus act (PCA)<sup>30</sup> and by law, not allowed to conduct military operations within the US. With presidential declarations, active components can perform stateside military operations, but the use of the declarations are seldom, and when they are used there can be considerable perception risk to the military and the US government. Due to this constraint and concern, active component SOF cannot generally operate within the US outside of supporting functions to law enforcement (LE). Special Operations Forces are, however, ideally suited to operate within and on the US border. Their operational capabilities, in addition to their support capabilities, can provide unique, experienced forces and enhance USNORTHCOM and Department of Homeland Security (DHS) missions.

While the PCA does not prevent the military services from supporting LE, nor preclude them from enforcing the law when so ordered by the president, it forbids the direct participation of active duty military personnel in search, seizure, and arrest during support activities to civilian LE agencies.<sup>31</sup> USNORTHCOM may require these capabilities, however, to augment DHS efforts on the US border and aid localized LE efforts during national emergencies. The military categorizes both of these instances as Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA) missions for which DOD charters USNORTHCOM to support with military capabilities.<sup>32</sup> The PCA does not apply to the NG under Title 32 authority - only while operating under Title 10 authority in which case they are part of the active military.<sup>33</sup>

The use of NG SF, based on this legal status, differentiates them from their active component SOF counterparts. This legal ability to operate inside the homeland is not simply for traditional border surveillance missions. Under this authority, DOD can

use NG SF in interdiction, arrest and detention missions, counter-drug missions, and counter-terrorism support missions as well.<sup>34</sup> Border governors in the states of Texas and California both have organic NG SF assets and can use them in a Title 32 duty status thus exempting them from the restrictions of the PCA. There are 26 states with NG SF assets to include 16 states with a SF company-sized element.<sup>35</sup> These units can operate on their respective states governor's orders within their state. They can also operate in other states if there is agreement<sup>36</sup> between receiving states to accept NG soldiers from the providing state. Though in a Title 32 authority and responsible solely to a state governor, USNORTHCOM, working with NGB, could provide direction and support to such missions thus allowing for the leverage of SOF capabilities to DHS and the States.

With NG SF being responsible for both federal and state missions, the absence of doctrine for domestic SF operations is a critical issue. States can, and should, activate their NG SF for emergencies and homeland security operations under Title 32. National Guard SF can greatly enable state emergency operations centers (EOC) during DSCA operations with communications, liaising with joint elements at the state and federal levels, and providing tested leadership and security. The state of Florida employed NG SF very effectively during hurricane Andrew and subsequently in support of hurricane Katrina with the implementation of NG SF rapid impact assessment teams (RIAT).<sup>37</sup> The RIATs provided near-real-time on-the-ground information to the EOC; assessed State, National Guard, and LE requirements; and assisted with evacuations and rescues of affected residents. Other Title 32 capabilities NG SF can apply are critical Infrastructure assessments for USNORTHCOM and search and rescue

operations for regional and national catastrophes. While NG SF units are under the control of a governor in Title 32 status, USSOCOM can coordinate with USNORTHCOM and NGB for direction and resources and can activate the forces to a Title 10 status, if required, with consent from the mobilized individuals.<sup>38</sup> Once activated to Title 10 status, USSOCOM could use the forces for a variety of federal missions in support of the homeland mission, but only in an active military capacity.

### Short-Duration Missions

National Guard SF, and many NG forces, currently conduct short duration (30-60 days) Title 10 missions. For NG SF these missions come multiple times a year in the form of Theater Security Cooperation Programs (TSCP) and specifically Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) missions. These are ideally suited for a variety of SOF units as training and advising are core competencies of SOF, but these same missions can maintain an operational reserve force if allocated appropriately across the whole of SOF. With each mission NG SF can bring civilian expertise in the areas of LE, medicine, logistics, aviation, construction, and security via their organic units or a modular unit construct created for a specific mission. The product should be a unique training plan derived from a PN's need for specialized training and not simply a "pull from the shelf" program of instruction (POI) that has been the US military norm for too long. The focus should be on the level of detail of training required based on a comprehensive training needs assessment (TNA) for the PN forces and not based simply on the size of the PN element to be trained. A Mission Tailored Force Package (MTFP) should be the goal for the following missions.

## Theater Security Cooperation Missions

Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) is among the fastest-growing sources of demand. The Guidance for the Employment of the Force (GEF) elevated security cooperation and its related activities to new importance as a tool for advancing and defending US interests. "The Joint Force Combatant Commanders and Service Chiefs shall actively partner with other US government (USG) agencies to pursue theater security cooperation to increase collective security skills with a wider range of partners."<sup>39</sup> These missions seek to facilitate interagency cooperation and enable international interoperability before crises occur as part of Phase 0 (shaping operations) and Phase 1 (deterrence operations) of Theater Campaign Plans (TCP). These missions also enable the US to gain and maintain access and relationships that support broader national interests yet, in FY 2012, only "55 percent of theater security cooperation activities were resourced."<sup>40</sup>

National Guard SF has been conducting these types of missions for decades and is ideally suited for continuation of these missions. Persistent presence through years of working and training with PN forces is essential to success. Most of these missions are approximately 30 days in length although TSOCs are implementing longer concepts, up to 60 days in length. The key to maximizing potential of these missions is persistent engagement, the PN, and the type of training required. In the asymmetric threat of today, a threat can emerge from any number of nations who may have little interaction with US forces. Active SOF cannot meet the demands to engage in training and operations with every potential conflict nation. Additionally, active SOF aviation is limited in availability to support increasing tempo in TSC missions. NATO PNs are requesting SF training in conjunction with rotary-wing assets<sup>41</sup>, yet SOF aviation is stretched too

thin to support. A viable option is to utilize NG SF with their respective State's NG aviation units, or the 193rd Special Operations Wing (SOW) in the Air NG, to conduct these TSC missions collectively as a modular unit.

With active component forces focused on key threat countries such as Libya, Somalia, and Afghanistan, NG SF can focus on lesser threat or lesser developed countries such as Uganda, Sudan, and Liberia. Working in the theater joint interagency interdepartmental multinational (JIIM) environment of US Africa Command (AFRICOM), NG SF could augment Department of State (DoS) training missions such as the African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) missions currently performed by contractors. Work on these types of missions would not only be appropriate for maintaining an operational NG SF, but are ideal in having USSOCOM work closer with DoS in a critical AOR. In this capacity, NG SF is used as part of the unified land component domain as a shaping force within the theater strategy to provide US train and assist missions to needing countries and augmenting the work done by the active component in the same region.

#### Security Sector and Humanitarian Assistance Missions

With security assistance programs USSOCOM can employ NG SF to fulfill mission requirements or augment active SOF to maintain security. This is not a novel concept. The 8th Special Forces worked in this modular capacity for security assistance in Latin America during the 1960s and did it very effectively compiling SF and non-SF capabilities into security missions.<sup>42</sup> With humanitarian assistance (HA), the NG is the leading DOD entity for support to these operations within the US. States continually call upon National Guard units to assist in times of emergency and to work in a JIIM environment while doing so. When the US decides to assist PNs in their HA needs, the

NG and NG SF is a logical choice to conduct these missions, especially in a low to medium threat environment, such as DSCA support to Haiti in the aftermath of the 2010 earthquake.

#### Counter Narcotics Trafficking (CNT) and Rule of Law Missions

With CNT operations in high-demand across the globe, specifically Afghanistan, trans-Sahara Africa, and Mexico, NG SF can be a paramount resource. NG SF has a high density of LE personnel in its ranks. Unlike active SOF, NG SF personnel have performed search and seizure, warrant-based operations, and CNT training at both the federal and state levels. Using a NG SF soldier who is also a DEA special agent on an overseas training mission allows USSOCOM to have expertise, not normally found within the active component SOF, to lead or augment a mission. Using NG SF with CNT specific capabilities on CNT missions in North Africa, or elsewhere, may be much more effective than having an active component SF unit conduct the same mission. As mentioned above with reference to ACOTA missions, NG SF are aptly suited for the DoS Civilian Police (CIVPOL) training missions that train and enable PN police forces. Like the ACOTA missions, USSOCOM could better integrate with global DoS operations while having DoS pay for the operations and maintenance (O&M) of these missions. These missions in CNT and Rule of Law can support TSOC objectives, maintain an operational NG SF, while allowing active component SOF to focus on other theater missions.

#### DSCA (Defense Support to Civil Authorities) Foreign Internal Defense (FID)

Many PN forces are looking for viability in the DCSA realm of operations to support their respective nations. NATO SOF forces are increasingly being required by their respective countries to provide support to domestic operations.<sup>43</sup> The NG is the

lead DOD element for DSCA operations based on their locations, training, and legal status under state governors. Defense Support to Civil Authorities foreign internal defense (FID) missions train PN forces on DSCA operations and homeland security. While FID missions are traditionally conducted in the PN country, training can also occur by having the PN forces train at a DSCA site in the US thus reducing deployment costs for NG SF. Regardless of location; these PN forces return to their nation a more capable DSCA force and a stronger US partner. These forces can train inside the US with NG SF, and other NG elements, on DSCA operations and even view, participate perhaps, in DSCA exercises like Vigilant Guard. Conducting this training also assists NG units in better preparing for US DSCA operations and strengthens PN relationships while preparing them for their DSCA operations. National Guard SF, augmented by other NG DSCA forces, is ideally suited for this type of FID mission especially if a state can provide SF, medical, aviation, and MP support to the FID mission wherever it may take place.

#### State Partnerships Program (SPP)

In addition to TSCP missions, Geographic Combatant Commanders (GCC) fund SPP missions designated specifically for National Guard forces. National Guard SF brings operations, training, and planning acumen to this acclaimed program. The SPP program is a proven, cost-effective Security Cooperation tool and one that active component forces cannot participate. Admiral Jim Stavridis, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR) praises, "The State Partnership Program is, dollar for dollar, my best EUCOM investment."<sup>44</sup> Through the SPP program, USSOCOM can leverage NG SF assets to support additional GCC missions and increase the SOF global presence without increasing costs to USSOCOM operations. The SPP program

assists the TSCP missions of each of the six GCCs. The program links US states with designated PNs which "promotes access, increases military capabilities, improves interoperability and enhances the principles of responsible governance."<sup>45</sup> The program helps prevent failed states and contributes to the stability of the US since it not only offers military-to-military training and cooperation, but also state governance to PN governance assistance. Working within the JIIM environment at the national level, NG SF can bring their coordination, interagency liaison, joint training, and SOF skills to increase effectiveness of SPP missions. National Guard forces cannot train on combat related skills with SPP funding, but HA, DSCA, Counterdrug/CNT, Border/Port Security are all permissible training activities, ideal for NG SF as already described. While the SPP program links specific States with specific PNs, a GCC can request any NG unit to conduct an SPP event with any participating nation.<sup>46</sup> This allows NG SF to provide training to a majority of nations in which capacity and relationship building is critical to US interests while leveraging a program in which active component SOF cannot participate.

### Long-Duration Missions

The short-duration missions discussed above are capable of maintaining an operational reserve with respect to the key component of continuous deployments and meeting ARTEP and MTP standards, but it may be that not all NG SF soldiers will be able to participate in enough of the short-duration missions to truly maintain their capabilities. In addition to the short-duration mission sets, USSOCOM and NGB should view long-duration mission for NG SF for both Title 10 and Title 32 statuses for lengths of time from 6 to 15 months. These are the duration standards to which Reserve component forces mobilized for Title 10 combat rotations to Iraq and Afghanistan.

During Kosovo deployments in the 1990's the military suggested that anything less than a 12-month deployment did not suffice to maintain a reserve unit operationally, but with more frequent and predictable deployments, NG SF units can operate on a shorter duration deployment cycle.

The two main flaws in this approach to maintain an operational reserve is the cost to mobilize and deploy NG units for extended lengths of time and the effect of operational tempo on NG forces and families.

The DOD has debated Reserve costs for decades, but a recent NGB review<sup>47</sup> of "wrap" rates (fully burdened costs of NG soldiers to include retirement pay, medical, military construction, and other benefits) shows the Reserve is less than one-third the costs of their active component counterparts. While the Reserves currently account for 39% of the manpower of the total Army, the Reserve component is at 16% of personnel costs and 17% of the retirement payout costs of active component.<sup>48</sup> Clearly NG costs to conduct operations will be less expensive than active duty even if mobilized every 5-6 years for an operational assignment. Much like active duty, NG soldiers do not tend to stay in the service until retirement, so the mobilization and mission costs of most NG soldiers should not become increased pension costs.

With regards to operational tempo for the NG SF soldiers and families, long-duration mobilizations would be in accordance with the current DOD policy of a 3-year "dwell" time (6 years for NG conventional forces). Dwell time is the measure DOD uses to identify how much time a service requires at home station based on the amount of time deployed away from home. National Guard SF soldiers are familiar with this tempo and a prescriptive tempo allows USSOCOM to build a forces generation model for NG

SF to provide predictability of time and location to ease pressures on families and civilian employers.

Activating NG SF for long-duration missions also assists in providing needed dwell time for active component SOF. The USSOCOM Commander describes the negative effects of dwell time on active component SOF, "A decade of war has exerted a physical and emotional stress on our force and their families."<sup>49</sup> Current guidelines call for a SOF soldier to get at "least one day at home for every day he is deployed, or a 1:1 dwell-to-boots-on-the-ground ratio."<sup>50</sup> SOF deployment lengths average about six months at home for every seven months deployed, but that doesn't include pre-mission training (PMT) or training in general which can keep SOF soldiers away from home much longer than the prescribed dwell time. By conducting long-duration missions, NG SF can assist active component SOF in their required dwell time. With NG SF mobilized for longer durations under Title 10 authority, active SOF can take relief from their operational tempo. At the same time, NG SF can maintain a regular operational continuum, build persistent presence in identified nations, and provide much needed SOF for TSOCs. The TSOCs constantly input request for forces (RFF) when they or their GCCs need military forces for missions within their AOR. Very few forces are directly assigned to TSOCs and those that are assigned are in high-demand and often already deployed. Special Operations Command - Africa (SOCAF) currently has no organic forces to deploy for operations in Africa. They consistently request SOF through USSOCOM for TSCP and other missions, but USSOCOM generally has no forces to provide from the active component.

When SOCAF requests NG SF there is generally O&M funding for the mission, but never any pay and allowances (P&A) funding to cover the costs of individual Reserve soldiers. By having an NG SF unit on a long-duration Title 10 mission, SOCAF could have its desired forces to deploy within their AOR without having to succumb to the RFF process. The NG SF could conduct pre-mission training (PMT) and then remain stateside; move to the vicinity of SOCAF; or deploy directly to a required mission within an African nation. Importantly, by having an NG SF unit on Title 10 status, SOCAF could have the NG SF take over a mission from active component SOF should the GCC need the active component to address a new crisis. This would allow for mission continuity for a TSCP in Nigeria if SOCAF needed active component SF immediately for a new crisis in Libya for instance. The US would not have to degrade one mission for sake of another. The RAND study agrees, "The ARNG Special Forces have additional capacity and could be employed to help satisfy future episodic spikes of violence."<sup>51</sup> The example described is SOCAF, but all the TSOCs are generally in need of additional forces to include the newly constituted TSOC-North. The DOD could potentially activate NG SF for TSOC-North under Title 10 or Title 32 authorities. Under Title 32 for work within the contiguous US, NG SF would be under the authority of a single State's governor and not USNORTHCOM directly. The TSOC-North's relationship with NG SF in this capacity would be in the form of synthesizing critical elements, enablers, and processes that help define USSOCOM objectives for homeland operations. Agreements worked in a JIIM environment between USSOCOM, NGB, respective States, and DHS amongst others by TSOC-North would set the parameters for NG SF deployments in the US and provide critical USSOCOM enablers to the NG

SF conducting the operations. Additional agreements amongst individual states would allow NG SF to cross state lines in a Title 32 status. As applicable, USSOCOM could potentially exercise the "hip pocket" activation used by NORTHCOM<sup>52</sup> for the Air National Guard air interdiction missions to move NG SF from a Title 32 status to a Title 10 status<sup>53</sup> for continued federalized work in the US or missions elsewhere globally.

USSOCOM working with NGB could create many models to fulfill the intent of a mobilized NG SF outlined above. One model might be to implement a rotating NG SF company for eight months at time. The 20th NG SF Group currently does a similar timeline for operations supporting the active component 7th SF Group in Latin America.<sup>54</sup> With this concept, USSOCOM implements a forces generation model for NG SF allowing for predictability of deployments for the NG and predictability of assigned forces for TSOCs. The two NG SF Groups would provide two companies each for a 15 month mobilization. With each NG SF Group having nine companies, each company would deploy for 15 months every 5.5 years meeting required dwell time and maintaining operational viability. Another model might deploy just one company per NG SF Group for eight months at a time. The deployment is shorter and every company would then be redeployed every six years. The Joint SOF reserves could have a similar model utilizing SEAL Teams 17 and 18<sup>55</sup> as well as the Air National Guard's 193 SOW. Using the Reserves in this manner would be more analogous with the British Special Air Service (SAS) reserves. The 22nd SAS is the only active operational element of the Regiment. Both 21 and 23 SAS<sup>56</sup> are reserve forces that deploy and augment the active regiment on an operational basis. The SAS organization and mission is largely the basis for the construct of US SOF.

## Recommendations

### Review NG SF Unique Capabilities and Legal Uses

USSOCOM should review and contemplate unique use of NG SF individual and collective capabilities for both OCONUS and homeland security missions. In doing this, mission requirements should be analyzed for required subject matter expertise from both a military and civilian perspective. USSOCOM should then align NG SF to missions based on capabilities vice simply aligning forces to missions based on general capabilities and availability. Use this analytical process for TSCP and related missions to best address USSOCOM initiatives and national interests.

### Request Funding for Long-Duration Missions

USSOCOM should finalize a forces generation model to include Reserve SOF and request funding for mobilizations through the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) process for both Title 32 and Title 10 missions. To do this, USSOCOM can leverage the GCC Support Activation authority under USC Title 10 12304 A/B to budget for the NG SF desired activations. Critical to this concept is to request both O&M and P&A funding for NG SF. USSOCOM cannot use Major Force Program -11 (MFP-11)<sup>57</sup> funding for P&A of NG SF. While USSOCOM has Title 10 authorities as a functional combatant command, it does not have control of the "personnel" requirement in the doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel and facilities (DOTMLPF) construct provided to the service chiefs. To ensure P&A funding for personnel USSOCOM and GCCs (TSOCs) needing forces, should initiate Integrated Priority Lists (IPL) expressing the need for additional SOF to conduct AOR respective missions to the Chairman Joint-Chiefs-of-Staff (CJCS). USSOCOM and GCCs should also discuss the potential use of NG SF (Army) with the

CSA and have the Army G-3/5/7 plans, G-8 programming, and comptroller for budgeting, review the requests for applicability and feasibility to support the IPLs submitted to the CJCS. The CJCS can then request through the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) changes to guidance in the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) or ideally input into the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) which will support the next Program Objective Memorandum (POM) cycle for the Army to budget these forces.

If approved, USSOCOM, as a force provider, will have to provide the SOF for the missions and can request NG SF support for the new requirements. Since the funding for personnel will come from the Army, the Army being the proponent service for Army NG SF, the money must pass through NGB and be "earmarked" for use for NG SF. The Chairman National Guard Bureau (CNGB) should thus be in discussion with the CSA and USSOCOM to ensure unity of effort in the process.

This concept will be a cost to the Army's budget. It is important that NG SF (USSOCOM) provide the Army with a return on its investment. The initial return allows the Army to meet Directive 1200.17 by actually maintaining an operational reserve. Equally important a return is perhaps NG SF working with the Army's newly regionally aligned Brigade Combat Teams (BCT) for training, enduring presence, and mission execution and cooperation as part of the Army's Total Force Policy and addressing the CSA initiative of SOF-Conventional Force integration.

#### Build NG SF into TSOC-North

As TSOC-North is constructed within USNORTHCOM, USSOCOM should build NG SF as a critical component into this new entity. Focus of TSOC-North should be both OCONUS (Canada and Mexico) focused and CONUS focused. The ability of SF NG to operate in both a Title 32 and Title 10 capacity should be the foundation of the

TSOC-North charter with emphasis placed equally on homeland security and DSCA missions. William Donovan began his career with the New York National Guard fighting Pancho Villa on the US Border prior to forming the OSS. The NG SF should likewise be a prime component of any joint border mission with the unique ability to operate on both sides of the US border.

#### Create SF Doctrine for DSCA

Finally, doctrine or specific guidance is required from USSOCOM to support all these activities since NG SF are USSOCOM assets and are provided with USSOCOM equipment through MFP - 11 funding. States and NG SF Groups must understand what they can and cannot use their NG SF and related equipment for when addressing DSCA concerns. Providing a framework with guidance to have NG SF operate in a Title 32 capacity can greatly enhance USSOCOM domestic capabilities, provide USNORTHCOM with operational domestic forces, and provide for a more secure nation.

#### Conclusion

The demand for SOF is increasing globally. While missions and operational environments are changing and becoming ever more complex in the Campaign against Al Qaeda and Transnational Terrorist Organizations (CAAQATTO) and other global missions, the SOF truths are not changing: SOF cannot be mass produced and competent SOF cannot be created after emergencies occur.<sup>58</sup> While these truths are embedded in SOF culture, they are not necessarily unique to SOF. Viewing NG SF as both a component of SOF and the greater Reserves, these same truths are equally accurate. Competent operational reserves cannot be mass produced or created after crises arise. The US cannot afford to lose the operational momentum gained by the

Reserves over the last decade of conflict. To ensure continuing operational capability to meet the Total Army Force Policy directive, NG SF and the Reserves cannot simply demand more funding for the same type of people, equipment, and capabilities as the active component, especially in an era of significant budget decreases, let alone sequestration. The Strategy for Homeland Defense and Defense Support of Civil Authorities concurs, "US strategy must use innovative approaches, articulate mission priorities, guide the deepening of external partnerships, and creatively adapt existing and programmed capabilities, rather than directing large investments in new equipment and capabilities."<sup>59</sup> Missions for the NG SF should focus on the uniqueness of the Reserves, especially the National Guard, with consideration of distinctive legal, funding, and capabilities-based missions and less on the ability to conduct the same mission as the active component with less training and funding.

By capitalizing on the uniqueness of NG SF and creating a mobilized NG SF force concept with a forces generation model, USSOCOM key concerns of "Continuing Presence" and "Thickening of the Force"<sup>60</sup> are greatly alleviated. This construct would also provide TSOCs SOF to manage and enable AOR shaping operations; provide continuing presence missions; build networks; and allow for needed active component dwell time. To ensure the funding for the long-duration missions, it will be necessary to synthesize critical elements, enablers, and processes within the GCCs, TSOCs, USSOCOM and NGB that define the strategic environment in peace, conflict and war and the best use of NG SF and active component SOF. Importantly, by implementing this continuous use concept, USSOCOM can operate more efficiently and can expand and contract SOF much more readily in response future fiscal challenges. As the

Honorable Thomas Lamont suggests when referencing military capabilities, "Never buy what you can rent."<sup>61</sup>

By maintaining an operational reserve that is resourced, trained, ready, and deployed in continuous use, the US will maintain a viable Reserve force that manifests Jomini's "mean": a force that is less expensive in peace that ensures the defense of the nation in times of war.

### Endnotes

<sup>1</sup> Baron de Jomini, *The Art of War*, trans. CPT G.H. Mendell (Project Gutenberg EBook, 2004), 34.

<sup>2</sup> Adm. Mike Mullen, *National Military Strategy* (Washington, DC: The Pentagon, February 2011), 12.

<sup>3</sup> Director National Guard LTG Ingram, "The Army National Guard," August 22, 2012, <http://www.dami.army.pentagon.mil/offices/dami-fl/Fl%20Docs/Army%20National%20Guard%202012%201010.pdf> (accessed December 15, 2012).

<sup>4</sup> Ibid.

<sup>5</sup> There are two National Guard Special Forces Groups in the National Guard: 19th SFG(A) and 20th SFG(A). The term NG SF used in this paper refers to the operations components of NG SF and not NG SF support elements or enablers as a comparison to active component Special Forces Groups. <http://www.nationalguardspecialforces.com/locations.html>.

<sup>6</sup> Adm. Mike Mullen, *National Military Strategy* (Washington, DC: The Pentagon, February 2011), 17.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid, 18.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid.

<sup>12</sup> GEN Martin Dempsey, *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Joint Force 2020* (Washington, DC: The Pentagon, September 2012), 10

<sup>13</sup> Army Chief of Staff GEN Ray Odierno, "The US Army in a Time of Transition," April 2012, <http://www.army.mil/article/78563/> (accessed December 22, 2012).

<sup>14</sup> Secretary of the Army, *Army Total Force Policy*, Army Directive 2012-08 (Washington DC: Secretary of the Army, September 4, 2012) 1.

<sup>15</sup> Department of Defense, *Managing the Reserve Components as an Operational Force*, DOD Directive 1200.17 (Washington DC: Secretary of Defense, October 29, 2008) 1.

<sup>16</sup> Secretary of the Army, *Army Total Force Policy*, Army Directive 2012-08 (Washington DC: Secretary of the Army, September 4, 2012) 2.

<sup>17</sup> Department of Defense, *Establishment of a Theater Special Operations Command to Support USNORTHCOM*, DOD Directive 12496-12 (Washington DC: Secretary of Defense, December 31, 2012) 1.

<sup>18</sup> David F. Burrelli, *FY2012 National Defense Authorization Act: Selected Military Personnel Policy Issues*, (Washington DC: US Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, January 5, 2012), 6.

<sup>19</sup> Cornell University, "Select Reserve: order to active duty for preplanned missions in support of combatant commands," February 20, 2013, <http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/10/12304b> (accessed February 20, 2013).

<sup>20</sup> John E. Peters, "Enhancing the Contribution of Reserve Component Army Special Operations Forces," RAND Arroyo Center Technical Study, 2012.

<sup>21</sup> ADM William H. McRaven, SOCOM 2020 (Tampa, FL: SOCOM, August 2012) 5.

<sup>22</sup> In 2010, The United States Army Special Forces Command (USASFC) under LTG Mulholland procured the services of the RAND Corporation to review the applicability of the National Guard Special Forces. John E. Peters, "Enhancing the Contribution of Reserve Component Army Special Operations Forces," RAND Arroyo Center Technical Study, 2012.

<sup>23</sup> United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) headquartered at Ft. Bragg, NC. John E. Peters, "Enhancing the Contribution of Reserve Component Army Special Operations Forces," RAND Arroyo Center Technical Study, 2012.

<sup>24</sup> John E. Peters, "Enhancing the Contribution of Reserve Component Army Special Operations Forces," RAND Arroyo Center Technical Study, 2012.

<sup>25</sup> COL William ("Wild Bill") Donovan was the wartime head of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) during World War II. The OSS was the direct predecessor of the current day Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Army Special Forces. Interestingly, Donovan was a US soldier, lawyer, intelligence officer and diplomat. Donovan was a graduate of Columbia Law School and became an influential Wall Street lawyer. In 1912, Donovan formed and led a troop of cavalry of the New York State Militia (the National Guard) which was mobilized in 1916 and served on the US-Mexico border during the US campaign against Pancho Villa. Douglas Waller, *Wild Bill Donovan* (New York: Free Press, 2011) 55-67.

<sup>26</sup> LTC Douglas O'Connell, *U.S. Army Special Forces and Homeland Security Operations*, Thesis (Monterey, CA: Naval Post Graduate School, March 2008) 17.

<sup>27</sup> Esequiel Hernandez Jr was killed by US Marines in June 1997 in south Texas while on a drug surveillance mission. This incident heightened civil tensions of military border missions. Graham Turbiville, *US-Mexican Border Security: Civil-Military Cooperation* (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Foreign Military Studies Office, May 1999), 3.

<sup>28</sup> US Code Title 10 governs the US Military. Cornell University, <http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/10>.

<sup>29</sup> US Code Title 32 governs the US State Militias and National Guard. Cornell University, <http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/32>.

<sup>30</sup> Posse Comitatus Act of 1878. US Department of Justice, [http://www.dojgov.net/posse\\_comitatus\\_act.htm](http://www.dojgov.net/posse_comitatus_act.htm).

<sup>31</sup> R.C. Mason, *Securing America's Borders: The Role of the Military*, (Washington DC: US Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, June 16, 2010), 3.

<sup>32</sup> US Code Title 10, sec. 375.

<sup>33</sup> A "federalized" National Guard unit is one that has been mobilized under Title 10 authority of the United States Code to perform a federal mission. Command and control rests solely with the President and the federal government. USC Title 10.

<sup>34</sup> US Code Title 32.

<sup>35</sup> United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) headquartered at Ft. Bragg, NC. John E. Peters, "Enhancing the Contribution of Reserve Component Army Special Operations Forces," RAND Arroyo Center Technical Study, 2012.

<sup>36</sup> A Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) can be used or eventually an Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) as type of agreements of assistance between States. [http://www.emacweb.org/index.php?option=com\\_content&view=article&id=80&Itemid=256](http://www.emacweb.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=80&Itemid=256).

<sup>37</sup> Florida Division of Emergency Response, *State of Florida Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan*, (Tallahassee, FL: State Emergency Response Team, February 2004) 17.

<sup>38</sup> A legal mechanism known as "hip pocket activation" allows for a "rapid federalization under certain conditions where NG forces can be instantaneously "federalized" in the event of domestic emergencies and contingency operations." Section 12301(d) of USC Title 10 provides that members of the "National Guard may be called to active federal duty with their governor's consent." The US Air Force currently uses this provision in a procedure to "automatically convert consenting Air National Guard members into Title 10 status upon the occurrence of a triggering event" in support of NORAD. USC Title 10, sec. 12301(d).

<sup>39</sup> US Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Stability Operations*, Joint Publication 3-07 (Washington, DC: US Joint Chiefs of Staff, September 29, 2011), 49.

<sup>40</sup> RAND Study Policy-level interviews with members of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, January 25. John E. Peters, "Enhancing the Contribution of Reserve Component Army Special Operations Forces," RAND Arroyo Center Technical Study, 2012.

<sup>41</sup> In 2012, NATO partners requested Special Operations Command Europe (SOCEUR) provide rotary-wing assets with SF training. Task Force 160 could not provide support to training given its mission disposition. SOCEUR Commander, MG Mike Repass, interview by author, Stuttgart, Germany, June 16 2012.

<sup>42</sup> A Mobile Training Team from the 8th Special Forces Group trained and advised the Bolivian Ranger Battalion that captured and killed Che Guevara in the fall of 1967. The SAF comprised the 8th Special Forces Group, a Military Intelligence detachment, a Medical detachment, a Military Police detachment, an Engineer detachment, an Army Security Agency detachment, and a Psychological Operations battalion. Fred J. Pushies, *U.S. Army Special Forces* (St. Paul, MN: MBI Publishing Company, 2001), 89-93.

<sup>43</sup> In 2012, Germany SOF requested 19th Special Forces to assist in DSCA training to show German SOF viability to German domestic concerns. SOCEUR Commander, MG Mike Repass, interview by author, Stuttgart, Germany, June 16 2012.

<sup>44</sup> Supreme Allied Commander - Europe ADM James Stavridis, "NATO," December 17, 2012, <http://www.eucom.mil/key-activities/partnership-programs/state-partnership-program> (accessed December 17, 2012).

<sup>45</sup> Ibid.

<sup>46</sup> In July 2012, SOCEUR employed an element of 19th Special Forces Group from the state of Colorado to Bulgaria for an SPP training event in which the state of Colorado had no SPP relationship. SOCEUR Commander, MG Mike Repass, interview by author, Stuttgart, Germany, June 16 2012.

<sup>47</sup> MG Jimmy Stewart Reserve Forces Policy Board, *Eliminating Major Gaps in DOD data on the Fully-Burdened and Life-Cycle Cost of Military Personnel* (Washington DC: National Guard Bureau, December 12, 2012).

<sup>48</sup> Ibid.

<sup>49</sup> Michelle Tan, "Less turn and burn for special operators," *Army Times*, March 19, 2012, <http://www.armytimes.com/news/2012/03/army-socom-dwell-031912w/> (accessed January 5, 2013).

<sup>50</sup> Ibid.

<sup>51</sup> John E. Peters, "Enhancing the Contribution of Reserve Component Army Special Operations Forces," RAND Arroyo Center Technical Study, 2012.

<sup>52</sup> The air intercepts operated through the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) component of NORTHCOM. <http://www.norad.mil/>.

<sup>53</sup> LTC Douglas O'Connell, *U.S. Army Special Forces and Homeland Security Operations*, Thesis (Monterey, CA: Naval Post Graduate School, March 2008) 49.

<sup>54</sup> The 20th SFG(A) Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) Caribbean and Central America (CCA) missions currently have a forces generation model.

<sup>55</sup> Naval Special Warfare Group 11 (NAVSPECWARGRU 11) is comprised of SEAL Teams 17 & 18, Title 10 Reserves. ADM William H. McRaven, SOCOM 2020 (Tampa, FL: SOCOM, August 2012).

<sup>56</sup> The role of 21 and 23 SAS is to augment United Kingdom SOF operations freeing the regular SAS from reconnaissance tasks and allowing them to focus on direct action (DA) missions. In the 1991 Gulf War, members of SAS reserves were used as battlefield casualty replacements for deployed active SAS units. SAS reservists also deployed to the Balkans in the mid-90s and were engaged in peace support operations. In Afghanistan the SAS reservists conducted 'hearts and minds' operations providing medical and other assistance to local forces and populations. In Helmand Province they deployed in a mentoring role, training and operating alongside the Afghan National Police (ANP). <http://www.eliteukforces.info/special-air-service/sas-reserves/>.

<sup>57</sup> Major Force Program (MFP)-11 funding is SOCOM allocated funding for SOF related training and equipment.

<sup>58</sup> ADM William H. McRaven, SOCOM 2020 (Tampa, FL: SOCOM, August 2012).

<sup>59</sup> Department of Defense, *Strategy for Homeland Defense and Defense Support of Civil Authorities*, DOD Directive 1918-13 (Washington DC: Secretary of the Defense, February 25, 2013) 15.

<sup>60</sup> ADM William H. McRaven, SOCOM 2020 (Tampa, FL: SOCOM, August 2012).

<sup>61</sup> Honorable Thomas R. Lamont, Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs. <http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/statemnt/2011/05%20May/Lamont-Bostick%2005-11-11.pdf>.