Evidence on the Effectiveness of the Defense Acquisition Board Process
Abstract
This study is concerned primarily with the effectiveness of the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) process in assuring that Major Defense Acquisition Programs are completed within cost and on schedule and perform as anticipated. It begins by articulating how inferences about the effectiveness of the DAB can be drawn from comparisons of the outcomes of groups of programs. The paper presents two comparisons: (1) single-Service new starts that is, programs to acquire a system of a new design with joint new starts; and (2) single-Service programs launched during the Cold War to acquire variants or modifications of, or to remanufacture (VMR) systems already fielded, with such programs initiated post-Cold War. The comparisons were made using eight metrics. The differences in the metrics were consistent and those on which the paper's conclusions rest were large. The Office of the Secretary of Defense acquisition oversight process clearly fell somewhat short in dealing with the problems presented by joint new starts and by single-Service VMRs post-Cold War. The paper concludes by noting that these shortfalls seem to reflect a lack of sufficient oversight by the DAB in circumstances in which oversight is needed after a program has been given authority to proceed.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- May 01, 2013
- Accession Number
- ADA589871
Entities
People
- Brandon R. Gould
- David L. Mcnicol
- Eugenia Fuchs
- Linda Wu
- Patricia F. Bronson
Organizations
- Institute for Defense Analyses