

Strategy Research Project International Fellow

U.S.-Brazil Cooperation: Working Together to Shape The Global Strategic Environment

by

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United States Army War College
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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

**U.S.-BRAZIL COOPERATION: WORKING TOGETHER TO SHAPE THE GLOBAL
STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT**

by

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U.S.-Brazil relations have been characterized by friendship for the past two centuries. The two main powers in the Americas have had more similarities than differences in their history, geography, formation of people, beliefs and political values. The U.S. remains the only superpower, but has been facing many challenges in the volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous international scenario. Brazil is consolidating its growth, leading the country to a more significant role on the world stage. This paper reviews the history of U.S.-Brazil cooperation, the major pillars of Brazilian foreign policy and the main aspects of U.S. foreign policy, and presents opportunities to enhance cooperation between the two countries. This paper concludes that the two countries can expand their historic cooperation by strengthening convergences and building complementary forms of activity to shape a more favorable global strategic environment.

U.S.-Brazil Cooperation: Working Together to Shape The Global Strategic Environment

The discovery of America was the prelude to the eventual establishment of two great countries: United States of America (U.S.) and Brazil. These two American nations have many similarities in their history, geography, formation of people, beliefs and political values.

Both countries were colonized by major European powers, the British and Portugal. They were colonies on which the European metropolis massively exploited their resources, according to the Mercantilist model. Both countries have in their histories a long period when the work force was based on slavery (at least in the southern U.S.). Their territories were expanded from smaller settlements on the coast to the interior, and they became countries with great territory in which there are many important natural resources available for the development of their economies. They each created a new Federal Capital.

The U.S. and Brazil received the French revolutionary ideals even before the revolution occurred in France in the end of 18th century. The American Revolution and the consequent independence of the U.S. were milestones that signed the rupture of the dominance of European powers and the belief that the New World should be a place of countries in which liberty, equality and fraternity would be the basis for a free people. The U.S. declared its independence in 1776 and consolidated its liberty in 1783 when the British acknowledged the U.S. as an independent country. Brazil, the largest country in Latin America, obtained its independence from Portugal in 1822. The U.S. was the first country to acknowledge Brazil's independence in 1824.

Lands of opportunity, both countries received waves of immigrants during their expansion and development, which made the diversity of cultures their people's main characteristic. They fought together against totalitarianism during World War I (WWI) and World War II (WWII), and were aligned during the Cold War against the spread of communism. Today, the U.S. and Brazil share the same values and principles and are two of the most important democracies on the international stage. They also cooperate in support of democracy and against terrorism.

The U.S. has become one of the most developed countries in the world and now is the only superpower. This makes the U.S. the most important actor in the world arena and it will remain so for a long time. The U.S. has been facing many challenges in the volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous (VUCA) international environment, such as persistent world economic crisis, political instability in many countries, and diffused security threats. This highlights the importance of international cooperation to reduce the threats to political freedom and economic development.

Brazil has grown rapidly in the last two decades. The country is now the seventh largest economy in the world and it has been reducing the poverty and inequality of its citizens. Brazil is one of the world's emerging powers, commonly referred to as the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa).¹ Brazil has become the de facto regional leader in South America and is becoming a global actor as a consequence of its new level of economic power. Brazil's foreign policy has become broader than ever before, leading the country to play a more significant role on the world stage. Brazil is looking for more cooperation among countries to promote economic development and strengthen democratic principles.

The thesis of this paper is that historic friendship and similarities in foreign policies should lead the U.S. and Brazil to greater cooperation on the world stage. This can be accomplished by strengthening convergences and building complementary forms of activity to help shape a more favorable global strategic environment.

This paper will first review the history of U.S.-Brazil cooperation in order to better understand the historic links between the two countries. It will then review the major pillars of Brazilian and U.S. foreign policy. Finally, it will discuss opportunities and present recommendations for greater cooperation on the global stage.

The History of U.S.-Brazil Cooperation

The U.S. and Brazil have had a historical commitment to cooperate on diverse issues, and today there is more scope for U.S.-Brazil cooperation than ever before. The two countries have been cooperating since the latter's independence. Cooperation was initially centered on bilateral relations because of Brazil's need for external support to consolidate its borders, strengthen its economy, and recover from political/economic crisis. From the WWII to the 1960s, this cooperation expanded to cooperation in the Latin American region, essentially in response to the ideological challenges of the Cold War. From the 1960s to the 1980s, cooperation decreased after Brazil's foreign policy moved away from its traditional support of U.S. foreign policy. Currently, U.S.-Brazil cooperation has a new face, based on Brazil's new level of power and on the basis of greater reciprocity.

U.S recognition of Brazil's independence was the first step of the history of U.S.-Brazil cooperation. This was done in context of the Monroe Doctrine established by U.S. President James Monroe in 1823.² The Monroe Doctrine was important for Brazil—if not essential—in its struggle against European imperialism and to guarantee the country's

independence.³ This was Brazil's primary national objective after its separation from Portugal.

Cooperation between the two young countries focused on the necessity to consolidate their territories, institutions, politics, economies, and national unity. They had to protect themselves from regional and international threats and to guarantee/expand their territories to attain their objectives. The Brazil-Argentina Palmas border dispute in 1895 was an example of diplomatic cooperation. U.S. President Grover Cleveland was called to arbitrate the border dispute and the decision was favorable to Brazil.

The U.S. became the primary destination of Brazil's coffee exports and an important lender of money in the transition from the 19th to the 20th Centuries. This demanded more cooperation between the two countries.

Cooperation between the U.S. and Brazil increased in the 20th Century. Brazil had achieved its goal of securing its borders with its neighbors⁴ and the Prata River region was stable in the beginning of the century. This allowed Brazilian diplomacy to concentrate on new objectives: international projection—looking to attain regional hegemony in South America—and national development. Brazil would necessarily approach the U.S. given its ascendance as a new international power. Moreover, the Monroe Doctrine was still in place and reinforced by the Roosevelt Corollary (1904).⁵ Brazil sought to obtain a more important position on the international stage and the alliance with the U.S. would be important step to achieve that goal,⁶ according to Rio de Janeiro Pontifical Catholic University Foreign Relations Institute Professor Leticia Pinheiro.

U.S.-Brazil cooperation during WWI was a significant milestone.⁷ Brazil declared war on Germany soon after the U.S. entered WWI and joined the allied forces with naval patrols in the South Atlantic and small units that were sent to Europe. WWI brought the two economies closer together because of the decline in Brazilian commerce with Britain and the increase in commerce with the U.S.

Brazil was strongly impacted by the Great Depression (1929) after WWI. Brazil's agriculture-based economy collapsed because of the decline in agricultural exports. That situation caused internal political instability and the military overthrew the agrarian power elite with support for a new industrial elite in 1930. The Brazilian *Old Republic* had come to an end. The new industrial elite increased Brazil's industrialization, based on import substitution. This pattern of industrialization was known in Brazil as "Americanism" because it had U.S. industry as a model. Brazil's industrial elite believed that increased economic relations with the U.S. would be better for Brazil than prioritizing relations with European economies. However, some political forces in Brazil still believed that the same support for industrialization could be attained by approaching Germany. At that point, cooperation between the two countries was decisive for Brazil stay in favor of the Allies than the Axis powers. The U.S. approached Brazil diplomatically and economically, offering support to establish the first Brazilian steel plant, the Companhia Siderúrgica Nacional (National Steel Company) in 1941.

The U.S. Good Neighbor Policy (1933) and the Inter-American Conference at Rio de Janeiro (1942) illustrate how the two countries were close to each other. Both countries took actions to encourage the other countries in the Americas to establish a broader alliance against the Axis totalitarian regimes. That occasion may have been the

first significant U.S.-Brazil cooperation to shape the strategic environment in the Western hemisphere. U.S.-Brazil cooperation at that time can be best depicted by the Brazilian Expeditionary Division (with approximately 25,000 soldiers) that fought alongside U.S. forces in Italy. Brazil and the U.S. would continue cooperate in favor of a new international order after the war, especially in the negotiations to create the United Nations (UN). Both countries were UN founding members.

New signs of U.S.-Brazil cooperation were seen during the Cold War. The most significant event was the establishment of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance signed in Rio de Janeiro on September 2, 1947. The treaty was a collective security mechanism, focused on the containment of the spread of communism.

Brazilian President Juscelino Kubitschek proposed Operation Pan-America—an economic development program for Latin America—in 1958 in face of growing communist movements and anti-U.S. sentiments in Latin America.⁸ This initiative proposed, “a reorientation of hemispheric policy, intended to place Latin America, by a process of full appraisal, in a position to participate more effectively in the defense of the West, with a growing sense of vitality and a greater development of its capacities.”⁹ This Brazilian initiative was embraced by the U.S. The U.S. also created the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and promoted the Alliance for Progress¹⁰. Brazil led the creation of the Latin American Free Trade Association (ALALC, in Portuguese) as an indirect result of this cooperation. These actions were to shape a better strategic environment in Latin America and to neutralize the influence of communism by emphasizing economic development as the foundation of a more socially just Latin America.

Brazil has cooperated in the diplomatic and military fields with the U.S. to shape a more stable international environment acting in international institutions such as the UN and the Organization of American States (OAS). Brazil has participated in peacekeeping operations with observers since 1947, and the country increased its participation with soldiers in the 1950s. Brazil sent an infantry battalion to the UN Emergency Force in Suez (UNEF) in 1957-67, and Air Force personnel to the UN Operation in the Congo (ONUC) in 1961-64.

U.S.-Brazil cooperation decreased in the period from 1961 to 1985, because Brazil turned its foreign policy from Americanism to neutralism and globalism. However, the country kept close ideological cooperation with the U.S. to block the spread of communism in Latin America during the first years of the military regime in Brazil in 1964-67. The most significant signs of this close ideological cooperation were the break in Brazil-Cuba relations in 1964, and Brazilian participation in the Inter-American Peace Force in the Dominican Republic—lead by the U.S.—with 1,100 soldiers in 1965. However, a sign of the decreasing cooperation was the fact that Brazil renounced the U.S.-Brazil Military Assistance Agreement in 1977, after it had been in effect since 1952. Another sign was that Brazil signed cooperation agreements with Germany to develop the Brazilian nuclear program in 1975 despite the objection of the U.S.

Brazil's military government was replaced by a civilian government in 1985. This transition coincided with a major economic crisis which forced the civilian government to call for the assistance of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the U.S. Brazil promoted many economic reforms and started to grow rapidly in the late 1990s.

U.S.-Brazil cooperation improved on a new basis following the economic stabilization. Brazil adopted many principles of the Washington Consensus¹¹ to open its economy and strengthen free market forces and the country became a more active actor in international issues. U.S.-Brazil cooperation expanded to many different areas. Also, Brazil's new economic power allowed the country to become a more significant voice on the international stage. This helped to establish U.S.-Brazil cooperation on the basis of greater reciprocity. In President Obama's words in his speech in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, in March 20th, 2011:

Let us stand together — not as senior and junior partners, but as equal partners, joined in a spirit of mutual interest and mutual respect, committed to the progress we can make together. Together, we can advance our common prosperity. As two of the world's largest economies, we worked side by side during the financial crisis to restore growth and confidence.¹²

U.S.-Brazil military cooperation is limited to a defense dialogue to shape collective security, and there are barriers to enhance cooperation in other fields. The Free Trade Area of Americas (FTAA) negotiations failed in 2005 because the U.S. and Brazil were not able to agree on the reduction of agricultural subsidies and the protection of intellectual property rights.¹³ There were also disagreements about the stalled Doha round of the World Trade Organization (WTO).

New horizons for cooperation have been seen recently. Presidents Barack Obama and Dilma Rousseff released a joint statement during the Brazilian President's official visit to the U.S. on April 9, 2012. They expressed the intent to cooperate beyond bilateral issues, looking to other countries and regions. The most significant points in the joint statement were that the two leaders "committed to working with the GOH [Government of Haiti] on developing and implementing its national energy plan ... [and]

directed the establishment of a Defense Cooperation Dialogue (DCD) ... They decided to intensify bilateral and multilateral cooperation in the field of physical protection and nuclear safety, as well as the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.”¹⁴ According to Congressional Research Service Latin American analyst Peter J. Meyer, “current issues in U.S.-Brazil relations include counternarcotics and counterterrorism efforts, energy security, trade, human rights, and the environment.”¹⁵

Brazilian Foreign Policy

The current Brazilian foreign policy was implemented during the President Cardoso administration (1995-1998 and 1999-2002). Support for regional integration and insertion into the international multilateral institutions were added to the traditional Brazilian foreign policy directed by a so called “responsible pragmatism”. The addition of multilateralism and integration contributed to a new paradigm.¹⁶ Indeed, it means to strengthen the UN and international multilateral institutions to attain a better strategic scenario for Brazil. Professor Leticia Pinheiro called this new paradigm “pragmatic institutionalism.”¹⁷

Brazil’s foreign policy emphasized the new paradigm under the President Lula administration (2003-2006 and 2007-2010). Brazil foreign policy is characterized by institutionalism and integration in the current Rousseff administration.¹⁸

Strategic Orientation

Brazil’s current foreign policy is guided by Brazilian national interests. These interests were summarized by then-Lieutenant Colonel Ronald Lundgren, a Brazilian Army officer and former student at the U.S. Army War College, in his 2002 Strategy Research Project. According to Lundgren, Brazil’s national interests include democracy, free trade, peace in South America, and the country’s insertion into the international

decision-making process.¹⁹ Brazil has been seeking deeper integration in Latin America, especially in South America, more relevance in the discussions of international issues, and more participation in peacekeeping operations.²⁰

Brazil's current foreign policy strategy is to build coalitions and strengthen Brazil's participation in multilateral institutions to promote the rearrangement of the international balance of power and thus attain favorable conditions to promote the nation's development.²¹ Paraphrasing Duke University Assistant Professor of Public Policy Hal Brands, Brazil's current foreign policy activity aims to balance the U.S. influence in South America, build coalitions to magnify Brazilian negotiating power, and seek to position Brazil as the leader of a more united South America.²² Brazil has strong influence in South America, and is acting to spread its influence to Central America and Caribbean. Brazil strengthens multilateralism and South-South relations.

Brazil is acting even more like an international middle power, using the best of its skills, soft power.²³ The term "soft power", as defined by Harvard University Professor Joseph S. Nye, Jr., and University of Waterloo Professor David A. Welch, is "[t]he ability to obtain desired outcomes through attraction or persuasion rather than coercion or payment."²⁴

International institutions are important forums for the exercise of Brazil's soft power. The country is a member of the major international institutions, such as the UN, OAS, IMF, World Bank and IDB. Brazil also sees the G-20 as an opportunity to discuss economic development, employment, and energy issues in favor of developing global governance. Brazil advocates that developing countries should have more participation

in world economic decision-making,²⁵ as a consequence of the growth of emerging powers and globalization.

Historically, most of the international community sees Brazil as a neutral country.²⁶ Brazil's traditional foreign policy based on multilateralism, peaceful dispute settlement, and nonintervention in the affairs of other countries is the most likely reason for this perception.²⁷ The country has good relationships with practically all nations in the world. Brazil has influenced other countries to establish or join agreements in many fields, especially regarding regional integration. Brazil's use of soft power allowed it to help create the Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR) and, more recently, the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR).

Brazil's ability to softly create good relations with almost all countries makes it attractive for major world powers to cooperate with Brazil in promoting common solutions to international issues. For example, Brazil along with Turkey tried to negotiate an alternative agreement with Iran to resolve the Iranian nuclear crisis in 2010. That initiative indicates that Brazil is seeking to play a more significant role on the international stage, using its soft power to mediate disputes. Professor Nye, Jr. wrote about this issue, "[i]n soft power terms, Brazil's popular culture of carnival and football has transnational appeal, and it has adopted a foreign policy designed to project a positive image in Latin America and beyond."²⁸ Brazil has increased cooperation with countries in all continents.²⁹ Inter-regionally, Brazil participates in several meetings like the Ibero-American Summit, the Latin America, Caribbean and European Union Summit, the India-Brazil-South Africa Forum, the South America-Africa Summit, the East Asia-Latin America Cooperation Forum, the South America-Arab Countries

Summit, and the G-15.³⁰ This illustrates how Brazil is using multilateral activity to diversify its international relations.

World Economy

Brazil increased its participation in World Trade Organization (WTO) discussions, and supported the Canadian proposal to expand the G-8 group and create the G-20 in 1999. Brazilian participation in the WTO Doha round reveals the country is today a significant country on the economic stage.³¹ The Johns Hopkins University Professor Riordan Roett wrote referring to Doha round, “[i]t is clear that the fate of any future trade talks will require pragmatic and open negotiations between the BRICS and their allies and not with the United States and the EU [European Union].”³² Brazil’s foreign policy objective is to seek free trade and economic development, with a focus on the developing countries’ needs, without negating the importance of the developed countries in free trade.³³

Brazil is negotiating to expand MERCOSUR to include the economic integration of the full status members (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Venezuela, and Uruguay), and the eventual integration of the associated members (Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru).

Meyer summarizes Brazil’s activity in South America, “[b]y promoting integration through organizations like Mercosur and Unasur, Brazil has been able to solidify its role as a regional power. These organizations provide forums in which Brazil can exercise leadership and build broad support for its positions on regional and global issues.”³⁴

Brazil’s activity and interests are not restricted to South America. The country looks to increase its relationship with Central America and the Caribbean. Brazil is leading the process of expanding the Latin America Integration Association (ALADI, in

Portuguese) to Central America and Caribbean. Also, Brazil is an important actor in the Summit of Latin America and the Caribbean on Integration and Development (CALC, in Portuguese) and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC, in Portuguese).

International Security

The emergence of Brazil as an economic power supports the country's hard power.³⁵ Nye, Jr. defined hard power as, "[t]he ability to obtain desired outcomes through coercion or payment."³⁶ Brazil's hard power can be perceived in two ways: when the country uses pressure and obstruction in diplomatic and collective security regional and international institutions, and by the use of its military in peacekeeping operations under the UN mandate.

Brazil is one of the founding members of the UN and the OAS. Both organizations are seen by Brazil as appropriate forums to maintain the international system of peace and security created after WWII. Peacekeeping operations are the most visible Brazilian contribution to international peace and security. Brazil has roughly 2,200 military and police personnel involved in UN peacekeeping operations.³⁷ The most significant is the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). Brazil also has been participating in the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) since 2006, helping to patrol the coast of Lebanon. The success of MINUSTAH and participation in other peacekeeping operations provided Brazil with good experience, and made the country a qualified contributor to world peace and security.

Brazil joins efforts to preserve peace and stability in the American continent. Brazil also "helped diffuse potential political crisis in Venezuela, Paraguay, Ecuador, Bolivia, Colombia, and Haiti."³⁸ According to Council on Foreign Relations think tank

members Samuel W. Bodman, James D. Wolfensohn, and Julia E. Sweig, this illustrates how Brazil led the way to form the South American Defense Council as a cooperative security suborganization under UNASUR.³⁹

Brazil represses gang and drug-dealing activity internally and assists border countries to do the same. “Indeed, Brazilian bilateral and multilateral diplomacy and counternarcotics assistance in Bolivia are examples of a strategy of engagement that has helped advance Brazilian economic and security interests as well as regional stability”,⁴⁰ according to Bodman, Wolfensohn, and Sweig.

Brazil supports international initiatives to prevent terrorism. Brazil promotes operations with MERCOSUR countries to interrupt financial support to terrorist groups from cells located along Brazil-Paraguay-Argentina border. The Brazilian military also will be employed in the security of the Soccer World Cup (20124) and the Olympics (2016) to prevent terrorism.

Energy

Energy issues are becoming a stage where Brazil is a significant player. Only 54 percent of the Brazil’s energy consumption is from non-renewable sources, the lowest percentage among the largest economies in the world.⁴¹ Moreover, massive oil reserves discovered off the Brazilian coast and a strong biofuels program, especially ethanol, have enhanced the country’s position in the international economy. Brazil’s foreign policy is to promote world energy integration with a focus on sustainability and the regional interconnection of infrastructure.

Environment and Climate Change

Brazil advocates actions in favor of sustainable forest management and the application of the Kyoto Protocol. The latter has been a difficult point of discussion

among nations, and much more effort is needed to develop an international consensus about this issue.

Democracy and Human Rights

Brazil supports UN and multilateral initiatives to ensure respect for the principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The UN Human Rights Committee and the International Criminal Court are significant institutions Brazil has joined and supported.

An important Brazilian activity is the promotion of democratic values. Every country admitted as full member of MERCOSUR has to accept not only the block's economic conditions, but also the democratic clause stated by the Protocol of Ushuaia (1998).⁴² This could be a way to prevent threats to democracy in the continent. One example of Brazil's enforcement of democratic values in South America is that Brazil led MERCOSUR to sanction Paraguay soon after the Paraguayan Congress impeached the President within 36 hours in 2011. MERCOSUR's members concluded that the Paraguayan Congress did not grant the former President the right to defend himself properly, which MERCOSUR considered a strong offense to constitutional order and democracy in that country. Paraguay was suspended from MERCOSUR up to the next Presidential elections in 2013.

U.S. Foreign Policy

The new international order that emerged in 1991, after the post-Cold War era, brought complexity and instability, rather than stability, to the world. There are now many more actors in the international arena and they are more interconnected than before.⁴³ Terrorism, insurgency, weapons of mass destruction proliferation, economic

crisis, climate change, food security, corruption, crime, and oppression of minorities challenge states and international institutions.

The U.S. is the main actor on the international stage as the only superpower, and its foreign policy interests all countries. Former U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright called the U.S. “the indispensable nation.”⁴⁴ The U.S. reaction to the 9/11 terrorist attacks showcased U.S. unilateralism. Today, after conducting two long wars, the U.S. is coming back to appreciate multilateralism as an efficient tool to address international issues, and to shape a new global partnership.⁴⁵ U.S. grand strategy as stated in the U.S. National Security Strategy highlights the essence of the current foreign policy and states how the U.S. wants to operate in the 21st Century:

Our national security strategy is, therefore, focused on renewing American leadership so that we can more effectively advance our interests in the 21st century. We will do so by building upon the sources of our strength at home, while shaping an international order that can meet the challenges of our time. [...]The starting point for that collective action will be our engagement with other countries. [...]We are working to build deeper and more effective partnerships with other key centers of influence—including China, India, and Russia, as well as increasingly influential nations such as Brazil, South Africa, and Indonesia—so that we can cooperate on issues of bilateral and global concern, with the recognition that power, in an interconnected world, is no longer a zero sum game.⁴⁶

Strategic Orientation

The National Security Strategy and the First Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review contain the major rules of U.S. foreign policy. These rules are focused in shaping an international order that meets the challenges of the 21st Century.

The main goal of U.S. foreign policy is to restore and sustain American leadership. The First Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review states that “[s]ustaining our leadership requires the restoration of our own strengths and capacities at home.”⁴⁷ This document also contains Secretary of State Clinton’s words, “[t]oday

more than ever, our ability to exercise global leadership depends on building a strong foundation here at home. That's why rising debt and crumbling infrastructure pose very real long-term national security threats."⁴⁸

The U.S. is seeking to build and shape a new global architecture of cooperation to work and partner with others in pursuit of shared objectives. The premise is to work with its traditional allies and include emerging centers of regional or global influence, and non-state actors. It calls for a reform in existing structures for cooperative action and the creation of new ones and the establishment of a network of alliances and partnerships, regional organizations and global institutions.⁴⁹ This meets what Australian Defence College Professor Michael Evans stated, "U.S. global power is largely based on agreement and consent through a network of multilateral institutions and alliances."⁵⁰ The speech delivered by Secretary of Defense Leon E. Panetta at the U.S. Institute of Peace, Washington, DC, on June 28, 2012, summarizes this commitment:

In the 21st Century, we must build partnerships that enable us to better meet a wider range of challenges. To that end, I see us building networks that leverage our unique capabilities – and the unique strengths of our allies and partners that share common interests – to confront the critical challenges of the future.⁵¹

The 21st Century environment requires the U.S. to engage not only states but beyond them. Civil societies—the activists, organizations, congregations, and journalists, etc—throughout the world are targets of U.S. diplomatic approach.

U.S. diplomacy seeks to elevate development and integrate the power of development and diplomacy by helping other nations develop the capacity to solve their own problems and participate in collective solutions to shared problems. The First Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review mentions some examples, "[p]reventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction requires that other countries

have secure borders. Preventing global pandemics requires good health systems in every country in the world. Addressing global climate change requires the shared commitment of all countries to green technology and environmentally friendly growth.”⁵²

U.S. diplomacy seeks the development of international partnerships to prevent emerging violence and state failure that pose risks to U.S. security and prosperity, and to protect populations where mass atrocities and other violence pose an affront to U.S. values. A key element of this diplomacy is the capability to strengthen the security of states at risk of violence both through effective, accountable security and justice systems able to guarantee internal security and through stronger civilian institutions and effective justice systems. This is to be achieved by investing to build capable partners.⁵³

World Economy

The world economic system is still based on the concepts of Breton Woods, but the new world order in the post-Cold War era has been changing the face of the international commerce and finance. U.S. foreign policy is to promote economic security and prosperity at home and abroad, according to U.S. Department of State.⁵⁴ The U.S. promotes free market forces and acts in opening economies to achieve this objective. Multilateral institutions, such as the WTO, are gaining even more importance.

Free trade agreements have been an important tool for the U.S. in reducing barriers to trade and protecting finance since the last decade of the 20th Century. The U.S. has 14 free trade agreements in force with 20 countries, and is in the process of negotiating the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) with Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore and Vietnam,⁵⁵ and the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) with the EU. The North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) has significantly increased the commerce

among the U.S., Canada and Mexico. The Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR) is a successful enterprise. Finally, free trade agreements were ratified with Panama in 2011 and Colombia in 2012.

The U.S. tried to establish a free trade agreement with all the American countries. Talks towards the establishment of the FTAA began with the Summit of the Americas, in the U.S. (1994). The last summit was held in Argentina (2005), but no agreement on FTAA was reached. The U.S. is still committed to open markets in Latin America via bilateral free trade agreements and unilateral trade concessions, despite the failure of the FTAA negotiations. Today, the most important issues for U.S. trade policy in the Americas are negotiations about agricultural subsidies, services, and intellectual property in the WTO.

International Security

The highest U.S. priority in the international security field is to protect the country. This includes the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism.⁵⁶ U.S. foreign policy addresses the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction through “the negotiation and implementation of effectively verifiable and diligently enforced arms control and disarmament agreements involving weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery as well as certain conventional weapons.”⁵⁷

U.S. counterterrorism foreign policy is to forge partnerships with non-state actors, multilateral organizations, and foreign governments to advance the counterterrorism objectives and national security of the U.S.⁵⁸ Counterterrorism is an issue on which the U.S. must work together with other countries and international institutions, like the UN and the Global Counterterrorism Forum.⁵⁹ U.S. counterterrorism foreign policy must be integrated with many other issues, such as economic development, democracy, human

rights, governance, food security, and arms control, to succeed. U.S. counterterrorism foreign policy is focused on counterterrorism capacity building, foreign law enforcement, and strengthening justice and interior ministries.⁶⁰ This requires strong international cooperation.

Parallel to counterterrorism foreign policy is counternarcotics foreign policy. The U.S. combats criminal elements to prevent the production, trafficking, and abuse of illicit drugs.⁶¹ The U.S. negotiates in the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, works with international organizations to develop international standards to prevent terrorist financing and money laundering, and provides technical assistance and training to key countries.⁶²

Conflict prevention and stabilization around the world is an important topic of U.S. foreign policy. It is characterized by breaking cycles of violent conflict and mitigating crises in priority countries. The U.S. is committed to work with the international community to address conflict and promote stabilization to attain this policy.⁶³ Cooperation in this issue is a rule of thumb, especially regarding peace operations, as in the case of Libya in 2011 where cooperation with NATO was key to success.

Energy

U.S. Department of State points out, on its Home Page on Internet, that “all our diplomatic relationships advance our interests in having access to secure, reliable, and ever-cleaner sources of energy.”⁶⁴ U.S. foreign policy is to lead global policy on energy, and to advance this issue in regional and multilateral institutions. U.S. actions aim to protect U.S. energy security and that of its allies and partners, and foster international cooperation toward a global clean energy future.⁶⁵ The latter opens space for joint

initiatives among friendly countries, especially in the Americas. An example of that is the U.S. initiative to integrate energy systems in the Americas, called “Connecting the Americas 2022.”⁶⁶

Other U.S. energy initiatives are to deepen oil and natural gas integration with Canada and Mexico, and cooperation in clean energy issues and shale gas exploitation. President Obama announced the release of the Blueprint for a Secure Energy Future on March 30, 2011. This document highlights conventional and unconventional natural gas, specifically from shale, as a crucial domestic energy source that is expected to play an important role in securing U.S. energy future. The document also indicates that shale exploitation is a field for international cooperation, “[t]he U.S. Energy Department is leading an Unconventional Gas Census for the Asia Pacific at the request of APEC energy ministers. These programs benefit both developing countries and the U.S. by moderating oil demand growth in these rapidly growing economies and facilitating fuel-switching to cleaner natural gas.”⁶⁷

Environment and Climate Change

The U.S. is taking several measures to lead the process of addressing the impact of developed and developing economies on the environment. The most significant is the Global Climate Change Initiative (GCCII), launched by the U.S. in 2009, in the context of the Copenhagen Conference.⁶⁸ This initiative addresses climate changing by laying the foundation for low-carbon growth, accelerating the clean energy revolution, and reducing emissions and conserving forests. U.S. efforts to achieve this are through bilateral assistance programs and multilateral contributions to help countries plan and implement effective climate adaptation activities.⁶⁹ The U.S. has an important role in the international institutions which discuss this issue, such as the Conference of the Parties

to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate.

Democracy and Human Rights

The U.S. has been an active defender of democratic values in the international institutions, and has influenced many societies by its soft power. The U.S. has been also supporting—directly or via international institutions—democracy, human rights and good governance as means to achieve security, stability, and prosperity around the world.⁷⁰ The U.S. Department of State highlights that “[t]he U.S. is committed to advancing democracy, human rights, gender equality, and sound governance to protect individual freedoms and foster sustainable economic growth.”⁷¹ The major instruments to attain this are programs conducted by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), partnerships with other public and private donors and foreign governments, and humanitarian assistance in case of natural disasters.

Opportunities to Enhance U.S.-Brazil Cooperation

Current U.S. foreign policy is based on strengthening international institutions and cooperation to promote economic development, peace, and stability. Current Brazilian foreign policy aims to create a new balance of power and strengthened international institutions to provide a strategic scenario characterized by economic and social growth, peace, and stability.

The U.S. and Brazil have convergences in their foreign policy objectives, despite the asymmetry between their levels of power. Independent researcher and retired U.S. Air Force Lieutenant Colonel E. Richard Downes, wrote about U.S.-Brazil cooperation in his article in the National Defense University Strategic Forum, “[l]ooking globally, common interests [in the Western hemisphere] include alternative energy development,

trade, peacekeeping, cybersecurity, nuclear nonproliferation, international terrorism, narcotics-trafficking, the environment, and development in Africa.”⁷² These issues provide a vast field for potential cooperation between the U.S. and Brazil. The two countries should look at their histories and develop a new era of friendly and strong cooperation.

National Defense University Center for Strategic Research Distinguished Visiting Fellow and Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars Brazil Institute Advisory Council member Ambassador Luigi R. Einaudi has the same perception, “[t]he ultimate objective should be for the United States and Brazil to direct their bilateral efforts toward maximizing both regional and global cooperation, with particular emphasis on conflict resolution, energy, and trade.”⁷³

Diplomatic Activity

Brazil is now a regional leader⁷⁴ and an international actor in promoting economic integration and democratic values. This ability to gather opinions and produce consensus may be of interest to U.S. foreign policy decision-makers. Brazil can be a communications channel with countries that the U.S. has more difficulty approaching.⁷⁵ According to Downes, mentioning a veteran Washington analyst of the country, Brazil has become “a respected player and interlocutor with both the emerging market countries and the industrial countries.”⁷⁶ Brazilian diplomacy can reach otherwise inaccessible countries like Cuba, Venezuela, and Iran. U.S. Army then-Lieutenant Colonel Lawrence T. Brown wrote about this possible role for Brazil in his 2012 Strategy Research Project at Army War College, “[a]nd its role as a third party broker does not end with Africa or other poor regions. Brazil sees itself as a viable broker for peace as

evidenced with its last-ditch diplomatic effort with Iran that attempted to resolve the uranium processing crisis.”⁷⁷

Cooperation between the U.S. and Brazil in addressing major issues could be a constructive use of both countries’ smart power,⁷⁸ and very useful in shaping a new international order. German Marshall Fund of the United States Transatlantic Fellow Dr. Daniel M. Kliman and Center for a New American Security President Richard Fontaine, in their report for the project that examines how the United States and its European allies can partner more closely with Brazil, India, Indonesia and Turkey to strengthen the international order, state, “[w]ith the global swing states still formulating their roles on the international stage, it is critical for Washington to act now. American decisions today will influence whether Brazil, India, Indonesia and Turkey contribute to the global order tomorrow.”⁷⁹

The U.S. and Brazil have many existing dialogue mechanisms, like the Economic Partnership Dialogue, the U.S.-Brazil Management Committee to Advance Cooperation on Biofuels, the Political-Military Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Dialogue, and the Global Partnership Dialogue (GPD).⁸⁰ The potential for enhanced U.S.-Brazil relations was summarized by U.S. Army Colonel James K. Rose’s in his article for the Center for Strategic Leadership of the U.S. Army War College:

Some analysts argue that the United States has been slow to comprehend Brazil’s transformation into an economic and political power. Now is the time for the United States to re-calibrate its partnership with Brazil. It must leverage the strengths of its own elements of economic power to forge a strong and lasting partnership with this emerging giant. The United States and Brazil are historically linked politically, economically and, to an ever growing extent, culturally. The United States must intensify its efforts to demonstrate to its southern neighbor that while other countries do have much to offer Brazil, the United States can offer more and is still clearly a partner of choice.⁸¹

The U.S. seeks to establish a better international system of global governance. Brazil's positions converge with the main U.S. positions in multilateral institutions such as the UN, G-20, WTO, and OAS. This suggests that both countries should cooperate to shape the global strategic environment. For example, the issue of agricultural subsidies helped prevent the conclusion of the Doha round of the WTO negotiations because the EU did not agree to reduce them. The U.S. and Brazil have more competitive agribusinesses and should cooperate to encourage the development of an EU position to one that is more supportive of free trade.

Another important issue is economic integration of American countries. The U.S. and Brazil could cooperate to support OAS,⁸² UNASUR and South American Defense Council efforts to increase economic and political stability in the continent, maintain Latin America free of major conflicts, and promote general development and well being.⁸³

A restructuring of the UN, especially the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), may occur as consequence of the new arrangement of international order. The rise of emerging powers demands a new balance of power in the UN. Brazil aspires to a seat in the UNSC, and the U.S. wants to lead this reform in a way that would support U.S. interests. The U.S. and Brazil are Western countries, and they share many of the same values. U.S.-Brazil cooperation could contribute to a reform of the UNSC that could achieve the both countries' objectives.⁸⁴

World Economy

The U.S. is able to play hard on the international institutions and on bilateral relations to shape the economic environment, especially regarding market opening, free trade, and protection of workers. Brazil sees in free trade a good opportunity to expand

its exports, but the country also believes that to open its economy it is necessary for all countries play according to international commerce rules, especially renouncing subsidies and other forms of indirect protectionism. The U.S. and Brazil should cooperate to unlock the WTO Doha round and convince countries to play more fairly in international commerce.

The successful U.S. experience with NAFTA is another complementary point to Brazil. The development of free markets would increase the two countries' development. Former U.S. Secretary of State and illustrious expert in foreign policy, international affairs, and diplomatic history Henry Kissinger stated, "[i]f discriminatory regional groupings dominate, the Western Hemisphere, with its vast market, will be able to compete effectively with other regional trading blocs; indeed, NAFTA is the most effective means to forestall such a contest or to prevail in it should it occur. [...] an expanded NAFTA could create incentives to abide by free trade, and penalize nations insisting on more restrictive rules."⁸⁵

The long U.S. experience is important to establish FTAA on a sound basis for all American countries in the event that negotiations are resumed. These negotiations should consider that Brazil has the most complex and diversified economy in Latin America.⁸⁶ On the other hand, Brazil's experience and influence in MERCOSUR—and now in UNASUR—could contribute to a broader economic integration of the Americas. Lundgren wrote about this connection Brazil-MERCOSUR-FTAA-WTO in 2002, before the FTAA negotiations were interrupted:

Hence, Brazil should prioritize the negotiations for the implementation of FTAA considering the various interests of Brazil's economic sectors, attempting to stimulate the more competitive ones and preserving those that need more time to adapt to international reality. Negotiations should

be preferably conducted, considering Brazil in the context of MERCOSUL [MERCOSUR], according to norms already agreed upon by the World Trade Organization (WTO).⁸⁷

Brazil is one of the BRICS and has been playing an important role coordinating the economic activity of those countries in international institutions. The BRICS meetings do not represent a solid block of countries, but they are forms of mutual consultation. BRICS countries have more differences than similarities. Actually, Brazil has more similarities with the U.S. than with the other BRICS.⁸⁸ The U.S. and Brazil can cooperate to promote some type of U.S.-BRICS convergence in the WTO negotiations. This could provide a useful approach to help unlock the Doha round.

International Security

Defense, counterterrorism and counternarcotics issues demand deep cooperation between the U.S. and Brazil to establish a collective defense and security system in the Americas, and to contribute to world peace.⁸⁹ The U.S. has a strong presence in international security, such as in counterterrorism, arms control, and protection of world commerce routes and important economic areas. U.S. leadership in protecting the global commons provides security benefits to Brazil. According to Brands, “Washington’s policing of the global commons has allowed Brazil to trade around the world without building a Navy capable of protecting that commerce. In this sense, Brazil is very much a ‘winner’ in the *Pax Americana*.”⁹⁰ Brazil supports international regulations on this issue, and sees the U.S. ability to lead the international community in this matter as beneficial for Brazil.

Brazil participates in major multilateral institutions and has been an active voice in the UN and the UNSC. Brazil has been elected a non-permanent member of the UNSC ten times since the creation of the UN. The U.S. can lead major operations to

maintain the international order, but Brazil is able to contribute to collective security by participating in peace operations. The two countries could cooperate in collective security, according to the level of power of each state. The U.S. and Brazil could cooperate in this field to share experiences and provide training to other countries. This possible cooperation meets what is written in the U.S. Western Hemisphere Defense Policy Statement (October 2012), “[t]hrough this policy statement, the United States underscores its commitment to reinvigorate our defense partnerships based on mutual interests, respect and shared responsibility to protect the citizens and states of this hemisphere.”⁹¹

U.S. counterterrorism and counternarcotics actions promote better domestic conditions for many countries by weakening the power of international criminals and terrorist groups. This U.S. activity indirectly helps Brazil fight organized crime and drug dealers, as it contributes to more stability in the neighboring countries. Also, the U.S. experience in counterterrorism could help Brazil and other American countries prevent terrorist actions in Latin America.

Energy

The U.S. is investing in the development of its own energy sources, including biofuels. Oil and gas drilling is increasing and alternative sources are becoming a reality, like shale oil and gas. Brazil will continue to be an important player in energy issues, as the country is expanding exploitation its large offshore oil reserves. Also, Brazil has significant experience in biofuels and other renewable sources of energy, and it has some shale oil reserves.⁹²

The U.S. and Brazil could cooperate to develop new technologies and to assist other countries to develop clean energy, such as solar and ethanol production, which

have much room to expand in Latin America, Africa, and Southeast Asia. The development of shale oil and gas exploitation technologies is another field for potential cooperation. The U.S. and Brazil could exchange their knowledge in this area to improve exploitation of their reserves and share it with other countries.

The U.S. and Brazil could also coordinate their activities in the international energy market to balance the power of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, and help stabilize or even reduce international oil prices, as the two countries are strengthening their positions as major producers.

Environment and Climate Change

The U.S. recent reduction of its carbon emissions indicates the country has an important contribution to environment preservation. For its part, Brazil is proving its commitment to better reconcile development with preservation. The reduction of deforestation in recent decades is the best example of Brazilian success in preserving the environment. Cooperation between the U.S. and Brazil would help spread environmental management knowhow to other countries, especially in Latin America and Africa.

Democracy and Human Rights

The U.S. is a major contributor to the development of democratic values, human rights and global good governance. Brazil is now a strong democracy, and has been promoting democratic values with other countries in Latin America. The U.S. and Brazil can cooperate regionally and internationally by joining their soft power to support democracy and human rights, and to coordinate actions to obtain that objective.⁹³ This could prevent the divergence of attitudes between the U.S. and Brazil, such as opposing reactions to the coups in Honduras (2009) and Venezuela (2002). Brands

writes about improving U.S.-Brazil communication, “it would be useful to strengthen mechanisms for policy discussion and high-level bilateral communication.”⁹⁴

Conclusion

The U.S. and Brazil have more than ever an opportunity to enhance cooperation. Any solution to international problems requires cooperation to succeed. According to Nye, Jr., “[t]hese solutions require cooperation among governments and international institutions. [...] Success will require partners, and that will mean maintaining old alliances as well as developing new networks that involve emerging powers such as China, India, and Brazil.”⁹⁵

U.S. Ambassador to Brazil Thomas Shannon, Jr. also perceived this time as an opportunity for enhanced U.S.-Brazil cooperation, “[f]or instance, Brazil now recognizes that our similar histories as racially and ethnically diverse countries committed to promoting equality and creating open and tolerant societies creates bonds that Brazil does not share with other partners.”⁹⁶ He also declared:

As the U.S. begins to look around and determine who they will be working with to try to solve some of the world’s problems, we have in Brazil a country that’s shown how to move from a closed economy to a market economy, and a country that shows that you can face deeply entrenched social problems and create democracy.⁹⁷

The U.S. should intensify efforts to pursue a new approach with Brazil, to build a new partnership, in accordance with U.S. foreign policy. Brazil should also leave behind fears about U.S. intentions of dominance, and should take consistent steps towards a strong cooperative relationship with the U.S. on the basis of greater reciprocity, without giving up its independent foreign policy.⁹⁸ Brazil must work with the major powers, and must approach the U.S. seeking cooperation to shape the global strategic environment.

Both countries can—and must—work together to shape what they want as a useful strategic scenario in the Americas and the world.

This research offers the following recommendations to achieve enhanced U.S.-Brazil cooperation.

Diplomatic Activity

The U.S. and Brazil should cooperate to strengthen regional and international institutions, such as the OAS⁹⁹, the IDB, and the UN. The U.S. and Brazil should cooperate to link the activity of UNASUR and CELAC to the activity of OAS.

A reformation of the current international order will soon take place. It would be useful for both countries to cooperate to help shape the international institutions of the new international order. The UNSC reform is inevitable in the mid to long-term. The U.S. and Brazil should cooperate to help Latin America obtain permanent representation on the UNSC, and determine how this council should work. U.S.-Brazil cooperation is therefore important to shape the UNSC in a way that would be beneficial for both countries.

The U.S. and Brazil should gather all the bilateral dialogue initiatives—like the GPD—into a more permanent high-level mechanism of permanent consultation to better understand each others' positions on international matters. The new mechanism would be a U.S.-Brazil Council for Cooperation and Consultation. It could prevent misunderstandings like the U.S. misperception of Brazil and Turkey's joint attempt to mediate an agreement between Iran, the U.S., and the International Atomic Energy Agency in 2010.

World Economy

The U.S. and Brazil seek to take advantage of the large and growing Latin America market, which has a GDP of USD 5,2 trillion, almost the GDP of China, and a population of roughly 580 million people.¹⁰⁰ The two countries should cooperate to begin new negotiations for the creation of the FTAA. These negotiations should consider that the U.S. and Brazil have two of the most complex economies in the Americas. Brazil's agribusiness is modern, competitive, and diversified, and the country's industrial basis is much stronger than other countries. The elimination or reduction of U.S. agricultural subsidies is a prerequisite for Brazil to open its industrial sector. At the same time, Brazil's fear that the U.S. economy would destroy the Brazilian industrial sector does not make sense in a global economy where companies must be more competitive to survive.

FTAA negotiations should consider that Brazil is member of MERCOSUR. This block applies a common external tariff of 20 percent for imported products. The U.S. and Brazil should discuss a common approach to all of MERCOSUR, and elaborate solutions to eliminate or reduce this barrier to free trade. If the U.S. and Brazil are not able to reach an agreement in the short term, they should negotiate specific agreements that would facilitate future free trade, such as the negotiation of regional investment treaty or a regional treaty for the elimination of double taxation. The recent U.S.-Colombia free trade agreement, ratified in 2012, can provide a rough outline for what could be included in a potential U.S.-Brazil free trade agreement.¹⁰¹

The U.S. and Brazil should discuss ways to unlock the WTO Doha round. Cooperation between the two countries should aim to reduce agricultural subsidies, protect intellectual property, encourage other countries to let their currencies float, and

accept minimum standards for the protection of worker rights and the environment. They should also cooperate to discuss with other countries new models for the international economic order, foreseeing a major reform of financial and economic institutions, like the IMF and World Bank, to better accommodate the last two decades of changes in the economic balance of power.

International Security

The U.S. and Brazil announced the establishment of the Defense Cooperation Dialogue (DCD) in 2012 after 35 years without a mechanism for defense cooperation. The DCD is to provide a forum for exchanging views and identifying opportunities for collaboration on defense issues around the globe.¹⁰² This is a good step towards cooperation, but the two countries should be more ambitious. They should cooperate to create in the Americas a new mechanism for collective defense and security (including cybersecurity) other than the old Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance. The new mechanism should be based on this old Treaty and the Inter-American Defense Board/OAS should be transformed into a Council with powers to enforce its resolutions, similar to the UN Security Council but without veto powers. This mechanism should be focused on counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, peace operations, and defense of sea routes in the South Atlantic, the South Pacific, and the Caribbean.

The U.S. and Brazil could increase counternarcotics cooperation to help Latin American countries fight international gangs and drug trafficking organizations. This is not a matter for the military, but for police and intelligence activity. The two countries could help other countries create a more efficient system of justice and improve their means of law enforcement.

Energy

The U.S. and Brazil should create a joint agency to exchange knowledge, promote research, and support clean energy programs in developing countries, especially in Latin America, the Caribbean, and Africa. The two countries should deepen the memorandum of understanding signed between the two countries in 2007 to promote greater cooperation on ethanol and biofuels.¹⁰³ The U.S. and Brazil can capitalize on the projected growth in their energy sectors in the next decades, and should expand their cooperation with other countries. This would help not only their economies, but would also help the development of other countries.

Environment and Climate Change

The U.S. and Brazil should create a joint mechanism to offer the two countries' knowhow in environmental management to other countries, especially in Latin America, the Caribbean, and Africa. The recurrence of climate-related natural disasters highlights how important it is to address this issue. Both countries should cooperate in the UN Frame Work Convention on Climate Change, and in other international forums, to shape climate management in this century.

Democracy and Human Rights

The U.S. and Brazil should cooperate in the OAS to prevent opposing and self-countering actions, such as with the U.S. and Brazilian responses to the Honduran and Venezuelan coups. The U.S. and Brazil are enthusiastic defenders of democratic values. Both countries could cooperate to support young democracies in the Americas by creating a joint agency to offer training and to provide assistance and knowhow when asked for. For example, they could cooperate in state-building in Haiti and work together

to make that country a self-sustaining and stable democracy. They could also cooperate in helping countries conduct fair elections.

The U.S. and Brazil have cooperated for the past two centuries. They have today an important opportunity to strengthen and expand cooperation, which reflects their histories and values, and will help take them safely into the 21st Century.

Endnotes

¹ The BRIC acronym was coined by Jim O'Neill in 2001 to refer to Brazil, Russia, India, China and Russia as the most significant emerging powers in the 21st Century. South Africa was added to the group later on, producing the BRICS acronym.

² *Ourdocuments.Gov Home Page*, <http://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=true&doc=23> (accessed November 18, 2012). "The Monroe Doctrine is the best known U.S. policy toward the Western Hemisphere. Buried in a routine annual message delivered to Congress by President James Monroe in December 1823, the doctrine warns European nations that the United States would not tolerate further colonization or puppet monarchs. The doctrine was conceived to meet major concerns of the moment, but it soon became a watchword of U.S. policy in the Western Hemisphere."

³ Leticia Pinheiro, *Política Externa Brasileira [Brazilian Foreign Policy] (1889-2002)* (Rio de Janeiro, RJ: Zahar, 2010), Kindle e-book.

⁴ The last border dispute—with Peru—was settled in 1909.

⁵ *Office of the Historian, U.S. Department of State Home Page*, <http://history.state.gov/> (accessed November 11, 2012). "The Roosevelt Corollary of December 1904 stated that the United States would intervene as a last resort to ensure that other nations in the Western Hemisphere fulfilled their obligations to international creditors, and did not violate the rights of the United States or invite "foreign aggression to the detriment of the entire body of American nations." As the corollary worked out in practice, the United States increasingly used military force to restore internal stability to nations in the region. Roosevelt declared that the United States might "exercise international police power in 'flagrant cases of such wrongdoing or impotence.'"

⁶ Pinheiro, *Política Externa Brasileira [Brazilian Foreign Policy] (1889-2002)*.

⁷ Jason W. Cronin, *Soft Power and Its Impact on U.S. Influence in Latin America* (Monterrey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2004), Kindle e-book. Cronin writes about Brazil's participation in the WWII along with the U.S., "The strong support made available to the U.S. by Brazil is a demonstration of the effectiveness in cementing the relationship the U.S. achieved with one of the largest nations in the hemisphere."

⁸ Paulo Roberto de Almeida, “Relações Internacionais e política externa do Brasil: uma perspectiva histórica” [International Relations and Brazil’s Foreign Policy: A Historic Perspective], Records of *Brasil 500 Anos Depois* Symposium, A Coruña: Imprensa da Deputación Provincial da Coruña 2002, <http://www.pralmeida.org> (accessed September 15, 2012). According to Almeida, the Operation Pan-America was the first really multilateral initiative of Brazilian Foreign Policy.

⁹ Fordham University, “Modern History Sourcebook: Operation Pan-America, 1959”, Fordham University website, <http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1958panamerica.html> (accessed October 31, 2012). According to the Fordham University, the basic objectives of Operation Pan-America were, “1. Reaffirmation of the principles of hemispheric solidarity; 2. Recognition of underdevelopment as a problem of common interest; 3. Adaptation of inter-American organs and agencies, if necessary, to the requirements of more dynamic action to carry on the struggle against underdevelopment; 4. Technical assistance for increased productivity; 5. Measures to stabilize the market for basic commodities; 6. Adaptation to present needs and expansion of the resources of international financial institutions; 7. Reaffirmation of private initiative in the struggle against underdevelopment; and 8. Revision by each country, where necessary, of its fiscal and economic policy, for the purpose of assuring means to promote economic development.”

¹⁰ Mark Eric Williams, *Understanding U.S.-Latin American Relations* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2012), 193. “The Alliance for Progress sought to achieve three broad goals in Latin America: political democracy, structural change, and economic development.”

¹¹ Ibid, 280. Washington Consensus is a term used to represent neoliberal measures proposed by institutions based in Washington, D.C., such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, and the U.S. Treasury Department to promote macroeconomic stabilization, economic, opening, respect to both trade and investment, and the expansion of market forces within the domestic economies around the world, especially in the developing countries. According to Mark Eric Williams, citing John Williamson, the 10 reforms proposed by the Washington consensus are fiscal discipline, reordering public expenditure priorities, tax reform, liberalization of interest rates, a competitive exchange rate, trade liberalization, liberalization of inward foreign direct investment, privatization, deregulation, and property rights.

¹² David Kerley and Jon Garcia, “Obama to Brazil: ‘Let Us Stand Together as Equal Partners’”, *ABC News*, March 20, 2011, <http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2011/03/obama-to-brazil-let-us-stand-together-as-equal-partners/> (accessed November 6, 2012).

¹³ Williams, *Understanding U.S.-Latin American Relations*, 325.

¹⁴ President Barack Obama and President Dilma Rousseff, “Joint Statement”, April 9, 2012, linked from *Ministério da Defesa Home Page*, at “Pronunciamentos”, https://defesa.gov.br/arquivos/2012/mes04/comunicado_conjunto_obama_dilma_abril_2012.pdf (accessed November 18, 2012).

¹⁵ Peter J. Meyer, *Brazil-U.S. Relations* (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2011), <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33456.pdf> (accessed October 14, 2012), 17.

¹⁶ Pinheiro, *Política Externa Brasileira [Brazilian Foreign Policy] (1889-2002)*.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Meyer, *Brazil-U.S. Relations*, 11. Meyer refers to Antonio Patriota's first speech as Minister of Foreign Relations of Brazil, "[b]uilding on its traditional principles, Brazilian foreign policy under the PT [Workers Party] administrations of Presidents Lula and Rousseff has emphasized three areas of action: (1) reinforcing relations with traditional partners such as its South American neighbors, the United States, and Europe; (2) diversifying relations by forging stronger economic and political ties with other nations of the developing world; and (3) supporting multilateralism by pushing for the democratization of global governance."

¹⁹ Ronaldo Pierre Cavalcanti Lundgren, *A Brazilian Security Strategy*, Strategy Research Project (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, April 2002), 3. "Brazilian national interests are grouped into three categories: vital, important and peripheral. Vital interests are the maintenance of sovereignty; protection of the citizenry; protection of the patrimonial integrity; sustenance of development and social peace. Important interests are perfecting functional democratic institutions; strengthening free trade; consolidation of the South American continent as a zone of peace; and striving for international peace and security. The third category, the peripheral interests, is an increase in Brazil's participation in the international decision making process and the assumption of a significant role in the international issues."

²⁰ Ministry of Defense, *National Strategy of Defense* (Brasília, DF: Ministry of Defense), http://www.defesa.gov.br/projetosweb/estrategia/arquivos/estrategia_defesa_nacional_ingles.pdf (accessed November 25, 2012), 17. Some of the guidelines stated by the Brazilian National Strategy of Defense reflect Brazil's foreign policy of integration and participation in peace operations, "18. To encourage the integration of South America. [...] 19. To prepare the Armed Forces to perform growing responsibilities in peacekeeping operations."

²¹ Ibid, 8. The Brazilian National Strategy of Defense states, "[h]owever, if Brazil is willing to reach its deserved spot in the world, it will have to be prepared to defend itself not only from aggressions, but equally from threats. [...] The national strategy of defense is inseparable from the national strategy of development. The latter drives the former."

²² Hal Brands, "Dilemmas of Brazilian Grand Strategy", Strategic Studies Institute Monograph (Carlisle Barracks, PA: United States Army War College, August 2010), <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/download.cfm?q=1017> (accessed October 14, 2012) v.

²³ Robin Lustig, "Brazil Emerges as A Leading Exponent of 'Soft Power'", *BBC News*, March 23, 2010, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/8580560.stm> (accessed October 10, 2012).

²⁴ Joseph S. Nye, Jr. and David A. Welch, *Understanding Global Conflict and Cooperation: An Introduction to Theory and History*, 8th ed. (New York: Longman, 2009), 330.

²⁵ *Ministério das Relações Exteriores Home Page*.

²⁶ Lawrence T. Brown, *Restoring the "Unwritten Alliance" in Brazil—United States Relations*, Strategy Research Project (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, March 2012), 17.

²⁷ Meyer, *Brazil-U.S. Relations*, 11. Meyer cites Georges D. Landau, "The Decision Making Process in Foreign Policy: The Case of Brazil", *Center for Strategic and International Studies*: Washington, DC: March 2003. "Brazil's foreign policy is a byproduct of the country's unique position as a regional power in Latin America, a leader among developing countries in economic cooperation and collective security efforts, and an emerging world power. Brazilian foreign policy has traditionally been based on the principles of multilateralism, peaceful dispute settlement, and nonintervention in the affairs of other countries."

²⁸ Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *The Future of Power* (New York, NY: Public Affairs, 2011), 176.

²⁹ The Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Relations has a special agency, Agência Brasileira de Cooperação, to manage the hundreds of cooperation projects. All projects are listed at http://www.abc.gov.br/abc_por/webforms/interna.aspx?secao_id=32&Idioma_id=1.

³⁰ *Ministério das Relações Exteriores Home Page*. The G-15 today has 17 members: Argentina, Algeria, Brazil, Chile, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Jamaica, Kenya, Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria, Senegal, Sri Lanka, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe.

³¹ Ron Kirk, "The Great Debate", *Reuters*, March 11, 2011, <http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2011/03/11/moving-doha-forward-the-u-s-view/> (accessed in November 10, 2012). According to Ron Kirk—U.S. Trade Representative— words, "The world has changed since the Doha negotiations began in 2001. To succeed today, WTO trade talks must address the world as it is and as it will be in the coming decades. The remarkable growth of emerging economies like China, India, and Brazil must be reflected in a final Doha outcome."

³² Riordan Roett, *The New Brazil* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 2010), Kindle e-book.

³³ *Ministério das Relações Exteriores Home Page*.

³⁴ Meyer, *Brazil-U.S. Relations*, 13.

³⁵ Hal Brands, "Dilemmas of Brazilian Grand Strategy", 13. According to Brands, "[Brazilian] Military spending increased from \$9.23 billion to \$23.9 billion between 2003 and 2009, permitting major technological upgrades."

³⁶ Nye, Jr. and Welch, *Understanding Global Conflict and Cooperation: An Introduction to Theory and History*, 328.

³⁷ *Ministério das Relações Exteriores Home Page*.

³⁸ Alvaro de Souza Pinheiro, *Knowing Your Partner: The Evolution of Brazilian Special Operations Forces* (MacDill Air Force Base, FL: Joint Special Operations University, Report 12-7, August 2012), 13.

³⁹ Samuel W. Bodman, James D. Wolfensohn, and Julia E. Sweig, *Global Brazil and U.S.-Brazil Relations* (New York, NY: Council of Foreign Relations, Task Force Report No. 66), http://i.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/Brazil_TFR_66.pdf (accessed July 12, 2012), 59. "In 2008, Brazil led the way to form the South American Defense Council as a cooperative security suborganization under Unasul. Unasul serves as an alternative to the OAS and seeks

to provide regional solutions to regional problems. At the same time, Unasul, which adopted a democratic charter in 2010 and is generally more focused on political and social issues than Mercosul, balances the Venezuela-dominated Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América (the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America, or ALBA). Unasul has been most effective at ad hoc mediation, diffusing Ecuador's police uprising and Colombia-Venezuela tensions in 2010."

⁴⁰ Ibid, 57.

⁴¹ *Ministério das Relações Exteriores Home Page*.

⁴² MERCOSUR, "Protocolo de Ushuaia Sobre Compromiso Democrático no Mercosul, Bolívia e Chile", http://www.mercosur.int/innovaportal/file/110/1/1998_protocolo_de_ushuaia-compromiso_democratico_port.pdf (accessed December 7, 2012). The democratic clause allows MERCOSUR's member to apply restrictions and sanctions to a member which breaks the democratic order.

⁴³ U.S. Department of State, *Leading Through Civilian Power: The First Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review* (Washington, DC: Department of State, 2010). Read Executive Summary, <http://www.state.gov/s/dmr/qddr/index.htm> (accessed November 19, 2012), 37. "Cold War blocs have dissolved, international organizations have proliferated, new or more robust regional organizations have emerged, from the European Union to the African Union to the East Asia Summit. Emerging powers increasingly seek to assert influence in global affairs, and virtually every nation has the technological and political means to make its voice heard and its vote count. So too the issues on the international agenda have proliferated and become more deeply interconnected."

⁴⁴ J. Martin Rochester, *U.S. Foreign Policy in the 21st Century* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2008), 100-101.

⁴⁵ U.S. Department of State, *Leading Through Civilian Power: The First Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review*, p. 10. "Never before has the international system itself been as important to our own security and prosperity. Today's threats and opportunities are often global, interconnected, and beyond the power of any one state to resolve. We are therefore working to build a just and sustainable international order that facilitates cooperation. To do so, we are strengthening our traditional alliances and deepening our cooperation with new centers of influence. We are updating and reforming long-standing institutions, working with bilateral, regional, and multilateral partners, and helping to shape new vehicles for global partnership."

⁴⁶ The White House, "National Security Strategy", May 2010, http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf (accessed December 4, 2012), 3.

⁴⁷ U.S. Department of State, *Leading Through Civilian Power: The First Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review*, 19.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Michael Evans, "Power and Paradox: Asian Geopolitics and Sino-American Relations in the 21st Century," *Orbis* 55, no. 1 (Winter 2011), 110.

⁵¹ Leon E. Panetta, "Building Partnership in the 21st Century", June 28, 2012, linked from *U.S. Department of Defense Home Page* at News/Speeches/Dean Acheson Lecture, "Building Partnership in the 21st Century", <http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1691> (accessed December 12, 2012).

⁵² U.S. Department of State, *Leading Through Civilian Power: The First Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review*, 21.

⁵³ *Ibid*, 22.

⁵⁴ U.S. Department of State Home Page, <http://www.state.gov>.

⁵⁵ *Export.Gov Home Page*, <http://export.gov/FTA/index.asp> (accessed January 26, 2013).

⁵⁶ The White House, "National Security Strategy", 4.

⁵⁷ *U.S. Department of State Home Page*.

⁵⁸ *Ibid*.

⁵⁹ *Ibid*. "The Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) is a new multilateral counterterrorism body with 30 founding members (29 countries plus the EU) from around the world. Launched by Secretary Clinton on September 22, 2011, the GCTF is a major initiative within the Obama Administration's broader effort to build the international architecture for dealing with 21st century terrorism."

⁶⁰ U.S. Department of State, *Leading Through Civilian Power: The First Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review*, 34.

⁶¹ *U.S. Department of State Home Page*. According to Department of State the U.S. foreign policy aims "(1) to reduce the entry of illegal drugs into the United States; and (2) to minimize the impact of international crime on the United States and its citizens. Counternarcotics and anticrime programs also complement counterterrorism efforts, both directly and indirectly, by promoting modernization of and supporting operations by foreign criminal justice systems and law enforcement agencies charged with the counter-terrorism mission."

⁶² *Ibid*.

⁶³ U.S. Department of State, *Leading Through Civilian Power: The First Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review*, 149. "The U.S. cannot and should not shoulder the burden of preventing and responding to crisis and conflict on its own. We must work with and help build the capacity of international, regional, and bilateral partners to prevent conflicts from erupting or escalating, and to keep and build the peace in their aftermath."

⁶⁴ *U.S. Department of State Home Page*, <http://www.state.gov/e/enr/index.htm> (accessed November 18, 2012).

⁶⁵ U.S. Department of State, *Leading Through Civilian Power: The First Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review*, 40.

⁶⁶ U.S. Department of State Home Page. "Connect 2022, launched by Columbia's former Minister of Mines and Energy Mauricio Cardenas and Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, is a hemispheric initiative, which establishes a decade-long goal to achieve universal access to electricity through enhanced electrical interconnections, power sector investment, renewable energy development, and cooperation. Connect 2022, endorsed by heads of state in the Summit declaration, supports the Energy and Climate Partnership of the Americas (ECPA), involving all governments of the Western Hemisphere, the private sector, IDB, World Bank, and OAS. It is advanced bilaterally and sub-regionally in North America; Central America with Mexico and Colombia; the Andes with Chile; Brazil and Southern Cone; and the Caribbean."

⁶⁷ President of the United States of America, *Blueprint for a Secure Energy Future* (Washington, DC: The White House, March, 2011), 15.

⁶⁸ U.S. Department of State, *Leading Through Civilian Power: The First Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review*, 85.

⁶⁹ Ibid, 86.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ Ibid, 89.

⁷² E. Richard Downes, "Trust, engagement, and Technology Transfer: Underpinnings for U.S.-Brazil Defense Cooperation", August, 2012, <http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/pdf/StrForum/SF-279.pdf> (accessed November 20, 2012), 2.

⁷³ Luigi R. Einaudi, "Brazil and the United States: The Need for Strategic Engagement", <http://www.ndu.edu/inss/docuploaded/SF%20266%20Einaudi.pdf> (accessed February 11, 2013), 12.

⁷⁴ Vance Stewart, "Is Brazil Actually Ready to be a World Economic Power?", *Center for Strategic Leadership*, Volume 13-11, July (Carlisle Barracks, PA: United States Army War College, 2011), http://www.csl.army.mil/usacsl/publications/IP13_11.pdf (accessed December 12, 2012), 1. "Brazil is providing vital leadership and example to the entire Latin America sphere of influence, as well as the other BRICs and aspiring developing nations."

⁷⁵ Henry G. Anthony, Jr., *Brazil and the U.S.: A Bright Future?*, Strategy Research Project (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, March 1987), 21. Anthony mentioned in his research, in 1987, the suggestion made by Professor Gabriel Marcella, Professor of Third World Studies, United States Army War College, about a possible U.S.-Brazil partnership, "the security of the region results from the recognition of mutual interests both by United States and South America, such as solving the debt crisis, and strengthening fragile democratic governments."

⁷⁶ Downes, "Trust, engagement, and Technology Transfer: Underpinnings for U.S.-Brazil Defense Cooperation", 2.

⁷⁷ Brown, *Restoring the "Unwritten Alliance"*, 18.

⁷⁸ Nye, Jr., *The Future of Power*, xii. “Smart power is the combination of hard power of coercion and payment with soft power of persuasion and attraction.”

⁷⁹ Daniel M. Kliman and Richard Fontaine, “Global Swing States: Brazil, India, Indonesia, Turkey and the Future of International Order”, November 2012, <http://www.gmfus.org/archives/global-swing-states-brazil-india-indonesia-turkey-and-the-future-of-international-order/> (accessed November 28, 2012), 34.

⁸⁰ U.S. Department of State, “Brazil-U.S. Global Partnership Dialogue”, April 16, 2012, linked from *U.S. Department of State Home Page*, <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/04/188116.htm> (accessed November 18, 2012). A joint communiqué on Brazil-U.S. Global Partnership Dialogue stated that dialogue mechanisms are promoting progress in U.S.-Brazil relations.

⁸¹ James K. Rose, “BRIC in the Backyard: Brazil’s Economic Rise and What it Means for the United States”, *Center for Strategic Leadership*, Volume 14-11, July (Carlisle Barracks, PA: United States Army War College, 2011), http://www.csl.army.mil/usacsl/publications/IP14_11.pdf (accessed October 24, 2012), 4.

⁸² Cronin, *Soft Power and Its Impact on U.S. Influence in Latin America*. Cronin writes about this point, “The United States must engage the OAS any and every time it needs to take action in Latin America. Involving the OAS not only provides legitimacy and increases dialog among all members, but provides greater communication and support for the OAS thereby increasing strength to an organization whose very charter currently supports the consolidation of democracies.”

⁸³ U.S. Department of Defense, *Western Hemisphere Defense Policy Statement* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense), <http://www.defense.gov/news/WHDP-English.pdf> (accessed December 12, 2012), 2. “We are also encouraging regional cooperation to enhance security and stability in South America, welcoming efforts by Brazil and partners to establish economic and security mechanisms, such as the South American Defense Council, which help build interdependence and further integrate partner forces.”

⁸⁴ Kliman and Fontaine, “Global Swing States: Brazil, India, Indonesia, Turkey and the Future of International Order”, 53. “Brazilian diplomats will find it extremely difficult to accomplish their major diplomatic goals—a more favorable world trade system, for instance, or Security Council reform—without the cooperation or at least the acquiescence of the United States [...] For the United States, on the other hand, a productive relationship with Brazil will be central to ensuring a smooth passage from unipolarity to multipolarity and maintaining a balance of power that favors democratic norms and institutions.”

⁸⁵ Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy* (New York, NY: Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, 1994), 832.

⁸⁶ Stewart, “Is Brazil Actually Ready to be a World Economic Power?”, 1. “Brazil deserves credit for achieving a vast and diverse industry base across economic sectors. Its 2009 \$2 trillion GDP was balanced between farming and ranching, manufacturing, and service sectors. First, the country’s geography provides proven and numerous mineral deposits, ample oil and natural gas field, rivers for hydroelectric power, as well as enormous forests capable of a sustainable timber industry. It is noteworthy that by 2006, Brazil had achieved oil self-sufficiency. Farming and cattle ranching across its fertile fields and pastures provide 27% of

GDP. Brazil's manufacturing ranges from automobiles, steel and petrochemicals to computers, aircraft, and consumer durables, yielding 27% of GDP. Finally, a sophisticated services industry accounts for the remaining 45% of GDP."

⁸⁷ Lundgren, *A Brazilian Security Strategy*, 17.

⁸⁸ Einaudi, "Brazil and the United States: The Need for Strategic Engagement", 10. According to Ambassador Einaudi, "[a] prerequisite for improved mutual engagement will be changes in perspective on both sides. Mutually beneficial engagement requires the United States to welcome Brazil's emergence as a global power. Brazil is more than a tropical China; it is culturally and politically close to the United States and Europe. Brazil, in turn, needs to realize that the United States accepts its rise. Brazil also needs to recognize that the United States still matters greatly to Brasilia and that more can be achieved working with Washington than against it."

⁸⁹ U.S. Department of Defense, *Western Hemisphere Defense Policy Statement*, 9. "The United States, through its participation at the OAS and through each of our military-to-military engagements, will promote a strong defense system of cooperation that seeks to address the complex challenges of the 21st century. Although the foundations of this system are a series of instruments and agreements, the system itself is a sum of evolving relationships that emphasize collective action and cooperation on defense and security matters. We will work to reform and leverage existing institutions to realize greater efficiencies and unity of purpose in addressing those issues that affect each country in the hemisphere."

⁹⁰ Brands, "Dilemmas of Brazilian Grand Strategy", 10.

⁹¹ U.S. Department of Defense, *Western Hemisphere Defense Policy Statement*, 1.

⁹² *Ibid*, 9. "A thriving biofuels program combined with aggressive offshore drilling has addressed Brazil's internal fuel needs and increased its international economic influence amid concerns about the long-term cost and availability of petroleum supplies, and the exploitation of the offshore Tupi oil field will likely make Brazil a major player in the hydrocarbon market."

⁹³ Cronin, *Soft Power and Its Impact on U.S. Influence in Latin America*. Cronin writes about the potential of U.S. soft power, "Information technology permits and facilitates the distribution of ideas and information at the speed of light. The United States must harness this potential, and while an imprecise political tool, it is one with greater longterm [sic] strategic potential than all the guided munitions in the current U.S. arsenal."

⁹⁴ *Ibid*, 59.

⁹⁵ Nye, Jr., *The Future of Power*, 231.

⁹⁶ Thomas A. Shannon, Jr., "Brazil and the United States: Building a Partnership for the 21st Century", *The Ambassadors REVIEW*, Spring, 2012, 25.

⁹⁷ Kelly Lewis, "U.S. Ambassador to Brazil Brings US-Brazilian Relations to the Forefront of Global Studies", November 21, 2012, *News From the Helm*, <http://www.semesteratsea.org/2012/11/21/u-s-ambassador-to-brazil-brings-us-brazilian-relations-to-the-forefront-of-global-studies/> (accessed November 27, 2012).

⁹⁸ Nye, Jr., *The Future of Power*, 223. “Even though the United States will retain certain demographic, technological, and entrepreneurial advantages, it will have to bargain more often with other countries as equals.”

⁹⁹ Einaudi, “Brazil and the United States: The Need for Strategic Engagement”, 13. Ambassador Einaudi confirms this point of view, “[b]oth the United States and Brazil should actively support inter-American institutions like the OAS that bring both of them together with other countries of the hemisphere.”

¹⁰⁰ *The World Bank Home Page*, <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD> (accessed November 25, 2012).

¹⁰¹ *Office of The United States Representative Home Page*, <http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/colombia-fta/final-text> (accessed December 14, 2012).

¹⁰² Joint Statement by President Obama and President Rousseff, Ministério da Defesa Home Page.

¹⁰³ Pinheiro, *Knowing Your Partner: The Evolution of Brazilian Special Operations Forces*, 15. “The first countries to receive U.S.-Brazilian assistance were the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Haiti, and Saint Kitts and Nevis.”